Equities

  A playable market-neutral opportunity has resurfaced to buy materials at the expense of utilities stocks and in yesterday’s Weekly Report, we outline our top seven reasons why investors should put on this pair trade on a tactical (3-6 month) horizon. As noted in our previous Insight Report, negative sentiment has weighted heavily on the cyclicals/defensives share price ratio and the same is true of the S&P materials/S&P utilities ratio. However, there is increasing pressure on the Chinese to either strike a deal with the U.S. and resolve the trade tussle or put together a comprehensive fiscal package alongside the already easing monetary backdrop in order to aid their decelerating economy. Importantly, the V-shaped recovery in the Li Keqiang index is signaling that the opening of the monetary taps and up-to-now piecemeal fiscal easing are starting to pay dividends. The upshot is that materials have the upper hand versus utilities. Bottom Line: We initiated a new long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade yesterday on a tactical (3-6 month) horizon. Please see our Weekly Report for more details.  

In yesterday’s Weekly Report, we highlighted how tightly inversely correlated negative news surrounding the economic slowdown in China and the cyclical/defensive share price ratio has been. We have further noted that a let up in the former, likely from a deal to defuse the ongoing trade war with the U.S. but also via increased Chinese fiscal and monetary easing, would be a catalyst for U.S. equities. We think most of the negativity in the Chinese economy is priced into the cyclical/defensive share price ratio (bottom panel). Accordingly, we reiterate our preference for cyclicals over defensives to position for a slingshot recovery. With that in mind, yesterday we initiated a new cyclical/defensive pair trade to capitalize upon this theme (please see the next Insight Report).    

Highlights Portfolio Strategy We highlight our top seven reasons of why it pays to initiate a long materials/short utilities pair trade this week. Enticing long-term residential real estate prospects, a vibrant labor market, the recent improvement in house affordability, encouraging industry operating metrics and rock bottom valuations, all signal that a durable advance looms for the S&P homebuilding index. Recent Changes Initiate a long S&P Materials/short S&P Utilities pair trade today on a tactical (3-6 month) horizon.   Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 pierced through the 50-day moving average last week and managed to hold the line above this key technical level. Stocks are still absorbing the December shock, and our sense is that it may take a while before the SPX clears 2,800 where it faced stiff resistance all last year (Chart 1). This is a ripe trading environment. Chart 12,800 Is Stiff Resistance However, in order for a breakout to materialize, we reiterate the three potential positive catalysts we identified last week: A continuation of the earnings juggernaut A positive U.S./China trade resolution A definitively more dovish Fed, which would help restrain the greenback On the earnings front, Charts 2 & 3 update our GICS1 sector EPS growth models with one caveat: due to a lack of data we continue to show telecom services instead of communications services. While most sectors are projected to decelerate following 2018’s fiscal easing-related profit growth boost, the energy sector is the one that clearly stands out. Chart 2Sector EPS Growth... Chart 3...Models Update Last week we highlighted that sell-side analysts are anticipating energy profits to contract in 2019;1 this is in line with our S&P energy EPS growth model that continues to point toward EPS contraction (third panel, Chart 2). Nevertheless, we expect upward surprises in this deep cyclical sector given BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service bullish oil forecast for the year. With regard to the three profit heavyweight sectors, tech, financials and health care, our EPS growth models are more or less in line with the street’s estimates (please refer to Table 2 in last week’s Weekly Report). Tech profits in particular are kissing off the zero growth line according to our regression model (top panel, Chart 3), and we continue to recommend a barbell positioning approach, overweighting the S&P software (high-conviction) and tech hardware, storage & peripherals indexes at the expense of the S&P semiconductors index. As a reminder we are neutral the broad S&P tech sector. Beyond profit growth, looking at our S&P 500 GICS1 sector Valuation Indicator (VI) and Technical Indicator (TI) provides a more complete sector positioning picture. Chart 4 is a valuation versus technical map of the 11 sectors, using our proprietary VI and TI as inputs. The map plots the VI on the y-axis and the TI on the x-axis. Both indicators depict Z-scores (please look forward to our upcoming Cyclical Indicator Update report that will highlight long-term GICS1 sector time series of our VI and TI). The S&P utilities sector is the most stretched and simultaneously very expensive sector. Real estate is just behind utilities and we continue to dislike both of these niche interest rate-sensitive sectors. The S&P consumer discretionary sector also makes it in this top right quadrant and is the most expensive GICS1 sector; we remain underweight this early cyclical sector. On the flip side, energy, materials and financials populate the bottom left quadrant; as a reminder we are overweight all three sectors. The S&P energy sector is the most undervalued and unloved of all GICS1 sectors. Netting it all out, we continue to prefer deep cyclical to defensive sectors as we still see the most opportunity in this tilt on all three fronts: earnings, valuations and technicals. Importantly, most of the bad/negative China slowdown news is likely reflected in the downtrodden cyclical/defensive ratio and a slingshot recovery is looming (China slowdown story count shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 5China Slowdown Baked In The Cake In that light, this week we are initiating a new cyclical/defensive pair trade that is primed to generate alpha, and also update a niche early cyclical group. Buy Materials/Sell Utilities A playable market-neutral opportunity has resurfaced to buy materials at the expense of utilities stocks. Below we outline our top seven reasons why investors should put on this pair trade on a tactical (3-6 month) horizon. Chart 6The Dollar's Trough While global growth is decelerating, this news is last year’s story, especially now that even the IMF came out and downgraded global output growth. This is contrarily positive as cyclical stocks have more than discounted a softer growth outlook. If anything, the surprise this year would be for global growth to pick up momentum on the back of a positive U.S./China trade dispute resolution. The top panel of Chart 6 shows our Global Trade Activity Indicator (GTAI) that is making an effort to trough. Historically, the GTAI has been an excellent leading indicator of the long materials/short utilities price ratio and the current message is that the latter has bottomed. As the Fed is backing off aggressively raising interest rates this year and this has dealt a modest blow to the U.S. dollar. As a reminder, a depreciating greenback is conducive to rising global growth and vice versa. Were the U.S. dollar to complete its reverse head and shoulders technical formation courtesy of a more dovish Fed, this will prove a boon for relative share prices (middle panel, Chart 6). Related to the softening currency is a pickup in commodity price inflation. In fact, already metal prices are outpacing natural gas prices. The latter is the marginal price setter for utilities. This relative pricing power gauge is signaling that the worst is behind this pair trade ratio and a relative profit-led advance is in the offing (bottom panel, Chart 6). While the China slowdown narrative is well telegraphed to the markets (Chart 5), there is increasing pressure on the Chinese to either strike a deal with the U.S. and resolve the trade tussle or put together a comprehensive fiscal package alongside the already easing monetary backdrop in order to aid their decelerating economy. Importantly, the V-shaped recovery in the Li Keqiang index is signaling that the opening of the monetary taps and up-to-now piecemeal fiscal easing are starting to pay dividends. The upshot is that materials have the upper hand versus utilities (Li Keqiang index shown advanced, Chart 7). Chart 7...Chinese Reflation... Domestic conditions are also fertile ground for the relative share price ratio. While the ISM manufacturing survey took a beating last month, the latest release of the Philly Fed manufacturing business outlook ticked higher (both current activity and six-month forecast), reversing last month’s downbeat sentiment reading (Chart 8). BCA’s view remains that there will be no recession in 2019, which underpins materials at the expense of utilities. Chart 8...No U.S. Recession... High-frequency financial market indicators also suggest that the path of least resistance is higher for this cyclicals vs. defensives share price ratio. Inflation expectations have rebounded following an over 50bps collapse late last year, and financial conditions have also started to ease, partially reversing December’s spike (Chart 9). At the margin, materials are an inflation beneficiary/hedge and also investors shed defensive utilities stocks when financial conditions start to ease (junk bond spread shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 9). Finally, our EPS growth models do an excellent job in capturing all these relative macro drivers and underscore that a reversal in bombed out technicals and depressed valuations looms (Chart 10).​​​​​​ Chart 9...Financial Market Indicators... Chart 10...And Compelling Valuations & Technicals Say Buy Materials/Sell Utilities In sum, a softer U.S. dollar, positive global/China growth surprises, commodity price inflation, an easing in financial conditions and no 2019 U.S. recession, all suggest that a relative earnings led advance will unlock excellent relative value and push the materials/utilities ratio higher in the coming months. Bottom Line: Initiate a new long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade today on a tactical (3-6 month) horizon. Will Homebuilders Go Through The Roof? While we were admittedly a bit early in buying homebuilders in late-September, relative share prices have come full circle and are in the black since inception.2 We maintain our overweight stance in this niche consumer discretionary sub index and reiterate our long S&P homebuilding/short S&P home improvement retail pair trade that we initiated last week.3 Domestic long-term housing prospects remain compelling, especially given that the GFC wrung out all the residential real estate excesses. Currently, household formation is still running higher than housing starts and building permits (top panel, Chart 11). Similarly the homeownership ratio remains low by historical standards (it has yet to return to the long-term mean, not shown) and suggests that there is pent up housing demand. Chart 11Robust Long-term Housing Fundamentals Further, housing valuations are not pricey as both the price-to-rent and price-to-income ratios are a far cry from the 2005/06 peak (bottom panel, Chart 11). BCA’s view remains that wages will continue to rise this year and the economy will avoid recession. Historically, a vibrant labor market and residential construction are joined at the hip (unemployment rate and unemployment insurance claims shown inverted, Chart 12). Chart 12Labor Market And Residential Construction Move In Lockstep Tack on the recent fall in the 30-year fixed mortgage rate courtesy of a marginally more dovish Fed, and first-time home buyers will return this spring selling season (second panel, Chart 11). Already there is tentative evidence that potential home-owners have rushed to take advantage of the near 50bps drop in interest rates since the early November peak. The Mortgage Bankers Association's (MBA) mortgage applications purchase survey hit a multi-year high this month and signals that the there is a long runway ahead for the S&P homebuilding share price ratio (bottom panel, Chart 13). Chart 13Buyers Are Coming Back On the homebuilding operating front there are also some encouraging signs. Lumber prices, are down $300/tbf since mid-summer. This wholesale lumber liquidation phase provides profit margin relief to homebuilders given that framing lumber is a key input cost to housing construction (second panel, Chart 14). Chart 14Firming Operating Metrics Importantly, bankers are still willing extenders of residential real estate credit according to the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey. Indeed, mortgage credit is expanding at a healthy clip and there are high odds that this recent pick up in mortgage loan origination will remain upbeat owing to the decrease in the price of credit (third & bottom panels, Chart 14). Finally, sell-side analysts’ exuberance on homebuilding profits has returned to earth and now industry long-term profit growth is trailing the overall market. This significantly lowered profit hurdle coupled with depressed relative valuations suggest that investors seeking early cyclical equity exposure can still park capital in homebuilding stocks (Chart 15). Chart 15Homebuilders Are Still Cheap Adding it all up, enticing long-term residential real estate prospects, a vibrant labor market, the recent improvement in house affordability, encouraging industry operating metrics and rock bottom valuations, all signal that a durable advance looms for the S&P homebuilding index. Bottom Line: Maintain the overweight stance in the S&P homebuilding index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME – PHM, LEN, DHI. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting 2019 Earnings” dated January 22, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Indurated” dated September 24, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting 2019 Earnings” dated January 22, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.     Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Special Report

In a report published early last August, I wrote that: “The perfect time for equity investing is when markets are cheap, earnings expectations are overly pessimistic and the monetary environment is highly accommodative. Currently, the opposite conditions exist: valuations are stretched, earnings expectations are euphoric and the Fed is in tightening mode. It does not seem a propitious time to be aggressive.” By the end of the year, the MSCI All-Country Index had declined by around 12%, with the S&P 500 down by a similar amount. Against that background, valuations improved, earnings expectations moderated and the Fed adopted a less hawkish tone. And, not surprisingly, investors and traders became much less bullish about the outlook, a positive development from a contrary perspective. As a result, BCA’s equity stance was upgraded to overweight from both a 3- and 12-month perspective. With no recession imminent and the Fed likely to raise rates by less than previously feared, we took the view that the path of least resistance for equities was up. There is no requirement at BCA for strategists to agree on the outlook. In fact, the opposite is true in that we encourage independent thinking and diverse ways of looking at the world. I have no strong reasons to disagree with the view that equities will end this year higher, and thus outperform bonds and cash. However, my concerns about the longer-run outlook, coupled with the potential for further late-cycle volatility, temper my comfort with an overweight position. Of course, this merely cements my reputation amongst colleagues as the resident BCA bear! What Troubles Me There rarely is a shortage of economic, financial or political issues to worry about. Even in the best of times, one can always find some problems and potential threats to the outlook. Contrary to my current reputation within BCA, I am not always bearish – I turned more positive on equities in the spring of 2009 and embraced the rally for most of the subsequent decade. However, notwithstanding the potential for equity prices to move higher this year, I perceive three particular challenges to an optimistic view of the outlook: The outlook for U.S. corporate earnings given the likelihood that labor’s share of income will rise from current unusually low levels. The financial markets’ addiction to easy money and low interest rates that may delay the normalization of monetary policy and encourage financial imbalances and excessive risk-taking. The unprecedented rise in U.S. federal deficits at a time of strong economic growth. There will be a price to pay down the road. Notably absent from this list is any mention of trade wars, Brexit, China, U.S. political dysfunction, recession risks and the many other issues that feature in news headlines. I do care about these things, but the three topics mentioned above are enough reason to be concerned, without piling on other problems. The Extraordinary Performance Of U.S. Profits, But… One of the most remarkable features of the past decade’s economic environment has been the impressive performance of U.S. corporate earnings. Despite the weakest economic recovery on record, profit margins have soared to an all-time peak (Chart 1). How on earth did companies manage that? Let’s start by noting what strong earnings growth did NOT reflect. Chart 1An Impressive Margin Performance First, there has not been above-trend growth in top-line revenues. The top panel of Chart 2 shows that S&P 500 sales have grown broadly in line with nominal U.S. corporate GDP over the past two decades. Second, related to the above point, there has not been a great environment for corporate pricing power. The corporate sector inflation rate has averaged a measly 1.2% during the past decade. Third, despite ongoing technological innovations, earnings have not benefited from a revival in productivity growth. Corporate sector productivity has grown at only a moderate 1.1% pace during the past 10 years, far below its historical average (third panel of Chart 2). Chart 2No Major Improvements Here! Finally, one other popular explanation – low interest rates - also can be ruled out as a major driver of the profit cycle. The large decline in interest rates since the Great Recession has clearly benefited some companies, but interest payments as a share of pre-tax profits have not shown much net change in the decade (final panel of Chart 2). In recent years, the lower level of rates has been offset by an increase in outstanding debt. We are left with two major drivers of the rise in margins: lower tax rates and, more importantly, tight control over labor costs. The effective tax rate paid by domestic non-financial companies averaged 21.7% between 2010 and 2017 compared with 26.7% between 2000 and 2007 (Chart 3). And the rate plunged further in 2018 in response to the large cut in the federal corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%. Had the effective tax rate continued to average 26.7% after 2010, after-tax profits of domestic non-financial companies would have grown at a much-reduced pace during the past eight years. Chart 3Corporate Tax Burdens Have Declined We finally come to the main explanation of remarkable earnings growth: the corporate sector’s success in capturing much of the benefits of higher productivity, rather than sharing it with labor. Historically, real employee compensation in the corporate sector rose in line with productivity, allowing both employees and the employers to enjoy the rewards of increased efficiencies. As a result, the shares of income going to capital and labor were among the most mean-reverting series in the economy (Chart 4). Chart 4A Major Divergence in Income Shares Everything changed around 2000 when real compensation began to stagnate, even as productivity continued to rise (Chart 5). Labor’s bargaining power was eroded by the combination of globalization and technological innovations, allowing companies to keep a tight grip on wage costs. The returns to capital soared while those to labor collapsed, with both moving to more than four standard deviations away from historical averages – an extraordinary divergence. If real employee compensation had continued to rise in line with productivity after 2000, then EBITD margins1 would be at their historical mean, rather than at a high extreme. Chart 5Labor Gets Left Behind The corporate sector’s ability to expand at the expense of labor has now come to an end. Wage growth has started to rise against the backdrop of an increasingly tight labor market. As a result, the labor share of income bottomed at the end of 2017 and the capital share peaked. Populist pressures against globalization also argue for an increased labor share.  The payoff to earnings growth from the drop in the corporate tax rate also will end this year. It was a one-off event with no further cuts in prospect. The bottom line is that the major tailwind (weak wage growth) behind strong U.S. earnings has turned into a headwind, while the secondary one (lower taxes) is ending. When it comes to S&P earnings (as opposed to the national income measure of profits), an additional supporting factor has been the decline in outstanding share balances that has boosted earnings per share. Many companies have taken advantage of low interest rates to raise debt and use the proceeds to buy back shares. However, with leverage now high and interest rates off their lows, the incentive for such financial engineering is diminishing. Debt growth has slowed and so should the pace of share buybacks (Chart 6). Chart 6Lots Of Financial Engineering The ever-optimistic analyst community remains unfazed about the above trends. According to IBES data, analysts’ individual company estimates imply long-run earnings growth of more than 16% a year for the S&P 500 universe (Chart 7). That is more than double average historical earnings growth. It was exceeded only by the insane optimism at the peak of the tech bubble in the late 1990s/early 2000, and we know how that ended! There can only be disappointment and an eventual marked downgrading of these earnings expectations. In my view, earnings will be lucky to grow at 3% a year over the long run from current elevated levels. Chart 7Euphoric Long-Run Earnings Estimates Some may argue that these long-term earnings estimates are irrelevant because investors pay them little attention. But there is a loose correlation between valuations and these earnings estimates, and while the price-earnings ratio (PER) has declined from its peak, it remains above its historical average. If long-term earnings estimates come down that should undermine the PER. Perhaps the causality is the other way: high valuations encourage analysts to inflate their earnings projections, but that would not be any more encouraging. Either way, it is a bearish chart. The Addiction To Easy Money The Fed’s gradual retreat from its hyper-easy policy stance was well telegraphed, but still unsettled the markets. That is the problem with addictions – the withdrawal period is always difficult. That has put the Fed in a tricky position as it must balance the need to prevent an overheated economy with the need to maintain financial stability. History suggests that the odds of the Fed getting it just right are slim. Adopting a cautious approach to tightening risks the worst of both worlds: falling behind the curve on inflation while encouraging financial speculation and imbalances. The Fed embraced an extended period of easy policy in the first half of the 2000s after the tech bubble burst, with the fed funds rate kept far below the growth in nominal GDP (Chart 8). If money is unusually cheap, then speculation and financial excesses are inevitable. The easy money period of the 1990s helped fuel the tech bubbles and the more extended period of easy money in the 2000s fueled the housing bubble. Once again, we have interest rates far below the growth in GDP and, not surprisingly, this has fed financial euphoria. Chart 8Monetary Policy Still Looks Accomodative The Fed has raised the federal funds rate by 225 basis points over the past three years, with nine increases of 25 basis points each. Four of the moves occurred in 2018 and have been blamed for financial problems in emerging economies and volatility in developed equity markets. Yet, all the Fed has done is bring the real fed funds rate out of negative territory. If a real funds rate of only 0.5% is enough to trigger extreme market volatility and threaten the economic expansion, then the system is much more vulnerable than generally assumed. There is much discussion in economic circles about the level of the real equilibrium interest rate – the rate consistent with the economy growing at trend, currently estimated to be around 2% a year. In the past, a simple rule of thumb was that real rates, over time, would have some approximation to the real growth in the economy. However, some studies (including by the Fed) argue that the real equilibrium rate may now be close to zero, far below the trend growth of the economy. If real rates close to zero are all that the economy can tolerate then that raises interesting questions. Does it mean that the economy’s growth potential could be much lower than 2%? Does it mean that if real rates have to be kept close to zero, then speculative activities in the markets will continue to build, ultimately threatening financial stability? Either way, it does not seem to be a positive story. Some worry that the Fed is making a mistake in both raising rates and unwinding its bloated balance sheet (aka QT or quantitative tightening). I believe this concern is hugely overstated. Contrary to popular opinion, the expansion in the Fed’s balance sheet did not lead to a surge of liquidity that drove asset prices sharply higher. Of course, the Fed’s bond purchases lowered yields and that forced money into riskier assets. However, there was no increased flood of money in the broader financial system. Quantitative easing (QE) led to a dramatic rise in bank reserves at the Fed, but there was no corresponding sustained surge in M2 – the measure of money supply that is more reflective of money available for economic and/or financial transactions. In other words, the money multiplier (the ratio of M2 to the narrow money) collapsed (Chart 9). This is because the credit system was impaired after the 2007-09 meltdown and the Fed was largely pushing on a string in its attempts to bring it back to life. The main way that Fed policy drove asset prices higher was keeping short rates close to zero because that gave investors a massive reason to take on more risk. Chart 9The Monetary Plumbing Has Blockages If QE was not the driving factor behind the bull market in stocks, then we should not be overly concerned about QT. Yes, investors will be forced to absorb more bond issuance as the Fed ceases to be a buyer. However, it is interesting to note that the current 10-year Treasury yield of 2.7% is no higher than five years ago, even though the Fed’s balance sheet has begun to shrink and the Fed has hiked rates nine times over the period (Chart 10). Chart 10Monetary Policy And Bond Yields The bottom line is that the Fed should continue on its path of reducing its balance sheet and not be timid about raising rates if the economy continues to grow in excess of a 2% pace. At some point there will be another recession and the Fed may well be blamed. But that is a lesser evil than feeding the addiction to easy money by prolonging the period of excessively low rates. Fiscal Profligacy The federal deficit is expected to reach around $1 trillion this year, around 5% of GDP. There is no precedent for such a large peacetime deficit during the late stage of an economic expansion (Chart 11). And, assuming current policies remain in place, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) expects the deficit to rise rather than fall over the next few decades given the aging population’s impact on entitlement programs. Chart 11Fiscal Policy Has Become Pro-Cyclical There is no strong support for fiscal discipline in Congress. Neither party has the stomach to tackle the problem of entitlements, those on the right want more spending on defense, while those on the left want more spending on social programs. One should never be surprised that politicians prefer fiscal profligacy to austerity. It is no fun and is injurious to re-election prospects to advocate spending cuts and tax increases. When things start to get of hand, the burden of imposing fiscal discipline falls on the markets. Currently, markets do not appear fazed by fiscal trends. The 10-year Treasury bond yield remains below 3% and the gap between 30- and 10-year yields is low. If markets are worried about government finances, that gap tends to widen as investors demand a fiscal premium to hold longer-duration bonds (Chart 12). Chart 12Bond Investors Unfazed By The Deficit...For Now Presumably, investor complacency about the grim fiscal picture reflects a list of other more important economic and financial concerns that are suppressing yields. There will be a limit to this fiscal tolerance, but we just don’t know exactly where it is. Japan’s gross government debt has exceeded 200% of GDP throughout the past decade without a financial crisis, but that is a poor model for what the U.S. can manage. Japan does not need to borrow from abroad and thus finances its deficits internally. In contrast, the U.S. current account deficit is still running at around $500 billion a year and the country is, by far, the world’s largest international debtor. Yes, the dollar is the international reserve currency of choice and the U.S. receives the exorbitant privilege from that. However, that will not protect the U.S. currency or markets from an eventual loss of investor confidence. I accept that a fiscal-related bond/currency market crisis could be years away, and timing is everything! Nonetheless, the current lack of fiscal discipline does pose a threat to markets because it could limit the authorities’ room to enact stimulus in the next recession. How I Could Be Wrong I have strong convictions about the views I expressed, but that does not mean I will be proved right. Let’s examine some counter arguments. On earnings, my pessimism will be unfounded if the corporate sector manages to keep a tight grip on wages and/or there is a sustained marked improvement in productivity. Of course, we need to exclude subdued wages that arise because of an economic slowdown as that would undermine sales growth. It would be remarkable if the nascent upturn in wage growth suddenly reverses without a renewed rise in unemployment so I would put low odds on that. As far as productivity is concerned, there are lots of interesting innovations these days, but none seem to be game changers within a five-year horizon. Autonomous vehicles will certainly be huge for several sectors but widespread adoption is still some time away. However, it is important to keep an open mind on this and I will certainly change my view if the data improve meaningfully. Turning to monetary policy, I suppose it is possible that the Fed will miraculously calibrate policy to achieve a soft economic landing and maintain financial stability. They have never been able to do this in the past but there is a first time for everything. Needless to say, I am hugely skeptical but time will tell. Finally, on fiscal policy, you would have to be an extreme optimist to believe that politicians will suddenly enact the politically painful measures required to restore order to government finances. The current Administration has shown no signs of fiscal responsibility and the opposition have not raised this as an issue. If anything, there are calls for even more spending. History shows that governments generally skirt to the edge of a severe crisis before they reluctantly embrace austerity. In other words, I do not see much case to be optimistic here. Concluding Thoughts On average, the stock market is more likely to rise than fall. Since 1950, the S&P has recorded monthly gains 60% of the time. In other words, it generally has paid to be bullish. This was particularly true between end-1982 and end-2018 with the S&P 500 delivering above-average compound annual returns of around 11% a year (8% a year in real terms), despite two 50%+ market declines during the period. This was the greatest 36-year period for financial assets in history, driven by falling inflation and interest rates, major corporate restructuring that boosted profit margins, rising equity multiples and a huge expansion in credit growth. Looking ahead, the environment will be very different. Inflation and interest rates are more likely to rise than fall, profit margins will be under pressure, it would imprudent to expect sustained gains in multiples, and broad credit growth will not return to its earlier rapid pace. Thus, future returns will be a pale shadow of the past performance. Against the above background, I don’t think I am being overly pessimistic. However, I understand that many investors do not have the luxury of taking a long-term view. For those who are in a competition to beat their peers, it can be disastrous to stand on the sidelines while the market marches higher. Moreover, if returns are going to be modest by past standards, it puts a premium on market timing, as difficult as that may be. So I do not recommend ignoring the BCA view that equities will outperform bonds and cash this year. My concerns are for the long run. The obvious question is: how should one invest in a world of low returns? I doubt that piling into alternative investments will be the solution as these assets will be affected by the same macro forces as conventional assets. The answer is a rather boring and obvious one. In the absence of being a market-timing and stock/sector-selection genius or investing with such a person, capital preservation has become more important. When returns are low, it takes longer to recover from market losses. This means one should maintain a conservative portfolio bias with higher-than-normal levels of cash.   Martin H. Barnes, Senior Vice President Economic Advisor mbarnes@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 EBITD = earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation. This measure best reflects the performance of earnings as it relates to output, wages, prices and productivity.

Highlights We believe 2019 and 2020 will be a tale of two markets; … : The latter stages of the long post-crisis party may be rewarding, but the inflection points that will herald a bear market and a recession are not too far off. … the first will be broadly favorable for investors in risk assets, … : The combination of ample monetary accommodation and the indiscriminate fourth-quarter markdown in risk assets provides the springboard for one last advance. … but the second will mark the end of the post-crisis bull market, … : Nothing lasts forever, and we wouldn’t be overweight risk assets at this stage were it not for last quarter’s selloff. … as the Fed pulls the plug on the expansion: Our base-case scenario does not call for a deep or lengthy recession, but once Fed policy transits from accommodative to restrictive, the going will become much rougher for stocks, corporate bonds and the economy. Feature We spent the week of January 14th meeting with clients in South Africa. It is always good to exchange views with investors, especially when they are at a distant remove from the echo chamber which inevitably colors our perspective, no matter how much we try to resist it. It was also a pleasure to swap a week of winter at home for summer abroad, where our clients’ golf talk helped boil our views down to a simple analogy. We see the next twelve to twenty-four months as a double-breaker putt. 2019-20’s Double Breaker The undulating terrain of some golf-course greens sets up putts that break one way and then the other on their path to the hole. That is the way we view the next twelve-plus months, following the fourth quarter’s sharp, sudden tightening in financial conditions (Chart 1). The selloff pulled hard on the financial-condition reins, checking some of the pressure on the economy to overheat, and allowing the Fed to pause its rate-hiking campaign. Relieved investors immediately bid stocks higher, and corporate-bond spreads tighter, retracing nearly half of the tightening in financial conditions, but we expect the Fed to remain on the sidelines until June anyway. Chart 1A Swift Tightening In Financial Conditions A Fed pause delays the date when monetary policy will turn restrictive by a few months. We see the monetary policy inflection point as the key event presaging all of the inflection points that matter most to investors: the transition from an equity bull market to a bear market; the point at which credit performance deteriorates, and spreads widen, in earnest; and the transition from expansion to recession. The delay, and the lower entry points provided by the selloff, set the stage for a last hurrah in risk assets over the next six to nine months. With the Fed in the background, investors will be able to focus on the above-trend growth driven by the remaining fiscal thrust (Chart 2) and what we expect will be better calendar 2019 S&P 500 earnings than investors currently anticipate. Chart 2Fiscal Fuel Will Keep 2019 Growth Above Trend Better-than-expected conditions will ultimately prove to be self-limiting, however. The more momentum the economy gathers while the Fed is on hold, the more budding inflation pressures will become evident. The more that inflation pressures reveal themselves, the more forcefully the Fed will have to act to counter them. The upshot for investors is that the last burst of the good times will necessarily bring forth a slowdown, and they therefore confront a putt that will break twice over the next year or two: equities and spread product will outperform Treasuries and cash over the first stretch, but underperform over the next.1 Inflation Pressure Our oft-repeated view that the fiscal stimulus will promote inflation pressures is not at all controversial. Force-feeding stimulus into an economy already operating at capacity should lead to inflation. Businesses and other investors, recognizing that the above-trend boost in aggregate demand is temporary and unsustainable, will not expand capacity to meet it. Imports may relieve some of the pressure, but prices should nonetheless rise as aggregate demand exceeds aggregate supply. Inflation pressures emanating from the labor market provoke much more pushback. Investors, tired of hearing that a pickup in wages is right around the corner, harbor considerable doubts about the Phillips Curve, which posits that there is an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and wage growth. We acknowledge that the 1960s belief in a mechanical tradeoff between inflation and unemployment – policymakers could have lower inflation if they were willing to tolerate higher unemployment, or lower unemployment if they were willing to tolerate higher inflation – was shattered by the stagflation of the 1970s. We further acknowledge that the relationship between unemployment and compensation is not linear. We continue to believe, however, that the laws of supply and demand apply, and that the relationship between compensation and unemployment has been slow to assert itself this time around because the Phillips Curve is kinked. That is to say that the sensitivity of wage growth to a drop in unemployment is a function of the level of the unemployment rate itself. A decline in unemployment from 10% to 9%, 9% to 8%, or 8% to 7% does not exert upward pressure on wages because there are many more qualified candidates than there are openings at such elevated unemployment rates (Chart 3, top panel). When the unemployment rate is 5% or less, on the other hand, wages do respond to unemployment declines because the lack of labor market slack ensures that employers have to compete to attract qualified candidates (Chart 3, bottom panel). Estimates of the United States’ natural rate of unemployment in recent years have typically hovered around 5%. Over the 50-plus years covered by the average hourly earnings (AHE) series, real AHE growth has tended to peak (Chart 4, bottom panel) following unemployment’s sub-natural-rate trough (Chart 4, top panel). It has not yet reached an elevated level, but wages did begin accelerating sharply a year after the unemployment gap turned negative in early 2017. With the unemployment rate on track to continue to fall throughout 2019 (it only takes about 110,000 net new jobs a month to hold it in place), we expect that real AHE growth has further to run. Chart 4Don't Count Dr. Phillips Out Just Yet Taking the analysis a step further to consider real wage growth relative to productivity growth exhibits an even stronger link with the unemployment gap. From the early ‘70s through 2001, when productivity and real wages grew at the same rate (Chart 5, middle panel), real wages fell behind productivity when the unemployment gap was positive and caught up when it was negative (Chart 5, bottom panel). Capital has seized a disproportionate share of the gains in productivity since 2002, with the real-wages-to-productivity ratio able to stabilize only when the unemployment gap turned negative from 2006 to 2008. Chart 5Productivity-Adjusted Real Wages Rise When Unemployment Bottoms We expect that the coming cyclical trough in the unemployment gap will be consistent with past troughs, which have been associated with cyclical peaks in compensation gains. The linkage between compensation and consumer prices isn’t firmly established, but investors don’t have to sweat it. As long as the Fed perceives a connection, which it clearly does, it can be counted upon to respond to higher wages by tightening policy. A swift recovery in oil prices – our Commodity & Energy Strategy service sees Brent crude averaging $80/barrel, and WTI averaging $74, across 2019 – will also help keep the Fed’s attention squarely focused on price stability after ten years of full-employment fixation. Bottom Line: Unnecessary fiscal stimulus will continue to exert upward pressure on prices, while an extremely tight labor market will place steady upward pressure on wages. The Fed will respond by removing accommodation, pushing the fed funds rate above the neutral level, and bringing down the curtain on the record-long expansion sometime in 2020. Upgrading Corporate Bonds We noted two weeks ago that the spread-widening in high-yield corporate bonds was extreme, and that overweighting spread product would mesh well with our renewed equity overweight. Our U.S. Bond Strategy colleagues have since upgraded credit,2 and we are following their lead. We now recommend that investors overweight equities, underweight fixed income and equal-weight cash. Within fixed income, we recommend that investors significantly underweight Treasuries while overweighting both investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds. Consistent with our above-consensus inflation expectations, we prefer TIPs to nominal Treasuries. We harbor no illusions that a new credit cycle has begun. It is late in an already lengthy cycle, and we view the projected near-term decline in high-yield default rates as a final unwind of the default spike that accompanied the shale-drilling rout in 2016 (Chart 6). We do not expect a recession in 2019, but the next one is likely not too far off, and defaults begin to pick up well ahead of a recession. Our spread-product upgrade is an opportunistic short-term move, not a change in our cyclical view. Chart 6A New Credit Cycle Has Not Begun High-yield spreads widened so much in the fourth quarter, relative to their history, that their capital-gain prospects have flipped. We had been at equal weight, anticipating an eventual move to underweight, because spreads were unusually tight. The capital-gain stretch of the cycle was long gone, and excess returns over Treasuries were limited to coupon spreads that were likely to be eroded by capital losses as spreads widened ahead of an approaching recession. The lurch in spreads from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in double-B, B and triple-C bonds (Chart 7) restores potential capital gains as a cushion that should protect the coupon spread against unanticipated economic weakness. Chart 7Irrational Gloom The Fed’s newly conciliatory stance should support spread product just as it should support equities. All three monetary-policy elements of our bond strategists’ peak-spread checklist are issuing the all-clear signal: twelve-month fed funds rate hike projections have collapsed (Chart 8, second panel), gold has revived (Chart 8, third panel), and the dollar’s relentless upward march has finally been halted (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 8Monetary Policy Argues For Lower Spreads ... The jury is still out on the global-growth elements of our bond team’s peak-spread checklist. Our China Investment Strategy service’s Market-Based China Growth Indicator looks spry3 (Chart 9, third panel), and industrial mining stocks may be in the midst of bottoming (Chart 9, bottom panel), but the CRB raw industrials index is still scuffling (Chart 9, second panel). A blowout in spreads accompanied by a less-hawkish Fed and rebounding global growth would be a no-brainer reason to own spread product, but two out of three ain’t bad, and spreads would not have blown out in the first place if global growth were poised to surge. The biggest threat to our constructive economic and market views is a slowdown in China, and its uncertain direction is a risk to overweighting credit. On balance, though, we believe the current level of option- and default-adjusted spreads adequately compensate credit investors over the next three to six months, especially after factoring in the Fed’s benign turn. Chart 9... But The Jury's Still Out On Global Growth Bottom Line: We are upgrading spread product to take advantage of its fourth-quarter selloff and a Fed pause that may last until June, despite uncertainty around the global growth outlook.   Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 The wise men and women gathered at the Barron’s annual roundtable foresee a similar setup, but with the direction reversed. They expect markets and the U.S. economy to encounter rough going in the first half of 2019 before conditions become more hospitable in the second half and in 2020, ahead of the next election. “Goodbye to Gloom,” Rublin, Lauren R., Barron’s, January 14, 2019, pp. 21-34. 2 Please see the January 15, 2019 U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy Corporate Credit,” available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the November 21, 2018 China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Trade Is Not China’s Only Problem,” available at cis.bcaresearch.com.