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Highlights Markets have gone too far in pricing out the Republican's market-friendly policy agenda. The President desperately needs a win ahead of mid-term elections. A bill that at least cuts taxes should be forming by year end. The risk is that continued political turbulence, now including the possibility of impeachment, distracts Congress and delays or completely derails tax reform plans. Fortunately for the major global equity markets, corporate profits are providing solid support. We expect U.S. EPS growth to accelerate further into year end, peaking at just under 20%. The projected profit acceleration is even more impressive in the Eurozone and Japan. Corporations are still in a sweet spot in which the top line is growing but there is no major wage cost pressure evident yet. U.S. EPS growth is well ahead of both Japan and the Eurozone at the moment, but we expect some "catch up" by year end that will favor the latter two bourses in local currency terms. EPS growth will fall short of bottom-up estimates for 2017, but what is more important for equity indexes is the direction of 12-month forward EPS expectations, which remain in an uptrend. The positive earnings backdrop means that stocks will outperform bonds for the remainder of the year even if Congress fails to pass any market-friendly legislation. The FOMC is "looking through" the recent soft economic data and slower inflation, and remains on track to deliver two more rate hikes this year. The impact of the Fed's balance sheet runoff on the Treasury market will be limited by several factors, but a shrinking balance sheet and Fed rate hikes will force bond yields to rise faster than is currently discounted. Policy divergence will push the dollar higher. The traditional relationship between the euro/USD and short-term yield differentials should re-establish following the French election. The euro could reach parity before the next move is done. "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Chinese growth has slowed but the authorities are easing policy, which will stabilize growth and support base metals. That said, we remain more upbeat on oil prices than base metals. Feature Investors have soured on the prospects for U.S. tax reform in recent weeks, but the latest travails in Washington inflicted only fleeting damage on U.S. and global bourses. The S&P 500 appears to have broken above the 2400 technical barrier as we go to press. Market expectations for a more tepid Fed rate hike cycle, lower Treasury yields and related dollar softness undoubtedly provided some support. But, more importantly, corporate profits are positively surprising in the major economies and this is not just an energy story. The good news on company earnings should continue to drive stock prices higher this year in absolute terms and relative to bond prices. It is a tougher call on the dollar and the direction of bond yields. We remain short duration and long the dollar, but much depends on the evolution of U.S. core inflation and fiscal policy. A Death Knell For U.S. Tax Reform? Chart I-1 highlights that the market now sees almost a zero chance that the Republicans will ever be able to deliver any meaningful tax cuts or infrastructure spending. Many believe that mushrooming political scandals encumbering President Trump will distract the GOP and delay or derail tax reform. Indeed, impeachment proceedings would be a major distraction, although this outcome would not necessarily lead to an equity bear market. The historical record shows that the economy is much more important than politics for financial markets. BCA's geopolitical strategists looked at three presidential impeachments, covering the Teapot Dome Scandal (April 1922 to October 1927), Watergate (February 1973 to August 1974) and the President Clinton's Lewinsky Affair (January 1998 to February 1999).1 Watergate was the only episode that coincided with a bear market, but it is difficult to pin the market downturn on Nixon's impeachment since the U.S. economy entered one of the worst post-war recessions in 1973 that was driven by tight Fed policy and an oil shock. Impeachment would require that Trump loses support among the Republican base, which so far has not happened. The President still commands the support of 84% of Republican voters (Chart I-2). Investors should monitor this support level as an indicator of the President's political capital and the risk of impeachment. Chart I-1Fading Hopes For Tax Reform We believe that markets have gone too far in pricing out Trump's market-friendly policy agenda. The President desperately needs a win ahead of mid-term elections, and tax reform and deregulation are two key areas where the President and congressional Republicans see eye to eye. The odds are good that an agreement to cut taxes will be formed by year end. Congressional leaders want tax reform to be revenue neutral, but finding sufficient areas to cut spending will be extremely difficult. They may simply require that tax cuts are paid for in a 10-year window. This makes it possible to lower taxes upfront and promise non-specific spending cuts and revenue raising measures down the road. Or, Congress may pass tax reform that is not revenue neutral through the reconciliation process, which would require that tax cuts sunset at some point in the future. Tax cuts would give stocks a temporary boost either way but, as we discuss below, it may be better for corporate profits in the medium term if Congress fails to deliver any fiscal stimulus. Profits, Beats And Misses While economists fret over the soft U.S. economic data so far this year, profit growth is quietly accelerating in the background (Chart I-3). On a 4-quarter moving total basis, S&P 500 earnings-per-share were up by more than 13% in the first quarter (84% reporting). We expect growth to accelerate further into year end, peaking at about 18%, before moderating in 2018. Profit growth is accelerating outside of the energy sector. The projected acceleration in EPS growth is equally impressive in the Eurozone and Japan. The favorable profit picture in the major economies reflects two key factors. First, profits are rebounding from a poor showing in 2015/16, when EPS was dragged down by the collapse in oil prices and a global manufacturing recession. Oil prices have since rebounded and global industrial production is recovering as expected (Chart I-4). Our short-term forecasting models for real GDP, based on a mixture of hard data and surveys, continue to flag a pickup in economic growth in the major economies (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Top-Down Profit Projection Chart I-4EPS Highly Correlated With Industrial Production Chart I-5GDP Growth Poised To Accelerate The U.S. model's forecast paints an overly rosy picture, but it does support our view that Q1 softness in the hard data reflected temporary factors that will give way to a robust rebound in the second and third quarters. The Eurozone economy is really humming at the moment, as highlighted by our model and recent readings from the IFO and purchasing managers' surveys. Indeed, these indicators are consistent with real GDP growth of nearly 3%! Our GDP models are also constructive for Japan and the U.K., although not nearly as robust as in the U.S. and Eurozone. Chart I-6Profit Margins On The Rise Second, the corporate sectors in the major economies are still in a sweet spot in which the top line is growing but there is no major wage cost pressure evident yet. This is the case even in the U.S., where labor market slack has largely been absorbed. Indeed, margins rose in Q1 2017 for the third quarter in a row (Chart I-6). Our indicators suggest that the corporate sector has gained some pricing power at a time when wage gains are taking a breather.2 The hiatus of wage pressure may not last long, and we expect the "mean reversion" in profit margins to resume next year. But for now, our short-term EPS growth model remains upbeat for the next 3-6 months (not shown). Profit margins are also on the rise in Japan and the Eurozone. Margins in the latter appear to have the most upside potential of the three major markets, given the fact that current levels are still depressed by historical standards, and that there remains plenty of slack in the European labor market. We are not incorporating any margin expansion in Japan because they are already very high. Nonetheless, we do not expect any "mean reversion" in margins over the next year either, because the business sector is going to great lengths to avoid any increase in the wage bill despite an extremely tight labor market. U.S. EPS growth is well ahead of both Japan and the Eurozone at the moment, but we expect some "catch up" by year end: The U.S. is further ahead in the global profit mini recovery and year-ago EPS comparisons will become more difficult by the end of the year. The drag on corporate profits in 2017 from previous dollar strength will be larger than the currency drag in the Eurozone according to our models, assuming no change in trade-weighted exchange rates in the forecast period (Chart I-7). The pass-through of past yen movements will be a net boost to EPS growth for Japanese companies this year.3 Currency shifts would favor the Japanese and the Eurozone markets versus the U.S. even more if the dollar experiences another upleg. We expect the dollar to appreciate by 10% in trade-weighted terms. A 10% broad-based dollar appreciation would trim EPS growth by 2½ percentage points, although most of this would occur in 2018 due to lags (Chart I-8). Eurozone and Japanese EPS growth would receive a lift of 2 and ½ percentage points, respectively, as their currencies depreciate versus the dollar. Chart I-7Currency Impact On EPS Growth Chart I-8A 10% Dollar Rise Would Trim Profits Finally, the fact that profits in Japan and the Eurozone are more leveraged to overall economic growth than in the U.S. gives the former two markets the edge as global industrial production continues to recover this year and into 2018. Japanese and Eurozone equity market indexes also have a higher beta with respect to the global equity index. The implication is that we remain overweight these two markets relative to the U.S. on a currency hedged basis. Lofty Expectations Even though the message from our EPS models is upbeat, our forecasts still fall short of bottom-up estimates for 2017. Is this a risk for the equity market, especially in the U.S. where valuations are stretched? Investors are well aware that bottom-up estimates are perennially optimistic. Table I-1 compares the beginning-of-year EPS growth estimate with the actual end-of-year outcome for 2007-2016. Not surprisingly, bottom-up analysts massively missed the mark in the recession. But even outside of 2008, analysts significantly over-estimated earnings in seven out of nine years. Despite this, the S&P 500 rose sharply in most cases. One exception was 2015, when the S&P 500 fell by 0.7%. Plunging oil and material prices contributed to an EPS growth "miss" of seven percentage points. Chart I-9 highlights that the level of the 12-month forward EPS estimate fell that year, unlike in the other years since the Great Recession. Valuations are more demanding today than in the past, but the message is that attaining bottom-up EPS year-end estimates is less important for the broad market than the trend in 12-month forward estimates (which remains up at the moment). Chart I-9S&P 500 Follows ##br##12-month Forward EPS The bottom line is that the backdrop is constructive for equities even if the Republicans are unable to push through any fiscal stimulus. In fact, it may be better for the stock market in the medium term if the GOP fails to pass any meaningful legislation. The U.S. economy does not need any demand stimulus at the moment (although measures to boost the supply side of the economy would help lift profits over the long term). The current long-in-the-tooth U.S. expansion is likely to stretch further in the absence of stimulus, extending the moderate growth/low inflation/low interest rate backdrop that has been positive for risk assets in recent years. The Fed's Balance Sheet: It's Diet Time The minutes from the May FOMC meeting reiterated that policymakers plan to begin scaling back on reinvesting the proceeds of its maturing securities of Treasurys and MBS by the end of the year. The Fed is leaning toward a gradual tapering of reinvestment in order to avoid shocking the bond market. Still, investors are rightly concerned about the potential impact of the balance sheet runoff, especially given that memories of the 2013 "taper tantrum" are still fresh. Chart I-10 presents a forecast for the flow of Treasurys available to the private sector, taking into consideration the supply that is absorbed by foreign official institutions and by the Fed. The bottom panel shows a similar calculation for the aggregate supply of government bonds from the U.S., Japan, the Eurozone and the U.K. While the supply of Treasurys has been positive since 2012, the net flow has been negative for these four economies as a whole because of aggressive quantitative easing programs. This year will see the largest contraction in the supply of government bonds available to the private sector, at US$800 billion. The flow will become less negative in 2018 even if the Fed were to keep its balance sheet unchanged (mostly due to assumed ECB tapering). If the Fed goes ahead with its balance sheet reduction plan, the net supply of government bonds from the major economies will move slightly into positive territory for the first time since 2014. There is disagreement among academics about whether quantitative easing (QE) directly depressed bond yields by restricting the supply of high-quality fixed income assets, or whether the impact on yields was solely via the "signaling effect" for the path of future short rates. Either way, balance sheet runoff will likely have some impact on bond yields. A good starting point is to employ an empirical estimate of the impact of QE. The IMF has modeled long-term Treasury yields based on a number of economic and financial variables and the stock of assets held by the Fed as a share of GDP. Just for exposition purposes, let us take an extreme example and assume that the Fed simply terminates all re-investment as of January 2018 (i.e. the runoff is not tapered). In this case, the amount of bank reserves held at the Fed would likely evaporate by 2021. This represents a contraction of roughly 10 percentage points of GDP (Chart I-11). Applying the IMF interest rate model's coefficient of -0.09, it implies that long-term Treasury yields and mortgage rates would rise by 90 basis points from the "portfolio balance" effect alone. Chart I-11Fed Balance Sheet Runoff Scenario However, it is more complicated than that. The impact on yields is likely to be tempered by two factors: The balance sheet may never fully revert to historic norms relative to GDP. Some academic experts are recommending that the Fed maintain a fairly large balance sheet by historical standards because of the need in financial markets for short-term, risk-free assets that would diminish if there are fewer excess bank reserves available. Banks, for example, are required by regulators to hold more high-quality assets than they did in the pre-Lehman years. As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions to tighten too quickly. Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. It is difficult to estimate how it will shake out, but a recent report from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City estimated that a $675 billion reduction in the size of the Fed's balance sheet is equivalent to a 25 basis point increase in the fed funds rate (although the authors admit that the confidence band around this estimate is extremely wide).4 We expect that the impact of runoff alone will be much less than the 90 basis point estimate discussed above. Still, the combination of balance sheet shrinkage and Fed rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. Fed Outlook: Mostly About Inflation The May FOMC minutes confirmed that the FOMC is "looking through" the soft economic data in the first quarter, chalking it up to temporary factors such as shifts in inventories. They are also inclined to believe that the moderation in core CPI inflation in recent months is temporary. The message is that policymakers remain on track to deliver two more rate hikes this year, in line with the 'dot plot' forecast. The market is pricing almost a 100% chance of a June rate hike. However, less than two full rate hikes are expected over the next year, which is far too benign in our view. Investors have been quick to conclude that recent economic data have convinced Fed officials to shift from a "gradual" pace of rate hikes to a "glacial" pace. Treasurys rallied on this shift in Fed expectations and a decline in long-term inflation expectations. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has dropped to about 1.8%, the lowest level since before the U.S. election. This appears to us that the bond market over-reacted to the drop in core CPI inflation from 2.2% in February to 1.9% in April. The evolution of actual inflation will be critical to the outlook for the Fed and Treasury yields in the coming months. Our U.S. fixed-income strategists have simulated a traditional Phillips Curve model of inflation (Chart I-12).5 The model projects that core PCE inflation will reach 2.1% by December, even assuming no change in the unemployment rate or the trade-weighted dollar. Inflation ends the year not far below the 2% target even in an alternative scenario in which we assume that the dollar appreciates and that the full-employment level of unemployment is lower than the Fed currently assumes. Chart I-12U.S. Inflation Should End Year At 2% Thus, the trend in inflation should reinforce the FOMC's bias to keep tightening policy, forcing the bond market to reassess the pace of rate hikes discounted in the curve. That said, if we are wrong and inflation does not trend higher in the next 3-4 months, then it is the FOMC that will be forced to reassess and our short duration recommendation will probably not pan out on a six month horizon. Longer-term, last month's Special Report highlighted that we have reached an inflection point in some of the structural forces that have depressed bond yields. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 20, builds on that theme with a look at the impact of technological progress on equilibrium bond yields. With respect to credit spreads, the state of nonfinancial corporate sector balance sheets and the overall stance of monetary policy will continue to be the main drivers of the credit cycle. If unwinding the balance sheet leads to a premature tightening of financial conditions, then the Fed will proceed more slowly on rate hikes. The crucial indicator to watch is core PCE inflation. Credit spreads will remain fairly well contained until core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target. At that point, the pace of monetary normalization will ramp up, putting spreads at risk of widening. Stay overweight corporate bonds within fixed income portfolios for now. While the Fed's balance sheet reduction by itself may not have a big impact on the dollar, we still believe the currency has more upside because of the divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) on the other. The BoJ will hold the 10-year JGB near to zero for quite some time. The ECB will also not be in a position to tighten policy for an extended period, outside of removing negative short rates and tapering QE purchases a bit further in 2018. The euro has appreciated versus the dollar even as two-year real interest rate differentials have moved in favor of the dollar since the end of March. This divergence probably reflects euro short-covering following the market-friendly French election outcome. Next up are the two rounds of French legislative elections in June. Polls support the view that Macron's En Marche and the center-right Les Republicains will capture the vast majority of seats in the legislature. Such an election outcome would make possible the passage of genuine structural reforms that would suppress wage growth and make French exports more competitive. Investors may be shocked into pricing greater odds of Euro Area dissolution when Italy comes back into focus. In the meantime, we do not see any risk factors emanating from the Eurozone that could upset the global equity applecart in the near term. Moreover, the traditional relationship between the euro/USD exchange rate and 2-year real yield differentials should now re-establish. The implication is that the euro could reach parity before the next move is done. Dr. Copper? The recent setback in the commodity pits has added to investor angst regarding global growth momentum. The LMEX base metals index is up almost 25% on a year-ago basis, but has fallen by 5% since February (Chart I-13). From their respective peaks earlier this year, zinc and copper are down about 7-10%, nickel has dropped by 18% and iron ore has lost almost half of its value. Is the venerable "Dr. Copper" sending an important warning about world growth? Chart I-13What Are Commodities Telling Us? Some of our global leading economic indicators have edged lower this year, as we have discussed in previous reports. Nonetheless, the decline in base metals prices likely has more to do with other factors, such as an unwinding of the surge in speculative demand that immediately followed the U.S. election last autumn. Speculators may be disappointed by the lack of progress on Republican promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending. The main story for base metals demand and prices, however, is the Chinese real estate sector. China accounts for roughly 50% of world consumption for each of the major metals. The Chinese authorities are trying to cool the property market and transition to a more consumer spending-oriented economy, thereby reducing the dependence on exports, capital spending and real estate as growth drivers. Fiscal policy tightened last year and new regulations were introduced to limit housing speculation. The effect of policy tightening can be seen in our Credit and Fiscal Spending Impulse indicator, which has been softening since mid-2016 (Chart I-14). The economy held up well last year, but the policy adjustment resulted in a peaking of the PMI at year-end. Growth in housing starts also appears to be rolling over. Both the PMI and housing starts are correlated with commodity prices. The good news is that BCA's China Investment Strategy service does not expect a major downshift in Chinese real GDP growth this year, which means that commodity import demand should rebound: The authorities wish to slow credit growth, but there is no incentive for the authorities to crunch the economy given that consumer price inflation is still low and the surge in producer price inflation appears to have peaked. Monetary conditions have tightened a little in recent months, but overall conditions are not restrictive. Both direct fiscal spending and infrastructure investment have picked up noticeably this year (Chart I-15). Finally, the PBoC re-started its Medium-Term Lending Facility and recently made the largest one-day cash injection into the financial system in nearly four months. Chart I-14China Is The Main Story ##br##For Base Metals Demand Chart I-15Direct Fiscal Spending And ##br##Infrastructure Have Picked Up Recently Export growth will continue to accelerate based on our model (not shown). The upturn in the profit cycle and firming output prices should boost capital spending. Robust demand will ensure that housing construction will continue to grow at a healthy pace. Households' home-buying intentions jumped to an all-time high last quarter. Tighter housing policies in major cities will prevent a massive boom, but this will not short-circuit the recovery in housing construction. Fading fears about a China meltdown may give commodities a lift later this year. Our commodity strategists are particularly positive on crude oil, as extended production cuts from OPEC and Russia outweigh the impact of surging shale production, allowing bloated inventories to moderate. In contrast, the backdrop is fairly benign for base metals. Our commodity strategists do not see the conditions for a major bull or bear phase on a 6-12 month horizon. Within commodity portfolios, they recommend a benchmark allocation to base metals, an underweight in agricultural products and an overweight in oil. From a broader perspective, our key message is that "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Investment Conclusions: Accelerating corporate profit growth in the major advanced economies provides a healthy tailwind and suggests that stocks could perform well under a couple of different scenarios in the second half of 2017. If the rebound in U.S. economic growth from the poor first quarter is unimpressive and it appears that Congress will be sidetracked by political turmoil in the White House, then the S&P 500 should benefit from the 'goldilocks' combination of healthy profit growth, low bond yields, an accommodative Fed and a soft dollar. If, instead, U.S. growth rebounds strongly and Congress makes progress on the broad outline of a tax reform bill over the summer months, then stocks should benefit from the prospect of stronger growth in 2018. Rising bond yields and a firmer dollar would provide some offset for stocks, but would not derail the equity bull market as long as inflation remains below the Fed's target. Our model suggests that U.S. inflation will remain below-target for the next several months, but could be near 2% by year end. This scenario would set the stage for a more aggressive Fed in 2018, a surge in the dollar and possibly a bear market in risk assets next year. We are therefore comfortable in predicting that the stock-to-bond total return ratio will continue to rise for at least the remainder of this year. The tough part relates to bond yields and the dollar, since the above two scenarios have very different implications for these two asset classes. Our base case is closer to the second scenario, such that we remain below benchmark in duration and long the dollar. That said, much depends on the evolution of U.S. core inflation and U.S. politics. Both are particularly difficult to forecast. A failure for core PCE inflation to pick up in the next 3-4 months and/or continuing political scandals in Washington would force us to reconsider our asset allocation. Of course, there are other risks to consider, including growing mercantilism in the U.S., Sino-American tensions and North Korea. At the top of the list are China and Italy. (1) China China remains our geopolitical strategists' top pick as the catalyst most likely to scuttle our upbeat view on global risk assets in 2017.6 Our base case assumption is that policymakers will not enact wide-scale financial sector reform, which would entail a surge in realized non-performing loans and bankruptcies and defaults, ahead of the Fall Party Congress. The regulatory crackdown so far seems merely to keep the financial sector in check for a while. The government has already stepped back somewhat in the face of the liquidity squeeze, and fiscal policy has been loosened (as mentioned above). All of the key Communist Party statements have emphasized that stability remains a priority. Nonetheless, it may be difficult for the authorities to manage the deleveraging process given nose-bleed levels of private-sector leverage. Politicians could misjudge the fragility of the financial system and investors might front-run the reform process, sending asset prices down well in advance of policy implementation. (2) Italy We have flagged the next Italian election as a key risk for markets because of polls showing that voters have become disillusioned with the euro. It appeared that an election would not take place until 2018, and we have downplayed European elections as a risk factor for 2017. However, the 5-Star Movement has now backed a proportional electoral system, which raises the chances of an autumn election in Italy. This would obviously spark turbulence in financial markets in the months leading up to the event. Turning to emerging markets, the pickup in global growth and a modest bounce in commodity prices would support this asset class. However, our view that the dollar is headed higher on the back of Fed rate hikes keeps us from getting too excited about EM stocks, bonds or currencies. Our other recommendations include the following: Within global government bond portfolios, overweight JGBs and underweight Treasurys. Gilts and core Eurozone bonds are at benchmark. Underweight the periphery of Europe. Overweight European and Japanese equities versus the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. Overweight the dollar versus the other major currencies. Overweight small caps stocks versus large in the U.S. market. Stay exposed to oil-related assets, and favor oil to base metals within commodity portfolios. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 31, 2017 Next Report: June 29, 2017 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Overview," April 017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Currency shifts affect earnings with a lag, which in captured by our models. 4 Forecasting the Stance of Monetary Policy Under Balance Sheet Adjustments. The Macro Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Troy Davig and A. Lee Smith. May 10, 2017. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers," dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets ," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com II. Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds? This month's Special Report was written by Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist for BCA's Global Investment Strategy Service. The report is a companion piece to last month's Special Report, which argued that some of the structural factors that have depressed global interest rates are at an inflection point. These factors include demographic trends and the integration of China's massive labor supply into the global economy. Peter's report focuses on technology's impact on bond yields. He presents the non-consensus view that slow productivity growth likely depresses interest rates at the outset, but will lead to higher rates later on. Not only could sluggish productivity growth lead to higher inflation, it could also deplete national savings. Both factors would be bond bearish, reinforcing the other factors discussed in last month's Special Report. I trust that you will find the report as insightful and educational as I did. Mark McClellan Productivity growth has declined in most countries. This appears to be a structural problem that will remain with us for years to come. In theory, slower productivity growth should reduce the neutral rate of interest, benefiting bonds in the process. In reality, countries with chronically low productivity growth typically have higher interest rates than faster growing economies. The passage of time helps account for this seeming paradox: Slower productivity growth tends to depress interest rates at the outset, but leads to higher rates later on. The U.S. has reached an inflection point where weak productivity growth is starting to push up both the neutral real rate and inflation. Other countries will follow. The implication for investors is that government bond yields have begun a long-term secular uptrend. The market is not at all prepared for this. Slow Productivity Growth: A Structural Problem Productivity growth has fallen sharply in most developed and emerging economies (Chart II-1). As we argued in "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," there is little compelling evidence that measurement error explains the productivity slowdown.1 Yes, the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, indoor plumbing, and air conditioning. No one has offered a convincing explanation for why the well-known problems with productivity calculations suddenly worsened about 12 years ago. If mismeasurement is not responsible for the productivity slowdown, what is? Cyclical factors have undoubtedly played a role. In particular, lackluster investment spending has curtailed the growth in the capital stock (Chart II-2). This means that today's workers have not benefited from the improvement in the quality and quantity of capital to the same extent as previous generations. Chart II-2The Great Recession Hit ##br##Capital Stock Accumulation However, the timing of the productivity slowdown - it began in 2004-05 in most countries, well before the financial crisis struck - suggests that structural factors have been key. These include: Waning gains from the IT revolution. Recent innovations have focused more on consumers than businesses. As nice as Facebook and Instagram are, they do little to boost business productivity - in fact, they probably detract from it, given how much time people waste on social media these days. The rising share of value added coming from software relative to hardware has also contributed to the decline in productivity growth. Chart II-3 shows that productivity gains in the latter category have been much smaller than in the former. Slower human capital accumulation. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the pace it did in the 1990s (Chart II-4). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores in mathematics and science, is edging lower in the OECD, and is showing very limited gains in most emerging markets (Chart II-5). Test scores tend to be much lower in countries with rapidly growing populations (Chart II-6). Consequently, the average level of global mathematical proficiency is now declining for the first time in modern history. Chart II-3The Shift Towards Software ##br##Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains Decreased creative destruction. The birth rate of new firms in the U.S. has fallen by half since the late 1970s and is now barely above the death rate (Chart II-7). In addition, many firms in advanced economies are failing to replicate the best practices of industry leaders. The OECD reckons that this has been a key reason for the productivity slowdown.2 Chart II-7Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Productivity Growth And Interest Rates Investors typically assume that long-term interest rates will converge to nominal GDP growth. All things equal, this implies that faster productivity growth should lead to higher interest rates. Most economic models share this assumption - they predict that an acceleration in productivity growth will raise the rate of return on capital and incentivize households to save less in anticipation of faster income gains.3 Both factors should cause interest rates to rise. The problem is that these theories do not accord with the data. Chart II-8 shows that interest rates are far higher in regions such as Africa and Latin America, which have historically suffered from chronically weak productivity growth. In contrast, rates are lower in regions such as East Asia, which have experienced rapid productivity growth. One sees the same negative correlation between interest rates and productivity growth over time in developed economies. In the U.S., for example, interest rates rose rapidly during the 1970s, a decade when productivity growth fell sharply (Chart II-9). Chart II-9U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The ##br##1970s While Productivity Swooned Two Reasons Why Slower Productivity Growth May Lead To Higher Interest Rates There are two main reasons why slower productivity growth may lead to higher nominal interest rates over time: Slower productivity growth may eventually lead to higher inflation; Slower productivity growth may deplete national savings, thereby raising the neutral real rate of interest. We discuss each reason in turn. Reason #1: Slower Productivity Growth May Fuel Inflation Most economists agree that chronically weak productivity growth tends to be associated with higher inflation. Even Janet Yellen acknowledged as much, noting in a 2005 speech that "the evidence suggests that the predominant medium-term effect of a slowdown in trend productivity growth would likely be higher inflation."4 In theory, the causation between productivity and inflation can run in either direction: Weak productivity gains can fuel inflation while high inflation can, in turn, undermine growth. With respect to the latter, economists have focused on three channels: First, higher inflation may make it difficult for firms to distinguish between relative and absolute price shocks, leading to suboptimal resource allocation. Second, higher inflation may stymie capital accumulation because investors typically pay capital gains taxes even when the increase in asset values is entirely due to inflation. Third, high inflation may cause households and firms to waste time and effort on economizing their cash holdings. There are also several ways in which slower productivity growth can lead to higher inflation. For example, sluggish productivity growth may increase the likelihood that a country will be forced to inflate its way out of any debt problems. In addition, central banks may fail to recognize structural declines in productivity growth in real time, leading them to keep interest rates too low in the errant belief that weak GDP growth is due to inadequate demand when, in fact, it is due to insufficient supply. There is strong evidence that this happened in the U.S. in the 1970s. Chart II-10 shows that the Fed consistently overestimated the size of the output gap during that period. Chart II-10The Fed Continuously Overstated The ##br##Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s Reason #2: Slower Productivity Growth May Deplete National Savings, Leading To A Higher Neutral Real Rate Imagine that you have a career where your real income is projected to grow by 2% per year, but then something auspicious happens that leads you to revise your expected annual income growth to 20%. How do you react? If you are like most people, your initial inclination might be to celebrate by purchasing a new car or treating yourself to a lavish vacation. As such, your saving rate is likely to fall at the outset. However, as the income gains pile up, you might find yourself running out of stuff to buy, resulting in a higher saving rate. This is particularly likely to be true if you grew up poor and have not yet acquired a taste for conspicuous consumption. Now consider the opposite case: One where you realize that your income will slowly contract over time as your skills become increasingly obsolete. The logic above suggests that your immediate reaction will be to hunker down and spend less - in other words, your saving rate will rise. However, as time goes by and the roof needs to be changed and the kids sent off to college, you may find it hard to pay the bills - your saving rate will then fall. The same reasoning applies to economy-wide productivity growth. When productivity growth increases, household savings are likely to decline as consumers spend more in anticipation of higher incomes. Meanwhile, investment is likely to rise as firms move swiftly to expand capacity to meet rising demand for their products. The combination of falling savings and rising investment will cause real rates to increase. As time goes by, however, it may become increasingly difficult for the economy to generate enough incremental demand to keep up with rising productive capacity. At that point, real rates will begin falling. The historic evidence is consistent with the notion that higher productivity growth causes savings to fall at the outset, but rise later on. Chart II-11 shows that East Asian economies all had rapid growth rates before they had high saving rates. China is a particularly telling example. Chinese productivity growth took off in the early 1990s. Inflation accelerated over the subsequent years, while the country flirted with current account deficits - both telltale signs of excess demand. It was not until a decade later that the saving rate took off, pushing the current account into a large surplus, even though investment was also rising at the time (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, ##br##Followed By Higher Savings Chart II-12China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, ##br##Then Savings Rate Took Off Today, Chinese deposit rates are near rock-bottom levels, and yet the household sector continues to save like crazy. This will change over time. The working-age population has peaked (Chart II-13). As millions of Chinese workers retire and begin to dissave, aggregate household savings will fall. Meanwhile, Chinese youth today have no direct memory of the hardships that their parents endured. As happened in Korea and Japan, the flowering of a consumer culture will help bring down the saving rate. Meanwhile, sluggish income growth in the developed world will make it difficult for households to save much. Population aging will only exacerbate this effect. As my colleague Mark McClellan pointed out in last month's edition of the Bank Credit Analyst, elderly people in advanced economies consume more than any other age cohort once government spending for medical care on their behalf is taken into account (Chart II-14).5 Our estimates suggest that population aging will reduce the household saving rate by five percentage points in the U.S. over the next 15 years (Chart II-15). The saving rate could fall as much as ten points in Germany, leading to the evaporation of the country's mighty current account surplus. As saving rates around the world begin to fall, real interest rates will rise. Chart II-13China's Very High Rate Of National Savings ##br##Will Face Pressure From Demographics Chart II-15Aging Will Reduce ##br##Aggregate Savings The Two Reasons Reinforce Each Other The discussion above has focused on two reasons why chronically low productivity growth could lead to higher interest rates: 1) weak productivity growth could fuel inflation; and 2) weak productivity growth could deplete national savings, leading to higher real rates. There is an important synergy between these two reasons. Suppose, for example, that weak productivity growth does eventually raise the neutral real rate. Since central banks cannot measure the neutral rate directly and monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, it is possible that actual rates will end up below the neutral rate. This would cause the economy to overheat, resulting in higher inflation. Thus, if the first reason proves to be true, it is more likely that the second reason will prove to be true as well. The Technological Wildcard So far, we have discussed productivity growth in very generic terms - as basically anything that raises output-per-hour. In reality, the source of productivity gains can have a strong bearing on interest rates. Economists describe innovations that raise the demand for labor relative to capital goods as being "capital saving." Paul David and Gavin Wright have argued that the widespread adoption of electrically-powered processes in the early 20th century serves as "a textbook illustration of capital-saving technological growth."6 They note that "Electrification saved fixed capital by eliminating heavy shafts and belting, a change that also allowed factory buildings themselves to be more lightly constructed." In contrast, recent technological innovations have tended to be more of the "labor saving" than "capital saving" variety. Robotics and AI come to mind, but so do more mundane advances such as containerization. Marc Levinson has contended that the widespread adoption of "The Box" in the 1970s completely revolutionized international trade. Nowadays, huge cranes move containers off ships and place them onto waiting trucks or trains. Thus, the days when thousands of longshoremen toiled in the great ports of Baltimore and Long Beach are gone.7 If technological progress is driven by labor-saving innovations, real wages will tend to grow more slowly than overall productivity (Chart II-16). In fact, if technological change is sufficiently biased in favour of capital (i.e., if it is extremely "labor saving"), real wages may actually decline in absolute terms (Chart II-17). Owners of capital tend to be wealthier than workers. Since richer people save more of their income than poorer people, the shift in income towards the former will depress aggregate demand (Chart II-18). This will result in a lower neutral rate. Chart II-16U.S.: Real Wages Have Been ##br##Lagging Productivity Gains Chart II-18Savings Heavily Skewed ##br##Towards Top Earners It is difficult to know if the forces described above will dissipate over time. Productivity growth is largely a function of technological change. We like to think that we are living in an era of unprecedented technological upheavals, but if productivity growth has slowed, it is likely that the pace of technological innovation has also diminished. If so, the impact that technological change is having on such things as the distribution of income and global savings - and by extension on interest rates - could become more muted. To use an analogy, the music might remain the same, but the volume from the speakers could still drop. Capital In A Knowledge-Based Economy Chart II-19Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed ##br##Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Labor-saving technological change has not been the only force pushing down interest rates. Modern economies are transitioning away from producing goods towards producing knowledge. Companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon have thrived without having to undertake massive amounts of capital spending. This has left them with billions of dollars in cash on their balance sheets. The price of capital goods has also tumbled over the past three decades, allowing companies to cut their capex budgets (Chart II-19). In addition, technological advances have facilitated the emergence of "winner-take-all" industries where scale and network effects allow just a few companies to rule the roost (Chart II-20). Such market structures exacerbate inequality by shifting income into the hands of a few successful entrepreneurs and business executives. As noted above, this leads to higher aggregate savings. Market structures of this sort could also lead to less aggregate investment because low profitability tends to constrain capital spending by second- or third-tier firms, while the worry that expanding capacity will erode profit margins tends to constrain spending by winning companies. The combination of higher savings and decreased investment results in a lower neutral rate. As with labor-saving technological change, it is difficult to know how these forces will evolve over time. The growth of winner-take-all industries has benefited greatly from globalization. Globalization, however, may be running out of steam. Tariffs are already extremely low in most countries, while the gains from further breaking down the global supply chain are reaching diminishing returns (Chart II-21). Perhaps more importantly, political pressures for greater income distribution, trade protectionism, and stronger anti-trust measures are likely to intensify. If that happens, it may be enough to reverse some of the downward pressure on the neutral rate. Chart II-21The Low-Hanging Fruits Of ##br##Globalization Have Been Picked Investment Conclusions Is slow productivity growth good or bad for bonds? The answer is both: Slow productivity growth is likely to depress interest rates at the outset, but is liable to lead to higher rates later on. The U.S. has likely reached the inflection point where slow productivity is going from being a boon to a bane for bonds. Chart II-22 shows that the U.S. output gap would be over 8% of GDP had potential GDP grown at the pace the IMF projected back in 2008. Instead, it is close to zero and will likely turn negative if growth remains over 2% over the next few quarters. Other countries are likely to follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Chart II-22Output Gap Has Narrowed ##br##Thanks To Lower Potential Growth To be clear, productivity is just one of several factors affecting interest rates - demographics, globalization, and political decisions being others. However, as we argued in our latest Strategy Outlook, these forces are also shifting in a more inflationary direction.8 As such, fixed-income investors with long-term horizons should pare back duration risk and increase allocations to inflation-linked securities. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal,"The Best versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence across Firms and the Role of Public Policy," OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 5 (November 2016). 3 Consider the widely-used Solow growth model. The model says that the neutral real rate, r, is equal to (a/s) (n + g + d), where a is the capital share of income, s is the saving rate, n is labor force growth, g is total factor productivity growth, and d is the depreciation rate of capital. All things equal, an increase in g will result in a higher equilibrium real interest rate. The same is true in the Ramsey model, which goes a step further and endogenizes the saving rate within a fully specified utility-maximization framework. In this model, consumption growth is pinned down by the so-called Euler equation. Assuming that utility can be described by a constant relative risk aversion utility function, the Euler equation states that consumption will grow at (r-d)/h where d is the rate at which households discount future consumption and h is a measure of the degree to which households want to smooth consumption over time. In a steady state, consumption increases at the same rate as GDP, n+g. Rearranging the terms yields: r=(n+g)h+d. Notice that both models provide a mechanism by which a higher g can decrease r. In the Solow model, this comes from thinking about the saving rate not as an exogenous variable, but as something that can be influenced by the growth rate of the economy. In particular, if s rises in response to a higher g, r could fall. Likewise, in the Ramsey model, a higher g could make households more willing to forgo consumption today in return for higher consumption tomorrow (equivalent to a decrease in the rate of time preference, d). This, too, would translate into a lower neutral rate. 4 Janet L. Yellen, "The U.S. Economic Outlook," Presentation to the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, February 11, 2005. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds," April 28, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Paul A. David, and Gavin Wright,"General Purpose Technologies And Surges In Productivity: Historical Reflections On the Future Of The ICT Revolution," January 2012. 7 Marc Levinson, "The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger," Princeton University Press, 2006. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The breakout in the S&P 500 above 2400 in May has further stretched valuation metrics. Measures such as the Shiller P/E and price/book are elevated relative to past equity cycles. The price/sales ratio is in a steep rise too. However, our U.S. Composite valuation metric, which takes into consideration 11 different measures of value, is still a little below the one sigma level that marks significant overvaluation. This is because our composite indicator includes valuation measures that take into account the low level of interest rates. Of course, these measures will not look as favorable when rates finally rise. Technically, the U.S. equity market has upward momentum. Our Equity Monetary Indicator has remained around the zero line, meaning that it is not particularly bullish or bearish at the moment. Our Speculation Index is high, pointing to froth in the market. The high level of our Composite Sentiment Index and low level of the VIX speaks to the level of investor complacency. The U.S. net revisions ratio jumped higher this month, and it is bullish that the earnings surprise index advanced again. Our U.S. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator continues to send a positive message for the S&P 500, although it is now so elevated that it suggests that there could be little "dry powder" left to buy the market. This indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. The widening gap between the U.S. WTP and that of Japan and Europe highlights that recent flows have favored the U.S. market relative to the other two. Looking forward, this means that there is more "dry powder" available to buy the Japanese and European markets. A rise in the WTPs for these two markets in the coming months would signal that a rotation into Europe and Japan is taking place. It is disconcerting that our Europe WTP suffered a pull-back over the past month. Nonetheless, we believe that accelerating corporate profit growth in the major advanced economies provides a strong tailwind and suggests that stocks remain in a window in which they will outperform bonds. U.S. bond valuation is hovering close to fair value. However, we believe that fair value itself is moving higher as we have reached an inflection point in some of the structural forces that have depressed bond yields. We also believe that the combination of Fed balance sheet shrinkage and rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. Technically, our composite indicator has touched the zero line, clearing the way for the next leg of the bond bear market. The dollar is very expensive on a PPP basis, although it is less so by other measures. Technically, the dollar has shifted down this year, crossing the 200-day moving average. That said, according to our dollar technical indicator, overbought conditions have been totally worked off, suggesting that the currency is clear to move higher if Fed rate expectations shift up as we expect. Moreover, we believe that policy divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and BoJ on the other will push the dollar higher. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Highlights Geopolitical risks remain overstated in 2017, but China and Italy could scuttle the party; June elections in France and the U.K. are not market-movers; But early Italian election is a risk that could prompt the ECB to stay easy, close long EUR/USD for a gain; U.S. budget reconciliation process may be arcane, but is vital to understand upcoming tax reform process; Investors should expect details of tax reform by Q4 2017, but legislation may only pass in Q1 2018. Feature We turned the traditional adage of "sell in May and go away" on its head last month in a report titled "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!"1 So far so good (Chart 1). The fundamental reasons behind the breakout is the narrowing of the global equity risk premium on the back of easy monetary policy and a recovering global economy (Chart 2) two trends that our colleagues at the Global Alpha Sector Strategy highlighted last September.2 Since then, geopolitical risks cited as likely to end the party have been largely overstated.3 We continue to worry about Chinese financial sector reforms, U.S. politics, Sino-American tensions, signs of growing U.S. mercantilism, prospects of early Italian elections, and especially the developments in North Korea. But these remain risks for 2018, rather than 2017.4 Chart 1Blow-Off Phase Has Resumed Chart 2Global ERP Has Room To Fall There are still some "loose ends" to tie up from the first quarter, including the upcoming French legislative and U.K. general elections. On the former, there is nothing to say other than that investors should indeed prepare for a "French Revolution," by which we mean a supply-side revolution.5 Current seat projections based on the latest polling have pro-market, centrist, Europhile parties controlling between 85-92% of the National Assembly following the two-round elections in mid-June (Diagram 1).6 Diagram 1French National Assembly Seat Projection Yes. In France. Skeptical commentary will surely rain on the centrist parade by pointing out that anti-establishment presidential candidates won nearly 50% of the vote in the first round of the presidential election (true), that Marine Le Pen will be back even stronger in 2020 (false), or that the electoral system is designed to suppress the populist vote (yes, so what?). We are not as perceptive nor profound as the witty op-ed writers. Our far simpler conclusion is that the French National Assembly will elucidate the revealed preference of the French electorate, given the electoral rules that are quite familiar to all French voters. And that preference appears to be for pro-market, and quite possibly painful, structural reforms. We remain long French industrials relative to German ones, but our clients may find alternative ways to play the upcoming free-market revolution in France. On the British front, Tory PM Theresa May is facing her first genuine crisis. The impact of the Manchester terrorist attack on the election is difficult to forecast. However, May's "dementia tax" gaffe has clearly given Labour new life in the polls (Chart 3). What most commentators saw as a clear shoo-in for the Conservative Party has now become a competitive, if not exactly tight, race. Chart 3Labour Gains... Chart 4...But Tories Keep Devouring UKIP We would note that despite Labour's rise in the polls, May's strategy of suppressing the UKIP vote by campaigning from the nationalist right is paying off. As Chart 4 illustrates, UKIP voters appear to be switching to the Tories en masse: UKIP has gone from support of 20% in April 2016 to under 5% today. Given Britain's first-past-the-post electoral system, May's strategy of swallowing the UKIP whole is a savvy move. It will eliminate the probability that UKIP siphons votes away from the Tories in competitive constituencies. Our own, highly conservative, estimate gives the Tories a minimum of 11 gained seats (Table 1). This is based on constituencies that voted for Brexit but where Labour and the Liberal Democrats won by less than 5% in the last election. Table 1Minimal Scenario Gives Tories 11 New Seats For Their Majority We do not think that the election will have much impact on the Brexit process. Political risks peaked in January when May announced that she planned to take the U.K. out of the EU Common Market. We pointed out at the time that this decision made it highly unlikely that the U.K. and EU negotiations would take an acrimonious turn.7 The market agreed with us, with the pound bottoming in mid-January. We continue to believe that the Brexit process will have no investment relevance for global assets. As for U.K. equities and the pound, a larger-than-expected seat grab by the Tories (375+) at the upcoming election would likely strengthen the pound further, which in turn could weigh on the FTSE 100 (with the FTSE 250 being less affected). A disappointing result, one where the Conservative Party fails to reach 350 seats, could create temporary headwinds for the pound. The one risk that remains on our horizon is faster-than-expected deleveraging in China. As we mentioned in our report last week, China's financial crackdown raises near-term risks (Chart 5).8 We do not think that policymakers are looking to enact wide scale financial sector reform, which would entail a surge in realized non-performing loans, bankruptcies, and defaults ahead of the Fall Party Congress. However, Chinese investors and businesses may already be looking ahead to 2018. Chart 5Policymakers Are Inducing Financial Risk... Chart 6...At A Time When Vulnerability Is Growing China's reserves-to-M2 ratio - an IMF-proposed measure that captures Chinese reserves of liquid assets against those that its residents could potentially liquefy as part of wide scale capital flight - has continued to decline (Chart 6). Measures of quarterly net portfolio flows and capital flight show that the Q4 2016 outflows accelerated sharply after a slowdown in outflows in the previous two quarters (Chart 7), although we have no information for Q1 2017. More recently, there has been a stunning surge in Bitcoin prices. The crypto-currency is up 65% since the start of May, which cannot be attributed to Euro Area fears given the victory of Europhile Emmanuel Macron in the French election. Could it be related to policy uncertainty in China? We think yes (Chart 8). China remains our pick for the risk that is most likely to scuttle our sanguine view on global risk assets in 2017. Chart 7Chinese Outflows Restarted In Q4 2016 Chart 8Chinese Uncertainty Is Bitcoin's Gain The final risk to investors that we have been tracking this year is inaction by U.S. Congress on the tax reform front. We have received many client questions regarding when investors should expect to see tax reform legislation and when (and how) it is expected to pass. We turn to this question in the rest of this report. Market Relevance Of The Budget Reconciliation Process The U.S. legislative process is complicated, arcane, and highly mutable. We have tried to spare our clients as much of the headache of U.S. congressional procedure as possible.9 However, the budget reconciliation process underpins current efforts to reform both the 2010 Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) and enact tax reform. To understand how, when, and whether the GOP-controlled Congress will pass these pieces of legislation, it is necessary for investors to learn the basics of the reconciliation process in particular, and the budget process more broadly. Budget reconciliation - or simply, reconciliation - simplifies the process of passing a budget and was introduced by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.10 To understand why reconciliation matters, we first have to explain how the U.S. Congress sets the budget. The U.S. Budget Process The U.S. budget process (Diagram 2) begins with the U.S. president submitting the White House budget request to Congress. This is a largely ceremonial act as Congress has the power over the appropriations process. Diagram 2U.S. Budget Process: A Tentative Timeline Congress takes into account the president's request as it formulates a budget resolution, which both houses of Congress pass but which is not presented to the president and does not actually constitute law. The resolution sets out the guidelines for the budget process, which is supposed to ultimately produce an appropriations bill. It is this bill, also referred to as a budget bill, which appropriates funding for the various federal government departments, agencies, and programs. Under a revised timetable in effect since 1987, the annual budget resolution is supposed to be adopted by both chambers of Congress by April 15, giving legislators sufficient time to then pass a budget bill by the start of the fiscal year on October 1. However, there is no obligation to do so. In fact, Congress failed to pass a budget resolution for most of President Obama's two terms in office due to a high degree of polarization between the Democrats and Republicans. As such, the government was funded via "continuing resolutions," which merely extended pre-existing appropriations at the same levels as the previous fiscal year. Reconciliation Process Where does the reconciliation process fit? It was originally introduced to simplify the process of changing the law on the books in order to bring revenue and spending levels into line with the budget resolution. The crucial feature of the process, and the reason we are focusing so much on it, is that it limits the debate in the Senate to 20 hours, thus automatically preventing any Senator from filibustering the ultimate legislation that emerges from the reconciliation process. No filibuster, no need to reach 60 Senate votes to invoke cloture, an act that ends the debate in the chamber. In the current context, where the Republican Party controls 52 seats, this means that the Republicans can use the reconciliation process to pass legislation that would otherwise be "filibustered" in the Senate. The reconciliation procedure is a very powerful legislative tool by which Congress can pass controversial legislation, as long as such legislation has an impact on government revenues or spending levels. Tax legislation, obviously, would impact government revenues. George W. Bush used the reconciliation procedure to lower taxes in 2001 and 2003. His father, George H. W. Bush used reconciliation to raise taxes in 1990 (and thus roll back some of the Ronald Reagan 1986 tax reform). The 1996 welfare reform - the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 - was also passed via the reconciliation process. Obamacare was not passed via the reconciliation procedure. The main portion of the bill - including almost all of its key provisions - was passed at the beginning of the 111th Congress in 2009 when the Democrats held 58 seats in the Senate following the momentous 2008 election.11 It was the subsequent amendments to the original bill that required the reconciliation process due to the death of Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy, particularly several crucial funding provisions. The one unifying feature of all reconciliation bills is that they must have an impact on the budget, essentially by changing the revenue or spending levels of the federal government. If the bill introduces extraneous provisions that deviate from the budgetary requirement, then these can be struck out by invoking the so-called "Byrd rule." Waiving the Byrd rule requires an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Senate, which is 60 votes. As such, it essentially requires the 60-seat majority needed to also invoke cloture, making the entire reconciliation process redundant. Bottom Line: The budget reconciliation process allows U.S. Congress to pass legislation without the a 60-seat Senate majority. However, procedural rules require the provisions of a reconciliation bill to deal exclusively with legislation that impact government revenue or spending levels. Timing Since the introduction of the procedure in 1974, there have been 24 reconciliation bills, three of which were vetoed by the president. The reconciliation process begins with the passing of the budget resolution, which sets out the "reconciliation instructions." However, since the procedure was introduced, it has rarely progressed along the intended timeline. The very first reconciliation act in 1980 was introduced in a budget resolution that passed well after the April 15 deadline, in mid-June. And the ultimate appropriations bill, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, was only signed into law in early December 1980, so essentially two months after the start of FY1981 on October 1. Investors should therefore understand that the U.S. budget process has no real firm deadlines. The schedule is highly malleable. A reconciliation bill also does not have to be passed with the actual budget. Despite being initiated by the budget resolution, reconciliation runs parallel to the budget process. For example, Congress has already set appropriations for FY2017, but the reconciliation bill on Obamacare - set by the FY2017 budget resolution - is still in negotiations. Diagram 3 illustrates that half of all reconciliation bills were passed after the start of the fiscal year for which they were introduced in a budget resolution. And five reconciliation bills were passed in the calendar year of the fiscal year for which they were supposed to reconcile the budget, basically mid way through the fiscal year. Diagram 3Timing Of Reconciliation Procedures This is important in the current context because investors are waiting for tax reform legislation which is supposed to be passed via the budget reconciliation process for FY2018. However, the GOP-controlled Congress has not even finished the budget process for FY2017. In fact, the budget resolution for FY2017 only passed the House on January 13, 2017. As we learned above, U.S. budget process guidelines call for the budget resolution to have been passed by April 15, 2016. As such, the Obamacare repeal and replace bill, if it were to ultimately pass the Senate, would certainly be the most delayed reconciliation bill ever. In fact, we could see the current Congress passing the FY2017 reconciliation bill in the waning days of FY2017! Congressional rules only allow one budget resolution to be active at any one time. In fact, as soon as a new budget resolution is passed, the old reconciliation instructions are made void. As such, investors have to wait for the Republicans to decide what they plan to do with the Obamacare reconciliation bill before they begin contemplating tax reform. Bottom Line: Republicans in Congress decided to issue reconciliation instructions as part of the FY2017 budget resolution, which passed in January. As such, investors have to wait until that process ends - with either Obamacare repeal or failure of the bill - before Congress can produce a FY2018 budget resolution with reconciliation instructions for tax reform. We suspect that the FY2018 budget resolution will be passed sometime between the end of the August Congressional recess, on September 5, and December. But that is just a guess (Diagram 4). It could happen earlier, in July, if Obamacare is dealt with over the next month. Diagram 4Tentative U.S. Political Timeline Reconciliation Rules And Tax Reform Changing America's complex tax laws is precisely the sort of legislative action that reconciliation was designed to facilitate. That said, investors are still not sure whether the Trump administration and Congress will be able to agree on comprehensive tax reform that includes lowering top rates for corporations, or whether they will merely agree to cut household taxes on households. Some clarity will emerge once the Republican-controlled Congress passes the FY2018 budget resolution, which will contain reconciliation instructions for either comprehensive tax reform (most likely) or merely household tax reform (unlikely). At that point, the length of the reconciliation process will depend on how much agreement there is surrounding tax reform. Diagram 3 shows that tax cuts - such as those in 2001 and 2003 - take relatively little time to pass. Tax reform, on the other hand, could take a while longer given multiple competing interests. If comprehensive, we would expect tax reform to be passed by the end of Q1 2018. Would that mean that tax cuts would only be effective from January 1, 2018? Or, even less bullish, from the start of FY2019? No. The GOP would have the option of making tax cuts retroactive and thus can avoid a huge market disappointment if tax cuts come later in the next year. It is even legally possible for tax laws passed in 2018 to take effect on January 1, 2017 - though it is admittedly more of a stretch than doing it this year.12 Can reconciliation be used to pass budget-busting tax reform, as we have argued investors should expect? You bet! From 1980 to the 1990s the reconciliation procedure was primarily used - and in fact designed - to reduce the deficit through reductions in mandatory spending, revenue increases, or both. It has since become a tool to expand deficits. This was most famously done by the Bush era reconciliation bills in 2001 and 2003, which introduced large tax cuts. The aforementioned Byrd rule forces any provision of a bill that increases the deficit beyond the years covered by the reconciliation bill to "sunset." In the case of the 2001 and 2003 bills, this meant that Bush-era tax cuts expired in 2011 (estate tax) and 2013 (which investors will remember as the "fiscal cliff"). The sunset period does not have to be ten years, it could conceivably be a lot longer, in effect making tax reform permanent, as far as most investors' time horizons are concerned. Following the Democratic Party sweep in the 2006 midterm elections, the Democrat-controlled Senate changed reconciliation rules to prohibit any deficit-increasing measures, regardless of the sunset clause loophole. However, the Republicans changed the rules back in 2015, after they re-took the Senate in the 2014 midterm election. This is crucial for two reasons: first, it means that the current procedural rules on the books allow deficits to be blown out via the reconciliation procedure and second, it establishes that the current cohort of Republicans in Congress is fiscally profligate, despite media punditry to the contrary. Bottom Line: The reconciliation process was designed to facilitate precisely the type of legislation that Republicans will try to pass via tax reform. According to the current procedural rules, such legislation can increase the budget deficit, as long as it sunsets at the conclusion of the budgetary period set out by the legislation (normally 10-years, but it could be longer). We suspect that tax reform will take until Q1 2018 to pass, but Republicans will be able to make its effects retroactive to January 1, 2017. The Big Picture - What Does It All Mean For Fiscal Policy? We expect the Republican-held Congress to attempt to pass comprehensive tax reform over the next four quarters. If the GOP fail to agree on "revenue offsets" for corporate tax cuts, we could see the Republican Congress electing to pass simple tax cuts for households, as the Bush-era tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 did. To facilitate such legislation politically, the Republicans will rely on "dynamic scoring," the macroeconomic modeling tool based on the work of economist Arthur Laffer (of the "Laffer curve" fame). The idea is that the headline government revenue lost through tax cuts fails to take into account the growth-generating consequences ("macroeconomic feedback") of the cuts, factors that actually add to revenues. In other words, "tax cuts pay for themselves." It is true that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) will balk at dynamic scoring. But we doubt that "egghead, socialist economists" will stand in the way of tax reforms. As we discussed above, the CBO's score will ultimately only force the Republicans to "sunset" tax reform legislation, not scuttle it. The market disagrees with us. After a wave of euphoria following the presidential election, the market has largely priced out meaningful fiscal stimulus. This can be seen in the flagging relative performance of infrastructure stocks and highly-taxed companies, as well as in the sharp decline in inflation expectations (Chart 9). Chart 9Market Has Voted: No Fiscal Stimulus We think the market is making a serious mistake by taking the Republican mantra of "revenue neutral" - meaning that any tax cuts would need to be offset by other revenue-raising measures - tax reform seriously. This is easier said than done. The three main ways that House Republicans have offered to pay for corporate and personal tax cuts - introducing a border adjustment tax, eliminating the deductibility of business interest payments, and jettisoning the deduction for state and local income taxes for individuals - will all face resistance from vested interests. We suspect that the GOP will produce some revenue offsets, but not enough to have a revenue-neutral tax reform. The path of least resistance, therefore, will be to bust the budget and then force the measures to expire over the life of the budget-setting window. White House budget director Mick Mulvaney has already floated the idea of extending the 10-year budget scoring window to 20 years. This would allow tax reform measures, even if they are characterized by the CBO as profligate, to expire in two decades. That's practically a lifetime away, as far as any investor is concerned. What is the investment significance of a stimulative tax reform package? Our colleague Peter Berezin has recently pointed out that it is ironic that fiscal stimulus is coming to America only when the economy has reached full employment. This means that much of the increase in aggregate demand arising from a more expansionary fiscal stance will be reflected in higher inflation rather than faster growth. This does not represent a major threat to risk assets now, but could later next year, as the Fed responds to greater fiscal thrust with tighter monetary policy.13 We encourage our clients to read BCA Special Report "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession," penned by Martin Barnes in March, which details the likely path that assets and the economy will take over the next two years.14 In the short term, the market will continue to fret that tax reform is doomed and that Republicans are committed to austerity. However, budget-busting tax reform could begin to be priced in by the market well before the reconciliation bill is ultimately passed. We suspect that the outlines of tax reform will emerge this summer. The market may realize that stimulus is coming as soon as the FY2018 budget resolution, containing tax reform instructions, is passed in Q3 or Q4 2017. Such a realization later this year could augur a violent snap-back in the USD. Currently, the two-year real interest rate differentials between the euro area and the U.S. have widened by 58 basis points in favor of the latter since the end of March, even though EUR/USD has actually rallied over this period (Chart 10). We have been long EUR/USD since March 22,15 in expectations that investors would be busy covering their euro hedges that they put on in the lead up to the French elections, the outcome of which we have had a high conviction on since November.16 However, now that net long speculative positions in the euro have risen to a three-year high - having been deeply short just a few weeks ago - the speculative demand for euros will ultimately subside (Chart 11). Chart 10Widening Real Rate ##br##Differentials Support The Dollar Chart 11Speculators Are Long The Euro##br## For The First Time In Three Years We are therefore closing our USD short versus both the euro and the pound, for gains of 3.48% and 3.34% respectively. As we expected, the ECB is going to look to guide investors towards a "dovish" tapering of its QE program. Speaking before the European Parliament's committee on economic affairs, ECB President Mario Draghi confirmed that "very accommodative financing conditions" reliant on "a fairly substantial amount of monetary accommodation" would continue. The ECB will have to make a decision whether to extend its sovereign bond purchase program into the next year or start winding it down as planned. Given news flow out of Italy that an election may be planned as early as September, the ECB may be forced to stand pat until after the end of the year. Given our view that tax reform in the U.S. would ultimately happen, and that it would eventually be marginally stimulative, any resurfacing of political risks in Europe - which we are expecting - should be negative for the EUR/USD. What should investors do about European equities? We are cautious. As we have been pointing out to our clients since September of last year, Italy is the political risk in Europe.17 However, we think that most investors are willing to bet that European equities can survive Italian political turbulence. This could be a mistake in the short term, as we think that Euroskeptic (albeit evolving) Five Star Movement could win a plurality in the next election. In the long term, Italy will become ECB's proverbial boulder, that Draghi must push up a hill like Sisyphus, only to see it roll down to the bottom with each bout of Italian political instability. As such, Italy's instability will force ECB to set its monetary policy for the weakest link in the Euro Area (Italy), rather than the aggregate. This should be positive for Euro Area risk assets, but negative for the euro, all other things being equal. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!" dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Strike While The Iron Is Hot," dated September 2, 2016, available at gss.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Overstated In 2017," dated April 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 6 The dates for the two rounds of the legislative elections are June 11 and 18. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'What Can You Do For Me' World?" dated January 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 We draw on several overviews of the budget reconciliation process in this report. Please see David Reich and Richard Kogan, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "Introduction To Budget 'Reconciliation'," dated November 9, 2016, available at cbpp.org; Megan S. Lynch, Congressional Research Service, "The Budget Reconciliation Process: Timing Of Legislative Action," dated February 23, 2016, available at fas.org; and Megan S. Lynch, Congressional Research Service, "Budget Reconciliation Measures Enacted Into Law: 1980-2010," dated January 4, 2017, available at fas.org. 11 To reach the required 60 seat filibuster-proof majority the Democrats relied on some luck and cunning. Democrat Al Franken unseated Republican Incumbent Norm Coleman in a recount in Minnesota and Arlen Specter, a Republican from Pennsylvania, switched his party affiliation to Democrat. 12 Congress, after the sweeping 1986 tax reforms, corrected certain oversights in that law by passing subsequent measures in 1987. These were made to be retroactive back to the previous calendar year, i.e. January 1, 1986, and the courts upheld the legislation. Hence, there is precedent for Republicans to pass tax reform in 2018 that takes effect January 1, 2017, though admittedly the circumstances would matter. Courts have even upheld retroactive tax legislation back to two calendar tax years. Please see Erika K. Lunder, Robert Meltz, and Kenneth R. Thomas, "Constitutionality of Retroactive Tax Legislation," Congressional Research Service, October 25, 2012, available at fas.org. 13 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Fiscal Policy In The Spotlight," dated May 26, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Research Special Report, "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession," dated March 7, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Five Questions On Europe," dated March 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Will Marine Le Pen Win?" dated November 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights On the European side, the key risk to our bullish DXY stance is that European growth is strong, the labor market seems to be tightening, and core CPI has perked up. These risks are real but mitigated by budding signs that European growth is at its best, by the abundance of hidden labor market slack, and by the high chance that the CPI spike was transitory. On the U.S. side of the ledger, the key risks are that wages do not pick up, that credit growth continues to act as a break on activity, and that political risks hamper fiscal dynamics. All would mean a more dovish Fed than we anticipate. These risks are mitigated by the fact that hidden U.S. labor market slack is only now low enough for wages to improve, credit looks set to turn around as financial conditions are supportive, and fiscal policy should surprise to the upside. USD/NOK has upside as Norway experiences declining inflation. Go long CAD/NOK. Feature Last week, we augmented our cyclically dollar bullish view by removing our tactical bearish bias on the USD. In our eyes, the market is underestimating the capacity of the Fed to increase rates and is also overestimating the economic impact of the fiasco surrounding Trump's alleged relationship with Russia. Despite our high conviction view that the dollar can rally 10% or more from current levels, we cannot be blind to the key risks surrounding it. This week, we explore where our stance on Europe and the Fed can go wrong. ECB Tapering = Upcoming Tightening Campaign? The key risk to our negative euro stance is the ECB. The market has moved to discount the first rate hike in Europe to happen in barely two years, an event we judge highly unlikely. However, if the market is right that a tapering of asset purchases in 2018 and a potential increase in the rates on deposit facilities to 0% are the opening salvos of an imminent campaign to push up the repo rate, the EUR/USD rally is only in its early days. Here are the key factors that would support this bullish euro view: The European economy is in a major economic upswing. Not only have PMIs surged, the IFO has hit an all-time high (Chart I-1). If this pace of growth can be maintained for an extended period of time, the European output gap will close faster than we anticipate, providing a stronger basis for the ECB to nudge all rates higher. The euro area labor market is tightening. Euro area unemployment rate is at 9.5%, only 0.7% above the OECD's estimate for NAIRU (Chart I-2). Thus, it would paint a picture where there is little slack in the economy at large and in the labor market in particular. In this environment, a continuation of the elevated growth currently experienced by the euro area could boost wages. Core inflation has picked up to 1.2% (Chart I-3). The ECB has historically displayed a tight reaction function to inflation. In the past, headline CPI mattered, but since Mario Draghi took the helm of this institution, the focus has switched to underlying pricing pressures. Thus, if euro area core inflation continues to move up, especially as U.S. core PCE inflation has weakened to 1.6%, the market will be vindicated and the euro could rebound on a more hawkish ECB. Chart I-1Europe Is Booming Chart I-2Low Labor Market Slack In Europe Chart I-3That Should Help The ECB To Hike Why Are These Factors Risks And Not Base Cases? To begin with, these factors have been discounted by the markets, a fact highlighted by the 42-month fall in the month-to-hike for the ECB since July 2016 to 24 months today. Also, as the European surprise index has outperformed the U.S. one, EUR/USD has rallied by 6%. In the process, investors have switched from being massively short the euro to being the most aggressively long in three years (Chart I-4). Risk-reversals in EUR/USD options are also at elevated levels, highlighting the potentially too-bullish disposition of investors toward the euro. On the growth front, some factors suggest that European growth may soon peak. The large improvement in the amount of industrial activity and capacity utilization in Europe relative to the U.S. was reflective of the big easing in monetary conditions that followed the collapse of the euro after 2014. But, as Chart I-5 illustrates, European industrial production needed a falling euro to beat that of the U.S., soon after the euro stabilized, the growth outperformance began to recede and is now near inexistent based on this metric. Thus, the euro rebound removes one of the key factors that supported the European economy in the first place. Chart I-4Investors Have Discounted##br## The Good News In Europe Chart I-5Europe's Growth Outperformance ##br##Was Because Of Policy Additionally, some economic data are showing disturbing signs. While Germany's IFO stands at a record high, Belgian business confidence has rolled over. In fact, export orders have been particularly weak (Chart I-6). This is of importance as Belgium has long been a logistical center for the euro area, and is a small open economy deeply integrated in the European economic infrastructure. This, therefore, portends to emerging risks to the whole euro area. Monetary dynamics too raise questions. European business confidence, a key piece of soft data that has underpinned investors increased bullishness on the euro is led by dynamics in M1 money supply. The roll over in M1 implies that business conditions in Europe are slowly passing their best period (Chart I-7). If euro area growth peaks, this also raises concerns about the state of the labor market. This is especially worrisome as we think the unemployment gap based on the OECD's estimate of NAIRU misses key elements of the European labor market slack. As we wrote last week, the key problem in Europe is labor underutilization; hidden labor market slack remains a serious concern.1 With workers in irregular contracts being a key source of job creation since the end of the 2013 recession, there are plenty of workers willing to change jobs without the incentive of a higher pay, limiting the upside in wages. Without wage growth, it will be difficult for European core inflation to continue its uptrend, especially as there are many signs that the rebound that has excited investors' imagination may have been a transitory event. Worryingly for euro bulls, our Core CPI A/D line for Europe, which tends to lead core CPI itself, rolled over last year and points to lower core CPI.2 Industrial good prices excluding energy have also been weakening for 15 months now, suggesting this inflation rebound may be an aberration (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Where Belgium Goes, ##br##So Does Europe Chart I-7Money Trends Point To A Deceleration##br## In European Soft Data Chart I-8Europe Core CPI ##br##Will Roll Over Bottom Line: Investors have become very bullish of the euro based on the fact that the economy has been very strong, the European headline unemployment rate is moving closer to NAIRU, and core inflation has perked up; raising the specter of high rates sooner than we anticipate. These economic developments need to be monitored closely, but the growth impulse in Europe is likely to soon deteriorate, broader measures of labor market slack in the euro area are far from being at full employment, and the tick up in core inflation is likely to prove to have been only a temporary blip. These forces should weigh on the euro for the rest of 2017. Maybe The Fed Will Not Tighten That Much? Meanwhile, in the U.S., investors only expect three rate hikes over the next 24 months. Markets have begun doubting the fed's capacity or resolve to hike interest rates as aggressively as we envision. A slew of disappointing data and political developments have cemented this opinion among investors. Among the most crucial factors are the following: Chart I-9Disappointing U.S. Wages Wage growth in the U.S. remains poor, especially as per average hourly earnings which are still only growing at a disappointing 2.3% rate (Chart I-9). This raises the specter that consumption will remain tepid and that inflationary dynamics will never take hold in the U.S. This risk is perceived as especially salient as core inflation and core PCE have slowed below the 2% objective of the FOMC. Slowing credit growth has also garnered a lot of attention among the public. Credit is the life blood of the economy, and this slowdown has prompted many investors to begin questioning whether or not the U.S. economy would ever be able to take off. This compounded worries around the perennially weak Q1 GDP growth. Finally, the myriad of scandals surrounding Trump and his dealings with Russia have raised much questions about his ability to ever implement fiscal stimulus. Moreover, the punitive terms associated with the repeal of Obamacare and the implementation of the American Health Care Act (AHCA) - which according to the CBO could leave as many as 23 million individuals without health insurance by 2023 and cause sharp increases in insurance premia - may dull any growth boosting impact of potential tax cuts. Thus, the political backdrop may prompt the Fed to be easier than was anticipated as recently as December 2016. Why Are These Factors Risks And Not Base Cases? To begin with, BCA still hold the view that wages in the U.S. are set to accelerate in the coming quarters. The Phillips Curve continues to be a reality, as the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker still display a tight relationship with the unemployment gap (Chart I-10). Moreover, it is often argued that the problem with today's labor market is that much of the job creation is happening in low-skilled positions. This is true, but historically, low-skilled jobs have tended to experience the most upward pressures when the job market tightens significantly. Instead, the key anchor on average hourly earnings has been the hidden labor market slack. However, today, the U-6 unemployment rate is finally ticking at 8.6%, levels where in previous cycles wage growth accelerated (Chart I-11). A rebound in GDP growth, as highlighted by the Atlanta Fed growth forecast of 4.1% in Q2, would accentuate pressures on the labor market and help realized the underlying wage pressures resulting from the current readings of the U6 unemployment rate. Chart I-10The Phillips Curve: It's Alive Chart I-11U.S. Wages Will Pick Up What could support growth? Let's begin with the credit dynamics. As we have argued, credit growth is a lagging indicator of economic activity. The improvement in the ISM through 2016 and early 2017 continues to point to a rebound in C&I loans in the U.S. (Chart I-12). Moreover, aggregate bank credit in the U.S. is already re-accelerating, suggesting that credit will once again add to economic activity, and will stop subtracting from it (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Credit Lags, And It Will Pick Up Chart I-13Momentum In U.S. Loans Is Turning Up Another positive for the U.S. economy has been the substantial easing in financial conditions resulting from the fall in the dollar and bond yields since the beginning of 2017. This easing should help economic activity over the course of the next quarters (Chart I-14). In its most recent minutes, the Fed has alluded to these forces. The fall in the dollar is already showing signs of helping. The ISM export orders index is currently ticking near 60, suggesting that the fall in the USD has had a stimulative impact on the U.S economy (Chart I-15). This is especially salient when contrasted with the euro area industrial production dynamics described above. Chart I-14U.S. Financial Conditions Will Help Growth Chart I-15The Dollar's Easing Is Evident Finally, when it comes to fiscal policy, our Geopolitical Strategy team remains adamant that tax cuts will materialize in the coming quarters. It is becoming imperative for congressional Republicans to achieve this as Trump's popularity remains dismal at the national level, which could prompt a serious electoral rout in the 2018 mid-term elections (Chart I-16). This means that fiscal easing is likely to come through, which should have an impact on asset prices and the dollar: The DXY is back to pre-election levels and the relative performance of stocks most sensitive to changes in tax policy is back to January 2016 levels. These price trends indicate that investors have massively curtailed their expectations for governmental support to growth. Chart I-16If Tax Cuts Don't Pass, Republicans Are Heading For A Huge Defeat In 2018 Moreover, the current format of the AHCA is unlikely to make it through the more moderate U.S. Senate. The loss of coverage and the insurance premia increases implied by the current plan are likely to be electoral poison in 2018, something well understood by key GOP policymakers. An AHCA still up in the air does not preclude tax cuts either. The budget deficit hole created by unfunded tax cuts will likely be patched through aggressive growth assumptions, the magic of dynamic scoring. The recently revealed Trump budget proposal itself is also unlikely to see the light of day in its current form and will evolve toward something more supportive of growth as time and negotiations pass. Bottom Line: Investors have massively curtailed their expectations of Fed tightening over the next two years. This view has been based on the lack of wage acceleration in the U.S., the poor credit growth numbers, and the uncertainty surrounding fiscal policy. These are still important risks to our bullish stance. However, we remain optimist because wage growth is only set to increase now, credit is a lagging indicator that looks about to pick up anew, financial conditions should help future U.S. economic activity, and the potential for tax cuts is far from dead. Stay long DXY. Norway's Passing Inflation Problem It was not long ago when the Norges Bank was facing the daunting task of kick starting a Norwegian economy ravaged by the collapse in oil prices while trying to contain the high inflation brought upon by the sell-off in the krone. However, following the stabilization of the NOK, this dilemma has dissipated as multiple measures of inflation have plunged. The Norges Bank is now free to maintain its dovish bias as the economy remains tired and will require easy monetary to recover going forward. Based on the effect of currency moves, inflation might reach a bottom at the beginning of next year, but it will likely stay below the central bank's target of 2.5 % for the foreseeable future (Chart I-17). Indeed, in spite of the rebound in oil prices, employment is contracting, the output gap is large, and wage growth remains deeply negative (Chart I-18). The Norges Bank is sympathetic to this view, acknowledging in its most recent monetary policy statement that inflation will hover in a 1-2% range in the coming years. Chart I-17A Stable NOK Will Keep Inflation Subdued Chart I-18No Domestic Inflationary Pressures In Norway Lastly, Norway's bubbly real estate market, the last obstacle to the Norges Bank dovish bias, is finally slowing down. Thanks to changes in regulation on residential mortgage lending at the start of the year, banks are tightening lending standards to households, a precursor to a cooling housing market (Chart I-19). With a Fed looking to increase rates, the real rate differential between the U.S. and Norway should move in favor of USD/NOK. Yet, could rising oil prices deepen the USD/NOK weakness? This seems doubtful as USD/NOK continues to be more correlated with real rate differentials than with the price of oil (Chart I-20). Nevertheless, the outlook of the krone against the AUD and the NZD is much more promising: Chart I-19No Need To Raise Rates To Curb Housing Prices Chart I-20Real Rates Matter More Than Oil Yesterday, OPEC Russia agreed to maintain their production cuts in place for the next nine months. This deal should keep the oil market in a deficit, pushing oil prices up and providing a tailwind to the NOK against non-oil commodity currencies. Chart I-21CAD/NOK: A Call On The U.S. Dollar On the other hand, the outlook for industrial metals and other commodities, which are more sensitive to the Chinese economy, continues to be worrying. Monetary conditions are still tightening in China and multiple economic activity indicators have disappointed to the downside. While base metals have already fallen considerably, we believe that additional weakness in the Chinese economy will trigger a selloff in EM assets, bringing the NZD and the AUD down with them. Finally, it may be time to sell the NOK against the CAD. The Bank of Canada struck a hawkish tone on Wednesday, stating that the Canadian economy's adjustment to lower oil prices is largely complete and that consumer spending should be supported by an improving labor market. This change in rhetoric should set the stage for a rally in CAD/NOK. Moreover, our Intermediate-Term Timing Model shows that this cross is 7% cheap, and our bullish USD view implies an outperformance of the loonie versus the krone given the tight correlation between CAD/NOK and the DXY (Chart I-21). Bottom Line: Outperformance of oil in the commodity space will help the krone outpace non-oil commodity currencies. However, the Norges Bank is likely to keep a dovish bias, which should make it difficult for the NOK to rally durably against a cheap U.S. dollar. Go long CAD/NOK. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa Research Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Bloody Potomac", dated May 19, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "The Achilles Heel Of Commodity Currencies", dated May 5, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The greenback suffered some losses following the release of Fed minutes. Puzzlingly, the rhetoric was not dovish, as markets and news outlets confirmed the prospect for a June rate hike. The result was a dollar selloff and a drop in yields. This easing in financial conditions created an additional fillip for the S&P as it traded at a record high, the opposite of what is expected with a looming rate hike. As new home sales contracted on a monthly basis and the manufacturing PMI disappointed, the U.S. soft patch continues. Nevertheless, our base case remains on par with the Fed's: the weakness in data is temporary and the Fed will hike more than the markets expect. We are already seeing this as continuing and initial jobless claims beat expectations at 1.923 million, and 234,000 respectively, and the greenback has found a footing at the 97.1 level. As this scenario further unfolds, gold will retreat as real returns increase, and the greenback will gain upward momentum. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The euro area continues to surprise with better than expected data: German IFO: Overall Business Climate came in at 114.6 - levels last seen in 1970; Expectations came in better than expected at 106.5; and the Current Assessment also beat expectations of 121.2, coming in at 123.2. Euro area Manufacturing PMI is at 57 for May, beating expectations of 56.5, and the Composite measure also recorded an outperformance, coming in at 56.8. On the consumer side, German Gfk Consumer Confidence Survey came in at 10.4, beating expectations of 10.2. While the euro to be overvalued on short-term metrics, and the euro area is structurally weaker than the U.S., weaker data needs to be seen for the markets to see a correction. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data has been negative in Japan: Manufacturing PMI decreased to 52 in May from 52.7 in April. Exports growth decreased to 7.5%, from 12% the month before and underperforming expectations. Japan's all industry activity Index also underperformed expectations, contracting by 0.6% MoM. We continue to believe that Japanese economic activity will ultimately be determined by the exchange rate. The yen has appreciated since this the start of the year, therefore it is understandable that inflation and economic activity have been subdued. Taking this into account, the BoJ will continue to target a yield of 0% in JGB's, and thus the yen should suffer on a cyclical basis given that real rates differentials with the U.S. will continue to widen. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent British data has been mixed: GDP growth underperformed, coming in at 2%, decreasing from last quarter and underperforming expectations, mostly reflecting poor trade numbers. Meanwhile total business investment grew by 0.8%, outperforming expectations. We are not positive on the pound against the dollar, given that near 1.3 the pound is no longer a bargain tactically. On the other hand we expect more upside against the euro. Powerful inflationary pressures are building in the U.K., and governor Carney, previously concerned about the effects of Brexit in the economy, might be more inclined now to deal with inflation as the U.K. has proved resilient. This will put upward pressure in British rates vis-à-vis European rates. Additionally EUR/GBP has reached overbought levels, indicating it might be a good time to short this cross. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 As the greenback's descent slowed down, so did the Aussie's ascent. The underlying motives for strength in the antipodean currency are misplaced. As data remains unpromising, this week followed through with further disappointments as overall construction work done contracted by 7.2% on an annual basis, with the engineering component contracting by 13%. Research by the RBA illustrates that construction work has a very close relationship with the national accounts of Australia. This could result in a slowdown in the economy - something which the RBA cannot afford amidst flailing inflationary pressures. On a more optimistic note, the commodity selloff is taking a breather. Most crucially for the AUD, iron ore futures have remained flat for almost a month after a 30% depreciation, and natural gas has been flat for almost a month. These developments have limited the AUD's downside for now. However, looming EM risks and the potential resumption of the dollar bull market represent very real risks for the AUD going forward. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The kiwi has appreciated by about 1.5% against the dollar this week. Additionally, recent data has been positive: Visitor Arrivals yearly growth skyrocketed to 21.5% on April. The trade balance outperformed expectations coming in at -3.48 Billion The kiwi economy continues to surge, with 7% growth in nominal GDP and retail sales growth at decade-highs. Additionally, dairy prices continue to surge, and are now growing at a 60% YoY pace. For this reason we are bearish on AUD/NZD, as the Australian economy is not only in a more precarious state, but is also more sensitive to the Chinese industrial cycle. Meanwhile, we continue to be bearish on NZD/USD, as a negative view on EM assets necessarily entails a bearish view on the kiwi. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Following on from the dollar's weakness, the CAD displayed further strength after the BoC's decision statement. While keeping rates unchanged, the bank highlighted that "recent economic data have been encouraging" and that "consumer spending and the housing sector continue to be robust on the back of an improving labor market". Furthermore, the Bank more or less expects these supports to growth to "strengthen and broaden over the projection horizon". While wholesale sales increased by less than expected at 0.9%, the BoC also expects that the "very strong growth in the first quarter will be followed by some moderation in the second quarter". This is likely to keep market expectations anchored and the CAD's value intact. Additionally, oil should pare recent weaknesses as OPEC follows through on its cuts. The CAD is therefore likely to see some strength against other commodity currencies. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF has continued to depreciate after coming close to reaching 1.1. We continue to be negative on this cross, as the Euro is likely to have limited upside from current levels. The ECB is unlikely to hike rates any time soon, as wage pressures outside of Germany continue to be muted. Furthermore, this is not likely to change any time soon, as the labor market of the periphery continues to be very rigid. Meanwhile, the SNB is likely to take off the floor from this cross next year, as core inflation and retail sales growth have both returned to positive territory. We will continue to monitor the rhetoric by the SNB to have a more clear understanding of when the removal of the floor might occur. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The krone has rallied this week, thanks to the rise in oil prices. However real rate differentials should continue to move in favor of USD/NOK. While the fed is likely to hike more than what is currently anticipated in the OIS curve, the Norges Bank will stay dovish, given that the Norwegian economy is still too weak to sustain a rise in interest rates. Furthermore, macro prudential measures seem to be helping the Norges bank to slow down the housing market. The NOK is also likely to have downside against the CAD. The dollar bull market should help this cross rally, given the tight correlation between CAD/NOK and the DXY. Furthermore the BoC has struck a more hawkish tone as of late, which should further increase the difference between interest rate expectations in these two countries. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Positive data emerged from Sweden this week as consumer confidence picked up to 105.9 from 103.7, beating expectation of a decline to 103.6. The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate remains on a structural downtrend, coming in at 6.6% according to Statistics Sweden. In terms of crosses, USD/SEK continues to weaken due to the greenback's instability. EUR/SEK has topped out and is also showing some weakness. Against commodity currencies, the movement is mixed. The SEK has shown the most strength against the AUD, while CAD/SEK and NZD/SEK have been flat, and NOK/SEK has seen considerable strength on the back of robust oil prices. We can see the SEK being weak against oil-based currencies as we expect OPEC to remain focused on cutting global oil inventories, while AUD/SEK could see further downside due to poor fundamentals in Australia. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights Fiscal policy is likely to be eased modestly in most advanced economies over the next two years. The U.S. Congress will ultimately cut taxes, although the size of the cuts will be far smaller than what President Trump has proposed. Ironically, fiscal stimulus is coming to America just when the economy has reached full employment. The market is pricing in too little Fed tightening over the remainder of the year. The dollar's swoon is ending. Go short EUR/USD with a target of parity by the end of the year. Feature Fiscal Thrust Around The World In its latest Fiscal Monitor, the IMF estimated that advanced economies eased fiscal policy by 0.2% of GDP in 2016, reversing a five-year streak of fiscal tightening (Chart 1). The Fund expects a further 0.1% of GDP of easing in 2017, followed by a neutral stance in 2018. In the EM universe, the IMF foresees a fiscal thrust1 of -0.2% of GDP in 2017 and -0.4% of GDP in 2018. Chart 1IMF Expects Modest Fiscal Easing In Advanced Economies, Further Tightening In EM Averages can disguise a lot of variation across countries (Charts 2). Comparing 2018 with 2016, the IMF expects Canada and the U.S. to experience a positive fiscal thrust of 0.7% of GDP and 0.4% of GDP, respectively. The fiscal thrust is projected to be -0.2% of GDP in the euro area, -1% of GDP in the U.K., and -0.5% of GDP in Japan. Among the larger advanced economies, Australia is expected to experience the largest degree of fiscal tightening, with a fiscal thrust of -1.2% of GDP. Across the EM universe, most of the fiscal tightening is projected to occur among oil producers. The IMF expects oil-exporting economies to collectively reduce their fiscal deficits by US$150 billion between 2016 and 2018. Political considerations require that the IMF give considerable weight to the stated objectives of governments when formulating fiscal projections. In reality, governments often struggle to meet their budget targets. Consequently, the Fund has typically overestimated the degree of fiscal consolidation that ends up happening (Chart 3). As such, our own projections foresee somewhat less fiscal tightening - and in some countries, a fair bit of fiscal easing - than the IMF projects. In particular: Chart 2Countries Will Follow Different Fiscal Paths Chart 3IMF Forecasts Tend To Overestimate Extent Of Fiscal Consolidation We do not expect much more incremental fiscal tightening out of the euro area. Thanks to a slew of austerity measures, the euro area's structural primary budget balance went from a deficit of 2.6% of GDP in 2010 to a surplus of 1.0% of GDP in 2014. It has remained close to those levels ever since. Now that a primary surplus has already been achieved and interest rates and bond spreads have fallen to exceptionally low levels, the need for further belt tightening has abated. That's the good news. The bad news is that high government debt levels in many European economies rule out any major new stimulus programs (Chart 4). The U.K. will slow the pace of fiscal consolidation. The U.K.'s structural primary budget deficit fell from a peak of 7.1% of GDP in 2009 to 1.3% of GDP in 2016. The IMF expects the primary balance to move into a surplus of 0.6% of GDP in 2019. We think that's unlikely. The Conservatives are under intense pressure to keep the economy afloat during Brexit negotiations. Prime Minister Theresa May has indicated she will delay eradicating the budget deficit until the middle of the next decade, having previously promised a 2020 target date. Japan has limited scope to further tighten fiscal policy. Japan's structural primary budget deficit reached 6.9% of GDP in 2010. The IMF expects it to reach 3.7% this year and fall further to 2% in 2020, provided the government goes forward with raising the VAT from 8% to 10%. We are skeptical that Japan's economy will be strong enough to allow the government to raise taxes. However, even if it is, this will only be because the Bank of Japan gooses growth by keeping long-term yields pinned to zero, thereby allowing the yen to depreciate further. China is making a structural transition to large budget deficits. The IMF estimates that China's structural primary budget balance deteriorated from a surplus of 0.1% of GDP in 2014 to a deficit of 2.8% of GDP in 2016. The increase in the fiscal deficit cannot be explained by the reclassification of off-budget spending as on-budget, since the IMF's "augmented" fiscal balance - which attempts to control for such statistical issues - deteriorated by roughly the same amount (Chart 5). Part of the erosion in China's fiscal balance stemmed from the global manufacturing slowdown in 2015-2016, which hit tax receipts and necessitated a healthy dose of fiscal stimulus. However, there is more to the story than that. As we controversially argued in "China Needs More Debt," now that China is no longer in a position to run gargantuan current account surpluses, large fiscal deficits will be necessary to absorb excess private-sector savings.2 The government's desire to rein in credit growth will only add to the impetus to find new sources of aggregate demand. The era of red ink has begun. Chart 4Government Debt Levels Outside Of Germany Are Still High Chart 5China's Fiscal Deficit Has Been Increasing The U.S. Congress will ultimately cut taxes, although the size of the cuts will be far smaller than what President Trump has ambitiously proposed. After a wave of euphoria following the presidential election, the market has largely priced out meaningful fiscal stimulus. This can be seen in the flagging relative performance of infrastructure stocks and highly-taxed companies, as well as in the sharp decline in inflation expectations (Chart 6). We think this pessimism is overdone. Donald Trump desperately needs a "win," and cutting taxes is one key area where the President and Congress both see eye to eye. Trump's falling poll numbers have heightened the risk that the Republicans will lose control of the House of Representatives next November (Chart 7). This makes passing a tax bill before the midterm elections all the more urgent. The main questions surround the scale and scope of any tax cuts, and just as critically, how they are paid for. We discuss these issues next. Chart 6Markets Have Priced Out Meaningful Fiscal Stimulus Chart 7Challenging Outlook For Republicans In 2018 Trump's Budget Proposal: Fake Math Chart 8Trump In Wonderland? If the definition of a good leader is one who underpromises and overdelivers, then President Trump's budget proposal left much to be desired. Trump's plan assumes that U.S. growth will reach 3% over the next ten years. Even in the unlikely event that the economy manages to avert a recession over this period, such a growth rate would be a remarkable feat. After all, growth has averaged only 2.1% since 2009. And keep in mind that the unemployment rate has fallen from 10% to 4.4% over this interval, consistent with potential GDP growth of only 1.4%. The slow pace of capital accumulation following the Great Recession undoubtedly hurt the supply side of the economy, but it would take a phenomenal - and rather implausible - acceleration in potential GDP growth to justify Trump's 3% target. Many of the other assumptions in Trump's blueprint are no less dubious (Chart 8). Despite projecting much slower growth, the Federal Reserve expects short-term rates to rise to 3% in 2019. In contrast, the Trump administration sees rates increasing to only 2.4%, an assumption that perhaps not coincidentally helps reduce projected debt-servicing costs. Most flagrantly, the plan assumes no decline in the revenue-to-GDP ratio, even though the basis for faster growth largely rests on the assumption of steep tax cuts. When pressed on the issue, officials from the Office of Management and Budget sheepishly noted that there would be offsetting limits on tax deductions, which would have the effect of broadening the tax base. However, no specific information was given on what these would entail. Many theories have been offered as to why Trump offered such an outlandish budget plan. Was he trying to appease conservatives in Congress? Perhaps this was just a sly attempt to gain leverage in future budget negotiations? Our theory is simpler: Trump promised an economic boom during the election campaign, while assuring voters that his tax cuts would more than pay for themselves. Hell would need to freeze over before he released a plan that did not share these assumptions. Congress Will Decide So where do we go from here? The specifics of Trump's plan are irrelevant. Congress will rewrite the budget from scratch. Major spending cuts will be scrapped. So will the onerous cuts to insurance subsidies and Medicaid in the House version of the health care bill. The Senate will ditch those. In contrast, Trump's tax cuts will be preserved, albeit on a smaller scale than envisioned in his budget proposal. Granted, congressional leaders have said they want tax reform to be revenue neutral, meaning that any tax cuts would need to be offset by other revenue-raising measures. That is easier said than done, however. The three main ways that House Republicans have offered to pay for corporate and personal tax cuts - introducing a border adjustment tax, eliminating the deductibility of business interest payments, and jettisoning the deduction for state and local income taxes for individuals - all face severe resistance from vested interests. In Washington, where there is a will there is usually a dishonest way. Budget forecasts are typically made over a 10-year window. Thus, it is possible to lower taxes upfront and promise spending cuts and ill-defined revenue raising measures in the tail end of the budget window. Such a strategy would generate a positive fiscal thrust early on, while leaving the door open for Congress to dump any future spending reduction or revenue measures before they are actually implemented. Add to that the tax revenue that is projected to pour in from supply-side reforms, and the stage is set for a dollop of fiscal easing starting in early 2018. How likely is it that Republicans will pursue such a strategy? Very likely. As evidence, look no further than the fact that White House budget director Mick Mulvaney floated the idea on Wednesday of extending the 10-year budget scoring window to 20 years. Investment Conclusions Chart 9Phillips Curve Is Alive And Well An obsessive focus on fiscal austerity hamstrung the recovery in many countries following the Great Recession. The irony is that fiscal stimulus is coming to America just when the economy has reached full employment. This means that much of the increase in aggregate demand arising from a more expansionary fiscal stance will be reflected in higher inflation rather than faster growth. This does not represent a major threat to risk assets now, but could later next year. Despite all the obituaries that have been written for the death of the Phillips curve, the data show that it is alive and well (Chart 9). Higher inflation will allow the Fed to raise rates once per quarter. The market is not prepared for this. Investors currently expect only 45 basis points in rate hikes over the coming 12 months. That is far too low. On the other side of the Atlantic, the ECB's months-to-hike measure has plummeted from 65 months in July 2016 to only 24 months today (Chart 10). Real rates are projected to be a mere 14 basis points higher in the U.S. than in the euro area in five years' time (Chart 11). Chart 10The Big Shift In Market Sentiment Towards ECB Policy Chart 11The Vanishing Transatlantic Bond Spread Poor demographics and high private-sector debt levels imply that the neutral rate of interest is lower in the euro area than in the U.S. And while the euro area may not be tightening fiscal policy any longer, the fact that its structural primary budget balance is 2.6% of GDP larger than America's means that the euro area's overall fiscal stance will contribute less to aggregate demand than in the U.S. This will force the ECB to keep rates lower for longer, causing the euro to weaken. Chart 12Widening Real Rate Differentials ##br##Support The Dollar Chart 13Speculators Are Long The Euro For ##br##The First Time In Three Years Incredibly, two-year real interest rate differentials between the euro area and the U.S. have widened by 41 basis points in favor of the latter since the end of March, even though EUR/USD has actually rallied over this period (Chart 12). We think this divergence has occurred because investors have been busy covering the euro hedges that they put on in the lead up to the French elections. However, now that net long speculative positions in the euro have risen to a three-year high - having been deeply short just a few weeks ago - the speculative demand for euros will subside (Chart 13). With all this in mind, we are going short EUR/USD today with a year-end target of parity and a stop-loss of 1.14. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 The fiscal thrust is defined as the change in the structural primary budget balance from one year to the next. As a convention, we define a positive thrust as loosening in fiscal policy (i.e., a lower fiscal balance). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Does China Have A Debt Problem Or A Savings Problem?" dated February 24, 2017, and "China Needs More Debt," dated May 20, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights The equity risk premium (ERP) is distorted: too low. The Eurostoxx600 uptrend is reaching a technical limit according to its 130-day (6-month) fractal dimension. The U.S.-Euro area bond yield spread is distorted: too high. The Spain-France bond yield spread is distorted: too high. The Italy-Germany bond yield spread is not distorted. Feature Central banks' massive interventions in markets have left many investors wondering: has the market's price discovery mechanism become dysfunctional - and if so, where most severely? It is a good question because clearly, the prices that are most distorted are also the ones most likely to dislocate, and generate lucrative opportunities. This week's report assesses the distortion in three important relative pricings: the Italy-Germany sovereign yield spread; the U.S.-euro area sovereign yield spread; and the prospective excess return from equities over bonds, otherwise known as the equity risk premium. The Italy-Germany Bond Yield Spread Is Not Distorted We often hear the claim that the ECB's bond purchase program has compressed periphery bond yields relative to core yields. But we find no evidence for such a distortion. For example, relative to the ECB's capital key1 and other guidelines for bond purchase volumes, there is a larger ongoing supply of Italian BTPs than German bunds.2 So from a technical perspective, the ECB's interventions should have depressed German bund yields more than Italian BTP yields, thereby expanding the spread. Chart Of The WeekLow Volatility: We've Been Here Before... And It Didn't Last In fact, the technical distortion seems quite small because the Italy-Germany yield spread can be fully justified by its two underlying fundamentals: relative competitiveness (Chart I-2) and euro breakup probability (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Euro Area Yield Spreads Depend On Relative Competitiveness ... Chart I-3... And The Probability Of Euro Break-Up The premium on Italian BTP yields exists as a compensation for the expected redenomination loss in the tail-event of euro breakup. Assuming this currency depreciation would neutralize Italy's current 25% under-competitiveness versus Germany, we can infer that the 125 bps yield premium on 5-year BTPs is pricing a 5% annual probability of euro breakup (because 125 bps = 25% loss times 5% probability). The probability should account for an Italian election that is due within the next year, and Italian public support for the euro hovering at an unconvincing majority of around 55%. In this context, the probability should be somewhat elevated, though not alarming. So a 5% annual probability of euro breakup through the next five years seems reasonable within its post-crisis 2%-20% range. On this basis, the Italian-Germany yield spread is not distorted (Chart I-4). Instead, the real anomaly is the Spain-France (5-year) yield spread which stands at 50 bps (Chart I-5). There is now no difference in competitiveness between Spain and France, so there should be no redenomination premium on Spanish Bonos over French OATs, irrespective of the probability of euro break up. Stay structurally overweight Spanish Bonos versus French OATs. Chart I-4The Italy-Germany Yield Spread At 150 Bps Is Fair Chart I-5The Spain-France Yield Spread At 50 Bps Is Too High The U.S.-Euro Area Bond Yield Spread Is Distorted: Too High If bond price discovery were based solely on economic fundamentals, the U.S.-euro area yield spread would not be at a multi-decade extreme today. Such an extreme spread exists because the difference between Fed and ECB policy is much more polarized than is justified by the economic fundamentals. In this sense, the relative pricing is distorted. Consider the hard data. The percentages of the working age population in employment are at the same respective pre-crisis highs in both economies; the difference in wage inflation is closing; and the gap between core inflation in the U.S. and euro area has narrowed very sharply to just 0.6%. Indeed, excluding the cost of shelter - which is not represented in the euro area CPI - core inflation in the U.S. is now lower than in the euro area. Agreed, Fed policy should be tighter than ECB policy. But the expected difference should not be at a multi-decade extreme. Given the self-proclaimed 'data-dependency' of both the Fed and the ECB, the polarization of monetary policy expectations (Chart I-6) has to converge to the rapidly narrowing gap in the hard economic data, one way or another (Chart I-7). Chart I-6The U.S.-Euro Area Yield ##br##Spread Is Too High ... Chart I-7... And Will Gravitate To The Narrowing ##br##Gap In The Economic Data I conclude that: the U.S.-euro area (and U.S.-Germany) yield spread can close much further; euro/dollar can rise structurally; and the market neutral equity pair-trade long euro area Financials/short U.S. Financials can continue to outperform. The caveat is that these positions are just one big correlated trade (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Chart I-8Expected Monetary Policy Difference ##br##Is Driving The U.S.-Germany Yield Spread ... Chart I-9... And Therefore The Relative ##br##Performance Of Financials The Equity Risk Premium Is Distorted: Too Low Equity market behaviour is starkly asymmetric; market ascents tend to be gentle and drawn out, while descents tend to be violent and abrupt. By contrast, bond market behaviour is more symmetric; both upward and downward moves can be gentle or violent. The upshot is that when the equity market is ascending, its observed volatility declines. And the longer and more established the ascent becomes, the lower the observed volatility goes, both in absolute terms and relative to bonds. Crucially, this is just an observation of the inherent behaviour of equities: a low observed volatility simply tells us that equity ascents are gentle and drawn out (Chart I-10); it does not tell us that equity risk has diminished. Chart I-10Low Volatility Just Tells Us That Equity Ascents Are Gentle And Drawn Out. ##br##It Does Not Tell Us That Equity Risk Has Diminished! Unfortunately, the decline in the observed volatility may create the illusion that equity risk has diminished. In response, investors might demand a smaller (or no) equity risk premium (ERP) - the excess prospective long-term return over bonds - because they have falsely concluded that the risk of a large intermediate loss is vanishing. In turn, the shrinking ERP and lower required return justifies an even higher price today, allowing the market to continue its gentle ascent. So observed volatility falls even further, and the process feeds on itself in a self-reinforcing spiral. Readers might recognise this as the setup of the Minsky hypothesis in which the illusion of systemic stability breeds systemic instability and an eventual tipping point - a so-called 'Minsky Moment'. The Minsky hypothesis is an explanation for the boom bust cycle in the economy. It proposes that a credit boom initially generates strong and steady growth with low observed volatility. But the associated hubris - "no more boom and bust" - eventually encourages reckless lending and thereby sows the seeds of its destruction. When the misallocated loans cannot be repaid, the inevitable nemesis arrives. Likewise, in the case of the equity market, today's low observed volatility is absolutely not a reason for hubris. Yet as demonstrated in Markets Suspended In Disbelief,3 the low observed volatility has seduced investors into accepting a wafer-thin ERP. Today's low observed volatility is at the lower end of a range that has existed for at least 50 years (Chart of the Week). We have been here many times before. In each case, the low observed volatility did not last. And when it rose, so too did the ERP. As supporting evidence, observe that the 130-day (6-month) fractal dimension of the Eurostoxx600 is suggesting that the current uptrend is reaching its technical limit (Chart I-11). As a reminder, when an investment's fractal dimension approaches its natural lower bound, it signals that excessive trend following and groupthink have reached a natural point of instability. At which point the established trend is likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. Chart I-11The Current Uptrend In The Eurostoxx600 ##br##Is Reaching Its Technical Limit Before making a large absolute commitment to the equity asset class on a 6-12 month or longer horizon, I would first like to see both of these trustworthy signals stop flashing red. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 The capital key refers to the proportion of the ECB's capital owned by each of the euro area member states, and it is broadly pro-rata to the member state's GDP. 2 German GDP is 2 times the size of Italian GDP, but the stock of German sovereign debt is only 1.1 times the size of Italian sovereign debt. 3 Published on April 13 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The 65-day fractal dimension of nickel versus tin is approaching a level which has previously signaled an imminent trend-reversal. Go long nickel/short tin as this week's trade. Chart I-12 For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights This week, we are reprising and updating "The Other Guys In The Oil Market" from our sister service Energy Sector Strategy (NRG), because it so well captures the state of oil production outside the U.S. shales, Middle East OPEC and Russia. "The Other Guys" account for ~ half of global supply. Next week, we'll publish a joint report with NRG analyzing today's OPEC meeting. The aptly named "Other Guys" account for ~ 42mm b/d of production, which they are struggling to maintain at current levels, let alone increase. These producers supply nearly half of global production, and have been stuck in a pattern of slow decline for years despite high oil prices. Beginning in 2019, we expect production declines to accelerate. This will put enormous pressure on the three primary growth regions, which markets likely will start pricing in toward the end of next year. Energy: Overweight. OPEC 2.0 is expected to extend its 1.8mm b/d of production cuts to the end of 1Q18 at its meeting in Vienna today. Going into the meeting, markets were being guided to expect even deeper cuts. Our long Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. short $45/bbl puts, and our long Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 Brent positions are up 75.0% and 509.5% respectively, following their initiation on May 11, 2017. Base Metals: Neutral. Steel and iron-ore prices are getting a boost from China's anti-pollution campaign, which is expected to run through the end of this month. This was launched ahead of the anti-pollution campaign we expected after the Communist Party Congress in the fall. Iron ore delivered to Qingdao is up 3.1% since May 9, when Reuters reported the campaign began.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold was well bid earlier in the week on the back of a weaker USD. Our long gold position is up 1.9%, while our long volatility trade, which we will unwind at tonight's close, is down 98.5%. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The weaker USD takes some pressure off wheat and beans over the short term, and might prompt a short-covering rally. We remain bearish, however, as the USD likely will bottom in the near future.2 Feature U.S. Onshore, Middle East OPEC (ME OPEC), and Russia combine to produce ~43 MMb/d of oil plus another ~11 MMb/d of other liquids (NGLs, biofuels, refinery gains, etc.). Combined, these producers increased crude production by 5 MMb/d plus another 1 MMb/d of other liquids production over the past three years (2014-2016), creating the oversupply that crashed prices. We expect these producers to add another 1.60 MMb/d of oil plus 1.14 MMb/d of other liquids by 2018 (over 2016 levels), dominated by nearly 2.0 MMb/d of oil and NGLs from the U.S. shales. Oil production from the other 100+ global oil producers also represents about ~42 MMb/d, but on balance has been slowly eroding since 2010, failing to grow even when oil prices were $100+/bbl. Despite some 2017 recovery from Libya, we expect total production to continue to fall in both 2017 and 2018. The few recently expanding producers among the Other Guys are running out of growth. Canada, Brazil, North Sea and GOM account for ~13 MMb/d of oil production in 2016, adding ~1.5 MMb/d over the past three years (2014-2016). North Sea production is projected to resume declines starting in 2017; GOM will reach it peak production sometime in 2017 or 2018, then start to ebb; large new Canadian oil sands projects will add ~310k b/d in 2017-2018, but scarce additions are scheduled beyond that; and Brazil's once-lofty growth plans have slowed to a crawl in 2016-2018. Global deepwater drilling activity and exploration spending have collapsed, lowering the reserve base, and undermining the stability of current production levels. Outside Of Just Three Regions, Oil Supply Picture Looks Worrisome Often overlooked in our discussions about world oil markets are the supply contributions of over 100 geographic regions. This collection of suppliers (which we will call the "Other Guys") is defined as all producing regions in the world other than: 1) U.S. Onshore (shales, specifically), 2) OPEC's six Middle East members, and 3) Russia. The Other Guys deliver nearly half of global production, try to maximize production every day (even OPEC nations among the Other Guys have not had production constrained by quotas), and still have endured consistent, albeit modest, production declines over the past six years. Chart 1Outside Of A Very Few Regions,##BR##Oil Production Has Struggled At the end of 1Q17, oilfield-services leader Schlumberger voiced sharp concerns regarding stability of supplies from these ignored producers, warning that aggregate capital expenditures within these regions will sustain an unprecedented third straight year of decline in 2017, with total spending only about half of 2014 levels. Chart 1 shows the divergent production histories of the three growing regions versus the rest of the world. Chart 1 also shows production of the Other Guys excluding the especially dramatic declines/volatility of Libyan production. Even though these producers benefitted from the same incentives and profitability from high oil prices as the three growing regions, as a group, they have been unable to expand production. As oil prices have plunged, drilling activity in these nations has also plummeted, raising concerns that production declines could start accelerating in the near future. Chart 2 shows that oil-directed drilling activity among the international components of the Other Guys (Chart 2 excludes GOM and highly-seasonal Alaska and Canada) has crashed by ~40%, from an average of over 800 rigs during the five-year period of 2010-2014 to under 500 rigs for the past year. Offshore drilling has collapsed even a little more sharply for these producers than overall oil-directed drilling, falling ~43% from an average of over 280 rigs to only 160 today (Chart 3, excludes GOM). Chart 2Other Guys' Drilling##BR##Has Collapsed 40% Chart 3International Offshore Drilling Is Down Over 40%,##BR##Boding Poorly For The Stability Of Future Production Offshore Production Declines To Accelerate Chart 4Other Guys' Offshore Drilling Has Collapsed As a particularly worrisome trend for the Other Guys' production stability, offshore drilling activity has collapsed in some of the most important offshore oil producing regions in the world, including the GOM, North Sea, West Africa, and Brazil (Chart 4). Considering the multi-year lag between drilling activity and the start of oil production, and the large well size and quick declines associated with offshore wells, the oil production impacts of this drilling collapse that started two years ago have not really been felt yet. When these regions get past the wave of new production from 2015-2017 project additions (projects started during 2011-2014), they will face a dearth of new projects maturing in 2018-2022 due to this collapse in drilling, with new production likely to be inadequate to offset the declines of legacy production. Brazil, the North Sea, West Africa, and GOM together account for about 12 MMb/d of oil production (Chart 5). These four offshore regions have benefitted from intense investment from 2010-2015 as shown by the surging rig counts during that period in Chart 4. This investment/drilling drove 1.1 MMb/d of oil production growth in Brazil, the GOM, and the North Sea from 2013 to 2016, without which total production from the Other Guys would have declined by 1.4 MMb/d rather than just 0.3 MMb/d. Despite strong investment, production in West Africa merely held flat outside of Nigeria during 2013-2016 while falling by 0.4 MMb/d within Nigeria (mostly in 2016 due to pipeline disruptions from saboteurs). Chart 5Offshore Production Will Stop Expanding, Then Decline Brazil offshore drilling activity over the past year is less than half of levels during 2010-2013. As a result, production growth will moderate significantly over the next few years, expanding far less (250k b/d in 2018 vs. 2016, based on our balances data) than the rapid 470,000 b/d step-up in production during 2013-2014. While Brazil still has a rich endowment of pre-salt reserves, marshalling capital and the International Oil Companies' (IOCs) focus to resurrect development activity will take years. We expect no growth during 2019-2020. The North Sea has seen production cut in half from the time of peak production in 1999 until 2013. Production declines were briefly halted and re-expanded by ~300,000 b/d during 2014-2016 due to a concerted drilling effort and brownfield maintenance program incentivized and financed by $100/bbl oil prices. Drilling has since declined 35% from average 2010-2014 levels, and production is expected to resume its downward trend in 2017-2018. Overall oil-directed offshore drilling in the GOM has been cut by over 50% from 2013-2014 levels. Based on our field-by-field analysis published in January, we estimate GOM oil production will hit a peak in a year and a half or less and then will succumb to declines due to lack of new drilling. West Africa has suffered production declines for the past several years due to both geologic challenges as well as more recent (2016-2017) political/sabotage related disruptions in Nigeria. With offshore drilling activity plummeting 70%-80%, we expect production declines will accelerate and it will take years of increased drilling to yield new production that can stem the declines. The collapse in Nigerian drilling, from 10 rigs in 2010-2013 to only 2-3 rigs over the past year, likely means that Nigerian production is incapable of returning to 2015 levels even if its recent sabotage issues are resolved. In aggregate, as shown in Chart 5, we expect production from these four offshore regions to stagnate during 2017-2018 (North Sea and West Africa decline while Brazil and GOM expand) before declining by ~0.5 MMb/d in each 2019-2020 due to the dramatic curtailment of investment during 2015-2017. SLB Talks Its Book, But Makes A Strong Point At an industry conference at the end of March, Schlumberger (again) railed against the inadequacy of the cash flow-negative U.S. shale industry to single-handedly supply enough production growth to satisfy continuing global demand growth, especially once the Other Guys start seeing more pronounced negative production effects from the sharply reduced investments over 2015-2017. "The 2017 E&P spend for this part of the global production base...is expected to be down 50% compared to 2014. At no other time in the past 50 years has our industry experienced cuts of this magnitude and this duration." - Paal Kibsgaard, CEO of SLB. SLB highlighted an analysis of depletion rates constructed with data from Energy Aspects. (The March 27 presentation can be found at www.slb.com). Annual depletion rates (annual production/proved developed reserves) in the GOM had spiked to over 20% in 2016 from a long-term level of only ~10% during 2000-2013. Similarly, depletion rates in the U.K. and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea also surged from ~10% to ~15% over the past three years. In both the GOM and the North Sea, oil production had recently been expanded, but proved developed reserves declined. Due to such low drilling investments during 2015-2016, producers have replaced only about half of the oil reserves that they've produced in the GOM and North Sea over the past three years (2014-2016). Eventually, this lack of investment in cultivating tomorrow's resources will catch up to the industry, and production will decline. Investors must take SLB's commentary with a grain of salt, as they could be construed as sour grapes. The immense pull of new capital spending to the U.S. shales has substantially benefitted SLB's primary competitors more than it has benefitted SLB (SLB is much more focused on international and offshore projects). Still, investors are too complacent about the stability of non-U.S. production. SLB's analysis and warnings of accelerating production declines should not be ignored. Bottom Line: Outside of the three regions of sharply growing production (U.S. onshore, ME OPEC and Russia) that investors are focused on, the other half of global production has been stagnant to declining despite high oil prices and high levels of drilling during 2010-2015. Now that drilling and capex in these regions has declined by 40%-50%, production declines should accelerate in coming years. Offshore production, especially, has not seen enough drilling to replace reserves, and is poised to decline within the next 2-3 years. The accelerating declines of the "Other Guys" will allow more room for growth from U.S. shales, ME OPEC and Russia. Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President, Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 Please see "China steel hits nine-week peak amid crackdown, lifts iron ore," published by reuters.com May 22, 2017. 2 Please see the feature article in last week's edition of BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy entitled "Bloody Potomac," in which our colleague Mathieu Savary lays out the case for an imminent USD rebound. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights U.S. Politics: We recommend that investors look through the political noise in D.C., which is unlikely to arrest the current cyclical economic upturn. Maintain a pro-growth asset allocation within fixed income portfolios: below-benchmark duration, favoring corporate credit over government bonds, especially in the U.S. Duration Checklists: An update of our Duration Checklists shows that the backdrop remains conducive to rising Euro Area bond yields, while the upward pressures on U.S. yields have diminished somewhat. The majority of the indicators, however, continue to point to higher U.S. Treasury and German Bund yields. Europe: Reduce European duration exposure, but wait for wider spread levels before moving out of European government bonds into U.S. Treasuries. Feature The Economy Trumps Politics Chart of the WeekHas Anything Really Changed? A whiff of panic swept across global financial markets last week, as the political risk bugaboo came back with a vengeance. In the U.S., the deepening morass surrounding President Trump's decision to fire former FBI Director Comey, and the potential links to the ongoing investigation of the White House's ties to Russia, raised concerns that Trump's ambitious pro-growth policy agenda would never make it out of Congress. Even this year's darling in the Emerging Markets, Brazil, suffered a huge financial rout after news broke of corruption allegations against the current president. Amid growing talk of a potential impeachment of Trump, the market action was a classic risk-off move, with equity markets falling, the VIX finally waking from its slumber and safe-haven assets like gold, U.S. Treasuries and the Japanese yen rallying. The euro climbed to new 2017 highs versus the U.S. dollar, without any changes in expectations about potential policy moves from the European Central Bank (ECB), as the market knocked down the probability of a June Fed rate hike (Chart of the Week). Some creative commentators called these market moves "the Trump fade" - the beginnings of a reversal of the so-called "Trump trade" that has sent U.S. equity prices and bond yields higher since the U.S. election on expectations of a large U.S. fiscal stimulus. We remain skeptical, however, that expectations of tax cuts and increased government spending have been the main drivers of the post-election boost in U.S. stock prices and Treasury yields, as the current cyclical upturn in global growth was already underway before Trump's election victory. Our colleagues at the BCA Geopolitical Strategy service note that, despite Trump's terrible overall approval ratings (Chart 2), his support among his Republican voters remains strong (Chart 3). Thus, an impeachment is only likely if the Republicans were to lose control of the House of Representatives in next year's U.S. midterm elections. Fear of that outcome should motivate the GOP to try and push through tax and healthcare reform well ahead of the 2018 midterms, in order to present a positive economic message to voters.1 Unless the evidence against Trump becomes so damning that even the Republicans in Congress have to focus on impeachment instead of policy, investors should ride out any market volatility associated with worries that the Trump economic agenda is at risk. Chart 2Trump's Support Abysmal Chart 3GOP Not Yet Willing To Impeach Trump Even without a boost to growth from D.C., however, we continue to expect the U.S. economy to grow above 2.5% in 2017. This above-trend pace will keep the Fed in play for at least two additional rate hikes before year-end, as it would give policymakers confidence that U.S. inflation expectations would return back the Fed's 2% target. In addition, as we discuss in the next section, the cyclical upturn in the Euro Area economy is showing no signs of cooling off, which will put more pressure on the ECB to begin preparing the markets for an eventual tapering of its asset purchases. The recent decline in bond yields is unlikely to persist much longer. Bottom Line: We recommend that investors look through the political noise in D.C., which is unlikely to arrest the current cyclical economic upturn. Maintain a pro-growth asset allocation within fixed income portfolios: below-benchmark duration, favoring corporate credit over government bonds, especially in the U.S. Checking In On Our Duration Checklists In a Special Report published back in February, we introduced a list of indicators to follow to assess the likely direction of U.S. Treasury and German Bund yields.2 We called these our "Duration Checklists", incorporating data on economic growth, inflation, investor risk aversion and market technicals to judge whether our bias to maintain a below-benchmark duration stance should be maintained. This week, we provide an update on those Checklists. The current message from the Checklists is that there is reduced upward pressure on bond yields from the overall strength of the global economy than existed four months ago. Domestic forces, however, are still pointing to higher yields in the U.S. and, especially, the Euro Area (Table 1). Specifically: Table 1A More Bond-Bearish Backdrop For Bunds Than USTs Global economic activity indicators have lost some momentum. While the global leading economic indicator (LEI) is still rising, our global LEI diffusion index has fallen sharply and is now below the 50 line, indicating that a more countries now have a falling LEI. In addition, the global ZEW index has drifted a touch lower, global data surprises are no longer positive, and the global credit impulse has ticked downward (Chart 4). Only the rising LEI warrants a "check" in our Checklists (i.e. justifies our current below-benchmark duration stance). U.S. & European domestic economic activity remains in good shape. Consumer and business confidence remains at strong levels on either side of the Atlantic, with corporate profit growth still accelerating (Charts 5 & 6). Only the modest decline in the U.S. manufacturing purchasing managers' index (PMI) is worthy of an "x" in our U.S. Checklist, although the index remains well above 50 and is not pointing to a more serious deterioration in the U.S. economy. Chart 4Global Growth Backdrop Has##BR##Turned Less Bond-Bearish Chart 5U.S. Economic Strength##BR##Still Supports Higher UST Yields Chart 6Euro Area Growth Is##BR##Gaining Upward Momentum Inflation pressures have eased a bit, especially in the U.S. The slowing momentum in global energy prices has taken some of the steam out of headline inflation in both the U.S. and Europe. Wage inflation has eased up a bit in the U.S., even with the labor market running at full employment (Chart 7). Wage growth and core inflation have recently ticked higher in the Euro Area, however, while the unemployment rate there has fallen to within less than a percentage point away from the OECD estimate of the NAIRU (Chart 8).3 The only indicators worthy of a "check" are the unemployment gap in both the U.S. and Euro Area, although we will give a potential "check" (with a question mark) to European wage inflation. If the recent uptick gains additional momentum, the case for the ECB to begin moving to a less accommodative policy stance will be much stronger. Chart 7Inflation Pressures On UST Yields Have Eased Chart 8Core Inflation & Wages Bottoming Out In Europe? There is still a pro-risk bias among global investors. U.S. and Euro Area equity markets are still in bullish trends, trading well above their 200-day moving averages. At the same time, corporate credit spreads remain tight and option-implied equity volatility is very low (even after last week's pop in the U.S. on the Trump drama). All indicators are worthy of a "check", suggesting that easier financial conditions can lead to higher bond yields (Charts 9 & 10). We are, however, giving an "x" to the European Checklist for the deviation of the Stoxx 600 from its moving average, as it is now at the +10% extreme that we defined as being potentially bond-bullish as it could foreshadow a near-term correction of an overheated stock market. Chart 9Still Generally A Risk-Seeking Backdrop In The U.S. Chart 10Strong Risk-Seeking Behavior In Europe Bond markets no longer look technically stretched. The sharp move higher in yields at the end of 2016 left all our indicators of yield momentum at bearish extremes (for bond prices). With bond yields pulling back from 2017 highs, however, the momentum measures all look neutral at the moment and are not an impediment to higher yields (Charts 11 & 12). The same goes for duration positioning in the U.S., with the net longs on 10-year Treasury futures now at the highest level since 2007. All of the technical indicators in our Checklists warrant an "check". Chart 11UST Technicals No##BR##Longer Stretched Chart 12Technicals Are No Impediment##BR##To Higher Yields In Europe Summing it all up, our Duration Checklists show that the majority of indicators are still pointing to higher bond yields in the U.S. and Europe, although not as decisively as when we first published the Checklists in February. There are more "check" on the European side of the ledger, however, suggesting that there is more room for European government bond yields to rise relative to U.S. Treasuries. This would indicate a potential trade opportunity to cut allocations to Europe and raise allocations to the U.S. Chart 13UST-Bund Spread Is Now Too Low The recent decline in U.S. yields, however, has narrowed the U.S. Treasury/German Bund spread to levels that make putting on a tightening trade unattractive on a tactical basis. (Chart 13). The gap between the data surprise indices in the U.S. and Euro Area already reflects the recent soft patch for the U.S. economy (middle panel). That spread in the surprise indices now at historically wide levels, suggesting more potential for Treasury yields to rise if the U.S. data begins to rebound soon, as we expect. Also, the gap between U.S. and Euro Area inflation expectations has narrowed alongside the recent downtick in U.S. core inflation (bottom panel), although we expect the decline in U.S. core inflation to be short-lived given the persistent tightness of the U.S. labor market. Net-net, we would prefer to see a wider Treasury-Bund spread before making switching our country exposure out of Europe and into the U.S. We can, however, listen to the message from our Checklists and reduce our duration exposure in Europe. Specifically, we are cutting our allocations to the longer maturity buckets (5 years out to 30 years) by 50% in our model portfolio for Germany, France and Italy, putting the proceeds into the 1-3 year buckets (see the table on Page 12). This will reduce our overall recommended portfolio duration by just over 1/10th of a year, as well as put an additional bear-steepening curve tilt within our European government allocations. We are comfortable with that bias, given the growing risk that the ECB will soon begin signaling a tapering of asset purchases once the current program expires at the end of the year. Bottom Line: An update of our Duration Checklists shows that the backdrop remains conducive to rising Euro Area bond yields, while the upward pressures on U.S. yields have diminished somewhat. The majority of the indicators, however, continue to point to higher U.S. Treasury and German Bund yields. Reduce European duration exposure, but wait for wider spread levels before moving out of European government bonds into U.S. Treasuries. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment", dated May 17 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "A Duration Checklist For U.S. Treasuries & German Bunds", dated February 15 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 3 Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate Of Unemployment. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Special Report

Dear Client, In addition to this Special Report, I am sending you our usual Weekly Report focusing on the market implications from the brewing crisis in the Trump White House. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Chart 1Commodity Prices: A Halting Comeback Commodity prices have managed to stage a halting comeback over the past two weeks, but still remain well below their highs for the year. Concerns over the Chinese economy, a withdrawal of speculative demand, and strong supply growth have all weighed on commodity prices. All three of these forces should ebb over the coming months. This should provide a more benign cyclical backdrop for commodities and commodity-related investment plays. We went long the December 2017 Brent futures contract two weeks ago. The trade is up 7.8% since then. Stick with it. The cyclical recovery in commodity prices will benefit DM commodity currencies such as the CAD, AUD, and NOK. Go short EUR/CAD. Feature What's Been Weighing On Commodities? Commodity prices have managed to stage a halting comeback over the past two weeks, but still remain well below their highs for the year (Chart 1). We see three reasons why commodities have struggled to gain traction over the past few months: Fears that the Chinese economy is losing growth momentum have intensified. Traders have soured on the commodity complex, causing speculative demand to fizzle. Skepticism about OPEC's ability to maintain production discipline has been running high. All three of these forces should ebb over the coming months. This should provide a more benign cyclical backdrop for commodities and commodity-related investment plays. Global Growth: An Uneven Picture After a strong end to 2016, global growth so far this year has been mixed. The euro area has continued to hum along, with real GDP increasing by 2% in Q1 on an annualized basis. Japanese growth clocked in at 2.2% in Q1. This marked the fifth consecutive quarter of positive growth - the first time this has happened in 11 years! In contrast, U.K. growth slowed to 1.2% in Q1, while the U.S. registered a disappointing 0.7% growth print. As discussed in the Weekly Report that accompanies this Special Report, the U.S. economy is likely to bounce back over the remainder of the year, notwithstanding the ongoing soap opera that has become the Trump presidency. However, even if that happens, traders have become increasingly concerned that stronger U.S. growth will be offset by weaker growth in China. China Growth Risks Back In Focus All four Chinese purchasing manager indices fell in April (Chart 2). This week's data releases saw below-consensus growth in industrial production, retail sales, and fixed asset investment. Tighter financial conditions have contributed to the recent growth shortfall (Chart 3). The PBoC has drained excess liquidity over the past few months, causing overnight rates to rise. Corporate bond yields have surged while Chinese small cap stocks have taken it on the chin. The slowdown in Chinese growth is a cause for concern, but some perspective is in order. The economy began the year on a strong footing. Nominal GDP increased by 11.8% in Q1, compared with 9.6% in Q4 of 2016. Real GDP rose by 6.9% in the first quarter, comfortably above the government's target of 6.5%. A modest slowdown from these levels is not surprising. Most indicators point to an economy that is still expanding at a decent clip. Export growth is accelerating and our China team's model suggests that this will remain the case, thanks to solid global demand and a competitive RMB (Chart 4). America's latest anti-dumping measures on some Chinese steel products are irrelevant from a big picture point of view, as U.S. steel imports from China only account for a mere 1% of Chinese steel output. Chart 2China: PMIs Falling Across The Board Chart 3Financial Conditions Have Tightened In China Chart 4China: The Rebound In Exports Should Continue Meanwhile, fixed investment is benefiting from an upturn in the profit cycle. Chart 5 shows that excavator sales, railway freight traffic, and the PBoC's Entrepreneur Confidence Index - all leading indicators for Chinese capex - are surging. Even the housing market is well positioned to withstand some policy tightening. Land purchases by developers have rebounded and the most recent central bank survey showed that households' home-buying intentions jumped to an all-time high in the first quarter (Chart 6). Chart 5Positive Signs For Chinese Capex... Chart 6...And The Housing Market Efforts Focused On Containing Financial Risk Most of the government's tightening measures have been designed to reduce financial sector risks while inflicting as little collateral damage on the economy as possible. So far, this strategy appears to be working: While broad credit growth has slowed from a high of 25.7% in January 2016 to 15.5% in April of 2017, almost all of that was due to a deceleration in borrowing by non-bank financial institutions. The pace of lending to nonfinancial private borrowers and the government - the so-called "real economy" - has barely fallen from last year. In fact, medium- and long-term loans to the corporate sector, a key driver of overall capital spending, have accelerated (Chart 7). The inversion of the Chinese yield curve largely reflects these macroprudential measures. The spread between 10-year and 5-year government bond yields turned negative last week, the first time this has ever happened (Chart 8). Chart 7China: Credit Growth To The Real EconomyBarely Affected By Tightening Measures Chart 8Chinese Yield Curve Inversion Some pundits have interpreted this development as an omen of a coming recession. However, there is a less dramatic explanation: Up until recently, non-bank financial institutions have been issuing so-called wealth management products like crazy. According to Moody's, the outstanding value of these products soared from U.S. $72 billion in 2007 to $4.2 trillion in the first quarter of 2017. The crackdown on shadow banking has forced many participants to liquidate their positions which, in many cases, included substantial leveraged holdings of government bonds. Since 5-year bonds are less liquid than their 10-year counterparts, yields on the former have increased more than on the latter. The Commodity Connection While the data is sketchy, it appears that Chinese non-bank financial institutions have been major players in the commodities market. As funding to these institutions - and their clients - dried up, panic selling of commodity futures contracts ensued. This withdrawal of Chinese investment demand for commodity markets began at time when, globally, long speculative positions were highly elevated. Chart 9 shows that net long spec positions as a share of open interest for energy and industrial commodities reached the highest levels in over a decade earlier this year. Today, speculative positioning has returned to more normal levels. This reduces the risk of a further downdraft in commodity prices. At the same time, the Chinese authorities appear to be relaxing some of their earlier tightening measures. The PBoC re-started its Medium-Term Lending Facility (MLF) earlier this week. It also made the largest one-day cash injection into the financial system in nearly four months on Tuesday. This follows the release of stronger-than-expected credit numbers for April, as well as Premier Li Keqiang's call over the weekend for "striking a balance" between enhancing financial stability and maintaining growth. Adding to the newfound easing bias, general government fiscal spending is now recovering (Chart 10). Chart 9Commodities: Long Speculative Positions Returning To More Normal Levels Chart 10China: Fiscal Spending Is On The Mend Oil Supply Should Tighten Chart 11Oil Inventories Should Decline Tighter supply conditions in various parts of the commodity complex should reinforce the upward pressure on prices stemming from firming demand. This is especially true for crude oil. Saudi Arabia and Russia announced earlier this week that they will support an extension of output cuts through to March 2018. Despite a sharp recovery in shale output, BCA's energy strategists expect global production to increase by only 0.5 MMB/d in 2017 compared to 1.5 MMB/d growth in consumption. Consequently, oil inventories should fall over the remainder of this year. Inventory draws will continue through 2018, albeit at a slower pace than in 2017 (Chart 11). Larger-than-expected declines in U.S. oil inventories over the past two weeks, along with a steep reduction in the volume of oil held in tanker ships (so-called "floating storage"), suggest that this trend has already begun. Some Investment Implications Fading fears about a China slowdown and a tighter supply picture will lift commodity prices over the remainder of the year. We went long the December 2017 Brent futures contract two weeks ago. The trade is up 7.8% since then. We are targeting a further 10% in upside from current levels. The cyclical recovery in commodity prices will benefit the stocks and bonds of companies within the resource sector. It will also benefit DM commodity currencies such as the CAD, AUD, and NOK. In addition, rising commodity prices will provide a tailwind to emerging markets, although Fed rate hikes and the occasional political scandal (here's looking at you, Brazil!) will take some bloom off the rose. The prospect of higher commodity prices supports our recommendation to be overweight euro area stocks relative to U.S. equities. The IMF estimates that the European economy is three-times more sensitive to changes in EM growth than the U.S. (Chart 12).1 If higher commodity prices give emerging markets a boost, this will help Europe's large industrial exporting companies. Calculations by JP Morgan suggest that petrostate sovereign wealth funds hold five times more European equities than U.S. stocks, even though European stocks account for less than half the global market capitalization of U.S. stocks.2 These funds are especially exposed to European financials and consumer discretionary names. Higher oil prices would give them greater scope to add to their favorite positions. What about EUR/USD? The run-up in the euro over the past few weeks was partly driven by the unwinding of sizable short hedges that traders put on in the lead up to the French elections. At this point, euro positioning has moved from being highly bearish to broadly neutral. Going forward, fundamentals will play the dominant role. On the one hand, an outperforming euro area equity market should attract foreign capital into the region, giving the common currency a boost. On the other hand, interest rate differentials will continue to move in favor of the dollar. As we discussed last week, the Fed is likely to raise rates by more than the 38 basis points that markets are currently pricing in over the next 12 months.3 In contrast, the ECB is likely to stand pat, given that the rate of labor underutilization is still 18% in the euro area, 3.5 percentage points higher than in 2008 (Chart 13). If anything, rising inflation expectations in the euro area could cause real short-term rates to decline, putting downward pressure on the euro. Chart 12Europe Is More Sensitive To EM Chart 13Labor Market Slack In The Euro Area Remains High Our research indicates that real interest rate differentials are by far the most important drivers of currency returns over cyclical horizons of around 12 months. The decline in the dollar over the past few weeks has occurred alongside an increase in real rate differentials between the U.S. and its trading partners. Notably, two-year real rate differentials have widened by 47 basis points versus the euro area since the end of March, even though the dollar has actually weakened against the euro over this timeframe (Chart 14). Thus, a period of "catch-up strength" for the dollar is in order. We continue to expect EUR/USD to reach parity by the end of the year. With all this in mind, we are opening a new trade today: Short EUR/CAD (Chart 15). Chart 14Widening Real Rate Differentials Support The Dollar Chart 15Play The Cyclical Recovery In Oil Via The EUR/CAD Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "IMF Multilateral Policy issue Report: 2014 Spillover Report," IMF, dated July 29, 2014. 2 Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou, Nandini Srivastava, Jigar Vakharia, and Mika Inkinen, "Flows & Liquidity," J.P.Morgan Global Asset Allocation (January 29, 2016). 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Dilemma," dated May 12, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The political theater in Washington has caused the last inning of the dollar correction to materialize. The U.S. economy remains at full employment, growth will stay above trend, and the Fed will be capable of hiking rates by more than the 66 basis points priced into the OIS curve over the next 24 months. It is time to buy the DXY. Investors are too optimistic on the euro and too negative on the CAD, short EUR/CAD as a tactical bet. The Swedish economy continues to improve. Yet, the SEK has limited upside as the Riksbank continues to find excuses to justify its dovishness. The downside for EUR/SEK is limited to 9.3. Feature Chart I-1Trump Rally Is Gone Four weeks ago, we wrote that the U.S. dollar correction was entering its last inning and recommended investors should wait a few more weeks before betting on renewed dollar strength.1 We think the time to bet on this rebound is now. To begin with, the dollar index has now erased all the gains accumulated since Trump's electoral victory, suggesting that all the hope of fiscal stimulus, deregulation, and tax cuts have now been priced out of the greenback (Chart I-1). In fact, at this point in time we think too many risks have been priced into the dollar. For one, the market is overemphasizing the likelihood of a Trump impeachment. While our Geopolitical Strategy group does think the likelihood of an impeachment procedure is near 100% if the democrats win the House in 2018, the likelihood remains much lower in 2017.2 Simply put, Trump remains a very popular president among republican voters (Chart I-2). Most problematic for many republicans that would like to see Trump out of office, is that his popularity is particularly strong among the "Tea Party" districts and voters (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Trump Still Popular With Republicans Chart I-3Trump Is Popular In Tea Party Territory Second, the chance that tax cuts are part of the upcoming budget negations is high. Tax cuts are espoused by the entire GOP caucus. Additionally, Republicans know that in order to avoid losing the Senate or the House of Representatives, or both, they have to do something popular with voters. Tax cuts definitely fit the bill. This simple political assessment points toward a likely passage of stimulus in the coming quarters despite Trump's personal woes. Finally, if Trump were to be stabbed in the back by the GOP establishment, what would the impact be on the dollar? Would the U.S. default? No. Would the economy enter a recession? No. Would the Fed become dovish? Neither. If anything, a potential removal of Trump from the oval office reduces the risk that he appoints a super-dove at the helm of the Fed, a risk that would have been very negative for our positive dollar cyclical stance. Regarding the economics behind the dollar rally, our positive cyclical stance on the USD predates the election of Trump, and in fact relied on the underlying shifts in the U.S. economy.3 These dynamics are still intact: While wage growth remains anemic, this partly reflects the fact that the long-term determinant of wage growth, productivity growth, is low. When this is taken into account, productivity-adjusted wage growth is in line with levels that in the past have prompted the Fed to tighten policy in order to combat potential inflationary dynamics (Chart I-4). Nonetheless, the risk is that wages begin accelerating going forward. The labor market is at full employment, with the U-3 unemployment rate standing 0.3 percentage points below the Fed's estimate of the neutral unemployment rate. Additionally, hidden labor market slack has also greatly dissipated (Chart I-5), with the U-6 unemployment rate, the number of workers in part-time jobs for economic reasons, and the amount of workers outside of the labor force but that would still like to have a job if economic conditions warranted it all back to levels where historically wage growth has gained momentum. Chart I-4Without Productivity Gains, Current Wage##br## Growth Is Enough For A Tighter Fed Chart I-5U.S. Labor Market##br## Is Tight Moreover, the outlook for consumption remains sturdy. Overall household income growth remains supported by elevated levels of job creation, and our indicator for real household disposable income growth continues to point up. Additionally, Federal income tax withholdings are accelerating, a sign of more robust consumption to come (Chart I-6). With consumer confidence at 17-year highs, positive income developments are likely to be translated into consumption. The outlook for capex is also bright. CEO confidence and capex intentions have all rebounded sharply, moves whose genesis predate Trump's election (Chart I-7). Moreover, elements are in place for these positive feelings to be catalyzed into actual investment. On the back of rebounding revenue growth, thanks to nominal GDP growth exiting levels historically associated with recessions, profit growth will receive a fillip, which should boost capex in the current context (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Income Tax Receipts Points ##br##To Healthy Consumption Chart I-7Capex Intentions Point ##br##To Higher Growth Chart I-8Revenue Growth Exiting ##br##Recessionary Levels Finally, when all major indicators are aggregated, real GDP growth looks set to accelerate. BCA's Beige Book diffusion index, based on the distribution of positive and negative mentions about the state of the economy in the Fed's Beige Book, is pointing to an acceleration in activity (Chart I-9). This suggests that the collapse in U.S. economic surprises may be toward its tail end. With this in mind, we continue to expect the Fed to increase rates more than the 66 basis points currently anticipated in the OIS curve over the next two years, as such, this supports our bullish stance on the dollar. In terms of tactical developments, the recent selloff has brought the DXY toward the levels congruent with the end of the correction.4 Additionally, based on our Intermediate-term timing model, the USD is now cheap enough to justify taking a long bet on the currency. The deeply oversold levels reached by our Intermediate-term momentum oscillator supports this message (Chart I-10). Finally, the Swedish Krona seems to be confirming these signposts. USD/SEK has historically displayed one of the strongest betas to the trade-weighted dollar's movements. The fact that this pair has not been able to break down below a long-term upward slopping trend line put in place since 2014, and that it also managed to stay above its 2015 peaks, gives us more confidence that the dollar correction is likely to have run its course (Chart I-11). Chart I-9BCA's Beige Book Monitor ##br##Improves Growth Will Strengthen Chart I-10Dollar Is ##br##Oversold Chart I-11USD/SEK Giving A Hopeful##br## Signal For DXY Bottom Line: The dollar has taken a beating in the wake of the scandals emerging out of the White House. In our view, these developments were only the catalyst that crystalized the last leg of the USD correction that begun in late 2016/early 2017. Ultimately, the bull case for the dollar predates Trump and rests on the dissipating slack in the U.S. economy. These developments are intact, even with Trump's fiascos in the foreground. Tactically, the dollar is now cheap enough and oversold enough to justify investors buy the DXY again. We are opening a long DXY trade this week. We remain long the dollar against most commodity currencies and EM currencies. The yen may continue to benefit if the budding weaknesses in the EM space gather further momentum. EUR/CAD Is A Short At this juncture, it would be natural for us to begin shorting the EUR against the USD. In fact, we believe the recent spike in the EUR has created a good shorting opportunity against the European currency. While we worry investors are becoming too pessimistic on the U.S., we believe investors are too optimistic regarding the capacity of the ECB to increase rates. Investors moved away from deep short positions on the euro and are now net long this currency. Also, while in July 2016 investors expected the first ECB rate hike to materialize in more than five years' time, they are now expecting the first repo rate hike to happen in just 24 months (Chart I-12). This looks premature. For comparison's sake, in the U.S. we are only seeing the early signs of labor market tightness, despite the last recession ending in the summer of 2009. Europe was victim to a double-dip recession, the last leg of which ended in 2013. This decreases the likelihood of Europe being at full employment today. More concretely, there remains plenty of hidden labor market slack in the euro area. In Europe, the main form of slack exists among workers hired under contracts, contracts that do not offer the same level of benefits and protections as regular employment. The euro area increasingly has a dual labor market, a condition that has weighed on wage growth for more than two decades in Japan. Today, as a result of such dynamics, the level of labor underutilization in Europe is still very elevated, which will continue to limit wage growth going forward (Chart I-13). Hence, core inflation dynamics in Europe are likely to prove disappointing and they will keep the ECB on a more dovish path than investors currently appreciate. Chart I-12Investors Too Optimistic On The ECB Chart I-13Labor Market Slack In The Euro Area Remains High For now we are electing to profit from this view by tactically shorting the euro against the CAD. We do believe there are problems in Canada, a topic we discussed a few weeks ago.5 But at this juncture, these worries seem well digested by markets. The Home Capital Group debacle has been front page news for weeks, but the aggregate banking sector remains strong, especially as loses on the mortgage holdings of Canadian banks will ultimately be passed on to the government through the insurance provided by the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation. Additionally, in the wake of the deepening trade dispute on softwood lumber, the fears of a disintegration of NAFTA have hit Canada especially violently, with the CAD falling 16% against the peso since January 2017. Chart I-14EUR/CAD Is Toppy Tactically, the pieces are falling into place to favor the CAD over the EUR. Our Commodity and Energy group remains positive on the outlook for oil prices. The continuation of the output controls by OPEC and Russia remains binding as oil producers want to further curtail elevated oil inventories. Therefore, oil prices have little downside and may even experience further upside, helping the CAD in the process. Additionally, investor positioning is very skewed. Investors are massively short the CAD, especially when compared to the euro, which historically has provided a signal to short EUR/CAD (Chart I-14). This is re-enforced by our Intermediate-term technical indicator which shows EUR/CAD as massively overbought. Shorter-term momentum measures such as the RSI or the MACD have also been forming negative divergences with actual prices in recent days. Bottom Line: The euro is likely to suffer if the USD correction is indeed finishing. Hidden labor market slack remains a much deeper problem in Europe than in the U.S. and will limit the capacity of the ECB to increase rates in the next two years, as investors are currently expecting. For now, we are electing to short the euro against the CAD instead of against the USD. The Canadian dollar is oversold and oil prices have limited downside from here as supply adjustments remain positive. Moreover, investors are at record shorts on the CAD, especially when compared to the euro. Sweden Is Strong, But The Riksbank Still Haunts The SEK The long-term outlook for both Sweden and the Swedish krona remain bright but the ultra-dovish stance of the Riksbank remains a potent short-term hurdle. To begin with, the SEK offers great value. Not only is it trading at 24% and 8% discounts to its PPP fair value against the USD and the EUR, respectively, but the trade-weight SEK is also trading at a near one-sigma discount against our long-term fair value models (Chart I-15). Chart I-15SEK Is Cheap... But Is It Enough? Additionally, Sweden's net international investment position has moved back in positive territory in 2014, and now stands 16.4% of GDP (Chart I-16). This is not only a reflection of the weakness in the SEK since 2014, but is first and foremost the end-result of more than two decades of accumulated current account surpluses. This development is crucial. Not only does the positive income balance generated by assets in excess of international liabilities put a floor under the current account; historically, currencies with positive and growing net international investment positions tend to exhibit an upward bias. In terms of economic developments, employment growth in Sweden remains steady. Unemployment has been in a protracted downtrend, falling 2.9 percentage points since 2008 (Chart I-17). Yet, despite being well into full employment territory, wage growth has been absent. To a large degree, this reflects entrenched deflationary pressures in the Swedish economy. However, deflationary forces are abating. Chart I-16A Long-Term Driver Pointing North Chart I-17Swedish Labor Market At Full Employment To begin with, Sweden's output gap has recently entered positive territory, which historically has been a reliable indicator of inflationary pressures in this country (Chart I-18). Also, monetary aggregates, M1 in particular, continue to point toward higher inflation in Sweden. This means that with the employment market being at full capacity, the conditions for higher inflation in Sweden are emerging. Our expectation of an upcoming upturn in the Swedish credit impulse - which until now has been contracting and exerting deflationary forces on the economy - reinforces confidence in our inflation view. Credit growth tends to lag industrial activity, but our industrial production model for Sweden is perking up. Improving industrial variables suggest that credit will move from depressing demand back to supporting demand, further rekindling inflationary forces (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Swedish Inflation Is Set To Pick Up Chart I-19Swedish Credit Impulse Will Rebound With this positive backdrop for prices, should investors buy the SEK right now? The Riksbank continues to represent a great hurdle for SEK bulls. The Swedish central bank has one of the strongest dovish biases amongst global monetary guardians. Against expectations, it recently increased the duration of its asset purchase program, giving markets a strong signal that it is unlikely to increase rates soon. This means that the Riksbank is unlikely to tighten policy until it sees the "whites of inflation's eyes". While we are moving in the right direction, we are not there yet. Officially, the Riksbank targets CPIF, which currently clocks in at 2%. Yet, the emphasis of the central bank on domestic price dynamics implies that adjustment away from dovishness will only occur when core inflation itself moves to 2% (Chart I-20). This means that gains in the SEK will be limited. To begin with, EUR/SEK does have downside, and our view that the euro is getting overextended highlights that EUR/SEK could fall toward 9.3. However, beyond this level, gains should prove limited as Sweden is a small open economy and EUR/SEK plays a big role in tightening monetary conditions for that country. As a result, any move in EUR/SEK below 9.3 is likely to be unwelcomed by the Riksbank until core inflation moves closer to 2%. Versus the USD, it will be even more difficult for the SEK to rally. Historically, the SEK has been one of the most sensitive currencies to the dollar's trend, implying that strength in DXY could be magnified in USD/SEK. In fact, the absence of breakdown in USD/SEK in the face of violent dollar selling pressures this week suggests that the SEK could be a serious casualty of a rebounding dollar. Additionally, real rate differentials continue to move in favor of the U.S. dollar, with U.S. 2-year real rates now 180 basis points above that of Sweden (Chart I-21). With the Intermediate-term technical indicator for USD/SEK now hitting oversold levels, the downside for USD/SEK is very limited, further supporting the idea that any rebound in DXY could lead to significant weaknesses in SEK. Chart I-20Core Inflation Needs To Rise Chart I-21Rates Differentials Support A Lower SEK Bottom Line: The Swedish economy has adjusted and several factors are pointing toward a pickup in core inflation in the coming quarters. However, the Riksbank has maintained a strong dovish bias. We need to see an actual pick up in core inflation itself before the central bank moves away from its dovish bias. While EUR/SEK could weaken toward 9.3, more gains for the krona against the euro will prove elusive until the Riksbank sees firmer inflation. USD/SEK is a buy at current levels. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant HaarisA@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction”, dated April 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled “Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment”, dated May 17, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “Dollar: The Great Redistributor”, dated October 7, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction”, dated April 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “AUD and CAD: Risky Business”, dated March 10, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The past week has been quite eventful for the greenback, slipping almost 2.3%. Most of the downside is owed to markets revising down rate expectations, on the basis of weak growth numbers and political scandals. The 10-year yield dropped, gold rose, and equities fell. There was also a large sell-off in EM currencies and a sharp appreciation in the yen. Furthermore, the soft patch in U.S. data continued as housing starts and building permits came in especially weak in April: 1.172 million and 1.229 million respectively, both underperforming consensus. Nevertheless, markets calmed after the release of stronger employment numbers with initial and continuing jobless claims beating expectations. The upswing in the Philly Fed index also helped revive sentiment. The dollar picked up Thursday morning following these releases. Interestingly, the DXY is at pre-election levels, which suggests that the dollar is nearing its bottom. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The euro has enjoyed significant upside as a result of Macron's victory and the dollar's drubbing. Weak data in the U.S. caused markets to revise growth expectations, pressuring the dollar downwards and the euro up. Further lifting the euro were comments by ECB President Mario Draghi, who highlighted that growth in the euro area is performing well. However, he also reiterated that "it is too early to declare success". These forces have lifted the euro to expensive levels on a tactical basis, suggesting the path of least resistance is most likely down as the ECB will find it hard to tighten policy and the dollar resumes its bull market. Data in the euro area has been mixed as of late without too much disappointment, and inflationary pressured remain unchanged. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 After coming slightly above 114, USD/JPY has plunged by more than 3%, as a result of the market pricing increasing odds that president Trump will get impeached. Although we believe that the correction of the dollar has run its course, the end of the Trump trade might have triggered the sell-off we have been expecting in emerging markets. Thus we like to play this risk off period by shorting NZD/JPY. On the data side, news have mostly been negative: Machinery orders contracted by 0.7% YoY, underperforming expectations. Consumer confidence came in lower than last month at 43.2. Bank lending grew by a measly 3% YoY underperforming expectations. However, real GDP for Q1 came in at 0.5% QoQ, beating expectations. This was dampened by the weak GDP deflator, which contracted by tk%. We continue to be yen bears on a cyclical basis, as the fed will raise rates more than the markets expects, while the BoJ will continue anchoring 10-year yields around zero. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K has been mixed: Industrial Production growth came in at 1.4%, underperforming expectations. However retail sales and retail sales ex-fuel growth came in at 4% and 4.5% respectively, both outpacing expectations. Crucially, both core and headline inflation came above expectations at 2.4% and 2.7% respectively. This surge in inflation is important as it raises the odds of a BoE hike this year, especially as the economy remains resilient. Moreover, as long term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored consumption is likely to continue to surprise as households are looking through the inflation caused by the depreciation in the pound. Overall, we continue to be positive on GBP against all other currencies but the U.S. dollar, given that the British economy will likely stay more resilient than investors are anticipating. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The RBA shed some light on the Australian economy through its most recent Minutes, highlighting that monetary policy needs to remain accommodative to support economic trends. It noted the negative hit to terms of trade as a result of Cyclone Debbie curtailing coking coal exports. China's housing market was also identified as a risk to Australia's exports and terms of trade. Nevertheless, this week the AUD was buoyant, helped by a weaker greenback. However, the factors above paint a bleak picture for the AUD's future. The very important employment figures depicted a similar trend to that of last year, with full-time employment in fact contracting while part-time employment picked up. Unemployment also declined by 0.2% to 5.7%, however, wages remain subdued. This corroborates the weaker core CPI measure of 1.5%, while the strong headline figure of 2.1% is likely to be transitory when the recent commodity-prices weakness kicks in. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The RBNZ continues to much more accommodative than warranted. The monetary policy report highlighted that the recent surge in inflation is mainly attributable to tradables, and that non-tradable inflation is bound to increase very gradually. We continue to believe that the RBNZ is understating the inflationary pressures in the economy, as core inflation is already higher than 2%. Additionally, retail sales are growing at 10-year high and nominal GDP growth has skyrocketed to 7.5%, by far the highest in the G10. Right now, the market expects the first rate hike to come in 9 months. We believe that a rate hike at this point would be the bare minimum for the RBNZ to avoid an overheating in the economy. Thus expectations have nowhere to go than up and the NZD now has considerable upside against the AUD. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 USD/CAD has been somewhat weaker this past week as oil prices rebounded and the dollar fell. Oil prices are likely to see further upside as OPEC and Russia are likely to agree to another supply cut to support oil prices. Domestically, the economy is improving as unemployment is declining and PMIs are perking up. The BoC also identified the output gap to close earlier than expected in its last meeting. The almost 4% depreciation in the CAD in the past month has made the oil-based currency considerably cheap. When looking at EUR/CAD, the depreciation has been around 7.5%. With the euro now sitting in expensive territory, the ECB is unlikely to change its stance any time soon as inflation has not yet rooted itself, while peripheral economies' inflation remain weak. The CAD, however, is likely to see further upside on the back of increasing oil prices and a strengthening economy. These factors warrant a short EUR/CAD trade. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 And CAD: Risky Business -AUD March 10, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Following the election of Emmanuel Macron as the new president of France EUR/CHF skyrocketed, coming close to hitting 1.1. At this point EUR/CHF is a very attractive short, given that good news for the euro are likely to tapper now that the French election is behind us. When it comes to inflation, the ECB will likely focus on the lowest denominator, because in spite of higher inflation in some countries like Germany or Austria, inflationary pressures remain muted in most other economies. This will prevent the ECB from tightening monetary policy as fast as the market expects. Meanwhile, the possibilities that the SNB takes the floor off EUR/CHF at the end of this year or the beginning of 2018 are rising given that inflation and economic activity are slowly coming back to Switzerland. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK has depreciated in the past weeks thanks to the fall in the dollar as well as rising oil prices. Additionally, the fall in inflation is slowing down, with core and headline inflation coming in at 1.7% and 2.2% respectively. Is it time to become bullish on the NOK against the U.S. dollar? We do not believe this is the case. While inflation might be close to bottoming it is unlikely to surpass the Norges Bank target in the coming years, given that inflationary pressures remain muted in Norway. Furthermore, given that USD/NOK is more sensitive to real rate differentials than oil prices, the effect of a dovish Norges Bank on USD/NOK will be much stronger than the impact of rising oil prices. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 We expect the SEK to experience limited upside in the next 3-6 months. The Greenback is bottoming and we expect USD/SEK to pick up on the back of the dollar bull market. Furthermore, EUR/SEK has limited downside as the RIksbank wants to keep monetary conditions easy. Indeed, the Swedish central bank is also planning to officially target CPIF instead of the CPI. While both of these measures are near 2%, the behavior of the Riksbank suggests that it is in fact targeting core inflation. Core inflation itself is still somewhat depressed, as consumer activity remains weak. However, we expect core inflation to pick up on the back of a higher credit impulse and money supply growth, which should help the Riksbank exit its dovish tilt later this year. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades