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Highlights Chart 1Checklist To Buy Credit The sell-off in spread product continued through the holiday season, but with spreads now looking more attractive, it is time to consider increasing exposure to corporate credit. Much like in 2015/16, spread widening is being driven by the combination of weaker global growth and the perception of restrictive monetary policy. With that in mind, we are monitoring a checklist of global growth and monetary policy indicators to help us decide when to step back in.1 With the market now pricing-in rate cuts for the next 12 months, monetary policy indicators already signal a buying opportunity (Chart 1). However, before increasing spread product exposure from neutral to overweight we are waiting for a signal from our high frequency global growth indicators. The CRB Raw Industrials index has so far only flattened off (Chart 1, top panel). It started to rise prior to the early-2016 peak in credit spreads. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 6-12 month investment horizon, and a neutral allocation to spread product for now. We expect to upgrade spread product in the near future as global growth indicators stabilize. Stay tuned. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 106 basis points in December. The index option-adjusted spread widened 16 bps on the month to reach 153 bps. Corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 320 bps in 2018, making it the worst year for corporate bond performance since 2011. Recent poor performance has restored some value to the corporate bond sector. The 12-month breakeven spread for Baa-rated debt has only been wider 37% of the time since 1988 (Chart 2). As a result, we are actively looking for an opportunity to increase exposure to corporate bonds. Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview To assess when to raise exposure from neutral to overweight, we are monitoring a checklist of indicators related to global growth and monetary policy.2 While current spread levels present an attractive tactical entry point, spreads may not re-tighten all the way back to their post-crisis lows. Corporate profit growth far outpaced debt growth during the past year causing our measure of gross leverage to fall (panel 4), but a stronger dollar and rising wage bill will weigh on profit growth in 2019. We expect gross corporate leverage to rise in 2019.   High-Yield: Neutral High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 366 basis points in December. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 108 bps, and currently sits at 498 bps. High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 363 bps in 2018, making it the worst year for high-yield excess returns since 2015. Our measure of the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for expected default losses is currently 394 bps, well above average historical levels (Chart 3). In other words, if corporate defaults match the Moody’s baseline forecast for the next 12 months, high-yield bonds will return 394 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries, assuming no change in spreads. If we factor in enough spread compression to bring the default-adjusted spread back to its historical average, then we get a 12-month expected excess return of 814 bps. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview For a different perspective on valuation, we can also calculate the default rate necessary for High-Yield to deliver 12-month excess returns in line with the historical average. As of today, this spread-implied default rate is 4.58%, well above the 2.64% default rate anticipated by Moody’s (panel 4). Junk bond value is definitely attractive, and as stated on the front page of this report, we are looking for an opportunity to tactically upgrade the sector. That being said, the uptrend in job cut announcements makes it likely that default rate forecasts will be revised higher in 2019 (bottom panel). At present, spreads appear to offer enough of a buffer to absorb these upward revisions. MBS: Neutral Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 basis points in December. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread widened 8 bps on the month, driven by a 7 bps increase in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and a 1 bp widening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). MBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 59 bps in 2018. The zero-volatility spread widened 12 bps on the year, split between a 10 bps widening in the OAS and a 2 bps increase in the option cost. Lower mortgage rates during the past two months spurred a small jump in refinancings, but this increase will prove fleeting. Interest rates are poised to move higher in 2019, and higher rates will limit mortgage refi activity and keep a lid on MBS spreads (Chart 4). Chart 4MBS Market Overview All in all, with higher interest rates likely to limit refinancings, and with mortgage lending standards still easing from restrictive levels (bottom panel), the macro back-drop for MBS remains supportive. Elevated corporate bond spreads currently offer a better opportunity than those in the MBS space, but the supportive macro back-drop means that there is very low risk of significant MBS spread widening during the next 12 months. We maintain a neutral allocation to MBS for now, and will only look to upgrade the sector as the credit cycle matures and it becomes time to adopt an underweight allocation to corporate credit. For the time being, corporate bonds are the more attractive play. Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 31 basis points in December, and by 80 bps in 2018. Sovereign debt underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 77 bps in December and by 263 bps in 2018. Sovereign spreads still appear unattractive compared to similarly-rated U.S. corporate spreads (Chart 5). Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Foreign Agencies underperformed by 24 bps in December and by 152 bps in 2018. Local Authorities underperformed by 86 bps in December and by 75 bps in 2018. Domestic Agencies underperformed by 7 bps in December and by 6 bps in 2018. Supranationals outperformed by 3 bps in December and by 22 bps in 2018. In a recent report we looked at USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign debt by country and found that only a few nations offer excess spread compared to equivalently-rated U.S. corporates.3 Those countries are Argentina, Turkey, Lebanon and Ukraine at the low-end of the credit spectrum and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE at the upper-end. We continue to view the Local Authority sector as very attractive. The sector offers similar value to Aa/A-rated corporate debt on a breakeven spread basis (bottom panel), and it is also dominated by taxable municipal securities that are insulated from weak foreign economic growth. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 114 basis points in December, and by 17 bps in 2018 (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio rose 2% in December, and currently sits at 87% (Chart 6). This is about one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean but above the average of 81% that prevailed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview In our research into the phases of the credit cycle, we often divide the cycle based on the slope of the yield curve. Since 1983, in the middle phase of the credit cycle when the 3/10 Treasury slope is between 0 bps and +50 bps (where it stands today), investment grade corporate bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of -49 bps. In contrast, municipal bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of +45 bps before adjusting for the tax advantage.4 We attribute the pattern of mid-cycle outperformance to the fact that state & local government balance sheet health tends to lag the health of the corporate sector. At present, our Municipal Health Monitor remains in “improving health” territory, consistent with an environment where ratings upgrades will outpace downgrades (bottom panel). Meanwhile, corporations are already deep into the releveraging process. Treasury Curve: Favor The 2-Year Bullet Over The 1/5 Barbell Treasury yields fell sharply in December, but with only minor changes to the slope beyond the 2-year maturity point. The 2/10 slope was unchanged on the month and currently sits at 17 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 5 bps on the month and currently sits at 49 bps. The biggest changes in slope occurred for maturities less than 2 years, as a result of Fed rate hikes being completely priced out of the curve (Chart 7). Our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter fell from +44 bps at the beginning of the month to -11 bps currently. Meanwhile, our 24-month discounter fell from +41 bps to -23 bps. Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview As a result of the sharp 1/2 flattening, the 2-year note no longer appears cheap relative to the 1/5 barbell (panel 4). Alternatively, we could say that the 1/2/5 butterfly spread is now priced for 15 bps of 1/5 steepening during the next six months (bottom panel). In fact, our yield curve models now point to bullets being expensive relative to barbells for almost every butterfly spread combination (see Tables 4 and 5). This means it is currently less attractive to initiate curve steeper trades than flattener trades. Despite the relatively low yield pick-up in steepener trades, we think they still make sense at the moment given that the Treasury market is discounting an economic outlook that is far too grim. As we discussed in our Key Views report for 2019, sustainable yield curve inversion is unlikely until later in the year, after inflation expectations are re-anchored around pre-crisis levels.5 As such, we maintain our recommendation to favor the 2-year bullet over the duration-matched 1/5 barbell.  TIPS: Overweight TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 196 basis points in December, and by 175 bps in 2018. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 26 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.71%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate also fell 26 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.91%. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have fallen sharply alongside the prices of oil and other commodities during the past two months, as they continue to grapple with two competing forces: Falling commodity prices on the one hand, and U.S. core inflation that continues to print close to the Fed’s target on the other. Eventually, the decisive factor in the TIPS market will be core U.S. inflation continuing to print close to the Fed’s 2% target. This will drive both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates back into a range between 2.3% and 2.5%, once the headwind from weakening commodity prices has passed. This is reinforced by the fact that the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is now well below the fair value from our Adaptive Expectations Model (Chart 8).6 This model is based on a combination of long-run and short-run inflation measures and is premised on the idea that investors’ expectations take time to adjust to changing macro environments. In other words, the market will need to see core inflation print close to the Fed’s target for some time before deciding that it will remain there on a sustained basis. Chart 8Inflation Compensation ABS: Neutral Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 8 basis points in December, but outperformed by 13 bps in 2018. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened by 6 bps on the month and now stands at 48 bps, 14 bps above its pre-crisis low. The excess return Bond Map on page 15 shows that consumer ABS offer greater expected returns than Domestic Agencies and Supranationals, though with a commensurate increase in risk. The Map also shows that Agency CMBS offer very similar return potential with much less risk. The New York Fed’s most recent SCE Credit Access Survey showed a decline in consumer credit applications during the past year, as well as an increase in rejection rates. This is consistent with the observed uptrends in household interest expense and the consumer credit delinquency rate (Chart 9). Chart 9ABS Market Overview Going forward, consumer credit delinquencies will continue to rise from very low levels, but are unlikely to spike without a significant deterioration in labor market conditions. As such, we maintain a neutral allocation to consumer ABS for now, but our next move will likely be a reduction to underweight as consumer credit delinquencies rise further. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in December, but outperformed by 20 bps in 2018. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 14 bps on the month and currently sits at 92 bps (Chart 10). A typical negative environment for CMBS is characterized by tightening bank lending standards on commercial real estate loans as well as falling demand. The Fed’s Q3 Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that lending standards were close to unchanged and that demand deteriorated. All in all, a slightly negative macro picture for CMBS that will bear close monitoring in the coming quarters. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 bps in December, and by 2 bps in 2018. The index option-adjusted spread widened 4 bps on the month and currently sits at 60 bps. The Bond Maps on page 15 show that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low-risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this sector continues to make sense. Chart 10CMBS Market Overview The BCA Bond Maps The following page presents excess return and total return Bond Maps that we use to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Maps employ volatility-adjusted breakeven spread/yield analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Maps do not impose any macroeconomic view. The Excess Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the excess return Bond Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps in excess of Treasuries. The Total Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the total return Bond Map shows the number of days of average yield increase required for each sector to lose 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of yield increases and are therefore less likely to lose 5%. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average yield decline required for each sector to earn 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of yield decline and are therefore more likely to earn 5%.     Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation (As Of January 4, 2019)   Table 5Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs)   Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst JeremieP@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Charts 2A and 2B in U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed In 2019”, dated December 18, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For the full checklist please see Charts 2A and 2B from the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed In 2019”, dated December 18, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Oil Supply Shock Is A Risk For Junk”, dated October 9, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
The JPY may be cheap, but Japan’s core inflation remains well below the Bank of Japan’s objective, and shows little sign of hitting 2% within a reasonable period (see chart). The recent strength in the yen only re-enforces the inability of the BoJ to hit its…
As we have been arguing, the yen should be strong in the current environment, especially against the euro, the Australian dollar and high-yielding EM currencies. When global growth weakens and safe heaven yields fall, the yen benefits. Not only do Japanese…
However, our conviction level on this view is not high, and we are prepared to revise it if it looks like global growth is accelerating, an outcome that would limit any further dollar strength (our subjective dollar score currently stands at 70%, below the…
Actually, it is usually just bullish or bearish because most people regard neutral views as lacking in conviction and insight. Our chief global strategist thinks this incentive structure is counterproductive. Not only does it cause analysts to turn a blind…
Highlights Risk assets have had a rough go of it since we last published on December 17th: Equities have been through the wringer, spreads have widened sharply, and the 10-year Treasury yield has tumbled to an 11-month low. We don’t put much stock in the talk that the Fed is about to go too far, … : We still judge that the fed funds rate is comfortably shy of its equilibrium level. The economy will decelerate this year, but fiscal stimulus will keep it growing above trend. … and even if market-unfriendly policies merit a lower equity multiple, … : A bull market in Washington uncertainty is a recipe for a lower multiple, and there are no signs that policy uncertainty will ebb any time soon. … we think the time has come to put our cash overweight to work: Equities priced in a lot of bad news when the forward multiple fell below 14. If earnings hold up like we think they will, a recovery to the mid-15s would deliver a double-digit gain, and that merits an equity overweight relative to cash and bonds. Feature Thanks to Christmas Eve and New Year’s Eve falling on Mondays, we haven’t published since December 17th. A lot has happened in those three weeks, starting with the FOMC’s final 2018 meeting. As we’ve gathered our bearings and tried to set a course forward through the volatility, we’ve asked ourselves several questions about markets, policy and the economy. This week’s report reviews those questions, including the ones the clients we met three weeks ago might want to ask now. Is the expansion coming to an end? Not just yet; we still think it has at least a year to run. Following several uninspiring releases, the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow forecast of real final domestic demand has slipped to 3.3% from 3.8%, but it’s still 3.3%. That may seem too good to be true this late in the cycle, but that’s what 100 basis points of fiscal stimulus can do when injected into an economy already operating at full capacity. The IMF estimates there’s still another 40 basis points of stimulus coming in 2019, and we expect that that infusion will be enough to stave off the next recession until 2020 or beyond. Is the Fed about to make a policy mistake? We do not think so. Although the neutral, or equilibrium, policy rate is only observable after the fact, research from the head of the New York Fed holds that the FOMC is not on the verge of breaching the neutral threshold. The widely-followed Laubach-Williams model estimates that the real neutral rate is between 0.75 and 0.875%, or 2.75-2.875% in nominal terms.1 Our internal equilibrium fed funds rate model sees even more breathing room – it estimates that the (nominal) equilibrium rate is around 3%, and that it will rise to around 3⅜% by the end of the year. U.S. equities have been hypersensitive to perceived inflection points in monetary policy throughout the sell-off, which began roughly after Jay Powell said in an October 3rd interview that interest rates were “a long way from neutral.” Interestingly, though, the money market’s expectations never really budged. At the time of the Powell interview, it was pricing in a December hike to 2.50%, and a 40% chance of one more hike to 2.75%. It would take the probability of a 2.75% terminal rate up to 80% in early November, but it was again calling for a 40% chance of 2.75% when we were on the road during the two-day December meeting. It now puts the odds of an additional hike at just 4%, and says the Fed will have cut rates once by the middle of next year (Chart 1). Chart 1According To The Money Market, The Fed's Done We do not know what is behind the money market’s obstinacy, but we see an economy that has far more accommodation than it needs. While we think it’s inevitable that the Fed will tighten into a recession – that’s life with a blunt monetary policy instrument that works with long and uncertain lags – we don’t think it is on the verge of doing so. Fiscal stimulus will ensure that the U.S. economy grows above trend again this year, and there are no imbalances in housing2 or the other cyclical segments of the economy that would make the expansion particularly vulnerable (Chart 2). Elevated rates of job openings (Chart 3, middle panel) and job quits (Chart 3, bottom panel) indicate that the labor market will continue drawing in workers (Chart 3, top panel), supporting consumption and growth. Chart 2No Signs Of Overheating, ...   Chart 3... And The Jobs Outlook Is Strong You aren’t still calling for four rate hikes this year, are you? Let’s call it three, now that the market-driven tightening in financial conditions (Chart 4) has already done some of the work of cooling off the economy. We take the Fed at its word when it says its actions are data-driven, and we don’t think that it will pile on when credit spreads have shot up to their 2015 oil-collapse/shale-patch-distress levels (Chart 5) and equity prices have swooned. If credit spreads retraced meaningfully, and equities went back to making new highs, four hikes might come back into play. Conversely, if spreads continued to widen and took aim at their 2016 peaks, two hikes might become more likely than three. Given our expectations for spreads (they will not approach 2015-6’s quasi-recession levels, but corporate leverage is too high to support material narrowing), and equities (the S&P 500 will be hard-pressed to eclipse September’s high), our base case is three hikes. Chart 4Tighter, Yes; Tight, No   Chart 5Spreads Say It's 2015-6, ... Have the economic fundamentals really deteriorated that much over the last three months? Not that we can tell. There have been some high-profile data disappointments here and there, like the punk manufacturing ISM release last Thursday, but the overall message has been positive, and Friday’s jobs report was consistent with an economy growing above trend. The economic surprise indexes have been declining since November, but they’re not at levels that are anywhere out of the ordinary (Chart 6). Our earnings-per-share model still sees robust growth for corporate earnings (Chart 7). Chart 6... But The Data Beg To Differ   Chart 7Earnings Will Decelerate, But They Won't Contract We are as discomfited by the prospect of new trade barriers as any other economists, and we have eyed the divergence between U.S. acceleration and rest-of-the-world deceleration with increasing wariness. Even for an economy as comparatively closed as the U.S., decoupling is only a temporary phenomenon. We tend to equate global activity with global trade, and generally view developing economies as especially dependent on trade. It is still early days, but we have found it mildly encouraging that EM activity and EM equities have been outpacing their DM equivalents. The growth backdrop can’t be that bad if the emerging markets are perking up. Do you still think the S&P 500 has yet to make its highs? Maybe, but we wouldn’t bet on it. We view stock prices, P, as the product of expected earnings, E, and the multiple investors are willing to pay for those earnings, P/E. If our confidence in the expansion is not misplaced, and corporate earnings match analysts’ consensus bottom-up expectations of $174, topping September 20th’s 2,930.75 closing high will require a multiple approaching 17. If analysts project year-over-year EPS gains across all of 2020’s quarters, E will rise over the course of the year, reducing the P/E expansion needed to make a new high, but an assault on the peak cannot succeed without a meaningful re-rating from today’s multiple in the 14s. Although multiple expansion has played second fiddle to earnings growth (Chart 8, middle panel) across the nine-and-a-half year bull market, it declined nearly 30% peak-to-trough in 2018, and was entirely responsible for the fourth-quarter sell-off (Chart 8, bottom panel). While we think the de-rating has gone too far, the last three months have persuaded us that a return to the 18.8 peak is too much to ask. Our working hypothesis is that the equity market has decided that Washington has become enough of an impediment that the market multiple has to come off a couple of points. Markets hate uncertainty, and the policy climate is flat-out unsettled: the principal architect and guarantor of the international postwar order repeatedly threatens to topple that order; the U.S.-China showdown does not appear to be nearing a resolution; and both political parties seem willing to sacrifice the economy to gain an advantage in 2020. In the absence of new deregulatory initiatives or tax cuts to balance out the broadly investment-unfriendly instincts of several of D.C.’s power players, a poisonous partisan climate and a dysfunctional administration can no longer be ignored. Chart 8Earnings Built The Bull Market; De-Rating Almost Wrecked It Okay, so what do you do now? We upgrade equities to overweight with the cash we raised in mid-June when we downgraded them from overweight to neutral. Although we wouldn’t bet on the S&P 500 topping 2,931, it doesn’t have to do so to generate alluring prospective returns. From a 2,500 starting point, a target of 2,750, or $174 earnings at a 15.75 multiple, would generate a 10% capital gain. If the economy holds up in line with our base-case expectation, it’s hard not to like U.S. equities at current levels. We were eager to put our cash overweight to work as we watched equities gyrate in October and November, but the combination of December’s valuation reset and the improved equity outlook from our Global Investment Strategy colleagues’ MacroQuant model encourages us to pull the trigger now. More money is made when conditions, or perceptions, go from terrible to bad than when they go from good to great. As the approaching earnings season redirects attention to the solid fundamental outlook, and the Treasury secretary stops taking actions that make investors wonder if conditions are far worse than they feared, there is a path for perceptions to improve. Chart 9Spreads Have Overreacted We continue to hold to our view that markets are underestimating the potential for inflation, making Treasuries vulnerable, especially at longer maturities. We reiterate our recommendation to underweight bonds via an underweight in Treasuries, and to hold interest-rate duration below benchmark in all fixed-income categories. We continue to recommend a neutral weighting in credit-sensitive fixed income, as the spread widening is incompatible with projected defaults (Chart 9), but we are not counting on meaningful spread compression this late in the cycle.   Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 From the spreadsheet containing updated estimates of the baseline model described in “Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest,” by Thomas Laubach and John C. Williams, published in the November 2003 Review of Economics and Statistics, located at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/rstar, and accessed January 3, 2019. 2 We discussed housing at length in the November 19 and December 3, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy Special Reports, “Housing: Past, Present And (Near) Future,” and “Housing Seminar,” respectively, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The yen’s sharp rally this week reflected a liquidation of carry trades. EUR/JPY has hit our target of 120, it is time to close our longstanding bearish recommendation on this pair. The downside in AUD/JPY is limited. The Bank of Japan will not stand idly by in front of the deflationary impact of a stronger yen. The coming weeks could witness some dollar softness, but this should prove temporary. Feature The FX market started the year with a bang. The yen rallied massively Thursday morning, during the so-called “witching hour” between the New York close and the Tokyo open. As is now usual, algorithms have been blamed. We agree that poor liquidity and automatized trading accentuated the speed of the move, but ultimately, the strength of the yen is rooted in fundamental reasons. As we have been arguing, the yen should be strong in the current environment, especially against the euro, the Australian dollar and high-yielding EM currencies. When global growth weakens and safe heaven yields fall, the yen benefits. Not only do Japanese domestic savers, who park their funds abroad in hope of higher yields, repatriate there money when growth slows, but also, carry-traders, who fund their purchases of high-yielding assets by selling the yen, buy back the JPY once volatility rises. The above-dynamics have driven the yen’s eye-catching move. The yen has been strong, but the AUD, the EUR, the TRY and the ZAR have also been weak, suggesting that investors who bought the yen also sold these currencies. This was a carry-trade reversal. What should we do with our long-held negative biases on EUR/JPY and AUD/JPY? Last night, EUR/JPY and AUD/JPY moved below 119 and 71, respectively. Our target for these pairs were EUR/JPY 120 and AUD/JPY 72. We are inclined to close these recommendations. As we have repeatedly highlighted, EUR/JPY is a function of global bond yields (Chart I-1). As a firm, BCA sees upward pressure on yields. Currently, the futures market is pricing in potential rate cuts in 2019 and 2020. We think that the U.S. economy is strong enough that the Fed will not cut rates over this timeframe. However, the Fed is likely to pause for one or two quarters, something made even more likely after the fall in the ISM manufacturing this week. Such a pause should create upward pressure on U.S. 10-year inflation breakevens, which currently trade at 1.7%, while also supporting risk asset prices. All these developments would be consistent with higher yields and thus, a stronger EUR/JPY. Chart I-1EUR/JPY Should Now Find Support Regarding AUD/JPY, this pair is now trading in line with the lows experienced in 2016, and at its worst Thursday morning, it traded at levels last recorded in the first half of 2009. We do anticipate continued weakness in the global economy, but not a recession. Hence, at current levels, the downside for AUD/JPY is limited. Beyond the global dynamics, we also need to take into account Japanese dynamics. The JPY may be cheap, but Japan’s core inflation remains well below the Bank of Japan’s objective, and shows little sign of hitting 2% within a reasonable period. The recent strength in the yen only re-enforces the inability of the BoJ to hit its target. In fact, the yen’s strength was met by a large rally in JGBs, with 10-year Japanese yields falling back to zero. We agree with the market’s assessment of the combined impact of a higher yen and slowing global growth: the BoJ will have to fight this deflationary impulse. How, though, is still unclear. The BoJ could cut rates while continuing to target a positive yield curve slope, something we think is likely. Also, Japan still sports a current account surplus as well as the largest positive net international investment position in the word. This means that this country has little to fear from a falling exchange rate. This raises the likelihood that the Ministry of Finance decides to intervene in the FX market in order to push the yen lower. The only constraint here is the U.S. Treasury, which could balk at such a move. Finally, the U.S. dollar has been losing momentum this December, and weaker U.S. economic data is likely to prompt the Fed to openly message that it will pause its hiking campaign for at least one quarter. This should cause a period of softness in the greenback. However, we continue to expect such softness to be temporary. The market anticipates rate cuts from the Fed, but this is not BCA’s baseline scenario. Thus, any pause along the hiking campaign should only have a transitory impact on the dollar, as the U.S. economy is likely to continue to grow above trend, preventing the need for lower rates. Bottom Line: Poor liquidity conditions may have facilitated the yen’s massive move this week, but its true driver was the weakness in global growth, which forced a massive liquidation of carry trades. As EUR/JPY has hit our 120 target, we are removing our long-standing negative bias on this pair. Staying short AUD/JPY at current levels does not make sense either, unless one expects a global recession, which is not our base case. Finally, the strength in the yen is hurting the Japanese economy, which will force the Bank of Japan to ease monetary conditions.   Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com
Getting right to the point: Oil fundamentals are, and could remain, disconnected from benchmark prices, as they were in the waning days of 2018, when markets were forced to recalibrate global supply-demand balances in the dark. Four factors will drive this disconnect and keep volatility elevated (Chart of the Week): Chart of the WeekPrice-Fundamentals Disconnect Will Persist Continuing uncertainty over how much oil Iran will export this year; A lack of precise information about individual production cuts from OPEC 2.0; Uncertainty over EM demand; and Illiquid markets, brought about by a diminution of speculators’ risk-bearing capacity, which is largely the result of the price-fundamentals disconnect. Nonetheless, we do not believe markets are responding to an as-yet undetected collapse in demand or run-away supply, which recent price action would suggest. To the contrary, we expect OPEC 2.0 and Canadian production cuts of ~ 1.4mm b/d, continued decline-curve losses and slower U.S. shale growth resulting from price-induced capex declines, will face off against stout demand to rebalance markets in 1H19. We are, therefore, getting long spot WTI, and long July 2019 Brent vs. short July 2020 Brent as a spread at today’s close. Highlights Energy: Overweight. We ended 2018 with an average gain of 24% on recommendations we closed or were stopped out of. Open positions going into 2019 – mostly Brent call spreads with stop-losses of -$1.00/bbl – were down 49%. Base Metals: Neutral. Chile’s national statistics agency INE reported copper output was 5.3mm MT over the January – November 2018 period, its highest level since December 2005, and 6% higher than year-ago levels.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold markets appear to be pricing less than the four rate hikes we’re expecting this year from the Fed. We remain long as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. U.S. negotiators head to Beijing next week to continue trade talks. We remain bearish soybeans all the same, given our expectation the current crop year will end with record-high stocks-to-use ratios worldwide. Feature The last time WTI oil futures traded this close to $40/bbl, OECD crude and products inventories stood at ~ 3.1 billion barrels, and OPEC 2.0 had just begun its output cuts in Jan17 (Chart 2). OECD inventories now stand under 2.9 billion barrels, and are on course to fall to ~ 2.5 billion by year-end, as the physical surplus is drained by a combination of falling production and still-strong demand (Chart 3). Chart 2OECD Inventories Will Draw, Taking Crude Prices Higher Chart 3Supply Cuts, Demand Strength Will Rebalance Markets Brent and WTI prices have fallen 39% and 41% from their October 2018 highs, following the about-face by the U.S. on Iranian oil-export sanctions in November. On the back of this, we expect OPEC 2.0 to follow through on its 1.2mm b/d production cuts – possibly even exceed them, as they did over the 2017 – 1H18 period. OPEC 2.0’s track record on production discipline is strong, hence our expectation the group’s 2019 output will fall to 31.14mm b/d vs. 2018’s 32.40mm b/d level.2 The Trump administration’s waivers for Iran’s eight largest oil importers expire May 2019. We view it as unlikely the administration will re-impose export sanctions in full on Iranian exports following the expiration of waivers, and expect they will be extended at least for 90 days. We expect Iranian production to fall from ~ 2.80mm b/d in 1H19 to an average 2.60mm b/d from June – December 2019, resulting in the loss of 1.25mm b/d of exports. We expect Saudi Arabia to raise production from 10.15mm b/d to 10.30mm b/d to offset most of this incremental loss of Iranian production. Government-mandated production cuts of 325k b/d in Alberta, Canada – undertaken to drain a persistent inventory overhang and loosen the flow of oil pipeline-transport-constrained production – also will remove actual production from the market this year.3 In addition, we continue to model the loss of 190k b/d of decline-curve losses in OPEC 2.0 member states that are incapable of maintaining or lifting output due to low prices and a lack of investment (Chart 4). The contribution of these states to the OPEC 2.0 cuts is to “manage” their depletion rates per their November 2016 accord (Table 1). Chart 4Production Outside Gulf OPEC Continues Decline, Led By VenezuelaTable 1Table 1 BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) Net, we have world supply growth at 0.5mm b/d this year vs. the 1.4mm b/d estimated by the EIA. Most of this again comes from the U.S., where we expect 1.3mm b/d growth. Due to the price rout following Iranian import waivers, we lowered our rig count projections – the main input of our U.S. production forecast – which took our Lower 48 U.S. (i.e., ex GOM) production growth to 1.2mm b/d from the 1.4mm b/d rate we estimated last month. Despite pipeline bottlenecks in the Permian Basin, which will be fully alleviated by 4Q19 when the last of ~ 2mm b/d of new takeaway capacity comes on line, U.S. shales still account for most of the net growth in U.S. ouput (Chart 5).4 If WTI prices remain in the mid- to low-$40/bbl range, however, rig counts will be driven lower, which will, all else equal, lower U.S. shale-oil output this year. Chart 5Lower WTI Prices Slow U.S. Shale Growth Lower Prices Will Support Demand The price collapse since October will keep global oil demand from breaking down, leading us to expect consumption to grow ~ 1.40mm b/d this year. This is down slightly from our previous estimate of 1.45mm b/d of growth, and falls 200k b/d short of the ~ 1.6mm b/d of growth we expect for 2018.5 Forecasting demand is notoriously difficult. This is particularly true for forecasting EM demand, the source of most of the growth in the world. We have non-OECD demand – our proxy for EM oil consumption – growing 1.0mm b/d this year, down from 2018’s rate of 1.2mm b/d. This reflects our expectation the IMF will lower its growth expectation for EM GDP to 4.6% this year, from its October 2018 estimate of 4.7% growth. This will take global GDP growth to 3.6% to 3.7% previously estimated. EM demand continues to be led by China and India, which we expect will grow 450k b/d and 210k b/d, respectively, this year, again accounting for more than half of EM growth. China’s oil consumption is expected to average 14.3mm b/d, while India’s will average just over 5mm b/d. We continue to expect modest stimulus coming from China in 2H19, which will support oil demand and consumer spending. However, this could surprise to the upside, with the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party coming up in 2021. Our colleagues at BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) noted that if China’s government is to launch another large-scale stimulus package (not a foregone conclusion), then the likeliest time frame is 2H19 or 2020. Indeed, this is more probable than anytime earlier, due to the desire of Chinese policymakers to dispel any doubts about stability in 2021 for the Party’s centenary. GPS’s Matt Gertken observed the average gap between the bottom of China’s credit impulse and the top of nominal GDP growth is ~ 1.5 to 2 years. Policymakers will not want to stimulate too aggressively in early 2019 and risk having a flagging economy in the midst of 2021 celebration.6 Investment Implications Over the short term, oil prices could remain disconnected from market fundamentals, which we believe remain broadly supportive. Indeed, the balance of risks still favors the upside, despite the epic volatility over the past 3 months brought about by the larger-than-expected waivers to importers of Iranian oil just before U.S.-imposed sanctions were due to kick in in November (Chart 6). Chart 62019 Brent, WTI Price Forecasts: Slightly Lower at And /bbl We have lowered our average 2019 Brent forecast to $80 this year from $82/bbl, and our WTI forecast to $74 from $76/bbl, given our assessments of production and consumption.7 Markets continue to re-calibrate supply and demand balances largely in the dark, and will continue to do so until greater clarity is gained on actual OPEC 2.0 production cuts and the state of EM demand. On the supply side, we expect sharp production cuts from OPEC 2.0 and Canadian producers of ~ 1.4mm b/d; falling output in non-Gulf OPEC states from continuing decline-curve losses; and slower U.S. shale growth resulting from lower capex in the wake of the price collapse. On the demand side, we lowered our EM growth estimate slightly ahead of an expected downgrade of EM growth this year, but we still expect consumption to show relatively strong growth of 1.4mm b/d. Net, the combination of supply cuts plus still-strong demand will remove the current global surplus, and rebalance the market by the end of 1H19. Thus, in our view, the balance of risks – as seen in our ensemble scenarios – still is to the upside (Chart 7). Chart 7Balance of Risks Favors Upside In line with our expectation for higher prices, we are getting long spot WTI, believing prices in the low- to mid-$40s extending beyond 1Q19 will cause a 5 – 10% slowdown in U.S. production growth later this year, which will set up a rally later in the year. We also are getting long July 2019 Brent vs. short July 2020 Brent as a spread at today’s close, in the expectation of a return to backwardation by the end of 1H19, as OECD inventories draw. We have touched on 3 of the 4 drivers of volatility in this week’s research. Next week we will examine the effect of this volatility on speculators’ risk-bearing capacity, and the implications for price discovery. Contrary to popular and received political opinion, speculation is a necessary and vital activity for the efficient functioning of commodity markets, particularly those used by commercial participants to hedge untoward price risks.   Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see “UPDATE 1-Chile monthly copper output highest in 13 years,” published December 31, 2018, by reuters.com. 2      Our estimates include continued production declines ex OPEC Gulf states and in other non-OPEC members like Mexico that are covered by the OPEC 2.0 agreement (Table 1). Under the production-cutting accord agreed at OPEC 2.0’s December meeting in Vienna, October 2018 is the benchmark against which new quotas – yet to by made public – are assessed. We note here that OPEC 2.0 has not published any official quota schedule following its December 2018 meeting, where it agreed to the 1.2mm b/d of production cuts.  Our supply estimates use data from the U.S. EIA, IEA and OPEC, along with trade press reports. 3      We estimate there is ~ 200k b/d of trapped Alberta supply – i.e., excess production over takeaway capacity (pipeline and rail) – along with ~ 35mm bbls of accumulated excess production in storage the Alberta government is attempting to draw down by its action over the course of 2019 at a rate of ~ 96k b/d.  4      By year-end, we expect U.S. crude oil production of 12.6mm b/d, which will keep the U.S. the largest crude oil producer in the world. U.S. crude oil exports can be expected to continue to grow as a result, after hitting 3.2mm b/d for the week ended November 30, 2018, an all-time high, according to EIA data. U.S. product exports likely will run ~ 6mm b/d this year. 5      The IEA and OPEC are expecting 2019 demand growth of 1.3mm and 1.29mm b/d, respectively, while the U.S. EIA is expecting consumption will grow 1.5mm b/d. 6      Please see “China Sticks To The ‘Three Battles’,” published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy October 24, 2018. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7      This puts us above the consensus Brent forecast of $69.13/bbl reported by Reuters. Please see “Oversupply, faltering growth to weigh on oil prices in 2019: Reuters poll,” published by reuters.com December 31, 2018. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Trade Recommendation Performance In 3Q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Over the past couple of months global equities have fallen by more than 10%, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield has dipped from above 3.2% to below 2.6%, and high-yield bond spreads have risen by more than 200 basis points. The market is sniffing out the risk…
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of December 31, 2018.  The quant model reduced Spain’s large overweight to a slight overweight, and further downgraded the U.S. allocation. As a result, the model now has assigned overweight allocations to Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Canada and Italy, with underweight allocations to the U.S., Japan, France and U.K.  Australia and Sweden are now in the neutral zone, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the overall model outperformed the MSCI world benchmark by 38 bps in December, with a 48 bps of outperformance from Level 1 model offset by a 21 bps of underperformance from Level 2. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed by 96 bps, with Level 2 outperforming by 120 bps and level 1 outperforming by 57 bps. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %)   Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1)   Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2)     Please see also the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, “Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model,” dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations.     GAA Equity Sector Selection Model Dear Client, As advised in our October 2018 Special Alert, we have suspended the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model due to the significant changes in the GICS sector classifications, implemented at the end of September. We will rebuild the model using the newly constituted sectors once full back data is available from MSCI, which we understood would be in December but which we have not received yet. We thank you for your understanding.   Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy, Research Associate amrh@bcaresearch.com