Financial Markets

Feature Dear Client, I am travelling this week so this report is a little different. It is the full transcript and slides of a client presentation I recently gave. The presentation summarises several years of in-house work on applying the Fractal Market Hypothesis to real-life investing. Dhaval Joshi The Efficient Market Hypothesis Is Wrong Good morning In the next 30 minutes or so I want to challenge the way you think about financial markets. You see, at school we are taught the mainstream models of financial markets: Modern Portfolio Theory, the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Efficient Market Hypothesis. And we are led to believe that these models describe the real world. But I'm sad to say that these mainstream models are deeply flawed. They simply don't describe financial markets as they behave in the real world. And in your heart of hearts, you know it. Take the supposed bedrock of financial market theory, the Efficient Market Hypothesis, and look at the assumptions it makes about markets (Slide 2). Slide 2 One. That economic and market returns follow a Normal - which is to say a standard bell-curve - distribution. Really? Everybody knows that returns exhibit 'fat-tails' in which extreme events happen much more frequently than the bell-curve would suggest. By the way, this also means that a statement such as "the financial crisis was a five standard deviation - five-sigma - event with odds of 3 million to 1" is also complete nonsense. Accounting for the true fat-tails, the likelihood of extreme events is much higher than the flawed bell-curve models would suggest, as we should all now be painfully aware! Two. That the distribution is stationary - its mean doesn't change through time. Again, wrong. We know that economies and markets can and do experience regular regime-shifts or phase-shifts. Three. That markets have no memory - they exhibit no trends. Now this is getting silly! We all know that markets exhibit very strong trends. Four. That markets do not produce repeating patterns at any scale. Untrue. And five. That markets are continuously stable at all scales. Wrong again. I'm sure you'll all agree that none of these assumptions that underlie the Efficient Market Hypothesis describe the markets that we all know and work with. The good news is that there is a model that does describe the financial markets as they behave in the real world (Slide 3). It correctly assumes the return distribution is non-Normal, the mean can change over time, markets can trend, produce repeating patterns, and can generate instabilities at any scale. Slide 3 The model is called the Fractal Market Hypothesis, first proposed by Edgar Peters in 1991. Now I can see some looks of fear at the mention of this intimidating word 'fractal'. But hang in there, there really is nothing to fear. A fractal is just a pattern that repeats over and over at different scales. You come across fractals all the time, perhaps without realizing it. A cloud is a fractal - because a small part of a cloud is just a scaled-down version of the whole cloud. And for those of you who enjoy your vegetables, you will notice that cauliflowers and broccoli are fractals because the florets are just miniature versions of the whole vegetable. But perhaps the most familiar example is a tree (Slide 4). You can clearly see that a tree is just a simple pattern repeating over and over at different scales. Indeed, on this next slide (Slide 5), you see images of the twigs, branches, and trunk structure - and you could not tell them apart. Except that the twigs are on a scale of millimeters, the branches are on a scale of centimeters, and the trunk is on a scale of meters. Slide 4 Slide 5 Let's switch back to financial markets. On this next slide (Slide 6), you see three images of ten successive points on the S&P500. Again, the three images look very similar. In fact, they're very different. The first is on a scale of weeks, the second on a scale of months, and the third on a scale of years. But just like the twigs, branches and trunk, you could not tell them apart without seeing the scale. In other words, financial markets are scale-invariant. They are fractals. Slide 6 But why? And so what? To answer these questions we must now introduce the four basic assumptions of the Fractal Market Hypothesis. One. Investors are not homogeneous. The market is composed of many participants with a large number of different time horizons (Slide 7) - ranging from the milliseconds or seconds for a high frequency trader, through the days or weeks for a hedge fund to the years or decades for a pension fund. Two. These different time horizons interpret the same fundamental information differently (Slide 8). For example, a short-term technical trader interprets a rising price as a buy signal. Whereas a long-term fundamental value investor interprets the same information as a sell signal. Slide 7 Slide 8 Three. The market price reflects the combination of the short-term technical trader's interpretation of the information and the long-term value investor's interpretation of the same information (Slide 9). Crucially, this means the market is not efficient unless all time horizons are active in setting the price. Four. The stability of the market at a given price depends on plentiful liquidity - an adequate balancing of supply and demand at that price (Slide 10). When many different time horizons are active, the market is efficient and liquidity is plentiful. This is because different investors will disagree on the interpretation of the same information, and will trade with each other in volume without moving the price. Slide 9 Slide 10 However, if one time horizon becomes dominant, the market becomes inefficient and liquidity will evaporate. As investors become a 'groupthink herd', the healthy disagreement that is needed to create liquidity disappears. And the market loses its stability. So to answer the question 'why' markets are fractals, it is clear that the short-term investors generate the short-term patterns while long-term investors generate the long-term patterns. And to answer the question 'so what', it is clear that if the fractal structure breaks down, it is a warning sign that liquidity is evaporating and the market is losing its stability. Next we must discuss how we can measure the market's fractal structure, and for this I'm going to digress a little and ask you a famous question. How long is Britain's coastline? This is the question that the grandfather of fractals, Benoit Mandelbrot, first asked in 1967. Actually, it's a trick question. The answer is that there is no answer! You see a coastline is also a fractal. And the more detail you capture and measure, the longer it becomes (Slide 11). The point is that with a fractal structure you cannot measure its length or size. But the good news is that you can measure its extent of 'fractal-ness' using something called a fractal dimension. In fact the next slide (Slide 12) shows how Mandelbrot first defined the fractal dimension of Britain's coastline. Slide 11 Slide 12 Then a couple of years ago we thought why don't we extend this concept to a financial market? After all, a price chart is similar to a coastline, except that distance is replaced with time. In fact, the maths is a little more complicated, but this is how we ended up defining the fractal dimension of a financial market (Slide 13). Bear in mind that you won't find this or any of the following analysis in any textbook because it is our own unique work. Rest assured, you don't need the maths to understand the concept intuitively. Think of it like this (Slide 14). A market that is not trending tends to sweep out 2-dimensional space. So its fractal dimension might be close to 2. But a market that is trending gets less and less fractal and closer and closer to a perfect 1-dimensional line. So its fractal dimension drops close to 1. Slide 13 Slide 14 And now we get to our findings, which are both remarkable and uplifting. When we applied our unique definition of fractal dimension to different financial markets in different historical timeframes, we discovered that the tipping point of instability turned out to be exactly the same across different historical eras, geographies and asset classes. We had come across a universal property of financial markets, irrespective of generation, culture or investment. Financial markets tended to reverse their near-term trend when the fractal structure between the 65-day investment horizon and the 1-day investment horizon disappeared. Specifically, when the 65-day fractal dimension dropped to 1.25. So we called this the "Universal Constant Of Finance". You can see that this universal constant applied to the top and initial bottom of the market during the 1929 Wall Street Crash (Slide 15), and to the top and bottom of the 1987 Crash (Slide 16). It also perfectly picked the tops and bottoms of the 1990 Nikkei Crash (Slide 17), and the 1993 Bond Market Crash (Slide 18). Slide 15 Slide 16 Slide 17 Slide 18 Some financial markets also tended to reverse long-term trends when the fractal structure between the 60-month investment horizon and the 1-month investment horizon disappeared. Specifically, when the 60-month fractal dimension dropped to 1.25. You can see here (Slide 19) how this has perfectly picked many of the structural turning points in the dollar. And when we see the rare star-alignment of a long-term signal coinciding with a near-term signal, it can predict a very strong reversal in a short space of time. This is precisely what we saw ahead of crude oil's sharp bounce in early 2016 (Slide 20 and Slide 21). So to conclude (Slide 22): Slide 19 Slide 20 Slide 21 Slide 22 Financial markets are efficient only when all investment horizons are present and active in setting the price. In other words, when the market has a rich fractal structure. When investment horizons converge to a groupthink herd, the fractal structure breaks down, and the fractal dimension nears its lower bound. This is a warning sign of an impending liquidity-triggered trend reversal, either short-term or long-term. I am now happy to take any questions. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com

Special Report

Feature Debt and leverage sit at the core of global investors' concerns over China's macro situation. Our recent conversations with clients confirm that fears of an "imminent" Chinese crash have abated, but investors remain fundamentally uncomfortable with China's seemingly ever-rising debt levels, and are concerned that a proverbial day of reckoning will eventually come, dragging the world into severe recession. Amid these deeply rooted woes, some investors have failed to detect China's cyclical improvement since early last year, and have been caught off guard by the powerful risk-on rally in some asset classes, such as commodities and emerging markets. We have addressed China's debt issue extensively in various reports of late. This week, we add to views articulated in a report penned by my colleague Peter Berezin, chief strategist of our Global Investment Strategy team, titled, "Does China Have A Debt Problem Or A Savings Problem?" Taken together, we intend to shed light on this complicated issue and dispute some commonly held misperceptions. In a nutshell: China's massive buildup of debt is rooted in the country's vast domestic savings and a financial intermediation system that relies heavily on the banking sector. It is wrong to discuss the debt problem without understanding China's basic macro features. (See also China Investment Strategy special report, "Chinese Deleveraging? What Deleveraging!" dated June 15th 2016).1 Therefore, China's rising debt is the mirror image of the accumulation of savings through investment. In this vein, assessing the debt situation essentially boils down to assessing the viability of China's capital spending. In our China Investment Strategy special reports, "How Much Does China Overinvest," dated May 4th 2016, and "The Myth Of Chinese Overcapacity," dated October 6th 2016,2 we found no systemic evidence of massive misallocation of capital, as claimed by many. In fact, the "efficiency" of Chinese capital spending is either comparable or superior to global norms, according to our calculations. While investors and analysts fixated on China's "debt bubble" focus almost entirely on the country's rising debt-to-GDP ratio, we have looked beyond this widely scrutinized conventional indicator by checking corporate financial statements for the true leverage situation at the micro level. In China Investment Strategy special reports, "Rethinking Chinese Leverage," dated October 27th, 2016, and "Rethinking Chinese Leverage, Part II,"3 dated January 5th 2017, we concluded that China's corporate debt situation in terms of both leverage ratios and debt sustainability is far from as precarious as widely perceived. It goes without saying that we are not completely sanguine about the increase in Chinese corporate debt, and we fully appreciate the risk that banks' asset quality would inevitably suffer in an economic downturn. We differ, however, on whether the expected increase in non-performing assets held by banks would degenerate into a financial crisis with chaotic consequences. In our China Investment Strategy special report, "Stress-Testing Chinese Banks," dated July 27th 2016,4 we made the case that Chinese banks would be able to withstand a dramatic increase in non-performing loans without suffering systemic stress, and that the market had priced in a rather extreme situation that in our view was unjustified. Finally, mounting concerns on China's macro debt situation among investors have broad-brushed virtually all Chinese stocks. Almost all Chinese sectors have been trading at steep discounts to their global counterparts, despite comparable leverage and profitability conditions at the micro level. This, in our view, represents market mispricing, and the large valuation gap will eventually be arbitraged away. This is the fundamental reason for our strategically positive assessment on Chinese stocks, especially H shares. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Chinese Deleveraging? What Deleveraging!,” dated June 15, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Myth Of Chinese Overcapacity,” dated October 6, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Rethinking Chinese Leverage, Part II,” dated January 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Stress-Testing Chinese Banks,” dated July 27, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Does China Have A Debt Problem Or A Savings Problem? There is little evidence of a major "credit bubble" in China. Rising debt is largely the consequence of the country's high saving rate. This has mixed implications for global bonds: On the one hand, an exaggerated fear of a hard landing in China has kept global bond yields below where they would otherwise be; on the other hand, high levels of Chinese savings will continue to weigh on real long-term yields. The real trade-weighted RMB will depreciate by a further 3%-to-5% over the next 12 months, with the bulk of the decline coming against the U.S. dollar. Chinese shares are still attractive at current valuation levels. Go long the H-share market versus the MSCI EM index. The China Question Recent Chinese economic data have been fairly solid and our China analysts expect that growth momentum will be sustained over the coming months.5 Nevertheless, there are plenty of clouds on the horizon. Direct fiscal spending has slowed sharply over the past 12 months. In addition, a crackdown on property speculation last year has led to a deceleration in home price inflation, which could adversely affect household spending and construction later this year. Then, of course, there is all that debt. There is no shortage of commentators who argue that China is experiencing a full-blown credit bubble. Others contend that rising debt in China is largely a manifestation of a chronic excess of domestic savings. Knowing which side is correct is critical for investors. If China is in the midst of a massive credit bubble, then it is natural to fear that this bubble will burst fairly soon. This could prove to be devastating to global financial markets. In contrast, if rising debt in China mainly reflects an overabundance of savings, then it is possible that debt will continue rising until those savings dissipate - something that may not happen for many years. We won't beat around the bush. Our view is that rising debt in China has largely been the result of excess savings. This implies that a financial crisis in China is unlikely anytime soon. That does not mean that China will cease being a source of occasional investor angst. But if another major global recession is coming, it will not be because of China. The Debt-Savings Tango Endless ink has been spilled on the question of whether savings create bank credit or bank credit creates savings. In reality, the answer is "both": Just like income can create spending and spending can create income, savings can create debt and vice versa. If an economy is operating at less than full employment, the decision by banks to extend new credit is likely to boost aggregate demand, leading to more hiring. This will raise household disposable income and potentially lift aggregate savings.6 On the flipside, if households decide to save a bit more, this will push down real interest rates. That, in turn, could entice firms to increase how much they borrow and invest. Debt creates savings, and savings create debt; it's a two-way street. Admittedly, thinking through the specific forces underlying the relationship between debt and savings is one of those things that can make your head spin. Thus, it is worthwhile to go through a few simple examples in order to elucidate the principles at work. With this knowledge in hand, we will be able to debunk many of the fallacies that investors routinely succumb to. Cuckoo For Coconuts: How To Think About Debt And Savings Imagine a small island economy consisting of 100 people, each of whom toils away producing 100 coconuts every year, resulting in annual GDP of 10,000 coconuts. Consider the following five examples, summarized in Table 1: Table 1Cuckoo For Coconuts:##br## Debt Creates Savings, Savings Create Debt Example #1: Each person consumes 100 coconuts. As a result, a total of 10,000 coconuts are consumed. Total savings is zero, as is total investment. No debt is created. Example #2: Each person consumes only 75 coconuts, selling the other 25 coconuts to a nearby plantation. The plantation buys these coconuts with the help of a bank loan and plants them, resulting in 2,500 new coconut trees. Total consumption falls to 7,500. Savings and investment equals 2,500 coconuts. 2,500 coconuts worth of bank loans are created. Notice that higher savings have led to more debt. Example #3: Same as Example 2, but now instead of selling the excess coconuts to a nearby plantation, they are exported abroad. Savings equal 2,500 coconuts, investment is zero, and the current account surplus is 2,500. The island accumulates 2,500 coconuts worth of foreign assets. The lesson here is that if a country can export some of its excess savings abroad, debt may not need to rise by as much as if the savings had to be intermediated by the domestic financial system. Note also that this example reveals the famous economic identity: S-I=CA. Example #4: Each person consumes 125 coconuts, made possible by importing 25 coconuts per person. Consumption now equals 12,500 coconuts. Savings equal -2,500 coconuts, investment is zero, and the current account deficit is 2,500. The island takes on 2,500 coconuts worth of external debt. Example #5: Half the island's residents consume 75 coconuts each, while the other half consumes 125 coconuts each. Those who consume 75 coconuts sell their surplus nuts on the open market, placing the proceeds in a bank. The bank lends out these savings to the other half of the population. Net savings and investment is zero. However, 1,250 coconuts worth of new bank loans are created. Debt Puzzles The key idea stemming from these examples is that debt is often formed when there is a persistent divergence between spending and income.7 This is true for the economy as a whole, as well as for its individual constituents (households, firms, and the government). Understanding this point helps resolve a number of seeming puzzles. For instance, it is sometimes alleged that China's debt buildup cannot be the result of the country's high saving rate because U.S. debt also rose rapidly in the years leading up to the financial crisis, an era during which the U.S. national saving rate was very low. Our simple examples demonstrate why this is a misleading argument. Examples 2, 4, and 5 show that debt levels will rise regardless of whether income exceeds spending or spending exceeds income. It is the absolute difference between the two that matters, not whether the residual is positive or negative. In Example 2, which is applicable to China today, households spend less than they earn. The resulting savings are intermediated by the financial system and transformed into investment, creating new debt along the way. In Example 4, which is applicable to the U.S. before the financial crisis, households spend more than they earn, leading them to take on new debt in order to finance imports. The increase in debt may get amplified, as in Example 5, if some households save while others dissave. As discussed in Box 1, Example 5 also helps explain why inequality and debt levels tend to rise and fall together over time. The Future Of Chinese Household Savings Chinese household savings now stand at nearly 40% of disposable income, notably higher than in other major developed and emerging economies. The increase in China's household savings, along with a widening gap between rich and poor, have been important drivers of faster debt growth (Chart 1). As time goes by, China's household saving rate will begin to decline due to the aging of its population, the expansion of household credit, and the emergence of a stronger "consumer culture." Yet, that shift is likely to be a gradual one. Progress in building out a social safety net has been painfully slow. This has forced households to maintain high levels of precautionary savings. The share of China's population in its 'prime savings years' (between the ages of 30-and-59) will also continue to increase over the next 15 years, which should support an elevated saving rate (Chart 2). Chart 1China: Higher Saving Rate And ##br##Inequality Went Hand In Hand With Debt Growth Chart 2China: Share Of Population In Its High Saving Years ##br##Has Not Yet Peaked In addition, sky-high property prices have forced young people to save a large fraction of their incomes in order to have any hope of owning a home. This is particularly true for men. Brides are in short supply in China. The saving rate among single-child households with one son is about four percentage points higher in rural areas and two percentage points higher in urban areas, compared to single-child households with one daughter. One academic study concluded that about half of the increase in China's household saving rate since the late-1970s could be attributed to this factor.8 Unfortunately, this problem is not going to go away anytime soon. The ratio of men between the ages of 25-and-39 and women between the ages of 20-and-34 - a proxy for gender imbalances in the marriage market - will surge from 1.06 at present to 1.35 by the middle of the next decade (Chart 3). What do countries with surplus savings and surplus men tend to do? Historically, the answer is that they have sent them off to fight. China's military spending has grown by leaps and bounds over the past decade (Chart 4). This trend is bound to continue, making East Asia an increasingly likely setting for future military conflicts.9 Chart 3A Shortage Of Chinese Brides Chart 4China: A Lot Of Dry Powder Understanding Chinese Corporate Debt Dynamics Many companies around the world rely heavily on retained earnings and equity sales to finance new investment projects. When this happens, investment can take place without the need for the creation of new debt. China has its fair share of consistently profitable companies that fund capital expenditures using internally generated funds, while tapping the equity markets as necessary to finance larger projects. However, the country is also awash with companies that are in constant need of debt financing. Perhaps not surprisingly, the former tend to be private firms while the latter are often state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Chart 5China: State-Owned Companies Are Not The Only Ones ##br##With Access To Cheap Financing Pundits like to assert that the secret to boosting growth in China is to wean these money-losing public companies off cheap credit, forcing them to cut back on production and capital spending. This will allow scarce economic resources to migrate to better-managed firms that will use them more wisely. But is this really a sensible assumption? What exactly is the evidence that China's well-run private companies have been starved of credit because most of it is flowing to money-losing companies? The data does not fit this "crowding out" story at all (Chart 5). The Japan Analogy A more sensible narrative is that the Chinese government has been prodding state-owned banks into lending money to state-owned companies and local governments in order to support aggregate demand and keep unemployment from rising. The experience of Japan is instructive here. Starting in the early 1990s, Japan entered an extended era where the private sector was trying to spend less than it earned (Chart 6). In order to keep unemployment from rising, the Japanese government was forced to try to export these excess savings abroad via a current account surplus or, failing that, absorb them with dissavings from the public sector. While Japan was able to lift its current account surplus from 1.4% of GDP in 1990 to 3% of GDP in 1998, this was not enough to fully offset the surge in desired private-sector savings. This necessitated the government to run large budget deficits. The same sort of fiscal trap now stalks China. Up until the Great Recession, China was able to export much of its excess savings. The current account surplus hit a record high of nearly 10% of GDP in 2007. In effect, China was doing what the islanders in Example 3 were able to do. The subsequent appreciation of the RMB undermined this strategy, forcing the government to take steps to boost domestic demand. It is no surprise that China's debt stock began to grow rapidly just as its current account surplus started to dwindle (Chart 7). Chart 6Japan Relied On Fiscal Largess And ##br##Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In ##br##Private-Sector Savings Chart 7China: Debt Increased##br## When Current Account Surplus ##br##Began Its Descent Keep in mind that fiscal policy in China entails much more than adjustments to government spending and taxes. Central government spending accounts for a fairly small share of GDP. The vast majority of fiscal stimulus is done via the banking system. This makes Chinese fiscal policy nearly indistinguishable from credit policy. From this perspective, China's so-called "debt mountain" is not much different from Japan's debt mountain once we acknowledge that the bulk of China's corporate debt in China is, in fact, quasi-fiscal debt. As evidence, note that in sharp contrast to the SOE sector, the ratio of liabilities-to-assets among private Chinese companies has actually been trending lower over the past decade (Chart 8). Yes, many of the investment projects undertaken by SOEs and local governments are of questionable economic merit. But that's beside the point. China's money-losing SOEs are the equivalent of Japan's fabled "bridges to nowhere." From the Chinese government's point of view, an SOE that is producing something is still preferable to one that is producing nothing. The ever-rising debt burden that these state-owned firms must carry to cover operating losses and finance new investment is just the price the government must pay to keep the economy afloat. Little Evidence Of A Genuine Credit Bubble Genuine credit bubbles tend to happen during periods of euphoria. U.S., Spanish, and Irish banks all traded at lofty multiples to book value on the eve of the financial crisis, having massively outperformed their respective indices in the preceding years. That's obviously not the case for Chinese banks today, which remain one of the most loathed sectors of the global equity market (Chart 9). Chart 8Chinese Private Firms: Liabilities-To-Assets##br## Trending Lower For A Decade Chart 9Chinese Banks: Unloved And Unwanted The U.S., Spanish, and Irish housing booms also occurred alongside ballooning current account deficits, something that doesn't apply to China (Chart 10). One can debate whether China is in the midst of a property bubble, but even if it is, it looks a lot more like the one Hong Kong experienced in the late 1990s. When that bubble burst, property prices plummeted by 70%. Yet, Hong Kong banks were barely affected (Chart 11). Chart 10Recent Credit Bubbles##br## Developed Amid Widening Current Account Deficits Chart 11Hong Kong##br## Is The Correct Analogy Chart 12Chinese Debt: Not Predominately Tied ##br##To The Property Market There is a lot of debt in China. However, most of it has not been centered on the property market (Chart 12). Rather, just as in Japan, debt has served a fiscal purpose - it has been used to absorb the excess savings of the private sector, so as to keep unemployment from rising. Chart 13 shows that national saving rates and debt-to-GDP ratios are positively correlated across emerging economies. China sits close to the trend line, suggesting that its debt stock is roughly what you would expect it to be. Chart 13Positive Correlation Between National Savings And Indebtedness Investment Conclusions Where does this leave investors? For global bonds, the implications of our analysis are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, the high probability that the Chinese government can maintain the status quo of continued credit expansion for the foreseeable future means that a hard landing for the economy - and the associated drop in safe-haven developed economy government bond yields that this would trigger - is unlikely to occur. On the other hand, high levels of Chinese savings will continue to fuel the global savings glut, keeping real long-term bond yields lower than they would otherwise be. On balance, investors should maintain a modest underweight allocation toward global bonds. Our analysis does not warrant either a very bearish or very bullish stance towards the RMB. Granted, a banking crisis could prompt Chinese savers to look for ways to move more of their money overseas, leading to further capital flight and a tumbling currency. As noted, however, such an outcome is not in the cards. On the flipside, a chronic shortfall of domestic demand will keep the pressure on the government to try to export excess production abroad by running a larger current account surplus. As we foretold in our March 2015 report "A Weaker RMB Ahead," this will push the authorities to weaken the currency.10 We expect the real trade-weighted RMB to depreciate by a further 3%-to-5% over the next 12 months, with the bulk of the decline coming against the U.S. dollar. If China averts a debt crisis, that's good news for global equities. In the developed market universe, Europe and Japan stand to benefit the most, given the cyclical bent of their stock markets. We are overweight both regions (currency hedged). Despite a weak start to the year, both markets have outperformed the U.S. in local-currency terms since bottoming last summer, a trend we expect will resume over the coming months (Chart 14). What about Chinese shares specifically? Clearly, there are many risks facing the Chinese economy that transcend debt worries, a possible trade war with the U.S. being the prominent example. Yet, considering that Chinese stocks trade at fairly cheap valuation levels, our sense is that these risks have been more than fully priced in by investors. With this in mind, we are going long Chinese H-shares relative to the overall EM basket.11 Chart 15 shows that H-shares now trade at a substantial discount to the EM index. Chart 14Euro Area And Japan: Rebound Will Continue Chart 15Chinese Investable Stocks Are Cheap Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Box 1 Debt And Inequality Chart 16U.S.: Positive Correlation Between ##br##Income Inequality And Debt-To-GDP Income inequality and the ratio of private debt-to-GDP have been positively correlated in the U.S. over the past century (Chart 16). The existence of this relationship is not merely due to a third factor: economic growth. Growth was strong in the 1920 and 1980s/90s - two periods of rapidly increasingly inequality - but it was also strong during the 1960s, a decade when inequality was falling. Our analysis helps shed light on this relationship. Return to Example 5, but this time assume that each resident consumes 100 coconuts, with half the population producing 75 coconuts and the other half producing 125 coconuts. 10,000 coconuts are still produced and consumed in aggregate, resulting in no net savings. But because half the population is borrowing money to acquire coconuts from the other half, debt levels still rise. Higher inequality leads to more debt. To be sure, the correlation between inequality and debt runs in both directions. Rising debt has historically led to an expansion of the financial sector. This has helped enrich Wall Street elites. In this way, rising debt can exacerbate inequality. On the flipside, rising income inequality entails a shift of income from poorer households - with high marginal propensities to consume - to richer ones - who generally save a large fraction of their income. This tends to reduce aggregate demand. Lower aggregate demand, in turn, leads to lower real rates, making it easier for poorer households to load up on debt and live beyond their means. 5 Please see China Investment Strategy, "Be Aware Of China's Fiscal Tightening," dated February 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 6 A few technical caveats are in order. Think of a simple closed-economy "Keynesian" model where aggregate demand determines income and where savings (S), by definition, are equal to investment (I). In this model, investment is usually treated as exogenous. Thus, if increased bank credit is used to finance new investment projects, this will also translate into higher savings (i.e., if "I" goes up, "S" must also rise). In contrast, if the credit ends up flowing into consumption, savings will remain unchanged. More plausibly, one can imagine that investment is subject to an "accelerator effect," so that increased aggregate demand prompts firms to increase capital spending. In that case, even if the credit flows into consumption, investment will still rise - and since savings is equal to investment, this means that savings will also go up. Intuitively, this happens because the increase in income derived from higher employment more than offsets the increase in consumption. This leads to higher aggregate savings. 7 The word "persistent" is important here. To see why, suppose that in Example 5, the people who consumed 125 coconuts each had previously been thrifty, which had allowed them to build up large bank deposits. Then they could finance their additional spending by running down their accumulated savings, rather than taking on new debt. Likewise, if those who consumed 75 coconuts had previously lived beyond their means, then instead of adding to their deposits, they would be paying back existing debt. The net result would be less debt, not more. 8 Shang-Jin Wei and Xiao Zhang, "The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence From Rising Sex Ratios And Savings Rates In China," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, No. 3, 2011. 9 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Weaker RMB Ahead," dated March 6, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 11 The exact trade is to be long China H-Shares versus the MSCI Emerging Market index, currency unhedged. The corresponding ETFs for this trade are the Hang Seng Investment Index Funds Series: H-Share Index ETF (2828 HK), and the iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF (EEM US). The Hang Seng China Enterprise index comprises of China H-Shares (Chinese stocks available to international investors) currently trading on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Crude-oil fundamentals stand out among commodities because of the active efforts by critical producers to rein in supply since the end of last year. This can be seen in even-higher compliance with the production accord - a supply shock in many ways - negotiated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia: Last month, Reuters estimated 94% compliance on the 1.2mm b/d in cuts pledged by OPEC states. We expect compliance to remain high, which will strengthen the divergence between oil prices and the USD, as markets look toward the upcoming summer driving season in the Northern Hemisphere. Active supply management and robust demand growth wrought by lower prices could continue to overwhelm a strong USD's influence on oil prices, if this Agreement becomes a durable modus operandi for KSA and Russia going forward. We give a high probability to this outcome, even as the Fed leans into its interest-rate normalization. Energy: Overweight. This past Thursday, we closed our long WTI Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 backwardation spread at +$0.96/bbl (Dec/17 over); it was initiated February 9 at -$0.11/bbl (Dec/17 under), resulting in a 972.7% gain. We also closed our Dec/19 short WTI vs. long Brent spread, elected February 6 at +$0.07/bbl (WTI over) at -$1.17/bbl (WTI under), for a gain of 1,771.4%. Base Metals: Neutral. Any demand uptick for base metals' coming from U.S. fiscal stimulus will not hit markets until 2H18 at the earliest. We remain neutral. Precious Metals: Neutral. Based on last week's analysis, we are tactically long a Jun/17 gold put spread (long the $1200/oz put vs. short the $1150/oz puts) and call spread (long the $1275/oz call vs. short the $1325/oz calls) at a net debit of $21/oz. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA expects continued demand from China to keep soybeans relatively well bid versus corn and wheat in the 2017/18 crop year. Total planted area for these crops is expected to be the lowest since 2011, keeping ending stocks flat to lower. Feature Prior to the end of the 1990s, crude-oil prices were, to use one of the most popular catch-phrases in finance, mean-reverting: The price of crude oil imported to the U.S. averaged just over $19/bbl from Mar/83, when WTI futures began trading, to 1999 (Chart of the Week). This meant WTI traded at ~ $20/bbl on average over that period. Prices were volatile, but pretty much returned to $20ish/bbl, which allowed traders to take a view on how soon prices would revert to their mean. Whenever prices were too far removed from that level, markets expected producers - OPEC mostly - to adjust output to meet current and expected demand conditions. Since roughly 2000 - maybe a little earlier - oil prices have followed a random walk.1 During this time, oil prices have been negatively correlated with the broad trade-weighted index (TWI) for the USD. One striking characteristic of oil prices and the USD TWI during this time is both followed random walks, which "like the walk of a drunken sailor, wanders indefinitely far, listing with the wind," to borrow Paul Samuelson's well-turned metaphor (Chart 2).2 Chart of the WeekOil's Past As Prelude: ##br##A Return To Mean Reversion? Chart 2Oil Prices And The USD Followed ##br##A Common Long-term Trend Until 1Q16 We believe this was caused by OPEC's decision to become a price-taker at the end of the 1990s - shortly after Dec/98 or thereabouts - after years of unsuccessfully trying to manage oil prices via production adjustments. After the price of oil imports in the U.S. dropped below $10/bbl (nominal), it appears the Cartel took the decision to respond to prices set by market forces (supply, demand, inventories and exchange rates), and to abandon its price-management efforts. The long-term correlation between oil and the USD was due to the fact that while oil prices and the USD followed random walks, they followed a common long-term trend as they wandered indefinitely about. This held up to the end of 1Q16, when a massive sell-off in risky-asset markets globally took oil prices below $30/bbl (Chart 3).3 This came on the heels of a price collapse brought about by OPEC's Nov/14 decision to launch a market-share war. By no means did this high correlation mean oil and the USD were always moving in lock step. The collapse in oil prices at the end of the last century led to a production-cutting agreement among OPEC states, Norway and Mexico, which lifted U.S. import prices from less than $10/bbl at the end of 1998 to $30/bbl by Nov/00. Likewise, export disruptions in Venezuela in 2002 - 2003 and, to a lesser extent, hurricane losses in the U.S. Gulf in 2005 sharply curtailed supply and lifted oil prices above what could have been expected given the USD's level at the time, as the Chart of the Week shows.4 End Of Oil's Random Walk? The price collapse of 1Q16 marked the bottom of the price move begun a few months prior to the Nov/14 market-share war declaration. The subsequent divergence between oil prices and the USD since then has been remarkable (Chart 4). The market-share strategy, which essentially allowed Cartel members to produce full-out and grab as much market share as possible, was engineered by KSA, and, we believe, initially was directed at undermining Iran's efforts to restore oil production lost to nuclear-related sanctions. From time to time, it also appeared OPEC was trying to retard the continued growth of shale-oil production in the U.S., which, by 2014, was increasing at an annual rate of more than 1mm b/d, enough to replace the entire output of Libya. Chart 3Close-up Of USD vs. ##br##Brent Divergence Chart 4The Divergence Between ##br##Oil Prices And The USD Is Remarkable This strategy was a complete failure. The price collapse that ensued brought KSA and Russia - both highly dependent on oil revenues - to the brink of financial ruin, compelling them to find a way to work together.5 After several false starts in 2016, they succeeded late in the year with a negotiated production cut. OPEC pledged to reduce output by as much as 1.2mm b/d, and non-OPEC producers agreed to cut output by close to 600k b/d, half of which is expected to come from Russia. Recent tallies by Reuters indicate 94% of the cuts from OPEC states that signed on to the deal have actually been realized.6 Should KSA and Russia find a way to coordinate their and their allies' production in a way that maintains the backwardation we expect later this year - the result of production cuts (Chart 5), and robust demand growth (Chart 6) - we could see oil prices become mean-reverting once again. Chart 5If KSA And Russia Can ##br##Coordinate Production ... Chart 6... And Demand Continues To Grow, ##br##The Oil-Price Backwardation Could Persist This likely requires the forward curves for WTI and Brent to remain backwardated, so as to moderate the growth in shale production, and for prices to remain between $55/bbl and $65/bbl, so as not to set off another shale boom. Gulf sources have indicated KSA prefers prices this year of ~ $60/bbl, which, we believe would allow it to keep some control over the rate at which shale production revives.7 Chart 7Supply Destruction And Robust Growth ##br##Rallied Oil Despite A Strong USD Investment Implications We are not calling for a return to mean-reversion in oil prices just yet. We are, however, highlighting the possibility for such a sea-change in the market if all the supply-side pieces fall into place - i.e., KSA, Russia and their respective allies find a way to work together to moderate U.S. shale-oil production. That said, we will be watching closely to see whether the KSA - Russia Agreement becomes a durable modus operandi in the oil market, particularly as regards the management of inventories and production in the market generally. If these states are able to keep prices ~ $60/bbl, and gain some control over the forward curve's slope - i.e., literally manage their production for backwardation - then there is a chance oil prices could once again become mean-reverting. In a mean-reverting world with backwardated oil prices, commodity-index exposure is favored, since investors would, once again, earn positive roll yields as the indices are rebalanced monthly in the underlying futures markets. Bottom Line: The persistent negative correlation between oil prices and the USD broke down following the global asset sell-off in 1Q16. Since then, the combination of supply destruction and robust demand growth has allowed oil prices to rally despite a strong USD (Chart 7). If KSA and Russia can continue to cooperate in their production-management deal - i.e., find a way to manage production so that prices remain closer to $60/bbl than not - and Brent and WTI forward curves backwardate, markets could once again become mean-reverting. In such a world, commodity-index exposures are favored - particularly those heavy on crude-oil and refined-products price exposure - for their positive roll yield. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Technically, oil prices have been I(1) variables (integrated of order 1) since about 2000, meaning they are mean-reverting in first differences (e.g., today's price minus yesterday's price). Please see Geman, Helyette (2007), "Mean Reversion Versus Random Walk in Oil and Natural Gas Prices," pp. 219 - 228, in Advances in Mathematical Finance. Haidar, Imad and Rodney C. Wolff (2011) obtained similar results, reporting crude prices were mean-reverting from Jan/86 - Jan/98, then random-walking since then; please see pp. 3 - 4 of "Forecasting Crude Oil Price (revisited)," presented at the 30th USAEE/IAEE North American Conference in Washington, D.C., during October 2011. Our own research corroborates these results - we find WTI and Brent were mean-reverting from Mar/83, when WTI futures started trading, to Mar/98; and were random-walking I(1) variables after that. 2 Please see Samuelson, Paul A. (1965), "Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly," in Industrial Management Review, 6:2. 3 This is to say, these variables were cointegrated, and could be expressed in a linear combination using an error-correction model. 4 Our colleague, Mathieu Savary, who runs BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy, addressed these oil-USD divergences in "Party Like It's 1999," published November 25, 2016. It is available at fes.bcareseach.com. 5 We discuss this at length in the feature article of Commodity & Energy Strategy published September 8, 2016, entitled "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash." Both states were burning through cash reserves, and were trying tap foreign markets for additional funds by selling interests in their most valuable holdings - via the IPO of, and via the sale of just under 20% of Rosneft held by the Russian government. Russia placed its Rosneft shares late last year with Glencore and Qatar's sovereign wealth fund, while KSA is expected to IPO Aramco in late 2018. 6 Please see "OPEC compliance with oil curbs rises to 94 percent in February: Reuters survey," published by the news service online February 28, 2017. 7 Please see "Exclusive: Saudi Arabia wants oil prices to rise to around $60 in 2017 - sources," published by Reuters online February 28, 2016. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of February 28, 2017. The model has maintained its large overweight in the U.S. Within the non-U.S. level 2 model, Spain and Italy weights have been increased at the expense of Japan and Switzerland. Japan and U.K. remain the two largest underweight countries. (Table 1). Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, both the level 1 and level 2 models outperformed their respective benchmarks in February, resulting in a 39 bps outperformance of the aggregate model vs. the MSCI World. Since inception, the GAA model has outperformed its benchmark by 30 bps. Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of February 28, 2017. The momentum component has shifted Consumer Discretionary from overweight to underweight. For mode details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor patrick@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com

How Long Is The Sweet Spot? Table 1Recommended Allocation The sweet spot on a baseball bat, scientists find,1 is the small area about two inches (5 cm) long, some six inches from the tip. The sweet spot for global risk assets may not be much bigger. The 22% rise in global equities since February last year has been driven by a "goldilocks" combination of recovering economic activity, quiescent inflation, and still-accommodative monetary policy. But, after such a strong rally, markets must walk a fine line - no slowdown in growth and no surprising tightening of monetary conditions - for prices to rise further. Our analysis suggests that they can, but the risk of a correction is rising. A lot of the better news of the past year has already been priced in. The price-to-sales ratio for U.S. stocks is close to an all-time high, and even the plain-vanilla 12-month forward PE ratio has reached 17.5x, the highest since 2002 (Chart 1). Volatility has fallen to a low level, with the VIX not rising above 12 over the past month, and the S&P500 index going 98 days without a one-day decline of 1% or more, the longest such period since 1995 (Chart 2). To a degree, this is justified by the recent strong pick-up in global growth. Sentiment indicators have accelerated since the election of President Trump, and even hard data is now showing the first signs of recovery (Chart 3) with, for example, U.S. retail sales rising 5.6% year-on-year in January, and core durable goods orders starting to follow the rise in companies' capex intentions (Chart 4). Similar positive economic surprises are visible in Europe, Japan, China and elsewhere. The problem is that further upside surprises are likely to be limited. Regional Fed NowCast surveys for Q1 real GDP growth are already at 2.5-3.1%. Consensus forecasts for S&P500 earnings growth in 2017 look about right at 10.5% but, with a stronger dollar and rising wages, are unlikely to be beaten. Chart 1Historically High Valuations Chart 2Time For A Pull-Back? Chart 3Hard Data Starting To Recover Too Chart 4Orders To Follow Capex Intentions Headline inflation has picked up (to 2.5% in the U.S. and 1.9% in the Eurozone), mainly because of higher oil prices, but core inflation remains sufficiently under control that central banks don't need to slam on the brakes. The rise in unit labor costs in the U.S. suggests that core PCE inflation will gradually move up to 2% during the year (Chart 5). The latest FOMC minutes revealed that members want a further rate hike "fairly soon", and BCA expects the Fed to raise three times this year (to which the futures market ascribes only a 36% probability). But Fed policy remains very accommodative (Chart 6), the European Central Bank is unlikely to end its asset purchases soon on account of political and banking system concerns, and the Bank of Japan remains committed to its 0% yield target for 10-year government bonds until inflation is well above 2%. Absent a powerful fiscal stimulus in the U.S. or a move by the "hard money" advocates in the Trump administration to change the Fed's modus operandi, we think its unlikely that a tightening of monetary policy will drag down asset prices. Chart 5Labor Costs Putting Pressure On Prices Chart 6Fed Policy Still Accomodative Risks certainly abound. The Trump administration could start a trade war with China. Its proposals for corporate and personal tax cuts could disappoint both in terms of their details and the timing of Congress's passing them. European politics remain a concern, with the probability of Marine Le Pen becoming French President increasing recently (though it remains small). But risk markets tend to rise on a wall of worry. Investor sentiment is not particularly bullish at the moment, with the bull/bear ratio among individual investors barely above 1 (Chart 7) and flows into equity funds in recent months not reversing the outflows of last year (Chart 8). Chart 7Retail Investors Not So Bullish Chart 8Equity Flows Are Still Tepid After a year of a strong cyclical risk-on rally, progress from now on will get tougher. A short-term change of direction is quite possible (and has already happened in some assets, with the yen moving back to 112 and the 10-year Treasury yield to 2.3%). But we expect economic growth to remain robust this year - with U.S. real GDP growth likely to come in close to 3% on the back of surprises in capex - which will push the 10-year Treasury yield above 3% by year-end. In this environment, we continue to favor equities over bonds, and maintain our pro-risk tilt in equity sectors, credit and alternative assets. Equities: U.S. equities have outperformed Eurozone ones by 5% year-to-date, mainly because of worries about Europe's political risk and the fragility of its banking sector. Though we think the political risks are overstated (except perhaps in Italy), we continue to prefer the U.S. in common currency terms because of our expectations of further dollar appreciation and because the lower volatility of the U.S. helps reduce the beta of our recommended portfolio. Emerging markets have outperformed global equities by 3% YTD, mainly on the back of stronger commodities prices. But we remain underweight EM because of the risks from a stronger dollar and rising global rates, concerns about protectionism and debt refinancing, and because of the likelihood that China's rebound will run out of steam over the next 12 months (Chart 9). Fixed Income: Rates have pulled back recently: long-term institutional investors have begun to find attraction in the long end of the U.S. Treasury yield curve at 2-3%, though speculative investors remain short (Chart 10). With the Fed likely to raise rates three times this year, inflation expectations to pick up further, and nominal GDP growth in the U.S. to reach 4.5-5%, we expect the U.S. 10-year yield to rise above 3%. We therefore remain underweight duration and prefer inflation-linked over nominal bonds. In the improving economic environment, we continue to like credit, but find valuations more attractive for investment-grade bonds than for high-yield. Currencies: Dollar appreciation has been on hold since January but we think the long-term trend remains in place because of the probable direction of relative interest rates. Neither Japan nor the Eurozone is likely to move towards monetary tightening over the next 12 months. Even if the Trump administration were to want a weaker dollar, a few tweets would not be enough to offset monetary fundamentals. And, while it is true that sentiment towards the dollar is already bullish, this has historically not precluded further appreciation, for example in the late 1990s (Chart 11). Chart 9EM Equities Correlated With China PMIs Chart 10Divergent Views On U.S. Bonds Chart 11Optimism Need Not Stop USD's Rise Commodities: The oil price remains close to its equilibrium level at around $55 a barrel, with the OPEC agreement largely holding but being offset by a production increase from the U.S. shale drillers, whose rig count has doubled since last May. We are neutral on industrial commodities: Chinese demand resulting from last year's reflationary policy is likely to be offset by the stronger dollar. Gold remains a useful portfolio hedge in a world of elevated geopolitical worries and inflation tail-risk, but is also negatively correlated with the U.S. dollar. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see, for example, "The Sweetspot of a Hollow Baseball or Softball Bat", by Daniel A. Russell, Pennsylvania State University, available at www.acs.psu.edu/drussell/bats/sweetspot.html Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)

Highlights U.S. Treasuries - Fair Value: The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield now appears 7 bps expensive on our model. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration and continue to monitor bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar for signals about the breadth of the global economic recovery. U.S. Treasuries - Technicals: Large net short bond positions are in the process of being unwound. A more balanced technical picture removes one of the key impediments to the bond bear market and possibly sets the stage for another leg higher in yields. China: Chinese monetary policy that is sufficiently accommodative to spur economic growth, but not so accommodative that it causes undue strength in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, is the most bearish outcome for U.S. bonds. Feature Bonds rallied strongly late last week without any obvious economic catalyst. Now that the dust has settled we find the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield trading at 2.34%, 7 bps below our estimate of fair value (Chart 1). Chart 12-Factor U.S. Treasury Model Updating Our U.S. Treasury Model That fair value estimate comes from our 2-factor U.S. Treasury model, based on the Global Manufacturing PMI and bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar. In our view, these two factors capture the most important macro drivers of U.S. bond yields. Stronger global growth, as proxied by the Global Manufacturing PMI, tends to push yields higher. However, to the extent that stronger global growth coincides with an appreciating U.S. dollar, the amount of monetary tightening that needs to be achieved through higher interest rates is limited. This caps the upside in long-dated U.S. bond yields. Put differently, it is not just the magnitude of the global growth impulse that matters for U.S. bond yields, but also the breadth of the recovery. The more broad-based the recovery, the less upward pressure on the U.S. dollar and the higher U.S. Treasury yields can rise. Last week we received Flash PMI estimates for the U.S., Eurozone and Japan that we can use to estimate the Global PMI for February. According to the Flash estimates, the U.S. PMI declined slightly in February, but this was more than offset by accelerations in both the Eurozone and Japan. Altogether, these three regions account for 48% of the Global PMI and, assuming PMIs in all other countries remain flat, we can calculate that the global PMI will nudge higher from 52.7 in January to 52.9 in February. Of course one month of data is much less important than the longer run trend. Taking a step back, we see that manufacturing PMIs are trending higher in every major economic bloc (Chart 2). Our diffusion index also shows that the global manufacturing recovery is more broadly based than at any time during the past three years (Chart 2, top panel). The synchronized nature of the recovery is also reflected in the behavior of the U.S. dollar, which has not appreciated during the past month even though Fed rate hike expectations have shifted up (Chart 3). The message from the survey of bullish dollar sentiment - the series that is included in our Treasury model - is more mixed. Bullish dollar sentiment plunged from elevated levels in January but has recovered somewhat during the past few weeks (Chart 3, panel 2). Meantime, U.S. Treasury spreads over German bunds and JGBs are also sending mixed signals. Short-maturity spreads have widened alongside increased U.S. rate hike expectations, while long-maturity spreads have been well contained (Chart 3, bottom 2 panels). Chart 2Synchronized Global Recovery Chart 3Keep Watching The Dollar Global bond investors should closely monitor trends in the U.S. dollar, bullish sentiment toward the dollar, and U.S. Treasury spreads over bunds and JGBs. Each of these indicators provides information about the breadth of the economic recovery. If Fed rate hike expectations remain firm, or even move higher, and that trend is not matched by a stronger dollar or wider Treasury spreads, then that would signal that the global recovery is becoming more synchronized, suggesting additional upside for bond yields. Bottom Line: The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield now appears 7 bps expensive on our model. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration and continue to monitor bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar for signals about the breadth of the global economic recovery. Chart 4Positioning Becoming More Balanced Treasury Technicals Less Stretched This brings us back to last Friday's bond rally. Puzzlingly, the 2-year U.S. Treasury yield declined 6 bps and the 10-year yield fell 7 bps on a day without any significant economic or political news. In fact, Treasury yields managed to decline even though rate hike expectations embedded in the overnight index swap curve were unchanged and the probability of a March rate hike priced into fed funds futures actually increased from 31% to 33%! The unusual disconnect between Treasury yields and rate hike expectations is probably related to the expiry of the March bond futures contracts. Last week, traders had to decide whether to let their March contracts expire or roll them over into June. Positioning data show that speculators carried large net short positions into last week (Chart 4), so it is possible that it was the capitulation of these large short positions that drove yields lower on Friday. More timely data from the skew between payer and receiver swaptions show that swaption investors are no longer betting on rising rates (Chart 4, panel 4). Net speculative positions in Treasury futures could follow suit when the data are released later this week. In addition, our composite sentiment indicator has just recently ticked back above the zero line (Chart 4, panel 2). Bottom Line: Large net short bond positions are in the process of being unwound. A more balanced technical picture removes one of the key impediments to the bond bear market, and possibly sets the stage for another leg higher in yields. China's Bond Market Balancing Act Chart 5Easy Money Spurs Chinese Growth In the context of the 2-factor U.S. Treasury model presented above, there are two reasons why developments in China matter for U.S. bond markets. The first is that China accounts for the single largest weighting in the Global Manufacturing PMI, so stronger growth in the Chinese manufacturing sector will pressure bond yields higher, all else equal. But the Chinese economy can also influence U.S. bond yields if changes in the RMB exert meaningful influence on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar. For example, faster Chinese growth pressures U.S. bond yields higher, but some of that upward pressure could be mitigated if that strong growth is engineered through a rapid depreciation of the RMB relative to the U.S. dollar. On the first point, China's manufacturing PMI is in a clear uptrend although the recent contraction in the government's fiscal expenditures is a potential warning sign (Chart 5). Our China Investment Strategy service views the fiscal contraction as a risk but still expects the Chinese economy to remain buoyant this year.1 This is because Chinese monetary conditions remain supportive of further gains in the manufacturing sector, and the rebound in China's PMI that began early last year is more tied to easing monetary conditions - a weaker exchange rate and falling real interest rates - than to increased fiscal spending. On the second point, while a weaker trade-weighted RMB has helped spur the recovery in Chinese manufacturing, the impulse from a weaker RMB has so far not been potent enough to move the needle on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar (Chart 6). From the perspective of U.S. fixed income markets a continuation of this trend would be the most bond-bearish outcome. Chinese monetary policy remains easy enough to spur economic growth but not so easy that it causes the U.S. dollar to spike. For the time being at least, China has been actively selling Treasuries in order to mitigate the extent of its currency depreciation (Chart 7). If China were to suddenly stop selling Treasuries, then the RMB would likely depreciate sharply. This would actually have an ambiguous impact on U.S. Treasury yields since it would probably lead to both a stronger U.S. dollar and faster global growth. Chart 6USD So Far Not Impacted By RMB Chart 7China Is A Treasury Seller More likely, however, is that China will continue to manage the gradual depreciation of its currency unless it is forced to take more dramatic action in the face of a negative growth shock. Our China Investment Strategy team notes that the annual People's Congress in early March should offer some important clues about the Chinese government's growth priorities and policy direction going forward. Bottom Line: Chinese monetary policy that is sufficiently accommodative to spur economic growth, but not so accommodative that it causes undue strength in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, is the most bearish outcome for U.S. bonds. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Be Aware Of China's Fiscal Tightening", dated February 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Portfolio Strategy The market has quietly adopted a less cyclical sectoral tone since yearend, a trend that could amplify over the coming months, even if overall appreciation persists. Defense stocks have grown into previously extended valuations, warranting ongoing above-benchmark exposure. The opposite is true for aerospace equities. Data processing shares are more likely to roll over than break out and we recommend paring positions to underweight. Recent Changes S&P Data Processing - Downgrade to underweight from overweight. Table 1 Feature The stock market has cheered the broad-based rebound in earnings and improvement in corporate sector pricing power (Chart 1). Unbridled optimism about growth friendly policy tilts including potential tax reform and select regulatory relief combined with an easing in financial conditions have encouraged investors to make large down payments against expected future profit gains. Indeed, extreme economic and earnings bullishness is evident in record setting price/sales (P/S) multiples: Chart 1 shows that on a median basis, the industry group (P/S) ratio is far above the 2000 peak, providing yet another metric in a long list of yardsticks signaling that greed is the overriding market emotion. Nosebleed valuation levels are cause for significant cyclical concern, but as discussed last week, momentum and a valuation-agnostic transition from fixed income to equities are the dominant tactical forces at the moment. Since it is difficult to reconcile valuations at odds with realistic expectations about future earnings growth, we remain focused on sub-surface positioning to indemnify against disappointment. Since late last year, the market has adopted a more defensive than cyclically-oriented tenor. Defensive sectors have troughed at extremely attractive relative valuation levels, based on our models (Chart 2). Conversely, cyclical sectors have rolled over, meeting resistance at very demanding valuation levels of more than two standard deviations above normal (Chart 2). Chart 1Future Growth Has Been Paid For Already Chart 2The Market Tone Is Changing Contrarians should take note. These nascent trend changes have developed even though economic data have generally surprised on the upside, which may be an indication that a more forceful response will occur once the string of upside surprises loses momentum. The global PMI has been very strong, but any hint of a reversal would provide a catalyst for a full-fledged recovery in defensive vs. cyclical stocks (Chart 3). The contraction in U.S. bank lending growth may be heralding slippage in hard economic data (Chart 3), to the benefit of defensive vs. cyclical sectors. Keep in mind that the market is priced for non-inflationary growth nirvana, such that even modest economic disappointment could short circuit the buying binge. The yield curve has stopped widening and financial conditions are no longer easing (Chart 3), providing additional confirmation that the defensive vs. cyclical equity sector trough is more likely a budding trend change than a pause in a downtrend. A trend change is also consistent with the relentless downgrading in emerging market vs. developed country GDP growth expectations (Chart 4). Chart 3Forward Looking Yellow Flags Chart 4No EM Confirmation For Cyclicals The lack of a durable and credible growth thrust in EM is confirmed by regional share price performance, as EM equities have significantly lagged their developed country counterparts (Chart 4). Now that China's fiscal stimulus impulse has rolled over amidst ongoing currency depreciation, EM lacks a catalyst for incremental growth outperformance vs. developed markets. Adding it up, evidence of a sub-surface trend change continues to materialize, even in the face of upward momentum in the broad market. We expect a mostly defensive along with select interest rate-sensitive exposure to provide optimal portfolio performance in the next 3-6 months. Defense Stocks Will Continue To Protect Portfolios... A Special Report sent to clients on October 31 outlined the long-term appeal of defense stocks, prior to the installment of a new, bellicose U.S. Administration. If anything, the latter threatens to exacerbate the decline in globalization that was already in progress (as discussed since 2014 by BCA's Geopolitical Strategy Service), potentially creating a leadership vacuum that will raise the specter of open military conflict. More nationalistic foreign policies in a number of countries, i.e. moving away from collaboration and cooperation and toward isolationism and self-sufficiency, is a recipe for increased geopolitical instability. China's challenge to the status quo is also likely to motivate a boost to defense spending globally. The recent World Economic Forum estimates of global military spending by 2030 cite both China and India planning to quadruple military outlays over this time frame (Table 2). The U.S. Administration is already pressuring other NATO members to boost defense spending after a long contraction (Chart 5), which should eventually spillover into rising defense contractor sales. Reportedly, only 5 out of 28 NATO members reached the targeted goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense. Ergo, there is room for an increase, especially in some larger countries with fiscal room to maneuver. More imminently, the conditions that have created the gap between aerospace and defense relative performance are growing even stronger (Chart 6). Table 2A New Arms Race Underway Chart 5Lots Of Upside Chart 6A Growing Gap While U.S. defense spending has been through a soft patch for the past several years, new orders for defense goods have been one of the strongest components of overall durable goods orders (Chart 6). The unfortunate reality is that the incentive to boost defense and security spending has never been higher. Terrorist activity continues to proliferate around the world (Chart 7), raising a sense of geopolitical uncertainty and mistrust. With defense new orders continuing to make new cyclical highs, factory output should run at levels flattering operating margins. Shipments of defense goods are outpacing inventories by a wide margin, which is consistent with solid pricing power. Even exports of military goods are booming (Chart 7), despite the strong U.S. dollar, reflecting a strong undercurrent of global demand. Domestic defense spending has room to expand. Real defense outlays are only just starting to recover (Chart 8). President Trump ran on a campaign to protect the U.S. from terrorism. That should make it comparatively easy to increase defense spending in the years to come. It is normal for defense stocks to retain momentum as defense spending growth accelerates (Chart 8, top panel). Increased staffing at the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) implies that purse strings may already be loosening in anticipation of heightened activity. DOD employment growth often provides a good leading indication for real defensive spending trends (Chart 8, bottom panel). Thus, while share prices have been on a tear and valuations are not cheap, rapid earnings growth has pushed down forward multiples to manageable, below-market, levels (Chart 9, shown as an average of the companies in the BCA Defense Index). Chart 7Powerful Momentum... Chart 8... With Long-Term Durability Chart 9Growing Into Valuations Prospects for strong multiyear growth should support a move to a premium valuation as margins expand (Chart 9), similar to what occurred during past defense spending booms, as chronicled in our October 31 Special Report. ...But Aerospace Stocks Are Out Of Fuel In terms of aerospace equities, the outlook is more challenging. New orders have been sinking steadily, reflecting a downturn in the commercial aerospace cycle. While long lead times and lengthy delivery schedules offer some earnings protection, dwindling order backlogs will ultimately undermine confidence in the long-term outlook. Chart 10 shows that aerospace unfilled orders are contracting, an environment typically associated with share price underperformance, or at least elevated volatility. Shipments of aerospace goods are falling, a rare occurrence (Chart 10). The implication is that aerospace industrial production is also shrinking (Chart 10). With a heavily unionized labor force, it will be difficult to maintain profitability. Will increased global growth translate into a recovery in aerospace new orders? Doubtful. Aerospace cycles tend to be long and are not always correlated with the business cycle. Aerospace new order growth has little correlation with the global leading economic indicator. In fact, if anything, it is more countercyclical. Ominously, there are signs of excess capacity. Our global airline consumer price index, a composite of airline pricing power in a number of major countries, is in negative territory. A negative CPI reflects excess capacity, and warns of grim prospects for a recovery in new airplane orders (Chart 11). Chart 10Running On Empty Chart 11Too Much Capacity Against this backdrop, aerospace profits will become increasingly reliant on maintenance, repair and consumables activity. However, weak pricing power suggests that this source of revenue is soft (Chart 11). Aerospace valuations are close to a par with those of defense stocks. Divergent profit outlooks imply that the latter should expand while the former get squeezed. Bottom Line: We remain confident that the BCA defense index (LMT, GD, RTN, NOC, LLL) will continue to generate above market returns, whereas the BCA aerospace index (BA, UTX, HON, TXT) exhibits asymmetric downside risk. Data Processors Are Losing Their Allure After a consolidation phase that restored value to a more neutral level, we upgraded the S&P data processing index to overweight in late-September, because it fit into our consumption vs. capital spending theme, outperforms in disinflationary environments and would benefit from a recovery in industry sales growth. While several of those factors still exist, the share price ratio has been unable to gain traction and the window for outperformance may be closing. The economic backdrop is no longer conducive to capital inflows. Data processing companies enjoy hefty recurring revenue and high returns on equity, warranting persistent above market valuations (Chart 12). However, the flipside of predictability is lower operating leverage than many other industries and a pattern of underperformance during periods of rising inflation expectations. Indeed, cyclical share price momentum tends to take its cue, inversely, from inflation expectations (inflation expectations shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 12). Renewed traction in global economic growth, as evidenced by the upturn in the global leading economic indicator (GLEI, shown inverted, top panel, Chart 13), represents a headwind to capital inflows and relative multiple expansion. The improvement in business sentiment has also boosted our capital spending model, albeit we are doubtful as to whether increased animal spirits will translate into much of a capital spending cycle in a world of deficient final demand and soft free cash flow. Still, any rise in capital spending would put the services-based data processing group at a disadvantage, in relative terms. The downturn in the ISM services index compared with the ISM manufacturing index reinforces that the external environment has become more challenging (Chart 13). All of these factors could be overcome if operating trends were set to improve. Data processing revenue trends are tightly linked with consumer spending (Chart 14). The personal savings rate has room to fall, facilitating an increase in outlays, particularly now that the labor market has tightened. Rising job security has buoyed consumer confidence, which has historically augured well for data processing sales growth. Chart 12The Window Has Closed Chart 13Sell Signals Chart 14Margin Squeeze But top-line growth has been in a funk of late, even with firming pricing power (second panel, Chart 14). Companies have made a significant investment to boost marketing, as evidenced by the surge in SG&A, but so far, this has sapped margins more than stoked revenue. Importantly, Visa has recently provided a fee break to retailers, who are increasingly banding together to put pressure on the industry to lower fees. Amidst increased competition on the payments processing side, this trend is likely to be structural and put downward pressure on profit margins. Thus, we are reluctant to embrace the jump in the producer price index, as future readings could be much weaker. The implication is that operating performance will not overcome macro hurdles. Bottom Line: Reduce the S&P data processing index (V, MA, PYPL, ADP, FIS, FISV, PAYX, ADS, GPN, WU, TSS) from overweight to underweight. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps. Favor growth over value (downgrade alert).

Highlights Since the 1950s, the trends in margins and earnings growth have been one and the same: as profit margins decline, so does earnings growth. The decline in profit margins that began in early 2015 has gone on hiatus for the past two quarters. But this rebound in margins is unlikely to be sustained. However, even if profit margins turn lower on a sustained basis, there is scope for equity returns to stay positive, based on historical precedent. Similar to a broad-based profit margin decline, further currency strength will be an earnings headwind, but not a show-stopper for profit growth. All in all, with forward multiples now at multi-decade highs, there is lots of room for earnings growth to disappoint, but the conditions for an equity bear market are not in place. Feature Equity prices continue to march higher and the S&P 500 made another all-time high last week. Q4 earnings reporting is now nearly complete, with about two-thirds of companies surprising to the upside. According to FactSet, the share of Q4 surprises is below the 5-year average, while the size of surprises (2.9% above the estimate) is also a smaller margin than the "average surprise" in the past five years (Chart 1). Nonetheless, that has not stopped analysts from getting even more bulled up about 2017 earnings. Analysts' consensus for S&P 500 operating earnings is 10.2% for the calendar year, and the forward multiple now stands at 17.5x, its highest level since 2004 (Chart 2). Chart 1Q4 Earnings Surprises: Better, ##br##But Not That Surprising Chart 2Forward P/E At ##br##Decade Highs A 10% rise in earnings within the year would not be an unprecedented move - there are numerous historical re-accelerations of operating earnings of that size. However, it would be unprecedented for earnings growth to move consistently higher over the next year without an upward trend in profit margins. As Charts 3A and 3B shows, the turning points in earnings growth always correspond with turning points in profit margins. True, there have been 13 minor episodes whereby profit margins have declined but earnings growth accelerated. But these periods were very short-lived, never lasting more than three months at a time. In the majority of these episodes, equity investors saw through the blip down in margins; equity prices continued to rally higher and returns for the year were larger than average. Chart 3AProfit Growth And Margins: An Iron Link Chart 3B There have been far more one-quarter episodes whereby earnings growth decelerates and profit margins continue to rise (39 times since 1951). In these cases, equities exhibit below average returns. Chart 4Slow Growth Will Stay A Profit Headwind The key takeaway is that when profit margins and earnings growth temporarily fail to pull in the same direction, investors have tended to focus on earnings growth. However, the caveat to the above analysis is that we rely on data going back to 1951. The current cycle is unique in that potential GDP growth has never been this low (Chart 4). In a low-growth environment, it is harder for volume expansion to compensate for any fall in margins. We believe that understanding the profit margin backdrop in this environment will remain particularly important. The Outlook For Profit Margins The trend in profit margins is determined largely by the relative growth rates of selling prices, compensation and productivity. Unit labor costs (ULC), which is compensation divided by productivity, account for about 60% of production expenses: the ratio of selling price to unit labor costs is a good proxy for profit margins (Chart 5). In terms of the denominator, unit labor costs have been choppy, but have nonetheless been on a rising trend since the beginning of the recovery. Since the early 1990s, unit labor costs tended to rise throughout the business expansion, and then fall sharply once businesses retrenched during recessions. If this cycle follows historical patterns, then unit labor costs could push higher toward 3%. In other words, labor expenses may not accelerate quickly, but it is highly unlikely that profits will benefit from a fall in ULC growth at this stage of the expansion. In a recent Special Report,1 we made the case that the economy is at full employment and there would be cyclical pressure for wages to rise, despite some structural headwinds. We do not anticipate a surge in labor costs, rather a slow creep higher. Chart 5Can Selling Prices ##br##Catch Up To Labor Cost? Chart 6Businesses Will Find It Hard ##br##To Pass On Price Increases Our major concern is whether or not selling prices (i.e. the numerator in our proxy) can keep up with even mild cost pressures. Traditionally, the conditions that allow companies to raise prices are also associated with rising costs of inputs and labor, and higher inflation prompts the Fed to impose monetary restraint. Thus, profit margins - and therefore equity prices - have generally done better when price inflation is low. However, the concern today is that inflation (corporate selling prices) is too low and that it is difficult for firms to pass on rising input costs, i.e. that a margin squeeze occurs because businesses cannot sufficiently pass on rising labor costs, as consumers have become conditioned to entrenched deflation, particularly at the retail level. We have written extensively in recent publications about inflation. Our bias is to expect broad-based inflation (PCE and CPI measures) as well as corporate selling price inflation (i.e. businesses pricing power) to rise slowly this cycle. The key points are as follows: Inflation expectations are extremely well anchored (Chart 6). True, there is a gap that has opened between survey and market-based inflation expectations. But as we explained in our January 9 Weekly Report, there are several reasons why market-based measures are likely overstating the rise in inflation expectations. Even so, these measures remain well below historic averages and continue to signal that even if the trend is up, the rate of inflation remains very benign. If survey-based inflation expectations are correct, then this business cycle could be a mirror opposite of the 1970s/80s. In that cycle, strong inflation expectations became self-fulfilling/self-reinforcing and lead to higher realized inflation. Today, after a long period of fearing deflation and experiencing massive price discounting at the retail level (Chart 6), consumers have become conditioned to expect prices will never go up. Even once the output gap is fully closed, it could take several years for inflation to gain traction. A strong dollar argues for constant drag on 30% of consumer price inflation (i.e. tradable goods and services). This will keep a lid on inflation for the foreseeable future. Overall, wage costs have outpaced pricing power since 2014, with the exception of the prior two quarters. We do not have a strong view on whether profit margins are finally in a sustained mean-reverting phase, but the above framework suggests that due to a very solid anchoring of inflation expectations, businesses could be faced with a tough pricing backdrop much later than is typical in the business cycle. Flat/falling margins are historically not enough to derail the bull market at this stage of the expansion. However, as we highlighted above, equities are now trading at sky-high forward valuations and have become extremely vulnerable to earnings disappointment. What About The Dollar? A frequent question from clients is about the role of the dollar in U.S. earnings and how enthusiastic can one be about earnings growth if the dollar is rising? As our U.S. Equity Strategy team has pointed out in the past, there are two distinct camps on the impact of U.S. dollar strength on equities.2 Bulls believe that dollar strength will depress commodity and import prices, tamping down inflation pressures and allowing the Fed to avoid monetary tightening. Therefore, the net monetary conditions impact will be positive for the U.S., which is a relatively closed economy. Under these conditions, capital would continue to flow into stocks. Bears see the currency as undermining profitability, given that foreign translation will take a hit along with income from foreign affiliates selling into weaker demand abroad (Chart 7). In other words, the rest of the world is exporting deflationary pressures to the U.S. via currency depreciation. This threatens the earnings outlook, particularly relative to still lofty growth expectations. Chart 7Dollar Headwind Our take is somewhere in between these two extremes. It is certainly true that a strong dollar helps contain inflation pressures, and allows for a prolonged business cycle. But as highlighted above, in an economy still struggling to grow much above 2%, inflation pressures are not an overly large concern to begin with. Meanwhile, hedging means that the currency translation effect on financial performance is not immediate. And the impact of any dollar strength surely depends on the conditions under which it is strengthening: dollar strength in a period of weak global growth will be more detrimental to returns than a dollar that is rising due to exceptionally strong domestic conditions. We are currently at neither one of these extremes (Chart 8). Chart 8U.S. And Global Economy: Not Hot, Not Cold Our Bank Credit Analyst service recently presented a matrix of different scenarios for the dollar and economic growth applied to a model for EPS growth. The key finding was that the effect of even small changes in growth assumptions dominate the effect of much larger moves in the dollar. A 10% dollar appreciation from current levels would shave about 2% from profits, assuming no change to the GDP growth outlook. The bottom line is that the recent improvement in margins has helped earnings recover from last year's profit recession. However, it is unlikely that margins have entered a lasting uptrend; firms lack pricing power and the labor market is now tight enough that unit labor costs will rise on a sustained basis. As profit margins trend lower in the coming years, this will present a headwind for profit growth. Similarly, our expectation that the currency will continue to appreciate over the next 12-18 months is a headwind to earnings growth. Current sky-high equity valuations leave little room for these risks. We expect that disappointments will eventually cause an equity price reset, but timing is uncertain. As we wrote last week, technical indicators do not currently suggest an important pullback is imminent. Looking further out, the overall backdrop of slowly building inflation, a go-slow Fed, and a mild pickup in nominal GDP growth, is a positive backdrop for long-term stocks. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "U.S. Wage Growth: Paid In Full?", dated November 28, 2016, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Service Special Report, “Equity Sectors And The Soaring U.S. Dollar,” dated November 3, 2014, available at uses.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Despite our tactical bullish stance, the cyclical outlook remains firmly negative for the yen, with a 12-month target for USD/JPY above 120. The BoJ is currently committed to an inflation overshoot, with this solid commitment, a strong economy will be able to lift inflation expectations, depress real interest rates, and hurt the yen. The key improvements pointing to higher inflation expectations are: Already positive inflation expectation dynamics, the closing of the output gap, the removal of the fiscal drag, the tightness in the labor market, and the end of the private-sector deleveraging. The tactical environment suggests that nimble traders with short investment horizons should stay short USD/JPY for now. Longer-term investors may want to add to short bets on the yen on further weaknesses. Feature We have espoused a cyclically bearish stance on the yen since September when the BoJ began targeting the price of money instead of the quantity of money, aiming for stable JGB yields around 0%.1 More recently, we have been buyers of the yen on a tactical basis. Here, we are reviewing whether this tactical call should morph into a cyclical bullish stance on the yen or whether the primary trend for the yen still points lower. Ultimately, we expect USD/JPY to punch through 120 on a 12 month basis. The Liquidity Trap Our framework to analyze the yen rests on one key assumption: Japan remains mired in liquidity trap dynamics. As we have pointed out before, the key symptom of this disease is evident in the Land of the Rising Sun: Loan demand has become irresponsive to changes in private sector borrowing costs (Chart I-1). In this environment, we can experience strange dynamics. As we argued in details a few months ago, when both in a liquidity trap and at the lower bound of interest rates, the demand for money is infinite, and interest rates are independent of the level of output in the economy.2 In other words, a decrease in exports, government spending, or investment, hurts demand without affecting nominal interest rates (Chart I-2, middle panel). However, in the long run, decreases in aggregate demand exert downward pressure on prices, and thus, lower inflation expectations today (Chart I-2, bottom panel). The opposite is true for a positive demand shock. Chart I-1The Symptom Of Disease Chart I-2The Thing That Should Not Be In this topsy-turvy world, a negative shock to growth, by decreasing inflation expectations, pushes up real interest rates, and thus the exchange rate. Meanwhile, a positive shock increases inflation expectations, pulling down real rates and the exchange rate as well. This is fundamental as USD/JPY continues to trade closely in line with real rate differentials between the U.S. and Japan (Chart I-3). Chart I-3USD/JPY: No Money Illusion Here This is even truer now that the Bank of Japan is both trying to keep 10-year JGB yields near 0%, and has promised to keep a very accommodative monetary policy in place until inflation has overshoot the price stability target of an average inflation rate of 2% over the whole business cycle. In other words, the BoJ's inflation target is near symmetrical and monetary policy will only harden once previous inflation undershoots below 2% have been compensated by an extended period of inflation overshoot. Also, we expect the BoJ to stay committed to this policy. Not only does Abenomics remain popular in Japan, but we expect Kuroda to be re-appointed to lead the BoJ. Moreover, the last two members of the policy committee not appointed by Abe will see their terms end in 2017. After this year, the BoJ committee will fully represents Abe's wishes. Under this framework, the key to expect the yen to fall is therefore not valuation, nor the current account outlook - two factors pointing to a higher yen - but whether or not the economy and inflation expectations can improve durably on a cyclical basis. In the next section, we explore the key positive economic developments underpinning our negative JPY stance. Bottom Line: As the BoJ is strongly committed to maintaining an extremely dovish stance until inflation overshoots by a wide-enough margin to compensate for previous undershoots, key economic improvements in Japan should lead to higher inflation expectations, falling Japanese real interest rates, and a much weaker yen. The Five Samurais We see five reasons to remain bearish the JPY: Inflation expectation dynamics, the closing output gap, the disappearance of the fiscal drag, the labor market tightness, and the end of the Japanese private sector's deleveraging. Factor 1: Inflation Expectations Are Already Unhinged Even before the BoJ aggressively targeted 0% JGB yields, Japanese inflation expectations were on an improving path. During the 2012 summer, markets began correctly anticipating the December electoral victory of Shinzo Abe, apprehending that his BoJ was about to massively ramp up quantitative easing. Japanese 5-year/5-year forward CPI swaps soon decoupled from the rest of the world and the U.S. (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The BoJ Policy Has Already Borne Fruit Chart I-5The Mechanics Of Price-Level Targeting So strong has the perceived commitment of the BoJ to higher inflation been that Japanese inflation expectations never tanked the way U.S. ones did after 2014. These dynamics contributed to keep Japanese real rates depressed relative to U.S. ones. Moreover a virtuous circle was created where lower real rates supercharged the USD/JPY's rally, lifting it by more than 60% from 77 in September 2012 to 125 in June 2015, and this further supported Japanese inflation expectations. In the summer of 2015, as EM and commodity prices began imploding on the growing expectation of a Chinese economic hard landing, Japanese inflation expectations did relapse, strengthening the yen rally. But again, unlike in the U.S., Japanese CPI swaps never fell to new lows, pointing to some improving dynamics for the domestic component of Japanese inflation expectation formations. Going forward, we expect Japanese inflation expectations to move further up. The price level targeting mechanism put in place by the BoJ last fall reinforces inflationary dynamics (Chart I-5). Any anticipated tightening in monetary policy in response to economic improvements has been pushed further away in the future, in a world where inflation may be higher locally and globally. Additionally, if global and local inflation rises, because nominal interest rates are pegged at low levels, the increase in inflation expectations puts additional downward pressure on real rates, further stimulating the domestic economy, further weakening the yen, and further boosting inflation expectations. The circuits for positive feedback loops are being laid in place. Factor 2: The Output Gap Based on the OECD's estimates, the Japanese output gap has now moved into positive territory for the first time since 2007-2008, the last episode where Japan experienced anything close to inflation (Chart I-6). Prior to then, the last time the Japanese output gap was as positive as it will be in 2017 was in 1993, among the last years when Japanese core inflation was still above 1%. While this reflects the global phenomenon of low productivity growth, the low level of supply expansion in Japan has been augmented by the 2% decline in the labor force since 1998. This means that the capacity constraints in the Japanese economy are easy to reach even if average real GDP growth has only been 0.8% since 2010. The cyclical improvements in the business cycle only point toward an increasingly positive output gap and rising inflationary pressures. To begin with, business confidence and PMIs are all very robust (Chart I-7). Chart I-6No More Slack In Japan Chart I-7Japanese Businessmen Feel Good The strength of the U.S. ISM index suggests that Japanese exports have more upside (Chart I-8) as well. Not only does a stronger Japanese trade balance contributes to a larger positive output gap, but also, strong export growth has often been the key precursor to higher capex in Japan (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Finally, the credit dynamics remain supportive. Bank loan growth has not slowed much, despite the large tightening in Japanese monetary conditions in 2016. With conditions now easing in the country, we expect the credit impulse, which has bottomed around the zero line, to re-accelerate going forward, supporting excess demand above potential GDP growth (Chart I-9). Together, all these factors suggest that the improvement in the Japanese shipments-to-inventory ratio witnessed since March 2016 will continue to lift Japanese inflation expectations higher (Chart I-10). Chart I-8Strong Japanese Exports ##br##Will Filter To Capex Chart I-9The Japanese Credit ##br##Impulse Will Rebound Chart I-10Upward Momentum In ##br##Japanese Inflation Expectations Factor 3: Fiscal Policy Another key factor that has hampered the Japanese economy since 2013 has been the large fiscal belt-tightening experience by the country. In the wake of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, the government primary deficit blew up to 7.7% of potential GDP in 2011. It will hit 3.5% for 2017, but the IMF does not forecast much more narrowing of the government budget gap (Chart I-11). This signifies that the great brake that slowed the Japanese economy and prevented a rise in inflation is being lifted. In fact, we expect the Japanese government deficit to increase again. First, Abe's upper house electoral victory last summer was built on a campaign of larger government spending. Second, with an approval rating of 56% four years into his premiership, Abe remains a highly popular prime minister for a country plagued by 15 changes of government since 1990. This is a vote of confidence by the Japanese public toward his "Abenomics" program. Finally, military spending is likely to increase. As recently as 2005, Japan's and China's defense budgets were the same; today, China outspends Japan by four times (Chart I-12). In an increasingly unstable Asia-Pacific region, where China, Russia, and North Korea are all conducting more independent foreign policy agendas, Japan will be forced to fend for itself with more military spending, underscoring the relatively hawkish agenda of the Abe administration on this front. This will require more spending by Tokyo in this arena. Chart I-11Vanishing Japanese##br## Fiscal Drag Chart I-12The Geopolitical Imperative To Increase ##br##Japanese Government Spending Factor 4: The tightening Labor Market The Japanese labor market has now become very tight and key supply-side adjustments are behind us. The job-openings-to-applicants ratio stands at July 1991 levels, the last time when Japan was able to generate any durable wage growth. Additionally, the level of participation of women in the labor force is very elevated. The employment-to-population ratio for prime-age females stands at 74%, well above the 71.4% level of the U.S. today, and just as high as the U.S. in 2000, when that ratio was at its highest (Chart I-13). Additionally, despite a shrinking labor force and population, the total number of employed individuals stands at 65 million, the highest level since 1999 (Chart I-14). Hiring growth is also experiencing its most vigorous upswing in 20 years. Unsurprisingly, nominal wages have been growing since 2013, the longest upswing since 2004 to 2006, and wages are now at their highest level since 2009 (Chart I-14, middle panel). Chart I-13The Japanese Labor Market Is Very Tight (I) Chart I-14The Japanese Labor Market Is Very Tight (II) With the economy remaining robust, the output gap being closed, and the fiscal drag disappearing, this tightening in the labor-market should lead to additional wage gains in Japan. As the labor market slack dissipates further, we expect Japanese employment growth to slow and wages to accelerate their upward path. It is true that the Japanese labor market duality still constitutes a structural damper on Japanese wages, but for now, the very important positive cyclical factors noted above should overpower this long-term negative. Only with additional reform of the labor market will this duality dissipate structurally. Factor 5: End Of The Private Sector Deleveraging The last factor that has turned the corner in Japan is the evolution of the private sector's deleveraging. Non-financial private debt fell from 220% of GDP in 1994 to 160% of GDP today, after having stabilized since 2009 (Chart I-15). At these levels, the Japanese non-financial private debt to GDP is in line with the worldwide average of 157%, much below China's 210%, as well as below the levels recorded in Canada, Australia, New Zealand or Sweden. This development is key for many reasons. First, since 2011, Japanese households have in fact re-levered, with their debt load rising by 6.5% since their trough. This means that Japanese households are generating demand in excess of their earnings, and are therefore a source of inflation in the country. Second, the end of deleveraging has coincided with an end to the decline in Japanese land prices that has put downward pressure on all prices since 1991 (Chart I-16). Finally, the rising debt load of the Japanese government is no longer just a compensating mechanism for the deficiency in demand created by the private sector's sector deleveraging. In fact, like for households, government dissaving is now purely adding to the aggregate demand of Japan, and at the margin, is inflationary. Unsurprisingly, since 2012, periods of accelerating growth in the Japanese broad money supply have now been associated with periods of weakness in the yen (Chart I-17). This highlights the fact that money creation is now generating some increase in inflation expectations as the private sector is not furiously building its savings anymore and as the Kuroda BoJ is not leaning against inflationary developments. Chart I-15Private Sector Deleveraging Is Over Chart I-16Land Prices Are Not A Source Of Deflation Anymore Chart I-17Money Matters Putting It All Together In our view, in an environment where Japan is beginning to generate domestic inflationary pressures of its own, where the output gap is now positive, where the government is not putting a brake on growth anymore, where the labor market is at its tightest in decades, and where private sector deleveraging is not an handicap anymore, any improvement in global growth is likely to result in further increases in Japanese inflation expectations. Our sister service, Global Investment Strategy is long Japanese CPI swaps, a trade we agree with. In the context of FX, with the BoJ firmly on an easing path, rising Japanese inflation expectations will only depress Japanese real rates, exactly as the Fed becomes more aggressive. As a result, on a 12-18 months basis, the downside for the yen is very large. What About Trump? Chart I-8Japan FDI Profile President Trump wants to see a lower dollar to achieve his goal of creating manufacturing jobs in the U.S. Much ink has been spilled on the potential emergence of a Plaza 2.0 accord. We disagree. The U.S. has very little leverage to boost the value of the yen. The Bank of Japan's policy is designed to generate domestic inflationary pressures, the yen is only a casualty of this policy. In fact, with inflation expectations having been so low for so long, no country in the world can better justify having a very loose monetary policy setting than Japan. Also, the 97% surge in the yen that followed the Plaza accord of 1985 caused Japanese interest rates to stay too low relative to the state of the economy. As a result, a massive debt bubble ensued that lifted the economy further, but then prompted the bust which Japan still pays for. Today, the Japanese are unlikely to want to repeat the same mistake. While we do think that deleveraging has ended in Japan, a country with a falling population is unlikely to begin a new private-sector debt supercycle either. Finally, China continues to be an economy that saves too much. This means that China can either allocate these savings domestically through the debt market or export them internationally through its current account surplus. We expect Chinese authorities, who are already very worried by the high debt load in China to choose the second option for the next two years. As a result, BCA foresees further declines in the RMB over the next 12 to 18 months. In this environment, the Japanese would find it very difficult to remain competitive in the Chinese market if their currency rises as the RMB weakens.3 That being said, Trump will want some concessions out of the Japanese. Already, the February 10 meeting between the U.S. president and PM Abe is giving us a glimpse of things to come. Japanese non-tariff barriers on U.S. products are likely to decrease, potentially in the agricultural and automotive field especially. Additionally, Japan still runs a large current account surplus and therefore, a large capital account deficit. We expect Japanese FDIs in the U.S. to only grow going forward. The main beneficiary is likely to be the automotive sector as it would be the key mechanism for Japanese firms to avoid paying large tariffs / punitive taxes and still access the vital U.S. market (Chart I-18). Moreover, this fits well within Trump's agenda as it creates manufacturing jobs in the U.S. Call it a win-win situation if you will. Not Time To Close Short USD/JPY Yet Despite this very negative cyclical view on the yen, we remain committed to our tactical short USD/JPY position: For one, positioning on the yen remains too extreme (Chart I-19). Second, as argued by our European Investment Strategy service, we may be on the cusp of a mini down cycle in the credit impulse, suggesting a temporary deceleration in the G10.4 The recent collapse in quarterly credit growth in the U.S. points exactly in this direction (Chart I-20). Because U.S. 10-year bond yields are so tightly linked to global economic surprises, negative surprises could put temporary downward pressure on Treasury yields (Chart I-21). A move lower in yields would be very supportive of the yen, even if only for a few months. Chart I-19Speculators Are Still Too ##br##Short JPY Tactically Chart I-20Falling Short-Term Credit##br## Impulse In The U.S. Chart I-21Falling Surprises Can##br## Temporarily Help Bond Prices Third, the dollar correction is not over. Sentiment and positioning on the dollar represent tactical hurdles that need to be overcome before the greenback can resume its ascent. Also French OAT / German bunds spreads are at distressed levels, having only been higher at the height of the euro crisis in 2012, and not far off the levels experienced during the ERM crisis of the early 1990s (Chart I-22). This suggests that the risk of a Le Pen presidency is now well known. We agree that the impact of such an event would be enormous, but the 34.5% odds currently assigned to it on Oddschecker are too great, especially now that Bayrou - a centrist politician - is not entering the race and putting his support behind Macron. Finally, the dollar has followed a textbook wave pattern since October. A continuation of this pattern suggests that the DXY has downside toward 97-98 (Chart I-23). Chart I-22OAT / Bund Spreads Price In A Lot Of Negatives Chart I-23A Textbook Wave Pattern In The Dollar The ultimate factor in favor of the continuation of the yen correction is the higher degree of complacency that has settled globally. Our Global Complacency indicator, based on the G10 stock-to-bond ratio, commodity prices, and the VIX is at an extremely elevated level warning of a potential risk-off event globally. Any rollover in this very mean-reverting indicator would prompt a further weakness in USD/JPY as well as AUD/JPY, especially if the BoJ doesn't increase stimulus in the meantime (Chart I-24). Chart I-24AUnless The BoJ Eases Further, Too Much ##br##Complacency Equals Tactically Long JPY Chart I-24BUnless The BoJ Eases Further, Too Much ##br##Complacency Equals Tactically Long JPY Bottom Line: Tactical investors should continue shorting USD/JPY for the moment. More cyclical players can begin deploying capital to short the yen as the cyclical outlook for this currency remains dire, but better opportunity to sell this currency are likely to emerge over the coming months. A dollar-cost averaging strategy seems wise at this point. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "How do You Say "Whatever It Takes" In Japanese?", dated September 23, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see the Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Down The Rabbit Hole", dated April 15, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 For a more detailed discussion on the RMB, please see the Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Does China Have A Debt Problem Or A Savings Problem?", dated February 24, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 4 For a more detailed discussion of the mini-cycle, please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Slowdown: How And When?", dated February 2, 2017, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The U.S. economy is giving a green light to the Fed to hike. Headline CPI is at 2.5% annually, and core CPI is at 2.3%; Retail sales beat expectations at 0.4% MoM; The core CPI measure is evidence that the U.S. economy is fundamentally strong and dynamic. Real GDP now stands 11% above its pre-recession peak, and it is approaching the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of potential output. The unemployment and output gap are also close to their long-term levels. With the economy closing in on its potential, it is only natural that FOMC participants "expressed the view that it might be appropriate to raise the federal funds rate again fairly soon" in the Minutes. Although a risk of disappointment from Trump's fiscal proposal is possible, the economy's momentum will continue. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism - January 27, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The euro area remains robust, with this week's data showing a strong outperformance: German, French and overall euro area PMI increased and beat expectations across all measures, with the exception of France which only outperformed on the Composite measure; Euro area producer prices strengthened to a 2.4% annual pace; After seeing some downside from worries about a Le Pen victory, markets have calmed François Bayrou, a centrist, announced an alliance with presidential candidate Emmanual Macron, adding a resistance to the euro's downside. Substantial volatility can still be expected, however, as a Le Pen victory is not completely out of the realm of possibility, which means that the euro can see some weakness in the near term. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 The French Revolution - February 3, 2017 GBP: Dismal Expectations - January 13, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Positive signs continue to emerge in Japanese data: Industrial production yearly growth came in at 3.2% Nikkei Manufacturing PMI came in at 53.5, outperforming expectations Japan's Leading Economic Index came at 104.8, the highest level since 2015 These economic developments are good news for the BoJ, as it shows them that their price level targeting and yield curve control measures seem to be working. However the objective of these measures is not to achieve these marginal improvements in the economy. The objective is to catapult Japan out of the liquidity trap it is in, which means that these measures will likely stay in place for a while. Therefore, on a cyclical basis we remain short the yen, as we expect USD/JPY to reach 120 on a 12 to 18 month horizon. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism - January 27, 2017 Update On A Tumultuous Year - January 6, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data has painted a mixed picture for the U.K. Industrial and manufacturing production yearly growth came in at 4.3% and 4% respectively. Both measures blew past expectations. Also, in spite of the dramatic fall in the pound, Inflation seems to be relatively contained, as both core and headline numbers came in below expectation at 1.8% and 1.6% respectively. However not everything is good news. Yearly growth for retail sales and retail sales ex fuel underperformed expectations coming at 1.5% and 2.6%, respectively. Additionally, wage growth has been limited, as average weekly earnings yearly growth came below expectations at 2.6%. We continue to be bullish on the pound, particularly against the euro as any additional political risks caused by Brexit are now well known by participants, making the pound very cheap, especially if one takes into account real rate differentials. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The AUD has been the top performing currency against the USD out of the G10, having appreciated 7.11% since the beginning of the year. This rally is increasingly tenuous. Full-time employment has struggled to pick up, while part-time employment increased by 4%. This will hamper wage growth and consumption going forward. This is important as consumption is already 58% of the economy. Meanwhile, net exports have made a negative contribution to GDP growth for almost two years. In fact, Australian exports to China subtracted 1% of GDP growth last year, due to a decline in commodity prices. Going forward, a limited upside in commodity prices and an end to the Chinese easing cycle can exacerbate this decline. On a technical basis, AUD/USD has sustained momentum since the beginning of the year, with the RSI displaying overbought levels since mid-January. The cross is also approaching a key resistance level, pointing to growing risks ahead. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data for New Zealand has not been particularly positive and have weighed on the kiwi: Retail sales underperformed, growing by 0.8% QoQ against expectations of 1.1%. Business NZ PMI fell to 51.6 from last month's 54.5. Nevertheless, a closer look at the data paints a much brighter picture: the decline in NZ PMI seems to have been primarily due to bad weather conditions, which means that the strong fundamentals of the kiwi economy should show up in the data once seasonal factors start to dissipate. Therefore, we are bullish on the NZD versus the AUD, as the structural backdrop for these countries could not be further apart, yet the market is now pricing less than a 10 basis points difference from here until the end of the year. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Canadian employment numbers came out seemingly strong, with a net change in employment of 48,300 and a decrease in the unemployment rate to 6.8%. However, these numbers mask numerous underlying inconsistencies. The decrease in unemployment was the result of a robust part-time employment growth of 5.6%, not the 0.3% growth in full-time employment. Wage growth remains subdued, with average hourly earnings of permanent workers currently increasing at a 1% annual pace, compared to 3.3% a year ago. Furthermore, hours worked have declined by 0.8%, exacerbating the weakness of full-time employment's contribution to activity. Retail sales underperformed expectations, contracting at a 0.5% monthly pace; the measure excluding Autos also contracted at a 0.3% pace. Increasing household debt and festering labor market complications are likely to weigh on consumer confidence. An uncertain outlook on trade developments is an additional handicap to future CAD strength. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 During the last couple of weeks, fear of a Eurosceptick government in Europe's second biggest economy, has lowered EUR/CHF below the implied floor that the SNB has had for the last couple of years. Indeed, last week, as La Pen surged on French presidential polls, this crossed reached 1.063, its lowest level since August 2015. This is bad news for Switzerland, as economic data continues to indicate that the country has not been able to shake off the shackles of deflation: Headline inflation outperformed expectations as it finally exited deflationary territory, coming in at 0%. Industrial production contracted by 3.3% on a year on year basis Given this deflationary backdrop, the SNB will continue to try to limit the downside for this cross. However, on the months leading to the French elections, the floor will continue to get tested. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Inflation seems to be abating in Norway as core and headline inflation numbers fell sharply from last month reading, coming in at 2.1% and 2.8% respectively. This is the result of various factors: First, the inflation caused by the collapse of the krone is starting to fade away. From 2014 to 2016, the krone collapsed along with oil prices. This selloff in the krone passed through inflation to the Norwegian economy via rising imported goods, with a lag. Today, roughly one year after the NOK bottomed, the effects of the currency on inflation is starting to dissipate. Furthermore, labor market dynamics in Norway are anything but inflationary as wage growth is contracting by 4% and although unemployment is low, the Norges Bank has pointed out that is in largely caused by a fall in the participation rate. Thus, given that high inflation is receding, the Norges Bank will keep its easing bias for the time being. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 The February 2017 Monetary Policy Statement illustrated a clear dovish stance. Governors and economists at the Riksbank are paranoid about risks emanating from a strong currency and political developments. Tensions from a recently strong SEK have created worries about a potential slowdown in inflation. The Bank has therefore reiterated the possibility of an intervention if the Krona's appreciation is too rapid, making it a very real possibility. A questionable political outlook from the U.S. and the euro area has further hampered the Riksbank's optimism. The euro area is a particular risk since it represents a large source of Sweden's growth, and any damage to the monetary union will have a catastrophic effect on Sweden. Because of these reasons, the Riksbank explicitly stated that it is "still prepared to make monetary policy more expansionary if the upward trend in inflation were to be threatened and confidence in the inflation target weakened." Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

The Tactical Asset Allocation model can provide investment recommendations which diverge from those outlined in our regular weekly publications. The model has a much shorter investment horizon - namely, one month - and thus attempts to capture very tactical opportunities. Meanwhile, our regular recommendations have a longer expected life, anywhere from 3-months to a year (or longer). This difference explains why the recommendations between the two publications can deviate from each other from time to time. Highlights In February, the model underperformed global equities and the S&P 500 in USD and local-currency terms. For March, the model slightly increased its allocation to stocks and cut its weighting in bonds (Chart 1). Within the equity portfolio, the allocation to Europe was increased. The model boosted its weightings to French and Australian bonds at the expense of Canadian and Swedish paper. The risk index for stocks, as well as the one for bonds, deteriorated in February. Feature Performance In February, the recommended balanced portfolio gained 2.1% in local-currency terms, and 0.2% in U.S. dollar terms (Chart 2). This compares with a gain of 3% for the global equity benchmark and a 3.3% gain for the S&P 500. Given that the underlying model is structured in local-currency terms, we generally recommend that investors hedge their positions, though we provide suggestions on currency risk exposure from time to time. The high allocation to bonds continued to hold back the model's performance. Chart 1Model Weights Chart 2Portfolio Total Returns Weights The model increased its allocation to stocks from 53% to 57%, and cut its bond weighting from 47% to 43% (Table 1). Table 1Model Weights (As Of February 23, 2017) The model increased its equity allocation to Dutch and Swedish equities by 4 points each, Germany and New Zealand by 2 points each, and France and Emerging Asia by 1 point each. Weightings were cut in Italy by 4 points, Latin America by 3 points, Spain by 2 points, and Switzerland by 1 point. In the fixed-income space, the allocation to Australia was boosted by 8 points, France by 6 points, and Germany by 4 points. The model cut its exposure to Swedish bonds by 9 points, Canadian bonds by 6 points, U.S. and U.K. bonds by 3 points each, and Kiwi bonds by 1 point. Currency Allocation Local currency-based indicators drive the construction of our model. As such, the performance of the model's portfolio should be compared with the local-currency global equity benchmark. The decision to hedge currency exposure should be made at the client's discretion, though from time to time, we do provide our recommendations. The most recent bout of dollar depreciation was halted in February. Our Dollar Capitulation Index is below neutral levels. However, it is not extended, meaning that it does not preclude renewed dollar weakness in the near term. That said, assuming no major negative economic surprises, a relatively more hawkish Fed versus its peers should provide support for the dollar (Chart 3). Chart 3U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* And Capitulation Capital Market Indicators The risk index for commodities was little changed in February. The model continues to avoid this asset class (Chart 4). The risk index for global equities rose to its highest level since early 2010, mostly on the back of deteriorating value. Despite this, the model slightly increased its allocation to equities (Chart 5). Chart 4Commodity Index And Risk Chart 5Global Stock Market And Risk The rally in U.S. stocks - driven by optimism about the economic outlook - pushed the value component of the risk index into expensive territory. The model kept a small allocation in U.S. equities. A change in the perception about the ability of the new U.S. administration to boost growth remains a risk for this market (Chart 6). The risk index for euro area equities continues to deteriorate. However, it remains lower than its U.S. counterpart. The continued flow of solid economic data and a weaker currency should bode well for euro area stocks, although political uncertainty is a potential headwind (Chart 7). Chart 6U.S. Stock Market And Risk Chart 7Euro Area Stock Market And Risk All three components of the risk index for Dutch equities are close to neutral levels. As a result, despite the recent deterioration in the overall risk index, it remains one of the lowest among the markets the model covers (Chart 8). The risk index for Swedish stocks worsened. However, the model increased its allocation to this bourse. Swedish equities would be a beneficiary of the continued risk-on environment (Chart 9). Chart 8Netherlands Stock Market And Risk Chart 9Swedish Stock Market And Risk The momentum indicator for global bonds is less stretched in February. Meanwhile, despite its latest decline, the cyclical indicator continues to signal that the positive global economic backdrop is firmly bond-bearish. Taken all together, the risk index for bonds deteriorated in February, although it still remains in the low-risk zone (Chart 10). U.S. Treasury yields moved sideways in February as investors await more guidance from the Fed on the timing of the next hike. A bond-negative cyclical indicator coupled with the unwinding of oversold conditions - as per the momentum measure - led to a deterioration in the risk index for U.S. Treasurys. The latter is almost back to neutral levels. The model trimmed the allocation to this asset class (Chart 11). Chart 10Global Bond Yields And Risk Chart 11U.S. Bond Yields And Risk The momentum indicator remains the main driver of the risk index for Canadian bonds. As a result, the less extreme momentum reading translated into an increase in the risk index for this asset class. (Chart 12). The risk index for Australian bonds moved lower in February, reflecting improvements in all three of its components. The model included the relatively high-yielding Aussie bonds in the portfolio. (Chart 13). Chart 12Canadian Bond Yields And Risk Chart 13Australian Bond Yields And Risk The cyclical indicator for euro area bonds is near expensive levels, and the momentum indicator shows heavily oversold conditions. These two measures are offsetting the cyclical one that is sending a bond-bearish message. While the overall risk index for euro area bonds is in the low-risk zone, the country allocation is concentrated in French paper (Chart 14). The risk level for French bonds is seen as low thanks to oversold momentum. French presidential elections are probably the most important political event in Europe this year. Whether the models' heavy allocation to this asset pans out hinges to a certain extent on the reduction of investor anxiety about this political risk (Chart 15). Chart 14Euro Area Bond Yields And Risk Chart 15French Bond Yields And Risk The 13-week momentum measure for the dollar broke below the zero line, and is currently sitting on its upward-sloping trendline, drawn from the 2010 lows, that has been broken only once before. Meanwhile, the 40-week rate of change measure is still suggesting that the dollar bull market has more legs on a cyclical horizon. Monetary divergences should lend support to the dollar over the cyclical horizon, although the new administration's attempts to talk down the dollar as well as heightened policy uncertainty could translate into more volatility (Chart 16). The weakening trend in the yen hit a snag two months ago, as the 13-week momentum measure reached the lows that previously foreshadowed a consolidation phase after sharp depreciations. This short-term rate-of-change measure has bounced smartly this year reaching a critical level. Meanwhile, the 40-week rate-of-change measure is not warning of a major change in the underlying trend which remains dictated by BoJ's dovish bias (Chart 17). EUR/USD has been gravitating towards 1.05 over the course of February. The short-term rate-of-change measure seems to be holding at the neutral level, while the 40-week rate-of-change measure is in negative territory, but hardly stretched. Political uncertainty has the potential to drive the euro in near term, but the longer-term outlook is mostly a function of the monetary policy divergence between the ECB and the Fed (Chart 18). Chart 16U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* Chart 17Yen Chart 18Euro Miroslav Aradski, Senior Analyst miroslava@bcaresearch.com