Fiscal
Recommended Allocation The Meaning Of Trump Sudden large shocks in markets are rare. But the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President is one such. After a shock of this magnitude, markets tend initially to overreact, then correct, before settling on a new course. Market action since November 9th has caused many asset prices to overshoot short term. It is likely that U.S. bond yields, inflation expectations, the performance of bank and materials stocks, and the U.S. dollar (Chart 1) will correct over the next month or so, perhaps triggered by the Fed's likely rate hike on December 14th or simply by shifting expectations for Trump's economic policies. But what is the likely long-term course, which should set our asset allocation for the next 6 to 12 months? We think investors should take Trump at least partly at his word when he says he will enact tax cuts and increase infrastructure investment. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service sees few constraints on Trump from Congress in the short term.1 The OECD in its latest Economic Outlook has given its imprimatur, arguing that "a stronger fiscal policy response is needed," and estimating that U.S. fiscal stimulus could add 0.1 percentage point to global growth next year and 0.3 points in 2018.2 If such a policy boosted growth and inflation, it would be negative for bonds. The only question, with 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yields having already risen by almost 100 bps since July, is how much of this is priced in. In the long run, government bond yields are broadly correlated with nominal GDP growth (Chart 2). In H1 2016, U.S. nominal GDP growth was 2.7%, and for 2016 as a whole probably about 3.2%. If it picks up to 4-5% in 2017 (2.5-3% real, plus inflation of 1.5-2%), an additional rise of 50-100 bps in the 10-year yield would not be surprising (though ECB and BoJ asset purchases might somewhat limit the rise in yields). Moreover, growth was already accelerating before Trump's victory. The effects of 2015's commodity shock and industrial and profits recessions have passed, with U.S. Q3 GDP growth revised up to 3.2% and the Fed's NowCasting models suggesting 2.5%-3.6% for Q4. The Citi Economic Surprise Index has surprised on the upside in recent weeks both in the U.S. and Europe - though not in emerging markets (Chart 3). And the Q3 earnings season in the U.S. was well above expectations, with EPS coming in at +3.3% YoY (compared to a consensus forecast pre-results of -2.2%). Analysts' forecasts for 2017 EPS growth are a comparatively modest 11%. Chart 1Some Short-Term Overshoots Chart 2Bond Yields Relate To Nominal Growth Chart 3Growth Was Already Surprising On The Upside But whether this new world will be positive for equities is harder to answer. Trump's unpredictability raises policy uncertainty: how much emphasis, for example, will he put on trade protectionism or confrontational foreign policy? This should raise the risk premium. The Fed's response will also be key. Futures have now priced in the rate hike in December and (almost) the two further rate hikes in the Fed's dots for 2017 (Chart 4). But the market still sees the long-term equilibrium rate (as expressed in five-year five-year forwards) as only just over 2%, compared to the Fed's 2.9%. And, although Janet Yellen has suggested that the Fed will act only after Trump's policies take effect ("We will be watching the decisions that Congress makes and updating our economic outlook as the policy landscape becomes clearer," she said), if core PCE inflation continues to pick up in 2017 beyond the current 1.7% and a strong stimulus package is implemented, the Fed might accelerate its rate hikes. More worryingly, Trump's fundamental views on monetary policy are unknown: does he, as a businessman, like low rates, or will he listen to his "hard money" advisers who believe the Fed has been too lax? Since he can appoint six FOMC governors in his first year in office, he will be able to influence monetary policy. Too fast a rise in Fed rates would be negative for equities. On balance, in this environment we see equities outperforming bonds over the next 12 months. It is unusual for the stock-to-bond ratio to decline outside of a global recession (Chart 5) - and, with the extra boost from fiscal policy (with Trump possibly joined by Japan, the U.K., China and others), a recession is unlikely over our forecast horizon. Chart 4Market Has Priced In 2017 Fed Hikes - ##br##But Not The Long-Term Chart 5Stocks Don't Often ##br##Underperform Outside Recession Accordingly, we are raising our recommendation for global equities to overweight, and lowering bonds to underweight. The problem is timing: we recognize that there may be a better entry point over the next couple of months. Some investors may, therefore, want to implement the change gradually. In addition, some recent market moves are not fundamentally justified: for example, we cannot see how the materials sector would be a significant beneficiary from a Trump fiscal stimulus. We plan to make further detailed adjustments to our equity country and sector recommendations and bond-class recommendations in the next Quarterly Portfolio Update, to be published on December 15th. Currencies: Stronger U.S. growth and tighter monetary policy suggest that the USD will continue to appreciate. The dollar looks somewhat expensive but is still well below the peak of overvaluation at the end of previous bouts of strength in 1985 and 2002. The Bank of Japan's policy of capping the 10-year JGB yield at 0% has worked well (pushing the yen down by 12% against the dollar in the past two months) and, as rates elsewhere rise, this implies further long-run yen weakness. The euro is likely to weaken less, with eurozone growth recently surprising on the upside and the ECB therefore likely to reconsider the amount of asset purchases at some point next year, though probably not at its meeting on December 8th. Emerging market currencies continue to look particularly vulnerable. Equities: In common currency terms, U.S. equities are more attractive than European ones. In local currency terms, however, the call is closer since the strong dollar will depress U.S. earnings relative to those in Europe, and an acceleration of global economic growth should help the more cyclical eurozone stock market. On the other hand, Europe faces structural issues, such as the chronically poor profitability of its banking system, and political risk from a series of upcoming elections (starting with the Italian referendum on December 4th). We continue to like Japan (on a currency hedged basis) and expect that the BoJ's policy will be bolstered by government fiscal and employment policies. We remain underweight on emerging markets. They have always been vulnerable during periods of dollar strength, and political side-effects from their bout of economic weakness in 2011-5 are starting to spread, recently to Turkey, Malaysia, India, Brazil, Korea and South Africa. Fixed Income: The risk of tighter Fed policy and higher yields suggest investors should remain underweight duration. We have liked U.S. TIPS over nominal bonds all year and, with 10-year breakeven inflation still only at 1.8%, they remain attractive in the current environment. We reduced high-yield bonds to neutral on September 30th, on the grounds that investors were no longer being sufficiently compensated for default risk: they have subsequently given -3% return, while equities rallied. We recommend investment grade credits for those investors who need to pick up yield (Chart 6). Commodities: After the OPEC agreement on production cuts, we expect the oil price to move towards $55 in the first few months of 2017 as inventories are drawn down. Over the longer run the risk is to the upside as a dearth of new projects, following cancellations last year, will tighten the supply/demand balance. Metals prices have strengthened since Trump's victory, with the CRB Raw Industrials Index up sharply (Chart 7). This makes little sense. Trump's stimulus will be centered on tax, not infrastructure. China remains a far more important factor: the U.S. represented only 7% of global steel consumption in 2015, for example, compared to 43% for China. And China's recent stimulus is running out of steam. Chart 6Yield On Investment Grade Credits ##br##Still Attractive Chart 7Trump Shouldn't Have ##br##This Much Effect On Metals Prices Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report,"U.S. Election: Outcomes and Investment Implications," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see OECD Global Economic Outlook, November 2016, available at http://www.oecd.org/economy/outlook/economicoutlook.htm. Recommended Asset Allocation
Highlights Investors are betting that Trump's expansionary agenda will not be torpedoed by his less market-friendly policies such as trade protectionism. We have some sympathy for this view, but believe that investors should remain cautious on risk assets until we receive more clarity on the sequencing of Trump's wish list and how aggressively he will pursue fiscal expansionism relative to trade and immigration reform. We doubt that Trump's fiscal and regulatory plan will place the U.S. economy on a permanently higher growth plane. Many of the growth headwinds that existed in the U.S. before the election remain in place. We expect that Trump will find most common ground with Congress on the fiscal side. It will be difficult, politically, for Republicans in the Senate and House to stand in Trump's way given that he has just been elected on a populist platform. We expect a meaningful fiscal stimulus package to be passed in the U.S. that will boost growth temporarily. We cannot rule out a trade war that more than offsets the fiscal impulse. Nonetheless, Trump's desire for growth means that he may tread carefully on protectionism. A window may open next year that will favor risk assets for a period of time. A temporary U.S. growth acceleration in late-2017/early 2018 would lift the equity and corporate bond boats. Our bias is to upgrade risk assets to overweight, but poor value means that the risk/reward tradeoff is underwhelming until we get more visibility on the new Administration's policy intentions. In the meantime, remain at benchmark in equities, overweight the dollar and below-benchmark duration in fixed-income portfolios. The bond selloff is likely to pause until there is more concrete evidence that Congress will accept tax cuts and infrastructure spending, but global yields eventually have more upside potential. Value and relative monetary policies favor the Japanese and European stock markets versus the U.S., at least in local currencies. We are less bearish on high-yield bonds in relative terms, although we are still slightly below-benchmark. Feature Initial fears that a Trump victory would be apocalyptic for the economy and financial markets quickly morphed into an equity celebration on hopes that the Republican sweep would usher in policies that will shift American growth into high gear. Major U.S. stock indexes have broken above recent trading ranges, despite the surge in the dollar and the devastation in bond markets. Investors are betting that Trump's expansionary policies will not be torpedoed by his less market-friendly policies such as trade protectionism. We have some sympathy for this view, but believe that investors should remain cautious on risk assets until we receive more clarity on the sequencing of Trump's wish list and how aggressively he will pursue fiscal expansionism relative to trade and immigration reform. In the meantime, investors should remain long the dollar and short duration within bond portfolios, although a near-term correction of recent market action appears likely. Our geopolitical strategists argued through the entire campaign that Trump had a better chance of winning than the consensus believed because he was riding a voter preference wave that is moving left. Trump campaigned as an unorthodox Republican, appealing to white, blue collar voters by blaming globalization for their job losses and low wages, and by refusing to accept Republican (GOP) orthodoxy on fiscal austerity or entitlement spending. Chart I-1Big Government Is Only ##br##A Problem For The Opposition The polarization of U.S. voters and comparisons with the U.K. Brexit vote are well trodden themes that we won't rehash here. The important point is that the GOP now holds both the White House and Congress. The investment implications hinge critically on how friendly Congress is to Trump's policy prescriptions. Many pundits argue that House and Senate Republican's will block Trump's ambitious tax cut and infrastructure spending plan because it would blow out the budget deficit. The reality is more complex. It will be difficult politically for Republicans in the Senate and House to stand in Trump's way given that he has just been elected on a populist platform; it would be seen as thwarting the will of the people. Our post-election Special Report pointed out that, over the past 28 years, each new president has generally succeeded in passing their signature items.1 Moreover, the GOP is less fiscally conservative than is widely believed. Fiscal trends under the Bush and Reagan administrations highlighted that Republicans do not always keep spending in check (Chart I-1). The key pillars of Trump's campaign were renegotiating trade deals, immigration reform, increased infrastructure and defense spending, tax cuts, protecting entitlements, repealing Obamacare and reducing regulations. However, there is a big difference between election promises and what can actually be delivered. It is early going, but our first Special Report, beginning on page 19, presents a Q&A from our geopolitical team on what we know in terms of political constraints and possible outcomes in the coming year. Common Ground On Fiscal Policy We expect that Trump will find most common ground with Congress on the fiscal side. Infrastructure spending has bipartisan support, as highlighted by last year's highway funding bill. Democratic senators and House Republicans have promised to work with the new President on infrastructure spending. Trump is likely to offer tax reform in exchange for his infrastructure plan. Trump wants to cut the top marginal corporate tax rate (from 39.6% to 33%), repeal the Alternative Minimum Tax, and slash the corporate tax rate (from 35% to 15%). His plan also includes increased standard deduction limits and a full expensing of business capital spending. The Tax Policy Center estimates that Trump's tax plan alone would increase federal debt by $6.2 trillion over the next ten years (excluding additional interest).2 An extra $1 trillion in infrastructure outlays over the next decade, together with a growing defense budget, could add another $100-$200 billion to total federal spending per year. The problem, of course, is that few sources of new revenue have been suggested to cover the costs of these policy changes. The Tax Policy Center's scoring of the Trump plan implies a jump in the U.S. debt/GDP ratio from 77% today to 106% in 2026. Other studies claim that the budget damage will be far less than this because government revenues will boom along with the economy. We doubt that will be the case. The outlook for U.S. trade policy is even more nebulous. Trump has threatened to kill the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and potentially place tariffs of 35% and 45%, respectively, on imports from Mexico and China (among other protectionist measures). He has even threatened to take the U.S. out of the WTO.3 These threats are no more than posturing ahead of negotiations, but Trump needs to show his base of support that he is working to "make America great again". Protectionism will probably generate more pushback from Republicans in the House and Senate than Trump's fiscal measures. The Economic Implications Of Trumponomics Table I-1Ranges For U.S. Fiscal Multipliers In terms of the overall economic impact, there are many moving parts and it is unclear how much the Trump Administration will push fiscal stimulus versus trade protectionism. As discussed in the Special Report, it is possible that the tax cuts will be implemented as quickly as the second quarter of 2017, while infrastructure spending could begin ramping up in the second half of the year. However, we cannot rule out a lengthy bargaining process that would delay the economic stimulus into 2018. We doubt that Trump will get everything on his wish list. Moreover, the multiplier effects of tax cuts, which will benefit the upper-income classes the most, are smaller than for direct government spending (Table I-1). Nevertheless, even if he gets one quarter of what he is seeking, it could be enough to boost aggregate demand growth by up to 1% per year over a two year period. In terms of trade, Trump will undoubtedly kill the TPP immediately following his inauguration to show he means business. The President also has the power to implement tariffs without Congressional consent. It is unclear whether he can also cancel NAFTA unilaterally, but at a minimum he can impose higher tariffs and trade restrictions on Canada and Mexico. Nonetheless, comments from his advisors suggest that president-elect Trump wants stronger growth above all else. This means that he may tread carefully to avoid the negative growth effects of a trade war. Some high-profile studies of the impact of the Trump economic plan paint a grim picture. The Peterson Institute points out that "withdrawal from the WTO would lead to the unraveling of all tariff negotiations and the reversion of rates to the MFN level of a preexisting agreement, conceivably all the way back to the Smoot-Hawley rates that were in effect in 1934." Another Peterson study reported the results of a simulation of the impact of returning to the Smoot-Hawley tariff levels, using a large general equilibrium global model.4 They find that U.S. real GDP would contract by about 7½%, or roughly $1 trillion. Thus, a "doomsday trade scenario" is possible, but it seems inconceivable that Trump would withdraw from the WTO given his desire for growth. More likely, he will settle for higher tariffs placed on Mexico and China. Such tariffs would undermine U.S. growth on their own, but we believe that some recent studies discussed in the press overstate the negative impact of these tariffs. Back-of-the-envelope estimates suggest that the tariff increases would reduce U.S. real GDP by roughly 1.2%, including retaliation by Mexico and China in the form of higher tariffs on U.S. exports (see Box I-1 for more details). The negative shock would likely be stretched over a couple of years.5 Box 1 Importantly, not all of any tariff increase would be "passed-through" to U.S. businesses and households. Studies show that, historically, the pass-through of tariff increases into U.S. prices was actually quite low, at about 0.5. A large portion of previous tariff hikes have been absorbed by foreign producers as they endeavored to protect market share. This means that a 35% tariff on Mexican imports would result in a roughly 17½% rise in import prices from Mexico. A 45% tariff on Chinese goods would result in a 22½% rise in import prices from China. Moreover, the import price elasticity of U.S. demand, or the sensitivity of U.S. demand to a change in the price of imported goods, is estimated to be about 1. That is, a 22½% rise in import prices from China leads to a 22½% drop in import volumes from that country. Roughly one-half of the drop in imports is replaced by purchases from other countries and one-half from U.S. sources. This so-called "expenditure switching" effect actually boosts U.S. real GDP on its own. Of course, this lift is more than offset by the fact that households and businesses suffer a loss of purchasing power due to higher import prices. Chinese and Mexican imports represent 2.7% and 1.7%, respectively, of U.S. GDP. With these figures and the elasticities discussed above, we can calculate a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the impact of the Trump tariffs. The expenditure switching effect would boost U.S. real GDP by about 0.4%. This is offset by the purchasing power effect of -0.7% (including a multiplier of 1.5), leaving a net loss of only 0.3%. Of course, China and Mexico will retaliate by imposing higher tariffs on U.S. exports. This has a larger negative impact on the U.S. because American export volumes decline and there is no offsetting expenditure-switching effect. We estimate that retaliation with equal tariffs on U.S. exports would reduce U.S. GDP by about 1% using reasonable elasticities. Adding it all up, the proposed Trump tariffs on China and Mexico would result in a roughly 1.2% hit to U.S. real GDP. This could overstate the negative shock to the extent that the tariff revenues are spent by the U.S. government.6 Moreover, some studies of the Trump agenda assume that business spending would wither under a stronger dollar, waning business confidence and higher interest rates. We are not so pessimistic. The threat of punitive measures is likely to dissuade some U.S. companies from moving production abroad. Ford announced that it had abandoned plans to shift production of its luxury Lincoln SUV from Kentucky to Mexico. On the flipside, the fear of losing access to the U.S. market might persuade some foreign companies to relocate production to the United States. Such worries were a key reason why Japanese automobile companies began to invest in new U.S. production capacity starting in the 1980s. Moreover, U.S. corporate capital spending has been lackluster since the Great Recession due to "offshoring". Higher tariffs would promote "onshoring", helping to lift capital spending within the U.S. economy. We are not arguing that trade protectionism will be good for the U.S. economy. We are merely pointing out that there are positive offsets to the negative aspects of protectionism, and that many studies are overly pessimistic on the impact on growth. That said, all bets are off if Trump does the unthinkable and cancels NAFTA outright and/or takes the U.S. out of the WTO. The Fed's Reaction The economic and financial market dynamics over the next couple of years depend importantly on how the Fed responds to the Trump policy mix. We are not worried about central bank independence or Janet Yellen's future. Donald Trump has, at various times, both praised and attacked the Fed Chair and current monetary policy settings. A review of the Fed may happen at some point, but we assert that an investigation will not be a priority early in Trump's mandate. Some have raised concerns that Trump could stack the FOMC with hawks when he fills the openings next year. More likely, he will opt for doves because he will not want a hawkish Fed prematurely shutting down the expansion. The studies that warn of a major U.S. recession under Trump's policies assume that the Fed tightens aggressively as fiscal stimulus lifts the economy's growth rate. For example, the Moodys' report assumes that the fed funds rate rises to 6½% by 2018!7 No wonder Moodys' foresees a downturn that is longer than the Great Recession. No doubt, it would have been better if fiscal stimulus arrived years ago when there was a substantial amount of economic slack. With the economy close to full employment today, aggressive government pump-priming could set the U.S. up for a typical end to the business cycle; overheating followed by a Fed-induced recession. Indeed, many investors are wondering if the U.S. is overdue for a recession anyway. The current expansion phase is indeed looking long-in-the-tooth by historical standards. However, the old adage is apt: "expansions don't die of old age, they are murdered by the Fed". In Charts I-2A, Chart I-2B and Chart I-2C, we split the U.S. post-1950 economic cycles into three sets based on the length of the expansion phase: short (about 2 years), medium (4-6 years) and long (8-10 years). What distinguishes short from the medium and long expansions is the speed by which the most cyclical parts of the economy accelerate, and the time it takes for the unemployment rate to reach a full employment level. Long expansion phases were characterized by a drawn-out rise in the cyclical parts of the economy and a slow return to full employment in the labor market, similar to what has occurred since the Great Recession (Chart I-2C). Chart I-2ALong Chart I-2BMedium Expansions Chart I-2CA Short Expansion Of course, the Fed did not begin to tighten policy immediately upon reaching full employment in the past. The Fed began hiking rates an average of 13 months after reaching full employment in the short cycles, 30 months for medium cycles, and more than 60 months in the "slow burn" expansions (Table I-2). Even if we exclude the 1960s expansion, when the Fed delayed for too long and fell behind the inflation curve, the Fed has waited an average of 45 months before lifting rates in the other long expansions (beginning in 1982 and 1991). The longer delay compared to the shorter expansions reflected the slow pace at which inflationary pressures accumulated. During these periods, inflation-adjusted earnings-per-share (EPS) expanded by an average of 25% and the real value of the S&P 500 index increased by 28%. Table I-1U.S. Expansions Can Last Long After Full Employment Is Reached The lesson is that risk assets can still perform well for a long time after the economy reaches full employment. Admittedly, however, equity valuation is more stretched today than was the case at similar points in past long cycles. Before the U.S. election, the current expansion appeared to be heading for a similar long, drawn-out conclusion. Inflationary pressures are beginning to emerge, but only slowly, and from a low starting point. Moreover, evidence suggests that the Phillips curve8 is quite flat at low levels of inflation. This implies that the Fed has plenty of time to normalize interest rates because inflation is unlikely to surge. However, a sea change in trade and fiscal policy could change the calculus. To the extent that fiscal stimulus is front-loaded relative to trade protection, and that any trade restrictions add to inflation, Trump's policy agenda could force the Fed to normalize rates more quickly. The FOMC Will Wait And See Chart I-3Inflation Expectations Moving To Target Yellen's congressional testimony in November revealed that the Fed is not yet preparing for a more aggressive tightening cycle. There was nothing to suggest that the Fed is revising its economic forecasts following the election. Similarly, the Fed is not making any upward revisions to its estimate of the long-run neutral rate, which remains "quite low by historical standards." The implication is that the Fed will raise rates in December, but it will keep its "dot" forecast unchanged. The FOMC is prudently awaiting the details of the fiscal package before changing its economic and interest rate projections. We doubt that the Fed will be aggressive in offsetting the fiscal stimulus. We have argued in the past that the consensus on the FOMC would not follow the Bank of Japan and officially target a temporary overshoot of the 2% inflation target. Nonetheless, most Fed officials would not be upset if, with hindsight, they tighten too slowly and inflation overshoots modestly. The inflation target is supposed to be symmetric, which means that 2% is not meant to be a hard ceiling. Moreover, the Fed will be extremely cautious about tightening monetary policy until TIPS breakevens are more firmly anchored around pre-crisis levels. Market-based measures of inflation compensation have surged in the past few weeks, but remain below levels that are consistent with the Fed hitting its 2% PCE inflation target (Chart I-3).9 Investors should continue to hold inflation protection in the bond market. A window may open sometime in 2017 in which improving economic growth is met with a cautious Fed. In this environment, we would expect the Treasury curve to bear-steepen and risk assets to outperform. The window will likely close once inflation moves up and inflation expectations converge at a level consistent with the 2% target. Bond Strategy The implications of Trump's policy agenda are clearly bond bearish, although yields have shifted a long way in a short time. The gap between market rate expectations and the Fed's median expected path has narrowed considerably, both at the long-end and short-end of the curve (Chart I-4). The 5-year/5-year forward overnight index swap rate is now 2.1%, only 82 bps below the Fed's median estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate. The U.S. 10-year yield has already converged with two measures of fair value, although yields remain well below fair value in the other major countries according to estimates of nominal potential output growth (Charts I-5 and I-6). The fact that the gap between the Fed's dots and market expectations has almost closed, means that a lot of bond-bearish news has been discounted in the U.S. We would not be surprised to see a partial retracement of the recent bond selloff. Investors will want to see concrete plans for substantial fiscal stimulus before the next leg of the bond bear market takes place. Speculators may wish to take profits on short bond plays, but investors with a 6-12 month horizon should remain short of duration benchmarks. Chart I-4Market Expectations Converging With Dots Chart I-5Bond Fair Value Method (I) Chart I-6Bond Fair Value Method (II) On a long-term horizon, the Trump agenda reinforces our view that the secular bull market in bonds is over. Larry Summers' Secular Stagnation thesis will be challenged and investors will come to question the need for ultra-low real interest rates in the U.S. well into the next decade. A blowout in the U.S. budget deficit will temper the excess global savings story to some extent. Tax cuts, infrastructure spending, full expensing of capital goods and reduced regulation may also boost the long-run potential growth rate in the U.S. All of this suggests that equilibrium interest rates and bond yields will shift higher. Nonetheless, poor demographic trends and other impediments to both the supply- and demand-sides of the U.S. and global economies have not disappeared. The ECB is likely to extend its bond purchase program beyond next March, while the Bank of Japan has capped the 10-year JGB yield at close to zero, both of which should limit the amount by which yields in the other developed markets can rise. We could even see global yields fall back to near previous lows if the Fed winds up tightening too aggressively and sparks the next recession. Is Trump Bullish For Stocks? Chart I-7Equity Market Breakouts Developed country stock markets cheered the U.S. election outcome, presumably betting that the positives will outweigh the negatives. The main indexes in the U.S. and Japan have broken out of their trading ranges (Chart I-7). Bourses in Europe have also moved higher, but have not yet broken out. On the plus side, deregulation and stronger growth are bullish for U.S. corporate profits. Trump's proposal for a major corporate tax cut is another positive for equities, although the effective corporate tax rate in the U.S. is already at multi-decade lows. Cutting the marginal rate will thus not affect the effective rate much for large corporations. Any lowering of the marginal rate will benefit small and medium enterprises, as well as domestically-oriented S&P 500 corporations. On the negative side, dollar strength will be a headwind given that about a third of S&P 500 earnings are sourced from abroad. This raises the question of which factor will dominate profit growth over the next year; better economic growth or dollar strength? Table I-3 presents a matrix of different scenarios for the dollar and economic growth applied to our U.S. EPS model. Our base-case assumptions, implemented before the election, generated 5-6% earnings growth in 2017. We assumed that real and nominal GDP growth would be on par with the conservative IMF forecast. The bullish case assumes that real GDP growth is about a percentage point stronger, with modestly higher inflation. The opposite is assumed in the bear case. These three cases are combined with various scenarios for the dollar. The key point of Table I-3 is that the growth assumptions dominate the dollar effects. If growth is significantly stronger than the base case, then it would require a massive dollar adjustment to offset the positive impact on earnings. For example, our EPS estimate rises from 5-6% in the base case to almost 13% in the strong growth scenario, even if the dollar appreciates by 5%.10 The elephant in the room is the prospect of a trade war. Anti-globalization polices are negative for equities generally, although the boost for domestically-oriented firms provides some offset. As we argued above, higher tariffs on Mexico and China alone would not fully counteract a major fiscal push next year, especially if the trade impediments are implemented with a lag. Nonetheless, a broader anti-trade initiative that draws retaliation from many of America's trading partners cannot be ruled out. This is the main reason why we remain tactically cautious on equities. Table I-3U.S. Earnings Scenarios Country Equity Allocation In common currency terms, the U.S. equity market has a lot going for it relative to Japan and Europe. There will be spillovers from stronger U.S. growth to other countries, but the U.S. will benefit the most from Trump's fiscal stimulus plan. Continuing policy divergence will prop up the dollar, boosting returns in common-currency terms. The dollar has appreciated by about 4% in trade-weighted terms since we first predicted a 10% rise, suggesting that there is another 6% to go. Chart I-8Eurozone Still Has Lots Of Slack However, it is a tougher call in local currency terms. Monetary policy will remain highly accommodative in both Japan and Europe. As we highlighted in last month's Overview, we still expect Japan to implement a major fiscal stimulus plan. In the context of the Bank of Japan's fixing of the 10-year yield, government spending will amount to a helicopter drop policy that could generate a substantial yen depreciation. The central bank will continue to hold the yield curve down even when growth picks up, to drive real yields lower via rising inflation expectations. In the Eurozone, the ECB is likely to extend its asset purchase program beyond next March because it cannot credibly argue that inflation is on track to meet the target on any reasonable timetable. While the Eurozone economy has been growing well above trend this year, the fact that wage growth is languishing highlights that significant labor market slack persists (Chart I-8). Easy-money policies in Europe and Japan will be bullish for stocks in both markets in absolute terms and relative to the U.S. Stocks are also cheaper in Japan and the Eurozone. Earlier this year, we presented a methodology for valuing Eurozone stocks relative to the U.S. from a top-down perspective. The methodology accounted for different sector weightings and the fact that European stocks generally trade at a discount to the U.S. This month's second Special Report, beginning on page 27, applies the same methodology to Japanese/U.S. relative valuation. Combining seven relative valuation measures into a single composite metric, we find that both the Eurozone and Japanese equity markets are about one standard deviation cheap relative to the U.S. (Chart I-9). History shows that investors would have made substantial (currency hedged) excess returns if they had favored Eurozone and Japanese stocks to the U.S. on a six-month or longer investment horizon whenever our composite valuation index reached one standard deviation on the cheap side. Our recommended (hedged) overweight in Europe and Japan has not worked out yet, as tepid global growth has instead flattered the lower-beta U.S. market. That tide should turn, however, if the rise in global bond yields reflects a credibly reflationary growth pulse in the U.S. A stronger dollar would redistribute some of that growth to other countries. Chart I-10 shows that higher beta markets like Europe and Japan can outperform the U.S. when bond yields rise. The financial sectors in both Europe and Japan, so punished relative to the broad market as a result of deleveraging and negative interest rates, would then be poised to outperform as well. Chart I-9Equity Valuation Chart I-10U.S. Equities ##br##Underperform When Yields Rise Investment Conclusions: Hopes are running high that fiscal stimulus and a more business-friendly regulatory framework will stir animal spirits, rekindle business investment and lift the U.S. economy out of its growth funk. The violent reaction in financial markets to the election has probably gone too far in discounting a transformative policy change. We doubt that Trump's fiscal and regulatory agenda will place the U.S. economy on a permanently higher growth plane. Many of the growth headwinds that existed in the U.S. before the election remain in place, such as: the end of the Debt Supercycle; deteriorating demographics; elevated corporate leverage; and nose-bleed levels of government debt. A lot of good (policy) news is already discounted in equity prices, implying that the market is vulnerable to policy or economic disappointments. That said, a window may open next year that would favor risk assets for a period of time. A temporary growth acceleration in late-2017/early 2018 would lift the equity and corporate bond boats. Markets will front-run the growth pulse (some of it is admittedly already discounted). Our bias is therefore to upgrade these asset classes, but poor value means that the risk/reward tradeoff is underwhelming until we get more visibility on the new administration's policy intentions. Until there is more clarity, remain at benchmark in equities, overweight the dollar and below-benchmark duration in fixed-income portfolios. EM assets appear to us like a lose-lose proposition. A trade war would obviously be disastrous for this asset class. But EM also loses if U.S. protectionism takes a back seat to growth initiatives to the extent that this results in a stronger dollar. EM risk assets have never escaped periods of dollar strength unscathed. The possibility of RMB depreciation versus the U.S. dollar adds to EM vulnerability. Our other investment recommendations include the following: avoid peripheral European government bonds within European bond portfolios due to Italian referendum risk; avoid U.S. municipal bonds, as tax cuts would devalue the tax advantage of muni debt; remain overweight inflation-linked bonds versus conventional issues within government bond portfolios, as inflation expectations have more upside potential; we are marginally less bearish on high-yield bonds since better growth will temper defaults. We also see less near-term risk of a Fed-driven volatility event. Nonetheless, concerns about corporate health still justify a slight underweight relative to Treasurys in the U.S. Overweight investment-grade corporates in Europe versus European governments due to ongoing ECB support; overweight European and Japanese equities versus the U.S. in currency-hedged terms. within the U.S. equity market, remain overweight small caps since Trump's corporate tax reform will benefit small firms disproportionately. Dollar strength also favors small versus large caps. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst November 24, 2016 Next Report: December 20, 2016 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "U.S. Election: Outcomes and Investment Implications," November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Jim Nunns, Len Burman, Ben Page, Jeff Rohaly, and Joe Rosenberg, "An Analysis Of Donald Trump's Revised Tax Plan," Tax Policy Center, October 18, 2016. 3 World Trade Organization. 4 Scott Bradford, Paul Grieco and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, "The Payoff to America from Global Integration," Peterson Institute for International Economics. 5 These calculations capture the demand-side effects of the tariffs. There will also be supply-side effects, in terms of reduced productivity, but this will be relatively small and affect the economy largely over the medium term. 6 The elasticities and methodology for these calculations are based on the report; "Trump's Tariffs: A Dissent," J.W. Mason, November 2016. 7 "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Mr.Trump's Economic Policies," Moody's Analytics, June 2016. 8 The short-term tradeoff between unemployment and inflation. 9 Inflation breakeven rates have historically exceeded 2% because of the presence of risk premia. 10 The impact of dollar appreciation on profits shown in Table 3 may seem too low to some readers given that S&P 500 companies derive a third of their earnings from abroad. However, some of these earnings are hedged, while dollar strength will benefit the earnings of domestically-oriented U.S. companies. II. A Q&A On Political Dynamics In Washington In this Special Report, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service answers some key questions posed by clients surrounding the incoming Trump administration. The situation could evolve quickly in the coming months, but these answers convey our preliminary thoughts. What support will President-elect Trump's infrastructure plans have from Republicans in Congress? The support for infrastructure spending can be gauged by popular opinion and the bipartisan highway funding bill passed by Congress late last year. The $305 billion bill to fund roads, bridges and rail lines received support from both parties (83-16 vote in the Senate and 359-65 vote in the House). The dissenting votes included fiscal conservatives and Tea Party/Freedom Caucus members. And yet many of their voters supported Trump, whose victory shows the political winds shifting against "austerity." Moreover, new presidents normally receive support from their party on major initiatives early in their term. Democratic Senators and House Representatives have suggested they may work with Trump on infrastructure spending, most notably Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Chuck Schumer and even Nancy Pelosi. This could mark an instance of bipartisanship in the context of still-growing polarization. The 2018 mid-term elections will be difficult for the Democrats, with 10 Democratic senators facing elections in states which Donald Trump won, including key "Rust Belt" swing states where the infrastructure argument is appealing (Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Ohio). Thus, there are political incentives for Democrats to cooperate with the White House on infrastructure. Trump owes his victory to swing voters who favor infrastructure. As we discuss below, he may give the GOP Congress some concessions (for instance, on tax reform) in exchange for cooperation on infrastructure spending. How many votes would he need to get an infrastructure bill passed in Congress? Trump will likely get the votes. He needs 218 votes in the House and 51 votes in the Senate, assuming his infrastructure plan is not so partisan (or so entwined with partisan measures like his tax cuts) as to draw a Senate filibuster. The GOP has 239 seats in the House and at least 51 in the Senate (Louisiana could make it 52). One way of overcoming any Democratic filibuster in the Senate is by "Reconciliation," a process for speeding up bills affecting revenues and expenditures. Under this process, which requires the prior passage of a budget resolution, a simple majority in the Senate is enough to allow a reconciliation bill to pass. The process can be used for passing tax cuts as well, after procedural changes in 2011 and 2015. If passed, what is the earliest we could expect more spending? Congress passed President Obama's $763 billion stimulus package, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), in February 2009, the month after he was sworn in. About 20% of the investment outlays went out the door by the end of fiscal 2009 and 40% by the end of fiscal 2010.1 Today, infrastructure outlays are less urgent, as the country is not in the mouth of a financial crisis, but the roll-out could be expedited by the administration. Trump's plan calls for building infrastructure through public-private partnerships, which could involve longer negotiation periods but also faster completion once started. Trump's team claims they can accelerate the spending process by cutting red tape. What is a 'best guess' on the final amount of deficit-financed infrastructure spending? Trump is currently committed to $550 billion in new infrastructure investment, down from initial suggestions of $1 trillion over a decade. A detailed plan has not been released, however. Trump's campaign promised to induce infrastructure spending via public-private partnerships, with tax credits for private investors. The plan was said to be "deficit neutral" based on assumptions about revenue recuperated from taxing the labor that works on the projects and the profits of companies involved, taxed at Trump's proposed 15% corporate tax rate.2 The government tax credit would have amounted to 13.7% of the total investment. Earlier proposals can easily be revised or scrapped. Already, Trump has reversed his earlier opposition to Hillary Clinton's proposal of setting up an infrastructure bank, potentially financed by repatriated earnings of U.S. corporations. His potential Treasury Secretary, Steven Mnuchin, raised the possibility on November 16. Who are key players in this process and what are their backgrounds? The aforementioned leading Democrats could become key players, if they prove willing to work with Trump on infrastructure. Comments by Paul Ryan and the Congressional GOP should be monitored, as infrastructure spending was not a major part of their policy platform, called "A Better Way," released in June of this year.3 The only infrastructure that Ryan mentioned in the GOP policy paper was energy infrastructure. Not the "roads, bridges, railways, tunnels, sea ports, and airports" that President-elect Trump has promised repeatedly, in addition to energy. Asked during the Washington Ideas Forum in September whether he supports infrastructure spending, Ryan said it is not part of the GOP's proposal. Other notable personalities to watch: Wilbur Ross, an American investor and potential Commerce Secretary pick, was one of the authors of Trump's original, public-private infrastructure plan. Peter Navarro, UC-Irvine business professor and another economic advisor, co-authored that proposal. Also watch: Steven Mnuchin, Finance Chairman of the Trump campaign and former Goldman Sachs partner, and potential Treasury Secretary pick. Stephen Moore, a member of Trump's economic advisory team and the chief economist for the Heritage Foundation. John Paulson, President of Paulson & Co. Also watch fiscal hawks such as House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy of California, who has recently softened on infrastructure spending, saying it could be "a priority" and "a bipartisan issue." Representative David Brat of Virginia, another ultra-conservative Freedom Caucus member, who has softened on infrastructure. House Appropriations Chairman Hal Rogers, and Representative Bill Flores, Chairman of the conservative Republican Study Committee, could also send signals. Chairman of the House Committee on ways and Means, Kevin Brady, has already admitted that some tax receipts from repatriated corporate earnings may go to infrastructure. Would deficit spending on infrastructure revive problems with the debt ceiling? The debt ceiling legislation is technically separate from the budget process. It is the statuary threshold on the level of government debt. It currently stands at $20.1 trillion. Congress voted last fall to "suspend" the debt ceiling until March of 2017. This means it will come due right around the time that negotiations over the fiscal 2018 budget resolution take place. But debt ceiling negotiating tactics are unlikely to recur in Trump's first year with his own party in control of Congress. Trump and the GOP could vote to "suspend" the debt ceiling indefinitely. Or, the GOP could set the debt ceiling limit so high that it no longer matters in the near term. Where do the GOP and Trump disagree on tax reform? Tax reform is a major GOP demand in recent years; it was also a focus, albeit less central, in Trump's campaign. Both want to flatten the personal income tax structure from 7 brackets to 3 brackets, with 12%, 25%, and 33% tax rates. Trump revised his initial tax plan, which called for 10%, 20%, and 25% rates, late in his campaign to be more compatible with the GOP. In terms of corporate taxes, President-elect Trump proposes a 15% rate for all businesses, with partnerships eligible to pay the 15% rate instead of being taxed under a higher personal income tax rate. By contrast, the GOP has called for a 20% corporate tax rate and a 25% rate for partnerships. How difficult is it to simplify the tax code? It is certainly not easy, but it can be done in 2017 given that the GOP controls both the White House and Congress. GOP leaders claim that a proposal will go public early in the year and a vote will occur within 2017. GOP leaders want a comprehensive law, including income and corporate tax reform, but there are rumors of splitting the two. Income tax reform may take longer to pass because it is more complex. There has not been comprehensive tax reform in the U.S. since Ronald Reagan signed the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Republicans obtained lower tax rates in exchange for a broadening of the base that the Democrats favored. It would be difficult to strike a similar deal next year, given that Republicans seek to slash taxes on corporations and top earners, and Democrats are staunchly opposed. There is likely to be some horse trading between Trump and the GOP. The GOP may use tax reform as the price of their support for Trump's infrastructure investment. Alternatively, Trump could hold out his Supreme Court appointments in exchange for GOP acquiescence on taxes and infrastructure. He could, for example, threaten to appoint centrist justices if the GOP does not play ball on other matters. What are the obstacles and timeline to a repatriation tax on overseas corporate earnings? An estimated $2.5-$3 trillion in corporate earnings are currently held "offshore," which means that taxes on this income is deferred until it is repatriated to the U.S. There is growing bipartisan support for a deemed repatriation tax. This means a one-off tax imposed on all overseas income not previously taxed. Obama, Hillary Clinton, Trump, and GOP representatives have all presented proposals to tap this source of tax revenue. For that reason there are various avenues through which it could be legislated. Trump put forth a plan to tax un-repatriated earnings at a 10% rate for cash (4% for non-cash earnings), with the liability payable over a 10-year period. As mentioned, this could be combined with his infrastructure plan as a way to finance an infrastructure bank or encourage the same corporations to invest in infrastructure development via tax breaks. According to the Tax Policy Center, Trump's repatriation plan would raise $147.8 billion in revenue over 2016-2026. Overall, this is a paltry sum of $14 billion per year. In a similar vein, President Obama's plan called for a 14% rate on repatriated earnings and was projected to raise $240 billion. The GOP offers a different plan from Trump. The party supports a repatriation tax at an 8.75% rate, payable over eight years. The GOP's plan would raise an estimated $138.3 billion during the same period. The GOP proposes to overhaul the entire U.S. corporate taxation system, while Trump does not. The GOP would change it from the worldwide system (i.e. the same corporate tax rate for U.S. corporations on profits everywhere), to a more typical destination-based system, in which U.S. corporations would be exempt from U.S. taxes on profits earned overseas. The latter would reduce the incentive for offshoring and tax inversions, that is, moving head offices outside of the U.S. to take advantage of lower tax rates. The 2004 tax holiday was a disappointment. Findings from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, NBER, Congressional Research Service, and others, indicate that the repatriated earnings did not significantly improve long-term fiscal deficits, boost employment, or increase domestic investment. Will Trump accuse China of "currency manipulation" on his first day in office as promised? It seems likely that Trump will follow through with his pledge of naming China a "currency manipulator." The question is whether he does so through the existing, formal Treasury Department review process or whether he would bypass that system and take independent action as the executive. Adhering to the formal process would show that Trump wants to keep tensions contained even as he draws a tougher line on economic relations with China. The "currency manipulation" charge is a mostly symbolic act that does not automatically initiate punitive measures. The move will not be unprecedented, as the U.S. labeled China a manipulator from 1992-1994. The label requires bilateral negotiations and could lead to Treasury recommending that Congress, or Trump, take punitive measures. The 2015 update to the law specifies what trade remedies Treasury might suggest, but the remedies are not particularly frightful. The options might prevent the U.S. government from supporting some private investment in China, cut China out of U.S. government procurement contracts, or cut China out of trade deals. The latter point, however, will be overshadowed by Trump's withdrawing the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a net gain for China since that strategic trade initiative had excluded China from the beginning. The real risk - higher than ever before, but still low probability - is that Trump could act unilaterally to impose tariffs or import quotas under a host of existing trade laws (1917, 1962, 1974, 1977) which give him extensive leeway. Some of these would be temporary, but others allow him to do virtually whatever he wants, especially if he declares a state of emergency or invokes wartime necessity (his lawyers could use any existing overseas conflict for this purpose).4 Presidents have been unscrupulous about such rationalizations in the past. Congress and the courts would not be able to stop Trump for the first year or two if he proceeded independently by executive decree. WTO rulings would take 18 months. China would not wait to retaliate, leading to a trade conflict of some sort. Would Congressional Republicans support punitive measures against China? How would China respond? There are two possibilities. First, Trump is free to set his own executive timeline if his administration makes a special case and he acts through executive directives. Second, Trump could proceed under the Treasury Department's existing timeline. An investigation would be launched in the April Treasury report, leading to negotiations with China. If there is no satisfactory outcome of the negotiations, then the October Treasury Report could label China as a currency manipulator. Under the 2015 law, there would be a necessary one-year waiting period before punitive measures are implemented. But again, Trump could override that. China would cause a diplomatic uproar; it would level similar accusations at the U.S. of distortionary trade policies. China would likely respond unilaterally as well as go to the WTO to claim that the U.S. has abrogated the purpose of the agreement, giving it an additional path to retaliate within international law. China's unilateral sanctions could target U.S. high-quality imports, services, or production chains. Or China could sell U.S. government debt in an attempt to retaliate, though it is not clear what the net effect of that would be. However, China would suffer worse in an all-out trade war. Xi Jinping has been very pragmatic about maintaining stability, like previous Chinese presidents since Deng. He is tougher than usual, but as long as Trump proposes credible negotiations, rather than staging a full frontal assault, Xi would likely attempt to strike a deal, perhaps cutting pro-export policies while promising faster structural rebalancing, to avoid a full-blown confrontation. We have seen with Russia that authoritarian leaders can use external threats and economic sanctions as a way to rally the population "around the flag." Trump's campaign threats, combined with other macro-economic trends, pose the risk that over the next four years China could face intensified American economic pressure and internal economic instability simultaneously. That would be a volatile mix for U.S.-China relations and global stability. But, once in office, it remains to be seen how Trump will conduct relations with China. Most likely, the currency manipulation accusation will cause a period of harsh words and gestures that dies down relatively quickly. The two powers will proceed to negotiations over a "new" economic relationship, highlighting the time-tried ability of the U.S. and China to remain engaged and "manage" their differences. Nevertheless, any shot across the bow will point to Sino-American distrust that is already growing over the long run. That distrust is signaled by Trump's success in key swing states by pitching protectionism, specifically against China. Will Trump's border enforcement policies add to fiscal stimulus? Yes, it would add marginally to the fiscal thrust that we expect from other infrastructure and defense spending. How will Trump approach the deportation of illegal immigrants? Trump will probably maintain Obama's stance on illegal immigration and deportation. Obama has deported around 2.5 million illegals between 2009 and 2015, the most of any president. These are mostly deportable illegals and non-citizens with criminal convictions. Trump stated in an interview on 60 Minutes that he plans to deport 2 to 3 million undocumented immigrants. The execution of this order will be swift as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has already exhibited this capacity under Obama. It is difficult to gage the economic impact of deportation. A study done by the University of Southern California found that undocumented immigrants are paid 10% lower than natives with similar skills in California.5 About half of farm workers and a quarter of construction workers are undocumented immigrants. If this source of cheap labor is removed, the cost for business in these sectors will increase. Are there other policy areas where you see a significant divergence between Congressional Republicans and Trump? Trump and the GOP establishment obviously have an awkward relationship that is only beginning to heal. Both sides are making progress in bridging the gap, but on trade protectionism, infrastructure, immigration, entitlement spending, and foreign policy Trump will continue to sit uneasily with Republican orthodoxy. This will give rise to a range of disagreements, separate from those listed above, of which we note only two here that have caught our attention during the post-election transition. How to deal with Putin: Trump has received renewed criticism from Sen. John McCain over a possible thaw in relations with Russia. This could affect the sanctions on Russia imposed by the U.S. and EU after the intervention in Ukraine in 2014, as well as broader Russia-NATO relations. H1B Visa: Trump is in favor of expanding H1B1 visas and allowing the "best" immigrants to stay in the U.S. once they complete their university education. But his White House chief strategist Steve Bannon has vilified the GOP for doing this. Thus there could be disagreement between the GOP and Trump's team on the issue of highly skilled immigrants. The BCA Geopolitical Team 1 Please see the White House, "The Economic Impact Of The American Recovery And Reinvestment Act Five Years Later," in the "2014 Economic Report of the President," available at www.whitehouse.gov. 2 Please see "Trump Versus Clinton On Infrastructure," October 27, 2016, available at peternavarro.com. 3 Please see Paul Ryan, "A Better Way For Tax Reform," available at abetterway.speaker.gov. 4 Please see Marcus Noland et al, "Assessing Trade Agendas In The US Presidential Campaign," Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-6, dated September 2016, available at piie.com. 5 Please see Manuel Pastor et al, "The Economic Benefits Of Immigrant Authorization In California," Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration, dated January 2010, available at dornsife.usc.edu. III. Japanese Equities: Good Value Or Value Trap? Japanese stocks have experienced a long stretch of underperformance versus the U.S. since the early 90's. The deflationary macro backdrop and poor corporate profitability are the main underlying factors, although there are many others. More recently, some corporate fundamentals have shifted in favor of Japanese stocks relative to the U.S., but investors remain skeptical, sending Japanese valuations to near all time lows in absolute terms and relative to the U.S. In this Special Report, we take a top-down approach to determine whether Japanese stocks are cheap versus the U.S. after adjusting for persistent differences in underlying profit fundamentals. Our mechanical and fundamental valuation indicators provide an impressive historical track record of "buy" and "sell" signals when the metrics reach extreme levels. The story is corroborated at the sector level. The implication is that there is plenty of "kindling" to drive a reversal in Japanese stock relative performance, but it needs a spark. We believe the catalyst could be a major fiscal push that would be like a "helicopter drop" under the current monetary regime. Unfortunately, the timing is uncertain. A major fiscal package may not occur until the spring. Japanese equities have been a perennial underperformer versus the U.S. for almost three decades, in both local- and common-currency terms (Chart III-1). There was a ray of light in the early years of Abenomics, when the aggressive three-arrow approach appeared to be finally lifting the Japanese economy out of Secular Stagnation. Yen weakness contributed to a surge in earnings-per-share (EPS) in absolute terms and relative to both the U.S. and world. Equity multiples also rose between 2012 and 2015. Unfortunately, Abe's honeymoon with equity markets has since faded. Yen strength, collapsing inflation expectations and weakening business confidence have caused investors to question the upside potential for Japanese corporate top-line growth (Chart III-2). EPS have fallen by 11% percent this year in absolute local currency terms, and are down by 10.7% versus the U.S. In turn, Japanese equities have dropped from the mid-2015 peak (Chart III-3). The decline in Japanese multiples this year is in marked contrast to a rise in the U.S. Chart III-1Japanese Equities ##br##Have Underperformed Chart III-2A Challenging ##br##Macro Backdrop Chart III-3Japanese EPS Growth ##br##Has Been Strong Until 2016 Japanese equities currently appear very cheap to the U.S. market based on standard valuation measures (Chart III-4). However, these ratios are always lower in Japan, except for price-to-forward earnings. Japanese companies generally have a much higher interest coverage ratio compared to Corporate America. Nonetheless, they tend come up short in terms of profitability. Operating margins in the U.S. have typically been double that of Japan (Chart III-5A). Japan's return-on-equity (RoE) has been dismal because of low levels of corporate leverage and loads of low-yielding cash sitting on balance sheets (Chart III-6). Table III-1 shows that Japan has a much larger sector weighting in consumer discretionary and a much lower weighting intechnology. Still, the story does not change much when we adjust financial ratios for differences in sector weights between the two markets (Chart III-5B). Chart III-4Japan Is Always Cheaper Chart III-5A...Adjusted For Common Sector Weights Chart III-5BJapanese Vs. U.S. Fundamentals... Chart III-6RoE Is Consistently Lower In Japan Table III-1Japanese Vs. U.S. Sector Weights The lower level of RoE by itself justifies a price discount on Japanese equities. But by how much? Are Japanese stocks still cheap once they are adjusted for structurally depressed profitability relative to the U.S.? This report assesses relative valuation, employing the same methodology used in our previous work on Eurozone equity valuation.1 While many cultural nuances make direct comparison of the Japanese market difficult, investment decisions are made within the scope of the available set of alternatives. With Japanese equity valuations at the lowest levels in recent history, the key question is whether this represents an opportunity to load up, or an example of a "value trap". We conclude that valuation justifies an overweight in Japanese equities (currency hedged), although the fiscal stimulus required to unlock the value may not arrive until February. Mechanical Approach We excluded the financial sector from our market valuation work since analysts use different fundamental statistics to judge profitability and value compared to non-financial companies. We also recalculated all of the Japanese aggregates using U.S. weights in order to avoid the problem that differing sector weights could bias measures of relative value for the overall market. The mechanical approach adjusts the valuation measures by subtracting the 5-year moving average (m.a.) from both markets. For example, the calculation for the price-to-sales ratio (P/S) is: VG = (US P/S - 5-year m.a.) - (EMU P/S - 5-year m.a.) Then we divided the Valuation Gap (VG) by the 5-year moving standard deviation of the VG. This provides a valuation indicator that is mean-reverting and fluctuates roughly between -2 and +2 standard deviations: Valuation Indicator = VG/(5-year moving standard deviation of VG) The same methodology is applied to the other valuation measures shown in Charts III-7A, 7B, 7C, 7D and III-8A, 8B, 8C. This approach suggests that the U.S. market is trading expensive to Japan in all seven cases except for the Shiller P/E. Japan is around 1-sigma cheap on most of the other valuation measures, with forward P/E the highest at almost 2 standard deviations. Chart III-7AMechanical Valuation Indicators (I) Chart III-7BMechanical Valuation Indicators (I) Chart III-7CMechanical Valuation Indicators (I) Chart III-7DMechanical Valuation Indicators (I) Chart III-8AMechanical Valuation Indicators (II) Chart III-8BMechanical Valuation Indicators (II) Chart III-8CMechanical Valuation Indicators (II) The underlying logic is that using a longer-term moving average should remove the structurally lower bias in Japanese valuations. Standardizing relative valuations in such a way should provide extreme valuation signals that can be used to gauge major trading opportunities. One potential pitfall of using a 5-year moving average to discount the structurally lower valuation of Japanese equities versus U.S. is that it fails to capture an extended period of either over- or under-valuation. For example, the U.S. may enter a bubble phase that does not occur in Japan. The 5-year moving average would move higher over time, eventually giving the false signal that the U.S. is back to fair value if the bubble persists. This is a fair criticism, although the track record of these valuation metrics shows that extended bubbles have not been a large source of false signals. Valuation By Sector We applied the same methodology at the sector level. Due to space constraints, we cannot present the 70 charts covering the seven relative valuation metrics across the 10 sectors. However, we present the latest reading for the 70 indicators in Table III-2, which reveals whether the U.S. is expensive (e) or cheap (c) versus Europe. A blank entry means that relative valuation is in the range of fair value. Table III-2Story Holds At The Sector Level The sector valuation indicators corroborate the message from the aggregate valuation analysis; over 60% of valuation metrics suggest that the U.S. is at least modestly expensive versus Japanese stocks. The U.S. is cheap in only 13% of the cases, with 26% at fair value. Value measures that most consistently place U.S. sectors in expensive territory are P/CF, P/B and EV/EBITDA. The U.S. sectors that are most consistently identified as expensive are financials, consumer discretionary, industrials, utilities, tech and basic materials. U.S. healthcare received a fairly consistent "cheap" rating while U.S. telecoms were consistently "cheap" or "fair" across all valuation measures. Predictive Value? Having a standardized tool of relative valuation is well and good but multiple divergence between regions is only useful if it translates into excess returns. Valuation is generally a poor timing tool but proves to be useful in predicting returns over a longer investment horizon. Theoretically, forward relative returns between Japanese and U.S. equities should be positively correlated with the size of the gap in their relative valuation metrics. In order to test the efficacy of the mechanical valuation indicator we calculated forward relative returns at points of extreme valuation divergences (in local currency). The trading rule is set such that, when the mechanical indicator reaches positive one or two standard deviations, we short the more expensive U.S. market and go long Japanese equities. Conversely, the opposite investment stance is taken for value readings of negative one and two standard deviations. Forward returns are calculated on 3, 6, 12, and 24 month horizons. Overall, the indicators performed well when the valuation gap between U.S. and Japanese multiples reached (+/-) 1 and 2 standard deviations from the long-term mean. Valuation measures exhibiting the highest returns were P/CF and forward P/E. For brevity, we present only these two measures in Table III-3. At two standard deviation extremes, the mechanical indicator produced a two-year forward return of 84% and 44% for P/CF and forward P/E, respectively. Table III-3 also presents the indicator's batting average. That is, the number of positive excess returns generated by the trading rule as a percent of the total number of signals. For P/CF, the batting average is between 50-60% for a 1 standard deviation valuation reading and mostly 100% for 2 standard deviations. The batting average for the forward P/E ranges from 53-92% for 1 standard deviation, and 83-100% for 2 standard deviations. Table III-3Select Mechanical Indictor Returns And Batting Averages Presently, all of the indicators are at or above the zero line signaling that the U.S. market is overvalued versus Japan. The valuation metric sending the strongest signal of U.S. overvaluation has interestingly been one of the better predictors of positive excess returns; the forward P/E mechanical indicator has just recently touched the +2 standard deviation level. Given the information provided by our back tested results above, investors are poised to enjoy strong positive returns by overweighting Japanese equities versus their U.S. peers. Fundamental Approach Chart III-9Japan Has A Lower Cost Of Debt Japanese companies trade at a discount relative to their U.S. peers due to more volatile Japanese profit fundamentals and a structurally depressed RoE. To compensate for structural differences in fundamentals we regressed U.S./Japanese value gaps on spreads in underlying financial statistics such as earnings-per-share growth, the interest coverage ratio, free-cash-flow growth, operating margins, and forward earnings-per-share growth. A dummy variable was used to exclude the "tech bubble" years in the late 90's to early 00's since the surge in tech stocks had an outsized effect on overall relative valuations, distorting the true underlying trend. The fundamental approach used in our previous Special Report comparing the U.S. and Eurozone did not work as well as hoped and we had an inkling that an analysis of Japan versus the U.S. might yield similar results. Once again we were underwhelmed by the results, although some valuation measures did produce decent outcomes. These included P/S, P/B, and P/CF. Unfortunately, fundamental models for EV/EBITDA, P/E and forward P/E either had low explanatory power or had coefficients with the wrong sign. The financial variable that appears most frequently as being significant in our fundamental models is the interest coverage ratio. Japanese firms have experienced a massive reduction in net debt post-GFC, while those in the U.S. have been taking advantage of lower rates to issue debt and perform share buybacks. Weak aggregate demand has dissuaded Japanese corporations from performing any sort of intensive capital expenditure programs and they have therefore been using free cash flow to build up cash reserves on their balance sheet and pay down debt. Not to mention, the more dramatic decrease in borrowing rates for Japanese firms has reduced their interest burden vis-à -vis U.S. corporates (Chart III-9). Chart III-10 presents the modeled fair values along with the corresponding valuation indicator. The U.S. market is expensive compared to Japan for all three models, with the most extreme cases being P/S and P/CF. Chart III-10AFundamental Valuation Indicators Chart III-10BFundamental Valuation Indicators Chart III-10CFundamental Valuation Indicators While the fundamental approach gave results that are less than spectacular, they still corroborate the message given by the mechanical approach. Japanese equities are undervalued compared to their U.S. peers and are reaching extreme levels, even after adjusting for structural trends in the underlying financials. Chart III-11Combined Fundamental Indicator Returns The next step is to verify the predictive power of our fundamental models. We analyzed forward returns implementing the same methodology used for the mechanical indicators. A (+/-) 1 standard deviation threshold was used as an investment signal to either overweight Japanese equities versus the U.S., if positive, or take the opposite stance if negative. Chart III-11 shows the returns categorized by time horizon and the number of valuation measures flashing a positive investment signal. The results were mixed; strong positive returns occurred when only one or two measures displayed valuation extremes, but excess returns were less than spectacular during periods when all three metrics provided the same signal. This is counter-intuitive, but when analyzing Chart III-10 it becomes apparent that the periods where all three indicators simultaneously entered extreme territory are concentrated in the last two years of history when U.S. market returns have trounced Japan. For periods during which our indicator flashed one or two positive signals, mostly before the past two years, returns were in line with those achieved by the mechanical indicators. Table III-4 shows the probability of success for the combined fundamental approach. Overall it has a batting average lower than that of the mechanical approach, with 60-89% for one signal and 70-86% for two signals. The batting average was generally poor when there were three signals for the reason discussed above.2 Since the beginning of 2015, all three indicators have been signaling that Japanese stocks are extremely cheap versus the U.S. Indeed, relative valuation continues to stretch as U.S. equity prices rise versus Japan, bucking the recent relative shifts in balance sheet fundamentals that favor the Japanese market. Table III-4Combined Fundamental Indicator Batting Averages Conclusion We are pleased with the results of the mechanical approach. The majority of valuation measures show that investors will make positive returns by overweighting and underweighting Japanese equities versus the U.S. when relative valuation reaches extreme levels. The consistency of these excess returns highlights that the indicators add value to global equity investors. We had hoped that a fundamentals based approach to valuation would have worked better. Conceptually, it would be more intellectually gratifying for company financials to better explain excess returns compared to technical measures. In a liquidity-driven world, this may be too much to ask. Although our fundamental models did not pan out perfectly, they still provided support for our underlying thesis that Japanese equities offer excellent value relative to the U.S. market. These models highlight that Japanese balance sheet and income statement trends favor this equity market versus the U.S. at the moment. Investors have been ignoring the fundamentals, frowning on Japanese equities in absolute terms and, especially, relative to the U.S. The sour view on Japan likely reflects disappointment in Abenomics. This includes not only fears that Abenomics is failing to lift the economy out of the liquidity trap, but also fading hopes for changes in corporate governance that would force firms to make better use of their cash hoards to the benefit of shareholders. All the valuation metrics presented above say that it is a good time to overweight Japan versus the U.S. in local currency terms. Of course, so much depends on policy these days. Our valuation metrics highlight that there is plenty of "kindling" in place for a reversal in relative performance given the right spark. As discussed in the Overview section, the catalyst could be a major fiscal stimulus package. When combined with a yield curve that is fixed by the Bank of Japan, it would amount to a "helicopter drop". Such a policy would drive up inflation expectations, push down real borrowing rates and dampen the yen. This self-reinforcing virtuous circle would be quite positive for growth in real and nominal terms, lifting the outlook for corporate profit growth and sparking a substantial re-rating of Japanese stocks. The timing is admittedly uncertain. A smaller fiscal package could be implemented as part of a third supplementary budget before year-end. A major fiscal push is most likely to occur only in February, when the next full budget is announced. Still, rock-bottom valuations make Japan an attractive market for longer-term investors, although the currency risk must be hedged. Michael Commisso Research Analyst 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Are Eurozone Stocks Really Cheap?" July 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Except for the 24-month column, which shows a 100% batting average. However, this can be ignored. There was only a single episode of three positive signals that occurred more than 24 months ago, allowing a 24-month return calculation.
Highlights Treasury Yields: The uptrend in Treasury yields has run into extreme technical resistance and is likely to abate during the next few weeks. Beyond that, a cyclical sweet spot of improving growth and accommodative monetary policy will open up during the first half of 2017 that will cause the Treasury curve to bear-steepen. Spread Product: Poor valuations and a probable Fed rate hike next month keep us cautious on spread product in the near term. But the environment for credit markets will turn more positive in the first half of 2017. Leveraged Loans: The combination of Fed rate hikes and elevated defaults should allow leveraged loans to outperform fixed rate junk bonds on a 12-month horizon. High-Yield Munis: An examination of spreads alone suggests that high-yield munis are attractive compared to high-yield corporate debt, but the attractiveness is not sufficient to compensate for lower tax rates under President Trump. Avoid high-yield municipal debt. Feature Several Fed speakers last week, including Fed Chair Janet Yellen, affirmed the case for a December rate hike, and the market has taken full notice of that message. We calculate that the market-implied odds of a rate hike next month rose to 84% as of the close of business on Friday.1 But just as critical for the path of Treasury yields is that the Fed will be taking a "wait and see" approach when it comes to the prospect of increased fiscal stimulus under the Donald Trump administration. Right now there is so much uncertainty about what the Congress will pass or not pass, what the president will propose. As a baseline, assuming a continuation of current fiscal policy has probably as good a chance as any other forecast that we are going to make up. Minneapolis Fed President Neel Kashkari2 This leads us to believe that the Fed will lift rates next month, but will also not revise its fed funds rate forecasts (dots) higher. We also expect that the Fed will be slow to respond to any pick-up in growth expectations as we head into 2017. This sets up a two-phase outlook for Treasury yields. During the next month, the uptrend in yields will meet resistance as both the market and Fed turn a more skeptical eye toward Trump's fiscal promises. But if growth picks up in early 2017, as we expect, and the Fed maintains its dovish bias, then we could enter a sweet spot where the Treasury curve resumes its bear-steepening and risk assets rally. Near-Term Pull-Back Two factors make us think it is likely that Treasury yields will at least level-off, and perhaps decline a bit, during the next month. First, market pricing has already mostly converged with the Fed's rate expectations, especially at the short-end of the curve (Chart 1). Our sense is that the Fed's dots provide a reasonable valuation anchor for yields in the absence of more concrete evidence that growth is accelerating. Second, technical measures and positioning data suggest that the rapid rise in yields is due for a pause. The fractal dimension for long-maturity Treasuries, a measure of groupthink developed by our Chief European Strategist Dhaval Joshi rests at 1.25, a level at which a trend reversal - even if only a temporary one - tends to emerge (Chart 2).3 Additionally, our composite sentiment indicator, based on the 13-week rate of change in prices, investor sentiment, and net speculative positions, is deeply oversold, highlighting the risk of a near-term reversal (Chart 3). Chart 1The Market & Dots Converge Chart 2Treasuries Face Technical Resistance Chart 3Bond Sentiment At A Bearish Extreme Cyclical Sweet Spot Once the December FOMC meeting has passed, we expect investor attention will turn toward U.S. economic growth, which should accelerate as we head into 2017 (Chart 4). Chart 4U.S. Growth: Poised To Accelerate Consumer confidence has been resilient at high levels, which supports continued strong consumer spending (Chart 4, panel 1). According to trends in public sector employment, government spending is poised to increase, even in the absence of new fiscal stimulus (Chart 4, panel 2). Inventories were an unusually large drag on growth in 2016. This drag will continue to unwind (Chart 4, panel 3). Survey measures suggest that non-residential investment will reverse its downtrend (Chart 4, panel 4). The supply of new residential housing remains tight, which will support increased construction even in the face of higher rates (Chart 4, bottom panel). On top of this, we can potentially tack on any newly enacted fiscal stimulus once Trump takes office in January. Our political strategists expect that the Trump administration will not face meaningful opposition from the Republican-controlled Congress, and will be able to enact - in relatively short order - a more stimulative fiscal policy in the form of lower taxes and increased spending for infrastructure and defense.4 A quicker pace of Fed tightening would be a powerful offset to this rosy growth outlook. In fact, Chair Yellen alluded to the notion that a large fiscal impulse would probably be counteracted by tighter monetary policy in her Congressional testimony last week: "The economy is operating relatively close to full employment at this point, so in contrast to where the economy was after the financial crisis when a large demand boost was needed to lower unemployment, we're no longer in that state."5 In essence, with the economy close to full employment it is more likely that a sufficiently large growth impulse will result in rising inflation, which the Fed will lean against. However, we believe this is a story for the second half of 2017. At least initially, the Fed will be in no rush to deviate from the dovish bias embedded in its current forecasts. Market-based measures of inflation compensation have increased strongly in the past few weeks, but remain below levels that are consistent with the Fed hitting its 2% PCE inflation target (Chart 5). The 5-year, 5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 2.06%, and needs to rise another 34bps before it is consistent with its average pre-crisis level. The Fed will be extremely cautious about tightening monetary policy until TIPS breakevens are more firmly anchored around pre-crisis levels. This opens a window in the first half of 2017 when improving economic growth will be met with still-accommodative monetary policy. In this environment we would expect the Treasury curve to bear-steepen and spread product to outperform. All else equal, we are likely to shift our recommended portfolio allocation in that direction (initiate curve steepeners, increase allocation to spread product) once the near-term risk of a Fed rate hike is behind us. The major risk to the view that a cyclical sweet spot opens up in the first half of 2017 is that any improvement in growth might be quickly cut-off by overly restrictive financial conditions, specifically in the form of a much stronger dollar (Chart 6). The pace of dollar appreciation has increased since the election and overall indexes of financial conditions have tightened, but so far the tightening has not been as sharp as that which occurred around the time of last year's Fed rate hike. We anticipate that this time around, due to the improved trajectory of growth outside of the U.S., tightening of overall financial conditions will not be as severe. A second related risk is that the recent surge in bond yields will harm cyclical sectors of the economy such as housing and consumer spending on durable goods (Chart 7). This is undoubtedly true, but it is important to recall that this process is self-limiting. If yields rise too far, then growth will decelerate and yields will reverse course. Then lower yields will cause growth to re-accelerate, leading to higher yields. As long as the Fed is perceived to be "behind the curve" on inflation then the underlying trend will be one of improving growth and a bear-steepening of the Treasury curve. Chart 5Breakevens Still Too Low Chart 6A Strong Dollar Is The #1 Risk Chart 7Higher Yields Also A Drag On Growth Bottom Line: The uptrend in Treasury yields has run into extreme technical resistance and is likely to abate during the next few weeks. Beyond that, a cyclical sweet spot of improving growth and accommodative monetary policy will open up during the first half of 2017. This will cause the Treasury curve to bear-steepen and will be positive for spread product. Leveraged Loans: Still A Buy We recommended that investors favor leveraged loans over fixed-rate junk bonds on July 19.6 In large part, this recommendation was predicated on a high conviction view that Treasury yields were poised to increase, thus benefitting floating rate loans over fixed rate bonds. Since July 19, the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan 100 index has returned +196bps, compared to +176bps of total return from the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield bond index, and flows into the largest leveraged loan ETF (BKLN) have outpaced flows into the largest junk bond ETF (HYG) since August (Chart 8). Historically, there are two reasons that leveraged loans might be expected to outperform fixed rate junk bonds (Chart 9). The first is that 3-month LIBOR is rising, causing loan coupons to reset higher. The second is that the default rate is elevated. Loans tend to benefit relative to bonds when the default rate is elevated because their senior position in the capital structure means they earn a higher recovery rate (Chart 10). Chart 8Loan Performance Is Lagging Fund Flows Chart 9Leveraged Loans Will Outperform Chart 10Loans Benefit From Higher Recoveries Taking a closer look at Chart 9 we can see that the above two factors have only led to two periods of sustained leveraged loan outperformance since 1991 (denoted by shaded regions). In 1994, loans outperformed bonds because the pace of Fed tightening surprised markets to the upside and 3-month LIBOR moved sharply higher. In this instance higher coupons were sufficient for loans to outperform even though corporate defaults were low. Loans also outperformed bonds between 1997 and 2002. In this case it was a prolonged uptrend in corporate defaults that drove the outperformance. Loans benefitted from higher LIBOR in the early stages of this period, but then the Fed began cutting rates in 2001. Loans did not outperform bonds during the 2004-2006 rate hike cycle, as defaults were very low and the rate hikes were well telegraphed - meaning that asset prices already reflected the up-move in 3-month LIBOR before it occurred. Likewise, loans did not outperform bonds during the 2008 default episode because the Fed was cutting rates sharply and, unlike in the 1990s, the spike and reversal in the default rate occurred over a relatively short period of time. The good news for loans is that the current environment very much resembles the early part of the 1997-2002 period insofar as the Fed is in the early stages of a rate hike cycle - so 3-month LIBOR can be expected to move higher - and corporate defaults have already started to increase. So far loans have only benefitted marginally from the rise in 3-month LIBOR because most have LIBOR floors. This means that the loan's coupon is only reset higher once 3-month LIBOR is increased above the stated floor. Bloomberg calculates that $221 billion of outstanding leveraged loans have LIBOR floors of 75bps and $690 billion of outstanding loans have LIBOR floors of 100bps. With 3-month LIBOR at 91bps currently, it will only take one more Fed rate hike before the floors on most loans are breached. Bottom Line: The combination of Fed rate hikes and elevated defaults should allow leveraged loans to outperform fixed rate junk bonds on a 12-month horizon. High-Yield Munis: Stay Away We detailed our longer-term outlook for municipal bonds in a recent Special Report,7 and then downgraded our muni allocation to underweight (2 out of 5) following Trump's surprise election win. Our expectation is that the combination of lower tax rates and increased infrastructure spending will be toxic for municipal debt. That analysis, however, focused on investment grade municipal debt. This week we investigate the relative value in high-yield municipal bonds relative to high-yield corporates. The starting point of our analysis is an examination of the spread differential between high-yield munis and high-yield corporates (Chart 11). The second panel of Chart 11 shows that, compared to history, munis offer a sizeable spread advantage over similarly-rated corporate debt. However, this comparison does not adjust for differences in duration and convexity between the two indexes. In the bottom panel of Chart 11 we show the residual from a model where the spread differential between high-yield munis and high-yield corporates has been regressed against differences in duration and convexity. We see that high-yield munis look even more attractive after making these adjustments. These simple adjustments reveal that high-yield munis are attractive relative to high-yield corporates, but they do not consider the impact of a macro environment that is about to turn extremely negative for municipal debt. To control for this we created an augmented model of the spread differential between high-yield munis and corporates, adjusting for duration, convexity, the effective personal tax rate, relative ratings migration and several other factors (Chart 12). Chart 11High-Yield Muni Valuation I Chart 12High-Yield Muni Valuation II High-yield munis still appear quite attractive based on this model, but if we assume that the effective personal income tax rate reverts even to 2011 levels, then the a good chunk of the spread advantage vanishes (Chart 12, panel 2). This is an extremely conservative assumption. In reality, we expect the effective personal tax rate will fall much below 2011 levels under the new administration. Bottom Line: An examination of spreads alone suggests that high-yield munis are attractive compared to high-yield corporate debt, but the attractiveness is not sufficient to compensate for lower tax rates under President Trump. Avoid high-yield municipal debt. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Our internal calculation differs somewhat from the widely reported probability that is available on Bloomberg terminals. The reason is that the Bloomberg calculation assumes a baseline fed funds rate of 37.5 bps (the midpoint of the Fed's current target range), while we use the current effective fed funds rate which has recently been stable at 41 bps. 2 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-16/fed-s-kashkari-says-election-hasn-t-changed-economic-outlook-yet 3 Please see European Investment Strategy Special Report, "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model", dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see BCA Special Report, "U.S. Elections: Outcomes And Investment Implications", dated November 9, 2016, available at www.bcaresearch.com 5 https://www.c-span.org/organization/?63944 6 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy / U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Six Reasons To Tactically Reduce Duration Exposure Now", dated July 19, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Recent market moves have been emotionally driven and speculative in nature. The risk is now that tighter monetary conditions risk crimping growth in the near term. Since 2014, whenever the 10-year Treasury yield has reached 2.5%, equity prices have corrected. This remains an important marker for when investors should begin to worry that the level of yields are moving into restrictive territory. Fiscal stimulus will be a positive development and could dominate the investment landscape for some time. But investors should not view it as a panacea for growth headwinds. Feature Investors continue to digest the ramifications of the new configuration in Washington. In this week's report, we answer the most frequently asked queries that we have received from clients. As always, please do not hesitate to contact us with yours. 1. How Has Your Forecast For Markets Changed Since November 9? We had been cautious on risk assets, we had been dollar bulls, and we had been advocating slightly underweight/neutral bond duration positions prior to the elections, as highlighted in the November 7 Weekly Report. Our cautious stance on equities, particularly large-cap stocks, has not changed. Our main worry has been that corporations continue to lack pricing power and top-line growth will struggle to grow meaningfully in 2017. In other words, profit margins are a headwind - as they often are at this point of the cycle (Chart 1). But contrary to past recoveries, persistent low growth means that top-line growth will not provide the same offset to a margin squeeze driven by rising labor costs (Chart 2). Chart 1Equity Market On Fire Chart 2Profit Margin Squeeze Intact For Now Our expectations have been for earnings growth to be in the mid-single digits in 2017, with risks to the downside depending on the degree of dollar strength. True, although the above profit outlook is rather uninspiring, it does not justify an underweight allocation to equities. Monetary policy is still accommodative and a recession is unlikely. However, as the Fed drains the punchbowl, volatility will increase as the onus of equity price appreciation falls heavily on profit drivers. Leading up to the election, we made the case that any adverse reaction to a Trump win would be very short and was not the main event for financial markets on a 6-12 month time horizon. Since November 9, there has been a strong, emotional reaction to the Trump win. Our first read of potential policy outcomes is that the "new America" will be far less business-friendly than equity prices are currently suggesting. The headwinds to multinationals from trade reform and immigration constraints may well offset any positive developments from deregulation in the financial and energy sectors. Most importantly, fiscal spending is positive to the extent that new projects and spending will boost top-line growth. But as we discuss below, the violent Treasury sell-off risks crimping growth before any fiscal spending kicks in. Moreover, so far gauges of policy uncertainty have stayed subdued, but that may change quickly, given the number of unknowns ahead and potential negative reactions from other countries to the new U.S. government. Taken together, we see no reason to upgrade our view on equities. For bonds, we had been expecting that the Fed would raise rates in December, because the economic and inflation data have been sufficiently strong relative to policymakers' thresholds to proceed with a rate hike. The bond market had not been fully discounting this outcome; our view was that the 10-year Treasury could move to 2% or slightly higher, due to the re-pricing of the Fed. Our models suggested that fair value on the 10-year Treasury was around 2% and so once bond yields got that level, a trading range would be established. Treasuries were overvalued for most of this year, and a symmetric shift to undervaluation could now occur. However, we have doubts that we have entered a new bond bear market. Market expectations for U.S. interest rates are rapidly converging to the Fed's forecasts. The rise in yields should pause once the gap has closed. Finally, we have been cyclical dollar bulls for some time. Our principle reason is due to the favorable gap in interest rate differentials between the U.S. and most other major currencies. We see no reason to change our dollar bullish stance. 2. Is Fiscal Spending Really The New Panacea? Our view can be summarized as: Curb Your Enthusiasm. Fiscal stimulus is a positive development. Since the early days of the Great Recession, monetary policymakers have been working alone. Monetary policy has become ineffective at boosting growth, and currency depreciation only shifts growth between countries, it does not create more. Fiscal spending is an opportunity to increase the "GDP pie." But as we wrote two weeks ago, the type of fiscal spending matters, a lot. Income tax cuts on high income earners as well as corporate tax cuts tend to have a low multiplier effect (well below 1), while direct spending by government, e.g. infrastructure outlays, tends to have a much higher multiplier (above 1). Equally important is the interest rate regime that coincides with fiscal stimulus. When an economy is near full employment and there is a risk that above trend growth will create inflation, central banks tend to react, and thus dull the force of the initial stimulus. That is the current economic scenario. The bottom line is that fiscal spending will give a fillip to GDP growth for a few quarters in late in 2017 and perhaps in 2018, but investors should be careful in assuming that fiscal spending will meaningfully change the long-term U.S. growth trajectory as it is not a solution for structural headwinds, such as an aging population. Chart 3Can The Economy Handle Higher Yields? 3. What Can We Monitor To Understand The Direction Of Policy With Trump As President? Cabinet appointments will be a key area of interest for financial markets. These personnel will ultimately help shape Donald Trump's policy path. There will likely be many rumors about potential appointments, but we believe it is best to ignore near-term noise and focus on Trump's announcements in December and the Senate's official appointments in January. 4. How High Can Bond Yields Get Before The Sell-off Becomes Economically Damaging? The economic backdrop has improved over the past two years and is much closer to full employment. Thus, underlying economic growth is better positioned to withstand a rise in yields. For example, better job prospects and security will allow prospective homeowners to better absorb higher mortgage rates. Still, investors should note that some equity sectors have already responded to the tightening. Chart 3 shows that home improvement stocks are underperforming significantly. What has changed is the greater role of the currency in overall monetary condition tightening. Indeed, the tightening in monetary conditions over the past twelve months has been principally due to the dollar rise. Our U.S. fixed income team's model of fair value for government bonds is based on global PMIs as a proxy for growth, policy uncertainty, and sentiment toward the U.S. dollar. The current reading suggests that 10-year Treasuries are fairly valued when at around 2.25%. Note that fair value has been moving higher in recent weeks on the back of better global economic news. Since 2014, i.e. the start of the dollar rally, whenever the 10-year Treasury yield has reached 2.5%, equity prices have corrected (Chart 4). We think this remains an important marker for when investors should begin to worry that the level of yields are moving into restrictive territory. Chart 4How Long Can Equities Shrug Off Rising Bond Yields? 5. Deregulation And Other Pro-Business Reforms Will Surely Spur Improved Business Confidence And Investor Animal Spirits? We are unsure. History has shown that periods of deregulation (the 1980s and 1990s especially) were conducive to high equity market returns and strong business growth, so this is indeed a positive factor. But there is a lot that can go wrong. Allan Lichtman, a political historian who has correctly predicted all of the past eight Presidential elections, is now predicting that Trump will be impeached within the next four years, due to previous improper business dealings. If that were to occur, we would expect market sentiment to be negative, closely akin to the Worldcom and Enron accounting scandals, which shook faith in the role of the public company CEO. One important gauge will be the global uncertainty index (Chart 5). Uncertainty leads to an increase in risk aversion, and can spur a flight into the safety of government bonds. So far, readings are benign, but should be monitored closely. Chart 5Beware A Rise In Uncertainty 6. What Are The Prospects For Fed Rate Hikes? We don't expect a major shift in the message from the Fed (i.e. the Fed dot plots) until monetary policymakers have better visibility on what the fiscal landscape will look like (Chart 6). Chart 6Fed Will Wait And See Janet Yellen's testimony last week indicates that a December rate hike is almost a certainty. However, there was no hint that the Fed is preparing for a more aggressive tightening cycle thereafter. Her assessment of the economy was balanced, noting that growth improved to 3% in Q3 from 1% in H1, but downplayed the full extent of the rebound due to a rise inventories and a surge in soybean exports. She described consumer spending to be posting "moderate gains," business investment as "relatively soft," manufacturing to be "restrained" and housing construction as "subdued." There was nothing to suggest that the Fed is revising its growth and inflation forecasts following last week's election. Yellen expects growth to continue at a "moderate pace" and inflation to return to 2% in the "next couple of years." Larger budget deficits would likely prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively, but for now, their bias is still to manage asymmetric downside risks. 7. Where Would You Deploy New Funds Today? Into cash. Recent market moves have been emotionally driven and speculative in nature. If the new American government succeeds in implementing a pro-business strategy of lower corporate taxes, increased infrastructure spending, a lighter regulatory burden for the financial services industry, while simultaneously avoiding any negative shocks from trade reform, foreign policy blunders, and general decline in economic and policy uncertainty, then perhaps the current risk-on market moves make some sense. However, that is a massive list, especially for a new President without political experience. In other words, markets have overshot and policy is likely to under-deliver. The risk is now that tighter monetary conditions risk crimping growth in the near term. 8. You Like Small Caps, But Are Cautious On High Yield Corporate Credit. These Two Markets Tend To Perform Similarly. Can You Comment? Historically, the absolute performance of small caps and high-yield corporate bond spreads have been tightly negatively correlated. This is because owning both investments tend to be considered a risk-on strategy. But over the past several years, this relationship has weakened and particularly, the correlation between high-yield corporate bond spreads and relative performance of small/large caps has loosened (Chart 7). This is in part because small cap sector weightings are now more closely aligned with large cap weightings. In other words, the S&P 600 index is no longer overly exposed to cyclical relative to the larger cap weightings. Chart 7Small Caps Are A Winner We expect small caps to outperform S&P 500 companies because they tend to have a domestic focus and will be more insulated from a rise in the dollar. As well, small caps, by virtue of being more geared to domestic growth, will benefit from ongoing better U.S. growth rates than global markets. Relative profit margins proxies favor small caps as well. 9. Is There A Structural Bear Market In Voter Turnout In The U.S.? A certain number of headlines have quoted a drastically lower turnout numbers for the 2016 election than in 2012. This has been reinforced by a theory of a structural downturn in voter participation. Both statements are incorrect. Early estimates for this year's election show that approximately 58.1 percent of eligible voters cast ballots, down from 58.6 percent in 2012.1 Note that these are just estimates. It is plausible that any decline in voter turnout in 2016 is due to the extreme unpopularity of both candidates (Chart 8). It is unlikely that this experience will be repeated in future elections. As for the longer-term picture, as Chart 9 shows that voter turnout had been, in fact, rising steadily since 2000. Chart 8Clinton And Trump Are Making (The Wrong Kind Of) History Chart 9Americans Like Voting, Just Not These Candidates 10. What Are Your Expectations For Upcoming Elections In Europe? A narrative has emerged in the financial industry since Donald Trump's victory and the U.K.'s decision to leave the EU: there is a structural shift towards anti-establishment movements. But we feel this is overstated. France is a case in point as Marine Le Pen, leader of the Euroskeptic National Front (FN), is reportedly enjoying a tailwind. To be sure, she can win the 2017 Presidential election, but her probability of winning has been inappropriately inflated following the U.S. election and, according to our Geopolitical experts, is approximately only 10%.2 Because Marine Le Pen is going to face off against an "establishment" candidate, she offers the alternative to the status quo that the French are seeking. But she is trailing her likely second round opponent, Alain Juppé, by around 40% in the polls. Le Pen is sticking to her negative views on the EU and euro membership. That is a formidable obstacle, since 70% of the French support the euro. The bottom line is that we do not believe that the U.S. election has had a meaningful influence on European voters. Developed nations across the globe are struggling with the same structural issues such as low growth and income inequality. It should not be surprising that common reactions and responses are occurring in various countries. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Please See "United States Elections Project," available at http://www.electproject.org/2016g. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Will Marine Le Pen Win?," dated November 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The blistering dollar rally has mimicked the selloff in U.S. and global bonds. The dollar and bonds may have gotten ahead of themselves. A short-term reversal or a pause in the recent trend is becoming our base-case scenario for the rest of the year. If a dollar correction materializes, USD/CNY will also retreat, temporarily diminishing pressures on EM currencies. The yen weakness illustrates the importance of the September policy change by the BoJ. AUD/SEK is a short. We are re-introducing our back sections, but now covering all the G10 currencies. Feature In recent weeks, we have developed the view that a Trump victory would embolden our cyclically bullish stance on the dollar. We re-iterated this sentiment last week.1 Since then, we have received many questions about the very short-term outlook for FX markets. Our view is that from now to the end of the year, the dollar is likely to stabilize and may even weaken somewhat. This should create a buying opportunity for investors that have missed the dollar rocket. It's All About Bonds The dollar rally since Trump's election has been so torrid that the broad trade-weighted dollar has made new highs. DXY is now flirting with the top of the trading range established since March 2015 (Chart I-1). If the dollar can significantly punch above this resistance, or EUR/USD falls below 1.055, another violent dollar rally could ensue. While we do ultimately expect such a move to materialize, we do not expect it to happen just yet. The main reason for our skepticism is the bond market. Much of the appreciation in the dollar has been explained by the sharp rally in U.S. bonds, which has caused interest rates differentials to move massively in favor of the greenback (Chart I-2). For DXY to meaningfully punch above 100, bonds have to sell-off further. Chart I-1The Return Of The King Chart I-2Dollar And Bond Yields: Same Fight Our U.S. Bond Strategy service remains cyclically underweight duration, but the short-term outlook is murky. The move in bonds has been extremely one-sided. The bond market's behavior displays the hallmark of groupthink, where long-term and short-term traders have uniformly been selling Treasurys. The fractal dimension for bonds, a measure of groupthink developed by Dhaval Joshi, our European Chief Strategist, rests at 1.25, a level at which a trend reversal - even if a temporary one - tends to emerge (Chart I-3).2 Chart I-3Groupthink In The Bond Market Additionally, our composite sentiment indicator, based on the 13-week rate of change of prices, investor sentiment, and net speculative positions, is deeply oversold, highlighting the risk of a backup in prices (Chart I-4). Fundamentals also warrant a careful stance. A December Fed hike is fully priced in, and the expected Fed funds rates 12-months from now is already near the levels hit before the Fed raised rates in 2015 (Chart I-5). A catalyst is now needed to push rate expectations materially higher. Chart I-4Bond Sentimen##br##t Is Depressed Chart I-5Interest Rates Priced In A Lot##br## In A Short Time Span However, the recent backup in yields and the dollar has massively hit EM currencies (Chart I-6). EM currencies are falling because investors are taking funds out of these economies. Consequently, EM liquidity and financial conditions are tightening, a dark omen for economic activity in that space (Chart I-7). The more than 10% fall in gold prices since July 8, also paints a picture of deteriorating global liquidity conditions. Chart I-6Bond Yields Are Hurting##br## EM Financial Conditions Chart I-7A Dark ##br##Omen An EM correction may compel the Fed to worry about the short-term outlook. This development, along with the tightening in U.S. financial conditions resulting from the 7% back up in the broad trade-weighted dollar and 77 basis points in bond yields since mid-August, heighten the risk of a correction in risk assets. The Fed is aware of this and the market knows it. Chart I-8CPI Swaps Can Rebound More Additionally, U.S. 5y/5y forward CPI swaps have backed up 60 basis points from their lows to 2.4%, but they still remain below their historical norm of 2.5% to 3.3% (Chart I-8). The Fed probably wants to see them closer to these levels before aggressively ramping up its rhetoric and "dot-plot" forecasts. A Trump presidency will result in a large dose of fiscal stimulus, but we still have little clarity regarding the size of any packages, their composition, or their timing. Neither does the Fed. If there was any clarity, the Fed would likely be in a position to increase its "dot-plot" even without inflation expectations being in their normal range. Additionally, this week, the Bank of Japan put actions behind its words and announced an unlimited bond buying program at fixed prices, a process that should cap the upside on this anchor for global yields. Thus, in the very near term, the burden of proof is now elevated for rates to rise higher without the Fed's rhetoric becoming clearly more hawkish. While we expect this outcome to ultimately materialize, the next few weeks are not when we see it happening. This implies that the dollar's rip-roaring rally is likely to take a pause and even retrace some of its exceptional gains. However, a key risk remains, and that is China. Since Trump's victory, the Chinese RMB has accelerated its downward path, depreciating 1.7% in nine days. This move reflects the fear that Trump will impose large tariffs on Chinese-made goods. In the process, the fall in the yuan has dragged Asian currencies lower than the DXY appreciation would have warranted (Chart I-9). If these moves were to continue, EM currencies, the yen, and the AUD would fall further even without U.S. bond yields rising much. In the short-term this remains more a risk rather than a base-line scenario. While USD/CNY has rallied, the yuan has been stable relative to the currency basket targeted by the PBoC (Chart I-10). Therefore, if our view that the U.S. bond sell-off pauses temporarily is correct, the USD/CNY rally will also take a breather. Chart I-9Tariff Risk Weighing On Asian Forex Chart I-10Mind The Gap! The currencies most likely to benefit from any dollar bull-market pause are JPY, SEK, and EUR as they have become hyper-sensitive to U.S. bond yields. EM currencies too could see a temporary rally, especially if USD/CNY stops appreciating in line with the DXY. Bottom Line: The dollar bull market is intact. However, the tactical outlook points toward a pause in the greenback's upswing. In light of the fast repricing of the market's expectations for Fed policy, and the lack of clarity regarding Trump's plans, bond yields and interest-rate expectations have gotten ahead of themselves. Even the rally in USD/CNY, which has contributed to devaluation pressures on other Asian currencies, could pause if DXY stops rallying for a period of time. Why is the Yen So Weak? We have articulated a very bearish view on the yen since September 23.3 To our way of thinking, the Bank of Japan pegging 10-year JGB yields to 0% until Japanese inflation significantly overshoots 2% was a sea-change. However, we have been surprised by the violence of the recent yen sell-off. After all, wouldn't a selloff in EM currencies support the yen? A few factors have been at play. First, Japanese preliminary Q3 GDP numbers have come in at 2.2% on a year-on-year basis, handily beating expectations of 0.9%. Moreover, industrial production has picked up, and our model forecasts further acceleration, despite the recent strength in the yen (Chart I-11). With the employment market being tight - the unemployment rate stands at 3.1% and the active-job-openings-to-applicants ratio is at a 25-year high - this raises the risk that inflation begins to emerge. With nominal bond yields pegged at zero, this would weigh on Japanese real rates, and thus the yen, which continues to closely correlate with Japanese real rates differentials. Second, the recent global sell off in bonds has been an additional weight on the yen. In our communications with clients, we are often reminded how USD/JPY and bond yields are essentially one and the same, a heuristic borne by the facts (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Japanese IP Is ##br##Picking Up Chart I-12USD/JPY And Bond Yields ##br##Are One And The Same But right now, there is more to the relationship with bond yields than in previous episodes. The September promise of a cap on 10-year JGB yields is causing Japanese yield differentials to stand at mid-2015 levels, despite global yields being lower than they were then (Chart I-13). Also, the sell-off in global bonds has caused 10-year JGB yields to move slightly above 0%. However, having announced unlimited bond purchases at capped yields, the BoJ is about to begin purchasing JGBs to prevent yields from punching above 0% meaningfully. This will result in growing Japanese liquidity, compounding already existing JPY weaknesses. Chart I-13The BoJ Policy In Action Finally, the government is talking up fiscal stimulus. The third revision of the second supplementary budget has been passed, and the executive is already pushing for a third supplementary budget. Additionally, both Abe and Kuroda are ramping up their rhetoric regarding next year's wage negotiations, highlighting the growing risk that the government will implement wage policies in 2017.4 Short-term risks are skewed toward a yen rebound. When the BoJ announced its new policy in September, USD/JPY was 7% undervalued according to our short-term model. This is not the case anymore. Also, if global bond yields stop their ascension until year end, the BoJ will not purchase any bonds. Moreover, falling global bond yields will push Japanese rate differentials in favor of the yen, supporting the currency further. Finally, a continuation of EM stresses could prompt Japanese investors to repatriate funds into the country, putting upward pressures on the yen. Bottom Line: The extraordinary weakness in the yen reflects the improvement in Japanese economic activity. Also, the change in monetary policy executed earlier this year is limiting the upside for JGB yields, and the BoJ is now setting up an unlimited purchase program to back its words. However, a short term pull-back in USD/JPY grows increasingly likely if the global bond implosion takes a breather. Going Short AUD/SEK Shorting AUD/SEK here makes sense. To begin with, AUD/SEK is trading 16% above its long-term fair value as well as 5.2% above its short-term equilibrium (Chart I-14). Additionally, the current account differential is 9.4% of GDP in favor of Sweden. In terms of the economy, the Swedish consumer is displaying stronger resilience than the Australian one, powered by an outperforming Swedish labor market (Chart I-15). Additionally, Swedish house prices are growing 5% faster than in Australia. With Swedish consumer confidence outperforming that of Australia, and Swedish household credit overtaking Australian household credit growth, inflationary forces could emerge, resulting in a tightening of Swedish policymakers' rhetoric relative to Australia. On this front, the recent pick up in Swedish inflation is telling. Having rebounded to 1.2% annually, Swedish headline CPI is at a four-and-a-half-year high, suggesting that the emergency measures put in place by the Riksbank are beginning to outlive their usefulness. Meanwhile, Australia is moving away from its easing bias. But a move toward less accommodation is still not in the cards, especially as employment growth underperformed and total hours worked contracted at a 1% annual pace. Financial market dynamics also favor a weaker AUD/SEK. This cross has moved much ahead of nominal interest rate differentials, and real-interest-rate differentials have moved in the opposite direction, pointing to a lower AUD/SEK. Additionally, the Swedish broad market as well as financial equities have been outperforming Australian stocks. This suggests that Swedish financial conditions are too easy relative to Australia. Finally, technicals point to a negative short-term outlook for this cross. AUD/SEK is massively overbought on a 52-week-rate-of-change measure. On a shorter-term basis, the MACD indicates an overbought condition and is forming a negative divergence with prices, exactly as the stochastic indicator has broken down (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Poor Risk/Reward Tradeoff ##br##For Holding AUD/SEK Chart I-15The Swedish Labor ##br##Market Is On Fire Chart I-16AUD/SEK:##br## Poised For A Shakeout Bottom Line: The outlook for AUD/SEK is problematic. This cross is pricey and the Swedish consumer is outperforming that of Australia. This is happening exactly as the Riksbank may begin moving away from its hyper-accommodative stance, as inflation is hitting four-and-a-half year highs. Finally, financial market dynamics and currency technicals are flagging a short in this cross. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Raeganomics 2.0?", dated November 11, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see European Investment Strategy Special Report, "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model", dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "How Do You Say "Whatever It Takes" In Japanese?", dated September 23, 2016 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Ibid. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Last week, equities and the dollar rallied as Trump's unexpected victory was taken as a positive for the U.S. economy in the hopes of promised fiscal stimulus. Both the market and Fed officials therefore remain tenacious on the prospects of a 25bps hike in December, with a 98% probability currently priced in. In a speech on Thursday, Yellen confirmed the gradual normalization of policy and acknowledged the strength of the U.S. labor market. Initial jobless claims declined to 235,000 from 254,000 and continuing jobless claims declined to 1.977 million from 2.043 million. This has further solidified our bullish stance on the dollar. On a technical basis, the DXY Index has hit a key resistance level of 100, which suggests a temporary halt to last week's surge. However, longer-term momentum is indicating a possible break-out from the key 100 level in the near future. Report Links: Reaganomics 2.0? - November 11, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The Euro continues to mirror the U.S. Dollar, losing more than 3% in a week since the U.S. Presidential Election. This move seems to be a function of the election only, as European data has come out reasonably strong this week: Economic sentiment from the ZEW Survey shot up to 15.8, beating expectations, while current conditions declined to 58.8 from 59.5. The trade balance increased by €8.2bn to €26.5bn. European GDP growth remains solid at 1.6%. Data points to EUR strength, so the Euro should remain somewhat neutral on a trade-weighted basis as its economy remains strong. Monetary policy divergence and technicals, however, should continue to weigh on EUR/USD in the short term, suggesting that cross-currency plays are the best way to capture any Euro strength. Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 The yen has been one of the worst performing currencies in the G10 following Trump's election, with USD/JPY appreciating by about 5%. After this down-leg, we will not be surprised if the yen recovers some ground in the short-term. USD/JPY has already reached overbought technical levels and the sell-off in EM caused by the rising dollar may eventually trigger a risk-off period from which the yen will benefit. However, past the short term, we continue to be yen bears. Although the policies that the BoJ implemented in September did not seem as radical back then, a cap on Japanese 10-year rates takes a whole different meaning for the yen in the recent environment where interest rates are rising in the U.S, since it exerts considerable pressure on Japanese real rates vis-à -vis the rest of the world. Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 An interesting trend has caught our attention: the British economy continues to be very resilient, beating not only market expectations but also projections by the BoE. Recent October data confirms this view: Retail sales and retail sales ex-fuel grew at an annual rate of 7.4% and 7.6% respectively, blowing past expectations. Additionally Markit Services PMI was 54.5, also beating expectations. This is particularly surprising given that the service sector is likely getting very little support from the weak pound. We are reticent to be bullish on the pound, at least on the short term, given that political risks continue to dominate the movements of this currency. Nevertheless, the cable is very cheap from a valuation standpoint, and if the British economy continues to beat expectations, the pound could become an attractive buy. Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The RBA left its cash rate unchanged at 1.5% at their November meeting, and clarified that their easing cycle has come to an end. Recent data, however, is showing signs of weakness in the Australian economy: the Westpac Consumer Confidence Index came in last week at -1.1%; wage pressures remain subdued at 1.9% yoy in Q3 from 2.1% in Q2; employment change was weaker than expected at 9,800 with the unemployment rate unchanged at 5.6% in October. Labor market slack remains a fundamental concern for the Australian economy, something the RBA also pointed out in their November statement. Inflationary pressures, if any, will likely emanate only from commodity prices, for which the outlook remains questionable due to a rising USD. Deteriorating consumer confidence and continued labor market slack will translate into deflationary tendencies, which will cap rates and add downward pressure on the AUD. Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 In line with expectations, The RBNZ cut rates by 25 basis points to 1.75% at its latest policy meeting. Shortly after, a speech by Governor Wheeler lifted the NZD, as he appeared to signal that the RBNZ might be done easing by stating that "at this stage we think that we won't need another cut". We are unfazed by this change of rhetoric, and continue to be bearish on the kiwi. The NZD has formed a head-and-shoulders pattern which, along with fading momentum, foretells a downside leg for this antipodean currency. Moreover, a sell-off in Asian currencies and deteriorating financial conditions in Emerging markets following Trump's election should put further downward pressure on the kiwi, given that the NZD is the most sensitive currency to Asian spreads in the G10. Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 The Fed is Trapped Under Ice - September 9, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data points south for CAD: The merchandise trade deficit increased to CAD 4.1bn in September, with imports rising 4.7% to a record CAD 47.6 bn, and exports only up 0.1% to CAD 43.5 bn. The housing market continues to display warning signs as housing starts decreased in October to 192,900 and building permits declined by 7% in September from August, showing signs of supply decreases and rising prices. Although the labor market seems to be picking up, with net change in employment increasing by 43,900 and the participation rate at 65.8%, the setback in growth from the commodity slump and the Q2 Alberta wildfires will keep the BoC from raising rates. Nevertheless, we remain bullish on oil in the commodity space, and the CAD will likely display strength against the antipodeans. Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 The rally in USD/CHF should subside, at least in the short term. Not only has the swissie reached technical overbought levels, but the continued tightening in EM financial conditions caused by the rising dollar increased the probability of a risk off period where the CHF would rally. EUR/CHF on the other hand is likely to have limited downside from here on. Since August 2015, this cross had traded within a tight range of 1.075 to 1.110, breaking down only after the Brexit vote, when all risk-off assets rallied. However it has recently broken down again, an unwelcomed development for the SNB, who will likely intervene in the currency market in order to keep a rising franc from adding additional deflationary pressures to the Swiss economy. Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Clashing Forces - July 29, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The Krone was another victim of Trump's election, with USD/NOK rising by 4%. Although we expect that the dollar bull market will ultimately weigh on the krone, we remain positive on the outlook for this currency compared to its commodity peers. Inflation is currently at 3.7%, significantly above the Norges Bank target. Additionally house prices are rising at almost 20%, while household debt as a percentage of disposable income has surpassed the 200% mark. The Norges Bank has not overlooked this developments, as their rhetoric has recently become more hawkish. All these factors along with rebalancing energy markets, should provide strong tailwinds for the NOK, particularly against its crosses. Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 The Swedish economy looks strong according to recent data: Manufacturing PMI ticked up last month from 54.9 to 58.4. Industrial production increased in September by 1.5% annually. Inflation in October came in at 1.2% yoy. Inflation in the near future also looks quite upbeat, as per the uptick in 1-, 2-, and 5-year Prospera inflation expectation numbers to 1.4%, 1.7%, and 1.9% respectively. The Riksbank has therefore lifted their easing bias, which is also reflected by an increase in the 12-month market expectations of the repo rate to -0.4%. All is not perfect though. New orders decreased by 16.4% annually, indicating possible fragility in the manufacturing sector. Additional medium-term risk to the SEK will be dictated by bullish moves in the USD, as SEK remains one of the currencies with the highest sensitivity to the dollar. Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Dazed And Confused - July 1, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights Tighter global oil markets resulting from the production cut we expect to be announced November 30 at OPEC's Vienna meeting, along with fiscal stimulus from the incoming Trump administration in the U.S., will continue to stoke inflation expectations. We believe gold is well suited for hedging investors' medium-term inflation exposure, given its sensitivity to 5-year/5-year CPI swaps in the U.S. and eurozone. If the Fed decides to get out ahead of this expected pick-up in inflation and inflation expectations by raising rates aggressively next year, we would expect any increase in gold prices - and oil prices, for that matter - to be challenged. For OPEC and non-OPEC producers, a larger production cut may be required to offset a stronger USD next year. Near term, we still like upside oil exposure, given our expectation that production will be cut. Energy: Overweight. We remain long Brent call spreads expiring at year-end, and long WTI front-to-back spreads in 2017H2, in anticipation of an oil-production cut. Base Metals: Neutral. We expect nickel to outperform zinc in 2017. Precious Metals: Neutral. We are long gold at $1,227/oz after our buy-stop was elected on November 11. We are including a 5% stop-loss for this position. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Our long Mar/17 wheat vs. beans order was filled on November 14. We still look to go long corn vs. sugar. Feature Chart of the WeekBrent, WTI Curves Will Flatten, ##br##Then Backwardate Following Oil-Production Cut Continuing production increases from sundry sources outside OPEC, which the International Energy Agency estimates will lift output almost 500k b/d in 2017, are turning the heat up on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia to agree a production cut at the Cartel's meeting in Vienna later this month. It's either that or risk another downdraft that takes prices closer to the bottom of our long-standing $40-to-$65/bbl price range that defines U.S. shale-oil economics. The unexpected strength in production growth outside OPEC likely will require KSA and Russia to come up with a production cut that exceeds the 1mm b/d we projected earlier this month would be required to lift prices into the mid-$50s/bbl range. On the back of the expected cuts, we recommended getting long a February 2017 Brent call spread - long the $50/bbl strike vs. short the $55/bbl strike at $1.21/bbl. As of Tuesday's close, when we mark our positions to market every week, the position was up 9.09%. Reduced output from KSA and Russia - and, most likely, Gulf allies of KSA - will force refiners globally to draw down crude in storage, and for refined product inventories to draw as well. This will lift the forward curves for Brent and WTI futures (Chart of the Week). We expect oil prices will increase by approximately $10/bbl, following the joint cuts of 500k b/d each we expect KSA and Russia, which will be announced November 30. This also will lift 3-year forward WTI futures prices, which, as we showed in previous research, share a common trend with 5y5y CPI swaps. As stocks continue to draw next year, we expect the forward Brent and WTI curves to flatten, and, in 2017H2, to backwardate - that is to say, prompt-delivery prices will trade above the price of oil delivered in the future. For this reason, we are long August 2017 WTI futures vs. short November 2017 WTI futures, expecting the price difference between the two, which favors the deferred contract at present (i.e., a contango curve), to flip in favor of the Aug/17 contract. Chart 2Longer-dated WTI Futures, ##br##Inflation Expectations Rising Fiscal Stimulus Expected in the U.S. The election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th president of the U.S. likely will usher in significant fiscal stimulus beginning next year, particularly as Republicans now control the Presidency and Congress for the first time since 2005 - 06, when George W. Bush was president. Trump campaigned on a promise of significant fiscal stimulus, which likely will, among other things, stoke inflation expectations as money starts to flow to infrastructure projects and tax cuts toward the end of next year. Even before Trump's election 5-year/5-year (5y5y) CPI swaps were ticking higher, as oil markets rebalanced and started to discount the drawdown in global inventories this year and next (Chart 2). As the outlines of the Trump administration's fiscal policy take shape and money starts to flow to infrastructure projects, we expect inflation expectations to continue to rise. In previous research, we showed 5y5y CPI swaps and 3-year forward WTI futures are cointegrated, meaning they follow the same long-term trend. Indeed, we can specify 5y5y CPI swaps in the U.S. and eurozone directly as a function of 3-year forward WTI futures.1 Gold Will Lift With Rising Inflation Expectations... In the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) markets, gold prices have shared a common trend with U.S. CPI 5y5y swaps and real interest rates, which we show in a new model (Chart 3A, top panel).2 Using this specification, we find a 1% increase in the U.S. 5y5y CPI swaps increases gold prices by slightly more than 9%. Similarly, we find a 1% increase in EMU 5y5y CPI swaps increases gold prices by slightly more than 10% (Chart 3B, top panel).3 Of course, investors always can go straight to Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) for inflation protection, given the evolution of the respective CPIs in the U.S. and eurozone drives returns for these securities (Chart 4). However, we believe gold gives investors higher leverage to actual inflation and expected inflation. Chart 3AGold Prices Ticking Higher With ##br##U.S. CPI Inflation Expectations Chart 3BEMU Inflation Expectations ##br##Vs. 3-year Forward WTI Chart 4Inflation Expectations And TIPS ##br##Are Highly Correlated, As Well ...But The USD's Evolution Matters, Too The combination of tighter oil markets and fiscal stimulus in the U.S. will continue to push inflation and inflation expectations higher. The Fed will not sit idly by and just watch inflation expectations move higher next year. Indeed, prior to the election, we expected two rate hikes next year, following a likely rate increase at the FOMC's meeting next month. With expectations of a tightening oil market, and a fresh round of fiscal stimulus from the incoming Trump administration, the odds of an even stronger USD increase. We had been expecting the USD will appreciate 10% over the next year or so, as a result of the upcoming December rate hike and two additional hikes next year. This could change, since, as, our Foreign Exchange Strategy service noted, "Trump's electoral victory only re-enforces our bullish stance on the dollar."4 A stronger USD, all else equal, is bearish for commodities generally, since it raises the cost of dollar-denominated commodities ex-U.S., and lowers the costs of commodity producers in local-currency terms. The former effect depresses demand at the margin, while the latter raises supply at the margin. Both effects would combine to reduce oil prices at the margin (Chart 5). This would, in turn, lower inflation expectations, which would feed into lower gold prices (Chart 6). Chart 5A Stronger USD Would Be Bearish For Oil Chart 6And Gold Prices As It Would Lower Inflation Expectations Our FX view, is complicated by the possibility the Fed might want to run a "high-pressure economy" next year, and the potential for additional Chinese fiscal stimulus going into the 19th Communist Party Congress next fall. If both the U.S. and China deploy significant fiscal stimulus next year, the growth in these economies could overwhelm the negative effects of a stronger USD, and industrial commodities - chiefly base metals, iron ore and steel - could rally as demand picks up. Oil demand also would be expected to pick up as a result of the combined fiscal stimulus coming out of the U.S. and China, both from infrastructure build-outs and income growth. KSA - Russia Oil-Production Cut Gets Complicated These considerations will complicate the calculus of KSA and Russia and their respective oil-producing allies as the November 30 OPEC meeting in Vienna draws near. If the Fed moves to get out ahead of increasing inflation expectations by adding another rate hike or two next year, oil prices will encounter a significant headwind. OPEC and non-OPEC producers could very well find themselves back at the bargaining table negotiating additional cuts, as prices come under pressure next year from higher U.S. interest rates. It is too early to act on any speculation regarding fiscal policy in the U.S. or China next year. However, given our expectation for an oil-production cut announcement later this month at OPEC's Vienna meeting, we are confident staying long the Brent $50/$55 call spread, and the long Jul/17 vs. short Nov/17 WTI spread position we recommended earlier this month. As greater clarity emerges on U.S. and Chinese fiscal policy going into next year, we will update our assessments. Bottom Line: We expect global oil markets to tighten as KSA and Russia engineer a production cut, which will be announced at OPEC's Vienna meeting later this month. Fiscal stimulus from the incoming Trump administration in the U.S., and possible fiscal stimulus in China next year could put a bid under commodities. However, if the Fed gets out ahead of the expected pick-up in inflation and inflation expectations by raising rates aggressively next year, any increase in commodity prices - oil and gold, in particular - will be challenged. KSA and Russia could find themselves back at the bargaining table, negotiating yet another production cut to offset a stronger USD. That said, we are retaining our upside oil exposure via a Brent $50/$55 call spread expiring at the end of this year, and our long Jul/17 WTI vs. short Nov/17 WTI futures, which will go into the money as the forward curve flattens and then goes into a backwardation. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com BASE METALS China Commodity Focus: Base Metals Nickel: A Good Buy, Especially Versus Zinc Chart 7Nickel: More Upside Ahead We are bullish on nickel prices, both tactically and strategically. Its supply deficit is likely to widen on rising stainless steel demand and falling nickel ore supply in 2017. China will continue to increase its refined nickel imports to meet strong domestic stainless steel production growth. We remain strategically bearish zinc even though our short Dec/17 LME zinc position got stopped out at $2500/MT with a 4% loss. We expect nickel to outperform zinc considerably in 2017. We recommend buying Dec/17 LME nickel contract versus Dec/17 LME zinc contract at 4.3 (current level: 4.38). If the order gets filled, we suggest putting a stop-loss level for the ratio at 4.15. Nickel prices have gone up over 50% since bottoming in February (Chart 7, panel 1). The global nickel supply deficit reached a record high of 75 thousand metric tons (kt) for the first eight months of this year, based on the World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS) data (Chart 7, panel 2). More upside for nickel in 2017 On the supply side, the outlook is not promising in 2017. Global nickel ore and refined nickel production fell 5.2% and 1.1% yoy for the first eight months of this year, respectively, according to the WBMS data (Chart 7, panel 3). The newly elected Philippine government is clearly aiming for "responsible mining," and has been highly restrictive on domestic nickel mining activities, actions that likely will reduce the country's nickel ore production in 2017. The Philippines became the world's biggest nickel ore producer and exporter after Indonesia banned nickel ore exports in January 2014. The Philippines has implemented a national audit on domestic mines from July to September and has halted 10 mines for their environmental violations since July. Eight of them are nickel producers, which account for about 10% of the country's total nickel output. In late September, the government further declared that 12 more mines (mostly nickel) were recommended for suspension, and 18 firms are also subject to a further review. Stringent policy oversight will be the on-going theme for Philippine mines. We expect more suspensions in the country next year. There is no sign the export ban will be removed by the Indonesian government. Since Indonesia banned nickel ore exports in January 2014, the country's nickel ore output has declined 84% from 2013 to 2015. This occurred even though smelters were built locally, which will allow more nickel ore output in Indonesia. However, the incremental Indonesian output is unlikely to make up for the global nickel ore shortage next year. Global nickel demand is on the rise again (Chart 7, panel 4). According to the International Stainless Steel Forum (ISSF), global stainless steel production grew by 11.5% in 2016Q2 from only 3.7% yoy in 2016Q1. Comparatively, in 2015, the growth was a negative 0.3%. Due to fiscal and monetary stimulus in China this year, we expect continued growth in global stainless steel production in 2017. Why China Is Important To Global Nickel Markets China is the world's biggest nickel producer, consumer and importer. Its primary effect on nickel prices is through refined nickel imports. It also influences global stainless steel prices through stainless steel exports. In comparison to the global supply deficit of 75 kt, the deficit in China widened to 346 kt for the first eight months of this year - the highest physical shortage ever (Chart 8, panel 1). China has driven the global growth of both refined nickel production and nickel consumption since 2010 (Chart 8, panels 2 and 3). During the first eight months of this year, Chinese nickel production dropped sharply to 40.5 kt, nearly three times the global nickel output loss of 13.6 kt. For the same period, China's nickel demand growth accounted for 67% of global growth. In addition, the country produces about 53% of global stainless steel and exports about 10% of domestic-made stainless steel products to the rest of world (Chart 8, panel 4). Clearly, China is extremely important to both the global stainless steel and nickel markets. China Needs To Import More Nickel in 2017 Looking forward, China is likely to continue increasing its nickel imports to meet a growing domestic supply deficit (Chart 9, panel 1). The country's ore imports have been declining because of Indonesia's ban since 2014, and further dropped this year on the Philippine's suspensions (Chart 9, panel 2). Scarcer ore supply drove down Chinese refined nickel and nickel pig iron (NPI) output every year for the past three consecutive years (including this year). Chart 8China: A Key Factor For Nickel Market Chart 9Chinese Nickel Imports Are Set To Rise Prior to 2014, China imported nickel ores from Indonesia to produce NPI, which is used in its domestic stainless steel production. In 2013, only 20% of domestic nickel demand was met by unwrought nickel imports. After 2014, China's higher nickel ore imports from the Philippines were not able to make up the import losses from Indonesia (Chart 9, panel 3). As a result, in 2015, the percentage of domestic nickel demand met by unwrought nickel imports jumped to 47%. Furthermore, for the first eight months of this year, imports accounted for 57% of Chinese demand. Before the Indonesian ban in 2014, Chinese stainless steel producers and NPI producers built up mammoth nickel ore inventories for their stainless steel ore NPI production (Chart 9, panel 4). Now, Chinese laterite ore inventories are much lower than three years ago. Plus, most of the inventories likely are low nickel-content Philippines ore. Besides the tight ore inventory, China's stainless-steel output is accelerating. According to Beijing Antaike Information Development Co., a state-backed research firm, for the first nine months of 2016, Chinese nickel-based stainless steel output grew 11.3% yoy, a much stronger growth rate than the 4% seen during the same period last year. Given falling domestic nickel output and increasing nickel demand from the stainless steel sector, China seems to have no other choice but to import more refined nickel or NPI from overseas. Downside Risks Nickel prices could fall sharply in the near term if massive LME inventories are released to the global market. After all, global nickel inventories currently are at a high level of more than 350 kt, which is more than enough to meet the supply deficit of 75 kt (Chart 10, panel 1). However, as prices are still at the very low end of the range over the past 13 years, we believe that the odds of a massive, sudden inventory release is small. Inventory holders will be hesitant to sell their precious inventory too quickly, therefore the inventory release will likely be gradual, especially given the continuing export ban in Indonesia and a likely increase in the suspension of mines in the Philippines. In the longer term, if Indonesian refined nickel output continues growing at the pace registered in the past two years, the global nickel supply deficit may be much less than the market expects (Chart 10, panel 2). In that scenario, nickel prices will also fall. Due to power supply shortages, poor infrastructure and funding problems, many of the smelters and stainless steel plants' development have got delayed, so we believe these problems will continue to be headwinds for Indonesian nickel output growth. A five-million capacity stainless steel project, funded by three Chinese companies, potentially making Indonesia the world's second biggest stainless steel producer, will only be in production by 2018. Therefore, we believe next year is still a good window for a further rally in nickel prices. In addition, global stainless steel output may weaken again after this year's stimulus from China runs out of steam, which will also weigh on nickel prices (Chart 10, panel 3). We will monitor these risks closely. Investment strategy We expect nickel to outperform zinc considerably in 2017. Nickel has underperformed zinc massively since 2010 with the nickel/zinc price ratio tumbling to a 17-year low (Chart 11, panel 1). Chart 10Downside Risks To Watch Chart 11Nickel Likely To Outperform Zinc In 2017 Even though our short Dec/17 LME zinc position was stopped out at $2500/MT with a 4% loss due to the short-term turbulence, we remain strategically bearish zinc, as we expect supply to rise in 2017 (Chart 11, panel 2).5 Given our assessments of the nickel and zinc markets, we recommend buying Dec/17 LME nickel contract versus Dec/17 LME zinc contract at 4.3 (current level: 4.38) (Chart 11, panel 3). If the order gets filled, we suggest putting a stop-loss level for the ratio at 4.15. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com 1 Our updated estimates of the cointegrating regressions for U.S. and eurozone 5y5y CPI swaps indicate 3-year forward WTI futures explain close to 87% of the U.S. swap levels and 82% of the eurozone swaps, in the post-GFC period (January 2010 to present). Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Inflation Expectations Will Lift As Oil Rebalances," dated March 31, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 We also found that, over a longer period encompassing pre-GFC markets, gold prices shared a common trend with U.S. 5y5y CPI swaps, as well. Indeed, the evolution of 5y5y CPI swaps explained 84% of gold's price from 2004, when the 5y5y CPI swap time series begins, to present. 3 Previously, we estimated a gold model using the Fed's core PCE and the St. Louis Fed's 5y5y U.S. TIPS inflation index and found a 1% increase in the core PCE translates to a 4% increase in gold prices. Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "A 'High-Pressure Economy' Would Be Bullish For Gold," dated October 20, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report "Reaganomics 2.0?," dated November 11, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report for zinc section "The Lithium Battery Supply Chain: Efficient Exposure To Electric-Vehicle Market," dated October 27, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Closed Trades
Highlights The 50bps spike in the JPM global government bond yield since August constitutes one of the most aggressive tightenings since the Great Recession. Higher bond yields weaken credit growth, and weaker credit growth almost always depresses subsequent GDP growth. Maintain at most a neutral weighting to equities. Lean against the aggressive sell-offs in Healthcare, Consumer Goods, Telecoms and government bonds. Lean against the aggressive rally in Financials. Feature November 9 is an important date in the annals of history. November 9, 1989 was the day that the Berlin Wall came down. Chart of the WeekGlobalization Has Been Good For Profits, Bad For Wages Through 1961-89, the Berlin Wall divided a city. More significantly, it symbolized a divided world. So when the wall came down on November 9, 1989, it marked a new era of globalization. Goods, services, capital and people started to move around the world much more freely, resulting in greater efficiencies and lower costs. In developed economies, profits surged. Using the United States as an example, in the 27 years since the Berlin Wall came down, stock market real earnings per share have gone up 200% (Chart I-2). Chart I-2The Backdrop For Populism But globalization has exacted a heavy price: the pressure on wages means that in the 27 years since the Berlin Wall came down, U.S. median household real income has gone up just 10%. By comparison, in the 28 years that the Berlin Wall stood, the median household real income went up 60% (Chart of the Week). November 9 is also the date that Donald Trump won the presidency of the United States. So exactly 27 years after one symbolic wall fell, is another one about to go up? Will Mr. Trump's promised wall with Mexico symbolize a new era of anti-globalization, and a reversal of the economic and financial trends since the Berlin Wall came down? Flaws In The Trump Plan Economists are almost unanimous that protectionism, trade barriers and tariffs - in other words, "building walls" - depresses long-term global growth. It is conceivable that protectionism could help some parts of the U.S. economy, though other parts might lose out as trading partners retaliated. It is inconceivable that protectionism would be good for the world economy as a whole. Chart I-3One Of The Most Aggressive Tightenings ##br##Since The Great Recession But what about Trump's noise about fiscal stimulus, and specifically infrastructure spending - why would anybody not get excited about that? The two word answer is: crowding out. If a dollar that is borrowed and spent by the government (or even forecast to be borrowed and spent by the government) pushes up the bond yield (Chart I-3), it makes it more expensive for the private sector to borrow and spend. If, as a result, the private sector scales back its borrowing by a dollar, the dollar of government spending would have no impact on GDP. This is because the dollar of government spending has crowded out a dollar of private sector spending. The fiscal multiplier would be zero. But doesn't the euro area debt crisis provide compelling evidence of the power of fiscal thrust and a very high fiscal multiplier? No, not exactly. The fiscal multiplier was high through the debt crisis because euro area austerity - a fiscal tightening - very unusually coincided with sharply rising bond yields - which killed private sector borrowing. In other words, fiscal tightening and private sector tightening were reinforcing each other. Through 2009-12, when the euro area debt crisis escalated, the relationship between fiscal tightening and growth in GDP per capita in 13 sampled economies had a near-perfect explanatory power (r-squared of 0.9); and its slope of 1.5 indicated an extremely high average fiscal multiplier (Chart I-4). But through 2012-15, after Mario Draghi "did whatever it takes" the unusual combination of fiscal tightening and higher bond yields no longer existed, and both the explanatory power of the relationship and fiscal multiplier collapsed (Chart I-5). Chart I-4A Very Strong Connection Between Fiscal Policy And Growth Through 2009-12... Chart I-5...But No Connection Between Fiscal Policy And Growth Through 2012-15 The lesson is that the efficacy of fiscal stimulus and infrastructure spending crucially depends on its impact on the bond yield - and thereby on private sector borrowing. Now note that the 6-month increase in the U.S. (and global) 10-year bond yield constitutes one of the sharpest tightenings since the Great Recession. Higher borrowing costs depress credit growth as captured in the 6-month credit impulse (Chart I-6). A weaker 6-month credit impulse then almost always depresses subsequent 6-month GDP growth (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Higher Borrowing Costs Depress##br## Credit Growth... Chart I-7...And Weaker Credit Growth Depresses ##br##Subsequent GDP Growth So yes, fiscal stimulus and infrastructure spending could be effective as long as the bond yield is anchored, as it is in Japan. But if the bond yield goes up sharply, the consequent drag from the private sector will partly or entirely negate any putative boost from the government. Explaining Market Shocks And Electoral Shocks In his seminal book Thinking, Fast And Slow psychologist and Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman1 proposed that the human brain has evolved two separate and independent systems for decision making: a fast, rapid-response, associative way of thinking which he calls "System 1" and a slow, analytical, measured way of thinking which he calls "System 2". The two ways of thinking, fast and slow, have evolved to protect us from two types of threat to our survival: immediate, and long-term. Thousands of years ago, the immediate threat to survival might have been a sudden noise in the bushes suggesting that a predator was stalking. Today, for a bond investor, the immediate threat might be a sudden noise about aggressive U.S. fiscal stimulus, suggesting that the end of deflationary pressures is nigh. Faced with this immediate but uncertain threat, using the slow and measured thinking of System 2 could be fatal. So we obey the fast-thinking, associative, emotional System 1 and run for cover - or sell bonds. Thousands of years ago, a long-term threat might have been a war of attrition against an enemy tribe. Today, for the bond investor, the long-term threat might be the end of the debt super cycle, suggesting that deflationary pressures will persist. Faced with this long war of attrition, an over-reliance on the impulsive decisions of System 1 could also be fatal. We must use the measured analysis and strategies of slow-thinking System 2. Kahneman's System 1 and 2 is also an excellent framework to help explain how the simple messages of the Brexiteers and Donald Trump led to stunning success at the ballot box. Faced with job destruction and stagnant real wages, many people intuitively believe that less globalization, less competition and less immigration must mean more jobs and a better standard of living. Associative and emotional System 1 immediately identifies with simple messages such as "take back control" or "build a wall". The success of the Brexiteers and Donald Trump was to acknowledge the deep malaise that many people are feeling and offer simple and intuitive cures. To be absolutely clear, this is neither an endorsement nor a criticism of the Brexiteers or Donald Trump, but simply an explanation of why their message hit home. Still, as we have argued, the more analytical and measured System 2 will find that the simple and intuitive cures that the Brexiteers and Donald Trump offer are not the panaceas that they might first seem. The Immediate Investment Decision Short-term traders generally use the rapid-response, associative, emotional System 1 for their decision making. Long-term investors generally use the slow, analytical, measured System 2. But after a shock, disoriented long-term investors may also switch from System 2 to System 1 and just follow the herd. Eventually though, System 2 switches back on, and the excessive herding and trend-following reverses. At the moment, several sector trends are at or near such a point of reversal according to our excessive groupthink indicator (Chart I-8, Chart I-9, Chart I-10, Chart I-11, Chart I-12). Chart I-8Healthcare Reversals After Excessive Trend-Following Chart I-9Consumer Goods Reversals After Excessive Trend-Following Chart I-10Telecoms Reversals After Excessive Trend-Following Chart I-11Financials Reversals After Excessive Trend-Following Chart I-12Government Bond Reversals After Excessive Trend-Following Specifically, on a 3-month trading view, we would lean against the aggressive sell-offs in Healthcare, Consumer Goods, Telecoms and government bonds; and we would lean against the aggressive rally in Financials. More generally, what does the Trump victory mean for European equities? In today's highly-connected financial markets, mainstream investments in Europe overwhelmingly depend on global developments, and not on parochial issues. The dominant components of the Eurostoxx600, FTSE100, DAX30, CAC40, AEX, SMI, and other major indices, are multinationals with a truly global footprint. So the answer rests on two subsidiary questions: What does the Trump victory mean for global monetary conditions? What does the Trump victory mean for global growth? As already mentioned, global monetary conditions have tightened significantly in recent months, and in accelerated fashion after the Trump victory. The 50bps tightening in the JPM global government bond yield since August constitutes one of the sharpest 3-month spikes since the Great Recession. But as in previous cases, the spike may be self-limiting given its squeeze on credit sensitive sectors and emerging markets. Since August, the dividend yield on equities is little changed - meaning that equities have become more expensive relative to bonds. But this is hard to justify as short-term growth prospects have, if anything, worsened. To repeat the powerful messages from Chart 6 and Chart 7, higher bond yields weaken credit growth; and weaker credit growth almost always depresses subsequent GDP growth. Putting all this together, asset allocators should maintain at most a neutral weighting to equities. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002 for his work on decision making. Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. After the big recent moves in markets, four open positions were closed at their trading-rule limits, two at profit targets, two at stop-losses. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart 1-13 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Trump's Win: The Republican sweep of both the White House and Congress in the U.S. elections will allow President-elect Donald Trump to implement much of his planned policies, including a major fiscal stimulus package. Trump Stimulus & The Yield Curve: Trump's proposed aggressive fiscal stimulus package will continue to put bear-steepening pressure on the U.S. Treasury curve. However, the future direction of global bond yields will be more influenced by the upcoming monetary policy decisions in the U.S. & Europe. Maintain a below-benchmark overall duration stance, while exiting curve flattening positions in the U.S. U.S. High-Yield: U.S. junk bond valuations have improved slightly in recent weeks, especially in light of an improving U.S. nominal growth outlook for 2017 that will reduce default risk to some degree. Upgrade U.S. high-yield allocations to below-benchmark (2 of 5) from maximum underweight. Feature Chart of the WeekTrump Turmoil For Bonds America has been treated to a pair of major shocking events over the past couple of weeks. The Chicago Cubs won baseball's World Series for the first time in 108 years. And now, Donald Trump - real estate tycoon, reality TV star, Twitter addict - has become the 45th President of the United States. In the aftermath of that stunning election victory, investors are being treated to one more shocker that seemed impossible even just a few months ago - rapidly rising bond yields. Trump's victory has not only changed the political power structure in the U.S., but has seemingly altered many of the familiar financial market narratives as well. The idea of "deficit spending" by the government to boost growth has not been heard for many years in Washington, but Trump has made it clear that a big fiscal stimulus is coming soon to America. He has laid out a combination of large tax cuts and infrastructure spending that could result in both a surge in U.S. Treasury issuance in the coming years and a more structural rise in inflation - again, developments that have not been seen in the U.S. in quite a while. The prospect of fiscal easing amid still-accommodative monetary conditions in the U.S., with the economy running at full employment, has sent Treasury yields surging back to pre-Brexit levels, wiping out six months of positive bond returns in the process (Chart of the Week). While many details are still to be worked out with regards to Trump's proposed fiscal policy shift, the markets have taken its pro-business tilt as a bullish sign for growth and a bearish sign for bonds. There is more scope for yields to rise in the near term, in the U.S. and elsewhere, with the Fed likely to deliver another rate hike next month and the global economy now in a cyclical upswing. Duration risk remains the biggest immediate threat for bond investors, and we continue to recommend a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. A New Sheriff In Washington Chart 2Markets Cheer Trump 'Bigly' The consensus opinion among investors going into the U.S. election was that a Trump victory would result in considerable market turmoil. This was a reasonable argument, as Trump ran a disruptive, anti-status-quo campaign that, by definition, would be expected to generate far more changes and uncertainty than a victory by Hillary Clinton. Yet outside of a few shaky moments in the wee hours of Election Night as markets began to realize that Trump would win, the big bond-bullish/equity-bearish risk-off moment never arrived. Perhaps Trump's more conciliatory tone in his victory speech helped to calm investors' fears that his caustic campaign demeanor would continue in the White House. More likely, investors saw the results in the U.S. Congressional elections and realized that the Republican Party had won a clean sweep in D.C. that would allow Trump to implement many of his campaign promises. Markets have been rapidly pricing the potential implications of a Trump presidency into many financial assets (Chart 2), from bank stocks (which would gain from Trump's proposed rollback of the Dodd-Frank regulations on bank activities and, more importantly, from the impact of higher bond yields and a steeper yield curve on profitability) to the U.S. dollar (which would benefit from Trump's protectionist trade agenda through narrower U.S. trade deficits and stronger U.S. growth that would raise the future trajectory of U.S. interest rates). Higher-quality USD-denominated credit spreads have been surprisingly well behaved, given the moves higher in U.S. yields and the USD itself. This may reflect an optimistic belief that Trump's pro-business, pro-growth policies can offset the negative impact on corporate profits from higher yields and a stronger USD. Markets are right to assume that Trump can actually deliver on his economic agenda. A detailed analysis of the implications of the Trump victory was laid in a Special Report sent last week to all BCA clients by our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy.1 One of their main conclusions was that Trump's ability to enact his plans will not be hindered much by the U.S. Congress. Republicans now control both the House of Representatives and Senate after last week's elections and Trump has been strongly supported even by the small government fiscal conservatives in Congress. After delivering such a stunning victory for the Republicans, Trump shouldn't face much serious resistance to his economic initiatives. Investors are starting to price in the potential inflationary implications of a President Trump, with the 5-year inflation breakeven, 5-years forward from the U.S. TIPS market now sitting at 1.84%. This is still well below the Fed's 2% inflation target (after adjusting for the usual historical difference between the CPI used to price TIPS and the Fed's preferred inflation gauge, the PCE deflator, which is around 0.4-0.5%). This measure can keep moving higher over the medium-term, given the timing of Trump's proposed fiscal stimulus. Bottom Line: The Republican sweep of both the White House and Congress in the U.S. elections will allow President-elect Donald Trump to implement much of his planned policies, including a major fiscal stimulus package. The 1980s Called - They Want Their Economic Policy Back The U.S. economy is now showing few internal imbalances that would require wider government deficits as a counter-cyclical policy measure. The private sector savings/investment balance is close to zero, as the post-crisis household deleveraging phase has ended and corporate sector borrowing has skyrocketed in recent years (Chart 3, top panel). Also, measures of spare capacity in the U.S. economy like the output gap or the unemployment gap are also near zero (bottom panel), suggesting that any pickup in aggregate demand from current levels could trigger a rise in wage inflation and domestically-focused core inflation. Chart 3Deficit Spending At Full Employment: Back To The Future? The last time that such a combination of fiscal stimulus and full employment occurred was in the mid-1980s during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. Trump's plans for aggressive tax cuts and sharp increases in discretionary government spending do echo the policies of Reagan, who presided over one of the nation's largest peacetime run-ups in discretionary government budget deficits and debt (Chart 4). Perhaps there was a kernel of truth in the Trump/Reagan comparisons made during the election campaign! Chart 4Less Fiscal Space Than In The 1980s Clearly, a sharp run-up in federal budget deficits could have a much greater impact on longer-term interest rates and the shape of the yield curve, given the much higher starting point for federal debt/GDP now (74%) compared to the beginning of the Reagan presidency (26%). Especially given the potentially large budget deficits implied by Trump's campaign promises. Back in June, Moody's undertook an economic analysis of Trump's economic policies based on publically available information (i.e. Trump's campaign website) and their own assumptions based on Trump's campaign speeches.2 Moody's ran policies through its own U.S. economic model, which is similar to the forecasting and policy analysis models used by the Fed and the U.S. Congressional Budget Office. This model allows feedback from fiscal policy changes to the expected swings in growth and inflation and the likely shifts in monetary policy. The Moody's analysts used a variety of scenarios, ranging from full implementation of Trump's proposals3 to a heavily watered-down version if he faced a hostile Congress (which is clearly not the case now). We show the Moody's model forecasts for the U.S. Federal budget deficit as a percentage of GDP in Chart 5, along with the slope of the very long end of the U.S. Treasury curve. We also show the 10-year/30-year slope versus a measure of the Fed's policy stance, the real fed funds rate. According to Moody's, a full implementation of the Trump platform would push the U.S. budget deficit to double-digit levels by 2020, and would add nearly $7 trillion in debt over that time, pushing the federal debt/GDP ratio to 100%. The less extreme scenarios show smaller increases in deficits and debt, but the main point is that even if Trump implements only some fraction of his policies, the U.S. budget deficit will go up significantly during his first term in office. Looking at the historic relationship between the deficit and the slope of the Treasury yield curve, this implies that Trump's policies should put steepening pressures on the long-end of the curve as the bond market prices in greater Treasury issuance and higher future inflation rates. Of course, the bottom panel of Chart 5 shows that Fed policy also matters for the shape of the curve, and this is where the current debate over the Fed's next moves comes into play. Chart 5Trump's Deficits Will Steepen The Curve (Fed Permitting) The market is currently discounting a 70% probability that the Fed will hike at the December FOMC meeting, which has been our call for the past few months. The Fed has been projecting an increase next month and another 50bps of hikes in 2017, but these were forecasts made in the BT (Before Trump) era. The pricing from the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve shows that the market's expectations have started to shift upward towards the Fed's forecasts, in contrast to the BT dynamic where the Fed was having to cut its forecasts down towards the lower levels implied by the market (Chart 6). Will the Fed now look at the fiscal stimulus proposed by Trump as a reason to hike rates higher, or faster, than their latest set of projections? A big fiscal stimulus at full employment would certainly give the FOMC cover to raise its forecasts for growth and inflation, which would require a shift upwards in its interest rate projections. We do not expect that outcome at next month's FOMC meeting, as the Fed would likely want to see more specific budget details from the Trump administration in the New Year. More importantly, the Fed will want to avoid any additional strength in the U.S. dollar by moving to a more hawkish stance too soon, which would turn the dollar once again into a drag on U.S. growth, inflation and corporate profits, potentially disrupting financial markets. With the Fed unlikely to become more hawkish in the near term, the Treasury market will remain focused on the fiscal implications of Trump, placing bear-steepening pressures on the Treasury curve. For that reason, we are exiting our current Treasury curve flattener positions (2-year vs 10-year, 10-year vs 30-year) this week and moving to a neutral curve posture. We continue to maintain a below-benchmark stance on overall portfolio duration, as well as an underweight bias toward U.S. Treasuries within the developed market bond universe (on a currency-hedged basis). Treasuries are still not cheap, despite the recent run-up in yields, according to our global PMI model which incorporates variables for growth, U.S. dollar sentiment and policy uncertainty (Chart 7). Fair value has risen to 2.25% on the back of improving global growth and reduced uncertainty post-Brexit, with rising dollar bullishness providing a downward offset. Chart 6Markets Moving UP To The Fed Forecasts Chart 7USTs Not Yet Cheap If the Fed were to move too quickly to a more hawkish stance, dollar bullishness would increase and limit the cyclical rise in yields. At the same time, greater policy uncertainty under a new President could also limit yield increases although, as we have laid out above, the nature of the Trump uncertainty is not bond-bullish if it results in rising levels of government debt. For now, it is best to maintain a cautious investment stance until there is greater clarity on the U.S. policy front, while being aware that Treasuries are no longer as sharply undervalued as they were just a week ago. Looking ahead, this bond bear phase could end if the ECB announces an extension of its bond-buying program beyond the March 2017 deadline. As we discussed in a recent Weekly Report, the ECB will not be able to credibly declare that European inflation will soon return to the 2% target.4 This will force the ECB to extend the bond buying for at least another six months, with some changes to the rules of the program to allow for smoother implementation of future purchases. If, however, the ECB does indeed announce a tapering of bond purchases starting in March, bond yields will reprice higher within the main developed bond markets, led by rising term premiums (Chart 8). Given the global bond market's current worries about the inflationary implications of a switch away from extremely accommodative monetary policy to greater fiscal stimulus, a spike in yields related to a less-accommodative ECB could turn nasty fairly quickly. Chart 8A Dovish ECB Will Prevent A Deeper Global Bond Rout Bottom Line: Trump's proposed aggressive fiscal stimulus package will continue to put bear-steepening pressure on the U.S. Treasury curve. However, the future direction of global bond yields will be more influenced by the upcoming monetary policy decisions in the U.S. & Europe. Maintain a below-benchmark overall duration stance, while exiting curve flattening positions in the U.S. U.S. High-Yield: More Growth, Fewer Defaults In recent discussions with clients, many have asked whether the implications of Trump's pro-growth policies, coming at a time of a cyclical upturn in the U.S. economy and inflation, should provide a boost to corporate profits that will, by extension, reduce the default risk in U.S. high-yield bonds. Chart 9Higher Nominal Growth Is Good For Junk (During Expansions) Chart 10High-Yield Valuations Have Improved Slightly It is a valid question to ask, as the excess returns on U.S. junk bonds have been historically been higher during expansions when nominal GDP growth (currently 2.8%) has been 4% or greater (Chart 9).5 With real U.S. GDP growth likely to expand by at least 2.5% in 2017, with moderately higher inflation, nominal growth should accelerate to a pace that has historically been friendlier for junk returns. Chart 11Corporate Balance Sheets Are Still A Problem Of course, the state of the corporate leverage cycle matters too, and that remains the biggest problem for high-yield. We have been maintaining an extremely cautious stance on U.S. junk bonds over the past few months, as a combination of highly-levered balance sheets and unattractive valuations led us to expect an underwhelming return performance from junk, especially with a volatility-inducing Fed rate hike likely to occur by year-end. That has not been case, however, as junk spreads declined steadily as the summer turned to autumn and have been relatively stable during the U.S. election uncertainty. Our colleagues at our sister publication, BCA U.S. Bond Strategy, recently introduced a simple model to predict junk bond excess returns as a function of lagged junk spreads and realized default losses.6 That model had been predicting excess returns over the next year of close to zero, but at today's spread levels the expected excess return over duration-matched U.S. Treasuries during the next year is closer to 157bps (Chart 10). While this is not the usual return that investors expect from an allocation to high-yield, it is better than the previous model prediction. Given this slightly more attractive level of spreads, a bond market now more prepared for a Fed rate hike, and with the default risks potentially narrowing somewhat on the back of a better nominal growth outlook for 2017, we no longer see the case for a maximum underweight position in high-yield. We still have our concerns about the state of the corporate credit cycle, and the valuations have not improved enough to justify a move back to neutral (Chart 11). Thus, we are only moving our U.S. high-yield allocation to below-benchmark (2 of 5) from maximum underweight (1 of 5). We are maintaining our below-benchmark stance on Euro Area and Emerging Market high-yield within our model portfolio, in line with our stance on U.S. junk. Bottom Line: U.S. junk bond valuations have improved slightly in recent weeks, especially in light of an improving U.S. nominal growth outlook for 2017 that will reduce default risk to some degree. Upgrade U.S. high-yield allocations to below-benchmark (2 of 5) from maximum underweight. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: Outcomes & Investment Implications", dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/2016-06-17-Trumps-Economic-Policies.pdf 3 Aggressive income tax cuts, no changes to entitlement spending, increased defense outlays, and even the more controversial protectionist promises such as a 46% tariff on Chinese imports and the deportation of 11 million undocumented immigrant workers. 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The ECB's Next Move: Extend & Pretend", dated October 25, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Excess returns are the highest during low growth or recession periods, as this is when credit spreads are at their widest and companies are deleveraging and actively acting to reduce default risks. That is not the case at the moment. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Don't Chase The Rally In Junk", dated November 1, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns