Geopolitics
Highlights The Senate will pass the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan largely as it stands. Markets will now turn to Biden’s second major reconciliation bill for FY2022 – the one with tax hikes. Democrats will go forward with tax hikes on corporations and the wealthy. But they will spend more than they tax for fear of squandering their term in power. Tax hikes threaten sectors like tech that already face headwinds from rising bond yields. The health sector is also at risk. Stick with cyclicals and value plays. Feature Markets have seesawed as volatility spikes in the face of rapidly rising bond yields. Value stocks such as financials stand to benefit relative to growth stocks as the market comes to grips with the first hint of normal inflation expectations since 2019 (Chart 1). Underlying the trend is a sea change in US fiscal policy. Chart 1Value Stocks To Reignite On Rising Bond Yields The House of Representatives passed the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan so it will now go to the Senate for revision, back to the House for approval, and then to President Biden’s desk by around March 14. Investors will now turn to Biden’s second major legislative act prior to the 2022 midterm election cycle: the fiscal year 2022 budget reconciliation process. Before we outline the time frame and tax hikes that that process will entail, we should take a moment to review the current bill. Senate Will Pass American Rescue Plan Largely As Is The House version of the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan contains $1,400 household rebates, direct checks via the Internal Revenue Service, for people who make less than $75,000 per year (double those numbers for married couples). Unemployment benefits are supposed to rise from $300 to $400 per week for 73 weeks instead of 50 weeks, with an expiration on August 29 instead of March 14. Those with children or other dependents will receive additional payments. The bill also includes $75 billion for fighting COVID-19, $350 billion for state and local governments, $170 billion for schools and universities, $225 billion for small business, $38 billion for the airline industry and various other tax benefits for families and workers.1 Those who have been let go from their jobs can more easily retain their previous health insurance. Chart 2 provides a visual comparison of the American Rescue Plan with the $900 billion in fiscal relief passed at the end of 2020 prior to House passage and Senate revision. Already the Senate version excludes a hike to the minimum wage, from $7.25 to $15 per hour, as the Senate parliamentarian ruled that does not qualify under the “Byrd rule” because it does not directly impact spending or taxation.2 Vice President Kamala Harris, who is also president of the Senate, could reverse this decision but otherwise the minimum wage will have to be considered in a separate bill later. Chart 2American Rescue Plan The Senate could pare back other aspects of the bill – such as state and local aid, given that local government revenues are in much better shape than expected. Chart 2 highlights that the state and local aid component is much larger this time around. Still, the purpose of Senate negotiations is to secure the votes of moderate Democrats, as winning over 10 Republicans is no longer feasible, and moderate senators are not going to sink the first legislative proposal of a president of their own party. The Senate is virtually guaranteed to pass the bill, likely by March 14 when current unemployment benefits expire. The bill’s economic impact will be to speed the vaccination process and provide another infusion of cash into households and various public institutions. Families are just starting to receive the last round of benefits passed in December and they had not exhausted the 14% year-on-year increase in real income that they saw as a result of last year’s CARES Act when the Coronavirus Response and Relief Act sent incomes soaring yet again (Chart 3). Economic growth will be supercharged as economic activity normalizes, consumer confidence recovers, and the service sector revives. Chart 3Washington Lavishes Households With Dole Biden’s Second Bill Will Pass This Fall The second budget reconciliation procedure, for fiscal year 2022, will begin in mid-April. The formal deadline to adopt a budget resolution is April 15 but the average delay would put the resolution in June.3 The maximum delay would see the resolution passed in October but that is unlikely in today’s context (Diagram 1). After the resolution passes, the House and Senate must reconcile their budgets, pass the same bill, and send it to the president for his signature. Diagram 1Timeline Of Biden Administration’s Second Budget Reconciliation, FY2022 The average time between Congress adopting a budget resolution and the president signing a reconciliation bill into law is 150 days, putting completion on September 15, 2021. This period could easily extend to November. In the worst-case, judging by history, Democrats could fail to conclude the process until October 2022 – but that is highly unlikely. A delay till December of this year would be a fumble, but a more realistic fumble, say if moderate Democrats must be won over due to controversial provisions. The second reconciliation bill is supposed to consist of investments over a ten-year period rather than emergency relief for the lingering pandemic and economic recovery. Biden’s proposed $2-$3 trillion green infrastructure program is the highlight but we also expect Democrats to prioritize their health care plan, which is estimated to cost $1.7-$1.9 trillion. Hence $4 trillion is a reasonable expectation for new spending but in this case the headline spending figure will be at least partially defrayed by tax hikes, unlike the first reconciliation bill (Charts 4A & 4B). If Biden raises taxes by half as much as he intends, the full price tag would be $2 trillion. Chart 4ABiden Will Spend, Then Tax Chart 4BBiden Will Spend, Then Tax The precise contours of this bill will remain unknown until Biden presents an outline in April and the House of Representatives drafts a resolution. We test six different scenarios involving different assumptions about Biden’s tax-and-spend proposals, highlighted in Table 1. Generally, we assume that Democrats will much more readily compromise tax hikes rather than spending, given that they want to err on the side of firing up the economic recovery. They are just as capable as Republicans were in 2017 of manipulating the numbers when it comes to the reconciliation requirement that the budget deficit not increase beyond a ten-year time period. Table 1Scenarios For Biden’s Second Reconciliation Bill The results are broken down in terms of revenue, expenditure, and net interest costs in Chart 5. The baseline is Biden’s campaign proposal. Scenario 1 assumes that Biden gets all of the spending he wants but is forced to compromise on tax hikes. Scenario 2 is more realistic as it assumes that Biden gets half of what he wants on both spending and taxes. Scenarios 3-6 examine what would happen if Biden were forced to strike out either his green infrastructure plan or his health and social security plan, depending on different revenue assumptions. In Scenarios 5 and 6 we grant Biden only half of his proposed taxes on corporations and wealthy folks, leaving other tax proposals to the side – otherwise the result would be a net tightening of fiscal conditions, which is neither intended nor politically possible. Chart 5Scenarios For Biden’s Second Reconciliation Bill The impact on the budget deficit in each scenario is shown in Chart 6. The greatest economic stimulus would occur under Scenario 1, which would soon become a problem for investors as it would hasten inflation and rising interest rates. Chart 6Deficit Scenarios For Biden’s Second Reconciliation Bill Scenario 2 is the most realistic policy scenario while being the least inflationary. By contrast, Scenario 4 is realistic but hardly less inflationary than the baseline case. In each of these scenarios it is important to bear in mind that the new government programs would be administered over a ten-year period and therefore the increase to the budget deficit would be more gradual than is the case of the American Rescue Plan, which clearly aims to be disbursed in the first few years. In the case of the Obama administration’s American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) the peak in spending occurred in 2013, four years after the bill was passed (analogous to 2025 today) (Chart 7). Infrastructure and green energy projects are also expected to increase productivity and hence potential growth. Chart 7Infrastructure Spending Could Peak Four Years After Bill’s Passage, As In 2009-13 The Byrd rule will become even more important with Biden’s second reconciliation bill because the bill will contain a mishmash of Biden’s campaign proposals. Democrats will try to pass as much of their agenda via fast track as possible so as to meet promises ahead of the 2022 midterm election. An advantage of health care spending is that it is unlikely to be struck down by the Senate parliamentarian given that the Obama administration relied on reconciliation to pass a critical second installment to the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). Biden’s health care plan is more popular than climate change policy, with both the general public and moderate Democrats, and it is guaranteed to pass reconciliation. Infrastructure spending faces greater challenges under reconciliation but they are not insurmountable. Infrastructure is normally handled via the traditional budget process or the Highway Trust Fund and some measures are likely to run afoul of the Byrd rule. Still, workarounds can be found.4 Hence the infrastructure plan is likely to be compromised but not prohibited due to technicalities. Even if infrastructure fails to make it into reconciliation, Biden can use the deadline to top up the exhausted Highway Trust Fund or to reauthorize the Surface Transportation Act as alternative pathways. It is not impossible to get Republican cooperation on infrastructure though the green agenda will meet resistance. The reconciliation process is nominally forbidden from increasing the budget deficit beyond ten years. Short-term spending is exempt, as is the case with the American Rescue Plan and its crisis-response measures, but the purpose of the second reconciliation bill is to invest in long-term, productivity-enhancing programs. A new government health insurance option and/or a green infrastructure buildout will take many years to implement and could increase deficits beyond the ten-year window. But Democrats, like Republicans, will be able to use accounting chicanery and gimmicks to make the budget outlook serve their purposes in passing the legislation. As long as they keep moderate members of the party on their side. Yes, Taxes Will Go Up … But That May Not Be All Bad For Markets Why should Democrats raise taxes at all? Why not focus on stimulus without taking on the political risk of higher taxes? After all, Republicans passed tax cuts via reconciliation without offsetting them by spending cuts. Was it not the higher taxes in Obamacare that greatly fueled resistance from Republicans and their victory in the House of Representatives in 2010? First, on the level of intentions, the Democrats clearly seek to increase taxes on corporations, high-income earners, and capital gains: Both Biden and Harris said they would raise taxes on the campaign trail and in the presidential debates despite the risk to their election prospects. Biden committed only to prevent tax hikes on those making less than $400,000 per year. Harris’s weakest moment in her debate with Mike Pence was her insistence that she would raise taxes but she stuck to her guns. Both factions of the Democratic Party want to raise taxes. Traditional Democrats view tax hikes as a way of paying for a larger government role in addressing social and economic imbalances. Populists view tax hikes as a way of redistributing from the ultra-rich. While budget deficits are not a general concern, combating inequality is a theme shared across the party. Second, on the level of capability, Democrats can get at least some of the tax increases that they want: The US is not overtaxed on the whole. True, Biden’s full tax agenda would push the US back up to the top of the OECD countries in terms of the corporate tax if an “integrated” view of both firm-level taxes and taxes on dividends and capital gains (Chart 8). But this point suggests that Biden will moderate his tax plan rather than abandon it altogether. Popular opinion did not favor Trump for cutting corporate taxes. Chart 8Biden’s Corporate Tax Proposal Would Make US An Outlier Again The macroeconomic impact of raising taxes is manageable in the context of the extraordinary fiscal stimulus that the US is passing. There is no clear relationship between tax rates and economic growth but it is natural for the Democrats to fear that they could squander their term in power by excessive fiscal tightening. Yet the negative economic impact of raising the corporate rate is only 0.8% of GDP over the long run, and half of that if the corporate rate is raised only halfway to what Biden intends (25% instead of 28%) (Table 2), according to the conservative-leaning Tax Policy Foundation. Table 2Economic Impact Of Corporate Tax Not Dramatic President Biden has the political capital early in his term to revise the Trump tax cuts according to Democratic prerogatives. His popularity will not hold up for long (Chart 9). And he only just has enough legislative power. While household sentiment is weak and economic conditions are moderate, both are set to improve as the pandemic fades and fiscal stimulus takes effect (Table 3). While tax hikes will embolden Republican opposition and the Democrats will have lost their chance to affect the tax code if Republicans win in 2022. At the moment, Republicans are divided and unpopular, so Democrats have a window of opportunity (Chart 10). Chart 9Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis? Chart 10Independents Up, Republicans Down Table 3Political Capital Index While Democrats could chuck all the Senate rules out the window in order to pass their spending plans without any offsets, this would anger moderates who tend to uphold Senate rules and norms. The party cannot afford to lose a single vote from their caucus in the Senate. Yet moderate Democrats are not against tax increases in principle. What they would oppose is either excessive tax hikes or a fiscal spending bonanza without any revenue offsets at all.5 It is entirely feasible to back-load tax increases so that they take effect in the latter half of the ten-year budget window, especially after the 2024 election. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is advising precisely this course of action and has herself argued that corporate tax hikes will go through.6 There may be some risk that Democrats go full left-wing populist and abandon any semblance of fiscal responsibility so as to supercharge the economy. So far they have agreed to maintain the Senate filibuster and scrap the minimum wage hike but this acceptance of Senate norms may not last as pressure builds. The second reconciliation bill is the last chance to fast-track major initiatives before the midterm. Vice President Harris could overrule the Senate parliamentarian across the board. This scenario is unlikely. The White House and Congress will find a balance that raises some revenue but errs on the fiscally accommodative side, as our scenarios above highlight. Investment Takeaways The market’s concern is that the Democrats will “overdo” the fiscal response and we fully share this concern. The American Rescue Plan alone will plug the output gap by almost three times more than the amount required. The coming tax hikes will not offset the wave of new spending that is coming down the pike. Democrats will partially reverse Trump’s tax cuts in the context of additional pump-priming that constitutes a net increase to the budget deficit. The net effect is inflationary. If Congress were to pass another $2 trillion bill without any substantial revenue offsets then the market would face an even bigger inflationary jolt and an even earlier return to rate hikes by the Fed. But this scenario is unlikely. So the inflationary risk is clear but investors need not panic in the short run. Our infrastructure trade is back on track as the reflation trade rumbles onward (Chart 11). The Democrats will get at least one more major bill passed and it will likely include at least half of Biden’s agenda, including around $2 trillion on green infrastructure. We will discuss the renewable energy portion at length in a forthcoming report. The health care sector faces headwinds from both Biden’s health policies and corporate tax hikes. The sectors that stand to benefit the most from a higher corporate tax rate are those that benefited least from Trump’s Tax Cut and Jobs Act – namely energy, industrials, materials, and financials, in that order (Chart 12A). These are also the cyclical plays that we favor in today’s accommodative policy environment. Chart 11Infrastructure Trade Back On Track Chart 12ACyclicals Outperforming Health Care Chart 12BCyclicals To Outperform Tech? The same cyclical sectors are also trying to make headway against the tech sector, which stands to suffer from higher interest rates as well as higher taxes, including a minimum tax on book earnings, if that part of Biden’s agenda makes it through the negotiations this fall (Chart 12B). Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Table A1APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A1BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A1CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3Biden’s Cabinet Position Appointments Footnotes 1 See Jeff Drew, “House passes $1.9 trillion stimulus bill with a variety of small business relief,” and Alistair M. Nevius, “Tax provisions in the American Rescue Plan Act,” February 27, 2021, Journal of Accountancy, journalofaccountancy.com. 2 See “The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate’s ‘Byrd Rule,’” Congressional Research Service, December 1, 2020, fas.org. 3 The current delay centers on whether the Senate will confirm Biden’s appointee for director of the Office of Management and Budget, Neera Tanden, who lost support from key moderate Democrat Joe Manchin. If she does not receive a compensatory Republican vote then Biden will have to appoint someone else and the Senate will have to confirm. Thus the budget resolution could easily be delayed into May or June. 4 For the difficulties, see Peter Cohn, “Democrats plan a spending blowout, but hurdles remain,” Roll Call, January 11, 2021, rollcall.com. For workarounds, see Zach Moller and Gabe Horwitz, “Reconciliation: How It Works and How to Use It to Help American Workers Recover,” Third Way, February 1, 2021, thirdway.org. 5 See Alexander Bolton, “Democrats hesitant to raise taxes amid pandemic,” The Hill, February 25, 2021, thehill.com. 6 See Saleha Mohsin and Christopher Condon, “Yellen Favors Higher Company Tax, Signals Capital Gains Worth a Look”, Bloomberg, February 22, 2021, Bloomberg.com
Highlights Market-based geopolitical analysis is about identifying upside as well as downside risk. So far this year upside risks include vaccine efficacy, coordinated monetary and fiscal stimulus, China’s avoidance of over-tightening policy, and Europe’s stable political dynamics. Downside risks include vaccine rollout problems, excessive US stimulus, a Chinese policy mistake, and traditional geopolitical risks in the Taiwan Strait and Persian Gulf. Financial markets may see more turmoil in the near-term over rising bond yields and the dollar bounce. But the macro backdrop is still supportive for this year. We are initiating and reinitiating a handful of trades: EM currencies ex-Brazil/Turkey/Philippines, the BCA rare earth basket, DM-ex-US, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership markets, and global value plays. Feature Chart 1Bond Yield Spike Threatens Markets In Near Term Investors hear a lot about geopolitical risk but the implication is always “downside risk.” What about upside risks? Where are politics and geopolitics creating buying opportunities? So far this year, on the positive side, the US fiscal stimulus is overshooting, China is likely to avoid overtightening policy, and Europe’s political dynamics are positive. However, global equity markets are euphoric and much of the good news is priced in. On the negative side, the US stimulus is probably too large. The output gap will be more than closed by the Biden administration’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan yet the Democrats will likely pass a second major bill later this year with a similar amount of net spending, albeit over a longer period of time and including tax hikes. The countertrend bounce in the dollar and rising government bond yields threaten the US and global equity market with a near-term correction. The global stock-to-bond ratio has gone vertical (Chart 1). Meanwhile Biden faces immediate foreign policy tests in the Taiwan Strait and Persian Gulf. These two are traditional geopolitical risks that are once again underrated by investors. The near term is likely to be difficult for investors to navigate. Sentiment is ebullient and likely to suffer some disappointments. In this report we highlight a handful of geopolitical opportunities and offer some new investment recommendations to capitalize on them. Go Long Japan And Stay Long South Korea China’s stimulus and recovery matched by global stimulus and recovery have led to an explosive rise in industrial metals and other China-sensitive assets such as Swedish stocks and the Australian dollar that go into our “China Play Index” (Chart 2). Chart 2China Plays Looking Stretched (For Now) While a near-term pullback in these assets looks likely, tight global supplies will keep prices well-bid. Moreover long-term strategic investment plans by China and the EU to accelerate the technology race and renewable energy are now being joined by American investment plans, a cornerstone of Joe Biden’s emerging national policy program. We are long silver and would buy metals on the dips. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “new era” policies will be further entrenched at the March National People’s Congress with the fourteenth five-year plan for 2021-25 and Xi’s longer vision for 2035. These policies aim to guide the country through its economic transition from export-manufacturing to domestic demand. They fundamentally favor state-owned enterprises, which are an increasingly necessary tool for the state to control aggregate demand as potential GDP growth declines, while punishing large state-run commercial banks, which are required to serve quasi-fiscal functions and swallow the costs of the transition (Chart 3). Xi Jinping’s decision to promote “dual circulation,” which is fundamentally a turn away from Deng Xiaoping’s opening up and liberal reform to a more self-sufficient policy of import substitution and indigenous innovation, will clash with the Biden administration, which has already flagged China as the US’s “most serious competitor” and is simultaneously seeking to move its supply chains out of China for critical technological, defense, and health goods. Chart 3Xi Jinping Leans On The Banks To Save The SOEs Chinese political and geopolitical risks are almost entirely priced out of the market, according to our GeoRisk Indicator, leaving Chinese equities exposed to further downside (Chart 4). Hong Kong equities have traded in line with GeoRisk Indicator for China, which suggests that they also have downside as the market prices in a rising risk premium due to the US’s attempt to galvanize its allies in a great circumvention of China’s economy in the name of democracy versus autocracy. Chart 4China/HK Political Risk Priced Out Of Market China has hinted that it will curtail rare earth element exports to the US if the US goes forward with a technological blockade. Biden’s approach, however, is more defensive rather than offensive – focusing on building up domestic and allied semiconductor and supply chain capacity rather than de-sourcing China. President Trump’s restrictions can be rolled back for US designed or manufactured tech goods that are outdated or strictly commercial. Biden will draw the line against American parts going into the People’s Liberation Army. Biden has a chance in March to ease the Commerce Department’s rules implementing Trump’s strictures on Chinese software apps in US markets as a gesture of engagement. Supply constraints and shortages cannot be solved quickly in either semiconductors or rare earths. But both China and the US can circumvent export controls by importing through third parties. The problem for China is that it is easier for the US to start pulling rare earths from the ground than it is for China to make a great leap forward in semiconductor production. Given the US’s reawakening to the need for a domestic industrial policy, strategic public investments, and secure supply chains, we are reinitiating our long rare earth trade, using the BCA rare earth basket, which features producers based outside of China (Chart 5). The renminbi is starting to rolling over, having reached near to the ceiling that it touched in 2017 after Trump’s arrival. There are various factors that drive the currency and there are good macro reasons for the currency to have appreciated in 2016-17 and 2020-21 due to strong government fiscal and monetary reflation. Nevertheless the People’s Bank allowed the currency to appreciate extensively at the beginning of both Trump’s and Biden’s terms and the currency’s momentum is slowing as it nears the 2017 ceiling. We are reluctant to believe the renminbi will go higher as China will not want to overtighten domestic policy but will want to build some leverage against Biden for the forthcoming strategic and economic dialogues. For mainland-dedicated investors we recommend holding Chinese bonds but for international investors we would highlight the likelihood that the renminbi has peaked and geopolitical risk will escalate. There is no substantial change on geopolitical risk in the Taiwan Strait since we wrote about it recently. A full-scale war is a low-probability risk. Much more likely is a diplomatic crisis – a showdown between the US and China over Taiwan’s ability to export tech to the mainland and the level of American support for Taiwan – and potentially a testing of Biden’s will on the cybersecurity, economic security, or maritime security of Taiwan. While it would make sense to stay long emerging markets excluding Taiwan, there is not an attractive profile for staying long emerging markets excluding all of Greater China. Therefore investors who are forced to choose should overweight China relative to Taiwan (Chart 6). Chart 5Rare Earth Miners Outside China Can Go Higher Market forces have only begun to register the fact that Taiwan is the epicenter of geopolitical risk in the twenty-first century. The bottleneck for semiconductors and Taiwan’s role as middleman in the trade war have supported Taiwanese stocks. It will take a long time for China, the US, and Europe to develop alternative suppliers for chips. But geopolitical pressures will occasionally spike and when they do Taiwanese equities will plunge (Chart 7). Chart 6EM Investors Need Either China Or Taiwan ... Taiwan Most At Risk South Korean geopolitical risk is also beneath the radar, though stocks have corrected recently and emerging market investors should generally favor Korea, especially over Taiwan. The first risk to Korea is that the US will apply more pressure on Seoul to join allied supply chains and exclude shipments of sensitive goods to China. The second risk is that North Korea – which Biden is deliberately ignoring in his opening speeches – will demand America’s attention through a new series of provocations that will have to be rebuked with credible threats of military force. Chart 7Markets Starting To Price Taiwan Strait Geopolitical Risk Chart 8South Korea Favored In EM But Still Faces Risks Over Chips, The North Chart 9Don't Worry About Japan's Revolving Door The North Korean risk is usually very fleeting for financial markets. The tech risk is more serious but the Biden administration is not seeking to force South Korea to stop trading with China, at least not yet. The US would need to launch a robust, multi-year diplomatic effort to strong-arm its allies and partners into enforcing a chip and tech ban on China. Such an effort would generate a lot of light and heat – shuttle diplomacy, leaks to the press, and public disagreements and posturing. Until this starts to occur, US export controls will be a concern but not an existential threat to South Korea (Chart 8). Japan is the geopolitical winner in Asia Pacific. Japan is militarily secure, has a mutual defense treaty with the US, and stands to benefit from the recovery in global trade and growth. Japan is a beneficiary of a US-driven tech shift away from excess dependency on China and is heavily invested in Southeast Asia, which stands to pick up manufacturing share. Higher bond yields and inflation expectations will detract from growth stocks more than value stocks, and value stocks have a larger market-cap weight in European and Japanese equity markets. Japanese politics are not a significant risk despite a looming election. While Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga is unpopular and likely to revive the long tradition of a “revolving door” of short-lived prime ministers, and while the Liberal Democratic Party will lose the super-majorities it held under Shinzo Abe, nevertheless the party remains dominant and the national policy consensus is behind Abe’s platform of pro-growth reforms, coordinated dovish monetary and fiscal policy, and greater openness to trade and immigration (Chart 9). Favor EU And UK Over Russia And Eastern Europe Russian geopolitical risk appears to be rolling over according to our indicator but we disagree with the market’s assessment and expect it to escalate again soon (Chart 10). Not only will Russian social unrest continue to escalate but also the Biden administration will put greater pressure on Russia that will keep foreign investors wary. Chart 10Russia Geopolitical Risk Will Not Roll Over While geopolitics thus poses a risk to Russian equities – which are fairly well correlated (inversely) with our GeoRisk indicator – nevertheless they are already cheap and stand to benefit from the rise in global commodity prices and liquidity. Russia is also easing fiscal policy to try to quiet domestic unrest. The pound and the euro today are higher against the ruble than at any time since the invasion of Ukraine. It is possible that Russia will opt for outward aggressiveness amidst domestic discontent, a weak and relapsing approval rating for Vladimir Putin and his government, and the Biden administration’s avowed intention to prioritize democracy promotion, including in Ukraine and Belarus (Chart 11). The ruble will fall on US punitive actions but ultimately there is limited downside, at least as long as the commodity upcycle continues. Chart 11Ruble Can Fall But Probably Not Far Biden stated in his second major foreign policy speech, “we will not hesitate to raise the cost on Russia.” There are two areas where the Biden administration could surprise financial markets: pipelines and Russian bonds. Biden could suddenly adopt a hard line on the Nordstream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany, preventing it from completion. This would require Biden to ask the Germans to put their money where their mouths are when it comes to trans-Atlantic solidarity. Biden is keen to restore relations with Germany, and is halting the withdrawal of US troops from there, but pressuring Germany on Russia is possible given that it lies in the US interest and Biden has vowed to push back against Russia’s aggressive regional actions and interference in American affairs. The US imposed sanctions on Russian “Eurobonds” under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) in the wake of Russia’s poisoning of secret agent Sergei Skripal in the UK in 2018. Non-ruble bank loans and non-ruble-denominated Russian bonds in primary markets were penalized, which at the time accounted for about 23% of Russian sovereign bonds. This left ruble-denominated sovereign bonds to be sold along with non-ruble bonds in secondary markets. The Biden administration views Russia’s poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny as a similar infraction and will likely retaliate. The Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act is not yet law but passed through a Senate committee vote in 2019 and proposed to halt most purchases of Russian sovereign debt and broaden sanctions on energy projects and Kremlin officials. Biden is also eager to retaliate for the large SolarWinds hack that Russia is accused of conducting throughout 2020. Cybersecurity stocks are an obvious geopolitical trade in contemporary times. Authoritarian nations have benefited from the use of cyber attacks, disinformation, and other asymmetric warfare tactics. The US has shown that it does not have the appetite to fight small wars, like over Ukraine or the South China Sea, whereas the US remains untested on the question of major wars. This incentivize incremental aggression and actions with plausible deniability like cyber. Therefore the huge run-up in cyber stocks is well-supported and will continue. The world’s growing dependency on technology during the pandemic lockdowns heightened the need for cybersecurity measures but the COVID winners are giving way to COVID losers as the pandemic subsides and normal economic activity resumes. Traditional defense stocks stand to benefit relative to cyber stocks as the secular trend of struggle among the Great Powers continues (Chart 12). Specifically a new cycle of territorial competition will revive military tensions as commodity prices rise. Chart 12Back To Work' Trade: Long Defense Versus Cyber By contrast with Russia, western Europe is a prime beneficiary of the current environment. Like Japan, Europe is an industrial, trade-surplus economy that benefits from global trade and growth. It benefits as the geopolitical middleman between the US and its rivals, China and Russia, especially as long as the Biden administration pursues consultation and multilateralism and hesitates to force the Europeans into confrontational postures against these powers. Chart 13Political Risk Still Subsiding In Continental Europe Meanwhile Russia and especially China need to court Europe now that the Biden administration is using diplomacy to try to galvanize a western bloc. China looks to substitute European goods for American goods and open up its market to European investors to reduce European complaints of protectionism. European domestic politics will become more interesting over the coming year, with German and French elections, but the risks are low. The rise of a centrist coalition in Italy under Mario Draghi highlights how overstated European political risk really is. In the Netherlands, Mark Rutte’s center-right party is expected to remain in power in March elections based on opinion polling, despite serious corruption scandals and COVID blowback. In Germany, Angela Merkel’s center-right party is also favored, and yet an upset would energize financial markets because it would result in a more fiscally accommodative and pro-EU policy (Chart 13). The takeaway is that there is limit to how far emerging European countries can outperform developed Europe, given the immediate geopolitical risk emanating from Russia that can spill over into eastern Europe (Chart 14). Developed European stocks are at peak levels, comparable to the period of Ukraine’s election, but Ukraine is about to heat up again as a battleground between Russia and the West, as will other peripheral states. Chart 14Favor DM Europe Over EM Europe Chart 15GBP: Watch For Scottish Risk Revival In May Finally, in the UK, the pound continues to surge in the wake of the settlement of a post-Brexit trade deal, notwithstanding lingering disagreements over vaccines, financial services, and other technicalities. British equities are a value play that can make up lost ground from the tumultuous Brexit years. There is potentially one more episode of instability, however, arising from the unfinished business in Scotland, where the Scottish National Party wants to convert any victory in parliamentary elections in May into a second push for a referendum on national independence. At the moment public opinion polls suggest that Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s achievement of an EU trade deal has taken the wind out of the sails of the independence movement but only the election will tell whether this political risk will continue to fall in the near term (Chart 15). Hence the pound’s rally could be curtailed in the near term but unless Scottish opinion changes direction the pound and UK domestic-oriented stocks will perform well. Short EM Strongmen Throughout the emerging world the rise of the “Misery Index” – unemployment combined with inflation – poses a persistent danger of social and political instability that will rise, not fall, in the coming years. The aftermath of the COVID crisis will be rocky once stimulus measures wane. South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil look the worst on these measures but India and Russia are also vulnerable (Chart 16). Brazilian geopolitical risk under the turbulent administration of President Jair Bolsonaro has returned to the 2015-16 peaks witnessed during the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff amid the harsh recession of the middle of the last decade. Brazilian equities are nearing a triple bottom, which could present a buying opportunity but not before the current political crisis over fiscal policy exacts a toll on the currency and stock market (Chart 17). Chart 16EM Political Risk Will Bring Bad Surprises Chart 17Brazil Risk Hits Impeachment Peaks On Bolso Fiscal Populism Bolsonaro’s signature pension reform was an unpopular measure whose benefits were devastated by the pandemic. The return to fiscal largesse in the face of the crisis boosted Bolsonaro’s support and convinced him to abandon the pretense of austere reformer in favor of traditional Brazilian fiscal populist as the 2022 election approaches. His attempt to violate the country’s fiscal rule – a constitutional provision passed in December 2016 that imposes a 20-year cap on public spending growth – that limits budget deficits is precipitating a shakeup within the ruling coalition. Our Emerging Market Strategists believe the Central Bank of Brazil will hike interest rates to offset the inflationary impact of breaking the fiscal cap but that the hikes will likely fall short, prompting a bond selloff and renewed fears of a public debt crisis. The country’s political crisis will escalate in the lead up to elections, not unlike what occurred in the US, raising the odds of other negative political surprises. Chart 18Reinitiate Long Mexico / Short Brazil While Latin America as a whole is a shambles, the global cyclical upturn and shift in American policy creates investment opportunities – particularly for Mexico, at least within the region. Investors should continue to prefer Mexican equities over Brazilian given Mexico’s fundamentally more stable economic policy backdrop and its proximity to the American economy, which will be supercharged with stimulus and eager to find ways to use its new trade deal with Mexico to diversify its manufacturing suppliers away from China (Chart 18). In addition to Brazil, Turkey and the Philippines are also markets where “strongman leaders” and populism have undercut economic orthodoxy and currency stability. A basket of emerging market currencies that excludes these three witnessed a major bottom in 2014-16, when Turkish and Brazilian political instability erupted and when President Rodrigo Duterte stormed the stage in the Philippines. These three currencies look to continue underperforming given that political dynamics will worsen ahead of elections in 2022 (possibly 2023 for Turkey) (Chart 19). Chart 19Keep Shorting The Strongmen Investment Takeaways We closed out some “risk-on” trades at the end of January – admittedly too soon – and since then have hedged our pro-cyclical strategic portfolio with safe-haven assets, while continuing to add risk-on trades where appropriate. The Biden administration still faces one or more major foreign policy tests that can prove disruptive, particularly to Taiwanese, Chinese, Russian, and Saudi stocks. Biden’s foreign policy doctrine will be established in the crucible of experience but his preferences are known to favor diplomacy, democracy over autocracy, and to pursue alliances as a means of diversifying supply chains away from China. We will therefore look favorably upon the members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and recommend investors reinitiate the long CPTPP equities basket. These countries, which include emerging markets with decent governance as well as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada all stand to benefit from the global upswing and US foreign policy (Chart 20). Chart 20Reinitiate Long Trans-Pacific Partnership Chart 21Reinitiate Long Global Value Over Growth The Biden administration will likely try to rejoin the CPTPP but even if it fails to do so it will privilege relations with these countries as it strives to counter China and Russia. The UK, South Korea, Thailand and others could join the CPTPP over time – though an attempt to recruit Taiwan would exacerbate the geopolitical risks highlighted above centered on Taiwan. The dollar is perking up, adding a near-term headwind to global equities, but the cyclical trend for the dollar is still down due to extreme monetary and fiscal dovishness. Tactically, go long Mexican equities over Brazilian equities. From a strategic point of view we still favor value stocks over growth stocks and recommend investors reinitiate this global trade (Chart 21). Strategically, wait to overweight UK stocks in a global portfolio until the result of the May local elections is known and the risk of Scottish independence can be reassessed. Strategically, favor developed Europe over emerging Europe stocks as a result of Russian geopolitical risks that are set to escalate. Strategically go long global defense stocks versus cyber security stocks as a geopolitical “back to work” trade for a time when economic activity resumes and resource-oriented territorial, kinetic, military risks reawaken. Strategically, favor EM currencies other than Brazil, Turkey, and the Philippines to minimize exposure to economic populism, poor macro fundamentals, and election risk. Strategically, go long the BCA Rare Earths Basket to capture persistent US-China tensions under Biden and the search for alternatives to China. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com We Read (And Liked) … Supply-Side Structural Reform Supply-Side Structural Reform, a compilation of Chinese economic and policy research, discusses several aspects of Chinese economic reform as it is practiced under the Xi Jinping administration, spanning the meaning and importance of supply-side structural reform in China as well as five major tasks.1 The book consists of contributions by Chinese scholars, financial analysts, and opinion makers in 2015, so we have learned a lot since it was published, even as it sheds light on Beijing’s interpretation of reform. 2015 was a year of financial turmoil that saw a dramatic setback for China’s 2013 liberal reform blueprint. It also saw the launch of a new round of reforms under the thirteenth Five Year Plan (2016-20), which aimed to push China further down the transition from export-manufacturing to domestic and consumer-led growth. Beijing’s renewed reform push in 2017, which included a now infamous “deleveraging campaign,” ultimately led to a global slowdown in 2018-19 that was fatefully exacerbated by the trade war with the United States – only to be eclipsed by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Built on fundamental economic theory and the social background of China, the book’s authors examine the impact of supply-side reform on the Chinese financial sector, industrial sector, and macroeconomic development. The comprehensive analysis covers short-term, mid-term and long-term effects. From the perspective of economic theory, there is consensus that China's supply-side structural reform framework did not forsake government support for the demand side of the economy, nor was it synonymous with traditional, liberal supply-side economics in the Western world. In contrast to Say’s Law, Reaganomics, and the UK’s Thatcherite privatization reforms, China's supply-side reform was concentrated on five tasks specific to its contemporary situation: cutting excessive industrial capacity, de-stocking, deleveraging, cutting corporate costs, and improving various structural “weaknesses.” The motives behind the new framework were to enhance the mobility and efficiency of productive factors, eliminate excess capacity, and balance effective supply with effective demand. Basically, if China cannot improve efficiencies, capital will be misallocated, corporations will operate at a loss, and the economy’s potential will worsen over the long run. The debt buildup will accelerate and productivity will suffer. Regarding implementation, the book sets forth several related policies, including deepening the reform of land use and the household registration (hukou) system, and accelerating urbanization, which are effective measures to increase the liquidity of productive factors. Others promote the transformation from a factor-driven economy to efficiency and innovation-driven economy, including improving the property rights system, transferring corporate and local government debt to the central government, and encouraging investment in human capital and in technological innovation. The book also analyzes and predicts the potential costs of reform on the economy in the short and long term. In the short run, authors generally anticipated that deleveraging and cutting excessive industrial capacity would put more pressure on the government’s fiscal budget. The rise in the unemployment rate, cases of bankruptcy, and the negative sentiment of investors would slow China’s economic growth. In the medium and long run, this structural reform was seen as necessary for a sustainable medium-speed economic growth, leading to more positive expectations for households and corporates. The improved efficiency in capital allocation would provide investors with more confidence in the Chinese economy and asset market. Authors argued that overall credit risk was still controllable in near-term, as the corresponding policies such as tax reduction and urbanization would boost private investment and consumption in the short run. These policies increased demand in the labor market and created working positions to counteract adverse impacts. Employment in industries where excessive capacity was most severe only accounted for about 3% of total urban employment in 2013. Regarding the rise in credit risk during de-capacity, the asset quality of banks had improved since the 1990s and the level of bad debt was said to be within a controllable range, given government support. Moreover, in the long run, the merger and reorganization of enterprises would increase the efficient supply and have a positive effect on economic innovation-driven transformation. We know from experience that much of the optimism about reform would confront harsh realities in the 2016-21 period. The reforms proceeded in a halting fashion as the US trade war interrupted their implementation, prompting the government to resort to traditional stimulus measures in mid-2018, only to be followed by another massive fiscal-and-credit splurge in 2020 in the face of the pandemic. Yet investors could be surprised to find that the Politburo meeting on April 17, 2020 proclaimed that China would continue to focus on supply-side structural reform even amid efforts to normalize the economy and maintain epidemic prevention and control. Leaders also pledged to maintain the supply-side reform while emphasizing demand-side management during annual Central Economic Work Conference in December 2020. In other words, Xi administration’s policy preferences remain set, and compromises forced by exogenous events will soon give way to renewed reform initiatives. This is a risk to the global reflation trade in 2021-22. There has not been a total abandonment of supply-side reform. The main idea of demand-side reform – shifts in the way China’s government stimulates the economy – is to fully tap the potential of the domestic market and call for an expansion of consumption and effective investment. Combined with the new concept of “dual circulation,” which emphasizes domestic production and supply chains (effectively import substitution), the current demand-side reforms fall in line with the supply-side goal of building a more independent and controllable supply chain and produce higher technology products. These combined efforts will provide “New China” sectors with more policy support, less regulatory constraint, and lead to better economic and financial market performance. Despite the fluctuations in domestic growth and the pressure from external demand, China will maintain the focus on reform in its long-term planning. The fundamental motivation is to enhance efficiency and innovation that is essential for China’s productivity and competitiveness in the future. Thus, investors should not become complacent over the vast wave of fiscal and credit stimulus that is peaking today as we go to press. Instead they should recognize that China’s leaders are committed to restructuring. This means that the economic upside of stimulus has a cap on it– a cap that will eventually be put in place by policymakers, if not by China’s lower capacity for debt itself. It would be a colossal policy mistake for China to overtighten monetary and fiscal policy in 2021 but any government attempts to tighten, the financial market will become vulnerable. A final thought: it is unclear whether there is potential for an improvement in China’s foreign relations contained in this conclusion. What the western world is demanding is for China to rebalance its economy, open up its markets, cut back on the pace of technological acquisition, reduce government subsidies for state-owned companies, and conform better to US and EU trade rules. There is zero chance that China will provide all of these things. But its own reform program calls for greater intellectual property protections, greater competition in non-strategic sectors (which the US and EU should be able to access under recent trade deals), and targeted stimulus for sustainable energy, where the US and EU see trade and investment opportunities. Thus there is a basis for an improvement in cooperation. What remains to be seen is how protectionist dual circulation will be in practice and how aggressively the US will pursue international enforcement of technological restrictions on China under the Biden administration. Jingnan Liu Research Associate JingnanL@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Yifu L, et al. Supply-Side Structural Reform (Beijing: Democracy & Construction Publishing House, 2016). 351 pages. Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Section III: Geopolitical Calendar
BCA Research’s US Investment Strategy & US Political Strategy services conclude that the enduring influence of Ronald Reagan and Paul Volcker may have run its course. The Volcker Fed’s uncompromising resistance to the 1970s’ runaway inflation…
Highlights Both the US and Iran have the intention and capability of restoring the 2015 nuclear deal so investors should presume that an escalation in tensions will conclude with a new arrangement by August this year. However, the deal that the Iranians will offer, and that Biden can accept, may be unacceptable to the Israeli government, depending on Israel’s March 23 election. Moreover if a deal is not clinched by August, the timeframe will stretch out for most of Biden’s term and strategic tensions will escalate. Major Middle Eastern conflicts and crises tend to occur at the top of the business cycle when commodity prices are soaring rather than in the early stages where we stand today. But regional instability is possible regardless, especially if the US-Iran talks fall apart. Maintain gold and safe-haven assets as the Iranian question can lead to near-term escalation even if a deal is the end-game. Feature Geopolitics is far from investors’ concerns today, so it could create some nasty surprises. Two urgent tests await the Biden administration – China/Taiwan and Iran – and provide a basis for investors to add some safe-haven assets and hedges amidst an exuberant stock rally in which complacency is very high. The past week’s developments underscore these two tests. First, Chinese officials flagged that they would cut off rare earth elements to the US, implying that they would retaliate if Biden refuses to issue waivers for US export controls on semiconductors to China.1 Second, Biden spoke on the phone with Benjamin Netanyahu for the first time. The delay signaled Biden’s distance from Netanyahu and intention to normalize ties with Israel’s arch-enemy Iran. In both the Taiwan Strait and the Persian Gulf, the base case is not a full-fledged military conflict in the short run. This is positive for the bull market. But major incidents short of war are likely in the near term and major wars cannot be ruled out. In this report we update our view of the Iran risk. A long-term solution to the nuclear threat is not at hand, which means that Israel could in the worst-case take military action on its own. Meanwhile tensions and attacks will escalate until a deal is agreed. Iranian-backed forces in Iraq have already attacked a US base near Erbil, killing an American military contractor.2 In the event of an Iranian diplomatic crisis, the stock market selloff will be short. The macro backdrop is highly reflationary and investors will buy on the dips. In the event of full-scale war, the US dollar will suffer for a longer period. Oil Price A Boon But Middle East Regimes Still Vulnerable Chart 1Oil Recovery A Boon For Middle East Markets Brent crude oil prices have rebounded to $65 per barrel on the global economic recovery. Middle Eastern equities are rallying in absolute terms, though not relative to other emerging markets (Chart 1). This underperformance is fitting given that the region suffers from poor governance, obstacles to doing business, resource dependency, insufficient technology and capital, and high levels of political and geopolitical risk. Non-oil producers and non-oil sectors in the Middle East have generally lagged the global economic recovery (Chart 2). The continuation of the recovery is essential to these regimes because most of them lack the fiscal room to provide large fiscal relief packages. The global average in fiscal support over the past year has been 7.4% but most Middle Eastern governments have provided 2% or less (Chart 3). Current account deficits have plagued oil producers since the commodity bust of 2014 and twin deficits have become a feature of the region, limiting the fiscal response to the global pandemic. Chart 2Middle East Economy Starts To Recover Chart 3Middle Eastern Regimes Fiscally Constrained The good news is that the recovery is likely to continue on the back of vaccines and fiscal pump-priming in all of the major economies. The bad news is that a black cloud hangs over the Middle East in the form of geopolitics. Given the underperformance of regional equities, global investors are not ignoring these risks – but they are a persistent factor until the Biden administration survives its initial tests in the region to create a new equilibrium. The unfinished geopolitical business in the region centers on the role of the US and the question of Iran. It is widely understood that the US has less and less interest in the region due to its newfound energy independence on the back of the shale revolution (Chart 4). This is why the US can afford to sign and break deals as it pleases under different administrations, namely the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal, otherwise known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA). The Obama administration spent two terms concluding the deal while the Trump administration spent one term nullifying it, leaving the central geopolitical question of the region in limbo. Israel and Arab governments feel increasingly insecure in light of the US’s apparent lack of foreign policy coherence and declining interest in the region. The US has not truly abandoned the region – if anything the Biden administration is looking to maintain or increase US international involvement.3 Washington still sees the need to preserve a strategic balance between Iran and the Arab states, prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons, and maintain security in the critical oil chokepoint of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz (Chart 5). But Washington’s appetite for commitment and sacrifice is obviously waning. The American public is openly hostile to the idea of Middle Eastern entanglements, and three presidents in a row have been elected on the assurance that they would scale down America’s “forever wars.” A decisive majority of Americans, including military veterans and Republicans, believe the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not worth fighting.4 And only 6% of Americans view Iran as the top threat to their country. Chart 4Waning US Interest In Middle East Chart 5Strait Of Hormuz Critical To Global Stability America’s lack of concern about the Iranian threat marks a difference from the early 2000s and especially from its critical Middle Eastern ally Israel. Naturally Israelis have a much greater fear of Iran, and 58% see it as the nation’s top threat (Chart 6). Israel and the Gulf Arab states are drawing together, under the framework of the Trump administration’s Abraham Accords, in case the US abandons the region. A deal normalizing relations with Iran would enable Iran to expand its power and influence and, if unchecked by the US, would pose a long-lasting threat to US allies. Chart 6No US Appetite For War With Iran – Israel A Different Story Chart 7China/Asia, Not Iran, The Strategic Priority For The US The US’s reason for dealing with Iran is that it needs to devote more attention to its strategy in the western Pacific in countering China (Chart 7). But China is also a reason for the US to stay involved in the Middle East. China’s role is expanding because of resource dependency and the desire to expand economic integration. Beijing wants to deepen its global investments, open up new markets, and create closer links with Europe (Chart 8). Chart 8AChina's Expanding Role In Middle East Chart 8BChina's Expanding Role In Middle East Chart 9Unresolved US-Iran Deal A Geopolitical Risk The opening of the Iranian economy would give the US (and EU) a greater role in Iran’s development, where China has a special advantage as long as Iran is a pariah. The US would add economic leverage to its military leverage in a region that provides China with its energy. The Chinese are not yet as capable of projecting power into the region but that is changing rapidly. There is a possible strategic balance to be established between these simultaneous foreign policy revolutions: the US-Iran détente, the Israeli-Arab détente, and the rise of Mideast-China ties. But balance is an ideal and not yet a reality. In the meantime these foreign policy revolutions must actually take place – and revolutions are rarely bloodless. It is possible for a meltdown to occur in light of the region’s profound changes. In particular, the US-Iran détente is incomplete and faces Israeli/Arab opposition, Iranian paranoia, and US foreign policy incoherence. At the moment it is premature to declare an end to the bull market in US-Iran tensions. That will come when a deal is actually sealed, and then tested and enforced. In the meantime Iranian incidents will occur (Chart 9). Geopolitical risks threaten to reduce global oil supply. Different regimes and their militant proxies will strike out against each other to establish red lines. But a US-Iran deal is highly likely – and once that occurs, the risk to oil supply shifts to the upside, as Iran’s economy will open up. Not only will Iran start exporting again but Gulf Arab producers will want to preserve their market share, which means they will pump more oil. Iran’s Regime Hardens Its Shell Ahead Of Leadership Succession The COVID-19 crisis has weakened regimes in the Middle East, much like the Great Recession sowed the seeds for the Arab Spring and many other sweeping changes in the region. But unlike the Arab Spring, the regimes most at risk today are majority Shia Muslim – with Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq all teetering on the verge of chaos (Chart 10). Chart 10Iranian Sphere De-Stabilized Amid COVID Chart 11Iranian Economy Weak (Despite Green Shoots) Chart 12Jobless Iranian Youth The Iranian economy is starting to show the faintest green shoots but it is far too soon to give the all-clear signal. US sanctions have shut off access to oil export revenues. Domestic demand is weak and imports are still contracting, albeit much less rapidly. The country has seen a double dip recession over the past ten years (Chart 11). Unemployment is rife, especially among the youth. The working-age population makes up 60% of total and periodically rises up in protest (Chart 12). Inflation is soaring and the currency is still wallowing in deep depreciation (Chart 13). All of these points suggest Iran is weaker than it looks and will seek to negotiate a deal with the Biden administration. But Iran cannot trust the US so it will simultaneously prepare for the worst outcome – no deal, sanctions, and eventually war. Chart 13Iran Still Ripe For Social Unrest Chart 14Iranian Regime Turning HawkishIran’s response to the US’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal and imposition of maximum pressure sanctions has been to adopt a siege mentality and fortify the regime for a potential military confrontation. The country is preparing for a highly uncertain and vulnerable transition from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to a future leader or group of leaders. The government fixed the 2020 parliamentary elections so that hardliners or “principlists” rose to prominence at the expense of independents and especially the so-called reformists. The reformists have been humiliated by the US betrayal of the deal and re-imposition of sanctions, which exploded the economic reforms of President Hassan Rouhani, who will step down in August (Chart 14). The Timeline Of Biden’s Iran Deal Still, it is likely that the US and Iran will return to some form of the 2015 nuclear deal. Lame duck Rouhani is politically capable of returning to the deal: President Rouhani is a lame duck president whose popularity has cratered. If he can restore the deal before August then he can salvage his legacy and provide a pathway for Iran out of economic ruin by removing sanctions. It is manifestly in Iran’s interests to restore the deal – one reason why it has never left the deal and has only made incremental and reversible infractions against it. If Rouhani falls on his sword he provides the Supreme Leader and the next administration with a convenient scapegoat to enable the deal to be restored. Freshman President Biden has enough political capital to return to the deal: Biden is capable of restoring the deal, as he clearly intends to do judging by his statements, cabinet appointments, and diplomatic actions thus far. He has demanded that Iran enter back into full compliance with the deal before he eases sanctions but even this demand can be fudged. After all, it was the US that exited the deal in the first place, and Iran remains in partial compliance, so it stands to reason that the US should make the first concession to bring Iran back into compliance. None of the signatories have nullified the deal other than the US, and it was an executive (not legislative) deal, so President Biden can ultimately rejoin it by fiat. This would not be a popular move at home but the US public is preoccupied. Biden would achieve a foreign policy objective early in his term. The timeline is critical – an early deal is our base case. But if it falls through, then it could take the rest of Biden’s term in office, or longer, to forge a deal. Tensions would skyrocket over that period. The timeline is shown in Table 1. The US has identified April or May as the time when Iran will reach “breakout” capability, i.e. produce enough highly enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb. The Israelis, for their part, estimate that breakout phase will be reached in August – the same month Rouhani is set to step down. Both the US and Israel view breakout as a red line, though there is some room for interpretation. Table 1Can Lame Duck Rouhani Salvage US Deal For Legacy By August? The option of rejoining the old deal with Rouhani as a scapegoat will end when Rouhani exits in August. The next Iranian president is unlikely to repeat Rouhani’s mistake of pinning his administration on a promise from the Americans that could be revoked as early as January 20, 2025. The next Iranian president will be a nationalist or hardliner. Opinion shows that the public looks most favorably upon the firebrand ex-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or the hardline candidate from 2017 Ebrahim Raisi. Another possible candidate is Hossein Dehghan, a brigadier general. The least favorable political figures are the reformists like Rouhani (Chart 15). Chart 15Iran’s Next President Will Be Hawkish We cannot vouch for the quality of these opinion polls but they are corroborated by other polls we have seen and they make sense with what we know and have observed in recent years. Apparently the public has turned its back on the dream of greater economic opening, with self-sufficiency making a comeback in the face of US sanctions (Chart 16). The regime will promote this attitude in advance of the leadership transition as it must be prepared to conduct a smooth succession even under the worst-case scenario of sanctions or war. Chart 16Iran Preparing For Supreme Leader’s Succession Chart 17Nuclear Bomb Key To Regime Survival The hitch is that Iran is interested in rejoining the deal it signed in 2015, not a grander deal. It will not sign an expanded deal that covers its regional militant proxies and ballistic missile program or requires irreversible denuclearization. The Supreme Leader has witnessed that an active nuclear weapon program and ballistic missile program provide the surest guarantees of regime survival over the long haul. The contrasting cases of Libya and North Korea illustrate the point (Chart 17). Libya gave up its nuclear program and weapons of mass destruction in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 only to see the regime collapse in 2011 and leader Muammar Gaddafi die under NATO military pressure. By contrast, North Korea refused to give up its nuclear and missile programs and repeatedly cut deals with the US that served only to buy time and ease sanctions, and today North Korea possesses an estimated 30-45 nuclear weapons deliverable through multiple platforms. Leader Kim Jong Un has used this leverage to bargain with the great powers. The lesson for Iran could not be clearer: a short-term deal with the Americans may buy time and a reprieve from sanctions. But total, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization means regime suicide. The Biden administration would prefer to create a much more robust deal rather than suffer the criticism of rejoining the 2015 deal, given its flaws and that the first set of deadlines in 2025 is only four years away. But Biden cannot possibly reconstruct the P5+1 coalition of countries to force Iran into a grander bargain in the context of US-Russia and US-China tensions. The sacrifices that would be necessary to bring Russia and China on board would not be worth it. Therefore Biden’s solution will be to rejoin the existing deal plus an Iranian promise to enter negotiations on a more comprehensive deal in future. The Iranians can accept this option since it serves their purpose of buying time without making irreversible concessions on their nuclear and missile programs. Israel then becomes the sticking point, as Iranian officials have said that the US rejoining the original 2015 deal would be a “calamity” and unacceptable. The Israeli government is studying options for military action in the event that Iran reaches nuclear breakout. However, the Israeli election on March 23 will determine the fate of Benjamin Netanyahu and his government’s hawkish approach to Iran. A change of government in Israel would likely bring the US and Israel into line on concluding a deal with Iran so as to avoid military conflict for the time being. If Netanyahu wins, yet the US and Iran fall back into compliance with the 2015 deal (Table 2), then Iran is still limiting its nuclear capabilities through 2025, obviating the need for a unilateral Israeli strike in the near term. Israel will not launch a unilateral strike except as a last resort, as it fears permanent alienation from its greatest security guarantor, the United States. Table 2Iran’s Compliance (And Non-Compliance) With The Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action If a deal cannot be put together by the time Rouhani steps down then the risk of conflict will increase as there will not be a prospect of a short-term fix. A much longer diplomatic arc will be required as Iran would draw out negotiations and the US would have to court allies to pressure Iran. The US and/or Israel could conduct sabotage or air strikes to set back the Iranian nuclear program. It is possible that the Iranian leadership or the increasingly powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps could overplay their hand in the belief that the US has no stomach for waging war. While it is true that the US public is war-weary, it is also true that that attitude would change overnight in the event of a national humiliation or attack. Investment Takeaways The Trump administration drew a hard line on nuclear proliferation. Trump’s defeat marks a softening in the US line regarding proliferation. This does not mean that the Biden administration will be ineffective – it could be even more effective with a more flexible approach – but it does mean that nuclear aspirants currently feel less pressure to make major concessions. This will hold at least until Biden demonstrates that he too can impose maximum pressure. Hence nuclear and missile tests will go up in the near term – as will various countries’ demonstrations of credible threats and red lines. The global economic recovery will strengthen oil producers by giving them greater government revenues with which to stabilize their domestic politics and restart foreign policy initiatives. The global oil price is reasonably correlated with international conflicts involving oil producers (Chart 18). With rising oil revenues, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and others will be emboldened to pursue their national interests. Chart 18Oil Price And Global Conflict Go Hand In Hand While the Biden administration’s end-game is a nuclear deal with Iran, the period between now and the conclusion of a deal will see an increase rather than a decrease in tensions and tit-for-tat military strikes across the region. Unexpected cutoffs of oil supplies and a risk premium in the oil price will be injected first, as we have argued. When a deal is visible on the horizon then oil prices face a downside risk, due to the resumption of Iranian oil exports and any loss of OPEC 2.0 discipline. It is possible that this moment is already upon us. This report shows a clear path to a US-Iran deal by August. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken is reaching out to the Iranians. Saudi Arabia has recently announced that it will not continue with large production cuts. Russian oil officials have argued that the global market is balanced and production cuts are no longer necessary.5 But given that the Russians and Saudis fought an oil market share war as recently as last year, it is not clear that a collapse in OPEC 2.0 discipline is imminent. What will be the market impact if hostilities revive in anticipation of a deal? Or worse, if a deal cannot be achieved and a much longer period of US-Iran conflict opens up for Biden’s term in office? Table 3 provides a list of major geopolitical incidents and crises in the Middle East since the Yom Kippur war. We look at the S&P500’s peak and trough within the three months before and after each crisis. The median drawdown is 8% and the market has usually recovered within one month. Twelve months later the S&P is up by 12%. Table 3Stock Market Reaction To Middle East Geopolitical Crises Table 4 shows a shortened list of the same incidents with the impact on the trade-weighted dollar, which is notable in the short run but is only persistent in the long run in the case of full-fledged wars like the first and second Persian Gulf wars. Table 4US Dollar Falls On Middle East Geopolitical Crises The stock market impact can last for a year if the crisis coincides with a bear market and recession. Middle Eastern crises tend to occur at the height of business cycles when economic activity is running hot, inflationary pressures are high, and governments feel confident enough in their economic foundation to take foreign policy risks. The Yom Kippur war and first oil shock initiated a recession in 1973. The first Iraq war also coincided with the onset of a recession. The terrorist attack on the USS Cole occurred near the height of the Dotcom bubble and was followed by the 2001 recession. The 2019 Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq refinery also occurred at the peak of the cycle. More analogous to the situation today are crises that occurred in the early stages of the global cycle. The Arab Spring and related events in 2011 coincided with a period of market weakness that lasted for most of the year as the aftershocks of the Great Recession rippled across the emerging world. This scenario is relevant in 2021 and especially 2022, as global stimulus wears off and governments strive to navigate the deceleration in growth. Middle Eastern instability could compound that problem. The chief risk in the coming years would be a failure to resolve the Iranian question followed by a US-Iran or Israel-Iran conflict that generates instability across the Middle East. Such a catastrophe could cause major energy supply shock that would short-circuit the global economy. History shows this risk is more likely to come late in the cycle rather than early but the above analysis indicates that a failure of the Biden administration to conclude a deal this year could lead to a multi-year escalation in strategic tensions with a new hawkish Iranian president. That path, in turn, could bring forward the time frame of a major war and supply shock. The Iranians have taken a hawkish turn, are fortifying their regime for the future, and will reject total denuclearization. The US is fundamentally less interested in the region and thus susceptible to continued foreign policy incoherence. The Israelis are just capable of taking military action on their own in the event of impending Iranian nuclear weaponization. These points suggest that the risk of war with Iran is non-trivial, even though a US-Iran deal is the base case. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See Sun Yu and Demetri Sevastopulo, "China targets rare earth export curbs to hobble US defence industry," Financial Times, February 15, 2021, ft.com. 2 For the US response to the Erbil attack see Jim Garamone, "Austin Pleased With Discussions With NATO Leaders," Department of Defense News, February 17, 2021, defense.gov. 3 For example, Biden is unlikely to withdraw precipitously from the region, including Afghanistan, as Trump intended, especially as long as he is in a high-stakes negotiation with Iran. 4 Ruth Igielnik and Kim Parker, "Majorities of U.S. veterans, public say the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were not worth fighting," Pew Research, July 10, 2019, pewresearch.org. 5 See Benoit Faucon and Summer Said, "Saudi Arabia Set to Raise Oil Output Amid Recovery in Prices," Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2021, wsj.com; Yuliya Fedorinova and Olga Tanas, "Global Oil Markets Are Now Balanced, Russia’s Novak Says," Bloomberg, February 14, 2021, Bloomberg.com.
Highlights Health care remains a top priority of the Democratic Party even though it is flying under the radar at the moment. Health care embodies the shift from small government to big government. While the 2021 budget reconciliation will hit Big Pharma and expand Medicaid, the 2022 reconciliation will seek a public health insurance option and Medicare role in price negotiations. If forced to choose between health care and climate change priorities, Democrats will choose health care. It is a bigger vote-winner. Stay short managed health care relative to the S&P 500. Go long health care facilities and equipment relative to the rest of the health sector. Feature The US Senate acquitted former President Donald Trump on a vote of 57-43 on February 13. No one was hanged.1 The trial was not economically or financially significant except insofar as it underscored peak US political polarization, US distraction from the global stage, and the extent of divisions within the Republican Party. Equity market volatility melted away as stocks surged higher on the generally positive backdrop of COVID vaccines and stimulus. Seven Republicans joined Democrats in voting to convict the former president of “incitement to insurrection.” Trump’s performance was worse than Bill Clinton’s but better than Andrew Johnson’s, though neither Clinton nor Johnson saw defections from their own party (Chart 1). The Republicans’ internal differences are serious enough to hobble them in the 2022 or 2024 elections but it is too soon to draw any hard conclusions. The Democratic agenda is also capable of bringing Republicans back together. Meanwhile the maximum of seven Republican defectors shows that it will be extremely difficult for Democrats to get 10 Republicans to join them in passing any controversial legislation in the Senate (Table 1). Hence the filibuster will remain in jeopardy over the long run if not in the short run. Also, in 2022, the Democrats have a chance to pick up seats in Pennsylvania and North Carolina. Chart 1Trump’s Acquittal And Historic Impeachment Results Table 1The Seven Senate Republicans Who Defected From Trump Biden’s Agenda After The American Rescue Plan Democrats are plowing forward with the first of two budget reconciliation bills, which enables them to pass legislation with a simple majority in the Senate. They hope to pass President Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan by mid-March, when unemployment benefits expire under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020. The final sum might be a bit less than this headline number. The second budget reconciliation bill, for fiscal year 2022, will be passed in the autumn or next spring and will contain anywhere from $4 trillion to $8 trillion worth of additional spending on health care, child care, infrastructure, and green projects over a ten-year period (Chart 2). This number will be watered down in negotiation as the pandemic subsides and the aura of crisis dies down, reducing the willingness of moderate Democrats to vote for anything controversial. But investors should not doubt Biden’s agenda at this stage. If there is anything we know about the reconciliation process it is that the ruling party will get what it wants. Investors should plan accordingly: the output gap will be closed sooner than expected and inflationary pressures will build faster than expected, even though it will take a while for the labor market to heal. Chart 2Biden’s Agenda AFTER The American Rescue Plan This policy combination of “loose fiscal, loose monetary” policy continues to drive stocks higher (and the dollar lower) despite the misgivings we noted about underrated geopolitical risks (Chart 3). A critical question is when the Fed will normalize monetary policy. This is not an apolitical question. Fed chair Jerome Powell’s term ends in February of 2022. He may contemplate tapering asset purchases prior to that date, causing troubles in the equity market, but actual tapering is more likely to occur in 2022, in the view of our US Bond Strategist Ryan Swift. Powell would only taper in 2022 if he is forced to do so by an ironclad policy consensus precipitated by robust inflation and possibly financial instability concerns. This timing gives President Biden an opportunity to nominate an ultra-dovish Fed chair. Rate hikes are entirely possible in 2022 but our political bias implies they are unlikely before 2023 (unless an ironclad consensus develops that they are necessary). Even in 2023, an ultra-dove will be reluctant to hike, depending on the context. And rate hikes are virtually off limits in 2024, at least until after the November election. This political timeline reinforces the view that the Fed will not be hiking anytime soon and investors should prepare for inflation risks to surprise to the upside over the coming years. Chart 3"Easy Fiscal, Easy Monetary" Policy Combination The Senate parliamentarian has not yet ruled whether a federal minimum wage hike to $15 per hour can be included in the bill. Biden has accepted it may be cut but his party will push it through if possible. Last week we found that a higher minimum wage would not have a dramatic macroeconomic impact. Still, wages will rise in the coming years due to the cumulative effect of the Democratic Party’s policies. Higher wages, taxes, and regulatory hurdles will cut into corporate profits. But the passage of a higher minimum wage today would not in itself be a negative catalyst for equities. Rather, we would expect the rally to take a breather once the first reconciliation bill is finished (next week or in the coming weeks), since it will bring wage hikes, rate hikes, and tax hikes more clearly into view on the investment horizon. Unlike minimum wages, there is little controversy over whether budget reconciliation can be used to change the health care system. This was done in 2010 as the second critical part to President Barack Obama’s Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). Hence Biden is highly likely to get his health agenda passed, which is largely an agenda of entrenching and expanding Obamacare. That is, as long as he prioritizes health care above other structural reforms like climate change. We think he will. In the rest of this report we look at Biden’s health care policy and the implications for US financial markets. Biden’s Health Care Policy Health care has been a top priority of the Democrats since 1992 yet they have repeatedly lost control of the agenda due to surprise Republican victories in 2000 and 2016. Republicans expanded Medicare under Bush but then failed to repeal and replace Obamacare under Trump. Now Democrats have only the narrowest of majorities in the House and Senate and will push hard to solidify and build on Obamacare. There is a low chance that they will leave this issue unsettled under the Biden administration. If new obstacles arise, more political capital will be spent to secure health care reform at the expense of other policies on the agenda. COVID-19 reinforces the Democrats’ focus on health care. The US has seen around 1,500 deaths per million people, making it one of the worst performers amid the crisis, comparable to the UK and Italy (Chart 4). Yet COVID is only the latest in a line of US public health failings and it is important to put COVID into perspective. For example, among US adults aged 25-44 years old, all-cause excess mortality from March to July last year was about 11,899 more than expected. By contrast, during the same period in 2018, there were 10,347 unintentional deaths due to opioids (Chart 5).2 In other words, the COVID crisis last year was comparable to the opioid crisis in magnitude, at least for middle-aged people. Obviously COVID has taken a terrible toll and is a more deadly disease for the old and the sick. The point is that the public’s wrath over poor public health and the US government’s ineffectiveness is well established. A pandemic was foreseeable, and foreseen, yet not prepared for, and it came on top of the opioid crisis and the debate about 30 million Americans who lack health insurance. The Biden administration has the intention and the capability to address these issues. Chart 4US Handling Of COVID-19 Left Much To Be Desired Chart 5Opioid Crisis Versus COVID Crisis The structural problem is well-known: The US spends more than other countries on health care but achieves worse results (Charts 6A & 6B). When workers get fired they lose health care, as insurance is tied to employment. Those whose employers do not provide health care or who are unemployed count among the ranks of the roughly 30 million uninsured. This number has fallen from its peak at 47 million in 2010 when Obamacare was enacted but has crept upward again since Trump’s attempt to dismantle that law and the lockdowns of 2020 (Chart 7). This is a driver of popular discontent that has proven again and again to generate votes, including in key swing states. Chart 6AThe US Spends More On Health Care … Chart 6B… But Sees Worse Avoidable Mortality Chart 7Rising Number Of Uninsured Even Pre-COVID A range of public opinion polling over many years shows that health care is a close second or third to the economy and jobs in voter priorities. Voters care more about COVID and health care than they do about climate change and the environment (Chart 8, first panel). Chart 8Public Opinion On Biden’s Priorities: Jobs, Health, Then Climate Another important takeaway from this opinion polling is that voters could not care less about budget deficits. Big spending solutions are all the rage (Chart 8, second panel). The Biden administration is prioritizing economic recovery and the pandemic response but will also pursue its health care reforms. If this policy requires a tradeoff with infrastructure and renewables, we would expect health care to get the greater attention. Over the long run Obamacare can be replaced but not repealed. The law is getting more popular over time and entitlements get harder to repeal over time. Slightly more than half of voters have a favorable view of the law and only 34% have an unfavorable view. Only 29%of voters want to repeal or scale back the law while about 62% want to build on it or keep it as it is (Chart 9). Underscoring this polling is the fact that the law was modeled on a Republican plan and even Trump adopted several of the most popular provisions: requiring insurance coverage for patients with preexisting conditions and slapping caps on pharmaceutical prices through import and pricing schemes. The Supreme Court has ruled Obamacare constitutional and is not expected to change that ruling this spring. It could object to the individual mandate – the most controversial part of Obamacare that required each person to pay a tax penalty if they did not purchase health insurance. But if parts of the law are stricken, Democrats have the votes to patch it up or provide an alternative. Chart 9Obamacare Has Grown On American Public Biden simultaneously shows that Democrats rejected the most popular alternative to Obamacare – “Medicare for All,” or single-payer government-provided health care – at least for the current presidential cycle. Medicare for All was co-sponsored by Vice President Kamala Harris and is still a long-term goal of the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. However, voters do not like the proposal when asked about its practical consequences (Chart 10). In the Democratic primary, only Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren argued for wholesale revolution in US health care that would see private insurance cease to exist and 176 million voters moved onto a public health system. Sanders’s plan would have cost an estimated $31 trillion, increasing the budget deficit by $13 trillion over 10 years, and would have encouraged the overuse of medical services due to the absence of a co-pay or fixed cost. This idea will not vanish but the Biden administration’s likely success in expanding Obamacare will lead the party to focus on other things (e.g. climate change). Chart 10Insufficient Public Demand For Government-Provided Health Care (For Now) Biden’s big proposal is to add a public insurance option that would exist alongside current private insurance options. This idea was originally part of Obamacare but was removed during negotiations – precisely because the Democrats eschewed the use of budget reconciliation (again, not a constraint this time).3 The Biden plan is estimated to cost $2.25 trillion over 10 years and includes larger subsidies, the ability of workers to choose whether they want their employer-provided plan or the public option, automatic enrollment, a lower age of eligibility for Medicare (from 65 to 60), drug price caps, and various other provisions (Table 2). Table 2Biden’s Health Care Plan Medicare, a giant consumer, would be able to negotiate drug prices directly with companies to drive down the price. Tax hikes on high-income earners and capital gains would pay for Biden’s policy. With public backing and full Democratic control of Congress, there is little that can stop Biden from achieving this health care policy, other than a change in direction from his party, which we do not expect. The first budget reconciliation only contains small parts of the Biden agenda, such as incentives for states to expand Medicaid under Obamacare and a reduction in Medicaid rebates for drug manufacturers.4 The second budget reconciliation process will have to cover health care and tax hikes. But the consensus view is that the second reconciliation will focus on infrastructure and green energy. This is a conflict of priorities that will have to be resolved. The research above suggests it will be resolved in favor of health care. This would leave the regular budget process as the means to advance infrastructure and green projects. Macro Impact Of Biden’s Health Care Policy The great health care debate over the past decade reflected the broad post-Cold War debate in the US over the role of government in the economy. It centered on whether government involvement should increase to expand health insurance coverage. Although private US health care spending accounts for 31% of total health care spending, and is thus larger than either Medicare (21%) or Medicaid (16%), the government has control of 44% of spending when all of its functions are added together. This share is set to increase now that the debate has been decided in favor of Big Government (at least for now). Future administrations might carve out more space for private choice and competition in health care but a permanent step-up in government involvement and regulation has occurred given the above points about Obamacare’s irrevocability. What are the macro consequences of such a change? The imposition of Obamacare may have contributed to the sluggish economic recovery in the wake of the Great Recession but the case is hard to examine objectively because the tax penalties only took effect in 2015-16 and then a new administration ceased implementation in 2017. In 2015 the Congressional Budget Office estimated that repealing Obamacare would increase the budget deficit by $353 billion over a ten year period but that it would also increase GDP by an average of 0.7% per year during the latter end of full implementation, thus boosting revenues and producing a net $137 billion increase in the budget deficit over ten years.5 In other words, Obamacare marginally tightened fiscal policy and encouraged some workers to cut their hours or stop working due to expanded subsidies, tax credits, and Medicaid eligibility.6 Repealing it would have reduced the tax burden on corporations and reduced the subsidy benefits to households but possibly with a slight boost to growth (Chart 11). Going forward, Biden’s policies are adjustments rather than a total overhaul but they would ostensibly add $2.25 trillion in spending and $1.4 trillion in revenue, resulting in a negative impact on the budget deficit (fiscal loosening) of $850 billion. The implication is that Biden’s plan would increase rather than decrease aggregate demand, albeit marginally in an era of already gigantic deficits. It would also remove some labor supply and eventually drag on GDP growth. Yet the impact of these effects is still uncertain given the general context of loose fiscal and loose monetary policy, the reduction in the number of uninsured people, and the potentially positive second-order effects of this increase in the social safety net for low-income families with high marginal propensities to consume. The bottom line is that the macro effects of Biden’s health plan will not be known for many years but the headline effect in the short run is an incremental addition to an already extremely loose fiscal policy setting. Chart 11Macro Effects Of Obamacare Repeal The negative effects will largely fall on high-income earners, capital gains earners, and corporations who will provide the revenue to pay for the plan. The private health insurance industry faced an existential threat from the Sanders plan but it still faces a loss of customers and earnings from the Biden plan. The major difference between Obamacare and Bidencare is that Obamacare forced insurance companies to provide a basic insurance option to the public but did not offer a public option to compete with them. Therefore their customer base increased albeit at a lower profit. Whereas Biden’s plan will create a public competitor that will siphon off customers from private insurance. Biden proposed giving workers this choice anytime but in the presidential debates suggested there would be limits. Either way private insurers stand to lose customers over time. This is not a major political constraint given that Big Insurance gets little sympathy from the public but it will have a negative impact on innovation and productivity in the health sector. Meanwhile Medicare would reimburse hospitals, clinics, and drug providers less for their services and goods. This would weigh on the profitability of small and private medical outfits and favor large and public providers that receive government subsidies and can stomach higher costs. It would also take a toll on Big Pharma and biotech sectors which have operated in a lucrative environment of low taxes, low regulation, and sizable pricing power. The US government has enormous negotiating power in the market, especially over home care, hospitals, nursing homes, and prescription drugs. Private and public investment are roughly evenly split, with public money dominating health care research and private money dominating structures and equipment. The government accounts for about 40% of total drug spending and both political parties believe this influence should be used to keep costs down, as public opinion is increasingly dissatisfied with high drug costs.7 There is a lot more to be said about the US health care system. A risk of Biden’s health reform is that it will increase the demand for health services without arranging for consummate increases in supply. In this sense it is inflationary. Investment Takeaways Health care stocks and each of the health care sub-sectors – pharmaceuticals, biotech, managed health care, facilities, and equipment – underperformed the S&P500 index amid the passage of Obamacare from March 23 to November 20, 2010. Within the sector, managed health care (health insurance) and biotech suffered most when the legislation first hit while facilities and equipment suffered most over the whole legislative episode. Once the law took full effect in 2014-15, equipment and managed health care outperformed, facilities were flat, and pharma and biotech underperformed. A look at the performance of the health care sector relative to the S&P 500 over the past 13 years shows that the sector rallied on President Obama’s victories in 2008, fell during the passage of Obamacare, staged a recovery that continued through the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the new law in June of 2012, and then dropped off (Chart 12 A). Health stocks benefited from the global macro backdrop from 2011-15. After 2015, when Obamacare took full effect, the business cycle entered its later stage, and populism emerged (with Sanders threatening a government takeover and Trump firing up the cyclical economy), health care stocks underperformed the market. Chart 12AHealth Sector's Response To Obamacare Saga Subsequent rallies have occurred, notably on the outbreak of COVID-19, but have not been sustainable. When Republicans failed to repeal Obamacare, when various crises gave defensive plays a tailwind, when Biden won the Democratic nomination over Sanders or Warren, and when the pandemic arose, the sector surged, often due to risk aversion in financial markets. In the end the negative trend reasserted itself as the combination of rising risk sentiment and policy headwinds outweighed the underlying demographic tailwind for earnings as society aged. Since the Democratic sweep of government in the 2020 elections the sector is testing new lows in relative performance. Pharmaceuticals charted a similar course to the overall health sector but never regained their pre-Obamacare peak in relative performance. They have underperformed again and again since the rise of Bernie Sanders and are today touching new lows (Chart 12B). Chart 12BBig Pharma's Response To Obamacare Saga A closer look at the sector since the 2020 election and especially the Democratic victory in the Senate shows that it continues to underperform the broad market. Facilities are the most resilient, pharma and biotech are trying to find a bottom, and equipment and managed health care have sold off. Relative to the health care sector, equipment and facilities are the outperformers but, again, pharma and biotech are trying to bottom (Chart 13). These results make sense as Biden’s biggest policy impact will be to stimulate demand for health care facilities and equipment while constraining profits for Big Insurance and Big Pharma via the public insurance option and allowing Medicare to negotiate drug prices. Thus equipment and facilities benefit from the political environment, pharma and biotech should be monitored to see if they break down to new lows on the passage of legislation, and managed health care gets the short end of the stick. Our US Equity Strategy service is neutral on the sector as a whole, overweight equipment, and underweight pharma. Chart 13Health Care Sector Response To Biden's Democratic Sweep Putting it all together, health care stocks are good candidates for a short-term, tactical bounce when the exuberant stock rally suffers a correction but they are not yet candidates for strategic investments. They are not likely to find a bottom until Biden’s policies are passed, or the pro-cyclical macro backdrop has changed. Biden’s policies are high priority for his party and face low legislative and political hurdles to passage, yet will have a huge impact on the relevant industries – undercutting the private health insurance customer base and capping the profits of America’s drug makers. These changes will have long-term ramifications so they are not likely to be fully discounted yet. Previously health care firms had huge pricing power – they could charge whatever they wanted while they did not face the full might of the government in setting prices – but going forward that will change. Biotech and pharma have large profit margins that are exposed to this policy shift so they are exposed to further downside – we would not be bottom-feeders. Moreover pharmaceuticals make up 28% of the health sector while biotech makes up 13%, so that these sectors will weigh down the whole sector. One would think that health care would outperform during a global pandemic – and most sectors did see a big bounce during the height of the COVID-19 outbreak. But the pandemic has created the impetus for a stimulus splurge that has fired up the cyclical parts of the economy. It has also underscored the industry’s public role and undercut its profit-making capabilities, not least by producing a Democratic sweep bent on improving US health outcomes – at the expense of US health industry profits. In sum, from a tactical point of view, health care stocks are well-positioned for a near-term rally in relative performance but from a strategic point of view they continue to face policy headwinds and should be underweighted relative to the broad S&P 500. Tactically, stay short the managed health care sub-sector relative to the S&P 500 (Chart 14). Strategically, go long health care facilities and equipment relative to the health care sector. Chart 14Health Stocks Outlook Under Biden Administration Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Appendix Table A1APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A1BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A1CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3Biden’s Cabinet Position Appointments Footnotes 1 During the election crisis [of 1876], Kentucky Democrat Henry Watterson urged that “a hundred thousand petitioners” and “ten thousand unarmed Kentuckians” go to Washington to see that justice was done. Years later, when he was sitting next to [Ulysses S.] Grant at a dinner party, Watterson told him, “I have a bone to pick with you.” “Well, what is it?” asked Grant. “You remember in 1876,” said Watterson, “when it was said I was coming to Washington at the head of a regiment, and you said you would hang me if I came.” “Oh, no,” cried Grant, “I never said that.” “I am glad to hear it,” smiled Watterson. “I like you better than ever.” “But,” added Grant drily, “I would, if you had come.” See Paul F. Boller, Jr, Presidential Campaigns: From George Washington To George W. Bush (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004 [1984]), p. 141. 2 See Jeremy Samuel Faust, Harlan M. Krumholz, and Chengan Du, “All-Cause Excess Mortality and COVID-19-Related Mortality Among US Adults Aged 25-44 Years, March-July 2020,” Journal of the American Medical Association, December 16, 2020, jamanetwork.com. 3 The death of Senator Edward Kennedy forced the Democrats to use reconciliation for the second part of President Obama’s health care reform, the Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. 4 Currently the Medicaid rebate cap is set at 100% of the cost of making a drug. Other provisions would include a boost for rural health care services (a partial reallocation of headline COVID relief funds) and an expansion of Obamacare tax credits and subsidies for unemployed workers to keep their former employer-provided insurance. These are mainly COVID relief measures rather than aspects of Biden’s long-term health agenda. See Julie Rovner, “KHN’s ‘What the Health?’: All About Budget Reconciliation,” Kaiser Family Foundation, February 11, 2021, khn.org; see also Nick Hut, “A look at some of the healthcare-specific provisions in the pending COVID-19 relief legislation,” Healthcare Financial Management Association, February 10, 2021, hfma.org. 5 For the CBO’s original report on repeal, see “Budgetary and Economic Effects of Repealing the Affordable Care Act,” Congressional Budget Office, June 19, 2015, cbo.gov. More recently see Paul N. Van de Water, “Affordable Care Act Still Reduces Deficits, Despite Tax Repeals,” Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, January 9, 2020, cbpp.org. 6 See BCA Global Investment Strategy, “The Fed’s Dilemma,” May 12, 2017 and “Four Key Questions On The 2018 Global Growth Outlook,” January 5, 2018, bcaresearch.com. Regarding the debate around Obamacare, promoters highlight the recovery in US growth and jobs – including full-time jobs and small-business jobs – by 2015. Critics say the recovery would have been stronger if not for the law. See e.g. Casey B. Mulligan, “Has Obamacare Been Good for the Economy?” Manhattan Institute, Issues Brief, June 27, 2016, manhattan-institute.org; Cathy Schoen, “The Affordable Care Act and the U.S. Economy: A Five-Year Perspective,” Commonwealth Fund, February 2016, commonwealthfund.org. 7 Republican Senator Chuck Grassley co-sponsored a bill with his Democratic counterpart Ron Wyden of Oregon that would penalize drug companies that raised drug prices faster than inflation. In a separate bill with Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota, he also proposed to prevent big name drug companies from paying generic drug-makers to delay the introduction of generics to the market. These bills were not debated on the main floor because then-Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell was unenthused about them but they exemplify the bipartisan consensus on government intervention to push down drug prices.
According to BCA Research’s US Political Strategy service, health care remains a top priority of the Democratic Party, which will hurt health care stocks. The health care debate over the past decade reflected the broad post-Cold War debate in the US over…
BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy service concludes that investors currently understate geopolitical risks. President Joe Biden faces imminent tests from China, Iran, and Russia. The phone conversation between Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping on February…