Inflation/Deflation
Highlights There is little risk that inflation will heat up over the next several months, … : Weak growth is more of a threat to the global economy than inflation. … which means the Fed won’t be in any hurry to take away this year’s rate cuts, … : We expect the Fed to leave the target fed funds rate alone for nearly all of 2020. … giving the economy plenty of opportunity to overheat: If trade tensions move to the back burner, and global manufacturing activity revives, the “insurance” rate cuts executed by the Fed and other central banks may turn out to have been unnecessary. The investment punch line is that accommodative monetary policy is likely to push asset prices and Treasury yields higher: Our revised Rates View Checklist supports going back to a below-benchmark duration stance over the tactical timeframe, in line with our cyclical view. Feature BCA researchers’ latest monthly view meeting opened with a discussion of whether inflation or deflation is the bigger risk to financial markets. Should investors be more concerned about signs of overheating or stalling growth? With inflation unable to get traction in any of the major economies, we all agreed that growth is the more critical unknown. An investor who gets the growth call right has the best chance of getting broad asset class positioning right, along with country, sector, duration, credit and currency tilts. While we continue to believe that there are more inflation pressures beneath the surface of the US economy than most investors realize, they are highly unlikely to manifest themselves any time soon. At today’s low-single-digit levels, inflation’s investment import is limited to its impact on monetary policy. Inflation expectations remain far below the levels that are consistent with the Fed’s inflation target (Chart 1), and the Fed is likely to keep policy easy until they adjust higher. Though it is uncertain just what levels of realized inflation, or inflation expectations, would trigger the Fed’s reaction function, we are confident that inflation will not be an issue in the coming year. Chart 1No Pressure To Remove Accommodation Chart 2Global Revival Ahead? We expect that global growth will surprise to the upside, pulling bond yields and risk asset prices higher. BCA’s global LEI bottomed earlier this year, and the diffusion index that leads directional moves in the LEI has turned sharply higher (Chart 2). The improvement is consistent with the easing in global financial conditions and the tentative détente in the trade war. Although we will not count on a completed “Phase I” agreement until it is signed, financial markets’ allergic reaction to trade tensions seems to have encouraged the White House to back off lest it undermine its re-election prospects. Interest Rates – Looking Back Figure 1Rates View Checklist We rolled out our Rates View Checklist a little over a year ago to systematize our interest rate analysis and to clarify the rationale underpinning our views1 (Figure 1). Detailing the key series we monitor to anticipate the future direction of rates helps clients think along with us while giving them the chance to adapt the framework for their own purposes. As we were starting from a position of recommending below-benchmark duration, the checklist was aimed at identifying and tracking the factors that could encourage us to become more constructive about Treasury bonds. We never did warm to duration on a cyclical basis, though we did turn tactically neutral in mid-August. Part of the reason was that we did not give enough weight to events outside of the US. Highly-rated, developed-market sovereign bonds are substitutes for one another, and there is a limit to how much currency-adjusted yields can deviate across countries. Very low to negative yields in the UK, France, Germany and Switzerland have exerted a magnetic pull on Treasury yields (Chart 3), and the different sovereigns should move in tandem going forward, with currency-hedged yields observing a tight range. Chart 3Birds Of A Feather The short end of the yield curve exerts considerable influence on rates across all maturities. Our US bond strategists’ golden rule of bond investing homes in on the deviation between actual and expected moves in the fed funds rate as the key determinant of duration positioning outcomes. Following their lead, our checklist is oriented around anticipating the Fed’s reaction to important incoming data. It seems to have done its job over the last year, highlighting the factors that drove the Fed to switch from dialing back accommodation to dialing it up. Although we never checked more than four of the eleven boxes in the checklist – Inverted Yield Curve, Sluggish Rise in Realized Inflation, Sluggish Rise in Inflation Breakevens and International Duress – those four boxes were enough to inspire the Fed’s dovish pivot. That pivot has so far encompassed three quarter-point rate cuts, pruning back the funds rate to 1.75% from 2.5%. It turns out that the key items in the checklist were the orientation of the yield curve; sluggish inflation expectations that the Fed worried could become “unanchored on the downside;” and the shadow of trade tensions that seem to have induced a global manufacturing recession, even if they have yet to infect the DM economies’ larger services sector. They tipped the scales for Fed policy and we will be especially alert to them going forward. Interest Rates – Looking Ahead Figure 2Revised Rates View Checklist While our interpretation of the checklist left something to be desired, we are convinced that the checklist approach is sound. We return to its framework for insight into the current rates outlook, after making a few tweaks to shore it up (Figure 2). Starting with Fed perceptions, there is still some daylight between our fed funds rate expectations and the market’s, as we think the Fed is done cutting, while the money market assigns a high probability to the possibility of one more cut (Chart 4). The combination of rate cuts and the rally in 10-year Treasury yields got the yield curve back to its typical upward-sloping orientation in October (Chart 5), so we can now uncheck the inverted curve box. We see the five-month inversion as a reason to be more vigilant, but given the unusually negative term premium, we are not treating it as a hard-and-fast sign of looming weakness. The money market has priced out all but one more rate cut, and the yield curve is no longer inverted, suggesting that recession fears are abating. Chart 4Looking For One More Cut Chart 5The Curve Is No Longer Inverted Chart 6Inflation Is Muted, ... We continue to check both of the sluggish inflation boxes. Realized inflation measures, headline and core, have slumped (Chart 6), and below-target inflation expectations remain a hot-button concern, judging by Fed speakers’ repeated references to them. The Fed has strapped itself to the mast with all its talk about inflation expectations, and it will not begin removing accommodation until inflation expectations revive. We cannot directly observe the output gap, but nearly 3% growth in 2018, and a rip-roaring labor market, offer solid evidence that it has closed and we leave its box unchecked. Labor market indicators unanimously point to the conclusion that monetary accommodation is not necessary. The unemployment rate is a full percentage point below the Fed’s and the CBO’s estimates of NAIRU. Ancillary indicators like the broader definition of unemployment including discouraged workers and involuntary part-time workers (Chart 7, top panel), and the openings (Chart 7, middle panel) and quits rates (Chart 7, bottom panel) from the JOLTS survey, testify to an extremely tight labor market. We expect that the pause in wage acceleration will prove temporary (Chart 8). Chart 7... Despite A Red-Hot Labor Market Chart 8Wage Gains Will Pick Up Again Chart 9No Overheating In The Real Economy With cyclical spending well short of past business cycle peaks (Chart 9), the real economy isn’t exerting any pressure on the Fed to intervene to choke off the expansion. (Although a modest pace of Fed hikes would support below-benchmark duration positioning, aggressive tightening to cut off overheating leads to recessions, and would favor long-maturity Treasuries.) We have removed the financial sector imbalances box because there has been no apparent follow through from Governor Brainard’s speech last September, which appeared to set the stage for tightening on the basis of frothy credit conditions. We maintain the international duress box, which is meant to alert us to an overseas crisis or near-crisis that could spark a flight to quality that depresses Treasury yields and/or inspires the Fed to pursue easier policy in an attempt to stave off contagion risks. Green shoots in manufact-uring, here and abroad, support the idea that growth outside the U.S. could be poised to accelerate. Chart 10Global Manufacturing Is Coming Back ... Chart 11... And US Manufacturing May Have Bottomed We add “Flagging Global Growth” to address the global growth blind spot that undermined our call last year. Our US Bond Strategy colleagues find that the Global Manufacturing PMI, the US ISM Manufacturing PMI and the CRB Raw Industrials Index are the global growth measures that exert the strongest influence on Treasury yields. The Global Manufacturing PMI has risen off its lows over the last three months and is within striking distance of getting back above the 50 contraction/expansion line, led by the US2 and China (Chart 10). The outlook for the US ISM Manufacturing PMI looks good on several counts. First, the comparatively modest manufacturing sector tends to move with the much larger services sector, and the sharp bounce in the Services PMI bodes well for the Manufacturing PMI (Chart 11, top panel). Within the manufacturing survey, New Export Orders’ leap back over 50 suggests that the global economy may have already seen the worst of the manufacturing weakness that has swept the rest of the world (Chart 11, bottom panel). The jury is still out on the CRB Raw Industrials-to-gold ratio (Chart 12, top panel), as industrial commodity prices have yet to show any spunk (Chart 12, bottom panel). Chart 12Commodities Have Yet To Turn Chart 13A Weaker Dollar Would Support Higher Rates With our trio of indicators mixed-to-positive on balance, we leave the global growth box unchecked. We have also added a dollar box to monitor when Treasury yields are drifting out of alignment with other sovereign yields. If the dollar and Treasury yields rise together, we would view the rise in yields as suspect and at risk of being reversed.3 There doesn’t appear to be any decoupling pressure now, as Treasury yields have risen while the dollar has bumped around in a narrow range (Chart 13, top panel), and bullish sentiment toward the dollar has cooled off, pointing the way to a currency-approved path to higher yields (Chart 13, bottom panel). Bottom Line: We check only two of the boxes in our revised rates checklist (Figure 2), supporting a below-benchmark duration stance. Investment Implications Like all investors, we hate to get anything wrong. We were wrong on rates, though, failing to see the potential for the 10-year Treasury yield to fall to 1.5%. The duration miss undermined results within the fixed income sleeve of our recommendations, as we didn’t take it off until the 10-year Treasury yield had fallen to 1.74% .4 We have modified our rates checklist to force ourselves to be more aware of the world beyond the US, but the available data still support below-benchmark duration positioning, and we now recommend going back to it over the tactical (0-3-month) timeframe. The date when monetary policy turns restrictive has been pushed out, and so have the dates when the bull markets in risk assets will end. We note that our overall asset allocation calls have performed well. Since we upgraded equities in our first 2019 report,5 the S&P 500 Total Return Index has gained 24% while our Treasury underweight, as proxied by the Bloomberg Barclays US Treasury Total Return Index, is up 7% (Chart 14, top panel). Since we upgraded spread product in late January,6 the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Investment Grade and High Yield Total Return Indexes are up 12% and 8%, respectively, versus the Treasury Index’s 7% (Chart 14, bottom panel). Chart 14Underweighting Treasuries Has Been The Way To Go The run-up to the Fed’s series of mid-cycle rate cuts doomed our duration call, but it has fortified the case for overweighting equities and spread product. We still expect the expansion, the equity bull market, and spread product’s long period of generating excess returns to die at the hands of the Fed. Now that the date when monetary policy settings become restrictive has been indefinitely delayed, the end-dates of the equity and credit bull markets have as well. We continue to recommend overweighting equities and spread product, and underweighting Treasuries. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the September 17, 2018 US Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “What Would It Take To Change Our Bearish Rates View?” available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The Global PMI is compiled from Markit’s individual country PMIs, so the chart shows the Markit US PMI instead of the more familiar ISM measure. 3 It the dollar were to rise significantly while Treasury yields rose faster than other DM sovereign yields, currency-adjusted Treasury yields would decouple from peer yields and arbitrage activity would likely bring them back down. 4 Please see the August 12, 2019 US Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “When The Facts Change,” available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see the January 7, 2019 US Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “What Now?” available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see the January 28, 2019 US Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Double Breaker,” available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Low and rapidly falling inflation accompanying extremely weak real growth constitute the current hazards to EM economies and their financial markets. Headline and core inflation in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan – the universe pertinent for EM bond…
Highlights Prevailing winds are still blowing in favor of the US dollar. Continue shorting a basket of EM currencies versus the greenback. Deflationary forces are gaining momentum in EM/China while inflationary pressures are accumulating in the US economy. The dollar will appreciate further, distributing inflationary pressures away from the US and into EM/China. Feature Our buy stop on the MSCI EM equity index at 1075 has not yet been triggered. Last week the EM index closed a hair short of this level. Our strategy remains intact: We continue to recommend caution and defensive positioning for EM investors, but will recommend playing the rally if the index breaks above this level. The fact that industrial metals and oil prices have failed to rally substantially even though the S&P 500 is making new highs gives us comfort that the Chinese industrial cycle is not experiencing a revival. Our buy stop on the MSCI EM equity index at 1075 has not yet been triggered. Absent a sustained recovery in the Chinese capital spending and rising commodities prices, EM equities and currencies will not be able to maintain their rebound. Chart I-1 illustrates that the total return on EM ex-China currencies (including the carry) correlates strongly with industrial metals prices. Similarly, EM share prices move in tandem with global materials stocks (Chart I-2). Chart I-1EM Currencies Correlate Strongly With Industrial Metals Prices Chart I-2EM Share Prices Move In Tandem With Global Materials Stocks The basis for these relationships is as follows: The majority of EM economies, and hence their share prices and exchange rates, are leveraged to China’s business cycle. The latter also drives industrial commodities prices, as the mainland accounts for 50% of global metals consumption. We elaborated on these relationships in our recent report titled EM: Perceptions Versus Reality. In this report, we examine the dichotomy between inflation in EM and US and discuss the macro rebalancing required and the implications for financial markets. Inflation: A Dichotomy Between EM… Low and rapidly falling inflation accompanying extremely weak real growth constitute the current hazards to EM economies and their financial markets: Headline and core inflation in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan1 – the universe pertinent for EM bond portfolios – are low and falling, justifying lower interest rates (Chart I-3). Consistently, aggregate nominal GDP growth in these economies is hovering close to its 2015 low (Chart I-4). Chart I-3EM: Inflation Is Low And Falling Chart I-4EM: Nominal GDP Is Subdued And Decelerating Chart I-5EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Money And Loan Growth Are Slowing In China, core consumer price inflation is at 1.5% and falling, and producer prices are declining. Even though many EM central banks have been cutting rates, narrow and broad money as well as bank loan growth are either weak or decelerating (Chart I-5). In brief, policy easing in these economies hasn’t yet revived money and credit growth. The reason why low nominal interest rates have not yet led to a recovery in money/credit is because real (inflation-adjusted) borrowing costs remain elevated. In addition, poor banking system health stemming from lingering non-performing loans – a legacy of the credit boom early this decade – has also hindered credit origination. Corroborating the fact that borrowing costs are high in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, interest rate and credit-sensitive sectors such as capital spending, real estate and discretionary consumer spending are all extremely weak. In particular, high-frequency data such as capital goods imports and car sales are shrinking (Chart I-6). Residential property markets are very sluggish in the majority of developing economies (Chart I-7). Chart I-6EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Credit-Sensitive Spending Is Shrinking Chart I-7Property Prices In Local Currency Terms Chart I-8Chinese Imports For Domestic Consumption And EM Exports Finally, the combined exports of EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan – which are correlated with mainland imports for domestic consumption – are shrinking (Chart I-8). Without a revival in Chinese domestic demand in general, and commodities in particular, EM exports will continue to languish. Bottom Line: Risks stemming from low and falling inflation in EM are rising. While central banks are cutting rates, they are behind the curve. For now, investors should not expect an imminent domestic demand recovery based on EM central bank interest rate cuts. …And The US In contrast to EM, investors and financial markets are complacent about inflation risks in the US. This is not to say that there is a risk of runaway inflation in the US. Our point is as follows: If US growth slows further, US inflation will subside. However, if US growth accelerates, consumer price inflation will surprise to the upside. Sectors such as capital spending, real estate and discretionary consumer spending are all extremely weak. US core consumer price inflation has been trending upwards in the past several years, consistent with a positive and widening output gap (Chart I-9, top panel). The average of six core consumer price inflation measures – core CPI, core PCE, trimmed mean CPI, trimmed PCE, market-based core PCE, and median CPI – is slightly above 2% and looks to be headed higher (Chart I-9, bottom panel). US unit labor costs are rising faster than the corporate price deflator (Chart I-10, top panel). A tight labor market will translate to robust wage growth. Chart I-9Barring Slowdown, US Core Inflation Will Rise Further Chart I-10Beware Of A US Profit Margin Squeeze With corporate profit margins already shrinking (Chart I-10, bottom panel) and consumer spending robust, companies will try to pass on higher costs to consumers. Hence, barring a slowdown in US consumer spending, consumer price inflation will likely rise. If global growth recovers, the dollar will sell off and US manufacturing will revive. Provided these two factors have been counteracting inflationary pressures in the US, their reversal will allow inflation to rise. Bottom Line: Underlying core inflation in the US has been drifting higher. Unless growth slows, inflation will surprise to the upside. Macro Rebalancing: In The Dollar’s Favor Bond yields and exchange rates often act as shock absorbers and re-balancing mechanisms for the global economy. The agility and corresponding adjustments of these financial variables assure a more stable real global economy. Given the current inflationary pressures in the US amid deflationary forces in EM, one of the ways in which this adjustment process will manifest itself is in the form of US dollar appreciation versus EM currencies. A strong greenback will redistribute inflationary pressures away from the US and into EM. An analogy for this adjustment process is the role of wind in rebalancing air pressure around the globe. When air pressure in location A is higher than in location B, the air moves from location A to location B, causing wind. This allows for a rebalancing of air pressure around the earth. US core consumer price inflation has been trending upwards in the past several years. When air pressure differences are substantial, winds become forceful – potentially to the point of causing damage. In a nutshell, this adjustment could come at the cost of strong winds, or even a storm. Global currency markets play a similar role to wind. A strong greenback will help cap US inflation by dampening activity and employment in America’s manufacturing sector. Slumping manufacturing will moderate activity in the service sector, as well as slowdown aggregate income and spending growth. In turn, weakening currencies will help reflate EM economies by mitigating the negative impact of lower exports in general and commodities prices in particular. EM economies need an external boost, especially now when their banking systems are in hibernation mode and China is not boosting its demand to the same extent it did during downturns since 2008. A caveat is in order here: In the case of many EMs, currency deprecation will initially hurt growth. The reason is that companies and banks in many EMs still hold large amounts of US dollar debt (Chart I-11). As the dollar appreciates, the cost of foreign debt servicing will escalate, prompting them to reduce corporate spending and bank lending. Hence, wind could turn into a storm. All in all, we continue to bet on EM currency depreciation, regardless of the direction of US bond yields. The basis is as follows: Contrary to widespread consensus, EM exchange rates correlate more strongly with commodities prices – please refer to Chart I-1 on page 1 – than US bond yields as shown in Chart I-12. Chart I-11EM External Debt Is A Risk If EM Currencies Depreciate Chart I-12EM Currencies And US Bond Yields: No Stable Relationship Emerging Asian currencies correlate with their export prices and the global trade cycle. Neither global trade activity nor Asian export prices are recovering (Chart I-13). Therefore, the recent bounce in EM currencies is not sustainable. Given the current inflationary pressures in the US amid deflationary forces in EM, one of the ways in which this adjustment process will manifest itself is in the form of US dollar appreciation versus EM currencies. Could it be that US inflationary pressures are dampened by deflationary tendencies originating from EM/China, producing a benign (goldilocks) scenario for financial markets? It is possible but not likely in the case of EM financial markets. Exchange rates hold the key to all EM asset classes. If the US dollar continues drifting higher – which is our bet – it will stifle the performance of EM equity, local bonds and credit markets (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Asian Export Prices And Container Freight Herald Weaker Regional Currencies Chart I-14Trade-Weighted Dollar And EM Share Prices Are Still Correlated Further, Box I-1 on page 10 discusses the 2008 clash between inflationary forces in EM and deflation in the US. Bottom Line: We continue to recommend playing the following EM currencies on the short side versus the dollar: ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, KRW and PHP. We are also short CNY versus the dollar. For allocations within EM equity, domestic bonds and sovereign credit, please refer to our investment recommendations on pages 16-17. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Box 1 Inflationary + Deflationary Forces = Goldilocks? Will inflationary pressures in the US be offset by disinflation in EM, resulting in a goldilocks outcome globally? A goldilocks period is one in which strong growth is accompanied by moderate inflation. It is possible, but in the global macro world inflation + deflation does not always equal goldilocks. In other words in global macro, (1-1) does not always equal zero. For instance, an inflation dichotomy was present in the first half of 2008. Back then, the US economy was already in recession, with acute deflationary pressures stemming from the deflating housing and credit bubbles. In turn, EM growth was still rampant and inflationary pressures were acute. In fact, in the period between March and mid-July of 2008, US and global bond yields were climbing on the back of rising worries about inflation. In retrospect, such an inflation dichotomy between the US and EM did not result in a goldilocks environment, but occurred on the precipice of the largest deflationary black hole in the post-war period. In the second half of 2008, US deflation overwhelmed EM inflation, generating a major deflationary tsunami worldwide. Russia: Long Domestic Bonds / Short Oil Chart II-1Undershooting CB's 4% Inflation Target Russia’s growth is already very sluggish. Lower oil prices2 entail both weaker growth and ruble weakness. The primary risk in Russia is low and falling inflation rather than rising inflation. Therefore, unlike in previous downturns, the central bank will be able to engage in counter-cyclical monetary policy, namely continue cutting interest rates. This makes a long position in local currency bonds a “no-brainer”. The only risk to owning Russian domestic bonds is the ruble depreciation due to falling oil prices and a risk-off phase in EM exchange rate markets. To hedge against these risks, we recommend the following trade: long Russian domestic bonds / short oil. The macro backdrop in Russia justifies considerably lower interest rates and we believe the central bank will deliver further rate cuts despite moderate currency depreciation. As a result, local bonds on a total- return basis in US dollar terms will outperform oil. The basis to expect a further meaningful drop in interest rates in Russia is as follows: Inflation Is Low And Falling: Various measures of inflation suggest that disinflation is broad based (Chart II-1). As a result, inflation will continue falling towards the central bank’s inflation target of 4%. Crucially, wage growth is decelerating both in nominal and real terms (Chart II-2). Monetary Policy Is Still Restrictive: Even though the central bank has cut rates by 125bps over the past 6 months, monetary policy remains behind the dis-inflation curve. Both policy and lending rates remain too high, especially relative to the low nominal growth environment (Chart II-3). Real borrowing costs stand at 9% for consumer and 4.5% for corporate loans (Chart II-4). The macro backdrop in Russia justifies considerably lower interest rates and we believe the central bank will deliver further rate cuts despite moderate currency depreciation. Chart II-2Russia: Sluggish Wage Growth Chart II-3Russia: Tight Monetary Policy Notably, weakening credit impulses for both business and consumer segments suggest that domestic demand will disappoint (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Russia: High Real Lending Rate Across Sectors Chart II-5Weakening Credit Impulses = Lower Demand And Investment Since October 1, the CBR has taken measures to curb consumer borrowing from banking and non-banks credit institutions. These new guidelines limit the latter’s lending to consumers with high debt loads. In short, much lower nominal and real interest rates will be required to reinvigorate domestic demand. Fiscal Policy Is Tight: The government has overplayed its hand in running very tight fiscal policy. The government primary budget surplus now stands at 3.8% of GDP. Government spending growth both in real and nominal terms remains very weak (Chart II-6). The National Project initiative has not yet been sufficient to expand government expenditures. In fact, a recent report from the Audit Chamber suggests that total spending under this National Project program for 2019 will be below government targets of 3% of GDP per year. Finally, the authorities committed a policy mistake at the beginning of year by hiking the VAT tax which has hurt consumption. Russian local currency bond yields are set to fall, even as oil prices decline over the coming months. A Healthy Balance Of Payment (BoP) Position: Total external debt and debt servicing are extremely low by emerging markets standards. Russia has the lowest external debt amongst its EM counterparts. Likewise, Russia’s international investment portfolio liabilities – foreigners’ ownership of equities and bonds – remain one of the lowest amongst EM (Chart II-7). Chart II-6A Lot Of Room To Boost Government Spending Chart II-7Foreigners' Holding Of Russian Financial Assets Are Low Investment Recommendations Chart II-8Local Bonds Are Decoupling From Oil Russian local currency bond yields are set to fall, even as oil prices decline over the coming months (Chart II-8). In light of this, we recommend the following pair trade: long local currency bonds / short oil. Dedicated EM fixed-income portfolios should continue to overweight Russian sovereign and corporate credit, as well as local currency government bonds relative to their respective EM benchmarks. Tight fiscal and monetary policies favor creditors. We have been bullish on Russian markets for some time arguing that they will behave as a low-beta play in EM selloff as discussed in our previous report. This view remains intact. Dedicated EM equity portfolios should continue overweighting Russian stocks, a recommendation made in October 2018. Given the ruble will likely depreciate gradually rather than plunge amid falling oil prices, the authorities will continue cutting rates and provide fiscal stimulus. That will benefit Russia versus many other EM countries. Finally, we remain long the RUB versus the Colombian Peso, a trade instituted on May 31, 2018. Andrija Vesic Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We exclude economies of China, Korea and Taiwan because they are different in their economic structure and inflation dynamics compared with majority of EMs. 2 BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team expects lower oil prices consistent with its thesis of EM slowdown. This is different from BCA’s house view that is bullish on oil. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
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The key question for asset allocators over coming months will be when (or, perhaps, whether) the global manufacturing cycle will turn up. This would trigger a move into more cyclically sensitive markets, for example euro zone equities and Emerging Market assets. It would push up commodity prices and government bond yields, and lead to a weakening of the U.S. dollar. Recommended Allocation Chart 1First Inklings Of A Pick-Up? For now, the evidence of this turning-point remains ambiguous, and so we hesitate to pull the trigger. BCA Research's calculation of the global OECD Leading Economic Indicator bottomed earlier this year and should lead to a pick-up in manufacturing activity soon (Chart 1). However, only in EM have the manufacturing PMIs bottomed (Chart 1, panel 2) and this was due mainly to a questionably strong September PMI in China which might be reversed when the latest data-point is published on October 1. In the euro zone, the best that one can say is that the PMIs have stopped falling but they remain at a low level (41.9 in Germany, for instance). Some market-based indicators also signal a pick-up – but not yet convincingly (Chart 2). Defensive currencies such as the U.S. dollar and yen have fallen a little against cyclical currencies like the Korean won and Australian dollar. Euro zone equities have shown some strength, especially in the beaten-down auto sector. The global stock-to-bond ratio looks to be about to break out of its recent range. And copper has bounced off its lows. But these moves could turn out to be just noise rather than the beginning of a trend. Chart 2Are Markets Sniffing Out A Turn? Easier financial conditions are the most likely cause of a rebound. BCA Research's Financial Liquidity Index tends to lead both manufacturing activity and the relative performance of global stocks by around 12-18 months (Chart 3). With the dovish turn of central banks this year, the decline in long-term interest rates (the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, even after its recent rebound, is only at 1.7% compared to 3.2% a year ago), the contraction in credit spreads, and a pick-up in money supply growth especially in the U.S. (where M2 is now growing 6.5% year-on-year), it would be surprising if these looser monetary conditions do not feed through into stronger activity over coming quarters. Chart 3Financial Liquidity Propels Growth Chart 4Could Inflation Now Slow? Indeed, one can easily imagine a scenario next year where growth rebounds but inflation slows (due to the lagged effect of this year’s weaker growth, Chart 4), allowing central banks to remain dovish for some time. This non-inflationary accelerating growth would be highly positive for risk assets and negative for the U.S. dollar. Chart 5 shows how various asset classes behaved in such an environment in the past. Chart 5How Assets Behaved Under Rising Growth/Falling Inflation Easier financial conditions are the most likely cause of a rebound. There are some risks to this optimistic scenario, however. Chinese growth remains sluggish with, for example, imports – the most important factor as far as the rest of the world is concerned – falling by 8.5% year-on-year in September and showing no signs of recovery (Chart 6). The acceleration of Chinese credit growth in early 2019 has petered out since the summer and points to a much flatter recovery of activity than was the case in 2016 (Chart 7). A politburo meeting in late October could lead to monetary stimulus being ramped up but, for now, investors should not assume a big reflationary impulse from China. In the developed world, the biggest risk is that the slowdown in manufacturing spills over into employment, consumption, and services. There are some signs in the U.S. that companies are delaying hiring decisions: job openings have fallen, and the employment component of both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISMs points to a deterioration in the labor market (Chart 8). Growing CEO pessimism, presumably because of anemic earnings and the trade war, points to continuing weakness in capex and a further decline in activity indicators (Chart 9). Chart 6Chinese Growth Still Sluggish... Chart 7...As Credit Growth Peters Out Chart 8Are Firms Starting To Delay Hiring? Chart 9CEOs Are Not Happy Chart 10Stocks Should Outperform Cyclically On balance, we still expect global growth to accelerate next year, and therefore global equities to outperform bonds over the next 12 months (Chart 10). But we want to have greater conviction for that view before we recommend more aggressive pro-cyclical tilts. We remain overweight equities versus bonds, but hedge the downside risk through an overweight in cash, and through tilts towards U.S. equities, and DM over EM equities. We continue to recommend hedging against the upside risk of greater Chinese stimulus and a strong rally in cyclical assets through an overweight in global Financials, Industrials, and Energy, and also through a neutral stance on Australian equities, which are a clean play on a Chinese rebound. We continue to look for the right timing to turn more positive on pure cyclical assets such as euro zone equities, and Emerging Markets. Fixed Income: A cyclical pick-up would imply that global government bond yields have further to rise (Chart 11). Our global fixed-income strategists have a short-term target for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield of 2.1% (versus 1.7% now) and -0.2% for Bunds (-0.4% now), which would take yields back to their 200-day moving averages (Chart 12).1 We continue to recommend a moderate underweight on duration, and prefer TIPS to nominal bonds, since inflation breakevens imply that the Fed will miss its inflation target by 80 basis points a year on average over the next 10 years. In an environment of accelerating economic growth, credit (both investment grade and high-yield)should outperform in both the U.S. and Europe. The most attractive points on the credit curve are BBB-rated bonds in IG, and the riskiest bonds in HY. For more risk-averse investors, agency MBS currently offer an attractive yield pickup over quality corporate credits. Chart 11Growth Will Push Up Yields Further... Chart 12...Initially To Their 200-Day Average Equities: Any upside for U.S. equities must come from improved earnings performance. Throughout 2019, earnings have been beating overly pessimistic analysts’ forecasts and Q3 looks to be no exception, with EPS growth on track to be much stronger than the -5% year-on-year that analysts forecast going into the results season (Chart 13). Next year, nominal GDP growth of 4% and a weaker U.S. dollar should produce 7-8% EPS growth. But, with a forward PE of 17x and the Fed unlikely to boost the multiple by further rate cuts, upside is limited. In the right economic environment (as described above), euro zone and EM stocks should do much better. We are currently neutral on euro zone equities, but the recent stronger performance by European banks gives us more confidence that we may be able to move to overweight soon (Chart 14). Similarly, our EM strategists have instituted a buy stop on the MSCI EM index and say they will go overweight EM equities if the index in USD terms rises 3% from its current level.2 Chart 13Analysts Are Too Pessimistic On Earnings Currencies: The first inklings of U.S. dollar weakness over the past month suggest that it may, too, be sniffing out the start of a cyclical rebound, since it tends to be a very counter-cyclical currency (Chart 15). Going forward, relative interest rates are also unlikely to be as bullish a force for the U.S. dollar as they have been in the past few years. For now, we are neutral on the U.S. dollar on a trade-weighted basis, but do see it depreciating against the Australian dollar and the euro over the next 12 months. The British pound has already risen to take into account the lesser probability of a no-deal Brexit, and we would not expect it to move much either way until the General Election result is clear. There are some risks to the optimistic scenario: Chinese growth remains sluggish, and there are signs that U.S. companies are delaying hiring decisions. Chart 14First Signs Of Euro Banks Recovering? Chart 15Recovery Would Be Dollar Bearish Commodities: Industrial metals prices have bottomed out in recent months, in line with Chinese leading indicators (Chart 16). But we will need to see greater Chinese stimulus before we become more positive. Crude oil has moved largely in a range for the past six months, with tightness in supply offset by some weakness in demand, especially from developed economies (Chart 17). With demand likely to pick up in line with the global economy, and supply still constrained by the Saudi/Russia production pact and geopolitical disturbances, our energy strategists see Brent crude averaging $66 a barrel in Q4 and $70 in 2020, versus $60 now. Chart 16Not Enough China Stimulus For Metals To Bounce Chart 17Oil Kept Down By Weak Demand As last year, the Global Asset Allocation service will not publish a Q1 Quarterly in mid-December. Instead, we will send clients on November 22 our annual report of the conversation between Mr and Ms X and BCA Research’s managing editors. This report will detail BCA's house views on the outlook for the macro environment and investment markets in 2020. We will publish GAA Monthly Portfolio Outlooks on the first business days of December and January. Garry Evans Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report “Big Mo(mentum) Is Turning Positive,” dated 29 October 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2For an explanation, please see the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report " EM Local Bonds: A New Normal?" dated 24 October 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)
Analysis on Mexico and Central Europe is available on pages 6 and 10, respectively. Highlights Deflationary pressures have been intensifying in Malaysia and the central bank will be forced to cut its policy rate. To play this theme, we recommend receiving 2-year swap rates. In Mexico, pieces are falling into place for stocks to outperform the EM equity benchmark on a sustainable basis. We are also keeping an overweight allocation on Mexican sovereign credit and local currency bonds. In Central Europe (CE), inflation will continue to rise as both labor shortages and ultra-accommodative monetary and fiscal policies promote strong domestic demand. We are downgrading our allocation of CE local currency bonds from overweight to neutral. Malaysia: Besieged By Deflationary Pressures Malaysian interest rates appear elevated given the state of its economy. Deflationary pressures have been intensifying and the central bank will be forced to cut its policy rate. The Malaysian economy continues to face strong deflationary pressures. To play this theme, we recommend receiving 2-year swap rates. We are also upgrading our recommended allocation to Malaysian local currency and U.S. dollar government bonds for dedicated EM fixed-income portfolios from neutral to overweight. The Malaysian economy continues to face strong deflationary pressures, requiring significant rate cuts by the central bank: Chart I-1 shows that the GDP deflator is flirting with deflation, and nominal GDP growth has slowed to the level of commercial banks’ average lending rates. Falling nominal growth amid elevated corporate and household debt levels is an extremely toxic mix (Chart I-2, top panel). Notably, debt-servicing costs for the private sector – both businesses and households – are high at 13.5% of GDP and are also rising (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Chart I-1The Malaysian Economy Is Flirting With Deflation Chart I-2High Leverage & Debt Servicing Costs Among Businesses & Households Crucially, real borrowing costs are elevated. In real terms, the prime lending rate stands at 5% when deflated by the GDP deflator, and at 3% when deflated by headline CPI. Notably, private credit growth (outstanding business and household loans) has plunged to a 15-year low (Chart I-3), underscoring that real borrowing costs are excessive. Chart I-3Malaysia: Credit Growth Is In Freefall Chart I-4Malaysia's Corporate Sector Is Struggling Malaysia’s corporate sector is struggling. The manufacturing PMI is below the critical 50 threshold and is showing no signs of recovery. Listed companies’ profits are shrinking (Chart I-4, top panel). Poor corporate profitability is prompting cutbacks in capex spending (Chart I-4, middle and bottom panels) and weighing on employment and wages. The household sector has been retrenching; retail sales have been contracting and personal vehicle sales have been shrinking (Chart I-5). The property market – in particular the residential sub-sector – is still in recession. Property sales and starts are falling, and property prices are flirting with deflation (Chart I-6). Critically, monetary policy easing and exchange rate depreciation are the only levers available to policymakers to reflate the economy. Fiscal policy is constrained as the budget deficit is already large at 3.4% of GDP, and public debt is elevated. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad is in fact aiming to reduce the total national debt (including off-balance-sheet debt) back to the government’s ceiling of 54% of GDP (from 80% currently). Chart I-5Malaysian Households Are Retrenching Chart I-6Malaysia's Property Sector Is In A Downturn Bottom Line: The Malaysian economy is besieged by deflationary pressures and requires lower borrowing costs. The central bank will deliver rate cuts in the coming months. Investment Recommendations A new trade idea: receive 2-year swap rates as a bet on rate cuts by the central bank. Consistently, for dedicated EM bond portfolios, we are upgrading local currency and U.S. dollar-denominated government bonds from neutral to overweight. Chart I-7Overweight Malaysian Local Currency And U.S. Dollar Government Bonds While we are downbeat on the ringgit versus the U.S. dollar, Malaysian domestic bonds will likely outperform the EM GBI index in common currency terms on a total return basis (Chart I-7, top panel). The same is true for excess returns on the country’s sovereign credit (Chart I-7, bottom panel). The basis for the ringgit’s more moderate depreciation, especially in comparison with other EM currencies, is as follows: First, foreigners have reduced their holdings of local currency bonds. The share of foreign ownership has declined from 36% in 2015 to 22% now of total outstanding local domestic bonds in the past 4 years (Chart I-8). Hence, currency depreciation will not trigger large foreign capital outflows. Second, the trade balance is in surplus and improving. This will provide a cushion for the ringgit. Finally, the ringgit is cheap in real effective terms which also limits the potential downside (Chart I-9). Dedicated EM equity portfolios should keep a neutral allocation on Malaysian stocks. We are taking profits on our long Malaysian small-cap stocks relative to the EM small-cap index position. This recommendation has generated a 6.6% gain since its initiation on December 14, 2018. Chart I-8Foreigners' Share Of Local Currency Bonds Has Dropped Chart I-9The Ringgit Is Cheap Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Mexico: Raising Our Conviction On Equity Outperformance Mexican local currency bonds, as well as sovereign and corporate credit, have been one of our highest conviction overweights for some time. These positions have played out very well (Chart II-1). Presently, pieces are falling into place for Mexican stocks to outperform the EM equity benchmark on a sustainable basis. First, long-lasting outperformance by Mexican local currency bonds and corporate credit will lead to the stock market’s outperformance relative to the EM benchmark. Chart II-2 shows that when Mexican local currency bond and corporate dollar bond yields fall relative to their EM peers, the Bolsa tends to outperform. In brief, a relative decline in the cost of capital will eventually translate into relative equity outperformance. Chart II-1Mexico Vs. EM: Domestic Bonds And Credit Markets Chart II-2Mexico: Relative Stock Prices Are Correlated With Relative Cost Of Capital Second – as discussed in detail in our previous Special Report – market worries about Mexico’s fiscal position are overblown, especially relative to other developing nations such as Brazil and South Africa. Orthodox fiscal and monetary policies, as well as low public debt, warrant a lower risk premium in Mexico, both in absolute terms and relative to other EM countries. Moreover, market participants and credit agencies have overstated the precariousness of Pemex’s debt and financing requirements. Pemex U.S. dollar bond yields have been falling steadily compared to EM aggregate corporate bond yields since the announcements of policies aimed at supporting the company’s debt sustainability. We have discussed Pemex’s financial sustainability and its effect on public finances in past reports.1 Third, having cut rates twice since September, the Central Bank of Mexico (Banxico) has embarked on a rate cutting cycle. This is positive for stock prices, as it implies higher equity valuations and will eventually put a floor under the economy. Given that both core and headline inflation have fallen within the target bands, this gives the monetary authorities more room to reduce interest rates. Banxico members have been vocal about their desire to cut rates further, which is being foreshadowed by the swap market (Chart II-3, top panel). Given that both core and headline inflation have fallen within the target bands, this gives the monetary authorities more room to reduce interest rates. The slowdown in the domestic economy and Andrés Manuel López Obrador’ (AMLO) administration’s tight fiscal policy will enable and encourage Banxico to further ease monetary policy (Chart II-3, bottom panel). Fourth, another positive market catalyst for Mexican equities is the ongoing outperformance of EM consumer staples versus the overall EM index. Consumer staples have a large 35% share of the overall Mexico MSCI stock index, while this sector in the EM MSCI benchmark accounts for only 7%. Therefore, durable outperformance by consumer staples often hints at a relative cyclical outperformance for the Mexican bourse (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Mexico: Continue Betting On Lower Rates Chart II-4Mexican Equities Are A Play On Consumer Staples Chart II-5Mexican Stocks Offer Reasonable Value Finally, Mexican equities are not expensive. Chart II-5 illustrates that according to our cyclically-adjusted P/E ratios, Mexican stocks offer good value in both absolute terms and relative to EM overall. We continue to believe AMLO’s administration is proving to be a pragmatic government with the aim of reducing rent-seeking activities and addressing structural issues such as poverty, corruption and crime. These policies will be positive for the economy over the long run and share prices will move higher in anticipation. Bottom Line: We are reiterating our overweight allocation on Mexican sovereign credit and domestic local currency bonds within their respective EM benchmarks. With further rate cuts on the horizon, yet upside risks to EM local currency bond yields, we continue to recommend a curve steepening trade in Mexico: receiving 2-year and paying 10-year swap rates. We now have high conviction that Mexican share prices will stage a cyclical outperformance relative to their EM peers. The bottom panel of Chart II-4 on page 8 illustrates that Mexican stocks seem to have formed a major bottom and are about to begin outperforming the EM equity benchmark. Dedicated EM equity managers should have a large overweight allocation to Mexican stocks. Our recommendation of favoring small-caps over large-cap companies in Mexico has been very profitable since we argued for this trade last November. We are taking a 12.9% profit on this position and recommend keeping an overweight allocation to both Mexican large- and small-caps within an EM equity portfolio. Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Central Europe: An Inflationary Enclave In Deflationary Europe Our macroeconomic theme for Central European (CE) economies – Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, elaborated in the linked report, has been as follows: Inflation will continue to rise as both labor shortages and ultra-accommodative monetary as well as fiscal policies in CE promote strong domestic demand. CE economies have stood out as an inflationary enclave in Europe. Notably, CE economies have stood out as an inflationary enclave in Europe. Going forward, inflation will continue to rise across this region, despite the ongoing contraction in European manufacturing. First, Hungary’s and Poland’s central banks are behind the curve – they remain reluctant to hike rates amid rampantly rising inflation within overheating economies (Chart III-1). In turn, real policy rates across CE are becoming more negative and will promote robust money and credit growth (Chart III-2). Chart III-1CE Central Banks Are Behind The Curve Chart III-2Low Real Rates Promote Rampant Credit Growth Policymakers are justifying stimulative policies by stressing ongoing woes in the Europe-wide manufacturing downturn. Yet, they are paying little attention to genuine inflationary pressures in their own economies. Most notably in Hungary, the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) has been aggressively suppressing its policy rate and engaging in a corporate QE program, despite rising inflation and an overheating economy. Similarly, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) seems inclined to cut rates sooner rather than later. On the other end of the spectrum though, the Czech National Bank (CNB) is the only CE central bank to have embarked on a rate hiking cycle over the past 18 months. Going forward, the CNB looks most likely to normalize rates by continuing its hiking cycle. This development will favor rate differentials between it and the rest of CE. As such, we remain long the CZK versus both the HUF and PLN (Chart III-3). Chart III-3Favor CZK Versus PLN & HUF Chart III-4Germany's Manufacturing Cycles And CE Inflation Second, European manufacturing cycles have historically defined CE inflation trends, with time lags of around 12 to 18 months. However, this time around, the euro area manufacturing recession will not translate into slower CE inflation and growth dynamics (Chart III-4). Above all, booming credit induced by real negative borrowing costs has incentivized robust domestic demand in general and construction activity in particular in CE. In addition, employment growth remains strong and double-digit wage growth has supported strong consumer spending (Chart III-5). As a result, manufacturing production volumes have remained relatively resilient in Hungary and Poland, even as manufacturing output volumes in both Germany and the broader euro area have been contracting (Chart III-6). Chart III-5Strong Domestic Demand In CE… Chart III-6...Entails Divergences In Manufacturing With Euro Area Third, inflationary pressures in CE are both acute and genuine. Wage growth has been rising faster than productivity growth across the region, leading to surging unit labor costs (Chart III-7). Mounting wage pressures reflect widespread labor shortages. Further, output gaps in these economies have turned positive, which has historically been a precursor of inflationary pressures. Finally, fiscal policy in CE will remain very expansionary, supporting strong business and consumer demand. Bottom Line: Super-accommodative monetary and fiscal policies have led to a classic case of overheating within CE, particularly in Hungary and Poland, and less so in the Czech Republic. Chart III-7Genuine Inflationary Pressures In Central Europe Chart III-8A Widening Current Account Deficit Is A Symptom Of Overheating Investment Implications Deteriorating current accounts (Chart III-8), rising inflation and behind-the-curve central banks warrant further currency depreciation in both Hungary and Poland. This is why we continue to recommend a short position on both the HUF and PLN versus the CZK. We are closing our Hungarian/euro area relative three-year swap rate trade with a loss of 87 basis points. Our expectation that the market would price in rate hikes in Hungary despite the central bank’s dovishness has not materialized. Investors should remain overweight CE equities within an EM portfolio due to strong domestic demand in these economies and no direct economic exposure to China. As we expect EM equities to underperform DM stocks, we continue to recommend underweighting CE versus the core European markets. We are downgrading our allocation to CE local currency bonds from overweight to neutral within an EM domestic bond portfolio. The primary reason is a risk of a selloff in core European rates. Anddrija Vesic Research Analyst andrija@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1. Please see Emerging Markets Strategy, "Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income," dated April 23, 2019 and "Mexico: Crying Out For Policy Easing," dated September 5, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Highlights Duration: The upturn in bond yields is not yet confirmed by our preferred global growth indicators. We anticipate that a reduction in trade uncertainty during the next few months will cause our indicators to rebound. But until then, investors should view the bond sell-off as tenuous. Yield Curve: Expect modest 2/10 steepening during the next few months, as the Fed keeps rates low even as economic growth improves. Steepening will show up in real yields, not in the TIPS breakeven inflation curve. The 2/10 slope will stay in a range between 0 bps and 50 bps for the next 6-12 months. Yield Curve Strategy: The 5-year Treasury note looks expensive compared to the rest of the yield curve, and historical correlations suggest it will rise the most if the Fed delivers fewer rate cuts than are currently expected. We recommend that investors short the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/30 barbell. Await Confirmation Bond yields look like they might be bottoming. The 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields are up 10 bps and 31 bps, respectively, since the 2/10 slope briefly inverted in late August (Chart 1). We are cautiously optimistic that the growth revival getting priced into Treasury yields will materialize. However, it’s vital to note that the yield rebound is not yet confirmed by the economic data. Even timely global growth indicators like the CRB Raw Industrials index remain downbeat (Chart 1, bottom panel). If global growth measures don’t bottom soon, then Treasury yields are certain to fall back. Chart 1Yields Are Ahead Of The Data We do expect the economic data to follow bond yields higher. We noted in last week’s report that the weakness in US economic data is concentrated in survey measures (aka “soft” data), while measures of actual economic activity (aka “hard data”) are holding up well.1 For example: The ISM Manufacturing survey is below its 2016 trough, but the year-over-year growth rate in industrial production is well above 2016 levels (Chart 2, top panel). Capacity utilization also remains elevated (Chart 2, bottom panel). New orders for core capital goods are holding firm, even with CEO confidence at its lowest since 2009 (Chart 2, panel 2). Employment growth remains strong, despite the employment component of the ISM Non-Manufacturing survey being just above the 50 boom/bust line (Chart 2, panel 3). Chart 2Will "Soft" Data Rebound? Our interpretation of the divergence is that uncertainty about the US/China trade war is weighing on sentiment and holding survey measures down. If that uncertainty is removed, survey measures will quickly rebound and converge with the “hard” data. On that front, we think it’s very likely that trade uncertainty diminishes during the next few months. The US and China have already agreed to an informal “phase one deal” that will require China to buy $40-$50 billion of US agricultural goods while the US delays the October 15 tariff hike. Odds are that President Trump will also delay the planned December 15 tariff hike and probably roll back some existing tariffs.2 The reason is that while Trump’s overall approval rating has been consistently low; until recently, he had been receiving high marks for his handling of the economy (Chart 3). But his economic approval rating took a tumble this summer and, as we head toward the 2020 election, he desperately needs an economic boost and/or policy victory to push up his numbers. We already see some tentative signs of a rebound in the regional Fed manufacturing surveys. A tactical retreat on trade should improve sentiment and cause survey data to move higher, alongside bond yields. And in fact, we already see some tentative signs of a rebound in the regional Fed manufacturing surveys (Chart 4). October figures are out for the New York, Philadelphia, Richmond, Kansas City and Dallas surveys, and they have all diverged positively from the national ISM. Chart 3It's Trump's Economy Chart 4Some Optimism From Regional Surveys Bottom Line: The upturn in bond yields is not yet confirmed by our preferred global growth indicators. We anticipate that a reduction in trade uncertainty during the next few months will cause our indicators to rebound. But until then, investors should view the bond sell-off as tenuous. Yield Curve: Macro Drivers We noted in the first section that the 2/10 Treasury slope has steepened sharply since it briefly broke below zero in late August. In this section, we consider whether this 2/10 steepening might continue. To do this we run through the main macro drivers of the yield curve. The Fed Funds Rate Traditionally, there is a very tight correlation between the fed funds rate and the slope of the curve (Chart 5). Fed tightening puts upward pressure on the curve’s front-end relative to the back-end, leading to a bear-flattening. Conversely, Fed easing drags the front-end down relative to the long-end, leading to bull-steepening. Chart 5The Fed's Yield Curve Control The traditional pattern broke down between 2009 and 2015 when the fed funds rate was pinned at zero. This period saw many episodes of bear-steepening and bull-flattening. But since the funds rate has been off zero, the traditional correlation has begun to re-assert itself. Our base case outlook calls for one more 25 bps rate cut tomorrow, followed by an extended on-hold period. This scenario might be expected to impart some mild steepening pressure to the curve, except for the fact that the front-end is already priced for 53 bps of easing during the next 12 months, significantly more than we expect. Our base case outlook calls for one more 25 bps rate cut tomorrow, followed by an extended on-hold period. If our base case scenario is incorrect, and growth continues to deteriorate, forcing the Fed to cut rates all the way back to zero. Then we would expect some initial bull-steepening, followed by bull-flattening as the funds rate approaches the zero bound. Wage Growth Wage growth is another excellent yield curve indicator, mainly because it helps determine the direction of the fed funds rate. Stronger wage growth causes the Fed to tighten and the curve to flatten. On the flipside, wage growth is a less effective indicator during Fed easing cycles, when it tends to lag changes in the funds rate (Chart 6). In fact, while wage growth is tightly correlated with the 2/10 slope, it lags changes in the slope by about 12 months (Chart 6, panel 2). Chart 6Wages Lead Tightening, But Lag Easing The upshot is that if the economy heads toward recession, then wage growth will not be a timely indicator of Fed rate cuts. However, if recession is avoided and wages continue to accelerate (Chart 6, bottom 2 panels), strong wage growth will limit how accommodative the Fed can be as it seeks to re-anchor inflation expectations. As such, persistently strong wage growth will limit the amount of curve steepening that can occur. Inflation Expectations The Fed’s need to re-anchor inflation expectations in a range consistent with its target is the main reason to forecast curve steepening. At present, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is a mere 1.66%, well below the 2.3%-2.5% range that the Fed would consider “well anchored”. One might conclude that if the Fed succeeds in driving this rate higher, it will impart significant steepening pressure to the curve. However, we must also note that the 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is even lower than the 10-year rate (Chart 7). Given our view that long-dated inflation expectations adapt only slowly to the actual inflation data, we would expect both the 2-year and 10-year breakevens to rise in tandem, exerting some modest flattening pressure on the curve.3 Chart 7Any Steepening Will Come From Real Yields Ironically, if the Fed is successful in re-anchoring long-dated inflation expectations, we expect it will cause the yield curve to steepen, but through its impact on real yields. At present, the 2-year and 10-year real yields are 0.37% and 0.14%, respectively. The act of holding rates steady for long enough to re-anchor inflation expectations will exert downward pressure on the 2-year real yield, while the 10-year real yield will rise in response to an improved growth outlook. The Fed’s goal of re-anchoring inflation expectations will likely lead to some curve steepening, but through the real component of yields, not the inflation component. The Neutral Rate The neutral rate – the fed funds rate that is neither inflationary nor deflationary – is a major wild card when it comes to the yield curve. Right now, the median Fed estimate calls for a neutral rate of 2.5%, while the market is pricing-in an even lower rate of 2%, at least according to the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield (Chart 8). Neutral rate estimates have been revised lower during the past few years, exerting significant flattening pressure on the yield curve. In theory, if we reach an inflection point where neutral rate estimates are revised higher, it would lead to substantial curve steepening. One thing to watch to help predict movement in neutral rate estimates is the gold price.4 Gold performs well when the market perceives monetary policy as increasingly accommodative, either because the Fed is cutting rates or because the assumed neutral rate is rising. The 2013 drop in gold foreshadowed downward revisions to the Fed’s neutral rate estimate (Chart 8, bottom panel). A further increase in gold, especially once the Fed stops cutting rates, would send a strong signal that current neutral rate estimates are too low. Monetary policy arguably exerts its greatest economic impact through the housing market. Investors can also watch the housing market for clues about the neutral rate. Monetary policy arguably exerts its greatest economic impact through the housing market. If housing activity starts to wane, it can be a strong signal that interest rates are too high. Last year, housing activity started to flag once the mortgage rate moved above 4% (Chart 9). If 4% proves to be the ceiling on mortgage rates, it would mean that the Fed’s current neutral rate estimate is roughly correct. However, home prices have moderated since last year, and new construction has started to focus more on the low-end of the market, where supply remains scarce.5 This shift in focus from homebuilders has caused the price of new homes to fall considerably (Chart 9, bottom panel), a supply side re-adjustment that could make the housing market more resilient in the face of higher rates. Chart 8Tracking The Neutral Rate: Gold Chart 9Tracking The Neutral Rate: Housing An upward re-assessment of the neutral rate would impart steepening pressure to the yield curve, but only if it occurs quickly, before the Fed has time to deliver offsetting rate hikes. However, we think it’s more likely that any increase in neutral rate estimates will occur gradually, alongside Fed tightening. In that case, a roughly parallel upward shift in the yield curve would be the most likely outcome. Verdict Considering all of the above factors, we would look for some modest 2/10 curve steepening during the next few months. The steepening will be driven by the Fed’s desire to re-anchor long-dated inflation expectations, a desire that will result in them keeping rates steady (apart from one more cut tomorrow), even as economic growth improves. As noted above, this steepening will show up in real yields, not in the TIPS breakeven inflation curve. That being said, strong wage growth and overly dovish market rate cut expectations will ensure that any steepening is well contained. We expect the 2/10 slope to stay in a range between 0 bps and 50 bps for the next 6-12 months. Yield Curve Strategy Chart 10Treasury Yield Curve When thinking about how to position a Treasury portfolio for our expected yield curve outcome, we first look at the value proposition offered by different Treasury maturities. Chart 10 shows the Treasury yield curve, and also each maturity’s 12-month rolling yield. The rolling yield is simply the combination of each maturity’s 12-month yield income and the price impact of rolling down the curve. It can be thought of as the return you would earn holding each bond for 12 months in an unchanged yield curve environment. The first thing that sticks out in Chart 10 is that the 5-year note offers poor value. We also note that the curve steepens sharply beyond the 5-year maturity point, so maturities greater than 5 years benefit a lot from rolldown. The simple intuition from Chart 10 is confirmed by our butterfly spread models.6 Chart 11shows that the 5-year bullet looks very expensive relative to a duration-matched barbell portfolio consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. In fact, with only a few exceptions, bullets are expensive relative to barbells across the entire Treasury curve (see Appendix). Chart 11Bullets Are Very Expensive All else equal, bullets tend to outperform barbells when the yield curve steepens. However, given current valuations, it would take a lot of steepening for bullets to outperform barbells during the next few months. Chart 12Yield Curve Correlations Further, Chart 12 shows that the front-end of the yield curve – out to about the 5-year/7-year point – tends to steepen when our 12-month discounter rises, while the long-end of the curve – beyond the 7-year point – tends to flatten. Given that our 12-month discounter is currently -53 bps, meaning that the market is priced for 53 bps of rate cuts during the next year, we expect it will rise during the next few months. This should exert the most upward pressure on the 5-year/7-year part of the curve. We have been recommending that investors play the curve by going long a 2/30 barbell and shorting the 7-year bullet. But given the significant rolldown advantage in the 7-year compared to the 5-year, we amend that recommendation this week. We now recommend that investors short the 5-year bullet and go long a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 30-year maturities. Bottom Line: The 5-year Treasury note looks expensive compared to the rest of the yield curve, and historical correlations suggest it will rise the most if the Fed delivers fewer rate cuts than are currently expected. We recommend that investors short the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/30 barbell. Appendix Table 1Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of October 25, 2019) Table 2Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of October 25, 2019) Ryan Swift U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Crisis Of Confidence”, dated October 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For further details on BCA’s outlook for US/China trade negotiations please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “How Much To Buy An American President?”, dated October 25, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 For further details on how inflation expectations adapt to the actual inflation data please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Signal From Gold?”, dated May 1, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Long Awkward Middle Phase”, dated July 2, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For details on our butterfly spread models please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification