Sorry, you need to enable JavaScript to visit this website.
Skip to main content
Skip to main content

Sectors

Highlights Dear Client, This issue of BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy features our 2017 Outlook for Bulks and Base Metals. The evolution of China's economy will, as always, be critical to these markets, given that country's outsized role in iron ore, steel and base metals. We are broadly neutral the complex, and, with the exception of the nickel market, see supply and demand relatively balanced. That said, the potential for price spikes - e.g., copper, where spare capacity is shrinking - and for monetary and fiscal policy errors to spill into these markets keeps downside price risk elevated. Next week, we will publish our 2017 Outlook for Energy Markets, with special attention to the oil market. As expected, OPEC and Russia agreed to cut production. As we went to press, WTI and Brent crude oil prices were up ~ 8.5% on the news. We will take profits today on our Long February 2017 Brent $50/bbl Calls vs. Short February 2017 $55/bbl Calls, which was up 73.6% basis Wednesday's close when we went to press. We remain long August 2017 WTI vs. Short November 2017 WTI futures in anticipation of a backwardated forward curve in 2017H2; as of Wednesday's close, this position returned 76.39% since November 3, when we recommended the exposure. Our 2017 Precious Metals and Agricultural outlooks will be published in the following weeks. We will finish with an outlook for commodities as an asset class in 2017 at year-end. We trust you will find these reports informative and useful for your investing and year-ahead planning. Kindest regards, Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President The monetary and fiscal stimulus that massively boosted China's housing market this year will wind down, bringing an end to the run-up in iron ore, steel and base metals prices. While we expect "reflationary" policies to continue going into the Communist Party Congress next fall, when new leadership roles will be announced, we do not expect anything along the lines of the surge in policy stimulus seen earlier this year: Unwinding and controlling property-market excesses and high debt levels will limit policymakers' desire to turbo-charge the housing market again, limiting the boost such policies provide. We are downgrading our tactically bullish view on iron ore to neutral. Our out-of-consensus bullish call was proven correct with a 43% rally in iron ore prices within the past eight weeks.1 Strategically, we retain a bearish bias, as rising iron ore supply may overwhelm the market again in 2017H2. We remain tactically neutral and strategically bearish steel. Low steel inventories and production disruptions caused by China's recently launched environmental inspection program likely will continue to support steel prices in the near term. However, persistently high steel output and falling demand from the Chinese property sector should eventually knock down prices in 2017H2. We remain neutral copper going into 2017, expecting Chinese reflationary stimulus to continue along with a concerted effort to slow the housing boom in that country. This will still support real demand for copper, but will reduce demand from new construction. Manufacturing will play a larger role on the demand side next year, while a stronger USD could limit price appreciation. We still believe nickel will outperform zinc over a one-year time horizon. We are bullish nickel prices, both tactically and strategically, as we expect a supply deficit to widen on rising stainless steel demand and falling nickel ore supply in 2017. For zinc, we remain tactically neutral and strategically bearish. We expect zinc supply to rise considerably in response to current high prices. For the global aluminum market, we remain tactically bullish and strategically neutral. Supply shortages will likely persist ex-China over the next three to six months. We have three investment strategies, including long iron ore/short steel futures, long nickel/short zinc futures, and buying aluminum on weaknesses. Feature Iron Ore & Steel: Limited Upside In 2017 A Quick Recap Back in early October, we wrote an in-depth report on global iron ore and steel markets in which we made an out-of-consensus tactically bullish call on iron ore, expecting the price to reach the April high of $68.70/MT in 2016Q4. Our prediction was realized, with iron ore prices surging 43% to a two-year high of $79.81/MT on November 11 (Chart 1, panel 1). Although the steel market has been much stronger than the assessment driving our tactically neutral stance indicated earlier in the quarter, our call that iron ore would outperform steel in the near term was correct: Steel prices rose 21% during the same period of time - only half of the iron ore price rally (Chart 1, panel 1). Over the past two months, the rally occurred in both futures and spot markets, and in the markets globally (Chart 1, panels 2 and 3). Chart 1Iron Ore: Downgrade To Tactically Neutral Chart 2Steel: Remain Tactically Neutral The 2017 Outlook First, we downgrade our tactically bullish view on iron ore to neutral, as China likely will import less iron ore in 2017Q1 (Chart 2, panel 1). China has imposed stricter environmental regulations on its domestic metals industry since 2014 to control pollution. The government currently is sending environmental inspection teams to major steel-producing provinces to check how well the steel producers are complying with state environment rules. Many steel-producing factories were closed this year, due to environmental violations. This will constrain growth in Chinese steel output in the near term (Chart 2, panel 2). Between 2011 - 15, the state-owned Xinhua news agency states Chinese steel capacity has been reduced by 90 million MT; authorities want to cut as much as 150 million MT by 2020, including 45 million MT this year.2 Chinese steel production generally falls in January and February as workers are celebrating the Chinese Spring Festival - the most important festival for the Chinese. Iron ore inventories at major Chinese ports are still high (Chart 2, panel 3). Given iron ore prices have already rallied more than 100% since last December and steel demand outlook remains uncertain next year, most steel producers likely will choose to push off purchases into 2017Q2 or later. While China may slow its iron ore purchases next year, global iron ore supply is set to increase in 2017 as many projects will come on stream. The world's biggest iron ore project, Vale's S11D, which has a capacity of 90 million metric tons (mmt) per year, is expected to ship its first ore in January 2017. Moreover, with iron ore prices above $70/MT, global top iron ore companies with low production costs can be expected to sell as much as they can to maximize their profit, given their all-in production costs for high-quality iron ore (62% Fe) typically are between $30 and $35/MT.3 That said, we are not bearish on iron ore prices in the near term. We prefer to be neutral. Iron ore prices will have pullbacks, but the downside may be also limited in 2017H1. Chinese domestic iron ore production is still in a deep contraction (Chart 2, panel 4). Plus, most steel producing companies prefer high-quality ore from overseas over the domestic low-quality ore. In addition, almost all steel companies in China are profitable at present, which means Chinese steel production will rise after the Spring Festival holidays. All of these factors will support iron ore prices. Chart 3Iron Ore & Steel: Strategically Bearish Second, we retain our tactically neutral view on steel. Chinese steel demand was lifted by China's expansionary monetary and fiscal policies this year - which we have dubbed China's "reflationary" policy - which included reductions in its central bank's policy rate and reserve requirement ratio, and implementation of additional infrastructure projects (Chart 3). This was the driving force for the sharp steel price rally this year. The big question is how sustainable Chinese steel demand growth will be? This will be highly dependent on the Chinese government's decisions and actions. More than a third of steel demand is accounted for by the property market, of which some 70% is residential property.4 Mortgages accounted for approximately 71% of all new loans in August of this year, down from 90% in July, according to Reuters.5 This loan growth powered the iron ore and steel markets this past 12 - 18 months and China's credit-to-GDP ratio to extremely high levels. The OECD recently observed, "The high pace of debt accumulation was sustained despite weaker domestic demand growth. This raises concerns about the underlying quality of new credit, disorderly corporate defaults and the possible extent to which it has been used to support financial asset prices. Residential property prices in some of the largest cities have risen by over 30% year-on-year, although price growth in smaller cities has been much more modest. The price gains have been partly driven by loose monetary policy and ample credit availability as well as reduced land supply."6 Based on our calculations, Chinese steel demand started showing positive yoy growth in July and, so far, had posted four consecutive months of positive yoy growth from July to October. In September and October, the growth was accelerated to 8.3% and 6.6%, respectively, a clear improvement from the 0.8% yoy growth registered in July. The growth may last another three to six months but could peak sooner, if there are no new stimulus plans announced by the government. In addition to the housing sector, China's auto industry also saw significant demand growth. As China cut the sale taxes on small passenger vehicles from 10% to 5% this year, Chinese car sales jumped 13.6% yoy for the first 10 months of 2016, a significant improvement from a 5.7% yoy contraction in the same period of last year. If the government lets the tax cut expire at year-end, Chinese auto production may decline in 2017, which will weaken Chinese steel demand. In the meantime, Chinese steel producers will keep boosting production next year, which likely will limit the upside for steel prices. That said, current steel inventories in China are still low. According to the China Iron and Steel Association (CISA), steel inventories at large and medium steel enterprises fell 9% from mid-September to late October. This probably will limit the downside for steel prices. Third, we retain a strategic bearish view on both iron ore and steel. If there is no additional reflationary stimulus deployed in 2017, we expect Chinese steel demand to weaken. In the meantime, Chinese steel producers will keep boosting their production. Let these two factors run nine to 12 months, and we believe they will be sufficient to knock down both steel and iron ore prices. Our research last year concluded the Chinese property sector is structurally down-trending.7 Given that the property market is the biggest end user of steel in China, accounting for about 35% of total steel demand, we are strategically bearish on steel and iron ore prices. How To Make Money In The Iron Ore & Steel Market? Chart 4Take Profit On Long ##br##Iron Ore/ShortSteel Rebar Trade We went long May/17 iron ore futures in Dalian Futures Exchange in China and short May/17 steel rebar futures in Shanghai Futures Exchange on October 6 (Chart 4). Both contracts are denominated in RMB. The relative trade gives us a return of 18.1% in two months. We are taking profits with this publication, but we may re-initiate this pair trade on pullbacks. Risks If China deploys additional fiscal and monetary stimulus next year, similar in scope to this year's stimulus, we will re-evaluate our view accordingly. If global iron ore production is less than the market expects we could see further rallies in iron ore prices. Should this occur, we will re-examine our market call, as well. Copper: Market Is Balanced; Little Flex On Supply Side The reflationary stimulus that powered China's property markets - and drove demand for iron ore and steel higher - also propelled copper prices to dizzying heights in 2016H2. We do not expect this juggernaut to continue, and instead expect copper to trade sideways next year as global supply and demand stay relatively balanced (Chart 5). China accounts for roughly half of global refined copper demand (Chart 6). Manufacturing activity has the greatest impact on prices: A 1% increase in China's PMI translates to a 1.8% increase in LME copper prices (Chart 7). Chart 5Copper Market Is In Balance Chart 6World Copper Markets Are Balanced Chart 7China Demand Will Remain Key For Copper China's property market accounts for about a third of global copper demand in used in construction, according to the CME Group, which trades copper on its COMEX exchange. A 1% increase floor-space started in China leads to a 0.3% increase in LME copper prices (Chart 8). The surge in demand from the housing market lifted China's copper demand over the past 12 - 18 months, as credit creation in the form of home-mortgage loans expanded at a rapid clip (Chart 9). We expect the Chinese government to continue to try to rein in a booming property market, which has seen mortgage-loan growth of 90% p.a. recently. If the government is successful, this will limit price gains for copper next year. If not, the bubble will continue to expand in large tier-1 and -2 cities in China, making the copper rally's fundamental support tenous to say the least. Chart 8China PMIs and USD TWI Drive LME Prices Chart 9Mortgage Growth Likely Slows in 2017 This drives our expectation that the real economic activity in China - chiefly manufacturing - will be the dominant fundamental on the demand side for copper next year. On the supply side, we expect 2.65% yoy growth in refined copper production, just slightly above the International Copper Study Group's 2% estimate. Company and press reports cite a reduced mine capacity additions, lower ore content in mined output, and labor unrest as reasons supply side growth is slowing. Our balances reflect a convergence of supply and demand for next year, and also highlight the reduced flexibility in the system to respond to unplanned outages. For this reason, the global copper market could be prone to upside price risk in the event of a major unplanned production outage. Watch Out For USD Strength Copper, like all of the base metals, is sensitive to the path taken by the USD. We continue to expect the Fed to lift rates next month and a couple of times next year. This most likely will lift the USD 10% or so over the next 12 months. This would be bearish for base metals, particularly copper, since 92% of global demand for the red metal occurs outside the U.S. Our modeling indicates a 1% increase in the broad USD trade-weighted index leads to a 3.5% decrease in LME copper prices. A stronger USD will raise the local-currency cost of commodities ex-U.S. EM demand would suffer, which would slow the principal source of growth for base metals. Metals producers' ex-U.S. with little or no exposure to USD debt-service obligations would see local-currency operating costs fall. At the margin, this will lead to increased supply. These effects would combine to push commodity prices lower, producing a deflationary blowback to the U.S. Nickel & Zinc: Going Different Ways In 2017? Zinc has outperformed nickel significantly for the past six years. This year alone, zinc prices have shot up over 90% since January, almost doubling the 50% rally in nickel prices for the same period of time (Chart 10, panel 1). The nickel/zinc price ratio has declined to its lowest level since 1998 (Chart 10, panel 2). Will nickel continue underperforming zinc into 2017? Or will the trend reverse next year? We believe the latter has a higher probability. Tactically, we are bullish nickel and neutral zinc. Strategically, we are bullish nickel and bearish zinc.8 Zinc's bull story has been well-known for the past several years, and nickel's oversupplied bear story also has been commented on in the news. However, both markets' fundamentals are changing. Based on World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS) data, for the first nine months of this year, the supply deficit in the global nickel market was at its highest level since 1996. Meanwhile, the global zinc market was already in balance (Chart 10, panels 3 and 4). Chart 10Nickel Likely To Outperform Zinc In 2017 Chart 11Nickel Has More Positive Fundamentals Than Zinc Both nickel and zinc markets are experiencing ore shortages (Chart 11, panels 1 and 2). For the nickel market, the ore shortage was mainly due to the Indonesian ore export ban, and Philippines' suspension of nickel miners for violating that country's environmental laws. For the zinc market, the ore shortage arose because of several big mines' depletion, years of underinvestment, and mine suspensions due to low prices late last year. The nickel ore shortage will become acute as the Indonesian ban remains in place and the Philippines' government becomes stricter on domestic mining operations. However, for zinc, most of the output loss occurred last year, and actually may be restored to the market in the near future. Zinc prices reached $2,811/MT last year as the market was adjusting to lost supply - the highest level since March 2008. In terms of demand, nickel exhibits much stronger demand growth versus zinc (Chart 11, panels 3 and 4). In addition, China's auto sales tax-cut policy will expire at year-end, which may cause Chinese auto production to fall in 2017. This will affect zinc much more than nickel, as less galvanized steel will be needed next year if Chinese car production falls. Investment Strategies We sold Dec/17 zinc at $2,400/MT on November 3, and the trade was stopped out at $2,500/MT with a 4% loss (Chart 12, panel 1). Zinc prices jumped 11.5% in four trading days in late November, which we believe was mainly driven by speculative buying. Nonetheless, in the near term, global zinc supply is still on the tight side, and zinc inventories are low (Chart 12, panel 2). Zinc prices could rally more in the near term. We were looking to go Long Dec/17 LME nickel vs. Short Dec/17 LME zinc if the ratio drops to 4.3 since mid-November (Chart 13, panel 1). We also suggested that if the order gets filled, put a stop-loss for the ratio at 4.15. Chart 12Zinc: Stay Tactically Neutral Chart 13Risks To Long Nickel/Short Zinc On November 25, the order was filled at the closing price ratio of 4.17. But unfortunately the ratio declined to 4.08 on the next trading day (November 28), based on the closing price ratio, which triggered our predefined stop-loss level with a 2.2% loss. The ratio was trading at 4.17 again as of November 29. As the market is so volatile, we recommend initiating this relative trade if it drops below 4.05 to compensate the risk. If the order gets filled, we suggest putting a 5% stop-loss level for the relative trade. After all, nickel prices could still have pullbacks, as global nickel inventories still are elevated (Chart 13, panel 2). Risks Our strategically bearish view on zinc will be wrong if global zinc ore supply does not increase as much as we expect, or global zinc demand still has robust growth in 2017. Our strategically bullish view on nickel will be wrong if Indonesian refined nickel output increases quickly, resulting in a smaller supply deficit than the market expects. However, due to power shortages, poor infrastructure and funding problems, development on many of the smelters and stainless steel plants once envisioned for the nickel market have been delayed. We believe these problems will continue to be headwinds for Indonesian nickel output growth, and will continue to restrict supply growth going forward. Aluminum: Cautiously Bullish In 2017 Chart 14Aluminum: Remain Tactically Bullish ##br## And Strategically Neutral Sharp supply cuts combined with tight inventories have pushed aluminum prices higher this year. Prices in China have rallied more than 50% so far this year, which was more than double the 20% rise in the global aluminum market (Chart 14, panel 1). This probably indicates a tighter Chinese domestic market than the global (ex-China) market. Looking forward, we remain tactically bullish on LME aluminum prices and neutral on SHFE aluminum prices.9 The supply shortage will likely persist ex-China over next three to six months. Global aluminum production has declined faster than demand so far this year. Based on the WBMS data, global aluminum output was still in a deep contraction in September (Chart 14, panel 2). Even though China's operating capacity has been rising every month so far this year, Chinese total aluminum output for the first 10 months was still 1.1% less than the same period last year. In addition, considering the possible output loss due to the Spring Festival in late January, we believe it will take another three to six months for China to meet its own domestic demand and inventory restocking. Extremely tight domestic inventories should limit the downside of SHFE aluminum prices (Chart 14, panel 3) as the market adjusts on the supply side. We think there is more upside for LME aluminum prices, as the supply shortage will likely persist ex-China over next three to six months. Currently, Chinese aluminum prices are about 18% higher than the LME prices (both are in USD terms), which will likely limit the supply coming from China's exports to the rest of world. Strategically, we are neutral LME aluminum prices and bearish on SHFE aluminum prices. Currently, about 85% of the China's aluminum operating capacity is making money. With new low-cost capacity and more idled capacity coming back on line, profitable Chinese smelters will continue boosting their aluminum production to maximize profits. This, over a longer term like nine months to one year, should eventually spill over to the global market. Investment strategy Chart 15Still Look To Buy Aluminum We recommended buying the Mar/17 LME aluminum contract (Chart 15) if it falls to $1,640/MT (current: $1,721/MT). We expect the contract price to rise to $1,900/MT over the next three to five months. If our order is filled, we suggest a 5% stop-loss. Risks Prices at both the SHFE and LME may come under intense pressure if aluminum producers in China increases their output quickly, even at a small loss, in order to create jobs and revenue for local governments. If global aluminum demand falters in 2017 while supply is rising, we will revisit our strategically neutral view on LME aluminum prices. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report for iron ore and steel "Global Iron Ore And Steel Markets: Is The Rally Over?," dated October 6, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. In this report, we are using Metal Bulletin iron ore price delivered to Qingdao port in China as our iron ore reference price. 2 Please see "N. China city cuts 32 mln tonnes of steel capacity" published October 30, 2016, by Xinhua's online service, xinhuanet.com. 3 Please see "CHART: The breakeven iron ore prices for major miners in 2016," published June 7, 2016, by Business Insider Australia. 4 Please see "China Resources Quarterly, Southern spring ~ Northern autumn 2016," published by the Australian Department of Industry, Innovation and Science and Westpac, particularly this discussion on p. 4, "The real estate sector." 5 Please see "China August new loans well above expectations on mortgage boom," published by Reuters September 14, 2016. 6 Please see the OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2016 Issue 2, Chapter 1, entitled "General Assessment of the Macroeconomic Situation," p. 44, under the sub-head "Rapid debt accumulation risks instability in EMEs." The IMF also expressed concern over rising debt levels supporting the real-estate boom in China, particularly in the larger cities, noting, "Credit and financial sector leverage continue to rise faster than GDP, and state-owned enterprises in sectors with excess capacity and real estate continue to absorb a major share of credit flow. The deviation of credit growth from its long-term trend, the so-called credit overhang--a key cross-country indicator of potential crisis--is estimated somewhere in the range of 22-27 percent of GDP..., which is very high by international comparison." Please see the IMF's Global Financial Stability Report for October 2016, "Fostering Stability in a Low-Growth, Low-Rate Era," p. 35, under the sub-heading "China: Growing Credit and Complexities." 7 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report "Chinese Property Market: A Structural Downtrend Just Started," dated June 4, 2015 and "China Property Market Q&As," dated July 2, 2015, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Oil Production Cut, Trump Election Will Stoke Inflation Expectations," dated November 17, 2016 and "The Lithium Battery Supply Chain: Efficient Exposure To Electric-Vehicle Market," dated October 27, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Market Saturation Likely In Asia, If KSA - Russia Fail To Curb Oil Production," dated November 10, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Closed Trades
Highlights Despite the static headline GDP figures, most of our indicators suggest Chinese growth momentum has improved since the second quarter, particularly in the industrial sector. A dollar overshoot, domestic housing policy tightening and potential policy mistakes by the Chinese authorities need to be monitored for potential growth disappointments. The rally in commodity prices reflects improving Chinese demand, but it has ignored the surging dollar. Chinese H shares are a safer play on Chinese reflation and growth improvement. Feature Our recent conversations with clients suggest that global investors' concerns over China have slightly abated, as various economic numbers have shown improvement. Nonetheless, investors remain highly sceptical about China's macro situation, raising questions ranging from "traditional" distrust of China's economic data to the latest worries of a "trade war" with the U.S. under President Donald Trump. We dedicate this week's report to addressing some common issues that we have been discussing with clients of late. What Is The Actual GDP Growth In China? In Recent Quarters, It Seems To Be Holding In A "Too-Good-To-Be-True" Tight Range? Chinese real GDP growth has been 6.7% for the past three consecutive quarters, right in the middle of the government's official target of 6.5-7%. This seemingly incredible stability has stoked long-held suspicions among investors about the reliability of Chinese economic data. While we do not claim to have the ultimate insider story on official Chinese statistics, and it is certainly possible that the macro numbers are "smoothed out" to hide otherwise greater volatility in economic reality, it is also possible that stable headline numbers overshadow bigger underlying fluctuations among different sectors (Chart 1). Chart 1Greater Volatility Underneath ##br##Stable GDP For example, while real GDP growth has stayed at 6.7% since Q1 this year, there has been some fluctuations in both the industrial and service sectors. Within the service sector, the financial industry has had a major downturn, with nominal growth falling from 10.9% in Q1 to 8.2% in the last quarter, partly due to last year's base effect of the stock market boom-bust. The real estate sector, on the other hand, has been on the mend, with growth strengthening from 14% in Q1 to 16.3%. Regardless, the exact GDP growth figures rarely matter from an investor's perspective. What is more important is the growth trajectory and policy implications. On this front, most of our indicators suggest growth momentum has improved since the second quarter of the year, particularly in the industrial sector. A strong recovery in manufacturing-sensitive indicators such as railway freight, heavy machine sales and electricity consumption (Chart 2). Continued acceleration in profit growth, in both the overall industrial sector and among listed firms.1 Further improvement in pricing power and producer prices. Producer price deflation that lasted for over four years ended in September, compared with 5.3% deflation in January. Looking forward, we expect the economy to continue to improve, even though some of the high-flying variables may begin to moderate. On the policy front, the authorities will likely enter a wait-and-see mode, especially on interest rates. Our model signals that the central bank's interest rate cuts have likely come to an end, unless the economy relapses again (Chart 3). This is also reflected in the pickup in interest rates in the bond market. We will further explore China's growth outlook, policy orientation and investment implications for the New Year in the first week of 2017. Chart 2Broad Improvement In##br## Industrial Indicators Chart 3No More Rate Cuts, ##br##For Now There Appears To Be Growing Acceptance In The Market That China Will Not Suffer A Hard Landing. What Are You Monitoring To Gauge The Growth Risk? We have not been in the "hard landing" camp, and have been anticipating a "rocky bottoming" process in Chinese growth for the year.2 Despite enormous financial volatility in January associated with the domestic stock market and the RMB, growth has largely played out as we anticipated. We expect the economy to remain resilient, but are watching some pressure points that could lead to disappointments. The first is the RMB, which has been depreciating notably against the dollar in recent weeks, as the dollar uptrend has resumed with vigour. In our view, a strong dollar is one of the key risks, as it not only generates downward pressure on the CNY/USD cross rate, on which the market tends to focus closely, but also halts the "stealth" depreciation of the RMB in trade-weighted terms, which reduces the reflationary benefits of a weaker exchange rate on the Chinese economy (Chart 4). In other words, a weak CNY/USD and a strong trade-weighted RMB is a poor combination for both financial markets and the macro economy.3 So far, the CNY/USD decline appears orderly, and we doubt the greenback will massively overshoot against all major currencies within a short period without causing growth difficulties in the U.S. However, the situation should be closely monitored and continuously assessed. The second is housing policy tightening, which the authorities have re-imposed since October to check rapid gains in home prices. So far, the tightening measures have not led to a significant slowdown in home sales in major cities: Daily home sales in the major cities that we track have broken out to new record highs (Chart 5). However, new housing supply has already been very weak, which together with robust sales could lead to even lower housing inventory and a further spike in home prices. We maintain guarded optimism on China's housing construction, as we discussed in detail in our previous report.4 The risk is that unyielding home price gains will force the Chinese authorities to up the ante on tightening, which could lead to a sudden deterioration in housing activity. In this vein, price moderation should be good news from policymakers' perspectives, as well as for the overall economy. Chart 4The RMB: Weak Or Strong? Chart 5Monitor Housing Activity Finally, as we have argued repeatedly, China's growth difficulties in recent years have had a lot to do with the excessively tight policy environment post the global financial crisis - a policy mistake that compounded deflationary pressures in the economy, which had already been suffering from weak external demand. Despite budding improvement in the economy, China's overall macro environment remains highly challenging, and policy mistakes that undermine aggregate demand will prove extremely costly. In this vein, any broader attempt to tighten policies, hasten administrative enforcement to de-lever or prematurely withdraw fiscal support on infrastructure construction will prove counterproductive. A more recent risk is how China deals with the potential protectionist threat from the U.S. under President Donald Trump.5 Our view is that China should avoid escalating trade tensions with tic-for-tac retaliations that could further complicate the growth outlook. As far as the markets are concerned, Chinese equities appear to have begun to price in a lower "China risk premium." Forward P/E ratios for both A shares and H shares have been rising since early this year, likely a reflection of investors' easing anxiety on China's macro conditions (Chart 6). Nonetheless, Chinese stocks' forward P/E ratios remain well below other major markets and the global average, and the risk premium in Chinese equities is still substantially higher than historical norms. Beyond near-term volatility, we expect the risk premium in Chinese stocks to continue to revert to the mean, leading to multiples expansion and further price gains. At minimum, Chinese equities should outpace global and EM benchmarks. There Has Been A Massive Rally In Some Industrial Commodity Prices In China. Is This Driven By Speculative Frenzy? How Much Does The Commodities Rally Reflect Chinese Demand? Industrial commodity prices have rebounded sharply in both the Chinese domestic spot markets and various derivatives exchanges. For some products, prices have gone parabolic, and there is little doubt that these extreme moves cannot be fully explained by fundamental factors (Chart 7). Nonetheless, it is also well known that commodities in general are subject to volatile price fluctuations, as they are extremely sensitive to marginal shifts in the supply-demand balance due to very low price elasticity among both producers and end users. Therefore, it is impossible, and rather meaningless, to precisely detangle speculative forces and fundamental factors. Chart 6Risk Premium Will Continue ##br##To Mean Revert Chart 7No Clear Evidence Of Commodity ##br## Speculative Frenzy That said, from a macro perspective, a few observations are in order: There does not appear to be a particularly high level of over-trading and speculative activity involved this time around compared with historical norms. Futures transactions this year have been hovering at close to record low levels, despite sharp prices gains in numerous products. Even if prices decline sharply, the impact on the financial system should be negligible because of very low investor participation. Broad-based improvement in numerous industry-sensitive indicators shown in Chart 2 on page 2 suggest the gains in commodity prices are at least partially attributable to improving demand rather than purely driven by speculative frenzy. In fact, improving Chinese demand is also reflected in a firmer global shipping rate. The Baltic Dry Index has almost quadrupled since its February lows, which hardly has anything to do with Chinese retail speculators (Chart 8, top panel). Massive price gains in some commodities such as steel and coal have been partially driven by the Chinese authorities' attempts early this year to "de-capacity" the two sectors, with aggressive efforts to cut idle capacity and reduce domestic production. The self-imposed restrictions together with improving demand have led to sharp price gains and a significant rebound in imports of related products (Chart 8, bottom panel). This confirms our view that the overcapacity issue in the Chinese industrial sector has been overestimated.6 Moreover, regulators' control on domestic supply has been relaxed, which will likely lead to rising domestic production in due course - this bodes well for Chinese domestic business activity, but poorly for the prices of related products. Historically, commodity prices have been positively correlated with China's growth trajectory, and negatively correlated with the trade-weighted dollar (Chart 9). Currently, the commodities rally clearly reflects regained strength in Chinese industrial activity, but has ignored the recent strength of the greenback, leading to a glaring divergence that has been very rare in recent history. Chart 8More Signs Of ##br## Improving Demand Chart 9Macro Drivers And Commodity Prices: ##br##Mind The Gap It remains to be seen how such a divergence will eventually converge. Our hunch is that the dollar will likely continue to rally in the near term, which means commodity prices could converge to the downside. Our commodities team has upgraded base metals from underweight earlier this year on China's reflation efforts, and is currently neutral on the asset class. What is more certain, however, is that China's reflation efforts and growth improvement should also lift Chinese H shares, but the price gains of H shares so far have been much more muted. Earlier this year we recommended going long Chinese H shares against the CRB index, which so far has been flat. We are still comfortable holding this position. The bottom line is that we do not advocate chasing the current rally in base metals. Chinese H shares are a safer play on Chinese reflation and growth improvement. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Stocks: Between Domestic Improvement And External Uncertainty", dated November 10, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "2016: A Choppy Bottoming", dated January 6, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The RMB's Near-Term Dilemma And Long-Term Ambition", dated October 20, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Housing Tightening: Now And 2010", dated October 13, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China As A Currency Manipulator?", dated November 24, 2016; and "China-U.S. Trade Relations: The Big Picture", dated November 17, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Myth Of Chinese Overcapacity", dated October 6, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
The S&P health care equipment index has underperformed alongside most other long-duration sectors, but the share price ratio has reached a point where buying interest should emerge. Sales have been running at a healthy double-digit clip, and new order growth remains firm, providing conviction that the outlook remains bright. Even exports are contributing positively, despite the high level of the U.S. dollar. The IFO survey of German medical equipment demand suggests that a solid undercurrent of foreign uptake exists. The recent contraction in valuation multiples suggests that sales are expected to disappoint in the coming year, an outlook that appears overly cautious, especially within the context of the nascent improvement in industry return on equity. We reiterate our overweight allocation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HCEP - MDT, ABT, DHR, SYK, BDX, BSX, BAX, ISRG, EW, STJ, ZBH, BCR, HOLX, VAR.
The sudden economic exuberance following the Trump election victory has caused a flight out of traditional safe havens that looks to have gone too far. For instance, consumer products stocks (household products, beverages and packaged food) are now trading below the broad market P/E multiple, in aggregate, on a trailing 12-month basis. The chart shows that forward relative returns have typically been very robust when the group trades at a discount to the market. What could go wrong? History shows that a period of stable and strong GDP growth can cause discounted valuations to persist. Pricing in such an outlook at this juncture is overly optimistic, given the unknown fallout from a strong U.S. dollar on the rest of the world, trade uncertainty, and potential financial strains in the heavily indebted corporate sector as a consequence of rising bond yields. Keep in mind that the consumer products has a positive correlation with the U.S. dollar (top panel). We would be buyers on recent share price weakness.
The S&P hotels index had been in a relative performance bear market since late last year when we reduced it to underweight, but downside risks have diminished even though a number of players have lowered 2017 guidance and revenue per room (REVPAR) expectations. A variety of valuation metrics show that the price ratio is plumbing recessionary-type levels. REVPAR should be supported by decent consumer spending. Wage growth, and thus aggregate income, is perking up, job security has risen and income expectations are on the upswing. Consumers are behaving as if income gains will be permanent, given the increase in consumer loan demand. Low fuel prices and the surge in vehicle miles driven are consistent with solid lodging outlays. The latter have recently reaccelerated, and are supporting better than market hotel pricing power. Now that wage inflation has rolled over, the margin squeeze should go on hiatus. The bottom line is that an upgrade to neutral is now in order, locking in a profit of 3% on our underweight recommendation. Please see yesterday's Weekly Report for additional charts and analysis. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOTL - MAR, CCL, RCL, WYN.
Housing activity dipped this year. In response, building supply store sales cooled and analysts have been quick to slash both sales and earnings growth estimates for home improvement retailers. However, an overreaction appears to be occurring. There is little indication of a return to punitively deflationary industry conditions and we continue to be encouraged by the long-term outlook. Household formation is accelerating now that the unemployment rate is below 5%. Building permits are below average levels, even excluding the housing bubble period. Consumers have only recently become comfortable taking on mortgage debt, and first time buyers represent a rising share of total home sales. Banks are ready and willing to extend mortgage credit, unlike most other credit. Ergo, housing activity still has legs. While the backup in Treasury yields will no doubt make housing somewhat less affordable, even a 100 basis point rise would not push affordability back to average levels. Mortgage payments would still be well below the long-term average as a share of income, and effective mortgage rates are still extremely low. Therefore, we would not be surprised to see stable housing metrics in the coming months, despite the yield back up. We recommend buying into home improvement retail share price weakness, please see yesterday's Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: BLBG: S5HOMI - HD, LOW.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The rise in Treasury yields is approaching a threshold that has often caused equity market indigestion. Stay focused on current monetary conditions rather than fiscal unknowns. The bear market in lodging stocks has played itself out: take profits on an underweight position. The sell-off in home improvement retail shares is overdone, and a contrarian long position should pay off despite the backup in mortgage rates. Recent Changes S&P Hotels Index - Take profits of 3% and raise to neutral. Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Feature Momentum may carry the market higher in the short run, but from current valuation levels, stocks, the dollar and bond yields can only climb sustainably in tandem if a non-inflationary economic boom is taking hold. In that sense, equities appear to be taking their cue solely from the anticipated U.S. political shift while ignoring the tightening in monetary conditions and hints of emerging market financial strains. The equity market outlook hinges on a judgement call as to whether the action in the currency and Treasury yields is reflective or restrictive? There are no easy answers, but below we discuss some of the variables that influence this decision. Chart 1 shows that the 10-year Treasury yield has climbed above fair value. Equity bulls may rejoice because yields have sauntered much deeper into undervalued territory before stocks have run into trouble. The big difference this time is that the greenback is also climbing. Parallel powerful rises in both the currency and yields are rare, and typically culminate in steep market pullbacks. Importantly, most of the recent yield rise reflects an increase in inflation expectations. The real component, i.e. economic growth expectations, has been far more muted (Chart 2). Chart 1Stocks, Yields, And The Dollar##br## Can't Climb Together For Long Chart 2Inflation Expectations ##br##Are Driving Up Yields Equities shrugged off the surge in yields during the 2013 taper tantrum. However, yields never rose above fair value then, and the increase was almost entirely due to the real component rather than a rise in inflation expectations, i.e. it was more reflective than restrictive (Chart 2). Meanwhile, equities had just been through a difficult stretch in 2012 on fears the euro was going to break apart, and sovereign yields in the periphery were in the early stages of a long descent (Chart 3). In other words, there was a structural tailwind for equities. In addition, the U.S. dollar was range-bound during that period, overall profit growth was strong, business lending was picking up and corporate bond spreads stayed tight (Chart 3). The outlook today is much different. Euro area periphery yields are up sharply, EM bond spreads are flaring out, profit growth is much weaker and the U.S. is importing deflation through U.S. dollar strength (Chart 3), particularly against China and other developing market currencies. Thus, we are uncomfortable making comparisons between today and 2013 broad market resilience. The speed of upward adjustment in Treasury yields also influences equity prices. At the moment, yields are rising faster than profit growth. The overall market has typically become more volatile and often corrects when the growth in yields outpaces profit growth (Chart 4). Chart 3The 2013 Taper Tantrum##br## Is Not A Good Guide Chart 4Too Far,##br## Too Fast? The most painful equity corrections have occurred when this gauge drops below -10%, as the latter suggests that inflation expectations are increasing rapidly, warning of valuation and monetary tightening ahead. This threshold is in danger of being breached on any further rise in yields. However, if the currency continues climbing, yields are unlikely to rise much further, if at all, underscoring that the next big tactical sub-surface market move may be a recovery in yield-dependent sectors as investors begin to fret about the deflationary and profit-sapping impact of a strong dollar. Against this backdrop, we caution against getting too comfortable extrapolating market momentum, because recent gains could be erased just as quickly as they accrued if monetary conditions keep tightening. On a sub-surface basis, value is being created in interest rate-sensitive sectors and destroyed in cyclical sectors, primarily industrials, as discussed last week. Meanwhile, we maintain a domestic vs. global focus, and recommend buying into the pullback in housing stocks. Buy Home Improvement Retailers Like many other interest rate-sensitive groups, home improvement retailers (HIR) have lagged recently, fueled by the surge in bond yields, and hence, mortgage rates. We doubt this is sustainable. U.S. currency strength will refocus attention on the lack of top-line growth in global-oriented industries, which will reverse recent countertrend intra-sector capital flows, and ensure that bond yields are capped. The housing market slowed this year by most metrics (housing starts, permits, sales growth), which undermined remodeling activity. In response, building supply store sales cooled (Chart 5, bottom panel). Recent earnings reports from housing-geared industries such as appliances and furniture vendors have also disappointed. Analysts have been quick to slash both sales and earnings growth estimates (Chart 5). However, as often happens, an overreaction appears to be occurring. There is little indication of a return to punitively deflationary industry conditions. In fact, the producer price index for appliance and furniture makers has shot up in recent months, heralding stronger HIR pricing power (Chart 6, second panel). Lumber prices are also up sharply, despite U.S. dollar strength, which will boost the top-line and profit margins (Chart 6). At a fixed spread over lumber prices, the higher the latter go, the more profit earned at a constant volume sold. We continue to be encouraged by the long-term outlook. Household formation is accelerating now that the unemployment rate is below 5%. Building permits are below average levels, even excluding the housing bubble period (Chart 7). Chart 5Housing Slowdown Already Reflected Chart 6No Sign Of Deflationary Stress Chart 7Still Early In The Mortgage Cycle Consumers have only recently become comfortable taking on mortgage debt, and first time buyers represent a rising share of total home sales. Banks are ready and willing to extend mortgage credit (Chart 7, bottom panel), unlike most other credit. Ergo, housing activity still has legs. While the backup in Treasury yields will no doubt make housing somewhat less affordable, Chart 8 shows that even a 100 basis point rise would not push affordability back to average levels. Mortgage payments would still be well below the long-term average as a share of income, and effective mortgage rates are still extremely low. Therefore, we would not be surprised to see stable housing metrics in the coming months, despite the yield back up. Existing house prices are flirting with new highs (Chart 7), despite the early stage of mortgage re-leveraging, which bodes well for future house price increases. If homeowners are confident that house prices will stay solid, they will be more inclined to make home improvement investments. These factors are represented in our HIR model. The model is climbing steadily, exhibiting a rare positive divergence from relative share prices (Chart 9). Our inclination is to side with the objective message from the model. The valuation case for the group has improved markedly. The forward P/E is well below the average of the last decade and the dividend yield is now on a par with that of the broad market. Typically, a positive yield differential has been a bullish relative performance signal (Chart 10). Chart 8Higher Yields Are Not A Game Changer Chart 9Our Model Remains Firm Chart 10Discounting A Weak Housing Market Most importantly, the industry continues to generate sky-high return on equity, and free cash flow is booming. The implication is that shareholder-friendly stock buybacks and dividend increases should continue apace, especially compared with the overall corporate sector. At current valuation levels, there is room for a playable recovery in relative performance, especially if Treasury yields level off on the back of relentless U.S. dollar strength. Bottom Line: Home improvement retail (BLBG: S5HOMI - HD, LOW) stock price weakness is a buying opportunity. We recommend an above-benchmark allocation. End Of The Bear Market In Hotel Stocks The S&P hotels index has been in a relative performance bear market since late last year when we reduced it to underweight, but downside risks have diminished even though a number of players have lowered 2017 guidance and revenue per room (REVPAR) expectations. Relative value has been created by the past year of underperformance. A variety of valuation metrics show that the price ratio is plumbing recessionary-type levels (Chart 11). Most notably, the relative price/sales ratio is almost on a par with the lows during the Great Recession, when a steep contraction was anticipated for the foreseeable future. Such a dire forecast is not in the cards, even if economic growth disappoints an increasingly optimistic consensus. The plunge in net earnings revisions has not been confirmed by a downturn in hours worked. Typically, these two series move hand-in-hand (Chart 12). Instead, hours worked continue to trend higher suggesting that reduced profit guidance is bringing analyst expectations to more attainable levels rather than signaling impending doom. After all, persistent hotel construction growth means that demand needs to run hot in order to keep deflationary pressures at bay. This has been a tall order in the past year, as tight business budgets and lackluster discretionary consumer spending have kept REVPAR under wraps (Chart 13). Occupancy rates remain below previous expansionary run rates, leaving revenue per room more exposed than normal to demand soft spots. Chart 11End Of Bear Market Chart 12An Undershoot In Estimates Chart 13Slow, But Steady, Growth REVPAR could be supported by decent consumer spending. Wage growth, and thus aggregate income, are perking up, job security has risen and income expectations are on the upswing. Consumers are behaving as if income gains will be permanent, given the increase in consumer loan demand. Low fuel prices and the surge in vehicle miles driven are consistent with solid lodging outlays. The latter have recently reaccelerated, and are supporting better than market hotel pricing power (Chart 13). Importantly, hotel profit margins are no longer under extreme duress. Decent pricing power gains and an easing in the industry's total wage bill inflation have combined to support an increase in our profit margin proxy (Chart 14). All of this implies that profit conditions are stabilizing, just as valuations have been squeezed, warranting an upgrade to neutral. Why not a full shift to overweight? There are a number of factors to consider. The lodging industry is battling secular crosscurrents. On the positive side, the lodging industry has consistently managed to increase its share of total consumer spending, in real terms (Chart 15), with periodic underperformance phases, typically during recessions. This likely reflects well-timed capacity investments and strong brands. As a result, hotel pricing power has also been in a structural uptrend (Chart 15). This cycle, pricing power has lagged, consistent with subdued REVPAR gains, but hotels have still managed to aggressively grow earnings per share. While buybacks have undoubtedly played a role in this advance, EPS is following a typical pattern. In the last four decades, hotels have suffered four major recession-related earnings contractions. After each contraction, profits ultimately surpassed their previous peak by more than 75%, on average. The duration of the upcycle averaged five years. This cycle the recovery has already lasted more than six years, but hotel profits have only increased 30% from the 2007 peak. That implies substantial profit upside ahead just to reach the average, albeit pricing power will need to kick in as it has in past cycles. On the downside, consumers are still showing a penchant for spending more on essentials compared with non-essentials. The ratio of retail sales at cyclical stores to non-discretionary stores has been highly correlated with relative performance (Chart 16, top panel). Chart 14The Margin Squeeze Is Over Chart 15Structural Tailwinds... Chart 16... And Headwinds That raises some question about the latest burst of strength in lodging outlays, especially in view of the pruning in business travel budgets, as confirmed by anecdotes from recent earnings reports. BCA's capital spending model is not forecasting any improvement (Chart 16, bottom panel). Lingering in the background has been the relentless increase in lodging construction. Capacity growth represents a long-term threat to pricing power (Chart 16), over and above the threat from new entrants such as AirBnB. Expansion explains why real hotel consumer prices have not come close to hitting new highs even though real hotel spending has. Hotel capacity expansion heralds intensifying deflationary pressure. Meanwhile, hotels have sizeable global operations, exposing profitability to risks of incremental U.S. dollar strength. Consequently, we would prefer to await signs of an impending improvement in capital spending, and thus, business travel, and/or a sharp downturn in hotel construction spending, before lifting positions all the way to overweight. Bottom Line: Lift the S&P hotels index (BLBG: S5HOTL - MAR, CCL, RCL, WYN) to neutral, locking in an 3% relative performance profit since our initial underweight call nearly a year ago. A further upgrade is tempting, but awaits relief from pricing power constraints. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and growth over value.
Highlights Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the FTSE100 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the pound? Stay neutral in the Eurostoxx600 versus the FTSE100. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the Nikkei225 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the yen? Overweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the Nikkei 225. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the S&P500 reduces to: will European Banks outperform U.S. Technology? Underweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500. Feature 2016 is the year of the political shock. But for investors, some things have stayed faithfully the same. Chart of the WeekEurostoxx Vs. Nikkei Reduces To: Will Euro/Yen Weaken? Last week's report From Berlin Wall To Mexican Wall explained how the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 ushered in a great era of globalization - an era in which goods, services, capital and people have moved around the world more and more freely. Chart I-2The Globalization Of Stock Markets For investors, one major upshot is that the world's biggest companies have also become more and more globalized. The leading European stock market indexes - Eurostoxx600, FTSE100, DAX30, CAC40 and many other national indexes - are now just a collection of multinational companies with a global footprint. The same applies to major indexes outside Europe, such as the Nikkei225 and S&P500. Before the era of globalization, many companies had little exposure to economies outside their country or region of domicile. Unsurprisingly, in the 1980s, a German bank share price was more correlated with the rest of the German stock market than it was with a U.S. bank share price. But today, a large proportion of sales and profits are sourced globally. The German bank share price is now more correlated with the U.S. bank share price than it is with the rest of the German stock market! (Chart I-2) This begs the question: if Brexit and President-elect Trump are ushering in a great era of anti-globalization, will the major indexes become parochial once again? The answer is perhaps, but it will be a slow process - even assuming that the anti-globalization rhetoric does fully materialize. Sometimes, Stock Market Allocation Reduces To A Currency View For the time being, one obvious distinction between the major indexes will remain instrumental in driving performance differences. The Eurostoxx600 is denominated in euros, the FTSE100 in pounds, the Nikkei225 in yen, and the S&P500 in dollars. However, the constituent companies' sales and profits are denominated in a mixture of major global currencies, or in dollars. So all else being equal, if the local currency weakens - in other words, if other global currencies strengthen versus the local currency - then index profits will rise in local currency terms. Meaning the index value must go up. And if the local currency strengthens, the index value must go down. Simplistic as it sounds, some important asset allocation decisions just reduce to a bi-lateral currency view. Chart I-3 clearly shows that Eurostoxx600 versus FTSE100 relative performance reduces to a simple question: will the euro weaken against the pound? If so, the Eurostoxx600 will outperform the FTSE100. And vice-versa. Clearly, the outlook for euro/pound has been an important question this year, and will be an equally important question next year. Chart I-3Eurostoxx Vs. FTSE Reduces To: Will Euro/Pound Weaken? Likewise, the Chart of the Week clearly shows that Eurostoxx600 versus Nikkei225 relative performance reduces to a similar simple question: will the euro weaken against the yen? If so, the Eurostoxx600 will outperform the Nikkei225. And vice-versa. Sometimes, Stock Market Allocation Reduces To A Sector View But in the case of the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500, relative performance does not reduce to the direction of euro/dollar. Since mid-2014, the euro has weakened substantially versus the dollar, yet the Eurostoxx600 has underperformed the S&P500. This is because another factor drives this relative performance pair (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 Does Not ##br##Depend On Euro/Dollar... Chart I-5...Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 Does Depend ##br##On Banks Vs. Technology Although major indexes are a collection of multinational companies, it doesn't follow that the sector exposures of these indexes will be the same. Comparing the Eurostoxx600 with the S&P500, the Eurostoxx600 has a marked overexposure to Banks and an especially marked underexposure to Technology (Table I-1). Table I-1Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 = Overweight##br## Banks, Underweight Technology Banks comprise 13% of the Eurostoxx600 market capitalization but only 6% of the S&P500. On the flipside, Technology comprises just 4% of the Eurostoxx600 market capitalization but a very substantial 21% of the S&P500. To repeat, multinational company share prices today are more correlated with their global sector than with their domestic stock market of listing. Recently, this has been true even for U.S. Banks - which amazingly have shown a higher correlation with European Banks than with the rest of the U.S. stock market. It follows that when two indexes are distinguished by large sector skews, these sector skews will drive relative performance. Our Special Reports Picking Countries The Right Way 1 Parts 1, 2 and 3 showed that this is the case for most head to head stock market comparisons within Europe. It is also the case for the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500. Put simply, for the Eurostoxx600 to outperform the S&P500 on a sustained basis, Banks must outperform Technology on a sustained basis. Or to be more precise, European Banks must outperform U.S. Technology (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 Reduces To: Will European Banks Outperform U.S. Technology? Applying Reductionism To The Eurostoxx600 We can now apply investment reductionism to position the Eurostoxx600 against three other major indexes: the FTSE100, the Nikkei225 and the S&P500. 1. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the FTSE100 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the pound? For the foreseeable future, the euro/pound exchange rate hinges on the perceived severity of Brexit. In this regard, there is unlikely to be meaningful new information until the U.K. Supreme Court delivers its verdict on the legal process that the U.K. government must follow. The verdict is due in January. So for the time being, it is appropriate to stay neutral in the Eurostoxx600 versus the FTSE100. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the Nikkei225 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the yen? 2. The euro/yen exchange rate hinges on ECB/BoJ relative monetary policy. Given that the BoJ made its bold policy move a few months ago, the focus now is on whether the ECB will continue with QE beyond March 2017. Chart I-7European Banks Do Not Offer An Especially##br## Large Discount To U.S. Technology The minutes of the ECB's most recent policy meeting provide some clues. On the one hand, the central bank cautioned on the unintended consequences of extended QE: "The possible side effects of the low interest rate environment and the range of non-standard measures in place on the longer-term intermediation capacity of banks and other financial institutions had to be further examined" On the other hand, the ECB emphasised: "(QE) was set to run... in any case until the ECB saw a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim... underlying inflation, however, continued to lack clear signs of a convincing upward trend." On this basis, it seems that the ECB will extend its QE program beyond March 2017, as well as give a strong commitment to keep policy rates anchored. But the recent underperformance of the Eurostoxx600 versus Nikkei225 has discounted a sizable strengthening of euro/yen. It is appropriate to lean against this and overweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the Nikkei225. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the S&P500 reduces to: will European Banks outperform U.S. Technology? Again, the minutes of the ECB's most recent policy meeting perfectly summarized the environment for European banks: "Ongoing structural challenges to banks' balance sheets, notably arising from still high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs) in parts of the euro area banking sector, in conjunction with regulatory challenges (BRRD), and the weakness in profitability were seen to pose a risk to the transmission of monetary policy and a further recovery in credit dynamics" Or as we recently put it,2 European bank investors are fighting three long-term headwinds: BRRD, NPLs and NIRP. Yet on a price to forward earnings multiple, European Banks do not offer an especially large discount to U.S. Technology (Chart I-7). Therefore, investment reductionism says it is appropriate to underweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the three European Investment Strategy Special Reports 'Picking 5 European Countries The Right Way' November 13, 2014, 'Picking Countries The Right Way: Part 2' March 26, 2015 and 'Picking Countries The Right Way: Part 3' November 12, 2015, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "All Roads Lead To Banks", dated October 6, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The recent sharp moves in markets offer another opportunity for a long plantinum / short palladium pair-trade. A similar opportunity on October 6 successfully signaled a 13% countertrend move. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-8 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations
After a semiconductor-driven, M&A related relative performance surge, the S&P technology sector has stumbled in recent weeks. The sell-off bears some similarities with the taper-tantrum period in 2013. Then, bond yields soared as the Fed floated trial balloons about tapering QE. As a long duration sector, technology bore the brunt of the backlash from a higher discount rate. Tech stocks did not trough until yields peaked. Moreover, in that period, BCA's Capital Spending Indicator had firmed while tech stocks were being sold off, signaling that corporate sector tech demand would soon improve. A recovery in tech new order confirmed that the sales outlook had brightened. Now, the capital spending outlook remains shaky, and tech new order growth is nil. Meanwhile, tech pricing power has nosedived. Deflation pressures are likely to intensify as the U.S. dollar appreciates. The bottom line is that there is no rush to lift underweight tech sector allocations.
Special Report Highlights A central bank cannot control/target the quantity and price of money simultaneously. For the past few years, China's central bank has silently moved away from controlling money growth toward targeting interest rates. As such, the reserve requirements imposed on banks have not and will not be a constraint on Chinese commercial banks' ability to lend and create money if the PBoC continues to supply banks with reserves "on demand." China's banks have created too many RMBs (broad money/deposits) and the PBoC has accommodated them. Such enormous supply of RMBs and mainland households' and companies' desire to get rid of their RMBs will lead to further yuan depreciation. Continue shorting the RMB and Asian currencies versus the U.S. dollar. Re-instate a short Colombian peso trade; this time against an equal-weighted basket of the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble. Feature Following our October 26 Special Report titled, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses",1 some clients have asked us how our analysis squares with fact that the People's Bank of China (PBoC) conducts its monetary policy using a reserve requirement ratio. The relevant question being, why would the PBoC's reserve requirements not limit commercial banks' ability to create money/credit? In that Special Report, we wrote: "A commercial bank is not constrained in loan origination by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) to commercial banks "on demand." Given PBoC lending to banks has surged 5.5-fold over last three years (Chart I-1), we concluded that the reserve requirement ratio had, for all intents and purposes, lost its meaning in China. In this week's report we elaborate on this issue in detail. The main implication of our analysis today reinforces our conclusion from the previous report: namely, China's commercial banks have expanded credit enormously, and the PBoC has accommodated it. With respect to financial market implications, there are simply too many RMBs (broad money/deposits) in the system (Chart I-2). Chinese households and companies can instinctively sense this, and are opting to move their wealth into real assets, such as real estate, or foreign currencies. Hence, the oversupply of RMBs will continue to weigh on China's exchange rate, which will depreciate much further. We expect the US$/CNY to reach 7.8-8 over the next 12 months. Chart I-1The PBoC Has Provided Banks With Liquidity 'On Demand' Chart I-2There Are Too Many RMBs Floating Around Targeting Either The Quantity Or The Price Of Money Any central bank can target and control either the quantity of money or the price of money, but not both simultaneously. This holds true for any monopolist supplier of any good/service that does not have control over the demand curve. A demand curve for money is the function that ties the quantity demanded at various price points (the price being interest rates). Central banks - being monopolist suppliers of money, but unable to control money demand - must choose between controlling either the quantity of money or the price of money. The system of required reserves (RR) is a tool to control money supply (the quantity of money). When central banks reinforce the RR ratio, interbank interest rates typically swing enormously and often deviate considerably from the target policy rate (Chart 1). For example, when commercial banks expand loans too much and lack sufficient reserves at the central bank, they must borrow from the interbank market and thereby bid up interbank rates- i.e., short-term interest rates rise. This in turn restrains credit demand or the willingness to lend, and eventually reduces money growth. The opposite also holds true. When a central bank wants to target interest rates (the price of money), it cannot control money supply. To ensure that interbank/money market rates stay close to the policy rate - i.e., to reinforce its interest rate target - a central bank should provide the banking system with reserves "on demand." In other words, when interbank rates rise above the target policy rate, a central bank should inject sufficient liquidity into the system to bring interest rates down. Similarly, when interbank rates fall below the target policy rate, a central bank should withdraw enough liquidity from the banking system to assure interbank rates rise converging to its target policy rate. By supplying commercial banks with reserves (high powered money) "on demand" - i.e., providing as much reserves as they need - a central bank is de facto failing to enforce reserve requirements. As such, the central bank is giving up control over money creation. By and large, RRs lose their effectiveness if a central bank provides commercial banks with as much reserves as they request. In short, when a central bank opts for targeting interest rates, it cannot steer monetary aggregates - i.e., RRs and RR ratios lose their meaning. In the 1970s and 1980s, most central banks in advanced countries targeted money supply to achieve their policy goals such as inflation and sustainable economic growth. However, starting in the early 1990s, developed nations' central banks (the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, the Swiss National Bank and others) began to move away from controlling money supply (monetary aggregates) and toward targeting interest rates. Individual banks' limitations to borrow from the central bank often rests with the availability of collateral. So long as a commercial bank has eligible collateral (often government bonds), it can access central bank funding. This is true for Chinese commercial banks too. Bottom Line: Monetary authorities cannot control/target the quantity and price of money simultaneously. The Money Multiplier In An Interest Rate Targeting System When a central bank opts for targeting interest rates, commercial banks can originate an unlimited amount of loans and demand the central bank provide additional reserves, as long as they have eligible collateral. This corroborates our point from our previous report that a commercial bank's loan origination is not constrained by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) "on demand." In a fractional reserve system, the ability of commercial banks to create loans/money is defined by a money multiplier. A potential ceiling for a money multiplier (MM) is calculated as: MM = (1 / RR ratio) For example, when the RR ratio is 10%: The money multiplier MM = (1 / 0.1) = 10 In effect, the banking system can create up to 10 times more money/loans/deposits per one dollar of reserves. Under the current system of interest rate targeting – which has prevailed among most developed countries since the early 1990s and more recently in China (more on China below) – we can think of the RR ratio as heading towards zero because central banks provide banks with almost unlimited liquidity (reserves). The RR ratio is not zero because there are still limitations on banks' ability to borrow from central banks due the availability (or lack thereof) of eligible collateral or compliance with Basel III requirements. Yet as the RR ratio gets smaller in size, its reciprocal (1 / RR ratio) becomes very large (not infinite, but a plausibly very large number). Overall, when a central bank targets interest rates, the ceiling of the money multiplier is not set by the central bank. Rather, the money multiplier is de facto determined by commercial banks' willingness to originate loans. Thus, the money multiplier can potentially be very high when animal spirits among bankers and borrowers run wild. Consequently, the points discussed in our Special Report titled, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses"2 - namely that commercial banks create loans/money/deposits out of thin air - holds, and is relevant in a system where central banks target/control interest rates. Bottom Line: When central banks opt to control short-term interest rates, they must provide commercial banks with as much liquidity as the latter demands. In such a case, RRs and the RR ratio become almost irrelevant. Therefore, in an interest rate targeting system, banks' ability to originate loans/create money and deposits is not contingent on their reserves at the central bank. This point is greatly relevant to China. The PBoC: Shifting From Money To Interest Rate Targeting For the past few years, China’s central bank has silently moved away from controlling money growth to targeting interest rates. As a result, nowadays the PBoC has very little quantitative control over money/credit creation by commercial banks or the money multiplier. It is Chinese commercial banks that effectively drive money/credit/deposit creation. Chart I-3SHIBOR Crises In 2013 Forced PBoC ##br##To Start Targeting Interest Rates We suspect this shift in China's monetary policy management has been occurring since early 2014 on the heels of the so-called SHIBOR crisis, which erupted in June 2013 when interbank rates surged and was followed by another spike in interbank rates in December 2013 (Chart I-3). During these episodes, the PBoC enforced reserve requirements and thus did not provide liquidity to banks that were running short on it. In essence, it did whatever a central bank targeting money growth via control over RR would do. However, as interbank rates surged and banks complained, policymakers backed off, and provided banks with as much liquidity as they demanded. This stabilized interbank rates and, importantly, appears to have marked the PBoC's shift toward interest rate targeting. Thus, by de facto moving to a monetary system of targeting interest rates, the PBoC cannot effectively reinforce reserve requirements because it must supply any amount of reserves that commercial banks require to preclude a major spike in interbank rates. A few points illustrate that in fact the PBoC has been targeting short-term money market rates, and banks have expanded loans enormously despite their excess reserves being flat: Volatility in interbank rates has dropped substantially (Chart I-4), as the PBoC's claims on commercial banks has exploded 5.5-fold since the early 2014. Even though commercial banks' excess reserves have been flat, their lending has been booming - i.e., the money/credit multiplier has been rising (Chart I-5). This is only possible when the PBoC has been supplying reserves "on demand" or when it cuts the RR ratio. Since the RR ratio has not been cut over the past two years, it means that the former is true. Chart I-4Interbank Rate Volatility Has Fallen As ##br##PBoC Injected A Lot Of Liquidity Chart I-5China's Money/Credit Multiplier##br## Has Been Rising Just like central banks in advanced economies, the only way the PBoC can alter money/credit growth is if it lifts or cuts its interest rate target. Barring any changes to its policy rate, commercial banks, not the PBoC, determine money/loan/deposit creation in China. As to other factors that determine the amount of credit/money creation by commercial banks in China, we elaborated on these in the above-mentioned report. Bottom Line: It appears the PBoC has shifted toward targeting interest rates. Consequently, the PBoC cannot pretend to control money/credit origination unless it changes its interest rate target. Moreover, we reiterate that China's abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative behavior among Chinese banks and borrowers, and not the natural result of the country's high savings rate. Oversupply Of RMBs = A Lower Currency As China's central bank has been printing RMBs and commercial banks have been "multiplying" them at a high rate (by originating loans), the supply of RMBs has continued to explode. Such an oversupply of local currency will continue to depress the value of the nation's exchange rate. The PBoC's liquidity injections have exploded in recent years (Chart I-6). The central bank has not only been offsetting the liquidity withdrawal due to its currency foreign exchange market interventions, but it has also been providing banks with as much liquidity as they require. The objective seems to have been to avoid a rise in interbank rates when corporate leverage is extremely high and banks are overextended. Since February 2015, the PBoC's international reserves have dropped by US$0.9 trillion, or 4.2 trillion RMB (Chart I-7). This means that the PBoC has withdrawn 4.2 trillion RMBs from the system. If the central bank did not re-inject these RMBs into the financial system, interbank rates would have skyrocketed. As the PBoC has injected RMBs into the system, it has effectively undone its RMB defense. The whole point of defending the exchange rate from falling or depreciating too fast is to shrink local currency liquidity. Yet, naturally, that would also lead to higher interbank rates. If the central bank chooses not to tolerate higher interest rates and continues to inject local currency into circulation, the RMB's depreciation will likely continue and accelerate. By injecting RMBs into the system, the monetary authorities have allowed banks to continue to lend, thereby creating enormous amounts of money and deposits. Banks create deposits when they lend. The Chinese banking system has a lot of deposits partially because commercial banks have lent too much. In short, the supply or quantity of money (RMBs) has continued to explode, despite massive capital outflows. Notably, if the PBoC did not lend RMBs to commercial banks, the latter's excess reserves would have plunged by 4 trillion RMB (Chart I-8) and banks would have been forced to pull-back their lending. Chart I-6PBoC's Liquidity Injections Have ##br##Exploded Since Early 2014 Chart I-7China: Foreign Exchange##br## Reserve Depletion Chart I-8China: What Would Have Banks' Excess Reserves##br## Been Without Borrowing From PBoC? Overall, in the current fiat money system, when a central bank targets interest rates, the monetary authorities can print unlimited high-powered money (bank reserves) and commercial banks can multiply it by creating enormous amounts of loans/deposits.3 However, there is no free lunch - no country can print its way to prosperity (otherwise all countries would have been very rich already). The negative ramifications of unlimited money creation are numerous, but this report focuses on the exchange rate implications. The growing supply of RMBs will lead to a much further drop in China's exchange rate. It seems Chinese retail investors and companies intuitively sense this, and are eager to get rid of their RMBs. This also explains Chinese investors' desire to overpay for any real or financial asset, domestically or abroad. We expect growing downward pressure on the RMB as capital outflows accelerate anew. Although China’s foreign exchange reserves are enormous in absolute U.S. dollar terms, they are low relative to money supply (Chart 9). The ratio of the central bank’s international reserves-to-broad money is 15% in China and it is relatively low compared with other countries (Chart 10). Chart I-9China: International Reserves Are Not##br## High Relative To Broad Money Chart I-10International Reserves-To-Broad##br## Money Ratio As a final note, the oversupply of local currency has not created inflation in the real economy because of massive overcapacity following years of booming capital spending. However, continued money creation will eventually lead to higher inflation. This does not seem imminent but we will be monitoring these dynamics carefully going forward. Bottom Line: China's banks have created too much RMBs and the PBoC has accommodated them. Such enormous supply of RMBs and mainland households' and companies' desire to get rid of their RMBs will lead to further yuan depreciation. Investment Implications: A Free-Fall For RMB And Asian Currencies The RMB's value versus the U.S. dollar will drop much further. Our new target range for US$/CNY is 7.8-8 over the next 12 months, or 11-14% below today's level. The forward market is discounting only 2.8% depreciation in the next 12 months (Chart I-11). We maintain our short RMB / long U.S. dollar trade (via 12-month NDF). A persistent relapse in the RMB's value will drag down other Asian currencies. In particular, the Korean won and the Taiwanese dollar have failed to break above important technical levels (their long-term moving averages), and have lately relapsed (Chart I-12). Chart I-11RMB Will Depreciate Much More##br## Than Priced In By Forwards Chart I-12Asian Currencies:##br##More Downside Ahead For the Korean won, we believe there is considerable downside from current levels. Consistently, we recommended shorting the KRW versus the THB trade on October 19.4 Chart I-13EM ex-China Currencies Total Return##br## (Including Carry): Is The Rally Over? Traders who believe in continued U.S. dollar strength, like we do, should consider shorting the KRW versus the U.S. dollar outright. For DM currencies, this means that the drop in the JPY has further to go. In emerging Asia, we are also shorting the MYR and the IDR versus the U.S. dollar and also versus Eastern European currencies such as the ruble and the HUF, respectively. As emerging Asian currencies depreciate versus the U.S. dollar, other EM currencies will likely follow. It is hard to see the RMB and other Asian currencies plunging and the rest of EM doing well. The total return (including the carry) of the aggregate EM ex-China exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar (equity market-cap weighted index) has failed to break above a critical long-term technical resistance, and has rolled over (Chart I-13). This is a bearish technical signal, implying considerable downside from these levels. As such, we maintain our core short positions in the following EM currencies outside Asia: TRY, ZAR, BRL and CLP and add COP to this list today. This is based on an assumption of diminished foreign inflows to EM and lower commodities prices. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy & Frontier Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com Colombia: Headed Toward Recession In our May 4 Special Report on Colombia,5 we argued that despite a bright structural backdrop this Andean economy was headed for a growth recession (i.e. very weak but still positive growth). Domestic demand has buckled and now we believe the nation could be on the verge of its first genuine recession in two decades (Chart II-1). Colombia's Achilles heel is its low domestic savings rate, reflected by a still large current account deficit financed by FDI and portfolio capital inflows (Chart II-2). As a result, low oil prices and rising global interest rates have exposed the nation's main cyclical vulnerability. Given the trade deficit is still large (Chart II-3) and our bias is that oil prices will be flat-to-down, a further retrenchment in domestic demand is unavoidable. Chart II-1Colombia's First Recession##br## In 20 Years? Chart II-2Colombia's Lingering Balance Of ##br##Payments Vulnerability Chart II-3A Weaker COP Will Force The ##br##Necessary Adjustment Going forward, the external funding constraint will continue to bite. Moreover, policymakers are trapped and will be unable to prevent growth from contracting. The central bank is stuck between the proverbial rock and hard place. Cutting interest rates will undermine the appeal of the peso to foreign investors. Raising rates to prop up the currency, however, will exacerbate the economy's downward momentum. In the end, downward pressure on the exchange rate and still high inflation mean the central bank will not cut rates soon (Chart II-4). Tight monetary policy in turn means that private sector credit will decelerate much more (Chart II-5). Chart II-4High (Well Above Target) Inflation Limits##br## Central Bank's Ability To Ease Chart II-5Colombia: Credit Growth Is ##br##Headed Much Lower Our marginal propensity to consume proxy, an excellent leading indicator for household spending, signals consumption is set to weaken even further (Chart II-6). Facing weakening demand, investment is set to continue contracting (Chart II-7) and, ultimately, unemployment will be much higher, reinforcing the downtrend in consumer expenditures. Chart II-6Colombian Domestic Demand##br## To Retrench Further Chart II-7Contracting Investment Bodes ##br##Poorly For Employment Meanwhile, fiscal policy will remain tight as Colombia's orthodox policymakers struggle to adjust the fiscal accounts to the structurally negative terms-of-trade shock in this oil-dependent economy. The current fiscal reform effort is very positive for sustainable long-run dynamics, as influential central bank board members have highlighted.6 Yet particular parts of the reform, such as raising VAT taxes from 16% to 19%, will almost inevitably lead to a drop in consumer demand. Furthermore, nominal government revenues are already contracting and a slumping economy means that the total fiscal effort will need to be greater than currently envisioned. Overall, with monetary and fiscal policy stimulus hamstrung by the nation's low domestic savings rate (i.e. large current account deficit), a mild recession seems very likely. And while a lot of weakness has already been priced into the nation's financial markets, we think there is still more downside ahead. For instance, the Colombian peso may be cheap in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, but it is highly vulnerable due to the nation's still wide current account deficit. This week we recommend re-instating a short position in the peso; this time against an equal-weighted basket of the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble.7 Turning to equities, Colombian stocks have fallen sharply since 2014, mostly a reflection of the collapse of the nation's energy plays. At present bank stocks account for 60% this nation's MSCI market cap, and though we believe they will fare better than many other EM banking systems,8 they will not go unscathed by a recession. Still, orthodox policymaking should limit the downside in the performance of this bourse and sovereign credit (U.S. dollar bonds) relative to their respective EM benchmarks. Meanwhile, fixed-income investors should continue to bet on yield curve flattening by paying 1-year/ receiving 10-year interest rate swaps, a trade we have recommended since September 16, 2015.9 The recent steepening in the yield curve will prove unsustainable as the economy tanks. Bottom Line: Colombia is probably headed toward recession and policymakers are straightjacketed and cannot ease monetary and fiscal policies to prevent it. As such, the currency will be the main release valve and it will depreciate further. Go short the COP versus an equal-weighted basket the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble. Dedicated EM equity and credit investors should maintain a neutral allocation to Colombia within their respective EM benchmarks. Continue to bet on flattening in the yield curve by paying 1-year/ receiving 10-year interest rate swaps. Santiago E. Gomez Associate Vice President santiago@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016. 3 As we argued in Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016, it is new loans that create new deposits and vice versa. 4 Please refer to the section on Thailand in our Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled " The EM Rally: Running Out Of Steam?" dated October 19, 2016. 5 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Special Report titled, "Colombia: A Cyclical Downturn Amid Structural Strength," dated May 4, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Cano, Carlos Gustavo "Monetary Policy in Colombia: Main Challenges 2016 -2017" Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Small Talks Symposium, October 7, 2016, Washington DC http://www.banrep.gov.co/sites/default/files/publicaciones/archivos/cgc_oct_2016.pdf 7 For more on the ruble please refer to the section on Russia in our Emerging Markets Weekly Report, dated November 16, 2016, titled, "Russia: Overweight Equities; Reinstate Long RUB / Short MYR Trade". 8 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Special Report titled, "Colombia: A Cyclical Downturn Amid Structural Strength" dated May 4, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 9 Please refer to the section on Colombia in our Emerging Markets Weekly Report, dated September 15, 2015, titled "Colombia: An Incomplete Adjustment", available at ems.bcareseach.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations