Sectors

A number of drug wholesalers have reported earnings misses and provided disappointing guidance, specifically citing worse than expected generic drug pricing pressure, enough to offset ongoing branded drug price increases. In the current environment of political uncertainty toward health care companies, the knee jerk reaction has been to abandon all pharmaceutical-related equities, regardless of exposure to branded or generic medicines. Our pharmaceutical equity view has noted that the time to worry about the pace of drug price increases would be if they sparked a change in consumption patterns and/or buyer behavior. The fact that major buying groups such as health insurers and pharmacy benefit managers are balking at generic drug price increases constitutes such a shift. Consumer spending on drugs has slowed, albeit that has neither been confirmed by still strong retail drug store sales nor booming hospital employment. Nevertheless, in light of new information, which implies that company disclosed pricing pressure is worse than current government data show, we are downgrading our outlook for drug-related shares. However, rather than sell after the index has already taken a large hit, pushing relative performance to oversold and undervalued levels, we will await a more opportune moment to lighten positions, especially in view of our preference for defensive equities. In the meantime, the S&P pharma and biotech indexes are now on downgrade alert and the overall health care sector is off our high-conviction list. The good news is that other parts of the health care sector should benefit, see the next Insight.

Beyond early last century's military rearmament, the idea of militarily outspending opponents was very evident in the early-1960s when U.S. defense spending surged by 20% on a year-over-year basis. If our hypothesis that a global arms race will continue to heat up in coming years pans out, then owning global (but especially U.S.) defense stocks as a structural play will pay handsome dividends. The early-1960s experience in U.S. aerospace & defense (A&D) stocks is the closest stock market parallel we found in our analysis (given data constraints). Then, relative performance was up over 100% in a span of four years, as U.S. A&D industrial production (IP) swelled to a 20% per annum clip with utilization rates running at 95%. A&D factories were humming, racing to fulfill orders as U.S. military expenditures boomed. That demand surge translated into a jump in sector sales and given the industry's high operating leverage, earnings and book values soared. The chart shows that from trough to peak, sector EPS rose by more than 400%, margins expanded from sub 2% to nearly 8%, and book value doubled. That stellar performance justified initial valuation premiums at the time. Using that period as a guide would imply that there is ample upside left for relative performance of the BCA U.S. defense index (that is a pure play on global defense spending). Bottom Line: Stay overweight the BCA U.S. defense index (LMT, GD, RTN, NOC, LLL), and please see yesterday's Special Report for additional details.

The European armament dynamics of the late-19th century/early 20th century are eerily reminiscent of the current post-Great Recession global arms race. Back then Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy on one side, and Britain, France and Russia on the other, were fiercely trying to outpace each other in terms of military expenditures. The crumbling Ottoman Empire along with the newly created smaller states in Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania were also eager weapons purchasers. Today, a fresh military expenditure-related development pops up almost daily. The chart shows that not only are the U.S. and China boosting military spending, but also Japan, Australia, India, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, etc.[1] The list goes on and on. The driving factor is "multipolarity," i.e. the emergence of multiple competing great powers, which BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service views as a key investment theme.[2] While we are not arguing that WWIII will erupt in the coming years, the purpose of yesterday's Special Report is to identify the winning global equity sectors from the intensifying global arms race: global defense stocks come atop of our list, but also global space-related equities and cyber security firms would be beneficiaries of the secular increase in military outlays. On a regional basis, the BCA U.S. defense index is the only game in town (see the next Insight). [1] Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com [2] Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model The model significantly reduced the weight of France by six percentage points due to change in liquidity condition, the other downgrade, albeit much smaller, was the U.S. All other countries had been upgraded as a result, with Germany being the largest beneficiary. Japan and U.K. remain the two largest underweights (Table 1). Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the overall model outperformed the MSCI World benchmark by 27 basis points (bps) in October, driven completely by the Level 2 model (as U.K and Australia underperformed the euro area). The Level 1 model was in line with the benchmark. Since going live, the overall model performed slightly better than its benchmark. Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live Chart 4Overall Model Performance For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model". http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850 GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of October 31, 2016. The momentum component has shifted Financials from underweight to overweight. For mode details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Senior Analyst patrick@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com

Highlights A poor fundamental backdrop for high yield is being offset by easy monetary conditions. A prolonged shallow uptrend in corporate defaults - and therefore spreads - is most likely. The relative performance of equities versus corporate credit has not been distorted by monetary policy: the high-yield debt market will remain a reliable indicator for equity market vulnerability. A December rate hike will not be problematic for the residential real estate market. Plenty of pent-up demand for housing exists, and this will provide long-term support, so long as the labor market remains robust. Feature High-yield (HY) corporate bond spreads have dramatically narrowed throughout 2016 (Chart 1). This trend should not go unnoticed, since beyond being an important asset class in its own right, we have long viewed the high-yield debt market as an early warning system for equities. The current message suggests an all-clear for stocks. Chart 1Dramatic Spread Narrowing In 2016, But... We have had a cautious stance on U.S. high yield since August 2015, based on the view that corporate balance sheet health has deteriorated to the point where defaults would continue to rise on a cyclical basis. This week, we explore whether this remains the right strategy, and also whether junk bond spreads are still a relevant leading indicator for the equity market. Our answer to both questions is: Yes. In our view, the HY comeback can be explained by three main factors. First, the recovery in energy-related junk bonds has led the rally, as rising oil prices have helped diminish the default risks among U.S. shale issuers. Second, the 2015 spike in junk bond yields - mainly due to contagion from energy-sector bankruptcy fears - created tactical value in high-yield. Throughout most of 2016, we have seen an unwinding of these previously oversold positions. And third, the high-yield market benefits from an ongoing and intense search for yield in a world of unattractive higher-quality interest rates. Looking ahead, the first two forces are unlikely to play much of a role in the outcome for junk bonds. Oil prices are likely to trade in narrow range, allowing energy-related company fundamentals to stabilize. The rally in junk bonds over the past several months has removed any perceived value in this sector. Thus, it is only the search for yield/accommodative monetary policy that still supports a narrowing in spreads. Over time, we believe junk bond performance will once again be aligned with balance sheet fundamentals, i.e. high-yield spreads will gradually widen. A Review Of Our HY Indicators Our fixed income strategists have developed three key indicators to gauge major turning points in corporate spreads (Chart 2): Corporate Health Monitor (CHM): An aggregate indicator of non-financial corporate balance sheet health. The CHM deteriorated further in the second quarter, and has reached levels that historically tend to only be seen during recessions. Of the indicator's six components, most of the weakness has occurred in measures of corporate profitability (Chart 3). One caveat is that our measure of leverage in the CHM remains low, but this understates the risks because it measures total debt as a percent of market value of equity. Leverage looks decidedly worse if measured using net debt/book value. Chart 2Key Corporate Credit Indicators Chart 3Corporate Health Monitor Components C&I bank lending standards: A Fed survey that measures how easy/difficult it is for the corporate sector to access bank loans. According to this gauge, banks have already been tightening credit conditions for the past three quarters. Deviation in monetary conditions from equilibrium: We use our Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), which incorporates movements in both the dollar and interest rates. Due to a very accommodative Fed, monetary conditions remain very easy according to this measure. At present, two of these three indicators are sending negative signals for corporate spreads. Our corporate health monitor is decidedly bearish, as are lending standards. Indeed, focusing on corporate balance sheets and fundamental credit quality metrics would almost unanimously lead investors to recognize that the credit cycle is in its late stages and to expect spreads to move wider. After all, spreads have widened in every episode of deteriorating balance sheet health since the mid-1990s. Or to put it more simply, a default cycle - leading to spread widening - has occurred each time that year-on-year profit growth has gone negative since 1984 (Chart 4). Chart 4Profit Contraction Spells Trouble For Junk Bonds Our Bank Credit Analyst service came to the same conclusion earlier this year. In a Special Report, our colleagues analyzed financial ratios for 770 companies from across the industrial and quality spectrum. Their work uncovered that the corporate re-leveraging cycle is far more advanced than is widely believed and that key financial ratios and overall corporate health look only mildly better excluding the troubled energy and materials sectors. Of course, there is an important salve this cycle at work and it is captured in our third indicator - monetary policy. As shown in Chart 2, easy monetary conditions have never persisted for this long and low rates have driven a colossal search for yield, causing high-yield bonds to become ever more divorced from fundamentals. This divergence between corporate bond spreads and balance sheet fundamentals is likely to persist for as long as monetary conditions remain supportive. Adding it up, a poor fundamental backdrop for high-yield is being offset by easy monetary conditions. This combination argues for a cautious long-term bias toward lower-quality corporate credit because a prolonged shallow uptrend in corporate defaults (and spreads) is most likely. Nimble investors may look to tactically buy junk bonds when spreads overshoot our forecast of default losses, although such an opportunity is not present at the moment (Chart 5). The equity market is suffering from the same dynamic. Chart 5No Value Here Will Junk Bond Yields Still Warn Of Stock Bear Markets? Junk bond yields have long been one of our early warning indicators for equity bear markets. Since the 1980s, junk yields (shown inverted in Chart 6) have consistently broken out to new highs 3-6 months before stock bear markets take hold. This is because in a typical cycle, junk yields tend to respond more quickly to an erosion in corporate health fundamentals and/or a credit event. Chart 6Junk Bonds Provide Early Warning For Stocks Chart 7Typical Behavior Here But, as we note above, in the current cycle, the reaction to worsening corporate health fundamentals has been far more subdued than historical relationships would have predicted, due to the salve effect of easy monetary policy. If corporate bonds are in a "bubble", does it mean that the behavior of junk bond spreads will no longer be an early predictor of stocks returns? We believe corporate bonds will still be a useful timing tool for equities. If equities are experiencing the same divorcing from fundamentals, courtesy of central bank largesse, then it stands to reason that what pops the bond bubble will also burst the equity balloon. The search for yield has affected the behavior of investors, and therefore returns, in a fairly systematic way. Due to the current extended period of ultra-low interest rates and central bank asset purchases, government bond prices have been pushed sky high (yields have sunk to rock-bottom lows). As a shortage of government bonds has taken hold, investors have sought to invest in "Treasury-like" products, first seeking out the safest corporate bonds, but eventually reaching further out on the risk spectrum to include high-yield bonds and (dividend yielding) stocks. Indeed, asset prices of all stripes have been distorted by the search for yield, which has fueled a broad inflation in all asset classes. The behavior of stocks relative to corporate bonds is telling (Chart 7). Since 2010, and until very recently, stocks outperformed junk bonds on a total return basis. Junk bonds outperformed investment-grade bonds over roughly the same period (although junk underperformed investment-grade in most of 2015 due to the collapse in energy prices and related energy company defaults). This is exactly what has occurred during every recovery phase since the 1980s. Over the past forty years, investment-grade bonds tended to outperform junk bonds and equities during economic recessions. Junk bonds beat equities during the early phases of recovery (i.e. when economic growth turns positive) and for as long as companies continue to repair balance sheets. And equity returns trump both investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds when our Corporate Health Monitor is deteriorating, i.e. in the latter half of the economic cycle, such as now. This suggests that the relative performance of equities versus corporate credit has not been distorted by monetary policy. One key takeaway is that, although very easy monetary conditions mean that corporate credit performance is becoming divorced from fundamentals, monetary policy has had a similar effect on equity prices (we have written at length in past reports about equity market performance diverging from profit indicators). As in past cycles, once the monetary cover fades, it is most likely that corporate credit markets will once again respond most quickly to balance sheet fundamentals. The bottom line is that we believe the high-yield debt market will remain a reliable indicator for equity market vulnerability. The current message is that a bear market in stocks will be averted, although as we have written in recent reports, earnings disappointments amid dollar strength represent a potential trigger for a near-term correction. Housing Outlook: Room To Expand Over the past quarter, residential real estate data has been slightly disappointing. September housing starts slipped to the bottom end of the range that has held this year and are only marginally above year-ago levels. House price inflation, as measured by the Case Shiller index, is negative on a 3-month basis. Despite this mild disappointment, we continue to believe the housing market is a relative bright light and will continue to be a significant positive contribution to GDP growth. Most indicators show that the housing market continues to recover along the typical path of the classic boom/bust real estate cycle (Chart 8). Chart 8Housing And Its History Chart 9First-Time Homebuyers Entering The Market Moreover, both supply and demand conditions are supportive of further construction activity and upward pressure on house prices over the next several quarters. On the demand side, household formation and a pick-up in interest from first-time buyers are the largest positives. Household formation: The number of households being formed is the most basic measure of marginal new demand for housing units. Household formation was suppressed during the Great Recession and early recovery years, because very poor job prospects and restricted access to credit sorely limited prospective new households from entering both the rental and ownership market. From 2007-2013, the annual household formation rate was 625,000, compared to over 1.1 million in the pre-crisis period.1 Now that the unemployment rate is at 5% and job security is improving, household formation rates are accelerating, particularly among young adults who have hitherto delayed moving out on their own. Monthly numbers are choppy, but household formation could easily run on average at 1.1 million per year for the next few years, simply to make up for muted rates post-housing crisis. First-time buyers: After years of putting off purchases, first-time buyers appear to be finally coming back to the housing market (Chart 9). According to the National Association of Realtors, the proportion of first-time homebuyers for existing home sales has reached its highest mark since July 2012 (34%). But there is still room for this share to improve, as prior to 2007, first-time homebuyers averaged about 40% of total purchases. Once again, persistent income gains and job security will be the driving factors behind first-time homebuyers' decisions. Could a Fed interest rate rise slow housing demand? We don't think so. Mortgage payments relative to income will remain well below their long-term average even if rates are increased by 200bps, an extreme case scenario. Even under this scenario, housing affordability would still be above average, conservatively assuming that income is held constant (Chart 10). Income and employment prospects will continue to trump mortgage rates for consumers making housing decisions; the current employment backdrop is positive for continued housing market activity. Chart 10December Rate Hike Won't Bother The Housing Market Chart 11Supply Is Tight From a supply perspective, conditions remain ripe for more robust construction activity. As Chart 11 shows, the supply of new homes remains low both in absolute, and in terms of months of supply. The bottom line is that we do not fear that a December rate hike will be particularly onerous for the residential real estate market. Plenty of pent-up demand for housing still exists, and this will provide long-term support, so long as the labor market remains robust, as we expect. The recent soft patch in housing will give way to stronger home building activity in the coming months, helping to boost real GDP growth in 2017. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 The State Of the Nation's Housing 2016, Joint Centre For Housing Studies of Harvard University http://jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/state-nations-housing-2016

Special Report

"That as the only possible policy in our day for a conqueror to pursue is to leave the wealth of a territory in the complete possession of the individuals inhabiting that territory, it is a logical fallacy and an optical illusion in Europe to regard a nation as increasing its wealth when it increases its territory, because when a province or state is annexed, the population, who are the real and only owners of the wealth therein, are also annexed, and the conqueror gets nothing." 1 Norman Angell's "The Great Illusion" posited in the early 1910s that war would be futile for developed nations, especially given the rising importance of economic and financial ties. Nevertheless, the arms race from the late-1800s gained momentum and eventually led to the Great War, dealing a devastating blow to his arguments. The European armament dynamics of the late-19th century/early 20th century are eerily reminiscent of the current post-Great Recession global arms race. Back then Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy on one side, and Britain, France and Russia on the other, were fiercely trying to outpace each other in military expenditures. The crumbling Ottoman Empire along with the newly created smaller states in Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania were also eager weapons purchasers. Today, a fresh military expenditure-related development pops up almost daily. Not only are the U.S. and China boosting military spending, but also Japan, Australia, India, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, etc (Chart 1).2 The list goes on and on. The driving factor is "multipolarity," i.e. the emergence of multiple competing great powers, which BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has shown to be a key investment theme.3 Chart 1U.S. Defense Spending Is More Than The Rest Of The World Combined While we are not arguing that WWIII will erupt in the coming years, the purpose of this Special Report is to identify the winning global equity sectors from the intensifying global arms race (Chart 2): global defense stocks come atop of our list, but also global space-related equities and cyber security firms would be beneficiaries of the secular increase in military outlays. On a regional basis, the U.S. defense stocks are the only game in town, but undiscovered Chinese, and to a lesser extent Russian, defense stocks are intriguing as are Israeli defense and tech stocks (please refer to the Appendix below for ticker symbols). Chart 2Intensifying Global Arms Race Late 19th/Early 20th Century: Militarism, Globalization & Finance Back in the late-1800s, the ascendancy of Germany was challenging the hegemony of Britain, fueling a European-wide arms race. Smaller newly formed states were also on the hunt for the latest and greatest weaponry. During the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 airplanes were deployed in combat for the very first time, highlighting the importance of new technology. Behind this explosive European rearmament were a few large British companies (Vickers Sons & Maxim Ltd, Armstrong and Whitworth, and Coventry Ordnance Works). "By 1905, its capital of £7.4 million ranked Vickers sixth amongst British companies; Armstrong Whitworth, with 5.3 million pounds capital was eleventh".4 Basil Zaharoff, who acted as general representative for business abroad for Vickers,5 was reputedly one of the richest men in the world.6 Moreover, globalization was on the rise in the late 19th century, as evidenced by global imports as a percentage of GDP (Chart 3). Industrialization coupled with imperialism and the colonization of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa along with population growth and rising demand for commodities were key drivers behind the jump in 19th century globalization. Finally, all of this was made possible by cross-boarder finance. Trade finance and credit growth skyrocketed in the late-1800s and the rising interconnectedness of global financial centers was most evident in the 1907 stock market panic that originated in the U.S., but spread like wildfire to the rest of the world. Chart 3Twin Peaks Of Globalization? Chart 4Heeding The Early 1960s Parallel What About The 1960s? The idea of militarily outspending opponents was very evident in the early-1960s when U.S. defense spending surged by 20% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 4), bolstering demand once again for military contractors. The mutually assured destruction (MAD) doctrine of military strategy and national security policy declared overtly in the early-1960s by U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara and the Space Race competition between the Cold War rivals also have striking similarities with today, as far as investment implications are concerned. Parallels With Today China's ascendency to a world power large enough to challenge the hegemony of the U.S. is a sea change.7 The rearmament of East Asia is reminiscent of late 19th and early 20th century Europe and involves Japan, Australia, South Korea, Vietnam and India. All of the Middle East, along with Turkey and Russia, are on a structural military spending spree. European NATO fringe states are also arming furiously (Chart 5), trying to thwart Russia's regional ambitions. In the U.S., despite the Budget Control Act of 2011 (sequestration), the CBO projects that defense spending will rise gradually from $586 billion in 2015 to $739 billion by 2026 (Chart 6). This is before any push for a fiscal spending thrust that both presidential candidates have proposed, which would include increased defense outlays. While as a percentage of GDP defense spending may drift sideways, in absolute terms it will likely rise, and thus boost demand for defense contractors. Chart 5Stealthy Rise In Defense Outlays Chart 6CBO Estimates New Defense Spending Highs Globalization has hit an apex recently (Chart 3).8 The world is still licking its wounds from the recent GFC, where U.S. financials stocks were so intertwined with their global peers that the crisis effectively brought down to its knees the global financial system and gave birth to unorthodox monetary policy that Central Banks are still currently deploying. Global Rearmament Beneficiaries If our hypothesis that a global arms race will continue to heat up in coming years pans out, then owning global defense stocks as a structural bet will pay handsome dividends. The global push away from austerity and toward more fiscal spending should also support aggregate defense demand. Thus, there are high odds that global defense stocks are primed to deliver absolute positive returns, irrespective of where the broad global equity market drifts in the next five years. Similar to Vickers and Armstrong and Whitworth making impressive stock market strides early last century, global defense stocks should continue to be high flyers. The early-1960s U.S. aerospace & defense (A&D) stocks are the only close stock market parallel we have come across in our analysis (given data constraints) and comparing this index's available metrics of that era with today is in order. A big pushback to the U.S. Equity Strategy service's constructive view on the U.S. defense index (since the late-2015 inception) has been that the valuations of these stocks are already full, leaving no valuation cushion for any mishaps (Chart 7). True, defense stocks are on the expensive side, but not if they manage to grow into their valuations, as we expect. Relative performance was up over 100% in a span of four years in the 1960s (Chart 8), as U.S. aerospace & defense industrial production (IP) swelled to a 20% per annum clip with utilization rates running at 95% (Chart 8). A&D factories were humming, racing to fulfill orders as U.S. military expenditures were thriving (Chart 4). Chart 7Buy Global Defense Stocks Chart 8In The 1960s A&D Factories Were Humming... This demand surge translated into a jump in sector sales momentum (Chart 4), and given the industry's high operating leverage, earnings and book values soared. From trough to peak, sector EPS rose more than 400%, margins expanded from sub 2% to nearly 8%, and book value doubled (Chart 9). That stellar performance justified initial valuation premiums at the time. Using that period as a guide would imply that there is ample upside left for relative performance of the global defense index (that is a pure play on global defense spending). For comparison consistency, we use U.S. A&D figures. Currently, U.S. A&D IP is contracting, with resource utilization running at 80%. U.S. A&D relative performance has risen a mere 30% since the Great Recession (Chart 10). Chart 9...Boosting The Allure Of ##br## A&D Stocks Chart 10If History At Least Rhymes, ##br## There Is Still Ample Upside... Likely, the advance is still in the early innings, and analysts have been very slow to upgrade their EPS estimates accentuating the apparent overvaluation. Importantly, 5-year forward relative EPS growth estimates are deep in negative territory which is very perplexing given the upward trajectory of industry demand (Chart 11). Given that we only have access to data for MSCI All-Country World aerospace & defense long-term EPS expectations the caveat is that some of the poor expectations and performance could be because of the waning aerospace delivery cycle. Unlike the deteriorating health of the broad corporate sector, profit margins are expanding and net debt-to-EBITDA is a comfortable 1.2x. Similarly, interest coverage ratio is near an all-time high of 8x (Chart 12), while the overall markets EBIT/interest expense ratio is half that. Chart 11...Especially ##br## Given Depressed Analysts' Expectations Chart 12Defense ##br## Wins Championships Global defense sector return on equity (ROE) is almost 30% and rising (Chart 13), whereas global non-financial corporate (NFC) ROE is hitting multi-year lows, with the U.S. NFC ROE plumbing all-time lows (Chart 14). Free cash flow is also growing briskly and the industry is making greenfield investments, with capex growing 9.5% year-over-year, the mirror image of the global NFC sector that is pruning capital outlays (middle and bottom panels, Chart 13). Chart 13Defense Flexing ##br## Its Muscles... Chart 14...Vs. The Atrophy In The U.S. ##br## Non-Financial Corporate Sector On the valuation front, modest overvaluation exists, as portrayed by the high relative price-to-cash flow and price-to-book multiples. However, the global defense stocks forward P/E ratio and EV/EBITDA multiple are on an even keel with the broad market (Chart 15), and if our thesis that a secular uptrend in defense-related demand looms proves accurate, then these stocks are not expensive, but on the contrary still represent a buying opportunity. Chart 15Mixed Signals On The Relative Valuation Front Chart 16Defense Is The Best Offense The Rise In Terrorism, Global Space Race And Cyber Security Threat The unfortunate structural increase in terrorist activity will also embolden governments around the world to step up defense spending (top panel, Chart 16).9 The latter tends to move in long cycles. U.S. defense industry revenues have already begun to outpace those of the overall S&P 50010, and a prolonged upturn lies ahead, based on the message from the previous upcycle. From a cyclical perspective, the defense capital goods shipments-to-inventories ratio is outpacing the overall manufacturing sector (second panel. Chart 16), reinforcing the case for ongoing earnings outperformance. The same also holds true in Europe. Western European terrorist attacks have increased, heralding further relative gains for the euro area aerospace & defense index (bottom panel, Chart 16). Beyond the disastrous spike in terrorism, the global space race is also gaining traction, with China spearheading the charge. There is a good chance that China will attain geosynchronous orbit satellites (residing more than 20,000 miles above the earth), challenging U.S. space dominance. India's space aspirations are grand and it is slowly and stealthily rising up the ranks on the space race. Moreover, as more countries aim to have manned space missions, that translates into higher space budgets and thus firming demand for space-related expenditures (Chart 17). Chart 17Space, The Final Frontier Finally, the number of cyber-attacks is also on the rise globally. Defending against attacks is a challenge. Not only does the cyber space domain definition remain elusive, but tracking hackers down is also increasingly difficult given the vastest of the internet, lack of global uniform policing methods and physical country borders. Crudely put, it is a lot easier for a Chinese or Russian hacker to deal a blow, for example, to U.S. nuclear infrastructure rather than physically deliver an attack. All of this suggests that investment in anti-hacking and counter cyber-attack capabilities is necessary around the globe in order to thwart cyber-terrorism. Risks To Our View While there is conceivably a risk that China will abruptly halt its intense militarization and make a U turn in its long-term strategy of becoming a military superpower, we assign a very low probability to such a turn of events. The global push for more fiscal spending may not materialize, which would be a risk to our sanguine global defense spending view. As Paul Volcker and Peter Peterson recently opined in a NY Times article11 - offering a different view from the always-articulate Larry Summers - prudent and fiscally responsible spending is in order given the excessive debt-to-GDP ratio that is probing war-like levels (Chart 18). This excessive debt overhang is not only a U.S. phenomenon, but also a global one spanning both advanced and emerging economies. Chart 18Excessive Debt Is A Risk To Bullish View On Global Defense Stocks One final risk is that the world will enter a prolonged peace phase and global terrorism will get quashed, with conflicts dying down in the Middle East, Russia reining in its imperialistic ambitions and China ceasing to stir the waters in the South and East China Seas. We would also assign low odds to this optimistic "no conflict phase" scenario, but it would indeed be welcome. Investment Conclusion Factors are falling into place for a structural outperformance period in the global defense index. The early-1900s and early-1960s parallels, coupled with the trifecta of terrorism, space race and cyber security all point to upbeat demand for defense-related goods and services. Expressing this buoyant view can be done from a bottom up perspective. The Appendix below highlights all the companies in the global defense index we track from Datastream and the alternative one from Bloomberg. An investable proxy is the U.S. aerospace & defense index as the U.S. dominates global A&D indexes and aerospace outfits also sport significant defense corporate segments (please see the Appendix below for relevant tickers). There are also three fairly liquid ETFs mimicking the U.S. A&D index: ITA:US, PPA:US & XAR:US. Moreover, below are a few more speculative investment ideas. Given China's dominance of global defense spending (ex-U.S.) we are confident that Chinese A&D stocks will also be eagerly sought after and deliver alpha in the coming years (please refer to the Appendix below for a list of China plays). If one has the resilience and the stomach to invest in Russian equities given high political and currency risk, then Russian A&D stocks may be a desirable vehicle. Russia remains a massive weapons exporter with a large sphere of influence. We would not underestimate the returns in local currency of some Russian A&D stocks (the Appendix below lists some Russian A&D listed firms). Finally, Israel A&D and IT companies either listed on NASDAQ or domestically in Tel Aviv offer some great opportunities for investors that can handle riskier investments. Not only Israel's geography, but also its intense IT/military focus and entrepreneurial culture imply that a number of these companies will be long-term winners (please see the Appendix below for relevant tickers). While most of the drones, space-related, and highly specialized IT companies are private, there is a drone and an anti-hacking ETF (IFLY:US & HACK:US). On the space front, we are tracking an index that comprises a number of space-related constituents that we show in the Appendix below. Nevertheless, most of these companies are categorized under A&D. Bottom Line: We are initiating a structural overweight in the global defense index with a longer-than-usual five year secular investment horizon. The re-rating phase in this index is still in the early innings. The re-rating phase in this index is still in the early innings. We also reiterate our overweight in the BCA U.S. defense index (LMT, GD, RTN, NOC, LLL). Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Angell, Norman (1911), The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage, (3 ed.), New York and London: G.P. Putnam’s & Sons. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, “The Great Risk Rotation,” dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, “Multipolarity And Investing,” dated April 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4 Angell, Warren, Kenneth (1989), Armstrongs of Elswick: Growth In Engineering And Armaments To The Merger with Vickers, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd. 5 http://www.oxforddnb.com/index/38/101038270/ 6 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Basil-Zaharoff 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II,” dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, “The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here,” in Monthly Report, “Winter Is Coming,” dated November 12, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “A Bull Market For Terror,” dated August 5, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Wobbling,” dated December 7, 2015, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 11 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/opinion/ignoring-the-debt-problem.html?_r=0 Appendix Table A1BI Global Defense Primes Competitive Peers Table A2World Defense Index (DS: DEFENWD) Table A3S&P 500 Aerospace & Defense Index ##br## (S5AERO Index) Table A4China ##br## Aerospace & Defense Table A5Russia & Israel Aerospace & Defense Table A6Kensho Space Index

Special Report

Highlights Clinton has a 65% chance of victory. She wins the election with 334 electoral votes. Trump has low odds of winning key swing states Virginia and Colorado. A Trump win requires a shock; it is not impossible by the historical record. A Clinton win is initially bullish and could bring some compromise. However, the median voter is moving to the left. The 1990s are gone. Feature BCA's Geopolitical Strategy made its initial U.S. general election forecast thirteen months ago in September 2015.1 We argued that the two most likely outcomes were: GOP Sweep Scenario: a Republican sweep (presidency and Congress) with a moderate candidate at the head of the party ticket; Democratic President / GOP Sweep of Congress: a Democrat win in the White House and a GOP that holds onto the House and Senate. Both outcomes would be positive for the markets given that (1) a GOP sweep would entail pro-market reforms (corporate taxes, de-regulation, entitlement reform, and modest fiscal spending) and (2) a divided government has historically produced a market-positive outcome. In December, we updated our forecast with a call that Hillary Clinton was a clear frontrunner given that a Trump nomination would greatly reduce the probability of a GOP sweep.2 Our reasoning then was that an anti-establishment Republican would fail to gather enough votes in the ideological middle of the American electorate. Although Trump has given Clinton a hardly believable run for her money, we continue to believe that misogynistic, racist, and narcissistic rhetoric are off-putting to the median American voter and distract from Trump's policy message (such as it is).3 In this final extended forecasting effort ahead of the election, our intention is to add value on three fronts: Get the final forecast right. Introduce the investment implications of our forecast. Ask what we have learned from this election so far. Quant Election Model: Trump Is A Red Herring Until very recently, the electoral polls showed a close race between Secretary Hillary Clinton and Mr. Donald Trump (Chart 1). However, our "Polls-plus" model, built using historical macroeconomic and election data since 1980, has been projecting a strong Clinton victory for some time. Based on our latest forecast, Hillary Clinton will win the 2016 presidential election in a landslide, with a projected electoral vote count of 334 (Chart 2). In the following section, we introduce our model, its results, and explain why the predicted Clinton victory is so comfortable. To be clear, our model has favored Clinton well before the most recent series of gaffes by Mr. Trump. Part I: Structural Econometric Model Our econometric work combines state-level election and economic data as well as trends in national politics and opinion. The model's dependent variable is the difference in the share of the vote received by the Republicans and Democrats in each state. The explanatory variables break down into the following categories: Voting Patterns: Each state's previous election results, back to 1980, are computed as the differential between Republican and Democratic vote share, and used to gauge voter predisposition. We also include a momentum variable which measures the change in the differential between the two previous elections. Economic Variables: We use changes in state and national economic conditions prior to the elections to capture the macroeconomic context. These include national GDP, oil prices, and state-level disposable income. Political Intangibles: We include three different qualitative variables to capture political attitudes. "Polarization" is computed to factor in the likelihood that the incumbent party will be voted out after staying in power for multiple terms. The "alternative choice" measures the presence of a prominent third party. We also include current presidential approval ratings. Using these variables, and strictly avoiding any advantage of hindsight, our model correctly predicted the winner of every election since 1984 (Table 1 and Appendix 1): 2012 - Obama v. Romney: The model slightly overestimated President Obama's support in West Virginia, Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, and Tennessee. 2008 - Obama v. McCain: The model produced an accurate forecast on an aggregate level, but again underestimated Obama's support. It misallocated electoral votes in 7 states. 2004 - Bush v. Kerry: Our analysis was only off by giving two extra electoral votes to Bush, but once more misallocated votes in 7 states. The Third Party Vote In 1992, 1996, and 2000: The model accurately predicted the winner in each contest but produced more volatile results as our sample started to shrink. In addition, the strong third-party candidacy in 1992 and 1996 distorted the results. These two elections were a key bellwether for the success of our model in 2016, as this year also features prominent third-party choices. Gary Johnson of the Libertarian Party is currently polling around 6.3%. 1984 and 1988: Our earliest set of elections produced results that were quite close to reality despite a limited sample size. Although this is somewhat surprising, it is to be expected given the landslide victories that occurred in both instances. Part II: Econometric Modeling Meets Polls Most of the components from our econometric model are slow-moving structural factors. Opinion polls, on the other hand, change based on periodical surveys. They are more volatile, but provide a good indication of the day-to-day pulse of the electorate. For this reason, we created an augmented version of our econometric model using probabilities constructed from polls. First, we transformed our econometric forecasts into probabilities by using two scenarios and the historical volatility of our estimates. The two scenarios are based on the potential impact of the third parties: one in which they gather 5-10% of the popular vote, and the other in which they fail to reach that threshold. From there, we calculated the historical standard deviations for each scenario, getting the lower and upper limits of the election forecasts. Giving the two limits equal chances of occurring, we calculated the GOP's chances to win each state. We then added opinion polls to this model. We used the election probabilities from FiveThirtyEight, which are computed using simulations from a collection of weighted and adjusted polls, to add a shorter-term dimension to our forecast.4 We give a 60% weight to the probabilities from the polls and 40% to our structural econometric model to ensure that we capture the momentum effect. Part III: 2016 Election - All Hype, No Fight Our polls-plus model suggests that Clinton has a 65.4% chance of winning the election (Table 2). This is somewhat lower than the probability derived by other polls-plus models - such as FiveThirtyEight and the New York Times. Further, our model shows that Clinton already has 279 electoral votes in states where she has more than a 70% chance of winning (Chart 3). By the same standards, Trump has secured only 170 votes. These results mean that even under the unlikely scenario where the GOP wins all the remaining swing states (North Carolina, Arizona, Florida, Ohio, and Iowa), if all else stays the same, the Democrats still win with 279 electoral votes. Intriguingly, our "White Hype" model back in March produced the same result using an entirely different method (it asked simply what share of the white vote Trump needed to win the swing states). At that time we argued that Trump had a very good chance to win Florida, Ohio, and Iowa, but that it would still be insufficient to win the election.5 In other words, our White Hype model correctly forecast in March the ultimate probabilities that our polls-plus model is now gauging from the combination of econometric results and opinion polls in October. Put differently, after winning the swing states (North Carolina, Arizona, Florida, Ohio, and Iowa), where the odds of winning are between 32% and 57%, the GOP would still need to steal the electoral votes in Virginia or Colorado (the latter in combination with Nevada or New Hampshire), away from the Democrats, where they are favored to win at 71.6% and 79.7%, respectively.6 This remains as unlikely now as it was in March.7 Bottom Line: Given the structural economic and political dynamics currently in place, our quantitative estimates show that Clinton is the clear favorite. Clinton has a 65.4% chance of winning the 2016 election, with an expected 334 electoral votes. Qualitative Election Model: Time To Dump Trump Thanks largely to the analysis of our colleague Peter Berezin, Chief Strategist of the BCA Global Investment Strategy, we took Donald Trump seriously long before most.8 We analyzed his electoral strategy - boosting the share of the white vote accruing to the GOP and away from the Democratic Party - and concluded that Trump did have a path to victory, albeit a very narrow one. Our research showed that Trump's strategy of increasing the Republican share of the white vote was mathematically the correct strategy for a GOP candidate to pursue, at least in 2016 when the white share of the total population remained large enough. We specifically showed that Trump would only need to increase white voters' support by 1.7% and 2.9% in Florida and Ohio, respectively, to flip those states, which seems quite reasonable and feasible.9 We also pointed out that getting a 5.7% swing in Iowa could be feasible. On the other hand, we showed that "flipping" Midwest states like Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin would require a very large swing of white voters in Trump's favor: 13.9%, 7.8%, and 8.1% respectively. At those numbers, Trump would have to win nearly 70% of Michigan's white voters, 65% of Pennsylvania's, and 58% of Wisconsin's. Of the three, Wisconsin looks the most feasible. On the other hand, the GOP only managed to pick up 52% of the state's white share in 2004, the last time a Republican candidate for president won an actual majority of the popular vote since 1988. So, getting to 58% is a high bar given Wisconsin's recent electoral history. How did our model hold up in terms of state-by-state polling? It did quite well! As we predicted, Trump has been doing relatively well in Iowa, Florida, and Ohio (Chart 4). In Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, Clinton's lead has remained higher than 5% through most of the election cycle and even through the periods where the media narrative shifted against her (Chart 5). Bottom Line: Despite a narrowing in the polls in mid-September - particularly following Clinton's September 11 health scare - we still concluded in our September Monthly Report that "the presidential race is Clinton's to lose."10 This is because both our quant (polls-plus) and qualitative (White Hype) models have correctly predicted that Trump's path to victory is extremely narrow. He would have to hold all of the swing-states where the White Hype model makes him competitive, and then also win either Virginia or Colorado plus Nevada, where he has struggled in the polls. Risks To Our View - A Trump Surprise! What scenario could occur between now and November 8 that throws off our forecast of a Hillary Clinton victory? As we have claimed from the beginning of the contest, Trump requires an exogenous factor to push him over the finish line. Given that Clinton's lead is now 6% in the polls, and that Trump is running out of time, he may need an act of God. That said, Trump has come a lot closer to winning the election than our polls-plus model suggests. Were it not for his idiosyncratic personality, the Democrats would have been a lot more vulnerable in 2016 than our predicted election outcome indicates. Why? Research by Professor Allan Lichtman, who has accurately predicted every U.S. presidential election since 1984, is instructive. Lichtman has called the election for Trump.11 His so-called "Keys" method - first outlined in a 1981 article and in his 1990 book, The Thirteen Keys To The Presidency - is a simple true or false quiz with thirteen propositions. If six or more of the answers are "false," the incumbent party loses the Oval Office (Table 3). For instance, if it is true that the average GDP growth per capita is higher in the past four years than the preceding four years, then that fact favors the incumbent. Today, this "long-term economic key" favors Hillary (Chart 6). In 2016, at least five of Lichtman's keys clearly favor the GOP: In the House of Representatives, the incumbent Democrats lost seats in the 2014 midterm elections, relative to the 2010 midterms (Chart 7). The Democrats do not have an incumbent candidate advantage. Obama achieved no major policy initiative in the second term. There was nothing comparable in effect to the Affordable Care Act, his signature legislation (Chart 8). Obama achieved no major foreign policy success. The Iran nuclear deal is too controversial to satisfy this key, although we suspect that history will judge it as a major success. Instead, the public focus has been on the disastrous intervention in Libya and the dithering in Syria. Hillary Clinton is not charismatic, which is an understatement (Chart 9). In addition, Gary Johnson, of the Libertarian Party, is a third-party candidate who could garner more than 5% of the vote (Chart 10). Under Lichtman's methodology, this is a key that hurts the incumbent. Of course, Libertarians may suck more votes away from Trump than Clinton. But Lichtman has signaled this issue as a crux of the election, and thinks it favors Trump. Moreover, in our view, Lichtman's keys could predict an even worse outcome for Clinton than Lichtman himself admits. Lichtman is very forthright about the fact that the keys require subjective judgment of the sort that professional historians make all the time. We would note, first, that the contest in the Democratic primary was serious. Sanders performed nearly as well as Clinton herself did in 2008, and better than other second-rank Democratic contenders going back to 1984 (Chart 11). Second, social unrest has likely risen in Obama's second term, or at least is perceived to have done so (Chart 12). Thus the primary contest and social unrest could trigger two more strikes against the incumbent party, without even debating whether Obama administration scandals or Trump's charisma qualify as keys against the Democrats.12 We think that Lichtman's model speaks volumes about the built-in vulnerability that the Democratic Party has faced throughout 2016. It also supports our initial September 2015 forecast, which gave largely even odds to both a moderate GOP presidential candidate and Hillary Clinton. As such, Trump's defeat will be a disaster for the Republican Party and will initiate a period of introspection - if not civil war - within the organization. Bottom Line: Trump does have good odds of winning the election if Clinton's lead in the polls drops below 3% between now and Election Day. If Trump gets back within striking distance, it will suggest that Clinton cannot shake him even after the media narrative and GOP establishment turned against him. With a 3% gap in the polls, the "turnout thesis" would become a lot more cogent. This is the thesis that Clinton will struggle to get members of the "Obama coalition" (millennials and minorities) to come out and vote, while Trump will motivate the registered but non-voting white population to turn out for him. At this point in the cycle, however, we doubt that Trump will re-test this level of competitiveness. Investment Implications: More Bullish Than Priced-In A Trump surprise would trigger a correction in equity markets, which is already due based on valuations, earnings, and other factors. We would expect the USD, as a key safe haven, to rally sharply both on Trump policy uncertainty and heightened geopolitical risk. We would also expect bond yields to fall initially, as part of a broad risk-off move, but then sell off due to the implication of more inflationary fiscal policies. Trump's policy proposals suggest a budget deficit blowout at least comparable to that under George W. Bush, which went from 2% to almost -4% of GDP. A combination of more spending and less tax revenue would blow the top off the bond market. What about the expected Clinton victory? First, markets love divided government (Table 4). Why? Because spending remains in check and no new onerous policies are likely. This will likely be the case if the GOP keeps the House of Representatives. However, we also think a Republican House could be conducive to dealing with Clinton, particularly on a modest fiscal stimulus: Clinton is not Obama: She will enter the Oval Office unpopular and without a strong mandate. She may not win over 50% of the popular vote. The Senate is in play, with polls at RealClearPolitics suggesting that the Democrats would win at least the four seats they need (leaving Vice-President Tim Kaine to cast the tie-breaking vote on legislation). The House is unlikely to be in play. Thus, unlike Obama in 2009, she will have a slim Senate majority at best (not filibuster-proof) and a GOP-held House. She will have to cut deals to advance her agenda. The Grand Coalition Lives: In the past few years, Congress has passed a number of important bills because establishment Republicans voted alongside Democrats (Chart 13). This coalition would remain in place, cemented by the populist threat to both camps represented by Trump and Sanders. The Knives Will Be Out For The Tea Party: Trump's rise and fall would be seen as an infamous debacle that cost the Republicans a highly significant election well within their reach. The Republican establishment will be determined to regain the reins of the party apparatus and brand. The Tea Party and other populist or anti-establishment Republicans will be blamed not only for giving Clinton the keys to the White House but also for giving the Democrats the advantage on the Supreme Court for a generation. True, Republicans could take away a narrow reading of the election results. They could blame the entire loss on Trump, not the party, given that Trump and the party had a bad relationship and Trump endorsed various positions at odds with conservative platforms and principles. They could therefore draw the conclusion that the correct strategy for the future is not to change policies or compromise with Democrats, but simply avoid running inexperienced, flamboyant mavericks for president. This view would be supported by the fact that, with a Clinton victory, moderate Republicans in more competitive districts, not arch-conservatives in bright red ones, are more likely to lose seats in the House. Ironically, this means that House Republicans could be just as zealous in opposition as they were under Obama, or more, and thus poised to resume the game of obstruction. This is possible, but we think the anti-establishment will be on the defensive, at least initially. Clinton will receive some kind of honeymoon period after dealing a devastating blow to the GOP. There will be Republicans ready to compromise, under the leadership of Paul Ryan, who did not accept the House speakership in order not to compromise. And the far-right will have at least some waverers in their midst. As such, we can see the potential for modest corporate tax reform (broadening the tax base without lowering the effective corporate tax rate). Even though such reform is not extraordinary, it should boost economic growth by helping small and medium-sized businesses grow. We can also see the GOP under Paul Ryan agreeing to modest increases in fiscal spending in return. Our colleague Anastasios Avgeriou, Chief Strategist of BCA's Global Alpha Sector Strategy, cogently argues that fiscal spending only comes amidst recessions. Chart 14 shows that mentions of "fiscal stimulus" in the news media are positively correlated with junk bonds and VIX, and negatively correlated with the yield curve. As such, fiscal stimulus only begins being contemplated when the pain of a recession hits. Could this time be different? Yes. 55% of Americans think the economy has not recovered from the Great Recession, and some polls suggest that over half think the U.S. is still in recession. As such, while a recession may not be occurring in reality, it may as well be as far as politicians are concerned. Moreover, the public apparently cares less about the deficit and debt than in the recent past: the number of Americans naming deficits as the "top priority" has fallen from 72% to 56% in the past few years. And again, the populist groundswell will reinforce the need to lift growth through policy. Beyond an immediate relief rally, we would fade any idea that Clinton's victory means a return to the Bill Clinton-environment for corporate profits and stock performance. A structural shift to the left is underway in American politics, both generational and economic, as we argued in June.13 Clinton will not be able to betray her pledges to Bernie Sanders supporters if she wants to be a two-term president. Thus, on a sectoral basis, we would expect Clinton to have quite a few negatives (Table 5). First, she would portend greater state involvement in healthcare, especially Big Pharma, despite the idea that repealing the Affordable Care Act would cause more uncertainty than keeping and changing it. We also would not expect her to be as favorable to the financial community as her list of donors suggests, given the challenges she faces on her left regarding financial regulation. On energy, she will benefit renewable energy companies more so than conventional ones, given her commitment to turning the U.S. into a "twenty-first century clean energy superpower." We would expect her to be good for defense stocks, both because she has a lifetime of foreign policy hawkishness and because of the global trend of multipolarity, which increases both the number of global conflicts and the risks of additional conflicts.14 For Trump, there is little reason to speculate - he has no experience governing, has flip-flopped on many policy stances, and is generally unorthodox and impossible to predict (e.g. his healthcare "plan"). If we had to venture a guess, we would say that, like Clinton, he will be positive for defense stocks. His aggressively anti-regulatory positions on the financial and energy sectors should be a boon for both. A critical thing to remember is that recent American presidents do not have a bad track record of getting what they want (Box 1). Like all leaders, they are at the mercy of constraints and structural factors, whether political, military, economic, or social. Yet they also command a powerful (and increasingly so) executive branch of government in the world's most powerful country. If Clinton wants higher taxes on the wealthy and a stronger state hand in healthcare, she will most likely get them. If Trump wants tougher border security and deep corporate tax cuts, he will likely get those as well. Congress is a check, but only that. BOX 1 U.S. Presidents: Promises And Performance Over the past 28 years, each new president has generally succeeded in passing the signature items on his agenda. George Bush Sr. is the major exception. He took office in 1988 with a pledge of keeping growth rates constant, creating 30 million new jobs over eight years, keeping the peace abroad, and improving the budget deficit without raising taxes. Instead, after only one year in office, he faced a recession that caused a 1.2 percentage point drop in the growth rate from Reagan's average, resulting in only 2.6 million increase in the civilian labor force his first term, 12.4 million wide of the mark. He was famously forced to raise taxes, despite saying "read my lips: no new taxes," and the budget deficit expanded from 2.7% to 4.5%. Finally, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait drew him into the Gulf War. Bill Clinton got luckier. His chief pledge was to raise wages, shift government investment from defense to the domestic economy, make healthcare more affordable, and reform welfare. He failed in healthcare, but generally succeeded in other initiatives. Wages admit of some debate - average earnings grew faster than under Reagan-Bush, though median earnings did not. Still, Clinton presided over a longer more stable period of wage growth than his predecessors (Chart 1). Non-defense investment rose 19% (defense barely grew) and its share in federal spending rose from 10% to 12%. The participation rate in cash assistance and food stamp programs declined sharply, as did the length of time on the dole. George W. Bush came to power on the promise of reforming social policy - health, education, social security - and essentially transferring the Clinton budget surplus to voters through tax cuts. He succeeded in taxes, education (No Child Left Behind Act), and health (Medicare expansion), aided by Republican majorities and popular support after the September 11 attacks. He failed to partially privatize social security, however. Barack Obama promised to make the tax code more progressive, make healthcare accessible and affordable, reduce energy dependency on the Middle East, and phase out the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has generally achieved these goals: the number of uninsured adults fell from 18% to 11%, healthcare price inflation has slowed from about 4% under Clinton and Bush to 3% per year, and U.S. energy imports have fallen from 33% to 25% of total consumption. However, while Obama succeeded broadly in withdrawing troops from the Middle East (Chart 2), he has failed to "finish" the war in Afghanistan. There are three chief takeaways: First, circumstances can overrule any president's plans, as occurred with George Bush Sr. Second, winning an election in reaction to a recession, as did Clinton and Obama, or suffering a crisis early in one's term, like Bush Jr., provides a tailwind for a president's initiatives. The flipside is that inheriting strong economic growth on the coattails of a popular two-term president may put an administration at risk of a cyclical downturn or general failure to meet expectations. (Warning for a Hillary Clinton administration!) Third, Congress can block some but probably not all of a president's plans. Clinton, Bush, and Obama each began with their own party controlling the legislature, which gave an early advantage that was later reversed. Clinton lost on healthcare but achieved bipartisan welfare reform. For Obama, legislative obstructionism halted various initiatives, but his core objectives were either already met (healthcare), not reliant on Congress (foreign policy), or achieved through compromise after his reelection (expiration of Bush tax cuts for upper income levels). For Bush Jr., the legislature switched after six years of his administration, yet social security had already proved to be the "third rail" of politics that he feared - he failed to reform it despite his own party's control of Congress. Final Thoughts: Lessons From 2016 The 2016 election has taught us some critical lessons. First, the world never would have believed, in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, that populism would be more disruptive in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in continental Europe. But that is what has happened. The United States and the United Kingdom have both seen an explosion of pent-up forces as a result of decades - particularly the past 16 years in the U.S. - of declining middle classes, rising inequality, and weak median incomes.15 The consequences are only just beginning to be felt, and are of far greater global significance coming from the U.S. than the relatively small U.K. The chief of these is that, in the U.S., the median voter has clearly moved to the left on economic policy. Trump's victory over an army of seasoned, relatively orthodox GOP contenders in the primary exposed the fact that the party's grassroot voters no longer care deeply about fiscal austerity and no longer wish to tolerate the corporate incentive for importing cheap labor. Rather, they want government to give them more goodies and protections. This fact, taken along with the demographic trends favoring millennials and minorities (who tend to vote left on economic policies), portends a shift by which the GOP attempts to capture left-leaning voters in a way that Bill Clinton and the "New Democrats" shifted to capture right-leaning centrist voters in the wake of Ronald Reagan and the collapse of the USSR. Part of this process will involve a political alignment in the U.S., now that the GOP's deep fractures have been exposed for all the world to see. Trump's candidacy could never have occurred if there had not first been a power vacuum at the center of the party. If Trump wins, it will be a veritable revolution for both parties. Fiscal conservatism (and social conservatism, for that matter) will have little to show by way of official party machinery. The global consequences will be highly disruptive as well since the executive branch has extensive power over all actions of the federal bureaucracy, trade, and foreign policy, and since the GOP will not obstruct Trump initially (whatever happens in the aftermath of any radical policy changes). If Trump loses, as mentioned above, the anti-establishment trend in the Republican Party will suffer the brunt of the blame - whether Tea Party or other. Though messy, this result could in fact be bullish for the U.S. in the long run, since it would discredit populism in the party and give a boost to reformers who seek to re-brand and redesign the party to respond to changes in the electorate. Thus, in 2020, either Clinton's policies will be working and Americans will not be demanding change, or they will not be working, and Americans will have a reformed GOP as an alternative. Alternatively, Trump's loss could fuel populism by showing the way for a similar candidate with similar policies yet who does not lack in charisma, oratory, and party backing. Trump's strategy of boosting white support for the GOP is demographically and mathematically possible at least until 2024. Or perhaps a different kind of Republican (or Democratic) candidate could attempt to capture aspects of Trumpism, given his left-tilt on economic policy, while appealing to the Democratic coalition of women, millennials, and minorities. The GOP shakeup should be watched closely. Lastly, the 2016 election has amplified a point that we have long emphasized: the news media works in narratives. These narratives work as a filter that preempts and distorts the presentation and, to some extent, reception of facts. This phenomenon was influential in Trump's rise - the first "Twitter" candidacy - as well as his recent decline. Similarly, it made the race competitive when Clinton's various scandals were "trending." As a result, investors cannot be too wary of what the mainstream press or financial "smart money" says about any particular political trend or event. It is essential to separate the wheat from the chaff by using empirics and looking at macro and structural factors to identify the constraints rather than the preferences of candidates or politicians. Trump's constraints, as we have contended, are too high. Appendix 1 shows the state-by state performance of the econometric model (without polls) for each of the past 8 elections. It compares the model's forecast (no hindsight bias) with actual results. APPENDIX 1 Back-testing GPS's Econometric Election Model 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election - Forecast & Investment Implications," dated September 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Bank Credit Analyst Strategic Outlook, "Stuck In A Rut," dated December 17, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 #shocker. 4 For a more detailed explanation of FiveThirtyEight's methodology, please see "A User's Guide To FiveThirtyEight's 2016 General Election Forecast," dated June 29, 2016, available at http://www.fivethirtyeight.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: The Great White Hype," dated March 9, 2016, available at gps.bcareseach.com. 6 The Democrats' probability of winning Nevada and New Hampshire are 74.4% and 80% respectively. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "U.S. Election: Is The Election Over?" in Monthly Report, "Who's Afraid Of Big Bad Trump?" dated August 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Trumponomics: What Investors Need To Know," September 4, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 9 The assumption being that the turnout, non-white vote share, and white turnout do not change from 2012. In other words, our model only focuses on the white share of the vote for the Republican candidate. We assume that Clinton will not benefit from an anti-Trump tailwind among minorities, which is a big assumption given the pernicious effects of the "White Hype" strategy on the minority support of a Republican candidate. On the other hand, we also do not change the white voter turnout, which is unfair to Trump as he would likely be able to boost the white turnout as he increases the GOP share of the vote. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "U.S. Election Update - The Home Stretch," in Monthly Report, "Transformative Vs. Transactional Leadership," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see our book review below for a discussion of Lichtman's latest book. See also Peter W. Stevenson, "Trump Is Headed For A Win, Says Professor Who Has Predicted 30 Years Of Presidential Outcomes Correctly," Washington Post, September 23, 2016, available at www.washingtonpost.com. 12 Lichtman addresses the issues of Sanders, scandals, and Trump's charisma in Peter W. Stevenson, "This Professor Has Predicted Every Presidential Election Since 1984. He's Still Trying To Figure Out 2016," Washington Post, May 12, 2016, available at www.washingtonpost.com. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, and "Annus Horribilis," dated January 20, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

The technology sector has spiked higher of late, supported by the merger premium in semiconductor stocks. However, the fundamental justification for the recent valuation expansion remains shaky. Tech sales growth remains non-existent. A dearth of new order growth and the ongoing contraction in Asian exports warn that it is premature to position for a recovery in top-line performance. That is confirmed by the impending corporate sector retrenchment, as the steady narrowing in the gap between the return on and cost of capital warns that business investment on tech goods will stay sluggish. Consumer spending on tech has been the lone bright spot, but even that has mostly been moving in line with overall consumption in recent years, not enough to deliver sales outperformance. As a result, fading recent tech strength makes sense, given vulnerability to a valuation squeeze.

While the corporate sector has run up debt levels and is struggling to generate profit growth, consumers have rebuilt their savings and are enjoying the benefits of a positive wealth effect. The increase in real wage and salaries growth is supporting consumer income expectations, according to the latest consumer confidence survey (top panel). The implication is that consumption-oriented plays should be well positioned to deliver profit outperformance. Consumer finance stocks provide an attractively valued play on this theme, as does the S&P data processing index. The latter is levered to total transaction volumes, and a healthy consumer should translate into positive sales momentum. We are overweight both indexes.