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Highlights Dear Client, The growth of the electric-vehicle market, particularly re its implications for hydrocarbons as the primary transportation fuel in the world, will remain a key issue for energy markets, particularly oil. The IEA estimates transportation accounted for 64.5% of oil demand in 2014, the latest data available, compared to natural gas's 7% share and electricity's 1.5% share.1 Last week, Fitch Ratings published a report concluding, "Widespread adoption of battery-powered vehicles is a serious threat to the oil industry." For example, the agency contends that "in an extreme scenario, where electric cars gained a 50 per cent market share over 10 years about a quarter of European gasoline demand could disappear." This is not a widespread view in the energy markets. IHS Energy published a report in 2014 finding, "Past energy transitions took decades to unfold and were driven by a combination of market factors: cost, scarcity of supply, utility and flexibility, technology development, geopolitical developments, consumer trends, and policy.2" While our view is more aligned with IHS's, it is undeniable electric vehicles are a growing market. For this reason, we are publishing an analysis by BCA Research's EM Equity Sector Strategy written by our colleague Oleg Babanov, which explores the lithium-battery supply chain and how investors can gain exposure to this critical element of the fast-growing global electric-vehicle market. Separately, we are downgrading our strategic zinc view from neutral to bearish, and recommending a Dec/17 short if it rallies. Robert P. Ryan Senior Vice President, Commodity & Energy Strategy Lithium is a rare metal with a costly production process and a high concentration in a small number of countries. Difficulty in production is comparable to deep-sea oil drilling. Lithium is the key element in lithium-ion batteries. Demand is rapidly increasing as more countries adopt environment-protection policies and electric-car production is on the rise. We recommend an overweight on the lithium battery supply chain (Table 1), on a long-term perspective (one year plus). We estimate demand for the raw material to rise by approximately 30% over the coming years, driven by the main electric vehicle production clusters in Asia and the U.S. Table 1Single Stock Statistics For Companies##br## In The Lithium Battery Supply Chain (Oct 2016)* What Is Powering Your Battery? Being a relatively rare and difficult to produce metal, lithium demand is rapidly increasing due to the metal's unique physical characteristics, which are utilized in long-life or rechargeable batteries. Rapidly rising demand from portable electronics manufacturers, and the push of the auto industry to develop new fuel-efficient technology, backed by the widespread support of many governments to reduce transportation costs and improve CO2 emissions, are driving prices for the metal higher. We believe that companies in the electric vehicle (EV) supply chain, from miners to battery producers and down to EV manufacturers, will benefit from the change in environmental policies and the growing need for more portable devices with larger energy storage. As the focus of the wider investment community remains tilted towards the U.S. (and Tesla in particular), many companies in the lithium battery supply chain, as well as EV producers, remain overlooked and undervalued. EV Production Expected To Surge We expect a continuation of the push towards energy-saving vehicles among car manufacturers, driven by government incentives and new tougher regulations (EU regulations for CO2 emissions in 2020 will be the strictest so far). Over one million EV vehicles of different types were sold in 2015. In countries such as Norway, the penetration of PEVs is reaching up to 23% (Chart 1). Based on the current growth rates (Chart 2), the compound annual growth rate of EV production is estimated at 30% to 35% over the next 10 years. Japan will remain in top spot in EV penetration (the current HEV rate is around 20% of the overall market). Japan's market (controlled by Toyota and Honda) is dominated by the HEV type of vehicles, and we expect it to remain this way. Chart 1PEV Penetration By Country Chart 2EV Sales By Country We expect the largest boost in market share gains to happen on the European market, based on very stringent CO2 emissions regulation (Chart 3) and ambitious EV targets set by the larger countries. EV market share is set to reach 20% (from the current 5%) in the coming seven to 10 years. The EU is closely followed by South Korea. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) has developed an ambitious plan of growth, by which EV market share should reach 20% by 2020 and 30% by 2025. New EVs will receive special license plates, fuel incentives, and new charging stations. MOTIE wants the auto industry to be able to produce 920,000 NEVs per year, of which 70% should be exported. Among other large markets, the U.S. and China will remain the two countries with lowest EV penetration rates, although growth rates will be impressive. This will be due to low incentives from the government and cheap traditional fuel supply (in the U.S.), or a low base, some subsidy cuts, and infrastructure constraints (in China). Especially in China's case, the numbers remain striking (Chart 4). According to statistics published by the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM), EV sales in 2015 grew 450% YOY. The market is estimated to grow at an average rate of 25% over the next 10 years. Chart 3EU CO2 Emission Targets Chart 4Monthly NEV Sales China In this report we will highlight companies from the raw material production stage: Albermarle (ALB US), Gangfeng Lithium (002460 CH), Tianqi Lithium Industries (002466 CH), and Orocobre (ORE AU); to added-value battery producers: BYD (1211 HK), LG Chem (051910 KS), and Samsung SDI (006400 KS); down to some electric vehicle companies: Geely Automobile Holdings (175 HK) and Zhengzhou Yutong Bus Company (600066 CH). The Supply Side Driven by demand from China and the U.S., the raw material base for lithium has shifted in the past 20 years from subsurface brines to more production-intensive hard-rock ores. Brine operations are mostly found in the so-called LatAm "triangle" - Argentina, Chile and Bolivia - while China and Australia produce lithium from spodumene (a mineral consisting of lithium aluminium inosilicate) and other minerals. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates world reserves at 14 million tonnes in 2015, with Bolivia and Chile on top of the table (Chart 5). The main lithium producing countries, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, are Australia, Chile, and Argentina (Chart 6). Chart 5Lithium Reserves Concentrated In LatAm Chart 6Lithium Production Dynamics By Country The lithium mining process starts with pumping lithium-containing brine to subsurface reservoirs and leaving the water to evaporate (from 12 to 24 months) until the brine reaches a 6% lithium content. From here there are three ways to process the concentrate, or the hard-rock in mineral form: Treatment with sulfuric acid (acidic method) Sintering with CaO or CaCO3 (alkali method) Treatment with K2SO4 (salt method) Further, lithium carbonate (Li2CO3), a poorly soluble solution, is isolated from the received concentrate and transferred into lithium chloride, which is purified in a vacuum distillation process. Storage is also difficult: as lithium is highly corrosive and can damage the mucous membrane, it is most commonly stored in a mineral oil lubricant. Due to the rare nature of the metal, lithium comes mainly as a by-product of other metals and comprises only a small part of the production portfolio. This is the reason why the underlying metal price and the share prices of the largest producers of lithium have low correlation (Chart 7). Albermarle, SQM, and FMC Corp currently control as much as three-quarters of global lithium production, but price performance is not keeping up with the price of the underlying metal. For best exposure to the metal, we concentrate on companies with a large degree of dedication to mining lithium and close ties to the end-users. We recommend one established market leader (by volume) - Albermarle (ALB US); one company that just started operations - Orocobre (ORE AU), whose assets are concentrated in Argentina; and two lithium miners from China - Jiangxi Ganfeng Lithium (002460 CH) and Tianqi Lithium (002466 CH). These companies display much higher correlation to the metal price (Chart 8). Chart 7FMC Corp., SQM And ##br##Albermarle Vs. Lithium Price Chart 8Orocorbe, Jiangxi Ganfeng And##br## Tianqi Lithium Vs. Lithium Price Albermarle (ALB US): U.S. company with EM exposure (Chart 9). After the acquisition of Rockwood Holdings in 2015, Albermarle became one of the largest producers of lithium and lithium derivatives. Lithium accounts for more than 35% of the company's revenue stream (+20% YOY), which compares favourably to the 20% of the Chilean producer SQM and the 8% of another large US producer FMC Corp. Chile comprises 31% of global production. Albermarle's 2Q16 results on 3 August came broadly in line with market expectations. Some deviation from expectations occurred because of discontinued operations in the Surface Treatment segment. Group sales contracted by 7%, due to divestures started in previous quarters (Chemetal). Positively, lithium sales grew 10% YOY due to both better pricing and higher volumes, and EBITDA in the segment improved by 20%. Group EBITDA (adjusted) grew by 5% YOY and the bottom-line (adjusted) expanded by 11% YOY. Management appears confident about FY16 operations, guiding 1% improvement in EBITDA, as well as 3% in FY EPS and aims to maintain EBITDA margins in the lithium segment at over 40%. We see high growth potential due to Albermarle's portfolio composition. The market is currently expecting an EPS CAGR of 9% over the next four years. Albermarle is trading at a forward P/E of 23.1x. Orocobre (ORE AU): An Australian company mining in Argentina (Chart 10). Orocobre is an Australian resource company, based in Brisbane. As in the case with Albermarle, the majority of operations are located in EM, so we see it as appropriate to include the company into our portfolio. Chart 9Performance Since October 2015: ##br##Albermarle vs MXEF Index Chart 10Performance Since October 2015: ##br##Orocobre vs MXEF Index Orocobre is at an initial stage in the lithium production process. The only division working at full capacity is Borax Argentina (acquired from Rio Tinto in 2012), an open-pit borate mining operation (producing 40 kilotonnes per annum (ktpa)). The flagship project (65% share), launched in a JV with Toyota Tsusho Corp, is the Olaroz lithium facility, a salt lake with an estimated 6.5 million tonnes of lithium carbonate (LCE) reserves. The planned capacity is at 17.5 ktpa. Due to the geological structure, it comes with one of the lowest operational costs ($3500 per tonne). The production ramp-up to 2,971 tonnes of lithium, reported on 19 July together with the 4Q16 results, came a notch below market expectations. The management lowered the production guidance, delaying full operational capacity by two months until November (realistically it might take even longer). Positive points in guidance included an LCE price exceeding $10,000/tonne in the upcoming quarter and confirmation that the company turned cash flow positive in the first half of this year.3 Orocobre is already planning capacity expansion at the Olaroz facility to 25 ktpa, with diversification into lithium hydroxide. Further exploration drilling is underway in the Cauchari facility, just south of Olaroz. The market forecasts the company to produce a positive bottom-line in FY17 and grow EPS by a CAGR of 25% for the next four years. Orocobre is currently trading at a forward P/E of 36.1x. Jiangxi Ganfeng Lithium (002460 CH): one of the largest lithium producers in China (Chart 11). Gangfeng is a unique company in the lithium space in the sense that it is a raw material producer with added processing capabilities. The main trigger for our OW recommendation was the acquisition of a 43% stake in the Mt Marion project in Australia. From 3Q16 onwards the bottleneck in raw material supply will be removed and the company can count on approximately 20 thousand tonnes (kt) of lithium spodumene. On the back of this news, the company announced a production expansion into lithium hydroxide (20 kt) from which 15 kt will be battery grade and 5 kt industry grade. This has the potential to lift Ganfeng to one of the top five producers in the world. Ganfeng reported stellar 2Q16 results on 22 August. The top-line grew two times YOY, while operating profit increased by 7.8x. Operating margin jumped from 9.8% to 35.9%, and the bottom-line expanded five-fold YOY. The profit margin also improved from 8.55% to 25.3%. We expect less strong, but still robust, YOY growth for the upcoming quarters. Market projects EPS CAGR of over 50% during the next four years, as the production run-up will continue. The company is currently trading at a forward P/E of 36.8x. Tianqi Lithium Industries (002466 CH): Making the move (Chart 12). Tianqi is the third largest producer in the world (18% of global capacity). Recently the company got into the news on rumors of its attempted expansion by taking a controlling stake in the world's largest lithium producer, Chile's SQM. Chart 11Performance Since October 2015:##br## Jiangxi Ganfeng Lithium vs MXEF Index Chart 12Performance Since October 2015: ##br##Tianqi Lithium vs MXEF Index SQM has an intricate shareholding structure, with the involvement of the Chilean government and a rule that no shareholder is currently allowed to own more than a 32% stake in the company (this rule can be changed only through an extraordinary shareholder meeting). At the moment the largest shareholder is Mr. Ponce Lerou (son-in-law of former President Augusto Pinochet), who owns just under 30% and has a strategic agreement with a Japanese company, Kowa, which makes the combined holding 32%. During the last week of September Tianqi acquired a 2% stake (for USD209 m) from US-based fund SailtingStone Capital Partners, which held a 9% stake, with the option to buy the remaining 7%. In a further step, Tianqi is trying to negotiate a deal with one of Mr. Ponce Lerou's companies which holds a 23% stake. It is said that Mr. Ponce Lerou has got into a political stalemate with the Chilean government on a production increase at one of its deposits and is looking to exit the company. Tianqi reported strong Q2 results on 22 August. Revenues grew by 2.4x YOY, and operating profit improved by 3.9x YOY. Operating margin grew from 42.99% in 2015 to 69.35% in 2Q16, and bottom-line increased twofold QOQ as production ramp-up continued. At the same time profit margin reached 48.9%, up from 2.8% a year ago. The company is currently trading at a forward P/E of 23.4x, and the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 13% over the next three years. The Demand Side4 Lithium is used in a wide range of products, from electronics to aluminium production and special alloys, down to ceramics and glass. But battery production takes the largest share of utilization (Charts 13A & 13B). Chart 13ALithium UsageChart 13BLithium Batteries Most Widely Used As confirmed by import statistics (from the U.S. Geological Survey), demand in many Asian countries, as well as the U.S., has been constantly rising. Among the main importers, South Korea is in fourth place with the largest number of new lithium-related projects started. In top position is the U.S., where we expect a strong demand increase, once the Tesla battery mega-factory in Nevada is completed, followed by Japan, which has the highest penetration of electric vehicles (EV), and China (Chart 14). Chart 14Composition Of Lithium Imports By Country Because of its low atomic mass, lithium has a high charge and power-to-mass ratio (a lithium battery generates up to 3V per cell, compared to 2.1V for lead-acid or 1.5V for zinc-carbon), which makes it the metal-of-choice for battery electrolytes and electrodes, and makes it difficult to replace with other metals, due to its unique physical features. Lithium is used in both disposable batteries (as an anode) and re-chargeable ones (Li-ion or LIB batteries, where lithium is used as an intercalated compound). Li-ion batteries are used in: Portable electronics, such as mobile phones (lithium cobalt oxide based); Power tools / household appliances (lithium iron phosphate or lithium manganese oxide); EVs (lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide or NMC). The most produced battery is the cylindrical 18650 battery. Tesla's Model S uses over 7000 of these type of batteries for its 85 kWh battery pack (the largest on the market until mid-August, when Tesla announced a 100 kWh battery pack). The amount of lithium used in a battery pack depends on the kW output. Rockwood Lithium (now Albermarle), estimated in one of its annual presentations that: A hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) uses approximately 1.6kg of lithium A plug-in hybrid (PHEV) uses 12kg An electric vehicle (EV) uses more than 20kg (but all depends on make, model, and technology). An average car battery (PHEV/EV) would use over 10kg of lithium, assuming 450g per kWh (please note that real-life calculations suggest a usage of up to 800g per kWh of lithium. We have used the lower end of the range for our estimates), with Tesla's battery consuming around 70kg of lithium. Simple math suggests that with the completion of the mega-factory (estimated production of 35 GWh or 500k batteries p.a.), Tesla alone will be consuming at least half of world lithium production by 2020, and create a large overhang in demand. Among car battery producers, we like global players with dominant market positions and strong ties to end-users, such as LG Chem, Samsung SDI in Korea, and BYD in China. Those three companies together control more than half of global battery production (Chart 15) and will most likely maintain market share in the foreseeable future, as barriers to entry are high due the amount of investment required into technology and production facilities, and the end-product is difficult to differentiate on the market. BYD Corp (1211 HK): Build Your Dreams, it's in the name (Chart 16). Founded in 1995 and based in Shenzhen, BYD covers the whole value chain, from R&D and production of batteries (phone and car batteries) to automobile production and energy storage solutions. It is currently the largest battery and PHEV producer in China. The total revenues stream consists of 55% from auto and auto components sales, 33% portable electronics battery, and 12% car battery sales. Chart 15Largest Lithium ##br##Battery Producers Chart 16Performance Since October 2015: ##br##BYD Corp vs MXEF Index We believe the company is best positioned to reap multi-year rewards from the recent drive of the Chinese government to promote new electronic vehicle (NEV) growth through subsidies, support of charging infrastructure, and changes in legislation. The introduction of carbon trading in August (carbon credit will be measured on the number of gasoline-powered vehicles in the producer's fleet) will give BYD a benefit over other car manufacturers. BYD's model pipeline and battery manufacturing capacity (expected to reach 20 GWh by FY17), as well as favourable pricing ($200 kWh compared to over $400 kWh for Tesla) put the company into a leadership position. BYD reported 2Q16 results on 28 August, which came out very strong. Revenues grew by 52.5% YOY and 384% on a semi-annual perspective, driven by all three business segments and especially strong in EV sales (+29% YOY). This came with a significant beat of consensus estimates and later we saw a 68% upwards adjustment. As a result operating margin and profit margin improved from 3.8% and 2.2% in 2Q15 to 8.5% and 5.8% in 2Q16. Bottom-line was up 4x YOY. The market is currently pricing in an EPS CAGR of 12% over the next three years. BYD is trading at a forward P/E of 23.9x. LG Chem (051910 KS): Catering for the US market (Chart 17). LG Chem is the largest chemical company in South Korea, operating in three different divisions: petrochemicals (from basic distillates to polymers), which account for 71% of total revenues, information technology and electronics (displays, toners etc.), which represent 13% of total revenues, and energy solutions, 16% of total revenues. LG Chem is the third largest battery producer in the world, manufacturing a pallet from small watch and mobile phone batteries down to auto-packs. LG's North American operations in Holland, Michigan produce battery packs for the whole range of GM (Chevrolet, Cadillac) EVs (including the most popular Volt range), as well as for the Ford Focus. In Europe, customers include Renault; in Asia, LG is working with Hyundai, SAIC, and Chery. The company reported better-than-expected 2Q16 results on 21 July. Revenues grew by 3% YOY and operating profit by 8.5% YOY, driven solely by the petrochem division (up 10% YOY). Bottom-line expanded by a healthy 8% YOY. LG Chem trades at deeply discounted levels (forward P/E of 11.6x) due to the remaining negative profitability in the battery segment (partly due to licensing issues in China, which represents 32% of total revenues), but we estimate that the trend will turn in the following quarters, as Chevrolet is ramping up demand with new product lines and management is guiding for a resolution in China. Furthermore, plans released by the Korean government in June/July (renewable energy plan and EV expansion plan) will increase demand for batteries by more than 30% CAGR in the next five years. The market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 9% over the upcoming four years. Samsung SDI (006400 KS): Investing into the future (Chart 18). In contrast to LG Chem, Samsung SDI is fully focused on Li-ion battery production, with 66.5% of total revenues coming from this division (BMW and Fiat among clients). The company also produces semiconductors and LCD displays, which account for 35.5% of total revenue. Chart 17Performance Since October 2015: ##br##LG Chem vs MXEF Index Chart 18Performance Since October 2015: ##br##Samsung SDI vs MXEF Index Samsung SDI is currently in a reorganization phase, as the company is spinning off "Samsung SDI Chemicals" and has announced it will invest $2.5 bn into further development of its car battery business. The proceeds from the sale of Samsung SDI Chemicals (taken over by Lotte Chemicals in April for around $2.6 bn) will also be directed towards the car battery segment. Samsung SDI reported weak 2Q16 results on 28 July, as expected. Revenues continued to contract on a YOY basis, although the rate of decline slowed compared to Q1 and even registered 2% QOQ growth. The bottom-line was positive due to a one-off gain (the sale of the chemical business). The main headwinds came from delays in licensing Chinese factory production and a strong Japanese yen. On the positive side, Li-ion batteries in portable devices performed well, due to better than expected Galaxy S7 sales, as well as OLED sales, due to increased demand and capacity constraints in the mobile phone and large panel spaces. Due to the high concentration of EV battery-related revenues in its portfolio, we believe that Samsung SDI will be the largest beneficiary of government's renewable energy and EV expansion plans. The company is also ideally positioned to take advantage of the fast-growing Chinese market (35% of revenues coming from China), once the issue with licensing is resolved (which management guided will happen in Q3). The recent problems with overheating or exploding batteries, reported by users of the new Samsung phones, have sent the share price lower. We believe that this offers an excellent entry point, as ultimately the company will replace/improve the technology, and, at the same time, there are no alternatives which could threaten Samsung SDI's leadership in the portable battery space. The temporary issue in China has weighted on valuations, as Samsung SDI is trading at a forward P/E of 27.7x, while the market expects EPS to increase fivefold in the coming four years. Accessing The Chinese EV Market Best access to the fast growing Chinese market is through local car manufacturers, such as Geely (Chart 19). The subsidy schemes, put in place by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), currently cover only domestic-made models (except the BMW i3). Furthermore, import duties are making foreign-made vehicles uncompetitive in terms of price. We recommend to overweight Geely (0175 HK) and electric bus producer Yutong Bus (600066 CH) on the 30% NEV rule for public transport procurement. Chart 19Accessing The Chinese EV Market Geely ("Lucky" in Mandarin) Automobile Holdings (175 HK): A company with large ambitions (Chart 20). Probably best known for its two foreign car holdings, Volvo and the London Taxi Company, Geely grew from a small appliances manufacturer to the second largest EV producer in China, with an ambitious goal to manufacture 2 mn units by 2020. We see the main positive driver in Geely's big push into the EV market. The goal set by management is to have 90% of its fleet powered by electricity by 2020. The so called "Blue Geely" initiative is based on a revamp of Geely's current fleet into HEVs/PHEVs (65% as per plan) and EVs (35%). In May the company raised $400 mn in "green bonds" in a first for a Chinese car company, to support its R&D and manufacturing project, Ansty, to produce the first zero-emission TX5 black cabs in the U.K. The company reported strong 1H16 results on 18 August. Revenues were up 30% YOY, driven by higher production volume (up 10% YOY) and a sales price hike of around 15% YOY. The co-operation with Volvo seems to be working well (Volvo's design, Geely's production capabilities). The average waiting time for new models in China is approximately two months. The bottom-line expanded by 37.5% YOY despite a high density of new model launches, and we expect to see some margin improvement in the coming quarters. The market forecasts an EPS growth CAGR of 25% over the coming four years. Geely is currently trading at a forward P/E of 15.6x. Zhengzhou Yutong Bus Company (600066 CH): An unusual bus manufacturer (Chart 21). Yutong Bus Company is the world's largest, and technologically most advanced, producer of medium and large-sized buses (over 75k units produced in FY15, 10% global market share), with its own R&D and servicing capabilities. Even more important, Yutong is one of the largest producers of electric-powered buses in China and globally. Chart 20Performance Since October 2015: ##br##Geely Automobile Holdings vs MXEF Index Chart 21Performance Since October 2015:##br## Yutong Bus Company vs MXEF Index Due to the 30% EV procurement rule for local governments, the number of electric buses produced in 2015 soared 15 times to 90,000, a quarter of which were produced by Yutong. We expect this number to grow further with the introduction of the new carbon emission trading scheme. We see Yutong as best positioned in the bus manufacturers' space to take advantage of the new trading rules. Yutong reported 2Q16 results on 23 August, which came in broadly in line with market expectations. Revenue expanded by 34% YOY, driven by volume growth (7400 NEV units sold, +100% YOY). The push into EVs came with higher cost-of-sales (warranty and servicing). This did not affect gross margin (up 1% to 25%). Bottom-line grew by 50% YOY. Management maintained an upbeat outlook, guiding 25,000 units of NEV sales in FY16, with an average sales price increase due to higher sales in the large-bus segment. Management also expects to receive the national subsidy for FY15 in 3Q16 and for 2016 in 1Q17. The market currently factors in an EPS CAGR growth of 8% over the next four years. Yutong is trading at a forward P/E of 12.3x. How To Trade? The EMES team recommends gaining exposure to the sector through a basket of the listed equities, which would consist of four mining companies, three car battery pack producers, and two EV manufacturers. The main goal is active alpha generation by excluding laggards and including out-of-benchmark plays, to avoid passive index hugging via an ETF. Direct: Equity access through the tickers (Bloomberg): Albermarle (ALB US), Gangfeng Lithium (002460 CH), Orocobre (ORE AU), Tianqi Lithium Industries (002466 CH), BYD (1211 HK), LG Chem (051910 KS), Samsung SDI (006400 KS), Geely Automobile Holdings (175 HK), Zhengzhou Yutong Bus Company (600066 CH). ETFs: Global X Lithium ETF (LIT US) Funds: There are currently no funds available, which invest directly into lithium or lithium-related stocks. Please note that the trade recommendation is long-term (1Y+) and based on an OW call. We don't see a need for specific market timing for this call (for technical indicators please refer to our website link). Trades can also be implemented through our recommendation versus MXEF index either directly through equities in the recommended list or through ETFs. For convenience, the performance of both the ETFs and market cap-weighted equity baskets will be tracked (please see upcoming updates as well as the website link to follow performance). Risks To Our Investment Case Because of the broad diversification, we see our portfolio exposed to idiosyncratic risk factors, which could affect single-stock performance, as well as the following macro factors: Mining: Falling lithium prices due to lower demand or a ramp-up in production on some of the Australian projects, could hurt profitability or delay new projects (especially in case of Orocobre). We also see some political risk stemming from the region of operations (Argentina, Chile), especially taking into account the weak performance of Chile's own lithium producer SQM and its role in a Brazil-like political scandal. Battery and EV production. We identify the main risk in drastic changes to governments' environmental and subsidy policies, which would hit the whole supply chain. A slowdown in economic development can make green or power-saving initiatives too expensive and governments will have to rethink their subsidy policies or production/penetration goals. This will hurt profitability through either a negative impact on sales or through smaller subsidies, which producers and end-users are receiving from their governments. One further risk is the dramatic increase in demand for lithium after the completion of Tesla's factory in Nevada, but may also come from other large players such as BYD. We currently see this risk as muted. As with all large Tesla initiatives, you have to take them with a pinch of salt, as the exact end numbers and the time the factory will be working at full capacity are unclear. Furthermore, Tesla, unlike many Chinese competitors, has no supply of lithium of its own, so there is little chance that it can protect supply or control prices. In any case, we see the overall portfolio as balanced, as the mining companies' performance should compensate for a negative impact on the end producers. Oleg Babanov, Editor/Strategist obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk BASE METALS China Commodity Focus: Base Metals Zinc: Downgrade To Strategically Bearish We downgrade our strategic zinc view from neutral to bearish. We believe zinc supply (both ore and refined) will rise in response to current high prices, resulting in a 10-15% decline in zinc prices over next 9-12 months. Tactically, we still remain neutral on zinc prices as we believe the market will remain in supply deficit over the near term. Chinese zinc ore production will recover in 2017, while the country's zinc demand growth will slow. China is the world's biggest zinc ore miner, refined zinc producer, and zinc consumer. We recommend selling Dec/17 zinc if it rises to $2,400/MT (current: $2,373.5/MT). If the sell order gets filled, put on a stop-loss level at $2,500/MT. Zinc has been the best-performing metal in the base-metals complex, beating copper, aluminum and nickel this year. After bottoming at $1,456.50/MT on January 12, zinc prices have rallied 64.7% to $2,399/MT on October 3 (Chart 22, panel 1). The Rally The rally was supercharged by a widening supply deficit, which was mainly due to a record shortage of zinc ores globally (Chart 22, panels 2, 3 and 4). Late last October our research showed the output loss from the closure of Australia's Century mine, the closure of Ireland's Lisheen mine and Glencore's production cuts would reduce global zinc supply by 970 - 1,020 KT in 2016, which would be equivalent to a 7.1 - 7.5% drop in global zinc ore output.5 Moreover, a 16% price decline during the November-January period spurred additional production cut worldwide. According to the WBMS data, for the first seven months of 2016, global zinc ore production declined 11.9% versus the same period of last year, a reduction never before seen in the zinc market. In comparison, there was no decline in global zinc demand (Chart 22, panel 4). As a result, the global supply deficit reached 152-thousand-metric-tons (kt) for the first seven months of 2016, versus the 230kt supply surplus during the same period last year. What Now? Tactically, We Remain Neutral. On the supply side, we do not see much new ore supply coming on stream over the next three months. On the demand side, both monetary and fiscal stimulus in China has pushed Chinese zinc demand higher. For the first seven months of 2016, the country's zinc consumption increased 209 kt, the biggest consumption gain worldwide. Because of China, global zinc demand did not fall this year. China will continue lifting global zinc demand as its auto production, highway infrastructure investment, and overseas demand for galvanized steel sheet will likely remain elevated over the near term (Chart 23, panels 1, 2 and 3). Inventories at the LME are still hovering around the lowest level since August 2009, while SHFE inventories also have been falling (Chart 23, bottom panel). Speculators seem to be running out of steam, as the open interest has dropped from the multi-year high on futures exchanges. Chart 22Zinc: Strategically Bearish, Tactically Neutral Chart 23Positive Factors In The Near Term The aforementioned factors militate against zinc prices dropping sharply in the near term. However, with prices near the 2014 and 2015 highs, and facing strong technical resistance, we do not see much upside. Strategically, We Downgrade Our Strategic Zinc View From Neutral To Bearish We believe zinc supply (both ore and refined) will rise in response to current high prices, resulting in a 10-15% decline in zinc prices over next 9-12 months. Chart 24High Prices Will Boost Supply In 2017 Zinc prices at both LME and China's SHFE markets are high (Chart 24, panel 1). Last year, many miners and producers cut their ore and refined production due to extremely low prices. If zinc prices stay high over next three to six months, we expect to see an increasing amount of news stories on either production cutbacks coming back or new supply being added to the market, which will clearly be negative to zinc prices (Chart 24, panels 2 and 3). So far, even though Glencore, the world's biggest ore producing company, is still sticking firmly to its output reduction plan, there have been some news reports about other producers raising their output, all of which will increase zinc ore supply in 2017. The CEO of the Peruvian Antamina mine said on October 10 the mine operator will aim to double its zinc output in 2017 to 340 - 350 kt, up from an estimated 170 kt - 180 kt this year, as the open pit operation transitions into richer zinc areas. This alone will add 170 kt - 180 kt new zinc supply to the market. Vedanta said last week that its zinc ore output from its Hindustan Zinc mine located in India will be significantly higher over next two quarters versus the last two quarters. Nyrstar announced in late September that it is reactivating its Middle Tennessee mines in the U.S., expecting ore production to resume during 2017Q1 and to reach full capacity of 50 kt per year of zinc in concentrate by November 2017. Red River Resource is also restarting its Thalanga zinc project in Australia, and expects to resume producing ore in early 2017. Glencore may not produce more than its 2016 zinc production guidance over next three months. But it will likely set its 2017 guidance higher, if zinc prices stay elevated. After all, the company has massive mothballed zinc mines, which are available to bring back to the market quickly. In comparison to the high probability of more supply coming on stream, global demand growth is likely to stay anemic in 2017, as the stimulus in China, which was implemented in 2016H1, will eventually run out of steam. How Will China Affect The Global Zinc Market? Chart 25Look To Short Dec/17 Zinc China is the world's largest zinc ore producing country, the world's largest refined zinc producing country, and the world's largest zinc consuming country. Last year, the country produced 35.9% of global zinc ore, 43.8% of global refined zinc, and consumed 46.7% of global zinc. Over the near term, China is a positive factor to global zinc prices. Domestic refiners are currently willing to refining zinc ores as domestic zinc prices are near their highest levels since February 2011. With inventories running low and domestic ore output falling 7.8% during the first seven months of 2016, the country may increase its zinc ore imports in the near term, further tightening global zinc ore supply. Domestic zinc demand and overseas galvanized steel demand are likely to stay strong in the near term. However, over the longer term, China will become a negative factor to global zinc prices. China's ore output the first seven months of 2016 was 221 kt lower than the same period of last year as low prices in January-March forced widespread mine closures. The country's mine output may not increase much, as the government shut 26 lead and zinc mines in August in Hunan province (the 3rd largest zinc-producing province in China) due to safety and environmental concerns. The ban will be in place until June 2017. Looking forward, elevated zinc prices and a removal of the ban will boost Chinese zinc ore output in 2017. Regarding demand, we expect much weaker Chinese zinc demand growth next year as this year's stimulus should run out of steam by then. Risks If global zinc ore supply does not increase as much as we expect, or global demand still have a robust growth next year, global zinc supply-demand balance may be more tightened, resulting in further zinc price rallies. If Chinese authorities resume their reflationary policies next year during the lead-up to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in the fall, which may increase Chinese and global zinc demand considerably, we will re-evaluate our bearish strategic zinc view. Investment Ideas As we are strategically bearish zinc, we recommend selling Dec/17 zinc if it rises to $2,400/MT (current: $2,373.5/MT) (Chart 25). If the sell order gets filled, put on a stop-loss level at $2,500/MT. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see p. 32 of the 2016 edition of the International Energy Agency's "Key World Energy Statistics." The IEA reckons global oil demand in 2014 averaged just over 93mm b/d. 2 Please see the Financial Times, p. 12, "Warning on electric vehicle threat to oil industry," in the October 9, 2016, re the Fitch Ratings report, and IHS Energy's Special Report, "Deflating the 'Carbon Bubble,' Reality of oil and gas company valuation," published in September 2014. 3 Because of the early stage of the project, a conventional equity analysis is not yet applicable. 4 Please see Technology Sector Strategy Special Report "Electric Vehicle Batteries", dated September 20, 2016, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report for Base Metal section, "Global Oil Market Rebalancing Faster Than Expected", dated October 22, 2015, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Closed Trades
As third quarter earnings reports trickle in for companies in the industrial sector, it is becoming increasingly clear that achieving meaningful sales growth will remain a daunting task. There is little incentive to bet on upside surprises. Commodity-related industries remain hamstrung by poor balance sheets and a dearth of free cash flow, which will limit capital availability needed for investment. Banks are tightening standards on business loans, a leading indicator for industrial sales growth (second panel). The ongoing contraction in core durable goods orders confirms that industrial sector earnings momentum remains negative. Now that sector labor costs are back on the upswing, the need for a sales recovery becomes even more urgent, otherwise profit margins will continue to get squeezed. We remain underweight the S&P industrials sector.
Consumer product stocks have had a tough few weeks, as renewed strength in the U.S. dollar threatens to undermine sales prospects. However, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic, especially in relative terms. Consumption has a lower economic beta than capital spending, particularly among consumer staples vendors. Consumer goods exports have started to rebound, even prior to renewed strength in emerging market currencies. The latter heralds at least a mild recovery in consumer product top-line growth. Domestically, retail sales at non-discretionary stores are outpacing sales at discretionary stores by a wide margin, another indication that in relative terms, profit conditions favor non-cyclical consumer goods vendors. We are overweight the S&P household products and S&P soft drink indexes.
Special Report Highlights China's abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative, high-risk behavior among Chinese banks - and not the natural result of the country's high savings rate. Banks do not intermediate savings into credit, and they do not need deposits to lend. Banks create deposits and money by originating loans. A commercial bank is not constrained in loan origination by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) to commercial banks 'on demand'. What habitually drives credit booms are the "animal spirits" of banks and borrowers. We are initiating a relative China bank equity trade: short listed medium-size banks / long large five banks. Continue shorting the RMB versus the U.S. dollar. Feature For some time, the consensus view has been that rampant credit growth in China and the resulting excesses have been the natural result of the country's high savings rate, particularly among Chinese households. We have long argued differently: abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative, high-risk behavior among Chinese banks and other creditors and borrowers. In this vein, China's credit bubble is no different than any other credit bubble in history. Although an adjustment in China might play out differently than it has in other countries where credit excesses became prevalent, China's corporate credit bubble is an imbalance that poses a non-trivial risk to both mainland and global growth (Chart I-1). Chart I-1China's Outstanding Credit Is Large Relative To Global GDP In a nutshell, Chinese banks have not channelled large amounts of household deposits into credit. Without mincing words, it is our view that banks have originated loans literally from "thin air" as banks do in any other country. In turn, credit has boosted spending, income and, consequently, savings. Do Deposits Create Loans, Or Do Loans Create Deposits? It is a widely held view among academics, investors and market commentators - including some of our colleagues here at BCA - that China's enormous credit expansion over the past several years has been a natural outcome of the nation's high savings rate. The argument goes like this: China has a very high savings rate, and it is inherent that household savings flow to banks as deposits. In turn, banks have little choice but to lend out on these deposits. The upshot of this reasoning is as follows: China's abnormally strong credit growth is a consequence of the country's abundant savings rather than an unsustainable excess. This argument hails from the Intermediate Loan Funds (ILF) model, otherwise known as the Loanable Fund Theory. This model suggests that deposits create loans - i.e., banks intermediate deposits into credit. Even though the ILF model is the most widespread theory of banking within academia and in textbooks, it unfortunately has little relevance to real-life banking - i.e., banking systems around the world do not function as the model posits. An alternative but much less recognized theory, the Financing Money Creation (FMC) model, asserts that banks create deposits from "thin air" when they originate a new loan. This is the model that banking systems in almost all countries in the world subscribe to. Indeed, whenever a bank makes a loan, it simultaneously creates a matching deposit in the borrower's bank account, therefore creating new money in the process (Chart I-2). In other words, bank loans create deposits and money. Chart I-2Commercial Banks: Credit Origination Creates Deposits Herein we cite various papers that discuss this matter and delineate the key points: "Banks do not, as many textbooks still suggest, take deposits of existing money from savers and lend it out to borrowers: they create credit and money ex nihilo - extending a loan to the borrower and simultaneously crediting the borrower's money account" (Turner, 2013). "When banks extend loans, to their customers, they create money by crediting their customer's accounts" (King, 2012). "Based on how monetary policy has been conducted for several decades, banks have always had the ability to expand credit whenever they like. They don't need a pile of "dry tinder" in the form of excess reserves to do so" (Dudley, 2009). "In a closed economy (or the world as a whole), fundamentally, deposits come from only two places: new bank lending and government deficits. Banks create deposits when they create loans." (Sheard, 2013). "Just as taking out a new loan creates money, the repayment of bank loans destroys money" (McLeay, 2014). The papers cited in the bibliography on page 18 elaborate on this topic in depth and readers are encouraged to review this literature. Bottom Line: Banks do not need deposits to lend. They create deposits and money by originating loans. Do Banks Lend Their Reserves At Central Banks? Another misconception about modern banking in general and China's banking system in particular is that banks lend out their excess reserves held at the central bank. Provided that Chinese banks have plenty of required reserves at the People's Bank of China (PBoC), some economists and analysts argue it is a matter of cutting the reserve requirement ratio to free up reserves (liquidity), which will allow banks to boost their loan origination. Again, we cite several papers as well as specific views from central bankers who reject the notion that banks lend out their reserves at the central bank: This comment by William C. Dudley (President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank) states "the Federal Reserve has committed itself to supply sufficient reserves to keep the fed funds rate at its target. If banks want to expand credit and that drives up the demand for reserves, the Fed automatically meets that demand in its conduct of monetary policy. In terms of the ability to expand credit rapidly, it makes no difference whether the banks have lots of excess reserves or not" (Dudley, 2009). "In fact, the level of reserves hardly figures in banks' lending decisions. The amount of credit outstanding is determined by banks' willingness to supply loans, based on perceived risk-return trade-offs, and by the demand for those loans. The aggregate availability of bank reserves does not constrain the expansion directly" (Borio et al., 2009). "While the institutional facts alone provide compelling support for our view, we also demonstrate empirically that the relationships implied by the money multiplier do not exist in the data ... Changes in reserves are unrelated to changes in lending, and open market operations do not have a direct impact on lending. We conclude that the textbook treatment of money in the transmission mechanism can be rejected..." (Carpenter et al., 2010). "...reserves are, in normal times, supplied 'on demand' by Bank of England to commercial banks in exchange for other assets on their balance sheets. In no way does the aggregate quantity of reserves directly constrains the amount of bank lending or deposit creation" (McLeay 2014). "Most importantly, banks cannot cause the amount of reserves at the central bank to fall by "lending them out" to customers. Assuming that the public does not change its demand for cash and the government does not make any net payments to the private sector (two things that are both beyond the direct control of the banks and the central bank), bank reserves have to remain "parked" at the central bank" (Sheard, 2013). More detailed analysis on this topic is available in the papers cited in the bibliography on page 18. Bottom Line: Banks do not lend out their reserves at the central bank. A commercial bank is not constrained in loan origination/money creation by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) to commercial banks 'on demand'. Empirical Evidence: Savings Versus Credit This section presents empirical evidence that there is no correlation between national and household savings rates and loan origination. This is true for any country, including China. Credit growth and credit penetration (the credit-to-GDP ratio) have little to do with a country's or with households' savings rates. Chart I-3 illustrates that there has been no correlation between China's national or household savings rates and the credit-to-GDP ratio. China's savings rate was high and rising before 2009, yet the credit bubble formation only commenced in January 2009 when the savings rate topped out. Looking at other countries such as Korea, Taiwan and the U.S., historically we find no correlation between their savings and credit cycles1 (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China: Credit And Savings ##br##Are Not Correlated Chart I-4The U.S., Korea And Taiwan:##br## Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated Importantly, a high or rising savings rate does not preclude deleveraging. There were many two- to four-year spans of deleveraging in China when the credit-to-GDP ratio was flat or falling (Chart I-5) - i.e., the growth rate of credit was at or below nominal GDP growth. This occurred despite the country's high and rising savings rate. So, not only is deleveraging not unusual for China but it has also occurred amid a high savings rate. This contradicts the commonly held view that Chinese credit has always expanded faster than nominal GDP because the nation saves a lot. Deleveraging at the current juncture will likely be very painful, because the size of credit flows is enormous and even a moderate and gradual deceleration in credit will produce a major drag on growth. Specifically, the credit impulse - the second derivative of outstanding credit that measures the impact of credit growth on GDP - will be equal to -2.2% of GDP if credit growth moderates from 11.3% now to 7.8% in the next 24 months (Chart I-6). Chart I-5There Were Periods Of ##br##Deleveraging In China Too Chart I-6China's Credit Impulse Will ##br##Likely Be Negative As Chart I-6 also demonstrates, China's credit impulse drives Chinese imports, the most critical variable for the rest of the world. Chart I-7China: A Growth Engine Shift Since 2009 Further, it is possible to argue that vigorous credit growth generates robust income growth. The latter, in turn, allows a nation as a whole and households in particular to save more. If Chinese banks had not originated as many loans since early 2009 as they have, many goods and services in China would not have been produced and sold, and income growth for all companies, households and even government would be much lower. Even if the savings rate were held constant, less income would entail lower absolute amounts of both national and household savings. In short, China's exponential credit growth since 2009 has helped boost both national and household income levels, and in turn the absolute level of their savings. Chart I-7 illustrates that before 2009, mainland economic and income growth were driven by exports, but since early 2009, credit has been instrumental in generating income growth and prosperity. Finally, many analysts rationalize strong loan growth among Chinese banks by their robust deposit growth. This logic is flawed: Chinese banks have substantial deposits on hand because they originate a lot of loans. Bottom Line: China's and any other country's national or household savings rate does not explain swings in credit creation. Banks do not intermediate savings into credit. Rather, banks create deposits and money. What Drives Bank Lending? If a credit boom is not driven by abundant savings, what is the foundation for a credit boom in general, and the one currently underway in China in particular? Loan origination by a bank depends on that bank's willingness to lend, as well as general demand for loans. Also, depending on policy priorities, regulators often try to encourage or limit banks' ability to lend by imposing and adjusting various regulatory ratios. Barring any regulatory constraints, so long as there is demand for loans and a bank is willing to lend, a loan will be originated. Hence, in theory, banks can lend to eternity unless shareholders and regulators constrain them. In the immediate wake of the Lehman crisis, the Chinese authorities encouraged banks to open the credit floodgates. Thus, there was a de facto deregulation in the nation's banking system in early 2009 - policymakers encouraged strong credit origination. The experience of many countries - documented by numerous academic papers on this topic - has demonstrated that banking sector deregulation typically leads to excessive risk-taking by banks, and abnormal credit growth. These episodes have not ended well, with multi-year workouts following in their wake. By and large, a credit boom often occurs when risk-taking by banks surges and shareholders and regulators do not constrain them. This has been no different in China - the credit boom since 2009 has been powered by speculative and excessive risk-taking among banks and their management teams in particular, amid complacency of regulators and shareholders. Bottom Line: What habitually drives excessive credit creation are the "animal spirits" of banks and borrowers. Banks' and borrowers' speculative behavior and reckless risk-taking typically degenerates into a credit boom that often ends in an economic and financial downturn. It has been no different in China. What Constrains Bank Lending? The following factors can limit bank credit origination: Monetary policy can limit credit growth via raising interest rates, which dampens loan demand. Also, banks can become more risk averse when interest rates rise as they downgrade creditworthiness of current and prospective borrowers. Government regulations can impose various restrictions on banks, restraining their risk-taking and ability to originate infinite amounts of credit. In China, to limit banks' ability to lend, regulators have imposed several mandatory ratios on commercial banks, and also practice 'Window Guidance'. First, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR=net capital / risk-weighted assets). This ratio limits banks' ability to originate infinite amounts of loans by imposing a minimum level CAR. In China, most banks comply comfortably with CAR. The CAR for the entire commercial banking system is currently 13.1%. While the minimum requirement is 8%. The caveat is that in China, banks' equity capital is nowadays considerably inflated because they have not provisioned for non-performing loans (NPLs). If banks were to fully provision for NPLs, their equity capital would shrink significantly, and they would probably not meet the minimum CAR. Table I-1 shows that in a scenario of 12.5% NPL ratio for banks' claims on companies and zero NPL on household loans and mortgages as well as a 20% recovery rate, a full provisioning by banks would erode 65% of their equity. In this scenario, the CAR ratio would drop a lot - probably below the required minimum of 8% and banks would be forced to raise new equity (dilute existing shareholders) or shrink their balance sheets - or a combination of both. Table I-1China: NPL Scenarios And Banks' Equity Capital Impairment Second, the leverage ratio - computed as net Tier-1 capital divided by on- and off-balance-sheet assets. According to government regulation, this ratio should be at least 4%. As of June 30, 2016, the leverage ratio for the entire commercial banking system was 6.4%, comfortably above its floor. Nevertheless, as with CAR, the leverage ratio is overstated at the moment because the numerator - net Tier-1 equity capital - is artificially inflated, as it is not adjusted for realistic levels of NPLs, as discussed above. If 65% of equity is eroded due to sensible loan-loss provisioning and write-offs (as per Table 1), the leverage ratio would drop to about 2.3%, below the required minimum of 4%. Hence, banks would need to raise new equity (dilute existing shareholders), shrink their balance sheets or do a combination of both. Equity dilution is bearish for bank stocks and, if and as banks moderate their assets/loan growth, the economy will suffer. Third, regulatory 'Window Guidance' is implemented through PBoC recommendations to banks on their annual and quarterly credit ceilings, and on their credit structures. There is no official disclosure of this measure, and it is done between the PBoC, the Chinese Banking Regulatory commission (CBRC) and banks' management. In recent years, the efficiency of 'Window Guidance' has declined dramatically. Banks have defied bank regulators' efforts to rein in credit growth by finding loopholes in regulations. What's more, they have de facto exceeded credit origination limits by moving credit risk off their balance sheets and classifying it differently than loans. The result has been mushrooming Non-Standard Credit Assets (NSCA). Table I-2 reveals that on- and off-balance-sheet NSCA stand at RMB 10 trillion and RMB 19 trillion, respectively. Furthermore, banks have lately expanded their lending to non-depositary financial organizations that include trust companies, financial leasing companies, auto financing companies and loan companies (Chart I-8). This has probably been done to circumvent government regulations. Hence, Chinese banks have taken on much more credit risk than regulators have wanted them to by reclassifying/renaming loans as NSCA, and parking these assets both on- and off-balance-sheet. Table I-2China: Five Largest Banks Hold ##br##Only 40% Of Credit Assets Chart I-8Non-Bank Financial Organizations##br## Are On A Borrowing Spree From Banks In short, regulatory measures in China have not been effective at restraining credit growth in recent years. Bank shareholders are the biggest losers when banks expand credit uncontrollably, and then their default rates rise. The reason being that banking is a business built on leverage. For example, if a bank's assets-to-equity ratio is 10 and 10% of assets go bad (default with no recovery), shareholders' equity will completely evaporate - i.e., they will lose their entire investment. Hence, it is in the best interests of bank shareholders to halt a credit expansion when they sense deteriorating credit quality ahead. Doing so will hurt the economy, but limit their losses. Why have shareholders of Chinese banks not stepped in to curb the credit boom and misallocation of capital? We believe they have either been satisfied with such a massive credit expansion, which has initially driven shareholder returns up, or weak institutional shareholder mechanisms have meant they have been unable to enforce credit discipline on their banks. All in all, if China's or any other credit system is driven by the principals of capitalism and markets, creditors are the ones who should curtail credit growth - regardless of what impact it will have on the economy. If a country's credit system in general and banks in particular do not operate on principals of capitalism and markets, banks can expand credit infinitely, thereby perpetuating capital misallocation and raising inefficiency, leading to stagnating productivity - in other words, a move to a more socialist bend. Only in a socialist system do banks expand their credit portfolios in perpetuity, since they are not run to maximize wealth for shareholders. On a related note, there is another misconception that all Chinese banks are state-owned and the government will be fast to bail them out by buying bad assets at par. Table I-3 illustrates the ownership structure of 16 Chinese banks listed the A-share market, including the large ones. The state (central and local governments) and SOEs have a large but not 100% ownership stake. In fact, foreign investors have considerable equity shares in many banks. Table I-3Chinese Banks: Shareholder Structure Is Diverse Hence, a government bail-out of these banks at no cost to shareholders would mean the Chinese government is using taxpayer money to benefit domestic private as well as foreign shareholders. Given the considerable amounts involved, this will be politically difficult to achieve unless the benefits of doing so are explicitly greater than the costs of doing nothing. Chart I-9Commercial Banks Are On ##br##Borrowing Spree From PBoC We are not implying that a government bailout is impossible. Our point is that it will take material pain and considerable deterioration in the economy and financial markets before the central government bails out banks at no cost to other shareholders. No wonder the authorities have not recapitalized the banks so far. In the long run, if the Chinese government is serious about improving the credit/capital allocation process, it has to allow market forces to take hold so that creditors and debtors are not bailed out but instead assume financial responsibility for their decisions. This means short-term pain but long-term gain. The lack of demand for credit is an important constraint on credit origination. If there are no borrowers, banks will have a hard time making a sizable amount of loans. Liquidity constraints also limit banks' ability to expand their assets. Let's consider an example when liquidity constraints arise. Bank A originates a loan, and Borrower A wants to transfer money to its Supplier B, which has an account at Bank B. In theory, Bank A should reduce its excess reserves at the central bank by transferring money to Bank B's reserve account at the central bank. However, if too many borrowers of Bank A try to transfer their money/deposits to other banks, Bank A will run into liquidity constraints as its excess reserves dry up. In such a case, Bank A should borrow money from the central bank or the interbank market to replenish its excess reserves. Provided many G7 central banks are nowadays committed to supplying as much liquidity (reserves) as banks require, in these countries banks do not really face liquidity constraints in lending. The focus of advanced countries' central banks is to control short-term interest rates - i.e., they manage liquidity in a way to keep policy rates at the target. In the case of China, even though the PBoC has a high required reserves ratio (RRR) for banks, it apparently supplies commercial banks with whatever amounts of liquidity they require. Chart I-9 reveals that the PBoC's claims on commercial banks have surged by fivefold in the past three years. Given the Chinese monetary authorities have in the recent years been very generous in meeting banks' demands for liquidity, the high RRR has not constrained mainland banks' ability to originate loans. This contradicts some analysts' assertions that the PBoC can boost lending by cutting the RRR. As the PBoC presently fully accommodates banks' demands for liquidity, the significance and impact of required reserves has declined. On the whole, nowadays, commercial banks in China are not facing liquidity (reserves) constraints to expand credit. High debt servicing costs could constrain bank lending. Are there limits to the credit-to-GDP ratio? It is illustrative to consider a numerical example for China. Corporate and household debt presently stands at 220% of GDP and, according to Bank of Intentional Settlement (BIS) calculations, debt servicing costs (including interest payments and amortization) account for around 20% of disposable income (Chart I-10). If credit indefinitely expands at a rate well above nominal GDP growth (Chart I-11) and interest rates do not decline, debt servicing costs will rise substantially. For example, let's assume that mainland corporate and consumer leverage reaches 400% of GDP in the next several years. If and when this happens, debt servicing costs could double, approaching 40% of income assuming constant interest rates and debt maturity. Chart I-10China's Corporate And Household##br## Credit: The Sky'S The Limit? Chart I-11Will Credit Growth Slow Toward##br## Nominal GDP Growth? No debtor can continue to function under such debt burden. Hence, debtors will have to cut their spending (for companies it will be a reduction in capex budgets) or these debtors will need to borrow to pay interest and retire old debt. In short, this becomes an unsustainable Ponzi scheme, where debtors borrow to service their debt obligations. Anecdotal evidence suggests this is not rare in China nowadays. One way the authorities could reduce debt servicing is to cut interest rates to zero and lengthen the maturity of debt. This is what many advanced economies have done. If Chinese credit penetration does not stop rising, the PBoC will be forced to cut rates to close to zero. This in turn will lead to large capital outflows, and the RMB will depreciate versus the U.S. dollar. Bottom Line: The following factors can restrain bank credit origination: monetary policy (higher interest rates), government regulations, bank shareholders, lack of credit demand, liquidity constraints and high debt servicing costs. Investment Implications Chart I-12Short Small Banks / Long Large##br## Banks In China If banks' shareholders and other creditors in China act in accordance with their self-interests to preserve the value of their assets, they will have to reduce credit origination/lending. As a result, China will experience an acute economic downturn. This would constitute a capitalist-type adjustment, which in turn will lead to more efficiency, solid productivity growth, and reasonably high economic growth over the long term. However, it will also mean significant short-term pain. If the government bails out everyone, underwrites all credit risks, and gets even more involved in capital/credit allocation, the economy will not experience an acute slump for a while. However, this would represent a shift toward socialism and the potential growth rate will collapse in the next several years. With the labor force stagnating and probably contracting in the years ahead, China's potential growth will be equal to its productivity growth. In socialism, productivity growth is low, often close to zero. The growth trajectory in this scenario will follow mini-cycles around a rapidly falling potential growth rate. In brief, China's growth rate is bound to slow further, regardless of what scenario plays out over the next several years. Today, we are initiating a relative China bank equity trade: short listed small- and medium-size banks / long large five banks in the A-share market (Chart I-12). There has been more speculative high-risk lending from the small- and medium-size banks than the large ones. As we documented in our June 15, 2016 Special Report titled Chinese Banks' Ominous Shadow,2 the largest five banks have fewer non-standard credit assets than medium and small banks. If 12.5% of banks' claims on companies turn sour and the recovery rate is 20%, 100% of the equity of 11 listed small- and medium-sized banks will be wiped out. The same number for the large five banks is 42%. Hence, these 11 listed small- and medium-sized banks are more exposed to bad loans than the large five. Finally, mushrooming leverage entails that the monetary authorities should reduce interest rates drastically. However, lower interest rates will spur more capital outflows from the mainland. Hence, the RMB is set to depreciate further. We have been shorting the RMB versus the U.S. dollar since December 9, 2015, and this position remains intact. 1 We discussed this at length in Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "China: Imbalances And Policy Options", dated June 12, 2012, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Chinese Banks' Ominious Shadow", June 15, 2016, link available on page 22. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com Bibliography Borio, C. and Disyatat, P. (2009), "Unconventional Monetary Policy: An Appraisal", BIS Working Papers, No. 292, November 2009. Carpenter, S. and Demiralp, S. (2010),"Money, Reserves, and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Does the Money Multiplier Exist?", Finance and Economics Discussion Series, No. 2010-41, Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Washington, DC: Federal Reserve Board Dudley, W. (2009), "The Economic Outlook and the Fed's Balance Sheet: The Issue of "How" versus "When"", Remarks at the Association for a Better New York Breakfast Meeting, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2009/dud090729.html Jakad, Z. and Kumhof, M. (2015), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", Bank of England, Working Paper 529, May 2015 King, M. (2012), Speech to the South Wales Chamber of Commerce at the Millenium Centre, Cardiff, October 23. Ma, G., Xiandong, Y. and Xim L. (2011), "China's evolving reserve requirements", BIS Working Papers, No. 360, November 2011. Turner, A. (2013), "Credit, Money and Leverage", September 12. Sheard, Paul (2013), "Repeat After Me: Banks Cannot And Do Not 'Lent Out' Reserves", Standard & Poor's Rating Services, August 2013, New York Werner, R. (2014b), "How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same?", International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 71-77. See King (2012), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", pp. 6, cited in Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof, Bank of England Working Paper 529, May 2015. See Dudley (2009), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", pp. 13, cited in Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof, Bank of England Working Paper 529, May 2015. See Carpenter and Demiralp (2010), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", pp. 13, cited in Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof, Bank of England Working Paper 529, May 2015. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
The speed at which the health care sector has sunk toward the bottom end of this year's trading range has unnerved many investors. The hit to health care stocks reflects a rise in risk premiums related to concerns that the U.S. government will exert more control over price setting if the Democrats win the election rather than any immediate downshift in relative forward earnings drivers. The sector is extremely oversold, and once the election is over, attention will refocus on the relative forward earnings outlook. Our Indicators suggest that earnings momentum will stay positive. Our health care sector pricing power proxy has rebounded after cooling from red-hot levels, and is still much stronger than overall corporate sector pricing (second panel). That is confirmed by the pharmaceuticals producer price index, and employment cost index for health insurance, i.e. pricing strength is broad-based. There is still scant evidence of a downshift in consumer spending patterns in reaction to rising health care sector inflation. Real (volumes) personal spending on health care goods and services continues to grow at a mid-single digit rate, well in excess of the rate of overall consumption. That is consistent with ongoing earnings outperformance. Stay overweight.
This year's exodus from casual dining stocks has been justified on the basis of overvaluation and deteriorating industry performance. The National Association of Restaurants (NAR) survey of current performance has dipped into negative territory, as restaurant operators have reported a decrease in traffic. However, cost structures are being realigned to a more subdued sales run rate. The NAR survey shows that staffing plans are on the wane. That leads restaurant labor cost inflation. As the largest source of expenses, any decline in headcount would be welcome given that minimum wages in a number of states are set to climb next year. Restaurant sales growth has been unimpressive for the past several years. Subdued pricing power gains, and until recently, lackluster income growth among lower income consumers have weighed on revenue growth. The good news is that consumer confidence among low income earners is on the upswing. In addition, restaurant retail sales often follow the trend in the wealth effect. Financial wealth gains are rebounding, and provided the stock market does not suffer a sustained swoon, consumers' feeling of affluence may soon be bolstered. We recommended booking profits of 9% and lifted positions to neutral in yesterday's Weekly Report. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5REST - MCD, SBUX, YUM, CMG, DRI.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Boost restaurant stocks to neutral, as same-store sales should improve next year. A further upgrade requires evidence of top-line traction. The exodus from health care stocks represents an overreaction rather than a downshift in fundamental forces. Stay long. Recent Changes S&P Restaurants Index - Upgrade to neutral for a profit of 9%. Table 1 Feature Equity market buoyancy remains a liquidity rather than an earnings story. Fed commentary and the trend in global bond yields, a reflection of the global central bank narrative, continue to exert an outsize influence on short-term price action and momentum. In the background, earnings are a wildcard. Companies may be surpassing beaten down third quarter estimates, but the path of profits over the next several quarters is by no means assured and will determine the durability of any stock market advance. Even excluding the persistent drag from narrowing profit margins, courtesy of falling productivity and increasing unit labor costs, it is dangerous to look at the corporate profit outlook through rose colored glasses. The low level of economic growth, both at home and abroad, represents a major hurdle to the corporate sector. Total business sales have climbed back up to zero, but it is premature to forecast meaningful growth ahead based on moribund global export growth (Chart 1), and/or leading economic indicators. After all, sales growth has been virtually non-existent for years, reinforcing that earnings per share have been driven by cost cutting and buybacks. While measured consumer price inflation has crept higher, corporate sector pricing power remains virtually non-existent. The producer price index is still deflating, despite the rally in oil prices. U.S. import prices are very weak (Chart 1). The negative global credit impulse warns that there is still no impetus to reinvigorate final demand, and by extension, global profits (Chart 1). It is hard to envision an economic reacceleration as long as the corporate sector is more inclined to retrench than expand, as heralded by stressed balance sheets and weak durable goods orders (Chart 2). Chart 3 shows BCA's two U.S. profit models. The first one is based on reflationary variables, such as the dollar, bond yields and oil prices. It is designed to predict the trend in forward earnings momentum. This model has troughed, but is not signaling any upside ahead in already exuberant analyst earnings estimates (Chart 3, second panel). Chart 1Without Sales Growth... Chart 2... And Rising Costs... Chart 3... How Much Can Profits Improve? The second model looks at macro data such as new orders, labor costs and productivity growth to forecast the trend in actual operating earnings. This model is slightly more optimistic (Chart 3, bottom panel), and signals a decisive end to the profit contraction, albeit not a growth rate sufficient to satisfy double-digit analysts forecasts or rich valuations. The U.S. dollar is a major wildcard, as any sustained strength would compromise earnings. Typically, major profit expansions only occur after the currency begins to depreciate and labor cost inflation ebbs (Chart 2). The late-1990s was an exception, as profits climbed alongside the currency and amidst rising wage inflation (Chart 2). However, that was during an economic and credit boom, two key factors that are conspicuously absent at the moment. Nevertheless, as discussed in past Weekly Reports, the flood of central bank liquidity could sustain the overshoot in equity prices for a while longer. Investors have demonstrated a willingness to look through soggy profits as long as the liquidity taps remain open. Despite the possibility of a stubbornly resilient broad market, we do not recommend interpreting it as a sign of economic vitality, and consider it high risk. Our portfolio strategy is based on expected sectoral earnings trends, as liquidity is subject to the whims of central bankers. We recommend a largely defensive sector portfolio, with some exceptions, as discussed in last week's Special Report. Our cyclical exposure remains confined to consumption-oriented plays; this week we are lifting our view on restaurants. Restaurants: Buying Into Weakness Investors have gravitated toward washed out deep cyclical sectors rather than consumption-oriented plays in recent months. However, we doubt this trend has staying power, as outlined in our Special Report last week. Consequently, it is time to revisit the outlook for shunned consumer sectors, such as restaurants. This year's exodus from casual dining stocks has been justified on the basis of overvaluation and deteriorating industry performance. The National Association of Restaurants (NAR) survey of current performance has dipped into negative territory (Chart 4), as restaurant operators have reported a decrease in traffic. One of the major drags on restaurant same-store sales has been the gap in restaurant inflation compared with the cost of food inflation for eating at home. Relative inflation has soared (Chart 5). That has caused relative spending growth at restaurants vs. at home dining to drop sharply, in real (volumes) terms. However, next year could be different. If the inflation gap falls, as predicted by the decline in relative spending (Chart 5), then restaurant traffic should stabilize. Importantly, the odds of budgets for dining out being pruned even further are low. As long as wages and salaries growth is decent and consumer income expectations are firm, consumers should still allocate a rising share to restaurants relative to eating at home (Chart 5). There is plenty of scope for relative restaurant spending to rise on a secular basis (Chart 5, bottom panel). Clearly, if relative spending were to reaccelerate too quickly, then the inflation gap would stay wide, and same-store sales growth would stay punk. That is a risk to an optimistic view of future restaurant traffic. But the good news is that cost structures are being realigned to a more subdued sales run rate. The NAR survey shows that staffing plans are on the wane. That leads restaurant labor cost inflation (Chart 4). As the largest source of expenses, any decline in headcount would be welcome given that minimum wages in a number of states are set to climb next year. In any case, the most potent profit elixir would be a recovery in top-line growth, sourced both domestically and from abroad. Restaurant sales growth has been unimpressive for the past several years. Subdued pricing power gains, and until recently, lackluster income growth among lower income consumers have weighed on revenue growth. The good news is that consumer confidence among low income earners is on the upswing (Chart 6), which bodes well for casual dining out in the coming quarters. If our bearish view on refiners and gasoline prices continues to pan out, then a windfall from lower fuel prices may further bolster the outlook. Chart 4Expenses Set To Ease Chart 5Inflation Gap Should Narrow Chart 6Sales Set To Stabilize... In addition, restaurant retail sales often follow the trend in the wealth effect (Chart 7). The latter has pulled back this year, owing to the equity market consolidation and house price correction. However, financial wealth gains are rebounding, and provided the stock market does not suffer a sustained swoon, consumers' feeling of affluence may soon be bolstered. Even marginal improvements in store traffic should be impactful to same-store sales. Restaurant chains have been in retrenchment mode since the Great Recession. Construction activity is historically low, which implies limited capacity expansion (Chart 7). Contribution from abroad may become less of a drag. The industry garners roughly 67% of sales from overseas. The strong U.S. dollar, particularly against emerging market currencies, has deprived the industry of sales strength. Moreover, even in domestic currency terms, emerging markets consumption has been through a difficult period, as the Asian Hotel and Restaurant Activity Proxy spent most of the last year in negative territory (Chart 8). But EM currencies have stabilized and Asian restaurant activity has climbed back into positive territory in recent months. The upshot is that foreign revenue could make up any lingering domestic sales slack. All of this suggests that leaning into share price weakness in anticipation of improved prospects next year makes sense. Nevertheless, the S&P restaurants index does not warrant a full shift from underweight to overweight. There could still be earnings/headline risk given lackluster readings in coincident activity indicators, despite McDonald's earnings beat last week. Valuations are not cheap. On a normalized basis, the relative forward P/E ratio has dropped below its average, but still trades at a premium to the broad market. A return to above average levels is possible if operating margins expand on the back of sales improvement (Chart 9), thereby sparking higher return on equity, but it may be too soon to position for such an outcome. Chart 7... Or Even Improve In 2017 Chart 8End Of Foreign Drag Chart 9Still Not Dirt Cheap Bottom Line: Lift the S&P restaurant index (BLBG: S5REST - MCD, SBUX, YUM, CMG, DRI) to neutral from underweight, locking in a profit of 9% since our underweight recommendation last November. Health Care Crunch: Buying Opportunity Or Trend Change? The speed at which the health care sector has sunk toward the bottom end of this year's trading range has unnerved many investors. In fact, the sector has dropped back down to the levels where we added it to our high conviction overweight list. The question now is whether our positive views still hold, and whether would we add here if we weren't long already, or if something more sinister is at work? The hit to health care stocks reflects a rise in risk premiums related to concerns that the U.S. government will exert more control over price setting if the Democrats win the election rather than any immediate downshift in relative forward earnings drivers. While it is impossible to forecast with any precision to what extent pricing models may or may not change, the political appetite may be low for another overhaul of the sector so soon after the Affordable Care Act was implemented. Regardless, several observations suggest that the sector may already be undershooting, i.e. a Democratic victory is already discounted. Relative performance has experienced a clear uptrend over the last forty years, with cyclical swings oscillating around its upward sloping trend-line (Chart 10). It would be extremely rare for a bull phase to peak prior to hitting at least one standard deviation above trend. Instead, the price ratio hit trend and is now not far above one standard deviation below trend, a level one would normally equate with an economic boom when capital flowed to high-beta sectors. Cyclical technical measures also point to an undershoot. Our Technical Indicator has hit an oversold extreme (Chart 11), signaling that the sell-off is in the late stages. Our relative advance/decline line has also stayed firm, suggesting that the decline in the overall sector has not been broad-based (Chart 11). Chart 10Time To Buy, Not Sell Chart 11Buying Opportunity Whether a wholesale flight from the sector, and all defensives in general, looms is largely contingent on the path of inflation expectations, which have been in a multiyear decline. This trend reflects anemic global final demand and the repercussions from over-indebtedness. Lately, inflation expectations have firmed, but that may largely reflect the rebound in oil prices courtesy of hopes for an OPEC production cut, given the lack of confirming indicators of growth acceleration and renewed strength in the U.S. dollar. The latter is testing the top end of its recent range (Chart 11, shown inverted, bottom panel), and it would be highly unusual for inflation expectations to rise concurrent with the U.S. dollar. In a world of zero interest rates and limited aggregate demand strength, a strong currency is deflationary, especially for corporate profits. Those conditions keep bond yields low, and push capital into long duration sectors. Once the election is over, attention will refocus on the relative forward earnings outlook. Our Indicators suggest that earnings momentum will stay positive. Our health care sector pricing power proxy has rebounded after cooling from red-hot levels, and is still much stronger than overall corporate sector pricing (Chart 12, second panel). That is confirmed by the pharmaceuticals producer price index, and employment cost index for health insurance, i.e. pricing strength is broad-based. There is still scant evidence of a downshift in consumer spending patterns in reaction to rising health care sector inflation. Real (volumes) personal spending on health care goods and services continues to grow at a mid-single digit rate, well in excess of the rate of overall consumption (Chart 12). That is consistent with ongoing earnings outperformance. As noted in past research, the time to forecast negative relative earnings momentum is when consumers balk at higher prices. So far, a few high profile cases of exorbitant drug price increases have grabbed the spotlight, but in aggregate, consumers are not voting with their wallets. The biggest tangible negative for the health care sector may be that shares outstanding are no longer falling (Chart 13). That mirrors overall buyback activity, which has cooled markedly on the back of balance sheet deterioration and waning free cash flow. We doubt the supply of health care stocks is going to rise much, however, because the sector is in good financial shape, earning healthy returns and is not dependent on external financing. Chart 12Demand Driven Pricing Power Gains Chart 13Buybacks Are Dwindling Bottom Line: Health care sector risk premiums have climbed in response to polling results, but an apolitical check on relative earnings drivers and valuations points to a buying opportunity. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and growth over value.
Highlights The U.S. is not yet a "high-pressure" economy, but slack is dissipating. U.S. growth, while not torrid, will remain high enough to push interest rates higher. The euro area continues to exhibit tepid domestic demand growth, and slack there remains higher than in the U.S. Monetary divergences will grow, weighing on EUR/USD. The Canadian economy displays underlying weaknesses which will prevent the BoC from hiking for an extended period of time. Stay long USD/CAD, but favor the CAD to the AUD and the NZD on a USD rally. Feature Following Janet Yellen's Boston speech last week, a new phrase has entered the lexicon of investors: "high-pressure economy". The speech was originally interpreted as a clarion call to let the economy overheat in order to absorb the slack created by the shock of 2008. However, Yellen still sees some slack in the economy. In her eyes, an easy monetary stance, at this point, will not cause an overheating, it will only bring back to the marketplace workers that had left the labor force. Chart I-1Drying Global Liquidity We have sympathy toward this view, especially when put in an international context where global capacity utilization remains depressed. Also, countries like China, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico have been intervening in the FX markets to preempt or limit downside to their currencies, tightening global liquidity conditions (Chart I-1). Nonetheless, the Fed Chair also highlighted that the FOMC did not want the U.S. economy to overheat as the domestic slack gets absorbed. Doing so would raise the risk that the Fed will have to then overcompensate by tightening rates very aggressively. This would prompt another recession. U.S.: Not High Pressure Yet, But... No indicator suggests that there is a burning need to quickly ratchet U.S. rates higher. However, domestic economic conditions are falling into place to justify a slow move toward higher rates. Our aggregate U.S. capacity utilization gauge is showing a dissipation of U.S. economic slack (Chart I-2, top panel). This is a side-effect of the tepid growth in the capital stock of U.S. businesses this cycle, which limits the expansion of the supply-side of the economy (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Meanwhile, household consumption should remain robust. Not only did 2015 register the strongest growth in the median household's real income since 1967, consumption is unlikely to slow much. In fact, vehicle-miles traveled and the Federal income tax receipts are both pointing toward healthy consumption (Chart I-3). Despite punky construction starts, housing activity shows signs of improvement. Housing inventories are near record lows and construction has underperformed household formation. Moreover, building permits are hooking upward, while housing affordability remains generous (Chart I-4). Additionally, the NAHB survey also points toward a rising share of residential activity in the economy (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Finally, capex intentions are slowly recovering. Moreover, the BCA House view is that the U.S. profit contraction is past its nadir. Going forward, capex and inventories are unlikely to subtract as much from growth as they did in 2015 and 2016. They may even become accretive to GDP growth. Chart I-2Vanishing U.S. Slack Chart I-3Positive Signs For The U.S. Consumer Chart I-4Residential Investment Will Improve Limited slack and a continued economic expansion imply a high likelihood of a Fed hike this year, and maybe two more next year if no shocks to financial conditions emerge. With markets currently pricing in 65 basis points of rate hikes by the end of 2019, this should lift rates across the curve. Higher interest rates on U.S. assets should drive private inflows into the country, pushing the U.S. dollar higher (Chart I-5). From a technical perspective, the U.S. capitulation index is breaking out to the upside following a pattern of lower highs. Since 2008, such breakouts have been followed by a significant rally in the broad trade-weighted dollar (Chart I-6). Thus, we continue to position ourselves for additional dollar strength this cycle. Chart I-5Flows Into The U.S. ##br##Are Set To Grow Chart I-6Favorable Technical ##br##Backdrop For The Greenback Bottom Line: The household sector remains healthy, and U.S. economic slack is dissipating. Hence, the Fed will try, rightfully or wrongly, to push rates higher this year and next, lifting the dollar in the process. Euro Area: Less Pressure A dollar rally could be painful for the euro. Yet, the euro is cheap and supported by a current account surplus of 3.3% of GDP (Chart I-7). What to do with this conflicting picture? For a currency to embark on a durable bull market, productivity growth needs to be stronger than that of its trading partners. A strong currency makes the tradeable-goods sector less competitive, hampering growth. A positive terms-of-trade shock, like that undergone by commodity producers during the previous decade can also do the trick. Neither of these statements currently describe the euro area. Another avenue for a country to withstand a strong currency is for growth to be domestically driven. If household consumption is the main locomotive, exporters' loss of market share do not hurt activity as much. This is true until the domestic economy enters a recession, an event usually driven by higher policy rates. This is why when the share of salaries in the U.S. economy expands, the dollar undergoes cyclical bull markets (Chart I-8). More salaries in the national income means more consumption. Chart I-7Euro ##br##Supports Chart I-8Domestically-Driven Growth##br## Is Good For A Currency In the euro area, GDP growth is above trend, but, in recent quarters, final private domestic demand has been weak (Chart I-9). In fact, last quarter, net exports were the main contributor to growth. This could explain why, since 2015, stronger European business surveys vis-à-vis the U.S. were unable to boost EUR/USD (Chart I-10). Chart I-9European Consumption##br## Isn't Strong Chart I-10If EUR/USD Could Not ##br##Rally Then, When Will It? We do expect eurozone final domestic demand to remain tepid. Yes, the credit impulse has improved, but this amelioration will prove temporary. The previous rebound in credit flows reflected the movement from a large contraction to a small expansion. Today, the dismal performance of euro area bank stocks - which have been a good leading indicator of European loan growth - points to slowing credit growth (Chart I-11). Fiscal policy is also moving from a small positive to a small negative. Work by the ECB staff shows that the cyclically adjusted budget balance in Europe fell by 0.3%, from -1.7% to -2.0% of GDP in 2016. Aggregate cyclically-adjusted budget balances are forecasted to improve to -1.8% and -1.6% of GDP in 2017 and 2018, respectively, representing a 0.2% fiscal drag each year. While a small number, we have to keep in mind that euro area trend growth is between 0.5% and 1%. This suggests that the European economy remains ill-equipped to handle a stronger euro. Moreover, the European economy exhibits much more slack than the U.S. economy. While total hours worked in the U.S. are 14% above Q1 2010 levels, in Europe, they are only 1.5% above such levels (Chart I-12), a gap much greater than demographics alone would have suggested. This means that monetary divergence will continue between Europe and the U.S. Chart I-11Euro Area Credit Impulse Will Weaken Chart I-12Less Capacity Pressures In Europe In fact, this week, the ECB did little to dispel this notion. Beyond trying to squash ideas of a sudden end to the QE program or any imminent tapering, president Draghi communicated that December will be the month when the real action occurs. Based on current trends, we expect the ECB to extend its QE program beyond March, but to hint at a tapering of purchases later in 2017. The ECB will also make it very clear that rates will remain as low as they currently are for an extremely long time. Thus, while the ECB might be slowly moving away from its hyper-stimulative stance, it will not do so as fast as the Fed. Therefore, policy divergences should continue to weigh on EUR/USD. Technicals are also pointing toward a lower euro. Not only has EUR/USD broken down its 1-year old series of higher lows, the euro's capitulation index, the intermediate-term momentum indicator, and the euro's A/D line are forming negative divergences with EUR/USD (Chart I-13). An interesting way to play the euro's weakness is to go short EUR/CZK, a position championed by our Emerging Market Strategy service.1 A floor at 27 has been set under EUR/CZK since November 2013. Yet, this floor looks increasingly untenable. Speculators are beginning to pile in. This week, 2-year Czech yields temporarily dipped below those of Swiss 2-year bonds, the current holder of the world's lowest yield. To fight appreciation pressures, the Czech National Bank (CNB) is accumulating a lot of reserves by buying euros, which is fueling a surge in the money supply (Chart I-14, top panel). Chart I-13Worrying Euro ##br##Technicals Chart I-14CZK: Reserves Expansion##br## Leading To Inflation This accumulation of reserves, in turn, is fanning inflationary forces in the Czech economy. The output gap is closing and core inflation already is increasing at a rate of 1.8% p.a. Easy financial conditions and expanding credit growth are likely to boost already-accelerating unit labor costs and wages (Chart I-14, bottom panel). This means that the 2% inflation target is likely to be hit as early as Q2 2017 according to the CNB. We expect this goal to be handily surpassed if the floor stays in place. Thus, we expect the CNB to abandon the floor within the next twelve months and we are shorting EUR/CZK. Finally, while we are bearish EUR/USD, we do believe that the euro will outperform the pound and commodity currencies. Moreover, despite poorer fundamentals, the euro could also temporarily outperform the SEK and the NOK if the dollar strengthens. The latter two are more sensitive to the USD than the euro is. Bottom Line: EUR/USD is at risk from the broad dollar rally. It is also likely to suffer from the tepid state of the euro area's final domestic demand, fueling monetary-policy divergences with the U.S. A speculative opportunity to short EUR/CZK is emerging, as the CNB's peg is outliving its usefulness. Canada: Falling Pressure USD/CAD has become more correlated with movements in rate differentials than with the vagaries of oil prices (Chart I-15). This puts the actions of the Bank of Canada in sharper focus. As expected, this week, the BoC left policy rates unchanged at 0.5%. More interesting was the quarterly monetary report. The economy has rebounded from the slump induced by the Q2 Alberta wildfires, and many key gauges of the Canadian economy have improved (Chart I-16). Yet, the BoC is looking the other way. Chart I-15CAD: Now More Rates Than Oil Chart I-16The BoC Is Looking The Other Way... The BoC is now forecasting the Canadian output gap to close in mid-2018; in July, this was expected to happen in the second half of 2017. This is because the BoC cut the expected Canadian growth rate by a cumulative 0.5% over the next two years. There have been some worrying developments warranting a more cautious forecast. While the Trudeau government's new childcare benefits are currently being rolled out and new infrastructure spending is to be implemented in 2017, the Canadian private sector's finances are increasingly shaky. The aggregate debt-servicing costs of the non-financial private sector is at record highs, with generous contributions from both households and the corporate sector (Chart I-17). The aggregate credit impulse has responded to this handicap, contracting by 7% of potential GDP, a move driven by the corporate sector (Chart I-18). While not as dramatic, the pace of debt accumulation by the household sector has also weakened. Recent administrative measures to cool the housing market - put in place by various provincial entities as well as the federal government - could accentuate this trend. Chart I-17...Rightfully So Chart I-18Collapsing Canadian Credit Impulse Another problem for Canada has been its loss of competitiveness. Non-oil Canadian exports have not responded as expected to the fall in the CAD. This is because many Canadian manufacturers have set up factories in Mexico and other EMs, or are competing with firms operating out of these nations. With these countries' currencies witnessing devaluations as deep as, or deeper than the loonie's, it is no wonder that Canada has lost market shares in the U.S. (Chart I-19). This means that Canadian rates will remain low for longer, making Canada another contributor to global monetary divergences vis-a-vis the U.S. The BoC is right to be worried that the Canadian economy will take longer than anticipated to close its output gap. With the pass-through to inflation of a lower CAD dissipating, the BoC expects Canadian core inflation to remain well contained for the next two years. We see little cause to disagree. This means that despite trading at a premium to PPP, USD/CAD has upside. Moreover, the Canadian dollar's A/D line is rolling over, another factor pointing to upside for USD/CAD (Chart I-20). At this point, the biggest risk to our view is oil. If WTI can breakout above $52 - perhaps in response to an as-yet negotiated OPEC/Russia oil-production cut or freeze - this could mitigate the downside for the CAD. Thus, while we like USD/CAD, we think the CAD has upside against the AUD and the NZD, especially as the loonie is less sensitive to the USD and EM spreads than the two antipodean currencies. Chart I-19Canada Is Losing Competitiveness Chart I-20Falling CAD A/D Line Bottom Line: The Canadian economy is showing surprising signs of underlying weakness. With the CAD having recently been more correlated to rate differentials than to oil, USD/CAD could rally on monetary divergences. That being said, on the back of a strong USD, CAD is likely to outperform the AUD and NZD. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Central European Strategy: Two Currency Trades", dated September 28, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "The risks have changed in terms of overshooting what I think is full employment with implications for potential imbalances...Those imbalances might result in a reaction by the Fed that we end up having to tighten more quickly than I would like" - FOMC Voting Member Eric Rosengren (October 17, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "An abrupt ending to bond purchases, I think, is unlikely...We remain committed to preserving a very substantial degree of monetary accommodation" - ECB President Mario Draghi (October 20, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Since the employment situation has continued to improve, no further easing of monetary policy may be necessary... at any rate, I would like to discuss this thoroughly with other board members at our monetary policy meeting" - BoJ Board Member Yutaka Harada (October 12, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Our judgment in the summer was that we could have seen another 400,000-500,000 people unemployed over the course of the next few years...So we're willing to tolerate a bit of overshoot in inflation over the course of the next few years in order to avoid that situation, to cushion the blow" - BOE Governor Mark Carney (October 14, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "We have never thought of our job as keeping the year-ended rate of inflation between 2 and 3 percent at all times...Given the uncertainties in the world, something more prescriptive and mechanical is neither possible nor desirable" - RBA Governor Philip Lowe (October 17, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "There are several reasons for low inflation - both here and abroad. In New Zealand, tradable inflation, which accounts for almost half of the CPI regimen, has been negative for the past four years. Much of the weakness in inflation can be attributed to global developments that have been reflected in the high New Zealand dollar and low inflation in our import prices" - RBNZ Assistant Governor John McDermott (October 11, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 The Fed is Trapped Under Ice - September 9, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Given the downgrade to our outlook, Governing Council actively discussed the possibility of adding more monetary stimulus at this time, in order to speed up the return of the economy to full capacity" - BoC Governor Stephen Poloz (October 19, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "[On the effects of low interest rates on the housing market]...If you look at the recent past, the dynamics have been a bit more reassuring...[still]let's not forget, this disequilibrium that we have achieved remains very high" - SNB Vice-President Fritz Zurbruegg (October 12, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Clashing Forces - July 29, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "A period of low interest rates can engender financial imbalances. The risk that growth in property prices and debt will become unsustainably high over time is increasing. With high debt ratios, households are more vulnerable to cyclical downturns" - Norges Bank Governor Oystein Olsen (October 11, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "[On Sweden's financial stability]...it remains an issue because we are mismanaging out housing market. Our housing market isn't under control in my view" - Riksbank Governor Stefan Ingves (October 27, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Dazed And Confused - July 1, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The resilience of EM industrial commodity demand, which is helping to lift inflation and inflation expectations in the U.S., will be tested over the next few months, as markets gear up for a possible oil-production deal between OPEC and Russia, and the first of perhaps three Fed rate hikes in December and next year. Any indication Janet Yellen has persuaded her colleagues to run a "high-pressure economy" will provoke us to get long gold, given its sensitivity to the Fed's preferred inflation gauge. We remain wary, however, given the higher-rates stance favored by some Fed officials, which, our modeling suggests, would reverse the pick-up in inflation and inflation expectations in the U.S. by depressing EM growth. Energy: Overweight. We continue to favor U.S. shale-oil producers at this stage in the cycle, and continue to look for opportunities to take commodity price exposure. Base Metals: Neutral. We downgraded copper to neutral from bullish last week, expecting prices to trade sideways over the next three months. Precious Metals: Neutral. We continue to be buyers of gold at $1,210/oz. If we continue to see the Fed's preferred inflation gauge increase, we will raise that target. Ags/Softs: Underweight. We are recommending a tactical long position in Mar/17 wheat versus a short in Mar/17 soybeans. Feature In her Boston Fed speech last week, Fed Chair Janet Yellen dangled catnip in front of commodity markets by discussing the possibility of "temporarily running a 'high-pressure economy,' with robust aggregate demand and a tight labor market" as a means of countering the prolonged hysteresis in the U.S. economy.1 Any indication Dr. Yellen has succeed in convincing her colleagues to pursue such a strategy would compel us to get long gold, given the sensitivity of the yellow metal to core PCE, the Fed's preferred inflation gauge (Chart of the Week).2 Indeed, we find there is a long-term equilibrium between spot gold prices and the core PCEPIand U.S. financial variables, which is extremely robust over time.3 Core PCEPI has been ticking up this year, most recently in March and appears to be leading 5-year/5-year inflation expectations tracked by the St. Louis Fed, which bottomed in June and have been trending higher since (Chart 2).4 In our modeling, we find a 1% increase in core PCE translates into a 4% increase in gold prices, suggesting gold would provide an excellent hedge against rising inflation. Chart of the WeekGet Long Gold If Pressure ##br##Builds in U.S. Economy Chart 2Core PCE ##br##Ticking Up Core PCE And EM Commodity Demand There is an enduring long-term relationship between inflation generally and EM commodity demand, which we have highlighted in previous research.5 This week we are exploring long-term equilibrium relationships between EM industrial commodity demand and core PCE, given the obvious interest among commodity investors. The big driver of core PCE is EM industrial commodity demand, as can be seen in Chart 3, which shows the output of two regressions we ran using non-OECD oil demand - our proxy for EM oil demand - and world base metals demand, which is dominated by China's roughly 50% share of global base metals demand. Core PCE is cointegrated with these measures of industrial-commodity demand, which makes perfect sense considering most - sometimes, all - of the demand growth for industrial commodities (oil and base metals, in this instance) is coming from EM economies.6 For example, of the total growth in oil demand since 2013, non-OECD demand accounted for 1.1mm b/d of an average 1.2mm b/d global demand growth. Within other markets, China accounts for more than 50% of global iron ore, copper ore, metallurgical and thermal coal demand.7 At the margin, prices in the real economy are being set by EM demand, not by DM demand. This, in turn, feeds into core and headline PCE and other inflation gauges. Feedback Between Fed Policy And EM Commodity Demand Leading economic indicators for EM growth are turning up, which is supportive for commodity demand near term (Chart 4). This has been aided by accommodative monetary policy in the U.S., which has kept the USD relatively tame after peaking in January 2016.8 Chart 3EM Industrial Commodity Demand,##br## Core PCE Share Common Trend Chart 4EM Leading Indicators ##br##Point to Growth Upturn The single biggest risk to commodity demand and commodity prices remains U.S. monetary policy. The longer-term cointegrating relationships highlighted in this week's research are consistent with earlier results we reported on the impact of U.S. financial variables on commodity demand.9 When we model EM oil demand as a function of U.S. financial variables, we find a 1% increase (decrease) in the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWI) is consistent with a 22bp decrease (increase) in consumption using these longer-dated models. For global base metals, a 1% increase (decrease) in the USD TWI corresponds with a 27bp drop (increase) in demand. As a general rule, each 1% increase (decrease) in the USD TWI is accompanied by a 25bp drop (increase) in EM demand for oil and global base metals (Charts 5 and 6). Chart 5EM Oil Demand Will Fall If ##br##The Fed Gets Too Aggressive... Chart 6...As Will##br## Base Metals Demand As mentioned above, we continue to expect a 25bp hike by the Fed at its December meeting, followed by two additional hikes next year. Our House view continues to maintain this round of rate hikes will cause the USD to appreciate by 10% over the next 12 months. If this is fully passed through, we expect this gauge to register a ~ 2.5% decline in EM demand for industrial commodities. This would reduce the core PCE's yoy rate of change to ~ 1%, vs. the current level of 1.7% yoy growth. Walking A Tightrope Chair Yellen's speech makes it clear the Fed is well aware of how its monetary policy affects the global economy and the feedback loop this creates. This is of particular moment right now, given the Fed is the only systemically important central bank even considering tightening its monetary policy. As she notes, "Broadly speaking, monetary policy actions in one country spill over to other economies through three main channels: changes in exchange rates; changes in domestic demand, which alter the economy's imports; and changes in domestic financial conditions - such as interest rates and asset prices - that, through portfolio balance and other channels, affect financial conditions abroad." The other major threat to EM commodity demand is the oil-production deal being negotiated by OPEC, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC, led by Russia. Should these negotiations result in an actual cut in oil production, it would accelerate the tightening of global oil markets - likely increasing the rate at which global inventories of crude oil and refined products are drained - and put upward pressure on prices. While we do not expect a material agreement to emerge from these negotiations - KSA and Russia already are producing at or close to maximum capacity at present. A freeze in production by these states would result in no change in production globally. The risk here is KSA actually cuts production beyond its seasonal decline by adding, say, a 500k b/d cut to the expected 500k b/d seasonal decline, and Russia agrees to something similar. This would be offset by continued production increases in Iran, and possibly in Libya and Nigeria, but would, nonetheless, surprise the market and rally prices. All else equal, higher prices would weaken EM demand growth at the margin, and feed back into lower inflation expectations. We do not believe it is in KSA's or non-OPEC producers' interest to try to tighten markets sharply, since a price spike would re-energize conservation efforts by consumers, particularly in DM economies, and incentivize alternative transportation technologies like electric cars, as happened when oil prices were above $100/bbl from 2010 to mid-2014. Nonetheless, KSA, Russia, and other parties to any production-management agreement will have to balance this risk against the likelihood U.S. shale producers step in to fill the production cutbacks before any meaningful increase in revenues accrues to these states. Bottom Line: It still is too early to discuss the implications of a production cut, given negotiations between the KSA and Russia camps ahead of OPEC's November meeting continue. However, this could become a material issue next year, just as the Fed is considering whether to hike rates two more times, as we expect. A combined oil-production cut emerging from the KSA - Russia negotiations, which is a non-trivial risk, coupled with two Fed rate hikes could set off a new round of disinflation or even deflation, just as EM commodity demand was starting to enliven inflation and inflations expectations in the U.S.10 This could force the Fed to back off further rate hikes, or even walk back previous rate hikes. If on, the other hand, Chair Yellen is successful in persuading her colleagues to run a "high-pressure economy" we would look to get long commodities generally, gold in particular, given our expectation core PCE inflation and inflation expectations will move higher. As our research has shown, the yellow metal is particularly sensitive to the Fed's preferred inflation gauge. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com SOFTS China Commodity Focus: Softs Grains: Focus On Relative-Value Trade We remain strategically bearish grains, but we are upgrading our tactical view for wheat from bearish to neutral. We believe most of the negative news already is reflected in wheat prices. Over next three to six months, we expect wheat to outperform soybeans. Wheat prices could move up on reduced U.S. acreage, rising Chinese imports, or any unfavorable winter weather in major producing countries while expanding area-sown in Brazil, Argentina, China and the U.S. will likely pressure down soybean prices. We recommend a tactical long position in March/17 wheat versus March/17 soybeans. We suggest a 5% stop-loss to limit the downside risk. Grain prices have already rebounded 10.3% since August 30, when prices collapsed to a 10-year low (Chart 7, panel 1). There were three main reasons behind the precipitous price drop from early June to late August. 1.The 25% rally grain prices in 2016H1 encouraged global planting of spring wheat, soybeans, corn and rice. 2.Favorable weather lifted yields of all grains to record highs. 3.Extremely cheap Russian, Ukraine, Argentine and Brazilian currencies boosted exports from these major grain producing countries. In addition, grain-related policy changes in Argentine and Russia also have stimulated their grain exports (wheat benefited most and corn next). Given a 10% rebound recently, as the USDA expects global grain stocks to rise 3% to a new high next year, we remain a strategical bearish view on grain. Looking forward, we will continue to focus on relative-value trades in grain markets. Tactically, we are interested in long wheat versus soybeans. Wheat: Tactically Neutral Wheat has underperformed other grains so far in 2016 (Chart 7, panel 2). Prices fell to 361 cents per bushel on August 31, which was the lowest level since June 2006 (Chart 7, panel 3). Wheat prices have already recovered 16.7% from their August bottom. We believe, over the next three to six months, wheat prices may have limited downside due to one or a combination of the following factors. U.S. farmers are currently in the process of planting winter wheat. According to the USDA, as of October 9, 59% of winter wheat acreage has been planted. As U.S. wheat production costs are well above current market prices, U.S. farmers likely will further cut their wheat acreage over the next several weeks. This year, U.S. wheat-planted acreage has already dropped to the lowest since 1971 (Chart 8, panel 1). Global wheat yields improved 2.8% this year, with 13.4% and 20.8% increases in Russian and U.S. yields, respectively. Even though Russia will raise its wheat-sown area for next season, the country's wheat crop still faces plenty of risks during its development period. Too cold a winter or too hot a summer, which may not even result in a considerable drop in yields, still could spur a temporary rally in wheat prices. Similarly, U.S. wheat yields are also likely to retreat from the record high in 2017H1. In addition, extremely low wheat prices will encourage global farmers to plant other more profitable crops instead. As a result, both global wheat acreage and yields will likely go down next year (Chart 8, panel 2). Speculators are currently holding sizable net short positions. Market sentiment is also extremely bearish. Given this backdrop, any short-covering also would drive prices up (Chart 8, panels 3 and 4). Chart 7Wheat: Cautiously Bullish Chart 8Wheat: Upgrade To Tactically Neutral ##br##On Supportive Factors Soybeans: Tactically Bearish Soybeans have outperformed other grains significantly this year (Chart 7, panel 2). As planting soybeans general is more profitable than planting corn, wheat and rice, global farmers are likely to expand their soybean acreage for the next harvest season. According Conab, Brazil's national crop agency, Brazil's soybean production next spring will increase 6.7% to 9%. Record high U.S. soybean production is likely to weigh down the market as well. According to the USDA, 7.1% jump in the yields will bring U.S. soybean crop to a record high, an 8.7% increase from last year. As of October 9, 2016, only 44% U.S. soybean has been harvested, 12 percentage points behind last year. Chart 9China Grain Imports Will Continue Rising How does China contribute to our grain view? As the world's largest grain producer and also the largest consumer, China is an important player in global grain market. Last year the country accounted for 20.7% of global aggregate grain production and 23% of global consumption. In terms of grain imports, as we predicted in our January 2011 Special Report "China-related Ag Winners For The Long Term," China's grain imports have been on the uptrend, despite the depreciating RMB in the most recent two years (Chart 9). In terms of individual grain markets, China has been the most significant player in the global soybean market, accounting for 62.7% of global imports last year. China is also the world's largest rice importer, accounting for 12.5% of global rice trade. However, for corn and wheat markets, China only accounted for about 2% of global trade. In late March, the Chinese government announced an end to its price-support program for corn, but the government maintained price-support policies for wheat and rice. The government also announced its temporary reserve policy will be replaced by a new market-oriented purchase mechanism for the domestic corn market. In addition, the policy of giving direct subsidies to soybean farmers will continue in the 2016-17 market year. What Are The Implications Of China's Grain-Related Policy? Domestic corn prices fell sharply with global prices, while the gap between domestic soybean prices and the international ones remains large (Chart 10, panels 1 and 2). This will discourage domestic corn sowing and encourage soybean production, which is positive to global corn markets, but negative for global soybean markets. China's imports of wheat and rice are set to rise, given a widening price gap (Chart 10, panels 3 and 4). The country's demand for high-quality wheat and rice are rising as household incomes have greatly improved. China will likely liquidate its elevated grain inventories, which account for about 45% of global stocks. This will be bearish for all grains. However, as most of the domestic grain stocks are low-quality grains, inventory liquidation may affect animal feed market rather than the good-quality grain market. Overall, China's grain policy is positive for international corn, wheat and rice prices, but negative for global soybean prices. Investment strategy As we expect wheat to outperform soybeans over the next three to six months, we recommend a tactical long position in March/17 wheat versus short March/17 soybeans with a 5% stop-loss (Chart 11). Chart 10Implications Of China Grain Related Policy Chart 11Go Long Wheat Versus Soybeans With Stops Downside risks To Our Relative-Value Trade Position Currently, global wheat inventories still are at a record highs, and almost all the major wheat exporting countries continue to hold considerable inventory for sale. If farmers in Russia, Ukraine and Argentina rush to sell to take advantage of recent price rally, wheat prices will fall. Also, a strengthening USD will put a downward pressure on grain (including wheat and soybeans) prices. For this reason, it will be important to monitor U.S. dollar strength against the currencies of these countries - too-strong a USD will keep grains from being exported, which will keep domestic U.S. prices under pressure. However, our relative-value trade may weather this risk well as a strengthening dollar affects both wheat and soybeans. Moreover, if weather continues to be favorable during the winter, wheat prices may drop below the August lows. On the other side, if unfavorable weather reappears in South America next spring like this year, soybean prices may quickly go up. To limit our downside risk, we suggest putting a 5% stop-loss to our long wheat/short soybeans trade. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Macroeconomic Research After the Crisis," Dr. Yellen's speech delivered at the October 14, 2016, Boston Fed 60th annual economic conference in Boston. She highlighted hysteresis - "the idea that persistent shortfalls in aggregate demand could adversely affect the supply side of the economy" - in her discussion on how demand affects aggregate supply. She noted, "interest in the topic has increased in light of the persistent slowdown in economic growth seen in many developed economies since the crisis. Several recent studies present cross-country evidence indicating that severe and persistent recessions have historically had these sorts of long-term effects, even for downturns that appear to have resulted largely or entirely from a shock to aggregate demand." 2 Core PCE is the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index, which excludes food and energy prices 3 The relationship shown in the Chart Of The Week covers the period March 2000 to present. The adjusted R2 of the cointegrating regression we estimated is 0.97; the price elasticity of gold with respect to a 1% change in the core PCE is close to 4%. The model is dominated by real rates, however: a 1% increase in real rates translates to a 15% decrease in gold prices, while a 1% increase in the broad trade-weighted USD implies a decrease in gold prices of just under 2.5%. Data and modeling constraints took the last observation to August 2016, when the model suggested the "fair value" of gold was close to $1,200/oz. At the time, gold was trading at just below $1,310/oz. Prices subsequently fell into the low to mid $1,200s, and were trading at ~ $1,270/oz as we went to press). 4 For this chart, we use the St. Louis Fed's 5y5y U.S. TIPS inflation index. Please see Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 5-Year, 5-Year Forward Inflation Expectation Rate [T5YIFR], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T5YIFR , October 19, 2016. 5 Please see "Memo To Fed: EM Oil, Metals Demand Key To U.S. Inflation" and "Commodities Could Be Hit Hard By Fed Rate Hikes," in the August 4, 2016, and September 1, 2016, issues of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. See also "China's Evolving Demand for Commodities," by Ivan Roberts, Trent Saunders, Gareth Spence and Natasha Cassidy," presented at the Reserve Bank of Australia's Conference focused on "Structural Change in China: Implications for Australia and the World," 17 - 18 March 2016. 6 The adjusted-R2 statistics for cointegrating regressions we ran for core PCE as a function of non-OECD oil demand and world base metals demand were 0.99 and 0.98 from 2000 to present. 7 Please see discussion beginning on p. 4 of "China's Evolving Demand for Commodities," by Ivan Roberts, Trent Saunders, Gareth Spence and Natasha Cassidy," presented at the Reserve Bank of Australia's Conference focused on "Structural Change in China: Implications for Australia and the World," 17 - 18 March 2016. 8 The Fed's broad trade-weighted USD index post-Global Financial Crisis peaked in January at just under 125 and currently stands at 122.6. Please see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Broad [TWEXBMTH], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TWEXBMTH, October 18, 2016. 9 Please see p. 3 of "Commodities Could Be Hit Hard By Fed Rate Hikes," in the September 1, 2016, issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 10 We define a non-trivial risk as a 1-in-6 chance of occurrence - i.e., the same odds as Russian roulette. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Closed Trades
The frenzy in semiconductor stocks has reached an overshoot phase. Relative performance had been buoyed by a flurry of M&A activity, but that has since waned without a similar response in share prices. If fundamentals return as the main driver, then a setback is probable. Our concern is that the inventory overhang continues to linger. Our proxy for global semiconductor inventories continues to grow, albeit at a slowing rate. Still, the semi sales-to-inventory ratio is deep in negative territory, which is typically deflationary and a harbinger of semiconductor profit contraction (bottom panel). That is confirmed by ongoing sluggishness in Taiwanese and Korean export and export price growth (second panel). The implication is that the surge in semi stocks is vulnerable to an abrupt reversal and an underweight position is warranted. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SECO - INTC, QCOM, TXN, AVGO, NVDA, ADI, MU, SWKS, LLTC, MCHP, XLNX, QRVO, FSLR.