Currencies

Highlights The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy stance is slightly accommodative for the U.S., but it is too tight for the rest of the world. Inflation is likely to slow further before making a durable bottom toward year-end. The Fed will remain on an extended pause, maybe all the way through to December 2020. The trade war is not going away, and investors should not be complacent. However, it also guarantees that Chinese policymakers will redouble on their reflationary efforts. As a result, global growth is still set to improve in the second half of 2019. The dollar rally is in its last innings; the greenback will depreciate in the second half of this year. Treasury yields have limited downside and their recent breakdown is likely to be a fake-out. Use any strength in bond prices to further curtail portfolio duration. The correction in stocks is not over. However, the cycle’s highs still lie ahead. Feature Ongoing Sino-U.S. tensions and weakness in global growth are taking their toll. The S&P 500 has broken below its crucial 2,800 level, EM equities are quickly approaching their fourth-quarter 2018 lows, U.S. bond yields have fallen to their lowest readings since 2017, copper has erased all of its 2019 gains and the dollar is attempting to break out. In response, futures markets are now pricing in interest rate cuts by the Fed of 54 bps and 64 bps, over the next 12 and 24 months, respectively. Will the Fed ratify these expectations? Last week’s release of the most recent Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee meeting minutes, as well as comments from FOMC members ranging from Jerome Powell to Richard Clarida, are all adamantly clear: U.S. monetary policy is appropriate, and a rate cut is not on the table for now. However, the avowed data-dependency of the Fed implies that if economic conditions warrant, the FOMC will capitulate and cut rates. Even as U.S. inflation slows, a recession is unlikely. Moreover, the Sino-U.S. trade war will catalyze additional reflationary policy from China, putting a floor under global growth. In this context, the Fed is likely to stay put for an extended period, but will not cut rates. While the S&P 500 is likely to fall toward 2,600, the high for the cycle is still ahead. We therefore maintain our positive cyclical equity view, especially relative to government bonds, but we are hedging tactical risk. Fed Policy Is Neutral For The U.S…. If the fed funds rate was above the neutral rate – the so-called R-star – we would be more inclined to agree with interest rate markets and bet on a lower fed funds rate this year. However, it is not clear that this is the case. Chart I-1Mixed Message From The R-Star Indicator Admittedly, the inversion of the 10-year/3-month yield curve is worrisome, but other key variables are not validating this message. Currently, our R-star indicator, based on M1, bank liquidity, consumer credit, and the BCA Fed monitor, is only in neutral territory (Chart I-1). Moreover, we built a model based on the behavior of the dollar, yield curve, S&P homebuilding relative to the broad market and initial UI claims that gauges the probability that the fed funds rate is above R-star. Currently, the model gives a roughly 40% chance that U.S. monetary policy is tight (Chart I-2). Historically, such a reading was consistent with a neutral policy stance.   Chart I-2Today, Fed Policy Is At Neutral Models can be deceiving, so it is important to ensure that facts on the ground match their insights. Historically, housing is the sector most sensitive to monetary policy.1 Key forward-looking activity measures are not showing signs of stress: mortgage applications for purchases have jumped to new cyclical highs, and the NAHB homebuilders confidence index has smartly rebounded after weakening last year (Chart I-3). Also, homebuilder stocks have been in a steady uptrend relative to the S&P 500 since last October (Chart I-3, bottom panel). These three developments are not consistent with tight monetary policy. Chart I-3This Would Not Happen If Policy Were Tight The corporate sector confirms the message from the housing sector. While capex intentions have weakened, they remain at elevated levels, despite slowing profit growth and elevated global uncertainty. Moreover, the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey shows that banks have again eased credit standards for commercial and industrial loans. Netting out all these factors, we are inclined to agree with the Fed that monetary policy in the U.S. is broadly neutral. If anything, the rebound in leading indicators of residential activity would argue that policy is even slightly accommodative. … But Not For The Rest Of The World Congress gave the Fed a U.S.-only mandate, but the U.S. dollar is the global reserve currency. Because the dollar is the keystone of the global financial architecture, between US$12 trillion and US$14 trillion of foreign-currency debt is issued in USDs, and the greenback is used as a medium of exchange in roughly US$800 trillion worth of transaction per year.2 Therefore, the Fed may target U.S. monetary conditions, but it sets the cost of money for the entire world. While U.S. monetary conditions may be appropriate for the U.S., they are not entirely appropriate for the world as a whole. Indeed, the green shoots of growth we highlighted two months ago are rapidly turning brown: Korean and Taiwanese exports, which are highly sensitive to the global and Asian business cycles, are still contracting at a brisk pace (Chart I-4, top panel). Japan, an economy whose variance in GDP mostly reflects global gyrations, is weakening. Exports are contracting at a 4.3% yearly pace, machine tool orders are plunging at a 33% annual rate and the coincident indicator is below 100 – a sign of shrinking activity. The semiconductor space is plunging (Chart I-4, second panel). Our EM Asia diffusion index, which tallies 23 variables, is near record lows (Chart I-4, third panel). Europe too is feeling the pain, led by Germany, another economy deeply dependent on global activity. The flash estimate for the euro area manufacturing PMI fell to 47.7 and plunged to 44.3 in Germany, its lowest level since July 2012 (Chart I-4, bottom panel). These developments show that the world economy remains weak, in part because the Chinese economy has yet to meaningfully regain any traction. The rebound in Chinese PMI in March proved short lived; in April, both the NBS and Caixin measures fell back to near the 50 boom/bust line. Since inflation lags real activity and global growth has yet to bottom, it could take some time before inflation finds a floor. A strong dollar is a natural consequence of an outperforming U.S. economy, especially when global growth weakens. Thus, the rally in the Fed’s nominal trade-weighted dollar to its highest level since March 2002 is unsurprising (Chart I-5). A strong Greenback will have implications for inflation, and thus the Fed. Chart I-4Global Growth: No Green Shoots Here Chart I-5A Strong Dollar Is A Natural Consequence Of Weak Growth   Transitory Inflation Weakness Is Not Over The Fed believes the current inflation slowdown is transitory. We agree. With a tight labor market and rising wages, the question is not if inflation will rise, but when. In the current context, it could take some time. As Chart I-6 shows, inflation has been stable for more than 20 years. From 1996 to today, core PCE has oscillated between 0.9% and 2.6%, while core CPI has hovered between 0.6% and 2.9%, with the peaks and troughs determined by the ebbs and flows of global growth. Since inflation lags real activity and global growth has yet to bottom, it could take some time before inflation finds a floor, likely around 1.3% and 1.5% for core PCE and core CPI, respectively. Chart I-6Stable U.S. Inflation Since 1996 A few dynamics strengthen this judgment: The strength in the dollar is deflationary (Chart I-7, top panel). Not only does an appreciating greenback depress import prices, it tightens U.S. and global financial conditions. It also undermines dollar-based liquidity, especially if EM central banks try to fight weakness in their own currencies. All these forces harm growth, commodity prices and ultimately, inflation. Chart I-7More Downside Ahead In Inflation For Now After adjusting for their disparate variance, the performance of EM stocks relative to EM bonds is an excellent leading indicator of global core inflation (Chart I-7, second panel). This ratio is impacted by EM financial conditions, explaining its forecasting power for prices. Since goods inflation – which disproportionally contributes to overall variations in core CPI – is globally determined, U.S. inflation will suffer as well. U.S. capacity utilization is declining (Chart I-7, third panel). The U.S. just underwent a mini inventory cycle. The 12-month moving averages of the Philadelphia Fed and Empire State surveys’ inventory indexes still stand above their long-term averages. U.S. firms will likely use discounts to entice customers, especially as a strong dollar and weak global growth point to limited foreign outlets for this excess capacity. Finally, the growth in U.S. unit labor costs is slowing sharply, which normally leads inflation lower (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Average hourly earnings may now be growing at a 3.2% annual pace, but productivity rebounded to a 2.4% year-on-year rate in the first quarter, damping the impact of higher salaries on costs. If global growth is weak and U.S. inflation decelerates further, the Fed is unlikely to raise interest rates anytime soon. As the Fed policy remains modestly accommodative and the labor market is at full employment, the balance of probability favors an extended pause over a cut. But keep in mind, next year’s elections may mean this pause could last all the way to December 2020. How Does The Trade War Fit In? An additional irritant has been added to the mix: the growing trade tensions between the U.S. and China. The trade war has resurrected fears of a repeat of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariffs, which prompted a wave of retaliatory actions, worsening the massive economic contraction of the Great Depression. There is indeed plenty to worry about. Today, global trade represents 25% of global GDP, compared to 12% in the late 1920s. Global growth would be highly vulnerable to a freeze in world trade. Besides, global supply chains are extremely integrated, with intra-company exports having grown from 7% of global GDP to 16% between 1993 and 2013. If a full-blown trade war were to flare up, much of the capital invested abroad by large multinationals might become uneconomic. As markets price in this probability, stock prices would be dragged down. Chart I-8Trade Uncertainty Alone Will Delay The Recovery The fear of a full-fledged trade war is already affecting the global economy. The fall in asset prices to reflect the risk of stranded capital is tightening financial conditions and hurting growth. Moreover, the rise in U.S. and global economic uncertainty is depressing capex intentions (Chart I-8). Since capex intentions are a leading variable for actual capex, global exports and manufacturing activity, the trade war is deepening and lengthening the current soft patch. Markets need to be wary of pricing in a quick end to the Sino-U.S. trade conflict. Table I-1 presents BCA’s Geopolitical Strategist Matt Gertken’s odds of various outcomes to the trade negotiations and their implications for stocks. Matt assigns only a 5% probability to a grand compromise between the U.S. and China on trade and tech. He also foresees a 35% chance that a deal on trade excluding an agreement on tech will be reached this year. This leaves 10% odds that the two sides agree to extend the negotiation deadline beyond June, 20% odds of no deal at all and a minor escalation, and 30% odds of a major escalation. In other words, BCA is currently assigning 60% odds of a market-unfriendly outcome, and only a 40% chance of a genuinely market-friendly one.3 Why the gloom? The U.S. and China are geopolitical rivals in a deadlock. Moreover, both parties are feeling increasingly emboldened to play hardball. On the U.S. side, President Donald Trump has threatened to expand his tariffs to all of China’s exports to the U.S., which would represent a major escalation in both the conflict and its cost (Chart I-9). However, despite the scale of the threat, even if it were fully borne by U.S. households, its impact should be kept in perspective. Imports of consumer goods from China only represent 2% of total household spending (Chart I-10, top panel). Moreover, households are not currently overly concerned with inflation, as goods prices are already muted (Chart I-10, middle panel) and family income is still growing (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Finally, a weak deal could easily be decried as a failure in the 2020 election. On the Chinese side, the 9.5% fall in the yuan is already absorbing some of the costs of the tariffs, and the RMB will depreciate further if the trade war escalates. Additionally, Chinese exports to the U.S. represent 3.4% of GDP, while household and capital spending equals 81% of output. China can support its domestic economy via fiscal and credit policy, greatly mitigating the blow from the trade war. The outlook for Chinese reflationary efforts is therefore paramount. In sharp contrast to its limited upside, the dollar’s downside will be much more significant once global growth improves. Not only do Chinese policymakers have the room to stimulate, they also have the will. In the first four months of 2019, Chinese total social financing flows have amounted to CNY 9.6 trillion, which compares favorably to the same period during the 2016 reflation campaign. Yet, the economy has not fully responded to the injection of credit and previously implemented tax cuts amounting to CNY 1.3 trillion or 1.4% of GDP. Consequently, GDP per capita is now lagging well behind the required path to hit the government’s 2020 development targets (Chart I-11). Moreover, Chinese policymakers’ recent comments have increasingly emphasized protecting employment. This combination raises the likelihood of additional stimulus in the months ahead. Chart I-10...But Do Not Overstate Trump's Constraints Chart I-11Chinese Stimulus: Scope And Willingness   Therein lies the paradox of the trade war. While its immediate effect on world growth is negative, it also increases the chance that Chinese authorities pull all the levers to support domestic growth. A greater reflationary push would thus address the strongest headwind shaking the global economy. It could take two to six more months before the Chinese economy fully responds and lifts global growth. Ultimately, it will. Hence, even as the trade war continues, we remain skeptical that the Fed will cut interest rates as the market is discounting. We are therefore sticking to our call that the Fed will not cut rates over the next 12 months and will instead stay on an extended pause. Investment Conclusions The Dollar So long as global growth remains soft, the dollar is likely to rally further. That being said, the pace of the decline in global growth is decelerating. As a corollary, the fastest pace of appreciation for the greenback is behind us (see Chart I-5 on page 6). The risk to this view is that the previous strength in the dollar has already unleashed a vicious cycle whereby global financial conditions have tightened enough to cause another precipitous fall in world growth. The dollar’s strong sensitivity to momentum would then kick in, fomenting additional dollar strength in response to the greater growth slowdown. In this environment, the Fed would have no choice but to cut interest rates. However, growing reflationary efforts around the world currently confine this scenario to being a risk, not a central case. Additional factors also limit how far the dollar can rally. Speculators have already aggressively bought the greenback (Chart I-12). The implication is that buyers have moved in to take advantage of the dollar-friendly fundamentals. When looking at the euro, which can be thought of as the anti-dollar, investors are imputing a large discount in euro area stocks relative to U.S. ones, pointing to elevated pessimism on non-U.S. growth (Chart I-13). It would therefore require a much graver outcome in global growth to cause investors to further downgrade the outlook for the rest of the world relative to the U.S. and bring in new buyers of greenbacks. Chart I-12USD: Supportive Fundamentals Are Already Reflected Chart I-13Plenty Of Pessimism In European Assets...   In sharp contrast to its limited upside, the dollar’s downside will be much more significant once global growth improves. The same factors that are currently putting the brakes on the dollar’s rise will fuel its eventual downturn. As global growth bounces, a liquidation of stale long-dollar bets will ensue. European growth will also rebound (Chart I-14), and euro pessimism will turn into positive surprises. European assets will be bought, and the euro will rise, deepening the dollar’s demise. We are closely following the Chinese and global manufacturing PMIs to gauge when global growth exits its funk. At this point, it will be time to sell the USD. Government Bonds Bonds are caught between strong crosscurrents. On the one hand, rising economic uncertainty caused by the trade war, slowing global economic activity and decelerating inflation are all bond-bullish. On the other hand, bond prices already reflect these tailwinds. The OIS curve is baking in 54 basis points of Fed cuts over the next 12 months, as well as a further 10 basis points over the following 12 months (Chart I-15, top panel). Meanwhile, term premia across many major bond markets are very negative (Chart I-15, middle panel). Finally, fixed-income investors have pushed their portfolio duration to extremely high levels relative to their benchmark (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Chart I-14...Creates Scope For Positive Surprises Chart I-15Fade The Treasury Rally   Last week, Treasury yields broke down below 2.34%. For this technical break to trigger a new down-leg in yields, investors must curtail their already-depressed expectations of the fed funds rate in 12-months’ time. However, the fed funds rate is not yet restrictive, and global growth should soon find a floor in response to expanding Chinese stimulus. Under these circumstances, the Fed is unlikely to cut rates, and will continue to telegraph its intentions not to do so. Hence, unless the S&P 500 or the ISM manufacturing fall below 2,500 and 50, respectively, any move lower in yields is likely to be transitory and shallow. Cyclically, yields should instead move higher. Our Global Fixed Income Strategy service’s duration indicator has already turned the corner (Chart I-16). Moreover, in the post-war period, Treasury yields have, on average, bottomed a year before inflation. Expecting an inflation trough in late 2019 or even early 2020 is therefore consistent with higher yields by year-end. Finally, when the Fed does not cut interest rates as much as the markets had been anticipating 12-months’ prior, Treasurys underperform cash. This is exactly BCA’s current Fed forecast. Chart I-16Global Yields Now Have More Upside Than Downside While we expect the bond-bearish forces to emerge victorious, yields may only rise slowly. The list of aforementioned supports for Treasury prices is long, the equity market will remain volatile and has yet to trough, and the trade war is likely to linger. We continue to closely monitor the AUD, the SEK versus the EUR, and copper to gauge if our view is wrong. These three markets are tightly linked to Chinese growth. If China’s stimulus is working, these three variables will rebound, and our bond view will be validated. If these three variables fall much further, U.S. yields could experience significantly more downside. Equities Equities are at a difficult juncture. The trade war is a bigger problem for Wall Street than for Main Street, as 43.6% sales of the S&P 500’s are sourced abroad. Moreover, the main mechanism through which trade tensions impact the stock market is through the threat that capital will be stranded – and thus worthless. This is a direct hit to the S&P 500, especially as global growth has yet to clearly stabilize and the Chinese are only beginning to make clearer retaliatory threats. Oil could also hurt stocks. Energy prices have proven resilient, despite weaker global economic activity. OPEC and Russia have been laser-focused on curtailing global crude inventories; even after the U.S. declined to extend waivers on Iranian exports, the swing oil producers have not meaningfully increased supply. Problems in Venezuela, Libya, and potential Iranian adventurism in Iraq could easily send oil prices sharply higher, especially as the U.S. does not have the export capacity to fulfill foreign demand. Thus, the oil market could suddenly tighten and create a large drag on global growth. This backdrop also warrants remaining overweight the energy sector. Stocks remain technically vulnerable. Global and U.S. stock market breadth has deteriorated significantly, as shown by the number of countries and stocks above their 200-day moving averages (Chart I-17). Moreover, since March, the strength in the S&P 500 has been very narrow, as shown by the very poor performance of the Value Line Geometric Average Index (Chart I-18). Meanwhile, the poor relative performance of small-cap stocks in an environment where the dollar is strong, where U.S. growth is holding steady compared to the rest of the world and where multinationals have the most to lose from a trade war, is perplexing. Chart I-17Stocks Remain Technically Fragile Chart I-18Dangerous Internal Dynamics   The U.S. stock market has the most downside potential in the weeks ahead. Like last summer, U.S. equity prices remain near record highs while EM and European stocks, many commodities and bond yields have been very weak. Moreover, the broad tech sector, the U.S.’s largest overweight, has defied gravity, despite weakness in the semiconductor sector, the entire industry’s large exposure to foreign markets, and the consequential slowdown in our U.S. Equity Strategy service's EPS model (Chart I-19).4 Thus, any bad news on the trade front or any additional strength in the dollar could prove especially painful for tech. This would handicap U.S. equities more than their already beaten-up foreign counterparts. Chart I-19The Tech Sector Profit Outlook Remains Poor These forces mean that the global equity correction will last longer, and that U.S. equities could suffer more than other DM markets. However, we do not see the S&P falling much beyond the 2,700 to 2,600 zone. Again, the fed funds rate is slightly accommodative and a U.S. recession – a prerequisite for a bear market (Chart I-20) – is unlikely over the coming 12 months. Moreover, global growth should soon recover, especially if China’s reflationary push gathers force. Additionally, an end to the dollar’s rally would create another welcomed relief valve for stocks. Chart I-20The Absence Of A Recession Means This Is A Correction, Not A Bear Market In this context, we recommend investors keep a cyclical overweight stance on stocks. Balanced portfolios should also overweight stocks relative to government bonds. However, the near-term risks highlighted above remain significant. Consequently, we also recommend investors hedge tactical equity risks, a position implemented by BCA’s Global Investment Strategy service three weeks ago.5 As a corollary, if stocks correct sharply, the associated rise in implied volatility will also cause a violent but short-lived pick up in credit spreads. In Section II, we look beyond the short-term gyrations. One of BCA’s long-term views is that inflation is slowly embarking on a structural uptrend. An environment of rising long-term inflation is unfamiliar to the vast majority of investors. In this piece, Juan-Manuel Correa, of our Global Asset Allocation team, shows which assets offer the best inflation protection under various states of rising consumer and producer prices. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 30, 2019 Next Report: June 27, 2019 II. Investors’ Guide To Inflation Hedging: How To Invest When Inflation Rises U.S. inflation is on a structural uptrend. Monetary and fiscal policy, populism, and demographics will tend to push inflation higher over the coming decade. How can investors protect portfolios against inflation risk? We look at periods of rising inflation to determine which assets were the best inflation hedge. We find that the level of inflation is very important in determining which assets work best. When inflation is rising and high, or very high, the best inflation hedges at the asset class level are commodities and U.S. TIPS. When inflation is very high, gold is the best commodity to hold and defensive sectors will minimize losses in an equity portfolio. However, hedges have a cost. Allocating a large percentage of a portfolio to inflation hedges will be a drag on returns. Investors should opt for a low allocation to hedges now, and increase to a medium level when inflation rises further. Some 38 years have passed since the last time the U.S. suffered from double-digit inflation. The Federal Reserve reform of 1979, championed by Paul Volcker, changed the way the Fed approached monetary policy by putting a focus on controlling money growth.1 The reform gave way to almost four decades of relatively controlled inflation, which persists today. But times are changing. While most of today’s investors have never experienced anything other than periods of tame inflation, BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade.2 The main reasons behind this view are the following: 1. A rethink in the monetary policy framework: At its most recent meeting, the FOMC openly discussed the idea of a price-level target, implying that it would be open to the economy running hot to compensate for the past 10 years of below-target inflation (Chart II-1.1A, top panel). Chart II-1.1AStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Chart II-1.1BStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I)   2. Procyclical fiscal policy: The U.S. is conducting expansionary fiscal policy while the economy is at near-full employment (Chart II-1.1A, middle panel). The last time this happened in the U.S., during the 1960s, high inflation followed, as the fiscal boost made the economy run substantially above capacity. 3. Waning Fed independence: President Trump has openly questioned the hiking campaign undertaken by the Fed. Moreover, he has tried to nominate Fed governors with dovish tendencies. Historically around the world, a lack of central bank independence has often led to higher inflation rates (Chart II-1.1A, bottom panel). 4. Peak in globalization: Globalization accelerated significantly in the 1990s and 2000s, flooding the global economy with cheap labor (Chart II-1.1B, top panel). However, we believe that globalization has peaked. Instead, populism and protectionism will be the dominant paradigms for years to come, reducing the cheap pool of workers and goods previously available. 5. Demographics: The population in the U.S. is set to age in coming years (Chart II-1.1B, middle panel). As the percentage of U.S. retirees increases, the number of spenders relative to savers will begin to rise (Chart II-1.1B, bottom panel). Higher spending and lower savings in the economy should create upward pressure on inflation. If our view is correct, how should investors allocate their money? We attempt to answer this question by evaluating the performance of five major asset classes during periods when inflation was rising. Furthermore, we look into sub-asset class performance to determine how investors should position themselves within each asset class to take advantage of an inflationary environment. In our asset-class analysis, we use a data sample starting in 1973 and we limit ourselves to five publicly traded assets that have adequate history: global equities, U.S. Treasuries, U.S. real estate (REITs), U.S. inflation-linked bonds,3 and commodities. We compare asset classes according to their Sharpe ratios: average annualized excess returns divided by annualized volatilities.4  BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade. In our sub-asset class analysis, we analyze global equity sectors, international vs U.S. equities, and individual commodities. In some of the sections in our sub-asset class analysis, our sample is slightly reduced due to lack of historical data. Moreover, since in some instances all sectors have negative returns, we compare sub-asset classes according to their excess returns only. We base our analysis on the U.S. Consumer Price Index, given that most of the assets in our sample are U.S. based. We opt for this measure because it tends to track the living expenses for most U.S. citizens and it is the preferred measure to index defined-benefit payments. Finally, we decompose the periods of rising inflation into four quartiles in order to examine whether the level of inflation has any impact on the performance of each asset. Chart II-1.2 and Table II-1.1 show the different ranges we use for our analysis as well as a description of the typical economic and monetary policy environments in each of them. Summary Of Results Table II-1.2 shows the summary of our results. For a detailed explanation on how each asset class and sub-asset class behaves as inflation rises, please see the Asset Class section and the Sub-Asset Class section below. Which assets perform best when inflation is rising? Rising inflation affects assets very differently, and is especially dependent on how high inflation is. Global equities performed positively when inflation was rising and low or mild, but they were one of the worst-performing assets when inflation was rising and high or very high. Importantly, equities underperformed U.S. Treasuries in periods of both high and very high inflation. Commodities and U.S. TIPS were the best performers when inflation was high or very high. U.S. REITs were not a good inflation hedge. Which global equity sectors perform best when inflation is rising? Energy and materials outperformed when inflation was high. Every single sector had negative excess returns when inflation was very high, but defensive sectors such as utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications5 minimized losses. Which commodities perform best when inflation is rising? With the exception of energy, most commodities had subpar excess returns when inflation was in the first two quartiles. Industrial metals outperformed when inflation was high. Gold and silver outperformed when inflation was very high. Additionally, gold had consistent returns and low volatility. What is the cost of inflation hedging? To answer this question, we construct four portfolios with different levels of inflation hedging: 1. Benchmark (no inflation hedging): 60% equities/40% bonds. 2. Low Inflation Hedging: 50% equities/40% bonds/5% TIPS/5% commodities 3. Medium Inflation Hedging: 40% equities/30% bonds/15% TIPS/15 % commodities 4. Pure Inflation Hedging: 50% TIPS/50% commodities. While increased inflation hedging provides better performance when inflation is high and rising, these hedges are costly to hold when inflation is at lower ranges or when it is falling (Chart II-1.3, panels 1 & 2). However, adding moderate inflation hedging (low or medium) to a portfolio achieved the right balance between cost and protection, and ultimately improved risk-adjusted returns over the whole sample (Chart II-1.3, panel 3). What about absolute returns? The benchmark outperformed over the whole sample. However, the low and medium inflation hedging did not lag far behind, while avoiding the big drawdowns of high inflation periods (Chart II-1.3, panel 4). Investment Implications High inflation may return to the U.S. over the next decade. Therefore, inflation hedging should be a key consideration when constructing a portfolio. Based on our results, our recommendations are the following: 1. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. 2.  However, these hedges are costly to hold as they will create a drag on returns in periods when inflation is not high or very high. Therefore, a low allocation to inflation hedges is warranted now. 3.   Inflation will probably start to pick up in the 2020s. A medium allocation to inflation hedges will then be appropriate. 4.   When inflation is high (3.3%-4.9%), investors should overweight energy and materials in their equity portfolios. Likewise, they should overweight industrial metals and energy within a commodity portfolio. 5.   When inflation is very high (4.9% or more), investors should overweight defensive sectors in their equity portfolio to minimize losses. Moreover, investors should overweight gold within a commodity portfolio. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. Asset Classes Global Equities The relationship between equity returns and rising inflation depends on how high inflation is, with outstanding performance when inflation is rising but low or mild, and poor performance as it gets higher (Chart II-2.1, top panel). This relationship can be explained by the interaction between interest rates, inflation, earnings, and valuations: Earnings growth was usually slightly negative when inflation was recovering from low levels. However, given that interest rates were very low in this environment and growth expectations were high, multiple expansion boosted equity returns (Chart II-2.1, bottom panel). When inflation was mild, the Fed typically started to raise rates, resulting in a declining multiple. However, equities had the best performance in this range thanks to very high earnings growth – a result of the economy growing strongly due to a healthy level of inflation. When inflation climbed into the high or very high range, earnings growth was usually positive but beginning to slow, as high inflation weighed on growth. Meanwhile the multiple started to decline rapidly due to rising interest rates and declining growth expectations. With the exception of the mild inflation range, the return profile of equities during inflationary periods was similar to its normal profile: negative skew and excess kurtosis (Table II-2.1). However, the consistency of returns decreased at higher levels of inflation, with only 45% of months with positive returns when inflation was rising and in its highest quartile. U.S. Treasuries U.S. Treasuries reacted in a similar fashion to equities when inflation was rising (Chart II-2.2). However, while Treasuries underperformed equities when inflation was low or mild, they actually outperformed equities when inflation was high or very high. This was in part due to the fact that at higher inflation ranges, U.S. Treasuries offer a higher coupon return when rates are high, at least partially counteracting losses from falling prices. The steady stream of cash flows from the coupons helped Treasuries achieve positive returns roughly two-thirds of the time at the highest levels of inflation (Table II-2.2). However, this consistency in returns came at a cost: very high inflation resulted in negative skew and high excess kurtosis. Therefore, while Treasuries provided frequent positive returns when inflation was very high, they were prone to violent selloffs. U.S. REITs While REITs had high risk-adjusted returns when inflation was rising but mild, much like equities they had subpar performance in every other quartile and particularly poor performance when inflation was high or very high (Chart II-2.3). These results confirm our previous research showing that REITs performance is very similar to that of equities.6 The return consistency for REITs was generally poor in inflationary periods, with the second-lowest percentage of positive return of any asset class (Table II-2.3). Moreover, REIT returns had excess kurtosis and negative skew throughout all inflation quartiles. Commodity Futures Commodities performed positively in every quartile, and did particularly well when inflation was mild (Chart II-2.4, top panel). However, total return and price return were very different due to the behavior of the roll and collateral return: Total risk-adjusted returns were lower than spot risk-adjusted returns when inflation was low and rising. This happened because during these periods, commodity supply was high relative to demand, as the economy was recovering from a deflationary shock. Thus, there was an incentive for producers to conserve inventories, making the futures curve upward-sloping (contango). Thus, roll return was negative (Chart II-2.4, bottom panel). When inflation was in the upper two quartiles, total risk-adjusted returns were much higher than risk-adjusted spot returns. This was because high inflation was the product of supply shocks. These supply shocks resulted in a downward-sloping futures curve (backwardation), which, in turn, resulted in a positive roll return. Additionally, high rates during these regimes contributed to a high collateral return. Commodities provided good return consistency during inflationary periods, with roughly 60% of positive return months in the upper two inflation quartiles (Table II-2.4). The skew of returns was neutral or positive in the top two quartiles. This means that although volatility was high for commodities, extreme return movements were normally positive. U.S. Inflation-Protected Bonds While inflation-protected bonds provided meager returns when inflation was rising but in the mild range, they provided excellent performance at the highest levels of inflation (Chart II-2.5). Moreover, this high Sharpe ratio was not just simply the result of low volatility, since U.S. TIPS had excess returns of 4.6% when inflation was high and 5.7% when inflation was very high.7 The return profile of inflation-protected bonds during inflationary periods was also attractive in our testing period. Average skew was positive, while kurtosis was relatively low (Table II-2.5). The percentage of positive months across all quartiles was also the highest of all asset classes, with a particularly high share of positive returns in the periods of highest inflation. Sub-Asset Classes Global Equity Sectors For the sector analysis, we looked at information technology, financials, energy, materials, utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications. We excluded industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples given that they do not have adequate back data. Once again, we separate rising inflation periods into four quartiles, arriving at the following results: When inflation was low, information technology had the best excess returns while utilities had the worst (Chart II-3.1, panel 1). This matches our observations at the asset class level, as IT is highly responsive to changes in the valuation multiple. When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance, followed by information technology (Chart II-3.1, panel 2). Meanwhile, financials had the worst performance, as rates were normally rising in these periods. When inflation was high, sectors highly correlated with commodity prices such as energy and materials outperformed. Meanwhile, IT was the worst performer (Chart II-3.1, panel 3). When inflation was very high, every sector had negative excess returns. Overall, investing in energy minimized losses (Chart II-3.1, panel 4). However, this performance was in part attributable to the oil spikes of the 1970s. Alternatively, defensive sectors such as utilities, telecommunications, and healthcare also minimized losses. International vs U.S. Equities How do equities outside of the U.S. behave when inflation is rising? While the high share of U.S. equities in the global index causes U.S. equities to be the main driver of global stock prices, is it possible to improve returns in inflationary environments by overweighting international equities? The answer once again depends on the level of inflation. When inflation was rising but low, U.S. stocks outperformed global ex-U.S. equities in both common currency and local currency terms (Chart II-3.2, panel 1). This was in part due to the inherent tech bias in U.S. stocks. Additionally, the low level of inflation was often accompanied by slowing global growth in our sample, helping the U.S. dollar. When inflation was mild, U.S. stocks once again outperformed international stocks in both local and common currency terms, though to a lesser degree (Chart II-3.2, panel 2). The dollar was roughly flat in this environment. U.S. stocks started to have negative excess returns when inflation was high (Chart II-3.2, panel 3). On the other hand international equities had positive excess returns in dollar terms, partly because of their energy and material bias and partly because the dollar was generally weak in this period. U.S. equities outperformed global ex-U.S. equities by a small margin when inflation was very high, given that defensive sectors such as telecommunication were over-represented in the U.S. index (Chart II-3.2, panel 4). The dollar was roughly flat in this period. Individual Commodities Our analysis above confirmed that commodities were one of the best assets to hold when inflation was rising. However, which commodity performed best?8 Total return for every commodity was lower than spot return when inflation was low (Chart II-3.3, panel 1). This was due to the upward-sloping term structure of the futures curve (contango), resulting in a negative roll yield. In this range, energy had the best performance, followed by industrial metals. Precious metals had negative excess returns. When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance of any commodity by far (Chart II-3.3, panel 2). Precious and industrial metals had low but positive excess returns in this period. When inflation was high, industrial metals had the highest excess returns, followed by energy (Chart II-3.3, panel 3). We omit energy for the last quartile since there is not enough data available. Overall, when inflation was very high, both gold and silver had the highest excess returns (Chart II-3.3, panel 4). However, gold’s return volatility was much lower, while it also had positive returns 64% of the time compared to 52% for silver. Other Assets U.S. Direct Real Estate Our asset-class analysis confirmed that public real estate (REITs) as an asset class offered poor risk-adjusted returns during inflationary periods. But how did direct real estate perform? We analyzed direct real estate separately from all other assets because of a couple of issues: Our return dataset is available only on a quarterly basis, versus a monthly basis for the rest of the assets in our sample. Even when annualized, volatility is not directly comparable when using data with different frequencies. The NCREIF Real Estate Index that we used is a broad aggregate, which is not investable. Individual property prices might differ from this aggregate. Finally, real estate returns are measured on an appraisal basis. Appraisal-based indices are not reflective of real transactions. Moreover, prices tend to be sticky. To attenuate this issue we unsmoothed the capital returns by removing return autocorrelation. Overall, the Sharpe ratio of direct real estate was solid throughout the first three quartiles of rising inflation (Chart II-4.1, top panel). There is not enough data available for the fourth quartile. However, judging by the performance of U.S. housing in the 1970s from OECD, risk-adjusted returns when inflation was very high was likely positive (Chart II-4.1, bottom panel).   Cash Cash (investing in a 3-month U.S. Treasury bill) outperformed inflation over our sample (Chart II-4.2, top panel). Moreover, cash provided positive real returns when inflation was mild, or high, or when it was decreasing (Chart II-4.2, bottom panel). However, cash was not a good inflation hedge at the highest inflation quartile, with an average annualized real loss of almost 2%. Juan Manuel Correa Ossa Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation   III. Indicators And Reference Charts Last month, we argued that the S&P 500 would most likely enter a period of digestion after its furious gains from December to April. This corrective episode is now upon us as the S&P 500 is breaking below the crucial 2,800 level. Moreover, our short-term technical indicators are deteriorating, as the number of stocks above their 30-week and 10-week moving averages have rolled over after hitting elevated levels, but have yet to hit levels consistent with a durable trough. This vulnerability is especially worrisome in a context where pressure will continue to build, as Beijing is only beginning to retaliate to the U.S.’s trade belligerence. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) is not flashing a buy signal either. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. It will require either cheaper valuations, a pick-up in global growth or further policy easing before stocks can resume their ascent. On the plus side, our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. and Japan continues to improve. However, it remains flat in Europe. The WTP indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The current readings in major advanced economies thus suggest that investors are still inclined to add to their stock holdings. Hence, stock weaknesses are likely to prompt buy-the-dip behaviors by investors. Therefore, the expected downdraft will remain a correction and stocks have more cyclical upside. Our Monetary Indicator remains in stimulative territory, supporting our cyclical constructive equity view. The Fed is firmly on hold and global central banks have been opening the monetary spigots, thus monetary conditions should stay supportive. The BCA Composite Valuation Indicator, an amalgamation of 11 measures, is in overvalued territory, but it is not high enough to negate the positive message of our Monetary Indicator, especially as our Composite Technical Indicator has moved back above its 9-month moving average. These dynamics confirm that despite the near-term downside, equities have more cyclical upside. According to our model, 10-year Treasurys are slightly expensive. Moreover, our technical indicator flags a similar picture. However, duration surveys show that investors have very elevated portfolio duration, and both the term premium and Fed expectations are very depressed. Taking this positioning into account, BCA’s economic view is consistent with limited yield downside in the short-run, and higher yields on a 6 to 12 month basis. On a PPP basis, the U.S. dollar is only getting ever more expensive. Additionally, our Composite Technical Indicator is not only in overbought territory, it is also starting to diverge from prices. Normally, this technical action points to a possible trend reversal, especially when valuations are so demanding. However, this downside will only materialize once global growth shows greater signs of strength. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes   Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1       Edward E. Leamer, "Housing is the business cycle," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 149-233, 2007. 2       This includes both real and financial transactions. 3       Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “How Trump Became A War President,” dated May 17, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4       Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “Stay Cyclically Overweight Global Equities, But Hedge Near-Term Downside Risks From An Escalation Of A Trade War,” dated May 10, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5       Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Trader's Paradise,” dated January 28, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 6       Please see Carl E. Walsh, “October 6, 1979,” FRSBF Economic Letter, 2004:35, (December 3, 2004). 7       Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 1), ” dated August 10, 2018, and “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 2),” dated August 24, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8       We use a synthetic TIPS series for data prior to 1997. For details on the methodology, please see: Kothari, S.P. and Shanken, Jay A., “Asset Allocation with Inflation-Protected Bonds,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 54-70, January/February 2004. 9       Excess returns are defined as asset return relative to a 3-month Treasury bill. 10       Sector classification does not take into account GICS changes prior to December 2018.  11       Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report "REITS Vs Direct: How To Get Exposure To Real Estate," dated September 15, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 12       It is important to note that the synthetic TIPS series does not completely match actual TIPS series for the periods where they overlap. Specifically, volatility is significantly higher in the synthetic series. Thus, results should be taken as approximations. 13       We decompose the returns into the same 4 quartiles to answer this question. However, due to lower data availability, we start our sample in 1978 instead of 1973. Moreover, our sample for energy is smaller beginning in 1983. This mainly reduces the amount of data available at the upper quartile. EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Highlights A financial market riot point remains likely over the coming few months to force policymakers, including those in China, to address the economic weakness that a full-tariff scenario will entail. The near-term outlook is bearish for China-related assets, but investors should stay cyclically bullish in anticipation of a strong reflationary response. It is not clear whether further monetary easing will occur over the coming year, given that monetary conditions have already eased substantially. But an RRR cut coupled with a benchmark lending rate cut is now a real possibility, and would signal that the monetary policy dial has been turned to “maximum stimulus”. Monthly credit growth needs to be approximately 2.8-3 trillion RMB per month in May and June in order to be consistent with a 2015/2016-magnitude policy response. May’s number may fall short of this, but that would set up June as a make-it or break-it month for credit creation. Chinese credit growth surged in 2012, but economic activity did not significantly accelerate. A repeat of this scenario is a risk to our cyclically bullish stance, but three reasons suggest it is not likely to occur. Investors should stay long USD-CNH over the cyclical horizon despite warnings from Chinese policymakers not to short the RMB. Feature Tensions between China and the U.S. have worsened materially over the past two weeks, in line with our view that an actual trade agreement this year (not just continued negotiations) is much less likely. The Huawei blacklist, stalled negotiations, a sharp escalation in preparatory nationalist rhetoric in China, and President Xi Jinping’s declaration in a Jiangxi province speech that the country is embarking on a new “Long March”1 significantly diminishes the possibility of a deal that addresses the U.S.’ structural concerns. Chart 1A Market Riot Point Is Coming This implies that any agreement would require President Trump to capitulate and accept a temporary deal relating simply to the balance of trade between the two countries. It is possible that this occurs over the coming 6-12 months (in time for Trump to attempt a declaration of victory before the 2020 election), but it is not likely to occur before real economic (and thus financial market) pain arrives. This supports our view that a major financial market riot point is likely over the coming few months to force policymakers, including those in China, to address the economic weakness that a full-tariff scenario will entail (Chart 1). Given this, we would not recommend a long position in Chinese stocks, either in absolute terms or relative to the global benchmark, for investors with a time horizon of less than 3 months. However, over a strictly cyclical (i.e. 6-12 month) time horizon, we would recommend staying long/overweight Chinese stocks (in hedged currency terms) on the basis that policymakers will ultimately respond as needed, lest they face an unstable deceleration in economic activity that may become difficult to stop. In this week’s report we address the following three questions facing China-exposed investors over the coming year, before concluding with a brief note about the RMB: Can the PBOC provide more of a reflationary impulse if needed, and if so, how? How can investors tell whether policymakers are stimulating as required from the monthly credit data? What are the odds that China will stimulate aggressively and the economy does not meaningfully reaccelerate? How Can The PBOC Ease Further? We argued in our May 15 Weekly Report that a 2015/2016-magnitude policy response will again be required in order for policymakers to be confident that the upcoming trade shock will be overcome.2 In our view, this response, instead of aggressive and broad-based bank lending, will likely have to come in the form of quasi-fiscal spending, e.g. a significant increase in infrastructure-oriented local government bond issuance (which we include as “credit” in our adjusted total social financing calculation). However, we have received several questions from clients asking about the outlook for monetary policy in a full-tariff scenario, particularly the question of what the PBOC can do to provide even more of a reflationary response. Most investors would simply assume that the PBOC would cut interest rates even further, and this is certainly a possible outcome over the coming year. But even if the PBOC were to cut interest rates, it is not always clear to investors what rate should or will be cut. Confusion surrounding China’s monetary policy landscape has been high ever since the PBOC established an interest rate corridor system in 2015, and a review of what has occurred over the past 2½ years is warranted in order to better understand the implications of future policy decisions. A 2015/2016-magnitude policy response will again be required in order for policymakers to be confident that the upcoming trade shock will be overcome. Chart 2The Simple (But Incomplete) View Of China's New Monetary Regime Chart 2 outlines how China’s new monetary regime is officially described by the PBOC. The benchmark lending rate, China’s “old” policy rate that established a base regulated rate for banks to price their loans, was replaced in 2015 with a corridor system. The target rate in this system is the 7-day interbank repo rate, which can be seen in Chart 2 is often at the low end of the corridor. However, we explained in a February 2018 Special Report why Chart 2 is only half of the story.3Charts 3 - 5 show the other half: Chart 3 shows that while the 7-day repo rate rose in late-2016 and 2017, the rise was fairly small (on the order of 60 basis points). By contrast, the 3-month repo rate surged, which appears to have been caused by macro-prudential policy changes aimed at severely curtailing the issuance of wealth management products by non-depository financial institutions. Chart 4 highlights that there is a strong (and leading) relationship between changes in China’s 3-month interbank repo rate and 1) changes in the percentage of loans issued above the benchmark rate and 2) changes in the gap between the weighted-average interest rate and the benchmark rate. Chart 5 shows that China’s weighted average interest rate can be successfully modelled by a regression on the benchmark lending rate and the 3-month interbank repo rate. Chart 3The 3-Month Repo Rate Has Been More Important Than The 7-Day Chart 4A Strong Link Between 3-Month Repo Rates And Economy-Wide Rates       The relationships shown in Charts 3 - 5 are weaker if the 3-month repo rate is replaced with the 7-day rate, highlighting that while the latter is the new de jure policy rate in China, the former has been the de facto policy and market-driven lending rate among banks and non-financial institutions over the past 2½ years. Chart 5The Benchmark Lending And 3-Month Repo Rates Explain Effective Lending Rates Our framework for examining China’s monetary policy environment leads us to conclude that there are three things the PBOC can do to meaningfully ease further, were they to decide to do so: The most impactful action that the PBOC could take is to cut the benchmark lending rate. While banks in China are no longer required to price loans in reference to the benchmark rate, in practice many still do. Roughly 2/3rds of loans in China have been priced at an interest rate above the benchmark over the past year, and Chart 5 noted that the weighted average interest rate is a direct function of the benchmark rate. As such, a cut to the benchmark rate is likely to feed directly into lower lending rates. Chart 3 showed that the substantial spread between the 3-month and 7-day repo rates that prevailed from late-2016 to mid-2018 has all but disappeared, implying that the PBOC cannot lower interest rates much further by dialing back on macro-prudential regulation. Instead, if it wants interbank rates to fall meaningfully, lowering the corridor around the 7-day rate by cutting the floor (the PBOC’s 7-day reverse repo rate) will likely be required. This would be carried out with further reductions to the reserve requirement ratio (RRR). Third, while Chart 5 showed that our model for the weighted average lending rate has done a very good job over the past few years, it is clear that a gap has opened up between the actual rate and that predicted by the model. The most likely explanation of this gap is that it is due to a risk premium applied by banks, possibly in response to the re-orientation of riskier funding demands that had previously been fulfilled by the shadow banking sector to on-balance sheet loans from depository institutions. It is not clear what policy tools are at the PBOC’s disposable to reduce the gap, but doing so has the potential to lower average interest rates by a non-trivial amount. The relative easiness of monetary conditions is the key difference between today and 2012. It is not clear yet which option the PBOC will pursue over the coming year or whether further monetary easing will occur, but an RRR cut coupled with a benchmark lending rate cut is now a real possibility. If it happens, it would be a clear signal for investors that the monetary policy dial has been turned to “maximum stimulus”. Inferring Reluctance Or Capitulation From Monthly Credit Growth The second issue that investors will be wrestling with over the coming few months relates to the question of whether the month-to-month pace of credit growth is consistent with the magnitude of the reflationary response that we believe will be required. To the extent that significantly more monetary easing occurs over the coming year, it is likely to have happened because policymakers were overly reluctant to green-light a renewed and substantial re-acceleration in credit growth and were then forced to fight a destabilizing slowdown in the economy. Chart 6A Strong Credit Response Will Be Required In Response To A Full Tariff Scenario We have used the metric of new credit to GDP as the primary method to judge the relative size of previous credit booms, and have argued that a return to 30% on this measure will likely be required in response to a full 25% tariff scenario (Chart 6). Unfortunately, China’s unique seasonality patterns and the lack of official seasonally adjusted data make it difficult for investors to judge whether incoming credit data is consistent with the required policy response. Previously, we have shown seasonally adjusted measures of credit using a simple application of X12 ARIMA, the statistical seasonal adjustment program used by the U.S. Census Bureau. But Charts 7 and 8 present a different approach. The charts show the average cumulative amount of adjusted total social financing as the calendar year progresses, along with a ±0.5 standard deviation band, based on the 2010 to 2018 period. The thick black line in both charts shows the progress in new credit creation this year, assuming an 8% annual nominal GDP growth rate for the remainder of the year. Chart 7 shows the cumulative progress in credit assuming a 27% new credit to GDP ratio for the year (corresponding to a half-strength credit cycle relative to past episodes), whereas Chart 8 assumes 30%. In our view, these charts are revelatory. First, Chart 7 provides evidence that policymakers have been reluctant to allow credit growth to surge. The chart shows that credit growth ran well above a half-strength credit cycle pace in the first quarter of the year; following this, through either administrative controls or jawboning, policymakers lowered the pace of credit growth in April such that it moved back within the range. By contrast, Chart 8 highlights that the pace of Q1 credit growth was exactly right in a 30% new credit to GDP scenario, and that April fell short. In order to be back within the range by June, Chart 8 suggests that monthly credit growth needs to be on the order of 2.8-3 trillion RMB per month in May and June, just a slightly slower pace than what investors observed in March. It is quite possible that May’s credit number will fall short of 2.8-3 trillion RMB, given that the increase in the second round tariffs only occurred on May 10 and that Chinese policymakers have so far seemed reluctant to pull the trigger. But this also heightens the risk of a serious near-term selloff in the domestic equity market, and would set up June as a make-it or break-it month for credit creation. Stimulus Without A Recovery? Revisiting The 2012 Scenario Chart 9The 2012 Scenario: Strong Credit, But A Modest Improvement In Activity A final question facing investors this year is whether it is possible that the Chinese economy fails to respond to strong efforts by policymakers to stimulate the economy. Chart 9 shows that a similar situation occurred in 2012; while the surge in new credit to GDP did stabilize economic activity and caused a modest uptrend, the economic improvement was much smaller than what the relationship shown in the chart would imply. In our view, there are three reasons to believe that a 2012 scenario will not repeat itself: First, Chart 10 shows that the Q1 rebound in new credit to GDP appears to have halted the decline in investment-relevant Chinese economic activity. There is no basis to suggest that an uptrend in activity has begun, but the fact that the economy has even started to respond to the pickup in credit growth is a positive sign. Second, Chart 11 highlights one important difference between 2012 and today. The chart shows that our leading indicator for China’s economy did not rise as much as new credit to GDP, and that this occurred because monetary conditions remained relatively tight from the beginning of 2012 all the way through to early-2015. This relative tightness in monetary conditions occurred because of fairly elevated interest rates, and due to a persistent rise in the real effective exchange rate. However, the collapse in the weighted average lending rate following the 2015/2016 economic slowdown has eased monetary conditions in a lasting way, suggesting that a similar rise in new credit to GDP should have a strongly positive effect on Chinese economic growth. This also underscores our earlier point: monetary policy has already largely returned to 2015/2016 levels, meaning that it is fiscal/administrative action to boost credit growth that is missing. Third, Chart 12 highlights that the pace of inventory accumulation represents another key difference between the current economic environment and that of 2012. The chart shows that the change in China’s level of industrial inventories relative to exports (both measured in value terms) rose sharply in 2011 and 1H 2012, only to slow significantly over the following year (which may have weighed on the rebound in activity in 2012 and 2013). In contrast, the chart shows that inventories have recently been contracting at their fastest pace relative to exports since 2011, implying that the drag on production from potential destocking may be minimal. Chart 10A (Very) Tentative Sign Of Stabilization Chart 11Monetary Conditions Are Considerably Easier Today There are, however, two caveats to the above analysis. First, on the inventory front, Chart 12 shows that the level of industrial inventories to exports is fractionally higher than it was in 2012, even though it has declined significantly from its 2017 high. The level of inventories has been rising relative to exports for some time, and thus the “equilibrium” level is not clear. But to the extent that a prolonged trade war with the U.S. requires meaningfully lower inventory levels in China, then destocking may become more of a drag than we expect. Second, Chart 11 shows that while monetary conditions are much easier today than they were in 2012, money growth is much weaker. A weaker-than-expected recovery in Chinese economic activity is much more likely if money growth remains weak, although we cannot reasonably envision an outcome where credit growth surges and growth in the money supply does not. A Brief Note On The RMB We noted in our May 15 Weekly Report4 that a significant rise in new credit to GDP and a meaningful decline in the currency would be required to stabilize China’s economy if the U.S. proceeds with 25% tariffs on all imports from China. Consequently, we recommended that investors hedge the inherent RMB exposure from a long US$ cyclical position in Chinese stocks by opening a long USD-CNH trade, with the expectation that a break above 7 in the coming weeks was likely (Chart 13). Chart 12Inventories Have Been Meaningfully Reduced   Chart 13In A Full Tariff Scenario, A Defense Of 7 Is Only A Near-Term Event Recently, Xiao Yuanqi, the spokesman for the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, was quoted as saying that “those who speculate and short the yuan will [surely] suffer heavy loss[es]”,5 which many investors took to mean that China will defend USD-CNY = 7 at all costs. In our view this may be true in the short-term, but is unlikely to occur over a 6-12 month time horizon in a full 25% tariff scenario. Policymakers have become much more attuned to sharp declines in the currency after the major episode of capital flight that occurred in 2015 and 2016, and are keen to ensure that any movements in the exchange rate are orderly. However, complete currency stability in the face of a major shock to the export sector means that the required rise in the “macro leverage ratio” to stabilize the economy will be even higher, highlighting that an orderly depreciation in the currency is the lesser of two evils. As such, we interpret these recent comments from policymakers as an attempt to prevent a breach in USD-CNY = 7 over the short-term, and an attempt to control the pace of decline over the longer term in a full-tariff scenario. The conclusion for investment strategy is that China-exposed investors should stay long USD-CNH over the cyclical horizon, but should limit the leverage of the position and should expect frequent short-term reversals.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “Is  Trump Ready For The New Long March?” dated May 24, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Simple Arithmetic,” dated May 15, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Seven Questions About Chinese Monetary Policy,” dated February 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Simple Arithmetic,” dated May 15, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5      Reuters News, “China’s top banking regulator says yuan bears will suffer ‘heavy losses’,” dated May 25, 2019.   Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Currency markets continue to fight a tug of war between weak incoming data but easier financial conditions. Our thesis remains that the path of least resistance for the dollar is down, but the rising specter of global market volatility suggests it could catapult to new highs before ultimately reversing. Most of our pro-cyclical trades have been put offside in this environment of rising volatility. Maintain tight stops until more evidence emerges that global growth has bottomed.  Large net short positioning in the Swiss franc and yen, together with cheap valuations, make them attractive from a contrarian standpoint. Hold on to CHF/NZD positions recommended on April 26. Feature Our thesis remains that global growth is in a volatile bottoming process. However, incoming data pretty much across the globe has been very weak, with the latest specter of a global trade war suggesting that economic softness could linger for longer than we originally anticipated.  Given the shifting market dynamics, it is important to revisit our thesis on how to be positioned in currency markets. We do so this week via the lens of the Australian dollar, one of the market’s favorite short positions. Future reports will focus on additional global growth barometers, and when to time the shift towards a more pro-cyclical stance. Positive Divergences Chart I-1Global Growth Barometers Flashing Amber On the surface, most data points appear negative for the Aussie dollar. Typical reflation indicators such as commodity prices, emerging market currencies, and industrial share prices are breaking down after a nascent upturn earlier this year. One of our favorite indicators on whether or not easing liquidity conditions will lead to higher growth are the CRB Raw Industrials index-to-gold, copper-to-gold, and oil-to-gold ratios. It is disconcerting that these indicators have moved decidedly lower together with U.S. bond yields, another global growth barometer (Chart I-1). On a similar note, currencies in emerging Asia that sit closer to the epicenter of Chinese stimulus are breaking down. This suggests that so far, policy stimulus in China has not been sufficient to lift global growth, and/or the transmission mechanism towards higher growth is not working.   Not surprisingly, the Australian dollar has been breaking down at a rapid pace, putting our long AUD/USD position offside. We will respect our stop-loss at 0.68 if breached, but a few indicators suggest the bearish view on the Australian dollar is very late: Chart I-2Australian Stocks Hitting New Highs Election Results: The recent general election outcome was a big surprise to the market, and has eased risks to both the country’s banks and housing market. The center-left Labour party, which moved further to the left in this electoral cycle, was defeated by a substantial margin. This has a few important implications. First, “negative gearing” – the practice of using investment properties that are generating losses to offset one’s income tax bill – will remain in place. This was a big overhang on the housing market, which likely exacerbated the downturn in Aussie house prices. Second, the capital gains tax exemption from selling properties will probably not be reduced from 50% to 25%, as previously pledged. Finally, the Liberal-National coalition government will maintain the policy of reimbursing investors for corporate taxes paid by the underlying company. This keeps the incentive for retirees to own high dividend-yielding equities such as those of Australian banks. Australian equities hit a new cyclical high following the election results. This suggests the return on capital for Aussie companies may have inched higher following the more pro-market leadership shift (Chart I-2). At low levels of interest rates, fiscal policy is much more potent than monetary policy. Interest Rates: The latest Reserve Bank Of Australia (RBA) minutes suggest that rate cuts are back on the agenda. But the question is, with the markets pricing in two rate cuts by the end of this year, does it still pay to be short the Aussie dollar on widening interest rate differentials? More importantly, fiscal policy is set to become decisively loose this year. The new government is slated to introduce income tax cuts as early as July. This is skewed towards lower-income households, meaning the fiscal multiplier may be larger than what the Australian economy is normally accustomed to. Meanwhile, infrastructure spending will remain high, which will be very stimulative for growth in the short term. At low levels of interest rates, fiscal policy is much more potent than monetary policy, and the RBA will be loath to cut rates more than is currently expected by the market, at a time when consumer indebtedness remains quite high, and policy rates are already close to rock-bottom levels. The key for the RBA will be the job market, which at the moment remains a pillar of support for the Aussie economy. Job growth is accelerating, and labor force participation is hitting fresh  highs (Chart I-3). So long as these trends continue, the RBA can afford to remain on the sidelines for a while longer. Meanwhile, while Aussie rates continue to drift downward, it has not been particularly profitable to buy U.S. Treasurys on a hedged basis (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Australia Employment Remains Robust Chart I-4It is Expensive To Short The Aussie Housing Market: For more than two decades, the Australian dollar has tended to be mostly driven by external conditions, especially the commodity cycle. But for the first time in several years, domestic factors have joined in to exert powerful downward pressure on the currency. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) has been on a mission to surgically deflate the overvalued housing market, while engineering a soft landing in the economy. Initially, their macro-prudential measures worked like a charm, as owner-occupied housing activity remained resilient relative to “investment-style” housing. What has become apparent now is that the soft landing intended by the authorities has rapidly morphed into a housing crash (Chart I-5). This is negative for consumption, both via the wealth effect and as well as for the outlook for residential construction activity. Chart I-5Could Australian Housing Bottom Soon? The good news is that policy is supposed to become supportive for Aussie homebuyers at the margin, with the government slated to introduce new initiatives to help first-time homebuyers. Should labor market improvements continue, it will also help household income levels. Over the past few decades, house prices in Australia have generally staged V-shaped recoveries when at this level of contraction. Betting on at least some stabilization going forward seems reasonable. Commodity Prices: One bright spot for the Aussie dollar has been rising terms of trade. Admittedly, most measures of Chinese (and global) growth remain weak. However, there have been notable improvements in recent months that suggest economic velocity may be picking up: Production of electricity and steel, all inputs into the overall manufacturing value chain, are inflecting higher. Intuitively, these tend to lead overall industrial production. If these advance any further, they will begin to exceed GDP growth, indicating a renewed mini-cycle (Chart I-6). Production of electricity and steel, all inputs into the overall manufacturing value chain, are inflecting higher. In recent months, both steel and iron ore prices have been soaring. Many commentators have attributed these increases to supply bottlenecks and/or seasonal demand. However, it is evident from both the manufacturing data and the trend in prices that demand is also playing a role. Meanwhile, Beijing’s clear environmental push has lifted the share of liquefied natural gas in Australia’s export mix (Chart I-7). Given that the reduction – if not the outright elimination – of pollution is a long-term strategic goal in China, this will be a multi-year tailwind. As the market becomes more liberalized and long-term contracts are revised to reflect higher spot prices, the Aussie dollar will get a boost. Chart I-6Some Green Shoots From China Chart I-7Australian LNG Will Buffet Terms Of Trade Valuation: In terms of currency performance, a lot of the bad news already appears priced in to the Australian dollar, which is down 15% from its 2018 peak, and 38% from its 2011 peak. Meanwhile, Australian dollar short positions appeared to have already hit a nadir. This suggests outright short AUD bets are at risk from either upside surprises in global growth or simply the forces of mean reversion (Chart I-8). One of our favorite metrics for the Australian dollar’s fair value is its real effective exchange rate relative to its terms of trade. On this basis, the Aussie dollar is cheap by about 10% (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Short AUD: ##br##A Consensus Trade Chart I-9AUD Is Attractive From A Terms Of Trade Perspective   China Credit Cycle: We have discussed at length how a revival in the Chinese credit cycle will help global and Australian growth. On the real estate front, residential property sales remain soft, but evidence from tier-1 and even tier-2 cities is signaling that this may be behind us, given robust sales. Over the longer term, the ebb and flow of property sales have usually been in sync across city tiers. A revival in the property market will support construction activity and investment. Chart I-10How Long Will The Weakness In China Last? House prices have been rising to the tune of 10%-15% year-on-year, and may be sniffing an eventual pick-up in property volumes. Finally, Chinese retail sales including those of durable goods remain very weak. Car sales are deflating at the fastest pace in over two decades. But the latest VAT cut by the government is being passed through to consumers, with an increasing number of car manufacturers cutting retail prices. This should help retail sales (Chart I-10). Other Global Growth Barometers Investors looking for more clarity on the global growth picture from the April and May data prints remain in a quandary. And the preliminary European PMI numbers this morning offered no glimmers of hope. That said, the most volatile components of euro area growth tend to be investment and net exports. Should they both pick up on the back of stronger external demand, GDP could easily gravitate towards 1.5%-2%, pinning it well above potential. The German PMI is currently among the weakest in the euro zone. But forward-looking indicators suggest we may be on the cusp of a V-shaped bottom over the next month or so (Chart I-11). Chart I-11German Manufacturing Might Be At The Cusp Of A V-Shaped Recovery The broad message is that global growth is in the midst of volatile bottoming process. However, before evidence of this fully unfolds, markets are likely to be swayed by the ebbs and flows of higher-frequency data. We recommend maintaining a pro-cyclical bias at the margin, but having tight stop losses as well as positions in both the Swiss franc and yen as insurance. Housekeeping Our buy-limit order on the British pound was triggered at 1.30 on March 29th. As we argued at the time, the pound was sitting exactly where it was after the 2016 referendum results, but the odds of a hard Brexit had significantly fallen. Since then, policy-induced volatility has led to a significant depreciation in the pound, with our position at risk of being stopped out at our 1.25 stop-loss this week. Given the rising specter of political volatility, we will respect our stop-loss if breached at 1.25. On the domestic front, economic surprises in the U.K. relative to both the U.S. and euro area continue to soar. The reality is that the pound and U.K. gilt yields should be much higher – solely on the basis of hard incoming data. Employment growth has been holding up very well, wages are inflecting higher, and the average U.K. consumer appears in decent shape (Chart I-12). The CPI data this week confirm that the domestic environment is hardly deflationary. That said, given the rising specter of political volatility, we will respect our stop-loss if breached at 1.25. Chart I-12Hold GBP/USD, But Stand Aside At 1.25   Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. have been soft: The Michigan consumer sentiment index jumped to 102.4 in May. However, the Chicago Fed national activity index fell to -0.45 in April. The Redbook index increased by 5.4% year-on-year in May. Existing home sales contracted by 0.4% month-on-month to 5.2 million in April. Moreover, new home sales fell by 6.9% month-on-month in April. The Markit composite index fell to 50.9 in April. The manufacturing and services PMI fell to 50.6 and 50.9 respectively. Importantly, this a just a nudge above the 50 boom/bust level. DXY index initially increased by 0.3%, then plunged on the weak PMI data, returning flat this week. The FOMC minutes released on Wednesday reiterated that the recent drop in core inflation is mostly transitory, and that no strong evidence exists for a rate change in either direction. With the forward market already pricing an 82% probability of a rate cut this year, any hawkish shift by the Fed will be a surprise. However, this will not necessarily be bullish for the dollar, if accompanied by a global growth bottom. We remain of the view that the path of least resistance for the dollar is down. Report Links: President Trump And The Dollar - May 9, 2019 Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mixed: Headline consumer price inflation was unchanged at 1.7% year-on-year in April, while core inflation increased to 1.3%. The current account balance narrowed to a surplus of 24.7 billion euros in March. However, this was above expectations. German GDP was unchanged at 0.6% year-on-year in Q1. The euro area Markit composite PMI was flat at 51.6 compared to the last reading of 51.5. Below the surface, both the manufacturing and services PMIs fell to 47.7 and 52.5, respectively. German composite PMI was held up at 52.4 by the services component that came in at 55. However, the manufacturing component fell to 44.3. German IFO current assessment dropped to 100.6 in May, and the business climate dropped to 97.9. In France, the Markit composite PMI came in at 51.3. The manufacturing and services PMIs both increased, to 50.6 and 51.7 respectively. This was the one bright spot in euro area data. EUR/USD has been flat this week, with recent data being on the softer side. The PMI data remain subdued, in particular. Meanwhile, political uncertainties continue to weigh on investors’ sentiment. Report Links: Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Reading The Tea Leaves From China - April 12, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mixed: Q1 annualized GDP grew by 2.1% quarter-on-quarter, well above estimates. Industrial production fell by 4.3% year-on-year in March, but was higher than the previous reading of -4.6% in February. Capacity utilization fell by 0.4% month-on-month in March. Exports contracted by 2.4% year-on-year in April, while imports increased by 6.4% year-on-year. The total trade balance thus narrowed from ¥528 billion to ¥64 billion. Notably, the exports to China fell by 6.3%, while exports to the U.S. increased by 9.6%. Machinery orders fell by 0.7% year-on-year in March. Nikkei manufacturing PMI fell below 50, coming in at 49.6 in May. USD/JPY fell by 0.5% this week. Yutaka Harada, a dovish member of the BoJ, warned during a news conference that by hiking the consumption tax rate at this critical juncture, Japan could risk sliding into a recession. With core CPI far from its 2% target, more monetary easing is probably exactly what the doctor ordered. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Tug OF War, With Gold As Umpire - March 29, 2019 A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. have been firm: The Rightmove house price index increased by 0.1% year-on-year in May. The orders component of the CBI industrial trends survey decreased to -10 in May. Retail sales increased by 3% year-on-year in April. Producer prices and input prices increased by 2.1% and 3.8%, year-on-year respectively in April. Headline inflation and core inflation increased by 2.1% and 1.8% year-on-year in April, both below expectations. GBP/USD decreased by 0.6% this week. Teresa May offered MPs a vote on a second referendum on Brexit, which considers a tighter customs union with the EU. The ongoing Brexit chaos has increased volatility in the pound. Report Links: Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mostly negative: ANZ Roy Morgan weekly consumer confidence index increased to 117.2 this week. Westpac leading index fell by 0.1% month-on-month in April. Completed construction work fell by 1.9% in Q1. AUD/USD fell by 0.3% this week. During this week’s federal election, the coalition government led by Prime Minister Scott Morrison won. Besides the political development, the RBA governor Philip Lowe gave a speech on Monday, highlighting external shocks to Australian economy. He also expressed the positive outlook for Australian economy in the second half of 2019 and 2020, supported by the ongoing capex in infrastructure and resources sectors, together with strong population growth. More importantly, he mentioned that the RBA would consider the case for lower interest rates, which is a dovish shift from previous speeches. We are long AUD/USD with a tight stop at 0.68. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been mixed: Credit card spending growth missed expectations, coming in at 4.5% year-on-year in April. Retail sales increased by 0.7% quarter-on-quarter in Q1. Retail sales excluding autos increased by 0.7% quarter-on-quarter in Q1. NZD/USD fell by 0.3% this week. NZD/USD is currently trading at a 7-month low around 0.65. A bleak external picture is worrisome for the kiwi. We continue to favor the AUD/NZD cross, from a strategic standpoint. Report Links: Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been solid: Retail sales increased by 1.1% month-on-month in March. In particular, retail sales excluding autos increased by 1.7% month-on-month, well above estimates.  USD/CAD appreciated by 0.3% this week. The better-than-expected retail sales data in March sparked a small rally in the loonie. However, the rally proved to be short-lived following softer oil prices. Positive data surprises in Canada will have to be sustained for the loonie to find some measure of support. Report Links: Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in the Switzerland have been positive: Money supply (M3) growth was unchanged at 3.5% year-on-year in April. Industrial production increased by 4.3% year-on-year in Q1, albeit lower than the last reading of 5.1%.  USD/CHF fell by 0.8% this week. As we argued in last week’s research note, the increasing global market volatility has reignited interest in the Swiss franc. We continue to recommend the franc as an insurance policy amid rising geopolitical risk. Report Links: What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 There was little data out of Norway this week: The unemployment rate came in at 3.5% in March, well below consensus of 3.7% and the previous reading of 3.8%. USD/NOK fell by 0.4% this week. Rising geopolitical risks will be supportive of the oil market and put a floor under the krone. Aside from the U.S.-Iran tensions, the world faces the prospect of the loss of Venezuelan production, and significant outages in Libya, which are all bullish. Meanwhile, Norway remains one of few G10 countries that can hike interest rates in the near term. Report Links: Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been positive: Capacity utilization increased by 0.5% in Q1. Moreover, the unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in April. This was well below expectations of 6.8% and the previous month’s reading of 7.1%. USD/SEK fell by 0.3% this week. While we favor both the NOK and SEK against the U.S. dollar, near-term factors are more bullish for the krone. Our long NOK/SEK position is currently 4.38% in the money. Stick with it. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Analysis on central Europe and Pakistan is published below. Highlights There are several reasons why Chinese authorities will likely allow the yuan to depreciate 6-8% from current levels in the coming months. RMB depreciation will weigh not only on emerging Asian but also on other EM currencies via several channels. We continue to recommend shorting a basket of the following currencies versus the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. Feature Chinese authorities will likely allow the yuan to fall 6-8% vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar from current levels in the coming months. The value of the RMB holds the key to the broader trend in EM currencies. In turn, dynamics in EM exchange rates typically define the trajectory for EM asset classes: stocks, credit spreads and local currency bonds. Odds are that the RMB along with other emerging Asian currencies will continue to depreciate (Chart I-1). There are several reasons why Chinese authorities will likely allow the yuan to fall 6-8% vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar from current levels in the coming months. Chart I-1Emerging Asian Currency Index Chart I-2Deflating Export Prices Herald Currency Depreciation First, currency depreciation will help mitigate the impact of U.S. import tariffs. With global trade volumes shrinking and U.S. import prices from China deflating (Chart I-2, top panel), China will benefit from a cheaper currency. Second, RMB devaluation goes against the Trump’s administration’s preference. The U.S.-China trade talks have flopped, and both sides seem to be jockeying to better position themselves ahead of another round of discussions. From a negotiation strategy perspective, it makes sense for China to devalue the yuan before a new round of negotiations starts again. Third, China needs lower interest rates to reduce the strain on numerous debtors. However, narrowing interest rate differential with the U.S. has often coincided with periods of RMB depreciation over the past nine years (Chart I-3). Chart I-3CNY/USD And Interest Rate Differential One reason why policymakers in China were previously reluctant to explore RMB/USD depreciation beyond the 7 mark was due to the risk of rampant capital exodus and a potential spike in financial market volatility. In other words, authorities were mindful that even mild and controlled depreciation could spiral out of control. However, with Chinese nationalistic rhetoric on the rise and the nation rallying around the flag, authorities now have more room to maneuver. They will not have a problem restricting capital outflows by residents, and there will be little general public dissatisfaction with a devaluation. Finally, at around $3 trillion, the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves are equivalent to only 14% of all yuan deposits, and 11% of broad money (M2) supply. In turn, the overhang of local currency money supply will exert structural downward pressure on the renminbi’s exchange rate in the coming years. This may be a convenient time to release some proverbial air out of the balloon – namely, the lingering money bubble in China – by devaluing the yuan. Bottom Line: The path of least resistance for the RMB is down. EM Currencies Are In Danger In recent months, we have been highlighting that the Korean won has been at a critical technical juncture and has broken down (Chart I-4, top panel). The Taiwanese and Singaporean dollars seem to be the next shoes to drop (Chart I-4, middle and bottom panels). Chart I-4 Chart I-5No Recovery In Asian Exports So Far U.S. import prices from various Asian countries are deflating, as shown in the bottom panel of Chart 2 on page 2. This typically warrants currency depreciation to mitigate the impact of export price deflation on national producers. Furthermore, emerging Asian exports are still shrinking, as evidenced by the latest trade numbers. Korea’s total exports for the first 20 days of May and Taiwan’s exports of electronics parts as of April are still contracting at a rapid pace (Chart I-5). The latter leads cyclical turning points in global trade by a couple of months. Finally, the RMB is the anchor currency in emerging Asia, and its depreciation will filter through the exchange rates of other regional, export-dependent economies. Regarding other EM currencies, they are also at risk of Chinese yuan depreciation. Apart from manufacturing sector competitiveness (discussed above), China’s exchange rate affects other economies in two distinct ways: Less Chinese imports: An RMB devaluation reduces the amount of China’s U.S. dollar inflows/payments to its trade partners (Chart I-6). Many EM and some DM currencies will be negatively affected since China is a major source of demand for these economies. Less capital outflows from China: RMB depreciation will likely be accompanied with heightened controls over capital outflows from China. In fact, various proxies for capital flight out of the mainland suggest the authorities have already substantially clamped down on outflows (Chart I-7). Economies that have profited from capital flight from China over the years are already feeling pain. For example, relapsing Australian property prices can be attributed to reduced capital flows from China. Chart I-6Chinese Imports In RMB And USD Chart I-7China: Reduced Capital Flight Likewise, there will be a period of painful adjustment in many emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere that have profited from Chinese capital flows – both via official and non-official channels. Bottom Line: RMB depreciation will affect various currencies via diverse channels: (1) deteriorating export competitiveness for manufacturing-based economies; (2) diminished mainland imports from China’s trade partners; and (3) reduced capital flows from China to economies that have typically relied on Chinese capital flows. The U.S. Dollar: A Review Of The Indicators We believe that the cyclical and structural backdrops remain favorable for the dollar, and that it will likely overshoot before a major top sets in. The U.S. dollar bull market is extended, but that does not mean it is over. Odds are that the greenback will overshoot before making a major top. In our last weekly report, we revisited currency valuations and found the dollar to be only moderately (one standard deviation) expensive, according to the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs. The latter is our favored currency valuation metric. The greenback has been in a major structural bull market since 2011. Secular bull/bear markets do not typically end before valuations reach 1.5-2 standard deviations. We believe that the cyclical and structural backdrops remain favorable for the dollar, and that it will likely overshoot before a major top sets in. Chart I-8U.S. Equity And Economic Outperformance Warrants Dollar Appreciation U.S. stocks are outperforming the rest of the world in local currency terms, not only based on market-cap equity benchmarks but also when measured using equal-weighted equity indexes (Chart I-8). This signals that return on capital is higher in the U.S. relative to the rest of the world. The latter has historically been positively related with the primary trend in the trade-weighted dollar (Chart I-8). The U.S. dollar currently offers an attractive yield relative to many of its peers. Chart I-9 illustrates the interest rate (3-month swap rate) differentials between the dollar and various EM and DM currencies. For each individual exchange rate, the bar denotes the U.S. interest rate spread over other markets, and the dot is the mean of this spread over the past 20 years. Not only is the current interest rate differential in favor of the greenback in the case of many currencies, but the spread is well above its 20-year mean for virtually all of the currencies included in Chart I-9. The sole exception is the Mexican peso – the latter’s current interest rate differential versus the U.S. is wider than its 20-year mean. In fact, the peso is among our most preferable EM currencies. The U.S. dollar currently offers an attractive yield relative to many of its peers. Bottom Line: Odds are in favor of a U.S. dollar overshoot, especially versus cyclical currencies such as EM and commodities-based ones. We continue to recommend shorting a basket of the following currencies versus the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. We are also structurally short the RMB versus the dollar. For investors who are looking for currencies with the least downside versus the U.S. dollar, our picks are MXN, RUB, THB, TWD, SGD and central European currencies. EM Credit Markets And Domestic Bonds: It’s All About Exchange Rates From a macro perspective, EM dollar-denominated and local currency bonds are primarily driven by exchange rates. EM sovereign spreads are very sensitive to both EM exchange rates and industrial metals prices (Chart I-10). The latter two are primarily driven by global trade cycles in general and China’s growth in particular. EM corporate spreads have been less sensitive to EM exchange rates. Yet they are unlikely to defy a major down-leg in EM currencies. The basis is as follows: when currencies depreciate, foreign-currency debt becomes more expensive to service warranting a period of wider credit spreads. Exchange rate fluctuations account for the bulk of domestic bonds’ total returns for foreign investors. We discussed this topic in our report titled Asset Allocation For EM Assets. Chart 11 shows the total return indexes in dollars and euros for the EM GBI local currency government bond index. Euro-based investors have fared much better than dollar-based ones. The euro’s depreciation versus the dollar explains this gap. However, from a technical point of view, total return in euros is facing a major resistance level (Chart I-11, bottom panel). European investors should take note. Chart I-10EM Sovereign Spreads Correlate With EM Currencies And Commodities Chart I-11Total Returns on EM Local Bonds In USD And Euros   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Continue Favoring Central Europe Within EM Equities: An overweight position in Central European (CE) equities within an EM equity portfolio is still warranted due to the following reasons: First, CE economies are the least exposed to a Chinese and global trade slowdown - the main causes of the EM selloff. Even though these economies are leveraged to German and euro area manufacturing - both of which are currently weak - they have little direct exposure to China and commodities. Second, currency trends are critical for the relative performance of equities. We expect EM currencies will depreciate versus the euro and against CE currencies. This argues in favor of CE stocks within an EM portfolio. Third, CE domestic demand remains strong and private credit growth robust (Chart II-1). Additionally, the authorities are maintaining a loose fiscal policy stance. As to European equity portfolios, we recommend underweighting CE bourses versus the core European markets. Chart II-2 illustrates that when EM equities underperform DM ones, CE share prices lag behind euro area stocks. Chart II-1Private Credit Growth Is Robust Chart II-2CE Underperforms Core Europe When EM Underperforms DM Currencies and Fixed-Income Markets: CE growth outperformance relative to EM suggests that CE exchange rates will outperform the majority of EM currencies. Critically, odds are that the euro has made a major bottom versus most EM currencies. This will facilitate CE exchange rate appreciation versus many other EM currencies. The latter warrants overweighting CE fixed-income markets against respective EM benchmarks. Currency Trades: Today we recommend closing our long CZK / short euro position. This trade has generated a 4.4% gain since September 28, 2016 with extremely low volatility. The basis for closing this position is there are signs that Czech growth and labor market tightness are peaking, warranting an end to rate hikes. Specifically, both economic activity and wage growth are slowing. This will lead the central bank to halt its rate hikes. Instead, we are opening a new trade: Go long CZK versus an equal-weighted basket of PLN and HUF. For the first time, Czech short rates have risen above those in Poland and Hungary (Chart II-3). This will be a major driver for Czech koruna appreciation against the other two currencies. The PLN and HUF will underperform the CZK because their monetary and fiscal policies are much easier than is currently warranted. Chart II-3Czech Interest Rate Differentials Versus Hungary And Poland Are Positive Chart II-4Trade Balances Favor CZK vs HUF & PLN The Hungarian central bank will launch its corporate QE program in July 2019 with a total of HUF 300 billion in corporate bond purchases. This will likely weigh on the HUF as the central bank monetizes some of the country’s outstanding corporate debt. Additionally, the Polish government has announced large fiscal stimulus ahead of this year’s elections. The fiscal deficit is projected to widen from 1% currently to 2% of GDP by 2020. Finally, trade balances in Poland and Hungary are deteriorating while the Czech Republic is running a large trade surplus (Chart II-4). Bottom Line: Continue overweighting CE within both EM equity and local currency bond portfolios. We are taking profits on our long CZK / short the euro trade and initiating a new position: Long CZK / short an equal-weighted basket of HUF and PLN.   Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Pakistan: No Pain, No Gain Pakistan’s economy and stock market are currently going through painful but necessary adjustments. The country has been suffering from a severe balance-of-payment crisis. Its exchange rate has already depreciated by 30% versus the U.S. dollar since December 2017. Its stock market in U.S. dollar terms has plunged 55% from its May 2017 peak. A bottom in the stock market is likely to occur when the currency stabilizes. Odds are that the Pakistani rupee is in its late phase of adjustment (Chart III-1). First, a US$ 6 billion worth IMF bailout fund is on its way. The country reached a staff-level agreement with the IMF on May 12. The IMF will release the funds in phases over a period of 39 months. Meanwhile, Pakistan will likely also receive US$ 2-3 billion from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the next three years. Altogether, multilateral financing will amount to about US$3 billion per year over the next three years. The country will also likely continue its bi-lateral borrowings from China, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Last year, about US$10 billion of external borrowing and a nearly US$7 billion reduction in the central bank’s foreign reserves helped fund the US$18 billion current account deficit. Over the next 12 months, we expect the financing needs to be considerably smaller due to shrinking twin deficits (Chart III-2). Chart III-1Pakistan's Rupee: Close To A Bottom? Chart III-2Twin Deficits Are Likely To Shrink Both trade and current account balances have started showing improvement in U.S. dollar terms due to a steep contraction in imports. Going forward, we expect export growth to turn positive on the back of currency devaluation but import contraction will deepen. Lastly, the IMF agreement might allow Pakistan to issue some Eurobonds while higher local rates might attract some foreign portfolio capital. Second, Pakistan’s top leadership has cooperated with the IMF. Just earlier this month IMF economist Reza Baqir was appointed the new central bank governor. In addition, the Finance Minister and the Federal Bureau of Revenue chairman have been replaced. These new appointments increase the odds that the IMF program will be enforced in Pakistan. Indeed, after only two weeks on the job the new central bank governor raised the policy rate this Monday by 150 basis points to 12.25%. Meanwhile, significant fiscal consolidation is on the way, as the new policymakers will be committed to the IMF program. The budget for the next fiscal year (June 2019 – May 2020), which will be presented in Parliament on May 24, will likely show a considerable reduction in non-interest expenditures. Finally, the IMF is also pushing for increased central bank independence. In the last 17 months, the central bank purchased massive amounts of government securities – a de facto monetization of public debt. This has exacerbated domestic inflation and currency depreciation. So long as the country is under the IMF program, it is reasonable to expect no public debt monetization. In summary, the ongoing substantial monetary and fiscal tightening and accompanying reduction in the twin deficits, coupled with the increased availability of foreign funding are positive for the exchange rate. It is possible that Pakistan will follow the 2016-2017 Egyptian roadmap. Egypt experienced a severe balance-of-payment crisis and agreed to a similar IMF bailout program. In the case of Egypt, a 55% depreciation in its currency in late 2016 was followed by a 77% rally in share prices in U.S. dollar terms over the subsequent 18 months (Chart III-3). We are putting Pakistani stocks on our upgrade watch list. We are reluctant to upgrade it now because currency weakness might persist for a couple of months. Further, monetary and fiscal tightening will amplify the economic downturn weighing on corporate earnings. Banks’ NPL ratios and provisions will likely rise considerably. Chart III-3The 2016-2017 Egyptian Roadmap Chart III-4Pakistani Equities: A Long-Term Profile Bottom Line: We are putting Pakistani equities on an upgrade watch list. This bourse’s technicals are becoming interesting – it might bottom at its previous highs (Chart III-4). In addition, both absolute and relative valuations of Pakistani stocks appear attractive (Charts III-5 & Chart III-6). Chart III-5Equity Valuations Look Attractive Chart III-6Relative Equity Valuations Also Look Attractive We are waiting for share prices and the currency to stabilize before recommending an overweight position in Pakistani equities.   Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights In the second half of 2019, economic growth will stop accelerating… …but an underpinning of equity valuations will limit sell-off magnitudes to around 10 percent or so, rather than deeper sustained plunges. The equity market will end up in a sideways channel… …but defensives, such as healthcare, will outperform economically-sensitive sectors. Overweight Euro Stoxx 50 versus Shanghai Composite. Overweight the JPY. Bitcoin is due another technical correction. Feature The 2019 playbook for economies and markets is playing out exactly as we predicted. In our first report of this year we wrote that 2019 would be the economic and investment opposite of 2018. Opposite to 2018 because the first half of 2019 would see inflation fade, and growth accelerate. And opposite to 2018 because the second half of 2019 would see inflation stop fading, and growth stop accelerating (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekIn The First Half Of 2019, Inflation Faded, Growth Accelerated Inflation Faded, Growth Accelerated Back in early January, we wrote: “Inflation is set to disappoint as the recent near-halving of the crude oil price feeds into both headline and core consumer price indexes. With central banks now promising even greater ‘dependence on the incoming data’, this unfolding dynamic will force them to temper any hawkish intentions and rhetoric, limiting the extent of upside in bond yields.” This was a controversial view at the time. Yet within a month of writing, the Federal Reserve had stopped hiking interest rates, while the ECB and other major central banks had also pivoted to more dovish. We also wrote: “Germany should benefit from another support to growth. Last year, the auto sector – a major engine of the German economy – spluttered as it absorbed the new WLTP emissions testing standard. Through the middle of 2018 German motor vehicle exports suffered a €20 billion hit which shaved 0.6 percent from Germany’s €3.4 trillion economy (Chart I-2). Now, if auto exports stabilize, this drag will disappear. And if auto exports recover to the pre-WLTP level after this one-off and temporary shock, Germany will receive a 0.6% mirror-image boost to growth.” 1 2019 is the economic and investment opposite of 2018. We now know that the German economy accelerated to a close-to-trend 1.7% clip in the second quarter, up from a -0.8 percent rate of contraction in the third quarter of 2018 (Chart I-3). This is not just due to relief in the auto sector. Growth in other European economies has also rebounded, so the acceleration in growth has a broader foundation, and is now beyond doubt. Given the openness of the European economy, it is also inconceivable that this growth pick-up does not reflect a more generalized acceleration in global activity.2 Chart I-2The WTLP Drag On German Auto Exports Is Over Chart I-3German GDP Growth Accelerated To A 1.7 Percent Clip To repeat, the 2019 playbook for economies and financial markets is playing out exactly as expected; in the first half of the year, inflation faded while growth accelerated. The question is: what happens next? Growth Will Struggle To Accelerate Further Clients ask us an important theoretical question: what is the most important driver for the economy and financial markets; is it the change in the bond yield (or interest rate) or is it the level of the bond yield? The answer is that both the change and the level of the bond yield are important in their different ways. The German economy accelerated to a close-to-trend 1.7% clip in the second quarter. When it comes to accelerations and decelerations in credit creation, it is the change in the bond yield that is the most important. Remember, GDP is a flow statistic, which means that GDP growth is a change of flow statistic receiving contributions from the change of flow of credit. As changes in the flow of credit result from the change in the bond yield – all else being equal – it is the change in the bond yield that drives GDP growth. If all of this sounds somewhat confusing, then Chart I-4 should make the point crystal clear. Chart I-4The Change In The Bond Yield Drives GDP Growth Since last November, high-quality 10-year bond yields have plunged 70 bps, and this collapse in yields helped to provide a strong impulse to growth in the first half of 2019. To receive the same impulse again in the second half, bond yields would have to plunge another 70 bps. But with the German 10-year bund yield already at -0.1 percent, the same rate of decline seems highly unlikely, if not mathematically impossible. The upshot is that the growth impulse from declining bond yields can only fade in the second half of this year.   However, when it comes to valuations and solvencies in the financial markets, it is the level of the bond yield that is the most important. Essentially, at a tipping point, higher bond yields can suddenly and viciously undermine the valuation support of equities, triggering a plunge in the stock market and other risk-assets which threatens a disinflationary impulse on the economy. The growth impulse from declining bond yields can only fade in the second half of this year. How can we sense this tipping point? It broadly equates to when the sum of the 10-year yields on the T-bond, German bund, and JGB is at 4 percent, the ‘rule of 4’ (Chart I-5). Conversely, when the sum is below 3 percent, the ‘rule of 3’, – as it is now – the seemingly rich valuation of equities versus bonds is broadly justified (Chart I-6).3 Chart I-5When The Sum Of 10-Year Yields On The T-Bond, Bund, And JGB Equals 4 Percent, The Global 10-Year Yield Equals 2 Percent Chart I-6The Rule Of 4, And The Rule Of 3 The upshot is that in the second half of 2019, economic growth will stop accelerating, but the support to equity valuations will limit sell-off magnitudes to around 10 percent or so, rather than deeper sustained plunges (Chart I-7). In aggregate, the equity market will end up in a sideways channel, but defensives, such as healthcare, will outperform economically-sensitive sectors. Chart I-7The Low Expected Return On Equities Is Justified When Bond Yields Are Ultra-Low How Did We Do? In our first report of the year, we also made (or reiterated) five investment recommendations. Today, we will review whether they worked or not, and what to do with them now. 1. Own a 25:75 combination of European banks relative to market, plus U.S. T-bonds. Chart I-8Banks Didn’t Outperform, But Bonds Did! Did it work? Yes. Although European banks underperformed the market, this was more than offset by the huge rally in T-bonds that resulted from the Fed going on hold (Chart I-8). Hence, the position is up 1 percent this year and 3.5 percent since its inception last November with the added advantage of negligible volatility. What to do now. Take profits. 2. Overweight EM versus DM. Did it work? No. EM has underperformed DM this year, though the position is broadly flat since its inception in November. What to do now. Close this position and switch into overweight Euro Stoxx 50 versus Shanghai Composite. 3. Overweight European versus U.S. equities. Did it work? The position is flat this year, though modestly up since its inception in November. What to do now. Maintain the position for a little while longer, as an expected short-term underperformance of the tech sector should benefit the tech-lite European equity market.  4. Overweight Italian assets versus European assets. Did it work? The position is broadly flat this year for both Italian equities and bonds relative to their European benchmarks. What to do now. Close any cyclical exposure to Italy, but maintain a structural exposure to Italian BTPs either in absolute or relative terms. 5. Overweight the JPY. Chart I-9In Japan And Europe, The Expected Interest Rate Cannot Go Much Lower Did it work? Yes. The broad trade-weighted JPY has outperformed this year, and especially so the JPY/EUR cross.   What to do now. Maintain the position. When the expected interest rate is at its lower bound, then it is difficult for the central bank to hurt its currency. In technical terms, the currency possesses a highly attractive payoff profile called positive skew (Chart I-9). Of course, there are plenty of currencies whose interest rates are near the technical lower bound, but we like the JPY because it has less political risk than the others. So for the moment, remain overweight the JPY.     Fractal Trading System*  This week we note that after a 100 percent rally in a near straight line, bitcoin’s 65-day fractal dimension is at the lower bound that has reliably signaled previous technical corrections. On that basis, this week’s recommended trade is short bitcoin, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 27 percent. Also, we are very pleased to report that short tech versus healthcare quickly achieved its 6.5 percent profit target and is now closed. This leaves four open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 German auto net exports and GDP are quoted at annualized rates. The Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicle test Procedure (WLTP) is a new standard for auto emissions that took effect on September 1 2018. 2 Quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth at annualized rates. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “The Rule of 4 Becomes the Rule of 3” dated March 21, 2019 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations