Currencies
Our Foreign Exchange Strategy team’s simple observation is that while the pound is sitting exactly where it was after the 2016 referendum results, the odds of a hard Brexit have significantly fallen since then. We are opening a buy-stop on GBP/USD at 1.30…
Highlights Most currency pairs continue to trade toward the apex of tight wedge formations. History suggests major breakouts could be imminent. While the trade-weighted dollar has historically tended to be the best performing currency over a six-month period following a U.S. yield curve inversion, this window is rapidly closing. As the tug of war between data disappointments and easier financial conditions plays out, we intend to selectively add to more USD short positions. The pound is sitting exactly where it was after the 2016 U.K. referendum results, but the odds of a hard Brexit have significantly fallen since then. Place a limit buy on GBP/USD at 1.30. The RBA’s dovish shift was widely expected, while the RBNZ’s was not. Meanwhile, the Aussie dollar is sitting close to the epicenter of any Chinese stimulus. Buy AUD/NZD for a trade. Feature Markets have taken a risk-on tone this week. On the data front, there was strong improvement in the Chinese composite PMI, as well as broad increases in the services component of the PMIs across Europe and the U.S. Retail sales data out of Europe and Asia were above expectations and U.S. housing data is beginning to benefit from the fall in interest rates. Case in point, mortgage applications jumped almost 20% week-on-week, nudging the mortgage purchase index towards new highs. On the political front, China and the U.S. appear to be approaching a trade deal, and the U.K. has reached across the aisle to forge a Brexit deal that will potentially include stronger support from the Labor party. Despite these positives, there remain some dislocations in financial markets as investors digest whether financial conditions have eased enough globally to lift us out of the growth slowdown. Since 2015, both the Japanese Nikkei 225 index and the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield have moved in lockstep (Chart I-1). Right now, these two global growth barometers are sending opposing signals. The Nikkei index bottomed in December 2018 and is 13% off its lows, while at 2.5%, U.S. bond yields are not far off the trough made last week. Back in 2016, both indicators bottomed together in a unified response to the Federal Reserve’s dovish shift as well as Chinese stimulus. Every time the U.S. 10-year versus three-month spread has inverted, pro-cyclical currencies have gotten clobbered. The important message is that monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, and over the last year, more central banks have tightened policy than at any time since 2011 (Chart I-2). Our central bank monitors are still falling, suggesting easy monetary policy is still required. It wasn’t so long ago that dismal manufacturing PMI readings from Europe and Japan sent equity markets into a tailspin, with the U.S. 10-year versus three-month spread inverting. At a minimum, this warns against betting the farm too early on pro-cyclical currencies. Chart I-1Who Is Right? Chart I-2Monetary Policy Still relatively Tight Bottom Line: Every time the U.S. 10-year versus three-month spread has inverted, the U.S. trade-weighted dollar has tended to be the best performing currency over the next six months, while other pro-cyclical currencies have gotten clobbered. This occurred whether or not the inversion was a head-fake (Chart I-3). Our bias is that this time is different, but we will await further confirmation from higher-frequency indicators before building aggressive USD short positions. Chart I-3ABeware Of Curve Inversions (1) Chart I-3BBeware Of Curve Inversions (2) What To Watch In our March 8th bulletin,1 we detailed the case for fading U.S. dollar tailwinds and what to watch for in order to adopt a more pro-cyclical stance. These included PMI differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world, copper- and oil-to-gold ratios, Chinese M2 relative-to-GDP, emerging market currencies, and China-sensitive industrial commodities. The message from these indicators remains broadly consistent with what was observed a month ago, so we will not reprint them here. That said, there are a few additional indicators to consider. AUD/JPY: This cross has broadly tracked swings in the global manufacturing pulse, given the Australian dollar benefits from improving global growth, while the yen benefits from flights to safety and deteriorating liquidity (Chart I-4). The cross has been dead flat around 79 for three months, suggesting these two forces are largely in a stalemate. A break higher in the cross towards the 82-83 zone would be encouraging. EUR/USD: For the U.S. dollar to weaken significantly, the euro will have to strengthen meaningfully, given the large share of euros in global reserves. Following dismal manufacturing PMI numbers out of Europe, the more domestic service-oriented PMIs have proven more resilient. Yet they still point to GDP growth between 1%-1.5% (Chart I-5). The external sector will have to participate to finally put a floor under the euro. It is encouraging that the euro has weakened significantly relative to the Chinese RMB, which should help European exports to China. Chart I-4Bottoming Processes Could Last A While Chart I-5Dollar Weakness Needs A Strong Euro Chinese Bond Yields: A larger share of financial intermediation is now being done through the Chinese bond market, meaning it has the power to ease financial conditions. There is significant debate as to whether Chinese credit stimulus has been sufficient, but bond yields suggest this has been the case (Chart I-6). We will be watching the Chinese aggregate money data for further confirmation that it is time to put on reflation trades. Chart I-6All Confirmatory Signs From China Count Bottom Line: We noted last week that exports to China from Singapore jumped by 34% year-on-year and those to emerging markets by 22% year-on-year. Recent data from Taiwan corroborate the improvement in the Chinese manufacturing PMI for the month of March. With many currency pairs trading toward the apex of tight wedge formations, history suggests breakouts are imminent. Given that currency crosses can themselves be indicators, we will wait for confirmation of a breakout before putting on fresh pro-cyclical positions. Westminster Unifies It has been almost three years since the British voted to leave the European Union (EU). The original deadline of March 29th has been extended to April 12th. As the new deadline approaches, the odds are that a new one will be negotiated, probably by the May 23rd EU elections or even later. The imbroglio has been highly complex, even for the most astute of political analysts. However, our simple observation is that while the pound is sitting exactly where it was after the 2016 referendum results, the odds of a hard Brexit have significantly fallen since then. We are opening a buy-stop on GBP/USD at 1.30 today for a trade (Chart I-7). A very detailed scenario analysis for Brexit was discussed in this month’s Bank Credit Analyst publication.2 The historical context is that while complete sovereignty of a nation is and always has been a desirable fundamental right, a hard Brexit will do little to alleviate the British voters’ angst. Globalization, decades of supply-side reforms and competition from emerging markets have lifted income inequality in the U.K. to the detriment of the average U.K. voter. However, this is hardly due to European integration, given that this same sentiment afflicts many other independent nations. Economic surprises in the U.K. relative to both the U.S. and euro area are soaring. Back when the referendum was held in June 2016, even the pro-Brexit Tories, a minority in the party, promised continued access to the Common Market. Fast forward to today and there are simply not enough committed Brexiters in Westminster to deliver a hard Brexit. Meanwhile, there is scant evidence the general populace wanted a hard Brexit, given the very slim margin of victory for the Leave vote. It is also possible that absent the prominence of migration issues and terrorist attacks that were afflicting Europe at the time, we would not be having this debate today. Chart I-7Changing Landscape For The Pound Chart I-8What Brexit? As we publish this week, British Prime Minister Theresa May has kicked off negotiations with opposition party leader Jeremy Corbyn in a plan to muster a deal before the April 12th deadline. This falls into the first camp of our three scenarios, which are: 1) a softer Brexit deal; 2) a general election to break the impasse; or 3) another referendum. In the case of a general election, unless a hard Tory replaces Ms. May, chances are a softer Brexit will prevail. Meanwhile, our geopolitical strategists have ventured to say that Brexit is unsustainable over the secular horizon, and that the U.K. will remain in the EU. Bottom Line: While the political battle unfolds in the U.K., the reality is that the pound and U.K. gilt yields should be much higher solely on the basis of hard incoming data. Employment growth has been holding up very well, wages are inflecting higher, and the average U.K. consumer appears in decent shape (Chart I-8). Economic surprises in the U.K. relative to both the U.S. and euro area are soaring. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible cable made its lows in mid-2016-early 2017 as it became clearer that the probability of a hard Brexit was waning. We are placing a limit buy on the pound today at 1.30, with a wide stop at 1.22. Buy AUD/NZD Chart I-9AUD Is On Sale There are few times in markets and trading when you get a semblance of a free lunch. But one such opportunity may be on the table for the Aussie versus the Kiwi. For starters, over the past five years or so, whenever this cross has broken below the 1.04 support level, going long proved to be a profitable strategy over the ensuing 6-to-12 months. Meanwhile, over the last 35 years, the cross has spent more than 95% of the time over 1.06, with the low in 2015 close to parity. Finally, the cross is very cheap on a real effective exchange rate basis, which means that relative prices in Australia are at a discount to those in New Zealand (Chart I-9). The confluence of monetary policy shifts over the last few months may be blurring the direction of relative interest rate trends, but on the simple basis of real three-month interest rate differentials, the Aussie should be 15% higher relative to the Kiwi (Chart I-10). Ever since 2015, the market has been significantly more dovish on Australia relative to New Zealand, in part due to a more accelerated downturn in house prices and a significant slowdown in China. The reality is that the downturn in Australia has allowed some cleansing of sorts, and brought it far along the adjustment path relative to New Zealand. We may now be entering a window where economic data in New Zealand converges to the downside relative to Australia, the catalyst being a foreign ban on domestic house purchases (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Divergences Are Very Rare Chart I-11Australia Is Well Along The Adjustment Path Chart I-12Domestic Demand Pressures In New Zealand A study by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand shows that on average, the elasticity of consumption growth to house price changes is 0.22%.3 However, the housing wealth effect is asymmetric with negative housing shocks, hurting consumption by more than the boost received from positive shocks. According to their calculations, the housing wealth elasticity for consumption is 0.23 for negative shocks, as compared to 0.13 for positive changes in housing wealth. This asymmetry may be due to the fact that, at very elevated debt levels, leveraged gains are used to pay down debt aggressively, whereas leveraged losses hit bottom lines directly. The study proves timely, since the RBNZ began a new mandate on April 1st to now include full employment in addition to inflation targeting. But given that the RBNZ has been unable to fulfill its price stability mandate over the last several years, it is hard to argue it will find a dual mandate any easier. Falling consumption will depress aggregate demand which, in turn, will depress consumption further. Falling inbound migration levels at a time of rapidly dwindling labor supply everywhere means the goldilocks scenario of non-inflationary growth may be behind us (Chart I-12). And for an economy driven by agricultural exports, productivity gains will be hard to come by. The final catalyst for the AUD/NZD cross will be a terms-of-trade shock, and evidence is rising that this is turning in favor of the Aussie (Chart I-13). China’s clear environmental push has lifted the share of liquefied natural gas in Australia’s export mix (Chart I-14). Given that eliminating pollution is a strategic goal in China, this will be a multi-year tailwind. Australia overtook Qatar last year as the world’s biggest exporter of liquefied natural gas. As the market becomes more liberalized and long-term contracts are revised to reflect surging spot prices, the Aussie dollar will get a boost. Chart I-13A Positive Shift Chart I-14A Shifting Export Landscape Bottom Line: Go long AUD/NZD as a strategic position. Place stops at parity. Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled “Into A Transition Phase,”dated March 8, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, titled “The State Of Brexit,” dated March 28, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Mairead de Roiste, Apostolos Fasianos, Robert Kirkby, and Fang Yao, “Household Leverage and Asymmetric Housing Wealth Effects - Evidence from New Zealand,” Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Discussion Paper Series, (April 2019). Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. have been weak compared to the rest of the world: Retail sales in February contracted by 0.2% month-on-month, shy of consensus of 0.3%. The March Markit manufacturing PMI fell to 52.4 while ISM manufacturing PMI rose to 55.3. However, the ISM non-manufacturing PMI also decreased to 56.1. The February durable goods orders contracted by 1.6% while still better than expected. Initial jobless claims fell to 202k this week. DXY index initially fell by 0.3% before rebounding to end the week flat. The upbeat Chinese data earlier this week was the strongest in the manufacturing sector for the past 8 months. Easing financial conditions worldwide and progress on trade talks have brought back investors’ risk appetite, which is a headwind for the counter-cyclical dollar. Report Links: Tug OF War, With Gold As Umpire - March 29, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have shown tentative signs of a recovery: The Markit manufacturing PMI fell to 47.5 in March, the weakest number since 2013. However, the Markit composite PMI and services PMI increased to 51.6 and 53.3 respectively, both higher than expected. The unemployment rate stayed unchanged at 7.8% in February. Consumer price inflation in March fell slightly to 1.4%. Retail sales grew at 2.8% year-on-year in February, outperforming expectations of 2.3% growth. In Germany, retail sales surged by 4.7% year-on-year. EUR/USD depreciated by 0.2% this week. While the manufacturing data remains weak, the services PMI and retail sales in the euro area all show signs of an imminent pickup. During a speech last Wednesday, Mario Draghi highlighted that policy will continue to remain accommodative which should help financial conditions. Moreover, good news from U.K. and China could improve the trade outlook in the euro area. Report Links: Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 A Contrarian Bet On The Euro - March 1, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been positive: Housing starts in February grew by 4.2% year-on-year. Nikkei manufacturing PMI in March came in at 49.2, surprising to the upside, while the services PMI fell slightly to 52. Foreign investment in Japanese stocks increased to 438.7 billion yen. USD/JPY appreciated by 0.5% this week. The Tankan survey for Q1 was a bit disappointing, but nascent green shoots in the global economic recovery are providing support for Japanese shares. On the flip side, the higher risk appetite will likely decrease the demand for the safe-haven Japanese yen. Report Links: Tug OF War, With Gold As Umpire - March 29, 2019 A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. have been mostly positive: The Q4 GDP surprised to the upside, coming in at 1.4% year-on-year. The Markit manufacturing PMI jumped to 55.1 in March, the strongest within the past year. The Markit construction PMI came in slightly below expectation at 49.7, while still above the last reading of 49.5. The services PMI fell to 48.9. GBP/USD appreciated by 0.7% this week. GBP/USD has been very volatile over the past weeks amid ongoing Brexit uncertainties. Despite this, the U.K. economy has been very healthy and cable is still trading at a discount to its fair value. Report Links: A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been improving: The NAB business confidence fell to 0 in March, but the business conditions component increased to 7. The February HIA new home sales increased by 1% month-on-month. Building permits in February increased by 19.1% month-on-month. Retail sales increased by 0.8% month-on-month in February. Trade balance came in at 4.8 million AUD in February. Legacy LNG projects almost guarantee trade surpluses for years to come. AUD/USD has been flat this week. On Tuesday, the RBA kept the interest rate unchanged at 1.5%, as was widely expected. AUD/USD is likely to form a floor if Chinese economic activity continues to improve and global industrial production picks up. Report Links: Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: The global dairy trade price index increased by 0.8% in April. ANZ commodity prices increased by 1.4% in March. NZD/USD fell by 1% this week. Despite positive terms of trade, NZD/USD is still trading at a 10%-15% premium above its fair value. New Zealand will be held hostage to the downturn in the Aussie economy. Meanwhile, a new dual mandate for the RBNZ makes it difficult to gauge whether its recent dovish shift is a one-off or more perpetual. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been mostly positive: GDP grew by 0.3% month-on-month in January, surprising to the upside. However, the Markit manufacturing PMI fell to 50.5 in March, from a previous reading of 52.8. USD/CAD rebounded after the plunge on positive Canadian GDP data, returning flat this week. On Monday, Governor Poloz gave a speech in Nunavut, highlighting slowing trade growth and the downside risks from trade wars. He stated that the economic outlook continues to warrant a policy rate that is well below the neutral range, and trade among provinces and territories should be promoted. Report Links: A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been strong: The KOF leading indicator increased to 97.4 in March. The February retail sales growth came in at -0.2% year-on-year, above the estimated -0.8%. Consumer price index came in higher than expected at 0.7% year-on-year. USD/CHF increased by 0.47% this week. While the inflation rate took a step closer towards the target rate, the uptick in investment sentiment and rising appetite for risk assets could be a headwind for the safe-haven franc. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been improving: Retail sales contracted by 1.3% month-on-month in February. However, the registered unemployment fell to 78.32k in March. The unemployment rate decreased to 2.4% accordingly. House prices increased by 3.2% year-on-year in March. The manufacturing PMI rose from 56.3 to 56.8 in March. USD/NOK fell by 0.3% this week. The Norwegian krone has been one of our favorite currencies, as it remains most responsive to crude oil prices. Our BCA house view is in favor of rising oil prices amid Iran and Venezuela sanctions and production cuts. Report Links: A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been better than expected: The manufacturing PMI came in at 52.8 in March, slightly higher than 52.7 in February. USD/SEK has been flat this week. The Swedish krona is still trading below its one sigma band of fair value. A brighter picture for the euro area could improve trade conditions for Sweden. Our short USD/SEK position is now 1.84% in the money since initiated. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The meaningful improvement in the March manufacturing PMIs (both Caixin and official) all but confirms that a rebound in Chinese economic activity is forthcoming. The odds that investors will look through any near-term economic and/or earnings weakness are directly related to the likely magnitude of the expansion in credit over the coming year, and our research points to the need for the recent pace of credit growth to be sustained in order to stabilize the outlook for earnings. Barring a substantial breakdown in trade talks between China and the U.S., a strong March total social financing release would likely tip the scales in favor of a recommendation to increase Chinese investable stock exposure within a global equity portfolio to overweight. Feature Tables 1 and 2 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets over the past month. On the growth front, coincident economic activity has sharply converged with our leading indicator for China’s economy, which we highlighted was likely to occur. Looking forward, while we await the March total social financing release later this month for a better sense of the likely magnitude in credit growth over the coming year, the meaningful improvement in the March manufacturing PMIs (both Caixin and official) all but confirms that a rebound in Chinese economic activity is forthcoming. Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary The likely magnitude of the uptrend in credit is important from an investment strategy perspective, as we have highlighted that weak coincident activity raises the risk of a lagged but meaningful further decline in Chinese earnings per share over the coming few months. The odds that investors will look through any near-term economic and/or earnings weakness are directly related to the ultimate size of the expansion in credit, and our research points to the need for the recent pace of credit growth to be sustained in order to stabilize the outlook for earnings. But the bottom line for investors is that we recently placed Chinese investable stocks (i.e. the MSCI China Index) on upgrade watch, and the March PMI is a step in the direction of a recommendation to increase equity allocation to overweight within a global stock portfolio. Investors should closely watch the March total social financing data (due to be released in mid-April); a strong release, barring a substantial breakdown in trade talks between China and the U.S., would likely tip the scales in favor of a move to overweight. In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we provide several detailed observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data below: Chart 1 shows that coincident economic activity sharply converged in January and February with our leading indicator for China’s economy, as we had argued many times over the past several months was likely to occur. In our view, most if not all of the previously beneficial tariff front-running effect has probably washed out of the data, implying that future changes in activity measures are now more likely to reflect actual changes in underlying economic circumstances. Chart 1A Convergence That We Predicted The components of our LKI leading indicator continue to point to divergent outcomes for the Chinese economy (Chart 2). Monetary conditions have weakened somewhat over the past few months, but remain quite easy relative to history. The credit components bounced in January but are still weak relative to their history, whereas money growth is extremely weak and has shown no sign of improvement. Barring a major rise in the RMB, a continuation in the recent pace of credit growth would likely be enough to cause our leading indicator to trend higher, particularly if money growth begins to pick up. Chart 2An Uptrend In Credit Growth Will Push Our Leading Indicator Higher We noted in our March 13 Weekly Report that growth in residential floor space started was unsustainably strong,1 and the January/February data update confirmed this view. Growth in starts has decelerated by 10 percentage points from December to February, highlighting that housing construction cannot permanently decouple from sales volume and that a further deceleration is possible unless sales growth (which is currently negative) begins to pick up. The PMI rebound in March registers as one of the most important macro developments since the release of the January total social financing data. Both the Caixin and official manufacturing PMI data came in solidly positive for March, rising relative to their February values and surprising consensus expectations to the upside. Chart 3 highlights that the March Caixin data has pushed the series above its post-2010 median, whereas the official PMI has risen to its 40th percentile from essentially its lowest point in the past decade. In our view, the PMI rebound registers as one of the most important macro developments since the release of the January total social financing data, in that it all but confirms that a rebound in (still depressed) Chinese economic activity is forthcoming. Chart 3A Very Sharp Rebound In Both Manufacturing PMIs Despite having rallied significantly from their low, Chinese stocks (both investable and domestic) remain approximately 20% below their early-2018 high in US$ terms. This is in contrast to global stocks, which are only 7% shy of their 2018 high. If Chinese equities can avoid a major earnings recession, this discrepancy underscores that there is further upside for stock prices in relative terms over the coming 6-12 months. For the A-share market, however, Chart 4 highlights a potential near-term roadblock for continued outperformance versus global stocks. The chart highlights that the relative performance trend is now bumping up against the upper end of a declining trend channel that has been in place for almost 4 years, a bearish pattern that is in stark contrast to that of the investable market. Conversely, a break outside of this channel would warrant attention, as it could signal a secular change in trend for the domestic equity market. Chart 4Is The Four Year Downtrend In A-Share Relative Performance Over? Chart 5 highlights that the strange combination of consumer staples and real estate stocks have been the clear sector winners over the past month, both in the investable and domestic markets. Signs of stabilization in consumer spending explains staples outperformance, but the rally in real estate stocks is more difficult to explain given the weakness in housing fundamentals referenced above. For now, our bias is to believe that real estate stocks are benefitting as a value play, given their deep discount relative to both their respective broad markets and their global peers. Chart 5A Sharp Rebound In Staples And Real Estate Stocks China’s 7-day interbank repo rate has increased somewhat over the past month, raising speculation that the PBOC may soon proceed with a generalized cut to the reserve requirement ratio. In our view, the trend in the 3-month interbank repo rate has been more important over the past few years, as it has closely correlated since late-2016 with average interest rates in the economy and sharp declines in the rate last year preceded the pickup in credit growth observed in January. Still, additional easing from the PBOC could be significant for market participants, as it would likely be greeted positively by investors and could further stoke the belief that Chinese credit growth may overshoot to the upside over the coming 6-12 months. A stronger RMB versus the euro will be welcome news for European exporters. In contrast to a significant improvement in domestic equity prices and investor sentiment, Chinese onshore corporate bond spreads have actually inched higher over the past month. While the rise has been comparatively small (8 basis points), spreads now stand at roughly a third of their 12-month range. A rising trend in onshore corporate bond spreads is not consistent with a slower pace of defaults over the coming 6-12 months, suggesting that at least some headwinds facing the Chinese economy will remain over the coming year if the recent trend in spreads continues. While CNY-USD has been largely flat over the past month, CNY-EUR has continued to rise and is now within striking distance of its 2018 high (Chart 6). This is not likely welcome news for Chinese exporters with close ties to Europe, but it may help provide a much-needed trade boost to the European economy over the coming year, whose manufacturing PMI has recently fallen to a six-year low. Chart 6A Stronger CNY-EUR Cross Will Help Boost Chinese Imports From Europe Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “China Macro And Market Review”, dated March 13, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that the global allocation of foreign exchange reserves towards the U.S. dollar peaked at about 72% in the early 2000s and has been in a downtrend since. Meanwhile, allocation to other currencies, notably…
Highlights U.S. growth remains robust, despite some temporary softness in recent months. Ex U.S., growth continues to fall but, with China probably now ramping up monetary stimulus, should bottom in the second half. Central banks everywhere have turned more dovish, partly in an attempt to push up inflation expectations. The combination of resilient growth and easier monetary policy should be good for global equities. We remain overweight equities versus bonds. Bond yields have fallen sharply everywhere. However, with U.S. inflation still trending up, and central banks unlikely to turn any more dovish this year, yields are unlikely to fall much further in 2019. We recommend a slight underweight on duration. We remain overweight U.S. equities, but are on watch to upgrade the euro zone and Emerging Markets when we have stronger conviction about China’s stimulus. Given structural headwinds in both Europe and EM, this would probably be only a tactical upgrade. We have been tilting our equity sector recommendations in a more cyclical direction, last month raising Industrials and Energy to overweight. We also prefer credit over government bonds within the fixed-income category, though we warn that spreads will not fall much further given weak corporate fundamentals. Feature Recommended Allocation Overview Don’t Fight The Doves The performance of risk assets essentially comes down to a battle between growth and monetary policy/interest rates. Last September, despite the fact that global economic growth was clearly slowing, the Fed sounded hawkish; this triggered an 18% drop in global equities in Q4. But, since late last year, all major developed central banks have turned more dovish, culminating in March’s decision of the ECB to push back its guidance for its first rate hike, and the FOMC’s wiping out its two planned hikes for 2019. But, at the same time, U.S. economic growth is showing resilience, and we see the first “green shoots” of a cyclical pickup in growth outside the U.S. This is an environment in which risk assets should continue to perform well. Why did the Fed back off? The most likely explanation is that it wants to give itself more room to act come the next recession. Inflation expectations have become unanchored, with 10-year breakevens over the past decade steadily below a level that would be consistent with the Fed achieving its 2% core PCE inflation target in the long run. In the period since the Fed formally introduced this (supposedly “symmetrical”) target in 2012, it has exceeded it in only four months (Chart 1). Around recessions over the past 50 years, the Fed has on average cut rates by 655 basis points (Table 1). It sees little risk, therefore, in letting the economy “run a little hot” and allowing inflation to rise somewhat above 2%. This would reanchor expectations, and eventually get nominal short- and long-term rates higher before the next recession. Chart 1Market Doesn’t Believe The Fed’s Target Table 1Fed Won’t Be Able To Cut This Much Next Time Chart 2Financial Conditions Now Much Easier Chart 3Housing Market Bottoming Out Meanwhile, U.S. growth seems to be stabilizing at a decent level after signs of weakness late last year caused by tighter financial conditions, a slowdown elsewhere in the world, and the six-week government shutdown. An easing of financial conditions since the beginning of the year should help to keep U.S. GDP growth above trend at around 2.0-2.5% this year (Chart 2). Most notably, interest-rate sensitive areas of the economy that were under pressure last year, especially housing, are showing signs of bottoming (Chart 3). Consumption also should be robust, given strong wage growth, consumer confidence close to historic record high levels, and amid no signs of a deterioration in the labor market (Chart 4). Chart 4No Signs Of Weaker Labor Market Chart 5Some 'Green Shoots' For Global Growth A key question for us over the next few months will be when to shift allocations to more cyclical, higher-beta equity markets such as the euro area and Emerging Markets. These have underperformed year-to-date despite the strong risk-on market. China’s nascent reflationary stimulus will decide the timing and level of conviction of this shift. As we explain in detail on page 6, we think the jury is still out on whether China is injecting liquidity on anything like the same scale as it did in 2016. Even if it is, historically it has taken six to 12 months before the effect showed through via a rebound in global trade, commodity prices, and other China-related indicators. The first early signs of a bottoming are emerging: Chinese fixed-asset investment and the Caixin Manufacturing PMI beat expectations last month, the German ZEW Expectations indicator has started to recover, and the diffusion index of the Global Leading Economic Indicator (which often leads the LEI itself by a few months) has picked up (Chart 5). We are on watch to shift our allocation1 but, given the long-term structural headwinds against both Europe and EM, we need to be more convinced about the strength of Chinese stimulus before doing so. The seeds of recession are sown in expansions. Eventually, we see the newly dovish Fed falling behind the curve. The Fed Funds Rate is still below the range of estimates of the neutral rate – hard though this is to estimate in real time (Chart 6). If the economy remains as strong as we expect, sometime next year inflation could begin rising to uncomfortable levels (and asset bubbles start to be of concern), which would push the Fed back into hiking mode. Given that the market is pricing in Fed rate cuts, not hikes, and that the Fed can hardly sound any more dovish than it does now without moving to an outright easing path, it seems to us that long-term rates are very unlikely to fall from here (Chart 7). Chart 6Fed Still Below Neutral Chart 7Can The Fed Get Any More Dovish Than This? In this environment, therefore, we continue to expect global equities to outperform bonds over the next 12 months. However, a recession is possible in 2021 triggered by the Fed late next year needing to put its foot abruptly on the brake. What Our Clients Are Asking Chart 8Ex-U.S. Equities Driven By China Stimulus When Is The Time To Switch Allocations To Europe And EM? It is slightly surprising that the 12% rally in global equities this year has been led by the low-beta U.S., up 13%, rather than Europe (up 9%) or emerging markets (up 9% - and much less if the strong Chinese market is excluded). Is it time to switch to these underperforming, more cyclical markets? Our answer is, not yet. Global growth ex-U.S. continues to weaken. It is likely to bottom sometime in the second half, as a result of Chinese growth stabilizing. However, the jury is still out on whether the increase in Chinese credit creation in January was a one-off, or major policy reversal. Even if it is the latter, a revival in global growth (and cyclical markets) has typically lagged Chinese stimulus by 6-12 months (Chart 8, panel 1). There are also significant structural headwinds for both the euro zone and Emerging Markets which make us reluctant to overweight them unless there are clear cyclical reasons to do so. Both have lagged global equities fairly consistently since the Global Financial Crisis, with only brief outperformance during periods of economic acceleration, such as in 2016 and 2012 (panel 2). The euro zone remains challenged by its banking system. Loan growth has been stagnant for years, and banks remain undercapitalized relative to their U.S. peers, and highly fragmented (panels 3 and 4). Emerging markets are hampered by their high level of foreign-currency debt (which makes them highly sensitive to U.S. financial conditions), dependence on China, and lack of structural reform. We could see ourselves shifting our recommendation from the U.S. to the euro area and EM, and becoming outright bearish on the U.S. dollar (a counter-cyclical currency), over the coming months if we find confirmation of a bottoming of global cyclical growth and become more confident in the size of China’s stimulus. But given the structural headwinds, and the steady underperformance of these markets, we need stronger evidence first. Chart 9Oil, Positioning, And Housing Why Is The 10-Year Bond Yield So Depressed? Despite U.S. equities rallying back to within 4% of a record high, the U.S. Treasury bond yield has fallen further this year (Chart 9, panel 1). Moreover, the 3-month/10-year yield curve has briefly inverted. Besides the Fed’s recent more dovish turn, what has depressed bond yields? We would pin the cause on the following factors: Dampened inflation expectations: Over the past few years the 10-year yield has been closely correlated with the oil price via inflation expectations. A temporary supply shock in Q4 caused oil prices to decline sharply. But tighter supply this year should allow the oil price to recover further. This should cause a rise in inflation expectation (panel 2). Trade positioning: Late last year, speculative short positions in government bonds were at their highest levels since 2015. However, the Q4 equity selloff pushed investors to cover their positions; these are now close to neutral (panel 3). Home Sales: Housing data has been weak over the past few quarters, with both existing and new home sales declining. But there are now signs of recovery: mortgage applications have started to pick up, which should in turn push home sales higher (panel 4). This should also allow for a rise in bond yields. Our key take-away from March’s FOMC meeting, when the tone turned decidedly dovish, is that the Fed is focusing on re-anchoring inflation expectations, which should push nominal yields higher. We think the market is very pessimistic by pricing in 42 and 56 bps of rate cuts over the next 12 and 24 months respectively. It would take a significant further weakening of economic data to make the Fed’s stance turn even more dovish and for nominal yields to fall even further. How Will U.S. Corporate Bonds Perform In The Next Recession? Historically high levels of U.S. corporate debt, as well as declining credit quality in the investment-grade space, have started to worry investors (Chart 10). Specifically, investors are worried that, when the next default cycle comes, a large portion of investment-grade debt will be downgraded to junk, forcing fund managers who are constrained to hold certain credit qualities to sell. These worries seem to be justified. Investment-grade bonds of lower credit quality tend to experience large increases in migration to junk status during credit recessions (Chart 11). Given the current composition of the U.S. investment-grade corporate bond universe, a credit recession would imply a downgrade to junk status of 4.6% of the index if we assume similar behavior to previous recessions. Depending on the speed of the selloff, such a downgrade could also have grave consequence for liquidity. According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), average daily turnover in the U.S. corporate bond market was 0.34% in 2018. Thus, it is not hard to envision a situation where forced selling could surpass normal levels of liquidity. However, it is hard to tell what would be the effect of such a fire-sale on credit spreads, given that they tend to widen in recessions regardless. While this asset class could perform poorly in the next recession, we don’t expect that its weakness will translate to the real economy. Leveraged institutions such as banks hold just 18% of corporate credit. Furthermore, despite being at all-time highs, U.S. nonfinancial corporate debt to GDP is still at a much healthier level than in other countries (Chart 12). Chart 10Declining Quality In Investment Grade Chart 12U.S. Corporate Debt Levels Are Healthy Relative To The Rest Of The World Chart 13A Value Rebound? Is It Time To Favor Value Over Growth Again? Since it peaked in May 2007, the ratio of global value to growth has attempted to rebound several times amid a sustained downtrend (Chart 13). Due to the cyclical nature and the neutral relative valuation of the value/growth indexes, we have preferred to use sector positioning (cyclicals vs. defensives) to implement a value/growth style tilt in our global portfolio since March 20162 (Chart 13, panel 1). Lately, we have received many requests on the topic of the value-versus-growth-ratio. After reaching a historical low in August 2018, the value/growth ratio slightly rebounded in Q4 2018 before reversing some of its gains so far this year. Additionally, the value/growth valuation gap as measured by both price-to-book and forward P/E has reached a historically low level (Chart 13, panel 4). As we have often noted, the sector composition of both the value and growth indexes changes over time.2 Chart 14 shows the current sector weights of S&P Pure Value and Pure Growth Indexes.3 It’s clear that now a bet on Pure Value versus Pure Growth is essentially a bet on Financials (which account for 35% of the Pure Value index) versus Tech and Healthcare (which together account for 38% of the Pure Growth index) - see also Chart 13, panel 2. Given the cyclical nature of the value/growth ratio and also the sector concentration, it’s not surprising that the value/growth play is also a play on euro area versus U.S. equities (Chart 13, panel 3). Currently, we are neutral on Financials and Tech, while overweight Healthcare in our global sector portfolio, and we are putting the euro area on an upgrade watch (see page 14). Therefore, maintaining a neutral stance between value and growth is in line with our sector and country views. However, a close watch for a possible upgrade of value is also warranted given the extreme valuation measures. Global Economy Overview: U.S. growth has slowed recently, though it remains more robust than in the more cyclical economies in Europe and emerging markets. Central banks almost everywhere have recently turned dovish. However, China’s increased monetary stimulus should help global growth bottom out in H2. This could lead the Fed and central banks in other healthy economies to return to a rate-hiking path. U.S.: The U.S. economy has been weak in recent months. The Citigroup Economic Surprise Index (Chart 15, panel 1) has collapsed, and the Fed NowCasts point to only 1.3-1.7% QoQ annualized GDP growth in Q1 (compared to 2.2% in Q4). But the slowdown is mostly due to the six-week government shutdown (which probably took 1% off growth), some seasonal adjustment oddities (which leave Q1 as the weakest quarter almost every year), and tighter financial conditions in H2 2018 which have now largely reversed. The manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISMs in February were still healthy at 54.2 and 59.7 respectively. Consumption (propelled by strong employment growth and accelerating wages) and capex remain strong (panel 3). BCA expects GDP growth in 2019 to be around 2.0-2.5%, still above trend. Euro Area: The European economy continues to slow, driven by weak exports to emerging markets, troubles in the banking sector, and political uncertainty. Q4 GDP growth was only 0.8% QoQ annualized, and the manufacturing PMI has fallen to 47.6 (with Germany as low as 44.7). But there are some early signs of an improvement. The ZEW Expectations index for Germany has bottomed (Chart 16, panel 1), fiscal policy should boost euro area growth this year by around 0.5 percentage points, and wage growth has begun to accelerate. The key remains Chinese stimulus, whose positive effects should help European exports recover sometime in H2. Chart 15U.S. Growth Slowing But Still Robust Chart 16Signs Of Bottoming In Global Ex-U.S.? Japan: Japan also remains highly dependent on a Chinese stimulus. Machine tool orders (the best indicator of capex demand from China) fell by 29% YoY in February. Despite stronger wage growth, now 1.2% YoY, inflation shows no signs of moving up towards the Bank of Japan’s target of 2%: ex energy and food CPI inflation is still only 0.4%. The biggest risk in 2019 is October’s planned consumption tax hike from 8% to 10%. Prime Minister Abe has said that he will cancel this only in the event of a shock on the scale of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. The government has put in place measures to soften the impact (most notably a 5% rebate on purchases at small retailers after October 1 paid for electronically), but consumption is still likely to fall significantly. Emerging Markets: China seems to have ramped up its monetary stimulus, with total social financing in January and February combined up 12% over the same months last year. Recent data have shown signs of a stabilization of growth: the manufacturing PMI rebounded to 49.9 in February from 48.3, and fixed-asset investment beat expectations at 6.1% YoY in January and February combined. Nonetheless, the size of liquidity injection is likely to be smaller than in previous episodes such as 2016, since Premier Li Keqiang and the PBOC have warned of the risk of excessive speculation. Elsewhere, some emerging economies (notably Brazil and Mexico) have showed signs of recovery after last year’s deterioration, whereas others (such as South Africa, Indonesia, and Poland) continue to suffer. Interest rates: Central banks worldwide have generally turned more dovish in recent months, with the Fed and ECB both moving to signal no rate hikes this year. This has pushed down long-term rates globally, with 10-year bond yields falling below 0% again in Germany and Japan. However, with global growth likely to bottom over the next few months, rates may not stay at current depressed levels. U.S. inflation, in particular, continues to trend up, and the Fed’s target PCE inflation measure is likely to exceed 2% over coming months. We see the Fed turning more hawkish by year-end, and long rates globally more likely to rise than fall from current levels. Global Equities Chart 17Watch Earnings Remain Cautiously Optimistic: We added risk in our January Portfolio Update4 by putting cash back to work in global equities, and then in the March Portfolio Update5 we reduced the underweight in EM equities and increased the tilt to cyclicals at the expense of defensives, to hedge against a continuing acceleration in Chinese credit growth. All these came after our risk reduction in July 2018.6 GAA’s portfolio approach has always been to take risks where they are most likely to be rewarded. BCA’s macro view is that global economic growth data is likely to be on the weak side in the coming months, but will pick up in the second half. This implies that equities are likely to rally again after a period of congestion within a trading range, supporting a cautiously optimistic portfolio allocation for the next 9-12 months. At the asset-class level, our positioning of overweight equities versus bonds while neutral on cash, reflects the “optimistic” side of our allocation. However, the rebound in global equities since the December sell-off has been driven completely by a valuation re-rating, while earnings growth has been revised down sharply. (Chart 17). As such, within global equities, our preference for low-beta countries (favoring DM versus EM, and favoring the U.S over the rest of DM) reflects the “cautious” aspect of our allocation. Our macro view hinges largely on what happens to China. There are signs that China may have abandoned its focus on deleveraging, yet it is too early to tell if it has switched back to a reflationary path. Therefore, our global equity sector overlay has a slight cyclical tilt by overweighting Industrials and Energy, which are among the main beneficiaries of Chinese reflationary policies or a positive resolution to U.S.-China trade negotiations. Chart 18Warming Up To The Euro Area Euro Area Equities: On Upgrade Watch We have favored U.S. equities relative to the euro area since July 2018.7 Since then, the U.S. has outperformed the euro area by 11% in USD terms and by 8% in local currency terms, with the difference being attributed to the weakness of the euro versus the U.S. dollar. Given BCA’s view on the global economy and the U.S. dollar, however, we are watching closely to switch our recommendation between the U.S. and euro area equities, for the following reasons: First, as shown in Chart 18, panel 1, the relative performance between the euro area and the U.S. is highly correlated with the EUR/USD exchange rate. BCA believes that the U.S. dollar is set for a period of weakness starting in the second half of the year,8 which bodes well for the outperformance of euro area equities. Second, relative earnings growth between the euro area and the U.S. is driven by the underlying strength of the economies, as represented by PMIs (panel 2). Both the relative earnings growth and relative PMI have stopped falling and have begun to bottom in favor of the euro area; Third, even though the euro area’s beta has been declining while that of the U.S. has increased, euro area beta is still higher than that in the U.S., making it more of a beneficiary of a global growth recovery; However, the relative valuation of euro area equities to their U.S. counterparts is now neutral not at the extreme level which historically has been a good entry-point into eurozone equities (panel 4). Chart 19Becoming Less Defensive Global Sector Allocation: Gradually Becoming Less Defensive GAA’s sector portfolio took profits on its pro-cyclical positioning and went defensive in July 20189 and remained so until the March Monthly update10 when we upgraded Energy and Industrials to overweight from neutral, while downgrading Consumer Staples two notches to underweight from overweight (Chart 19). The upgrade of Industrials was mainly a hedge against further acceleration in China’s credit growth. But why did we upgrade Energy to overweight yet maintained an underweight in Materials? Long-term GAA clients know that, in terms of global sector allocation, we have structurally favored the oil-related Energy sector to the metals-related Materials sector since October 2016, because oil supply/demand is more global in nature while the supply/demand of metals, especially industrial metals, is closely linked to China (see also the Commodity section of this Quarterly on page 18). From a cyclical perspective, the relative performance of the two sectors has historically closely correlated with the relative prices of oil and metals, as shown in panel 2. This is not surprising because changes in forward earnings for the two sectors are also closely linked to change in the corresponding commodity prices (panels 3 and 4). BCA’s Commodity and Energy Strategy service has an overweight rating on oil and a neutral stance on metals, implying that the growth in the oil price will outpace that of metal prices, which suggests that the Energy sector will outperform the Materials sector (panel 2). Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight On Duration. Global equities have recovered 16% since reaching the low of 2018 on December 24, yet the global bond yield has decreased by 21 bps over the same period. While the directional movement of bond yields is somewhat puzzling given such strong performance in equities (see page 7 for some explanations), it’s evident that the bond markets have been driven by the recent weakness in global growth (Chart 20, panel 3), and are pricing out any expectation of rate hikes over the coming year in major developed economies. Given the surprisingly dovish tone at the March FOMC meeting and BCA’s House View that global economic growth will rebound in the second half, bond yields are now highly exposed to any hawkish shift in central bank policies and any recovery in inflation expectations. As such, it’s still appropriate to maintain a slight underweight on duration over the next 9-12 months. Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds. Depressed inflation expectations have been one reason why global bond yields have decoupled from equities. However, the crude oil price, which closely correlates with inflation expectations, has stabilized. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects Brent crude to end 2019 at US$75 per barrel (Chart 21). This implies a significant rise in inflation expectations in the second half of the year, supporting our preference for inflation-linked bonds over nominal bonds. However, TIPS are no longer cheap. For those who have not already moved to overweight TIPS, we suggest “buying TIPS on dips”. Inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) in Australia and Japan are also still very attractive versus their respective nominal bonds. Overweighting ILBs in those two markets also fits well with our macro themes. Chart 20Rates: Likely More Upside Risk Chart 21Favor Inflation Linkers Corporate Bonds Chart 22Tactical Upside Remains For Credit In February, we raised credit to overweight within a fixed-income portfolio while underweighting government bonds. So far, this has proven to be the right decision, as corporate bonds have generated excess returns of 90 basis points over duration-matched Treasuries. We based our positioning on the mounting evidence that global growth is turning up: credit impulses are starting to rebound in several major economies, monetary conditions have eased, and our diffusion index of global leading indicators has rebounded sharply, indicating that there remains tactical upside for global credit (Chart 22– panel 1 and 2). When will we close our tactical overweight? Our U.S. Bond Strategy Service has set a target for spreads of U.S. corporate bonds with different credit ratings. According to their targets, which denote the median spread typical of late-cycle environments, there is still some room for further spread compression in non-AAA credits (Chart 22 – panel 3 and 4). However, the upside is limited and, if spreads keep tightening, we will probably close our position by the end of Q2. On a cyclical horizon, the fundamentals of corporate health are still a headwind, with both the interest-coverage and liquidity ratio for U.S. investment-grade corporates standing near 10-year lows.11 Moreover, we expect these ratios to deteriorate further, as corporate profits will likely come under pressure due to increasing wage growth. Finally, we expect that the Fed will turn more hawkish by the end of 2019, turning monetary policy from a tailwind to a headwind. Thus, we recommend investors to remain overweight, but be ready to turn bearish in the back end of the year. Commodities Chart 23Prefer Oil, Watch Metals Energy (Overweight): Stable demand, declining Venezuelan production due to U.S. sanctions, instability and possible outages in Libya, Iraq, and Nigeria, alongside the GCC’s commitment to cut output through year-end, should support oil prices and allow further upside (Chart 23, panels 1 & 2). While U.S. crude production is on the rise, bottlenecks in its export capabilities should limit market oversupply. Crude supply shocks should outweigh any slowdown in demand, specifically from emerging markets. BCA’s energy strategists expect Brent to average $75 and $80 throughout 2019 and 2020 respectively, and for the gap between WTI and Brent to narrow significantly. Industrial Metals (Neutral): China, the world’s largest consumer, still plays a big role in the direction of industrial metals. Year-to-date, metals prices have been supported partly by a more stable dollar. For now, we maintain a neutral stance until we see confirmation that Chinese stimulus will trigger further upside to metal prices perhaps in the second half. However, a lack of sustained Chinese demand, alongside weaker global growth over the next few months, would weigh down on metal prices (panel 3). Precious Metals (Neutral): Gold has reversed its downslide and rallied by over 10% from its Q4 2018 low. With the market pricing out any Fed rate hikes this year, rising inflation expectations, a weaker USD by year-end, and lower real rates should help gold outperform other commodities in this late-cycle phase. We recommend an allocation to gold as an inflation hedge, as well as a hedge against geopolitical risks (panel 4). Currencies Chart 24The End Of The Dollar Bull Market U.S. Dollar: Our bullish stance on the dollar has proven to be correct, as the trade-weighted dollar has appreciated by 5% in the past 12-months thanks to the slowdown in global growth. However, the two reasons for the growth slowdown – Fed tightening and Chinese deleveraging – have started to ease. On March 20 the Fed revised its forward guidance to no rate hikes in 2019 and only one rate hike in 2020. Meanwhile, Chinese total social financing relative to GDP has bottomed, indicating that Chinese authorities have opted for a pause in their deleveraging campaign (Chart 24, panel 1). These developments will likely boost global growth and hurt the countercyclical greenback. Therefore, we recommend investors to slowly shift to a cyclical underweight on the dollar. Euro: Most of the factors that dragged the euro down last year are fading: political risk in Italy has eased, fiscal policy is moving from a headwind to a tailwind, and the relative LEI between the EU and the US has started to pick up (panel 2). Moreover, we see little scope for euro area monetary policy to turn any more dovish versus the U.S., since forward rate expectations currently stand near 2014 lows (panel 3). Thus, we expect the euro to be one of the best performing currencies this year. Yen: Easy monetary policy by global central banks will boost asset prices and reduce volatility, creating a risk-on environment that is typically negative for the yen (panel 4). Moreover, the IMF still projects Japan to have a negative fiscal drag of 0.7% this year, which will force the BoJ to prolong its yield curve control regime. As a result, we expect the yen to be one of the worst performing currencies this year. Alternatives Intro: Investors’ allocation to alternatives is on the rise as we get closer to the end of the business cycle along with increasing realized volatility in traditional assets. In the alternatives assets space, we recommend thinking about allocations through three buckets: 1) return enhancers, means of outperforming traditional equity, fixed income, and mixed-asset strategies; 2) inflation hedges, means of preserving capital throughout periods of elevated inflation; and 3) volatility dampeners, means of reducing drawdowns and portfolio volatility during periods of market drawdowns. Return Enhancers: In our July and October 2018 Quarterly reports, we recommended investors trim back on PE allocations and reallocate towards hedge funds. Growing competition in the PE space has pushed up multiples. Given where the business cycle currently is, we favor macro hedge funds, as they tend to outperform in this sort of environment as well as in downturns and recessions (Chart 25, panel 1). Inflation Hedges: In our July 2018 Quarterly, we recommended investors pare back their real estate allocations, given the backdrop of a slowdown/sideways trend in the sector, and specifically within the retail segment. Given that the end of the current cycle is likely to be accompanied by elevated levels of inflation, we recommend clients to modestly allocate to commodity futures on the likelihood of a softer dollar and rising energy prices (panel 2). Volatility Dampeners: We continue to recommend both farmland and timberland since they have lower volatility than other traditional and alternative asset classes (panel 3). While timberland is more impacted by economic growth via the housing market, farmland has a near-zero correlation with economic growth. We do not favor structured products due to their unattractive valuations. Chart 25Prefer Hedge Funds Over Private Equity Risks To Our View Our economic outlook is quite sanguine. What would undermine this scenario? Many investors have become nervous about the inversion of the U.S. yield curve. And we have shown in the past that an inversion of the 3-month/10-year yield curve has been a reliable indicator of recessions 12-18 months ahead.12 Its inversion in March, then, is a concern. But note that the indicator works only using a three-month moving average (Chart 26); the curve often inverted for a brief period without signaling recession. We expect long-term rates to rise from here, steepening the curve. But a prolongation of the current inversion would clearly be a worrying signal. The direction of China continues to play a key role in defining the macro picture. Our current allocation is based on the view that China is doing some monetary and fiscal stimulus but that, at the current pace, it will be much smaller than in 2016 (Chart 27). The weak response of money supply growth suggests, as Premier Li Keqiang has complained, that the liquidity is mostly going into speculation (note that A-shares have risen by 20% this year) rather than into the real economy. The March Total Social Financing data, released in mid-April, will give a better read of the degree of the reflation. If it is bigger than we expect, this would suggest a quicker shift into euro area and Emerging Market equities than we currently advocate. The U.S. dollar remains a key driver of asset allocation. The dollar is a counter-cyclical currency and, with global growth slowing, has continued to appreciate moderately this year (Chart 28). We see a weakening of the dollar later this year, when global growth picks up. But if this were to happen more quickly or dramatically than we expect – not impossible given the currency’s over-valuation and crowded long-dollar positions – EM stocks and commodity prices, given their strong inverse correlation with the dollar, could bounce sharply. Chart 26Yield Curve Inversion Chart 27How Much Is China Reflating? Chart 28Dollar Is Counter-Cyclical Garry Evans, Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaolit@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa Ossa, Senior Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy, Research Associate amrh@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the Equities Section of this Quarterly on page 14 for more details. 2 Please see Global Asset Allocation “GAA Quarterly,” dated March 31, 2016 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see https://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-us-style.pdf 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation “Monthly - January 2019,” dated January 2, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Global Asset Allocation “Monthly - March 2019,” dated March 1, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Global Asset Allocation “Quarterly - July 2018,” dated July 2, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Global Asset Allocation “Quarterly - July 2018,” dated July 2, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “What’s Next For The Dollar?” dated March 15, 2019 available at gis. bcaresearch.com 9 Please see Global Asset Allocation “Quarterly - July 2018,” dated July 2, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see Global Asset Allocation “Monthly Portfolio Update,” dated March 1, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 11 Based on BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy’s bottom-up health monitor. 12 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Can Asset Allocators Rely On Yield Curves?” dated June 15, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation
Highlights Global equities and other risk assets will trade sideways with elevated volatility over the coming weeks before grinding higher for the remainder of the year, as global growth finally accelerates after a series of false starts. We now see the Fed raising rates more slowly than we had previously envisioned, but ultimately having to scramble to hike rates in order to quell inflation. The fed funds rate will probably plateau at 4% in 2021, implying nine quarter-point hikes more than the market is currently discounting. Over a 12-month horizon, investors should overweight global equities, underweight government bonds, and maintain a neutral allocation to cash. The dollar will peak in the second quarter and then weaken over the remainder of the year and into 2020, before starting to strengthen again late next year. Investors should prepare to temporarily upgrade EM and European stocks over the coming weeks, while increasing exposure to cyclical equity sectors. Industrial metals and oil will strengthen over the course of the year. Gold should be bought on any dip. Investors should begin to de-risk their portfolios in late-2020 in anticipation of a recession in 2021. Feature Here We Go Again? After having become more defensive last June, we turned bullish on stocks following the December post-FOMC meeting plunge. As stocks continued to rebound, we tempered our optimism. In the beginning of March, we wrote that “having rallied since the start of the year, global stocks will likely enter a ‘dead zone’ over the next six-to-eight weeks as investors nervously await the proverbial green shoots to sprout.”1 Last Friday’s release of disappointing European PMI data poured some herbicide on the green shoots thesis. Germany’s manufacturing PMI hit a six-year low, with the new orders component registering the weakest reading since the Great Recession. This took the 10-year German bund yield into negative territory for the first time since 2016. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield also fell to a 15-month low, causing the 3-month/10-year curve to invert. Historically, an inverted yield curve has been a reliable predictor of U.S. recessions (Chart 1). Chart 1Yield Curve Inversions, Recessions, And The Term Premium President Trump’s decision to appoint TV commentator Stephen Moore to the Fed’s Board of Governors did not help matters. Recommended by fellow supply-side “economist” Larry Kudlow, Moore is best known for dismissing concerns over the state of the housing market in 2007, his spot-on 2010 prediction that QE would cause hyperinflation, and his belief that the Trump tax cuts would lead to a smaller budget deficit. Global Growth Will Accelerate In The Second Half Of The Year Given all these worrisome developments, is it time to turn cyclically bearish on the economic outlook and risk assets again? We do not think so. While the next few weeks could be challenging for equities – a risk that our MacroQuant model is currently flagging – sentiment should improve as global growth finally accelerates after a series of false starts. Indeed, some positive signs are already visible: The diffusion index of our global leading economic indicator, which tracks the share of countries with rising LEIs, has moved higher (Chart 2). It leads the global LEI. Service sector PMIs have also generally improved, suggesting that the weakness in global growth remains concentrated in trade and manufacturing. And even on the trade front, a few forward-looking indicators such as the Baltic Dry Index and the weekly Harpex shipping index, which measures global container shipping activity, have bounced off their lows. We would downplay the signal from the yield curve, as it currently is severely distorted by a negative term premium. If the 10-year Treasury term premium were back to where it was in 2004, the 3-month/10-year slope would be more than 200 bps steeper, and nobody would be talking about this issue. In fact, given today’s term premium, the curve would have almost certainly inverted in 1995. Anyone who got out of stocks back then would have missed out on one of the greatest bull markets in history. It should also go without saying that some of the decline in the U.S. 10-year yield reflects a positive development: The Fed has turned more dovish! If one looks at the 10-year/30-year portion of the yield curve, it has actually steepened. This is a sign that the market is seeing the Fed’s actions as being reflationary in nature. There is no clear causal mechanism by which an inverted yield curve slows economic activity, apart from it potentially becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy where the yield-curve inversion scares investors, thereby leading to a tightening in financial conditions (Chart 3). Such “doom loops” are conceptually possible, but as we discussed earlier this year, they are unlikely to occur in the current environment.2 At any rate, financial conditions have eased since the start of the year. This should boost growth in the coming months. Chart 2Global Growth May Be ##br##Starting To Stabilize Chart 3Easier Financial Conditions Since The Start Of The Year Bode Well For Global Growth Chinese Credit Growth Set To Rise Global growth has been weighed down by a slowing Chinese economy. Last year’s deleveraging campaign led to a significant deceleration in investment spending, which had negative repercussions for capital equipment and commodity producers all over the world (Chart 4). Historically, China has loosened the reins on the financial sector whenever credit growth has fallen towards nominal GDP growth (Chart 5). It appears we have reached this point. Despite a weak seasonally-distorted February print, credit growth has finally accelerated on a year-over-year basis. Chart 4China: The Deleveraging Campaign Had Adverse Effects On Investment Spending Chart 5Historically, China Has Scaled Back On Deleveraging When Credit Growth Has Fallen Close To Nominal GDP Growth We do not expect Chinese credit growth to rise as much as in past releveraging cycles. However, this is because the economy is in better shape, not because there is some intrinsic constraint to increasing debt from current levels. China’s elevated savings rate has kept interest rates well below trend nominal GDP growth, which is the key determinant of debt sustainability (Chart 6).3 As long as the central government maintains an implicit guarantee on most local and corporate debt, as it is currently doing, default risk will remain minimal. In any case, given that total debt stands at 240% of GDP, even a one percentage-point increase in credit growth would generate a hefty 2.4% of GDP in credit stimulus. The Chinese credit impulse leads imports by about six-to-nine months (Chart 7). This bodes well for global trade in the second half of the year. Chart 6China's High Savings Rate Has Kept Interest Rates Well Below Trend Nominal GDP Growth Chart 7Global Trade Will Benefit From A Chinese Reflationary Impulse A Lull In The Trade War? A de-escalation in the trade war would help matters. As a self-professed master negotiator, Donald Trump needs to secure a deal with China before next year‘s presidential election, while also convincing American voters that the agreement was concluded on favorable terms for the United States. Reaching a deal with China early on in his term would have been risky for Trump if it had failed to bring down the bilateral trade deficit – an entirely likely outcome given how pro-cyclical U.S. fiscal policy is. At this point, however, Trump could crow about making a great deal with China while reassuring voters that the product of his brilliance will be realized only after he has been re-elected. Thus, the likelihood that Trump will seek to strike a deal has risen. For their part, the Chinese want as much negotiating leverage as they can muster. This means being able to convincingly demonstrate that their economy is strong enough to handle the repercussions from turning down a trade deal that fails to serve their interests. Since the credit cycle is the dominant driver of Chinese growth, this requires putting the deleveraging campaign on the backburner. Faster Global Growth And Stronger Domestic Demand Will Benefit Europe Stronger Chinese growth will help the European export sector later this year. The export component of the Chinese Caixin PMI has moved up from its lows. It leads the euro area PMI by about three months. Meanwhile, euro area domestic demand will benefit from a more accommodative fiscal policy and lower bond yields. The decline in bond yields will be especially helpful to Italy. The spike in yields and loss of business confidence following the election of a populist government last March plunged the economy into recession (Chart 8). Now that the 10-year BTP yield has fallen more than 100 bps from its highs, the Italian economy should start to perk up. The ECB will not raise rates this year even if domestic growth speeds up, but the market will probably price in a few rate hikes in 2020 and beyond. This will allow for a modest re-steepening of yield curves in core European bond markets, which should be positive for long-suffering bank profits. Brexit remains a concern. The ongoing saga has reached the farcical stage where: 1) The U.K. has voted to leave the EU; but 2) Parliament has voted to stay in the EU unless it reaches a satisfactory deal with Brussels; while 3) rejecting the only deal with Brussels that was on offer. Given that most British voters no longer want Brexit (Chart 9), we think that the government will kick the proverbial can down the road until a second referendum is announced or a “soft Brexit” deal is formulated. Either outcome would be welcomed by markets. Chart 8Italian Bond Yields Are A Headwind No More Chart 9U.K.: In The Case Of A Do-Over, The Remain Side Would Likely Win What Will The Fed Do? Last year’s “Christmas Crash” clearly shifted the Fed’s reaction function in a more dovish direction. We do not expect Jay Powell to raise rates over the next few months, but a reacceleration in global growth is likely to prompt the Fed to tighten anew in December. The Fed will continue raising rates once per quarter in 2020, before accelerating the pace of tightening in 2021 in response to rising inflation. In all, we see the fed funds rate increasing to around 4% by the end of this cycle. This represents nine quarter-point hikes more than the market is currently discounting (Chart 10). We were stopped out of our short fed funds futures trade, but we recommend that clients short the June-2021 fed funds futures or a similar instrument. The U.S. Economy: Great Again Fundamentally, the U.S. economy is on solid ground and can handle higher interest rates. Unlike a decade ago, the housing market is in good shape (Chart 11). The homeowner vacancy rate stands near a record low. Judging by FICO scores, the quality of mortgage lending remains high. The labor market is also firm, with job openings hitting another record high in February (Chart 12). The combination of a healthy housing and labor market is invariably good for consumers. Chart 11U.S. Housing Fundamentals Are Solid Chart 12The U.S. Labor Market Is Firm The personal savings rate currently stands at 7.6%, notably higher than one would expect based on the ratio of household net worth-to-disposable income (Chart 13). A decline in the savings rate would allow consumer spending to increase more quickly than income. With the latter being propped up by rising wages, this will be bullish for consumption. Capital spending intentions have dipped over the past few months, but remain elevated by historic standards (Chart 14). The real nonresidential capital stock has grown by an average of only 1.7% since the start of the recovery, down from 3% in the pre-recession period (Chart 15). A cyclical upswing in productivity growth, rising labor costs, and low levels of spare capacity should all motivate businesses to invest in new plant and equipment. Chart 14Capital Spending Intentions Have Softened, But Remain Elevated Chart 15There Is Room For More U.S. Capital Investment Corporate Debt: How Much Of A Risk? Chart 16U.S. Corporate Debt Is Not Extreme By Global Standards Corporate debt levels have increased significantly in recent years, while underwriting standards have deteriorated, as evidenced by the proliferation of covenant-lite loans. Nevertheless, the situation is far from dire. Relative to other countries, U.S. corporate debt is quite low (Chart 16). At 143% of GDP, corporate debt in France is twice that of the United States. This is not to suggest that everything is fine in the French corporate sector; but the fact is that France has not had a corporate debt crisis. This signals that the U.S. is not at imminent risk of one either. Netting out cash, U.S. corporate debt as a share of GDP is at the same level it was in 1989, a year in which the fed funds rate was close to nine percent. The ratio of corporate net debt-to-EBITD remains reasonably low. The interest coverage ratio is above its historic average. In addition, corporate assets have also risen quite briskly over the past few years, which has kept the corporate debt-to-asset ratio broadly stable (Chart 17). The corporate sector financial balance – the difference between corporate income and spending – is still in positive territory at 1% of GDP. Every recession in the past 50 years began when the corporate sector financial balance was in deficit (Chart 18). Chart 17U.S. Corporate Debt: How High? Chart 18Corporate Sector Financial Balance Still In Surplus Unlike mortgages, which are often held by leveraged institutions, most corporate debt is held by unleveraged players such as pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, and ETFs. Bank loans account for only 18% of nonfinancial corporate sector debt, down from 40% in 1980 (Chart 19). The share of leveraged loans held by banks has declined from about 25% a decade ago to less than 10% today. Moreover, banks today hold much more high-quality capital than in the past (Chart 20). This makes corporate debt less systemically important for the economy. Chart 19Banks Have Reduced Their Exposure To The Corporate Sector Chart 20U.S. Banks Are Well Capitalized One of the reasons we turned more bullish on risk assets in December was because stocks had plunged and corporate spreads widened without much follow-through in financial stress indices. For example, the infamous TED spread barely budged (Chart 21). Chart 21TED Spreads Are Well Behaved, Indicating No Major Signs Of Financial Stress Everyone Agrees With Larry Given the lack of major imbalances in the U.S. economy, why do investors believe that the Fed cannot raise rates further even though the Fed funds rate in real terms is barely above zero? The answer is that investors appear to have bought into Larry Summers’ secular stagnation thesis, which posits that the neutral rate of interest is much lower today than it was in the past. We have some sympathy for this thesis, but it is important to remember that it is a theory about the long-term determinants of interest rates such as productivity and demographic trends. The theory says little about the cyclical drivers of interest rates, including the amount of spare capacity in the economy, the stance of fiscal policy, credit growth, and wage trends. Earlier this decade, when we were still very bullish on bonds, one could have plausibly argued that the economy needed extremely low interest rates: The output gap was still large; the deleveraging cycle had just begun; home and equity prices were depressed; wage growth was anemic; and fiscal policy had turned restrictive after a brief burst of stimulus during the Great Recession. Far From Neutral? All of the forces mentioned above have either fully or partially reversed course over the past few years. Take fiscal policy as one example. The IMF estimates that the U.S. structural budget deficit averaged 3.3% of GDP in 2014-15. In 2019-20, the IMF reckons the deficit will average 5.6% of GDP. To what extent has easier fiscal policy raised the U.S. neutral rate of interest? Let us conservatively assume that every $1 of additional fiscal stimulus adds $1 to aggregate demand. In this case, fiscal policy has added 2.3% of GDP to aggregate demand over the past five years. Suppose that a one-percentage point increase in aggregate demand raises the neutral rate of interest by 1%, which is in line with the specification of the Taylor Rule that former Fed Chair Janet Yellen favored. This implies that fiscal policy alone has raised the neutral rate by over two percentage points. The discussion above suggests that cyclical factors may have pushed up the neutral rate considerably, even if long-term structural factors are still dragging it down. Since the Fed is supposed to set interest rates with an eye on what is appropriate for the economy over the next year or two, rates may end up staying too low for too long. This will cause the economy to overheat, eventually leading to a surge in inflation. The Inflation Boogeyman The good news is that none of our favorite indicators point to a major imminent inflationary upswing (Chart 22): Despite higher tariffs, consumer import price inflation has slowed; core intermediate producer price inflation has decelerated; the prices paid components of the ISM and regional Fed surveys have plunged; inflation surprise indices have rolled over; and both survey and market-based measures of inflation expectations remain below where they were last summer. In keeping with these developments, BCA’s proprietary Pipeline Inflation Indicator has fallen to a two-and-a-half-year low. Wage growth has accelerated, but productivity growth has increased by even more. As a result, unit labor cost inflation has been coming down since the middle of last year. Unit labor costs lead core CPI inflation by about 12 months (Chart 23). This implies that consumer price inflation is unlikely to reach uncomfortably high levels at least until the second half of next year. Chart 22No Symptoms of An Imminent Major Inflationary Upswing In The U.S. ... Chart 23... And Decelerating Unit Labor Costs Will Dampen Inflationary Pressures For The Time Being At that point, risks are high that inflation will move up. This could force the Fed to start raising rates aggressively in early-2021, a course of action that will push up the dollar and cause equities and spread product to sell off. The resulting tightening in financial conditions will probably plunge the U.S. and the rest of the world into recession in mid-to-late 2021. Stay Bullish Global Equities For Now, Turn Defensive Late Next Year Chart 24Analyst Expectations Are Quite Muted The two-stage Fed tightening cycle discussed above – gradual rate hikes starting in December and continuing into 2020, and more aggressive hikes thereafter in response to rising inflation – shapes our investment views over the next few years. The Key Financial Market Forecasts Chart at the beginning of this publication provides a rough sketch of where we think the main asset classes are heading. We suspect that equities and other risk assets will be able to digest the first stage of rate tightening, albeit with heightened volatility around the time when the Fed starts preparing the market for another hike later this year. Unlike last September, earnings estimates are much more conservative. Bottom-up estimates foresee EPS rising by 3.9% in the U.S. and 5.4% in the rest of the world in 2019 (Chart 24). The combination of faster growth, easier financial conditions, and ongoing share buybacks implies some upside to these numbers. Perhaps more importantly, unlike in September, the Fed will only start hiking rates if the economy is performing well. Powell erred in saying that “rates were a long way from neutral” just when the U.S. economy was starting to slow. Had he uttered those words when U.S. growth was still accelerating, investors would have probably disregarded them. Jay Powell won’t make the same mistake again. Rather, he will make a different one: He will let the economy overheat to the point where the Fed finds itself clearly behind the curve and forced to scramble to catch up. The resulting stagflationary environment – where growth is slowing due to a shortage of available workers and inflation is on the upswing – will be toxic for equities and other risk assets. While it is difficult to be precise about timing, we recommend that investors maintain a modestly pro-risk stance over the next 12-to-18 months. However, they should pare back exposure to equities and spread product late next year before the Fed ramps up the pace of rate hikes. Prepare To Temporarily Upgrade International Stocks The U.S. stock market tends to be “low beta” compared to other bourses. If global growth accelerates in the second half of this year, international stocks will outperform their U.S. counterparts. We sold our put on the EEM ETF for a gain of 104% on Jan 3rd, and now recommend being outright long EM equities. We will be looking to upgrade both EM and European equities to overweight in the coming weeks in currency-unhedged terms once we see more confirmatory evidence of a global growth revival. We have mixed feeling about Japanese stocks. Stronger global growth will benefit Japanese multinationals, but firms focused on the domestic market may suffer if the government goes ahead and raises the sales tax in October. We would hold off upgrading Japanese stocks for the time being. At the global sector level, we pared back our defensive tilt earlier this year, after having turned more cautious last summer. We recommend that investors overweight energy and industrials. We are also warming up to financials and materials. The former will benefit from a steepening in yield curves later this year as well as from faster credit growth. The latter will gain from a more robust Chinese economy. We would maintain a neutral allocation to health care, info tech, and communication services. Real estate and utilities will both suffer once bond yields start moving higher. Classically defensive sectors such as consumer staples will also underperform. Global Bond Yields Likely To Rise Global bond yields are likely to rise over the next 12-to-18 months as growth surprises on the upside. Yields will continue rising into the first half of 2021 as inflation accelerates. Unlike in past risk-off episodes, Treasurys will not provide much of a safe haven in the lead up to the next recession. As noted above, one of the reasons that bond yields are so low today is because the term premium is very depressed. The cumulative effect of Fed bond purchases has probably depressed the term premium, but the bigger impact has stemmed from the fact that investors see Treasurys as an insurance policy against various macro risks. Investors are accustomed to thinking that when an economy slides into recession, equity prices will fall, the housing market will deteriorate, wage gains will recede, job prospects will worsen, but at least the value of their bond portfolio will go up! The problem with this reasoning is that it is only valid when the Fed is hiking rates in response to stronger growth. If the Fed is hiking rates because inflation is getting out of hand, Treasury yields could end up rising while stocks are falling. This was actually the norm between the late-1960s and early-2000s (Chart 25). Chart 25Treasury Yields Could Rise While Stocks Fall If Treasurys lose their safe-haven status, the term premium will move higher. A vicious circle could develop where rising bond yields weaken the stock market, causing investors to flood out of both stocks and bonds and into cash, leading to even higher bond yields and lower equity prices. Investors should maintain a modest short duration stance towards Treasurys over the next 12 months, and then move to maximum underweight duration in mid-2020 as inflation starts to break out. Going long duration will only make sense once the Fed has raised interest rates into restrictive territory and the economy slides into recession. That is not likely to occur until the second half of 2021. Regionally, we favor European, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, and especially Japanese government bonds over the next 12 months relative to U.S. Treasurys. The U.S. economy is at the greatest risk of overheating. In currency-hedged terms, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield is among the lowest in the world (Table 1). Japanese 10-year bonds, for example, offer 2.72% in currency-hedged terms, while German bunds command 2.94%. Table 1Bond Markets Across The Developed World The U.S. Dollar: Heading Towards A Soft Patch Gauging the outlook for the U.S. dollar is a bit tricky. Even though the Fed will only be raising rates gradually over the next 12 months, it will still hike more than what is discounted by markets. With most other central banks still sitting on the sidelines, short-term rate differentials are likely to move in favor of the greenback. That said, aside from Japan, stronger global growth will likely prompt investors to price in a few more rate hikes in other developed economies in 2020 and beyond. Consequently, long-term yield differentials may not widen by as much as short-term differentials. Perhaps more importantly, the U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it moves in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart 26). This countercyclicality stems from the fact that the U.S. economy is more geared towards services than manufacturing compared with the rest of the world (Chart 27). As such, when global growth accelerates, capital tends to flow from the U.S. to the rest of the world, translating into more demand for foreign currency and less demand for dollars. Chart 26The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 27The U.S. Is A Low-Beta Play On Global Growth If global growth picks up in the back half of this year, the dollar will likely peak in the second quarter and weaken over the remainder of 2019 and into 2020. The dollar’s trajectory may thus follow a similar course to the one in 2017, a year in which the Fed raised rates four times, but the broad trade-weighted dollar nevertheless managed to weaken by 7%. Chart 28The Yen Is A Risk-Off Currency As was the case in 2017, the euro will probably gain ground later this year against the U.S. dollar as will most EM and commodity currencies. However, just as the Japanese yen failed to participate in the rally that most currencies experienced against the dollar in 2017, it will struggle to gain much traction against the greenback. The yen is a “risk-off” currency and thus tends to fall whenever global risk assets rally (Chart 28). In addition, the yen will suffer if global bond yields move up relative to JGB yields later this year, as will likely be the case if the BoJ is forced to prolong its yield curve control regime in the face of tighter fiscal policy. We would go long EUR/JPY on any break below 123. After First Weakening, The Dollar Will Rally Again Late Next Year As the U.S. economy encounters ever more supply-side constraints in 2020, growth will slow and inflation will accelerate. The Fed will respond by hiking rates more quickly than inflation is rising. The resulting increase in real interest rates will put upward pressure on the dollar. In this stagflationary environment, equities will tumble and credit spreads will widen. Tighter U.S. financial conditions will reverberate around the world, causing global growth to decelerate even more than it would have otherwise. This will further turbocharge the dollar. The greenback will only peak once the Fed starts cutting rates in late-2021. Commodities: Getting More Bullish A weaker dollar later this year, along with stronger global growth led by a resurgent China, will be bullish for commodities. BCA’s commodity strategists recommend going long copper at current prices. They are also maintaining their bullish bias towards oil. They expect Brent to average $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl in 2020. Higher U.S. shale output will be offset by delays in building out deepwater export facilities, which will keep supply fairly tight. In past reports, we discussed the merits of buying gold as an inflation hedge. However, we held back from doing so because of our bullish dollar view. Now that we see the dollar peaking over the next few months, we would be buyers of gold on any break below $1275/ounce. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Gretzky’s Doctrine,” dated March 1, 2019. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Low Odds Of An FCI Doom Loop,” dated January 4, 2019. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Is There Really Too Much Government Debt In The World?” dated February 22, 2019. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Following last week’s dovish FOMC meeting, the OIS curve has moved to expect lower interest rates. This has dragged down Treasury rates to below 2.4%, raising the specter of an incoming wave of mortgage refinancing. In order to hedge this prepayment risk,…
Highlights For the Eurostoxx50 to outperform the S&P500, the big euro area banks have to outperform the big U.S. tech stocks. Tactically overweight Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 as well as other pro-cyclical positions such as overweight EM versus DM… …but prepare to take profits in the summer months. In the medium term, the euro area versus U.S. long-bond yield spread has plenty of scope to compress from its current -180 bps… …and EUR/USD has the scope to head higher. Feature Without a shadow of a doubt, the chart that causes the greatest stir among our clients is the Chart of the Week. It shows that one of the biggest investment decisions, the choice between the euro area and U.S. equity markets, reduces to the choice between the three large euro area banks – Santander, BNP Paribas, and ING – and the three U.S. tech behemoths – Apple, Microsoft, and Google. Chart of the WeekEurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 Is Just 3 Banks Vs. 3 Tech Stocks! Clients are simultaneously amazed and unsettled by this manifestation of the Pareto Principle, which states that the vast majority of an effect is explained by a tiny minority of causes. Financials feature large in the Eurostoxx50 while tech giants dominate the S&P500. But the amazing thing is that almost all of the relative performance can be explained by just three stocks in each market. The vast majority of an effect is explained by a tiny minority of causes. The chart creates a cognitive dissonance. What about the things that are supposed to matter for stock market selection: relative economic growth, profits growth, margins, valuations and geopolitics? The answer is that all of these are interesting areas of study, but they are mere details in the big picture. For the Eurostoxx50 to outperform the S&P500, the big euro area banks have to outperform the big U.S. tech stocks (Chart I-2). Period. Chart 2For The Eurostoxx50 To Outperform The S&P500, Euro Area Banks Have To Outperform U.S. Tech Our view is that in the immediate future this is certainly possible, but that over the long haul it will prove to be a very tall order. When The Mean Is Meaningless The structural performances of vastly different equity sectors can diverge for a very long time. How long? Japanese banks have underperformed U.S. tech for thirty years and counting! In this situation, mean-reversion and ‘standard deviations’ from the mean become meaningless concepts (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Japanese Banks Have Underperformed U.S. Tech For Thirty Years And Counting! The statistical concept of a standard deviation is only meaningful if the underlying data is stationary, which is to say mean-reverting. If it isn’t, then it is impossible to say that a sector price or valuation is stretched either versus another sector, or versus its own history. One problem is that sector performances and valuations undergo phase-shifts when they enter a different economic climate. The structural outlook for bank profits experiences a phase-shift when a debt super-cycle ends. Therefore, comparing a bank valuation after a debt super-cycle with the valuation during a debt super-cycle is as meaningless as comparing your height as an adult to your height when you were a child! Sector performances and valuations undergo phase-shifts when they enter a different economic climate. To which, a frequent riposte is: within the same sector, euro area companies appear cheaper than their counterparts elsewhere in the world. But again, this apparent value is deceptive because it is simply an adjustment for the so-called ‘currency translation effect’ and the anticipated long-term moves in exchange rates. If investors anticipate the euro ultimately to strengthen – because they see that it is trading well below purchasing power parity – then a multinational company listed on a euro area bourse will suffer a future headwind to its mixed-currency denominated profits when they are translated back to a stronger euro. To discount this anticipated headwind, the euro area multinational must trade cheaper compared with a peer in, say, the U.S. But the cheapness is a false impression. Pulling together these complexities of sector effects, phase-shifts in sector valuations and currency effects, making the big call between Europe and America on the basis of performance or valuation mean-reversion is dangerous. Instead, we come back to the basic question: should you tilt towards euro area financials or towards U.S. tech? Own Banks For The Short Term Only Japanese financial sector profits peaked in 1990 and stand at less than half that level today. Euro area financial sector profits peaked in 2007, and are tracking the Japanese experience with a 17-year lag. If euro area financial profits continue to follow in Japan’s footsteps, expect no sustained growth through the next 17 years (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Euro Area Financial Profits Are Following Japanese Footsteps In a post credit boom era, banks lose the lifeblood of their business: credit creation. This loss becomes a multi-decade headwind to financial sector profit growth and share price performance. Bank profits are dependent on two other drivers. One is operational leverage – the amount of equity held against the balance sheet. More stringent European regulation is making this a headwind too. Banks have to hold more equity capital against assets, diluting their profitability. The other driver is the net interest margin – the difference between rates received on loans and rates paid on deposits. In this regard, both fintech and the blockchain are likely to create a further headwind to bank profitability. Japan’s experience suggests that euro area financials will struggle to outperform structurally. Admittedly, U.S. tech may also face its own headwinds or phase-shift, most obviously antitrust lawsuits to counter its near-monopoly status. But even allowing for this, Japan’s experience suggests that euro area financials will struggle to outperform structurally. Rather, financials is a sector to play for outperformance phases lasting no more than a few quarters. Last autumn, we noted that short-term credit impulses in the major economies were flipping from a sharp down-oscillation into an up-oscillation phase (Chart I-5). On that basis, we recommended a tactical overweight to Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 as well as other pro-cyclical positions such as overweight EM versus DM. Those pro-cyclical sector positions have broadly succeeded, but they are still appropriate given that up-oscillation phases very reliably last around nine months. Chart I-5Short-Term Credit Impulses Have Flipped To Up-Oscillations The caveat is: prepare to take profits in the summer months. The Fed Is Now At ‘Neutral’, But Where Is The ECB? Last week, the Federal Reserve confirmed that “the Federal funds rate (at 2.5 percent) is now in the broad range of estimates of neutral – the rate that tends neither to stimulate nor to restrain the economy.” This begs the question: where is the ECB policy rate (now at 0 percent) relative to its neutral? Our very high conviction view is that the ECB policy rate is well below neutral. Financials is a sector to play for outperformance phases lasting no more than a few quarters. The twenty year life of the euro captures multiple manias and crises, some centred in Europe, some in the U.S. Through these twenty years, the euro area versus U.S. long bond yield spread has averaged -50 bps1 (Chart I-6). Over this same period, the euro area versus U.S. annual inflation differential has also averaged -50 bps (Chart I-7). Ergo, the real interest rate differential has averaged zero. Meaning, the ex-post neutral real interest rates in the euro area and the U.S. have been exactly the same. Chart I-6The Euro Area Vs. U.S. Yield Spread Has Averaged -50 Bps... Chart I-7...The Euro Area Vs. U.S. Inflation Spread Has Also Averaged -50 Bps With little difference in the neutral real rates over the past two decades, is there a valid reason to expect a difference in the future? An obvious response is the fragility of the euro area’s banking system will require the ECB to persist with its zero interest rate policy for years. In Germany and France, bank lending is healthy, and could easily weather modestly tighter monetary policy. In fact, the evidence suggests that this fear is exaggerated. In Germany and France, bank lending is healthy, and could easily weather modestly tighter monetary policy (Chart I-8). The problem has been localised in Italy, where bank lending relapsed once again in 2018. Chart I-8Bank Lending Is Healthy In Germany And France However, on closer examination this was a direct result of political tensions. Recently, Italian bank lending has been a very tight (inverse) function of the Italian bond yield. The BTP yield spiked last year when Rome escalated its budget spat with Brussels, and bank lending took a hard hit. But now that the Italian bond yield has retraced, lending should recover (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Italian Bank Lending Should Recover Now That The Bond Yield Has Come Down The central issue is can the U.S. policy rate – which is at neutral – and the ECB policy – which is below neutral – diverge much from here? Our high conviction answer is no. Therefore, in the medium term, the euro area versus U.S. long-bond yield spread has plenty of scope to compress from its current -180 bps, one way or the other (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Can Interest Rate Expectations Diverge Much From Here? It also implies that after remaining range-bound in the immediate future, EUR/USD has the scope to head higher. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System This week’s recommended trade is to go long SEK/NOK, as it is close to the limit of tight liquidity that has signaled many previous technical reversals in this currency cross. Set a profit target of 1.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, the on-going rally in government bonds caused the short position in 30-year T-bonds to hit its stop-loss. This leaves us with five open positions. Long SEK/NOK. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Calculated from the over 10-year government bond yield: euro area average, weighted by sovereign issue size, less U.S. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations