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Special Report Highlights Three factors point to stable or narrower USD cross-currency basis swap spreads: the improving health of global banks, the end of the adjustment to the regulatory change affecting prime-money market funds, and the relaxation to the Supplementary Leverage Ratio rules by the U.S. Treasury. Four factors point to wider basis swap spreads: BCA's forecast that U.S. loan growth will pick up, our view on U.S. inflation, the coming decline in the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, and the potential for U.S. repatriation. We expect USD basis swap spreads to widen again, which suggests increasing FX vol. This would hurt carry trades, EM currencies and dollar bloc currencies. Feature Three factors point to stable or narrower USD cross-currency basis swap spreads: the improving health of global banks, the end of the adjustment to the regulatory change affecting prime-money market funds, and the relaxation to the Supplementary Leverage Ratio rules by the U.S. Treasury. Four factors point to wider basis swap spreads: BCA's forecast that U.S. loan growth will pick up, our view on U.S. inflation, the coming decline in the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, and the potential for U.S. repatriation. We expect USD basis swap spreads to widen again, which suggests increasing FX vol. This would hurt carry trades, EM currencies and dollar bloc currencies. The rather arcane topic of cross-currency basis swap spreads has periodically surfaced in the news in the past few years. The widening in cross-currency basis swap spreads has been highlighted as one of the key factors explaining why covered interest rate parity relationships (the link between the price of FX forward, spot prices and interest rate differentials) have not held as closely after the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) as before. The widening of cross-currency basis swap spreads has also been highlighted as a factor behind the strength in the U.S. dollar in 2014 and 2015. Similarly, the recent narrowing in the cross-currency basis swap spread has been highlighted as a factor behind the weakness in the USD this year. This week we delve a little deeper into what cross-currency basis swap spread measures, and what some of its major determinants are. We ultimately expect the USD cross-currency basis swap spread to widen again, which should contribute to a stronger dollar and increased global FX volatility. What Is A Cross-Currency Basis Swap? To examine what drives cross-currency basis swap spreads, one first needs to understand what these instruments are. Let's begin with a regular FX swap. An FX swap in EUR/USD is a contract through which two counterparties agree to exchange EURs for USDs today, with a reversal of that exchange at the maturity of the contract - a reversal set at a predetermined exchange rate simply equal to the forward value of the EUR/USD. So, if counterparty A lends X million EURs to counterparty B, the former receives in U.S. dollars the equivalent of X million EURs times the prevalent EUR/USD spot rate from counterparty B today. The transaction does not end there. Simultaneously, the FX swap forces B to give back the X million EURs to counterparty A at maturity, while counterparty A gives back X million EUR times the EUR/USD forward rate in U.S. dollars to counterparty B. This forward rate is the rate prevalent when the contract was agreed upon. The transactions are illustrated in the top panel of Chart 1. Chart 1FX Swaps Vs. Cross Currency Basis Swaps The problem with regular FX swaps is that they offer little liquidity at extended maturities. If market players want to hedge long-term liabilities and assets, they tend to do so using a cross-currency basis swap, where much more liquidity is available at long maturities. Chart 2A Bigger Funding Gap = ##br##A Wider Basis Swap Spread A EUR/USD cross currency basis swap begins in the same way as a regular FX swap: counterparty A lends X million EURs to counterparty B, and the former receives in U.S. dollars the equivalent of X million EURs times the prevalent EUR/USD spot rate from counterparty B today. However, this is where the similarities end. A cross-currency basis swap has exchanges of cash flows through its term. Counterparty B, which provided USDs to counterparty A, receives 3-month USD Libor, while counterparty A, which provided EURs to counterparty B, received 3-month EUR Libor + a (alpha being the cross-currency basis swap spread). At the maturity of the contract, counterparty A and B both receive their regular intermediary cash flows, and also re-exchange their respective principal - but this time at the same spot rate as the one that existed at the entry of the contract (Chart 1, bottom panel). In both regular FX and cross-currency basis swaps, counterparties have removed their FX risks, except that in the latter, the interest differentials have been paid during the life of the contract instead of being factored through the forward premium/discount. This is fine and dandy, but it leaves a unexplained. The cross currency basis swap spread (a), is a direct function of the relative supply and demand for each currency. If investors demand a lot of EUR in the swap market relative to its supply, a will be positive. If they demand more USDs, a will be negative. A good example of this dynamic is the funding gap of banks. Let's take the Japanese example. Japanese banks have a surplus of domestic deposits (thanks to the massive savings of the Japanese corporate sector) relative to their yen lending. As a result, they have large dollar lending operations. To hedge their dollar assets, Japanese banks borrow USD in large quantities in the cross-currency swap market. This tends to result in a negative swap spread in the yen (Chart 2). This is particularly true if both the banking sector and the other actors in the economy (institutional investors and non-financial firms) also borrow dollars in the swap market to hedge dollar assets, which is the case in Japan (Chart 3). Chart 3Japanese Investors Are Accumulating Assets Abroad Additionally, if there are perceived solvency risks in the European banking sector, this should further weigh on the cross-currency basis swap spread, pushing it deeper into negative territory, as the viability of the main EUR counterparties becomes at risk. The same dance is true for any currency pair. Chart 4The Structural Gap In The Basis Swap Spread##br## Reflects Regulation The other factor that affects USD cross-currency basis swap spreads is the supply of U.S. dollars, especially the room on large banks' balance sheets to service these markets. The cross-currency basis swap spread could be close to zero if large arbitrageurs take offsetting positions to arbitrage the spread away, doing so until the spread disappears. However, with the imposition of Basel III and Dodd-Franks, banks have been constrained in their capacity to do this. Indeed, increased leverage ratio requirements (now banks need to post more capital behind repo transactions as well as collateralized lending and other derivatives) mean that arbitraging cross-currency basis swap spreads and deviations from covered interest rate parity has become much more expensive. Furthermore, the increase in Tier 1 capital ratios associated with these regulations has forced banks to de-lever; however, engaging in arbitrage activities still requires plenty of leverage (Chart 4). Economic Factors Driving The Spread The factors that we look at essentially relate to the supply of USD available for lending in offshore markets, as well as determinants of relative counterparty risks between the U.S. and the rest of the world. Factors Arguing For Narrower Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads Global Banks Health The price-to-book ratio of global banks outside the U.S. has been largely correlated with USD cross-currency swap spreads. When global banks get de-rated, spreads widen, and it becomes more expensive to hedge USD positions in the swap market (Chart 5). This is because as investors perceive the solvency of global banks deteriorating, they impose a penalty as the Herstatt risk increases. Additionally, solvency problems can force banks to scramble to access USD funding, prompting deeper spreads. Chart 5Banks Perceived Health Determines ##br##Basis Swap Spreads BCA is positive on global financials and sees continued improvement in European NPLs. This means that solvency risk concerns are likely to remain on the backburner for now, pointing to narrower basis swap spreads. Supplementary Leverage Ratio Changes In June, the U.S. Treasury announced a relaxation of some of its rules on supplementary leverage ratios, lowering the amount of capital required to support activity in the repo market behind initial margins for centrally cleared derivatives, and behind holdings of Treasurys. This means that commercial banks in the U.S. can have bigger balance sheets and more room to engage in arbitrage activity, implying a greater supply of dollars in the USD cross-currency basis swap market. In response to last June's proposal, basis swap spreads narrowed by 11 basis points. BCA believes these changes will continue to support dollar liquidity, and will further help in narrowing cross-currency basis swap spreads. Prime Money-Market Funds Debacle Is Over Chart 6More Expensive Bank Funding Equals ##br##Wider Basis Swap Spreads In October 2016, regulatory changes were implemented that allowed prime money market funds to have fluctuating net asset values. Obviously, this meant that prime money-market funds would be not-so-prime anymore. As a result, to remain the ultra-safe vehicles that they once were, prime money-market funds de-risked. As a result, they cut their exposure to risky activities in anticipation of these changes. In practice, a key source of short-term funding for banks evaporated from the market, putting upward pressure on bank financing costs. As the LIBOR-OIS spread increased, so did basis-swap spreads (Chart 6): as it became more expensive for banks to finance themselves, they had to curtail the supply of USDs provided to the swap market, an activity normally requiring intense demand on banks' balance sheets. This adjustment is now over, suggesting limited potential widening in USD basis swap spreads. Factors Arguing For Wider Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads 1. U.S. Loan Growth When U.S. banks increase their loan formation activity, USD cross-currency basis swap spreads widen (Chart 7). As banks increase their extension of credit through loans, they decrease the amount of securities they hold on their balance sheets (Chart 8). This means there is less supply of liquidity available for balance sheet activities, particularly providing dollar funding in the offshore market. In the Basel III / Dodd-Frank world, less-liquid bank balance sheets are synonymous with wider USD basis-swap spreads. As we argued last week, increasing U.S. capex, easing lending standards for firms and rising household income levels should result in increasing loan growth in the U.S. which will result in lower abundance of liquid assets and a widening basis swap spreads.1 Chart 7More Bank Loans Lead To Wider Swap Spreads Chart 8More Debt Equals Less Securities In Bank Credit 2. U.S. Inflation There is a fairly close relationship between U.S. inflation and the USD basis swap spread, where a higher core CPI tends to lead to a wider spread (Chart 9). The fall in U.S. inflation this year likely contributed to the narrowing in basis swap spreads. Our take on this is that as inflation falls, it gives an incentive for banks to hold low-yielding liquidity on their balance sheets as real returns on cash improve. This fuels a gigantic carry trade through the basis-swap market. We expect inflation to pick up meaningfully by mid-2018, which should widen cross-currency basis swap spreads.2 3. Central Bank Balance Sheets When the Federal Reserve increases the size of its balance sheet relative to other balance sheets, this tends to lead to a narrowing of the USD basis swap spread as the global supply of dollars relative to other currencies increases. The opposite is also true. This relationship did not work after late 2016 (Chart 10). However, during that episode, as the change in prime money-market funds caused a dislocation in banks' funding, commercial banks exhibited cautious behavior and increased their reserves with the Fed. As Chart 11 illustrates, there is a tight relationship between the change in commercial banks' reserves held at the Fed and cross-currency basis swap spreads. Going forward, as the Fed lets it balance sheet run off, we expect to see a decrease in commercial banks' excess reserves. This could contribute to upward movement in the basis swap spread. Chart 9When U.S. Inflation Increases, ##br##Swap Spreads Widen Chart 10Smaller Fed Balance Sheet Leads To##br## Wider Basis Swap Spreads Chart 11Fed Runoff Could##br## Widen Basis Swap Spreads 4. U.S. Repatriations The most revealing relationship unearthed in our study was that when U.S. entities repatriate funds at home, this tends to put strong widening pressure on the USD cross-currency basis swap spread (Chart 12). U.S. businesses hold large cash piles abroad - by some estimates more than US$2.5 trillion. However, most of these funds are held in highly liquid, high-quality U.S.-dollar assets offshore. These assets are perfect collaterals for various transactions in the interbank market. The funds held abroad by U.S. firms are a source of supply for U.S. dollars in the offshore markets. When U.S. entities bring assets back home, the widening in the basis swap spread essentially reflects a decline in the supply of USD in offshore markets, and vice versa when Americans export capital abroad. Chart 12U.s. Repatriations Support Wider Basis Swap Spreads BCA's base case is that tax cuts are likely to hit the U.S. economy in 2018, even if the growing feud between Trump and the establishment Republican party members is a growing risk. BCA still views a tax repatriation as a higher-likelihood event, as it is the easiest way for the U.S. government to bring funds into its coffers. The 2004 tax repatriation under former President George W. Bush did result in substantial fund repatriation in the U.S. This time will not be different. We expect any such tax repatriation to cause a potentially large deficit of supply in the USD offshore markets, which could create a strong widening basis on the cross-currency basis swap spread in favor of the dollar. Bottom Line: Three factors argue for USD cross-currency basis swap spreads to stay at current levels, or even narrow further. These factors are the health of global banks, the easing in U.S. supplementary leverage ratios and the end of the adjustment of U.S. bank funding to new regulations affecting prime money-market funds. On the other hand four factors points to wider USD cross-currency basis swap spreads: BCA's positive outlook for U.S. credit growth; BCA's positive outlook on U.S. inflation; the run-off of the Fed's balance sheet; and the potential for U.S. entities repatriating funds from abroad. Potential Direction And Investment Implications We anticipate USD cross-currency basis swap spreads to widen over the coming 12 months. We think the easing in the Supplementary Leverage Ratios rules by the U.S. Treasury is the most important factor pointing to narrower USD cross-currency basis swap spreads. However, Basel III rules and most of Dodd-Frank are still in place, which suggest there remains large constraints on the balance-sheet activities of global banks, which will limit the potential for a narrowing of the USD basis swap spread as U.S. banks will remain constrained in their ability to supply U.S. dollars in the offshore market. On the other hand many factors support wider USD cross-currency basis swap spreads, most important of which is the potential for more credit growth. This is in our view a very strong force as it requires banks to ration the use of their balance sheets, limiting their activity in the offshore market. Moreover, we do foresee a high probability of tax repatriation, which would put strong widening pressure on the swap spreads. In terms of implications, wider USD basis swap spreads tend to be associated with rising FX vols (Chart 13). As we highlighted in a Special Report last year, higher FX vols are poison for carry trades.3 As such, we think that widening swap spreads could spur a period of trouble for traditional carry currencies. This means EM and dollar-block currencies are likely to suffer in this environment. Chart 13Wider Basis Swap Spreads Equals Higher Vol Additionally, in China, Xi Jinping is consolidating power and has taken control of the Politburo. This implies he now has more room to implement reforms. Removal of growth targets after 2020, removal of growth as a criterion for grading local officials, a focus on balanced growth, and a focus on combatting pollution all suggest that Chinese growth is unlikely to follow the same debt-fueled, capex-led model.4 This will weigh on Chinese imports of raw materials, and hurt export volumes and prices for many EM countries and commodities producers. This means these policies represent a headwind for many carry currencies. Moreover, historically, wider USD funding costs have been associated with a stronger dollar, as it makes it more expensive to hedge dollar assets. Thus, in an environment where U.S. interest rates are rising relative to the rest of the world - making U.S. assets attractive - wider basis swap spreads are an additional factor that could lift the dollar. Bottom Line: We anticipate the USD cross-currency basis swap spread to widen over the next 12 months. This will be associated with higher FX vols, which hurt carry trades, EM currencies and dollar-block currencies. Chinese reforms will reinforce these risks. Additionally, wider basis swap spreads will create support for the USD. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "All About Credit", dated October 20, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Conflicting Forces For The Dollar", dated September 8, 2017, and "Is The Dollar Expensive?", dated October 13, 2017. 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Carry Trades: More Than Pennies And Steamrollers", dated May 6, 2016. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Xi Jinping: Chairman Of Everything", dated October 25, 2017 and Special Report, titled "How To Read Xi Jinping's Party Congress Speech", dated October 18, 2017.
Highlights The macro environment remains positive for risk assets. Nonetheless, the shadow of the '87 stock market crash is a reminder that major market corrections can occur even when the earnings and economic growth backdrop is upbeat. Our base case remains that global growth will stay reasonably firm in 2018, although the composition of that growth will shift towards the U.S. thanks to the lagged effects of easier financial conditions and the likelihood of some fiscal stimulus next year. Positive U.S. economic growth surprises and the disappearing output gap will allow the Fed to raise rates more than is discounted by the markets, providing a lift to the dollar and widening U.S. yield spreads relative to its trading partners. The momentum in profit growth, however, will favor Japan relative to the U.S. and Europe. Investors should overweight Japanese equities and hedge the currency risk. There is still more upside for oil prices, but we are not playing the rally in base metals. The Chinese economy is performing well at the moment, but ample base metal supply and a rising dollar argue against a substantial price rise from current levels. Emerging market equities should underperform the developed markets due to a rising U.S. dollar and the largely sideways path for base metals. Our macro and profit views are consistent with cyclicals outperforming defensive stocks. Investors should also continue to bet on higher inflation expectations and be overweight corporate bonds (relative to governments). High-yield relative value is decent after accounting for the favorable default outlook. It is too early to fully retreat from risk assets and prepare for the next recession. Nonetheless, the market has entered a late cycle phase. Investors appear to have shed fears of secular stagnation, and have embraced a return to a lackluster-growth version of the Great Moderation. The risk of disappointment is therefore elevated. Low levels of market correlation and implied volatility can perhaps be justified, but only if there are no financial accidents on the horizon and any rise in inflation is gradual enough to keep the bond vigilantes at bay. Investors with less tolerance for risk should maintain an extra cash buffer to protect against swoons and provide dry powder to boost exposure after the correction. Feature The October anniversary of the '87 stock market crash was a reminder to investors that major market corrections can arrive out of the blue. With hindsight, there were some warning signs evident before the crash. Nonetheless, the speed and viciousness of the correction caught the vast majority of investors by surprise, in large part because the economy was performing well (outside of some yawning imbalances such as the U.S. current account deficit). Many worried that the 20% drop in the S&P 500 would trigger a recession, but the economy did not skip a beat and it was not long before the equity market recouped the losses. We view the '87 crash as a correction rather than a bear market. BCA's definition of a bear market is a combination of magnitude (at least a 15% decline) and duration (lasting at least for six months). Bear markets are usually associated with economic recessions. Corrections tend to be short-lived because they are not associated with an economic downturn. None of our forward-looking indicators suggest that a recession is in the cards in the near term for any of the major economies. Even the risk of a financial accident or economic pothole in China has diminished in our view. As discussed below, the global economy is firing on almost all cylinders. Chart I-1Valuation Today Is Very Stretched Vs. 1987 Nonetheless, there are some parallels today with the mid-1980s. A Special Report sent to all BCA clients in October provides a retrospective on the '87 crash.1 One concern is that the proliferation of financial computer algorithms and derivatives is a parallel to the popularity of portfolio insurance in the 1980s, which was blamed for turbocharging the selling pressure when the market downturn gathered pace in October. My colleague Doug Peta downplays the risks inherent in the ETF market in the Special Report, but argues that automatic selling will again reinforce the fall in prices once it starts. It is also worrying that equity valuation is much more stretched than was the case in the summer of 1987 based on the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio (CAPE, Chart I-1). The CAPE is currently at levels only previously reached ahead of the 1929 and 2000 peaks. In contrast, the CAPE was close to its long-term average in 1987. Quantitative easing and extremely low interest rates have pulled forward much of the bond and stock markets' future returns. It has also contributed to today's extremely low readings on implied volatility. The fact that the Fed is slowly taking away the punchbowl and that the ECB is dialing back its asset purchase program only add to the risk of a sharp correction. The Good News For now though, investors are focusing on the improving global growth backdrop and the still-solid earnings picture. While the S&P 500 again made new highs in October, it was the Nikkei that stole the show among the major countries. Impressively, the surge in the Japanese stock market was not on the back of a significantly weaker yen. As we highlighted last month, risk assets are being supported by the three legged stool of robust earnings growth, low volatility and yield levels in government bonds, and the view that inflation will remain quiescent for the foreseeable future. The fact that the global growth impulse is broadly-based is icing on the cake because it reduces lingering fears of secular stagnation. Even emerging economies have joined the growth party, while a weak U.S. dollar has tempered fears of a financial accident in this space. Our forward-looking growth indicators are upbeat (Chart I-2). Our demand indicators in the major economies remain quite bullish, especially for capital spending (not shown). Animal spirits are beginning to stir. Moreover, financial conditions remain growth-friendly, especially in the U.S., and subdued inflation is allowing central banks to proceed cautiously for those that are tightening or tapering. The global PMI broke to a new high in October, and the economic surprise index for the major economies has surged in recent months. Our global LEI remains in a strong uptrend and its diffusion index shifted back into positive territory, having experiencing a worrisome dip into negative territory earlier this year. We expect the global growth upturn will persist for at least the next year. The U.S. will be the first major economy to enter the next recession, although this should not occur until 2019. It is thus too early to expect the equity market to begin to anticipate the associated downturn in profit growth. Earnings: Japan A Star Performer It is still early days in the Q3 earnings season, but the mini cyclical rebound from the 2015/16 profit recession in the major economies is still playing out. The bright spots at the global level outside of energy are industrials, materials, technology and consumer staples (Chart I-3). All four are benefitting from strengthening top line growth and rising operating margins. Chart I-2Upbeat Global Economic Indicators Chart I-3Global Earnings By Sector The U.S. is further advanced in the mini-cycle and EPS growth is near its peak on a 4-quarter moving total basis. The expected topping out in profit growth is more a reflection of challenging year-on-year comparisons than a deterioration in the underlying fundamentals. The hurricanes will take a bite out of third quarter earnings, but this effect will be temporary. Moreover, oil prices are turbocharging earnings in the energy patch and we expect this to continue. Our commodity strategists recently lifted their 2018 target price for both Brent and WTI to $65/bbl and $63/bbl, respectively. The global uptick in GDP growth, along with continued production discipline from OPEC 2.0 are the principal drivers of our revised outlook. We expect the fortuitous combination of fundamentals to accelerate the drawdown in oil inventories globally, which also will be supportive for prices. While U.S. financials stocks have cheered the prospects that Congress may pass a tax bill sometime in early 2018, sell-side analysts have been brutally downgrading financial sector EPS estimates. This has dealt a blow to net earnings revisions in the sector. Expected hurricane-related losses are probably the main culprit, especially in the insurance sector. Nonetheless, our equity sector strategists argue that such indiscriminate downgrades are unwarranted, and we would lean against such pessimism.2 Recent profit results corroborate our positive sector bias, although we are still early in the earnings season. European profits will suffer to some extent in the third quarter due to the lagged effects of previous euro strength. The same will be true in the fourth quarter, although we expect this headwind to diminish early in 2018. That leaves Japan as the star profit performer among the majors in the near term. The recent surge in foreign flows into the Japanese market suggests that global investors are beginning to embrace the upbeat EPS story. Abe's election win in October means that the current monetary stance will remain in place. The ruling LDP's shift away from austerity (e.g. abandoning the primary balance target) may also be lifting growth expectations. A Return To The Great Moderation? Chart I-4Market Correlation And The ERP A lot of the good news is already discounted in equity prices. The depressed level of the VIX and the drop in risk asset correlations this year signal significant complacency. Large institutional investors are reportedly selling volatility and thus dampening vol across asset classes. But there is surely more to it. It appears that investors believe we have returned to the pre-Lehman period between 1995 and 2006 when the Great Moderation in macro volatility contributed to low correlations among stocks within the equity market (Chart I-4). The idea is that low perceived macroeconomic volatility during that period had diminished the dispersion of growth and inflation forecasts, thereby trimming the variance of interest rate projections. This allowed equity investors to focus on alpha rather than beta, given less uncertainty about the macro outlook. Of course, the Great Recession and financial market crisis brought the Great Moderation to a crashing end. Correlations rocketed up and investors demanded a higher equity risk premium to hold stocks. Today, dispersion in the outlooks for growth and interest rates have fallen back to pre-Lehman levels, helping to explain the low levels of implied volatility and correlation in the equity market (Chart I-5). Some of this can be justified by fundamentals. The onset of a broadly-based global expansion phase has likely calmed lingering fears that the global economy is constantly teetering on the edge of the abyss. Investor uncertainty regarding economic policy has moderated as well (bottom panel). Historically, implied volatility tended to fall during previous periods when global industrial production was strong and global earnings were rising across a broad swath of countries (Chart I-6). Our U.S. Equity Sector Strategy service points out that, during the later stages of the cycle, equity sector correlations tend to fall as earnings fundamentals become more important performance drivers and sector differentiation generates alpha, as the broad market enters the last stage of the bull market. Similarly, the VIX can fluctuate at low levels for an extended period when global growth is broadly based. Chart I-5A Less Uncertain Macro Outlook? Chart I-6Broad-Based Growth Lower Implied Volatility Still, current levels of equity market correlation and the VIX are unnerving given a plethora of potential geopolitical crises and the pending unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet. Moreover, any meaningful pickup in inflation would upset the 'low vol' applecart. Table I-1 shows the drop in the S&P 500 index during non-recession periods when the VIX surges by more than 10% in a 13-week period. The equity price index fell by an average of 7% during the nine episodes, with a range of -3.6 to -18.1%. Table I-1Episodes When VIX Spiked The Equity Risk Premium Chart I-7Still Some Value In High-Yield On a positive note, the equity risk premium (ERP) is not overly depressed. There are many ways to define the ERP, but we present it as the 12-month forward earnings yield minus the 10-year Treasury yield in Chart I-4. It has fallen from about 760 basis points in 2011 to 310 basis points today. We do not believe that the ERP can return to the extremely low levels of 1990-2000. At best, the ERP may converge with the level that prevailed during the last equity bull market, from 2003-2007 (about 200 basis points). The current forward earnings yield is 550 basis points and the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.4%. The ERP would need to fall by 110 basis points to get back to the 2% equilibrium. This convergence can occur through some combination of a lower earnings yield or higher bond yield. If the 10-year yield is assumed to peak in this cycle at about 3% (our base case), then this leaves room for the earnings yield to fall by 50 basis points. This would boost the forward earnings multiple from 18 to 20. However, a rise in the 10-year yield to 3½% would leave no room for multiple expansion. We are not betting on any further multiple expansion but the point is that stocks at least have some padding in the event that bond yields adjust higher in a gradual way. It is the same story for speculative-grade bonds, which are not as expensive as they seem on the surface. The average index OAS is currently 326 bps, only about 100 bps above its all-time low. However, junk value appears much more attractive once the low default rate is taken into account. Chart I-7 presents the ex-post default-adjusted spreads, along with our forecast based on unchanged spreads and our projection for net default losses over the next year. The spread padding offered by the high-yield sector is actually reasonably good by historical standards, assuming there is no recession over the next year. We are not banking on much spread tightening from here, which means that high-yield is largely a carry trade now. Nonetheless, given a forecast for the default and recovery rate, we expect U.S. high-yield excess returns to be in the range of 2% and 5% (annualized) over the next 6-12 months. The bottom line is that the positive growth backdrop does not rule out a correction in risk assets, especially given rich valuations. But at least the profit, default and growth figures will remain a tailwind in the near term. The main risk is a breakout in inflation, which financial markets are not priced for. Inflation And Hidden Slack The September CPI report did little to buttress the FOMC's view that this year's inflation pullback is temporary. The report disappointed expectations again with core CPI rising only 0.13% month-over-month. For context, an environment where inflation is well anchored around the Fed's target would be consistent with core CPI prints of 0.2% every month, roughly 2.4% annualized. The inflation debate continues to rage inside and outside the Fed as to whether the previous relationship between inflation and growth have permanently changed, whether low inflation simply reflects long lags, or whether it will require tighter labor markets in this business cycle to fuel wage and price pressures. We back the latter two of these three explanations but, admittedly, predicting exactly when inflation will pick up is extremely difficult and we must keep an open mind. A Special Report in the October IMF World Economic Outlook sheds some light on this vexing issue.3 Their work suggests that the deceleration in wage growth in the post-Lehman period in the OECD countries can largely be explained by traditional macro factors: weak productivity growth, lower inflation expectations and labor market slack. The disappointing productivity figures alone account for two-thirds of the drop in wage growth. However, a key point of the research is that the headline unemployment figures are not as good a measure of labor market slack as they once were. This is because declining unemployment rates partly reflect workers that have been forced into part-time jobs, referred to as involuntary part-time employment (IPT). The rise in IPT employment could be associated with automation, the growing importance of the service sector, and a diminished and more uncertain growth outlook that is keeping firms cautious. The IMF's statistical analysis suggests that the number of involuntary part-time workers as a share of total employment (IPT ratio) is an important measure of slack that adds information when explaining the decline in wage growth. Historically, each one percentage point rise in the IPT ratio trimmed wage growth by 0.3 percentage points. Chart I-8 and Chart I-9 compare the unemployment rate gap (unemployment rate less the full-employment estimate) with the deviation in the IPT ratio from its 2007 level. The fact that the IPT ratio has had an upward trend since 2000 in many countries makes it difficult to identify a level that is consistent with full employment. Nonetheless, the change in this ratio since 2007 provides a sense of how much "hidden slack" the Great Recession generated due to forced part-time employment. Chart I-8Measures Of Labor Market Slack (I) Chart I-9Measures Of Labor Market Slack (II) For the OECD as a whole, labor market slack has been fully absorbed based on the unemployment gap. However, the IPT ratio was still elevated at the end of 2016 (latest data available), helping to explain why wage growth has remained so depressed across most countries. The IPT ratio is still above its 2007 level in three-quarters of the OECD countries. Of course, there is dispersion across countries. Japan has no labor market slack by either measure. In the U.S., the unemployment gap has fallen into negative territory, but only about half of the post-2007 rise in the IPT ratio has been unwound. For the Eurozone, the U.K. and Canada, the unemployment gap is close to zero (or well into negative territory in the U.K.). Nonetheless, little of the under-employment problem in these economies has been absorbed based on the IPT ratio. Our discussion in last month's report highlighted the importance of the global output gap in driving inflation in individual countries. Consistent with this, the IMF finds that there have been important spillover effects related to labor market slack, especially since 2007. This means that wage growth can be held down even in countries where slack has disappeared because of the existence of a surplus of available labor in their trading partners. Phillips Curve Is Not Dead That said, we still believe that the U.S. is at a point in the cycle when inflationary pressures should begin to build, even in the face of persisting labor market slack at the global level. Chart I-10 shows the ECI and the Atlanta Fed wage tracker, which are the best measures of wages because they are less affected by composition effects. Both have moved higher along with measures of labor market tightness. Wage and consumer price inflation have ebbed this year, but when we step back and look at it over a longer timeframe, the Phillips curve still appears to be broadly operating. Moreover, inflation is a lagging indicator. Table I-2 splits the post-war U.S. business cycles into short, medium, and long buckets based on the length of the expansion phase. It presents the number of months from when full employment was reached to the turning point for consumer price inflation in each expansion. There was a wide variation in this lag in the short- and medium-length expansions, but the lags were short on average. Chart I-10Phillips Curve Still (Weakly) Operating Table I-2Inflation Reacts With A Lag It is a different story for long expansions, where the lag averaged more than two years. We have pointed out in the past that it takes longer for inflation pressures to reveal themselves when the economy approaches full employment gradually, in contrast to shorter expansions when momentum is so strong the demand crashes into supply constraints. The fact that U.S. unemployment rate has only been below the estimate of full employment for eight months in this expansion suggests that perhaps we and the Fed are just being too impatient in waiting for the inflection point. Turning to Europe, the IPT ratio confirms the ECB's view that there is an abundance of under-employment, despite the relatively low unemployment rate. This suggests that the Eurozone remains behind the U.S. in the economic cycle. As expected, the ECB announced a tapering in its asset purchase program to take place next year. While policymakers are backing away from QE in the face of healthy growth and a shrinking pool of bonds to purchase, they will continue to emphasize that rate hikes are a long way off in order to avoid a surge in the euro and an associated tightening in financial conditions. U.S./Eurozone bond yield spreads are still quite wide by historical standards and thus it is popular to bet on spread narrowing and a stronger euro/weaker dollar. However, some narrowing in short-term rate spreads is already discounted based on the OIS forward curve (Chart I-11). The real 5-year, 5-year forward OIS spread - the market's expectation of how much higher U.S. real 5-year rates will be in five years' time relative to the euro area - stands at about 70 basis points. This spread is not wide by historical standards, and thus has room to widen again if market expectations for the fed funds rate moves up toward the Fed's 'dot plot' over the next 6-12 months. While market pricing for the ECB policy rate path appears about right in our view, market expectations for rate hikes in the U.S. are too complacent. This implies that long-term spreads could widen in favor of the U.S. dollar over the coming months, especially if U.S. growth accelerates while euro area growth cools off a bit. The fact the U.S. economic surprise index has turned positive is early evidence that this process may have already begun. Moreover, the starting point is that the dollar has been weaker than interest rate differentials warrant, such that there is some room for the dollar to 'catch up', even if interest rate differentials do not move (Chart I-12). We see EUR/USD falling to 1.15 by the end of the year. Chart I-11Room For U.S./Eurozone Spreads To Widen... Chart I-12...Giving The Dollar A Lift A New Fed Chair? Our forecast for yield spreads and currencies is not overly affected by the choice of Fed Chair for next year. President Trump's meeting with academic John Taylor reportedly went well, but we think the President will prefer someone with a less hawkish bent. Keeping Chair Yellen is an option, but she has strong views on financial sector regulation that Trump does not like. The prevailing wisdom is that Jerome Powell is a moderate who is only slightly more hawkish than Yellen. But the truth is that we don't really know where he stands because he has no academic publication record and has generally steered clear of taking bold views on monetary policy. In any event, the organizational structure of the Fed makes it impossible for the chair to run roughshod over other FOMC members. This suggests that no matter who is selected, the general thrust of monetary policy will not change radically next year. As discussed above, uncertainty is elevated, but our base case sees inflation rising enough in the coming months for the Fed to maintain their 'dot plot' forecast. The market and the Fed are correct to 'look through' the near-term growth hit from the hurricanes, to the rebound that always follows the destruction. The U.S. housing sector is a little more worrying because some softness was evident even before the hurricanes hit. Since the early 1960s, a crest in housing led the broader economic downturn by an average of seven quarters. Nonetheless, we continue to expect that the housing soft patch does not represent a peak for this cycle. Residential investment should provide fuel to the economy for at least the next two years as pent up demand is worked off, related to depressed household formation since the 2008 financial crisis. Affordability will still be favorable even if mortgage rates were to rise by another 100 basis points (Chart I-13). Robust sentiment in the homebuilder sector in October confirms that the hurricane setback in housing starts is temporary. China And Base Metals Turning to China, economic momentum is on the upswing. Real-time measures of economic activity such as electricity production, excavator sales, and railway freight traffic are all growing at double-digit rates, albeit down from recent peak levels (Chart I-14). Various price indexes also reveal a fairly broadly-based inflation pickup to levels that will unnerve the authorities. Growth will likely slow in 2018 as policymakers continue to pare back stimulus. We do not foresee a substantial growth dip next year, but it could be hard on base metals prices. Chart I-13Housing Affordability Outlook Housing ##br##Affordability Under Various Rate Assumptions Chart I-14China: Healthy ##br##Growth Indicators Policy shifts discussed in Chinese President Xi's speech in October to the Party Congress are also negative for metals prices in the medium term. The speech provided a broad outline of goals to be followed by concrete policy initiatives at the National People's Congress (NPC) in March 2018. He emphasized that policy will tackle inequality, high debt levels, overcapacity and pollution. Globalization will also remain a priority of the government. The supply side reforms required to meet these goals will be positive in the long run, but negative for growth in the short run. Restructuring industry, deleveraging the financial sector and fighting smog will all have growth ramifications. The government could use fiscal stimulus to offset the short-term hit to growth. However, while overall growth may not slow much, the shift away from an investment-heavy, deeply polluting growth model, will undermine the demand for base metals. Our commodity strategists also highlight the supply backdrop for most base metals is not supportive of an extended rally in prices. The implication is that investors who are long base metals should treat it as a trade rather than a strategic position. Despite our expectation that policy will continue to tighten, we believe that investors should overweight Chinese stocks relative to other EM markets. Investment Conclusions: Our base case remains that global growth will stay reasonably firm in 2018, although the composition of that growth will shift towards the U.S. thanks to the lagged effects of the easing in U.S. financial conditions that has taken place this year and the likelihood of some fiscal stimulus next year. The U.S. Congress has drawn closer to approving a budget resolution for fiscal 2018 that would pave the way for tax legislation to reach President Donald Trump's desk by the end of the first quarter of next year. Surveys show that investors have all but given up on the prospect of tax cuts, which means that it will be a positive surprise if it finally arrives (as we expect). Positive U.S. economic growth surprises and the disappearing output gap will allow the Fed to raise rates more than is discounted by the markets, providing a lift to the dollar and widening U.S. yield spreads relative to its trading partners. The momentum in profit growth, however, will favor Japan relative to the U.S. and Europe. Investors should favor Japanese equities and hedge the currency risk. There is still more upside for oil prices, but we are not playing the rally in base metals. The Chinese economy is performing well at the moment, but ample base metal supply and a rising dollar argue against a substantial price rise from current levels. Emerging market equities should underperform the developed markets due to a rising U.S. dollar and the largely sideways path for base metals. Our macro and profit views are consistent with cyclicals outperforming defensive stocks. Investors should also continue to bet on higher inflation expectations and be overweight corporate bonds (relative to governments) in the major developed fixed-income markets. Our base-case outlook implies that it is too early to fully retreat from risk assets and prepare for the next recession. Nonetheless, the market has entered a late-cycle phase. Calm macro readings and still-easy monetary policy have generated signs of froth. Investors appear to have shed fears of secular stagnation, and have embraced a return to a lackluster-growth version of the Great Moderation. Low levels of market correlation and implied volatility can perhaps be justified, but only if there are no financial accidents on the horizon and any rise in inflation is gradual enough to keep the bond vigilantes at bay. Upside inflation surprises would destabilize the three-legged stool supporting risk assets, especially at a time when the Fed is shrinking its balance sheet. Black Monday is a reminder that major market pullbacks can occur even when the economic outlook is bright. Thus, investors with less tolerance for risk should maintain an extra cash buffer to protect against swoons, and to ensure that they have dry powder to exploit them when they materialize. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst October 26, 2017 Next Report: November 20, 2017 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "Black Monday, Thirty Years On: Revisiting The First Modern Global Financial Crisis," October 19, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Banks Hold The Key," October 24, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 3 Recent Wage Dynamics In Advanced Economies: Drivers And Implications. Chapter 2, IMF World Economic Outlook. October 2017. II. Three Demographic Megatrends Dear Client, This month's Special Report is written by my colleague, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist. Peter highlights three key demographic trends that will shape financial markets in the coming decades. His non-consensus conclusions include the idea that demographic trends will be negative for both bonds and equities over the long haul, in part because the trends are inflationary. Moreover, continuing social fragmentation will not be good for business. Mark McClellan Megatrend #1: Population Aging. Aging has been deflationary over the past few decades, but will become inflationary over the coming years. Megatrend #2: Global Migration. International migration has the potential to lift millions out of poverty while boosting global productivity. However, if left unmanaged, it poses serious risks to economic stability. Megatrend #3: Social Fragmentation. Rising inequality, cultural self-segregation, and political polarization are imperilling democracy and threatening free-market institutions. On balance, these trends are likely to be negative for both bonds and equities over the long haul. In today's increasingly short-term oriented world, it is easy to lose track of megatrends that are slowly shifting the ground under investors' feet. In this report, we tackle three key social/demographic trends. Chart II-1Our Aging World Megatrend #1: Population Aging Fertility rates have fallen below replacement levels across much of the planet. This has resulted in aging populations and slower labor force growth (Chart II-1). In the standard neoclassical growth model, a decline in labor force growth pushes down the real neutral rate of interest, r*. This happens because slower labor force growth causes the capital stock to increase relative to the number of workers, resulting in a lower rate of return on capital.1 The problem with this model is that it treats the saving rate as fixed.2 In reality, the saving rate is likely to adjust to changes in the age composition of the workforce. Initially, as the median age of the population rises, aggregate savings will increase as more people move into their peak saving years (ages 30 to 50). This will put even further downward pressure on the neutral rate of interest. Eventually, however, savings will fall as these very same people enter retirement. This, in turn, will lead to a higher neutral rate of interest. If central banks drag their feet in raising policy rates in response to an increase in r*, monetary policy will end up being too stimulative. As economies overheat, inflation will pick up, leading to higher long-term nominal bond yields. Contrary to popular belief, spending actually increases later in life once health care costs are included in the tally (Chart II-2). And despite all the happy talk about how people will work much longer in the future, the unfortunate fact is that the percentage of American 65 year-olds who are unable to lead active lives because of health care problems has risen from 8.8% to 12.5% over the past 10 years (Chart II-3). Cognitive skills among 65 year-olds have also declined over this period. We are approaching the inflection point where demographic trends will morph from being deflationary to being inflationary. Globally, the ratio of workers-to-consumers - the so-called "support ratio" - has peaked after a forty-year ascent (Chart II-4). As the support ratio declines, global savings will fall. To say that global saving rates will decline is the same as saying that there will be more spending for every dollar of income. Since global income must sum to global GDP, this implies that global spending will rise relative to production. That is likely to be inflationary. Chart II-2Savings Over The Life Cycle Chart II-3Climbing Those Stairs Is ##br##Getting More And More Difficult Chart II-4The Ratio Of Workers To ##br##Consumers Has Peaked The projected evolution of support ratios varies across countries. The most dramatic change will happen in China. China's support ratio peaked a few years ago and will fall sharply during the coming decade. Nearly one billion Chinese workers entered the global labor force during the 1980s and 1990s as the country opened up to the rest of the world. According to the UN, China will lose over 400 million workers over the remainder of the century (Chart II-5). If the addition of millions of Chinese workers to the global labor force was deflationary in the past, their withdrawal will be inflationary in the future. The fabled "Chinese savings glut" will eventually dry up. Chart II-5China On Course To Lose More ##br##Than 400 Million Workers Rising female labor force participation rates have blunted the effect of population aging in Europe and Japan. This has allowed the share of the population that is employed to increase over the past few decades. However, as female participation stabilizes and more people enter retirement, both regions will also see a rapid decline in saving rates. This could lead to a deterioration in their current account balances, with potential negative implications for the yen and the euro. Population aging is generally bad news for equities. The slower expansion in the labor force will reduce the trend GDP growth. This will curb revenue growth, and by extension, earnings growth. To make matter worse, to the extent that lower savings rates lead to higher real interest rates, population aging could reduce the price-earnings multiple at which stocks trade. This could be further exacerbated by the need for households to run down their wealth as they age, which presumably would include the sale of equities. Megatrend #2: Global Migration Economist Michael Clemens once characterized the free movement of people across national boundaries as a "trillion-dollar bill" just waiting to be picked up from the sidewalk.3 Millions of workers toil away in poor countries where corruption is rife and opportunities for gainful employment are limited. Global productivity levels would rise if they could move to rich countries where they could better utilize their talents. Academic studies suggest that less restrictive immigration policies would do much more to raise global output than freer trade policies. In fact, several studies have concluded that the removal of all barriers to labor mobility would more than double global GDP (Table II-1). The problem is that many migrants today are poorly skilled. While they can produce more in rich countries than they can back home, they still tend to be less productive than the average native-born worker. This can be especially detrimental to less-skilled workers in rich countries who have to face greater competition - and ultimately, lower wages - for their labor. Chart II-6 shows that the share of U.S. income accruing to the top one percent of households has closely tracked the foreign-born share of the population. Table II-1Economic Benefits Of Open Borders Chart II-6Immigration Versus Income Distribution Low-skilled migration can also place significant strains on social safety nets. These concerns are especially pronounced in Europe. The employment rate among immigrants in a number of European countries is substantially lower than for the native-born population (Chart II-7). For example, in Sweden, the employment rate for immigrant men is about 10 percentage points lower than for native-born men. For women, the gap is 17 points. The OECD reckons that a typical 21-year old immigrant to Europe will contribute €87,000 less to public coffers in the form of lower taxes and higher welfare benefits than a non-immigrant of the same age (Chart II-8). Chart II-7Low Levels Of Immigrant Labor Participation In Parts Of Europe Chart II-8Immigration Is Straining Generous ##br##European Welfare States All of this would matter little if the children of today's immigrants converged towards the national average in terms of income and educational attainment, as has usually occurred with past immigration waves. However, the evidence that this is happening is mixed. While there is a huge amount of variation within specific immigrant communities, on average, some groups have fared better than others. The children of Asian immigrants to the U.S. have tended to excel in school, whereas college completion rates among third-generation-and-higher, self-identified Hispanics are still only half that of native-born non-Hispanic whites (Chart II-9). Across the OECD, second generation immigrant children tend to lag behind non-immigrant students, often by substantial margins (Chart II-10). Chart II-9Hispanic Educational Attainment Lags Behind Chart II-10Worries About Immigrant Assimilation Immigration policies that place emphasis on attracting skilled migrants would mitigate these concerns. While such policies have been adopted in a number of countries, they have often been opposed by right-leaning business groups that benefit from cheap and abundant labor and left-leaning political parties that want the votes that immigrants and their descendants provide. Humanitarian concerns also make it difficult to curtail migration, especially when it is coming from war-torn regions. Chart II-11The Projected Expansion ##br##In Sub-Saharan Population Europe's migration crisis has ebbed in recent months but could flare up at any time. In 2004, the United Nations estimated that sub-Saharan Africa's population will increase to 2 billion by the end of the century, up from one billion at present. In its 2017 revision, the UN doubled its projection to 4 billion. Nigeria's population is expected to rise to nearly 800 million by 2100; Congo's will soar to 370 million; Ethiopia's will hit 250 million (Chart II-11). And even that may be too conservative because the UN assumes that the average number of births per woman in sub-Saharan Africa will fall from 5.1 to 2.2 over this period. For investors, the possibility that migration flows could become disorderly raises significant risks. For one, low-skill migration could also cause fiscal balances to deteriorate, leading to higher interest rates. Moreover, as we discuss in greater detail below, it could propel more populist parties into power. This is a particularly significant worry for Europe, where populist parties have often pursued business-sceptic, anti-EU agendas. Megatrend #3: Social Fragmentation In his book "Bowling Alone," Harvard sociologist Robert Putnam documented the breakdown of social capital across America, famously exemplified by the decline in bowling leagues.4 There is no single explanation for why communal ties appear to be fraying. Those on the left cite rising income and wealth inequality. Those on the right blame the welfare state and government policies that prioritize multiculturalism over assimilation. Conservative commentators also argue that today's cultural elites are no longer interested in instilling the rest of society with middle-class values. As a result, behaviours that were once only associated with the underclass have gone mainstream.5 Technological trends are exacerbating social fragmentation. Instead of bringing people together, the internet has allowed like-minded people to self-segregate into echo chambers where members of the community simply reinforce what others already believe. It is thus no surprise that political polarization has grown by leaps and bounds (Chart II-12). When people can no longer see eye to eye, established institutions lose legitimacy. Chart II-13 shows that trust in the media has collapsed, especially among right-leaning voters. Perhaps most worrying, support for democracy itself has dwindled around the world (Chart II-14). Chart II-12U.S. Political Polarization: Growing Apart Chart II-13The Erosion Of Trust In Media It would be naïve to think that the public's rejection of the political establishment will not be mirrored in a loss of support for the business establishment. The Democrats "Better Deal" moves the party to the left on many economic issues. Nearly three-quarters of Democratic voters believe that corporations make "too much profit," up from about 60% in the 1990s (Chart II-15). Chart II-14Who Needs Democracy When You Have Tinder? Chart II-15People Versus Companies The share of Republican voters who think corporations are undertaxed has stayed stable in the low-40s, but this may not last much longer. Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and the rest of the corporate establishment tend to lean liberal on social issues and conservative on economic ones - the exact opposite of a typical Trump voter. If Trump voters abandon corporate America, this will leave the U.S. without any major party actively pushing a pro-business agenda. That can't be good for profit margins. The fact that social fragmentation is on the rise casts doubt on much of the boilerplate, feel-good commentary written about the "sharing economy." For starters, the term is absurd. Uber drivers are not sharing their vehicles. They are using them to make money. Both passengers and drivers can see one another's ratings before they meet. This reduces the need for trust. As trust falls, crime rises. The U.S. homicide rate surged by 20% between 2014 and 2016 according to a recent FBI report.6 In Chicago, the murder rate jumped by 86%. In Baltimore, it spiked by 52%. Chart II-16 shows that violent crime in Baltimore has remained elevated ever since riots gripped the city in April 2015. The number of homicides in New York, whose residents tend to support more liberal policing standards for cities other than their own, has remained flat, but that is unlikely to stay the case if crime is rising elsewhere. The multi-century decline in European homicide rates also appears to have ended (Table II-2). Much has been written about how millennials are flocking to cities to enjoy the benefits of urban life. But this trend emerged during a period when urban crime rates were falling. If that era has ended, urban real estate prices could suffer tremendously. It is perhaps not surprising that the increase in crime rates starting in the 1960s was mirrored in rising inflation (Chart II-17). If governments cannot even maintain law and order, how can they be trusted to do what it takes to preserve the value of fiat money? The implication is that greater social instability in the future is likely to lead to lower bond prices and a higher equity risk premium. Chart II-16Do You Still Want To Move Downtown? Table II-2Crime Rates Are Creeping Higher In Europe Chart II-17Homicides And Inflation Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy 2 Another problem with the neoclassical model is that it assumes perfectly flexible wages and prices. This ensures that the economy is always at full employment. Thus, if the saving rate rises, investment is assumed to increase to fully fill the void left by the decline in consumption. In the real world, the opposite tends to happen: When households reduce consumption, firms invest less, not more, in new capacity. One of the advantages of the traditional Keynesian framework is that it captures this reality. And interestingly, it also predicts that aging will be deflationary at first, but will eventually become inflationary. Initially, slower population growth reduces the need for firm to expand capacity, causing investment demand to fall. Aggregate savings also rises, as more people move into their peak saving years. Globally, savings must equal investment. If desired investment falls and desired savings rises, real rates will increase. At the margin, higher real rates will discourage investment and encourage saving, thus ensuring that the global savings-investment identity is satisfied. As savings ultimately begins to decline as more people retire, the equilibrium real rate of interest will rise again. 3 Michael A. Clemens, "Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?" Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 25, no.3, pp. 83-106 (Summer 2011). 4 Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: The Collapse And Revival Of American Community," Simon and Schuster, 2001. 5 Charles Murray has been a leading proponent of this argument. Please see "Coming Apart: The State Of White America, 1960-2010," Three Rivers Press, 2013. 6 Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Crime In The United States 2016" (Accessed October 25, 2017). III. Indicators And Reference Charts Global equity markets partied in October on solid earnings and economic growth figures, and the rising chances of a tax cut in the U.S. among other bullish developments. The Nikkei has been particularly strong in local currency terms following the re-election of Abe. Our equity indicators remain upbeat on the whole, although the rally is looking stretched by some measures. The BCA monetary indicator is hovering at a benign level. Implied equity volatility is very low, investor sentiment is frothy and our Speculation Indicator is elevated. These suggest that a lot of good news is already discounted. Our valuation indicator is also closing in on the threshold of overvaluation at one standard deviation. Our technical indicator is rolling over, although it needs to fall below the zero line to send a 'sell' signal. On a constructive note, the solid rise in earnings-per-share is likely to continue in the near term, based on positive earnings surprises and the net revisions ratio. Moreover, our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) continued on its bullish equity signal in September for the third consecutive month. We introduced the RPI in the July report. It combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators are also bullish on stocks in the U.S., Europe and Japan. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The U.S. and European WTPs rose in October after a brief sideways move in previous months, suggesting that equity flows have turned more constructive. But the Japanese WTP is outshining the others. Given that the Japanese WTP is rising from a low level, it suggests that there is more 'dry powder' available to purchase Japanese stocks, especially relative to the U.S. market. We favor Japanese stocks relative to the other two markets in local currency terms, as highlighted in the Overview section. Oversold conditions for the U.S. dollar have now been absorbed based on our technical indicator, but there is plenty of upside for the currency before technical headwinds begin to bite. The greenback looks expensive based on PPP, but is less so on other measures. We are positive in the near term. Our composite technical indicator for U.S. Treasurys has moved above the zero line, but has not reached oversold territory. Bond valuation is close to fair value based on our long-standing valuation model. These factors suggest that yields have more upside potential before meeting resistance. Other models that specifically incorporate global economic factors suggest that the 10-year Treasury is still about 20 basis points on the expensive side. Stay below benchmark in duration. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market ##br##And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market ##br##And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst
Highlights Chinese growth will slow next year, but underlying momentum remains strong. Jerome Powell is the most likely choice for Fed chair. However, no matter who is selected, the general thrust of monetary policy will not change radically next year. The transatlantic interest rate spread is not particularly wide considering that the output gap is larger in the euro area, while the neutral rate and expected inflation are lower. U.S. growth should surprise on the upside over the next few quarters, as already evidenced by the rebound in the economic surprise index. This will give the Fed greater scope to raise rates. We expect EUR/USD to reach $1.15 by the end of the year. Feature China: Let's Get This Party Congress Started China's 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China kicked off this week. As widely expected, President Xi Jinping lauded the successes that China has enjoyed over the past few years in his opening speech, but cautioned that more must be done to reduce corruption, clean up the environment, and expedite market reforms.1 We expect Chinese growth to slow modestly in 2018 from the current above-trend pace, as the government pares back stimulus efforts. Nevertheless, the underlying trend in growth will remain reasonably solid. Chart 1 shows that real-time measures of economic activity such as electricity production, excavator sales, and railway freight traffic are all growing at a healthy pace. Despite the introduction of some tightening measures this spring, the housing market remains resilient. The share of households planning to buy a new home is close to record high levels, while the amount of land purchased by developers - a good leading indicator for housing starts - has continued to accelerate (Chart 2). Chinese property developer stocks have been on a tear this year, outperforming even the red-hot tech sector. With housing inventory levels at multi-year lows, home prices should stay firm. In the industrial sector, rampant producer price deflation last year has given way to modest inflation this year. This has boosted industrial profits, which should support corporate spending in the months ahead (Chart 3). Chart 1Chinese Economy: No Need To Be Pessimistic Chart 2Chinese Housing Market Remains Resilient Chart 3Boost In Industrial Profits Bodes Well For Corporate Spending Both money and credit growth surprised on the upside in September. As we have argued before, copious private-sector savings will forestall a credit crunch and, at least for the foreseeable future, permit the government to run large off-balance sheet budget deficits in an effort to support aggregate demand (Chart 4). Indeed, for all the talk about slowing credit growth, medium- and long-term bank lending to nonfinancial corporations - probably the best single measure of credit flows to the real economy - has continued to accelerate this year (Chart 5). Investors should continue to overweight Chinese stocks relative to the EM aggregate. Chart 4China's Fiscal Deficit Has Been Increasing Chart 5Credit To Real Economy Accelerating Musical (Fed) Chairs News reports indicate that President Trump has winnowed down the list of candidates for Fed chair to five individuals: Chief economic advisor Gary Cohn, current Fed Governor Jerome Powell, former governor Kevin Warsh, Stanford university economist John Taylor, and current chair Janet Yellen. We suspect that Cohn will not make the cut, given his apparent falling out with Trump following the President's remarks about the Charlottesville protests. Warsh and Taylor are likely to be seen as too hawkish. That just leaves Powell and Yellen. Chair Yellen's relatively dovish views on monetary policy would likely sit well with Trump, but she has two major strikes against her. One, she has generally been in favor of more financial sector regulation, which is anathema to Trump. Two, Trump accused her of abetting Hillary Clinton during the election campaign. Keeping her as Fed Chair (assuming she would actually want the job) might convey the message that he is no longer interested in shaking up the existing institutional order in Washington DC. This just leaves Powell as the default candidate, who reportedly has received the blessing of Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. The prevailing wisdom is that Powell is a moderate who is only slightly more hawkish than Yellen. But the truth is that we don't really know where he stands because he has no academic publication record and has generally steered clear of taking bold views on monetary policy. Such a potentially malleable mind may be exactly what Trump is seeking! Still, the organizational structure of the Fed makes it impossible for the chair to run roughshod over other FOMC members. This suggests that no matter who is selected, the general thrust of monetary policy will not change radically next year. Thoughts On The Transatlantic Yield Spread I have been visiting clients in Europe this week and questions about the relative stance of monetary policy between the U.S. and the euro area have come up in almost every meeting. The gap between U.S. and euro area rate expectations has narrowed since the start of the year, helping to push the euro higher. Nevertheless, most interest rate spreads remain elevated by historic standards. This has led many commentators to speculate that they will continue to shrink, putting further upward pressure on EUR/USD. For example, the U.S. 5-year Overnight Index Swap rate currently stands at 1.82%. This compares to only 0.02% in the euro area. The current level of spreads can be partly explained by the fact that labor market slack is still substantially higher in the euro area than in the U.S. Outside of Germany, labor underutilization is still 6.3 percentage points higher across the euro area than in 2008 (Chart 6). In contrast, our work suggests that the U.S. labor market has returned to full employment.2 Chart 6Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Still High Outside Of Germany This is not to say that transatlantic interest rate spreads won't narrow over the coming years. They will. But what matters for investors is how spreads evolve relative to market expectations. The market is already pricing in roughly 50 basis points of spread compression in five-year rates between now and 2022. If one looks further out to 2027, the spread in expected policy rates stands at 94 basis points.3 That may still seem like a lot, but keep in mind that inflation expectations in the euro area are well below those of the U.S. The CPI swap market is predicting that U.S. inflation will exceed euro area inflation by 67 basis points over the next decade. All things equal, lower inflation in the euro area implies that nominal interest rates should be lower there too. Moreover, many euro area government bond markets trade at a discount due to country-specific default/denomination risks. While these risks have faded, they have not gone away. As such, GDP-weighted euro area government bond yields - which are arguably what the ECB cares most about - are generally higher than swap rates of the same maturity. In Search Of Fair Value Chart 7The Neutral Rate Is Lower In The Euro Area A reasonable estimate is that the market currently sees the real terminal rate in the U.S. as being roughly 40 basis points higher than in the euro area. As it happens, this is almost identical to the gap in the neutral rate between the two regions that Williams, Laubach, and Holston have calculated (Chart 7). Does that mean that the current transatlantic spread is close to fair value? Not quite. One of things that has become apparent over the past eight years is that euro area membership comes at a high price. When countries such as Italy and Spain are hit by adverse economic shocks, they are limited in how they can respond. They cannot devalue their currency because they do not have a currency to devalue; and they cannot loosen fiscal policy for fear of being attacked by the bond vigilantes. All they can do is suffer from grinding deflation in the hopes of regaining competitiveness through weak wage growth. This means that over the long haul, unemployment in the euro area is likely to be above NAIRU more often than in the U.S. This, in turn, implies that euro area policy rates will, on average, be below their neutral value more often than in the U.S. Thus, even if the gap in the real neutral rate between the two regions were 40 basis points, the expected gap in policy rates should be larger than that. Modest Downside For EUR/USD The discussion above suggests that the transatlantic interest rate spread is not especially wide if one looks further out in time. If U.S. growth surprises on the upside over the coming months, while euro area growth flatlines, spreads will widen again. Such an outcome is, in fact, quite likely. U.S. financial conditions have eased significantly relative to those of the euro area since the start of the year (Chart 8). To the extent that changes in financial conditions lead growth by about 6-to-9 months, the U.S. could start outperforming the euro area as we enter 2018. The fact the Goldman's Sachs' U.S. Current Activity Indicator has hooked higher and the economic surprise index has rebounded smartly is early evidence that this process may have already begun (Chart 9). We see EUR/USD falling to 1.15 by the end of the year. Chart 8Diverging Financial Conditions ##br##Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Chart 9Early Evidence That U.S. May ##br##Outperform Euro Area Next Year Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy / China Investment Strategy Special Report, "How To Read Xi Jinping's Party Congress Speech," dated October 18, 2017. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Secular Bottom In Inflation," dated July 28, 2017; and "What's the Matter With Wages?" dated August 11, 2017. 3 We estimate the expected policy rates ten years out by looking at one-month, 10-year forward OIS rates (i.e., the market's expectation of where one-month OIS rates will be ten years from today). Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights U.S. credit growth is set to improve as capex has more upside and households benefits from a positive backdrop. The U.S. has substantially more room to increase leverage than the rest of the G10, pointing toward further monetary divergences. The euro is not very cheap and is trading at a significant premium to forward rate differentials. It is thus at risk if U.S. rates can rise vis-à-vis Europe. Chinese underlying inflation is becoming elevated, which could prompt additional tightening by the PBoC. Moreover, Xi Jinping's speech this week suggests a move away from the debt-fueled, investment-led growth model. The AUD is at risk. Feature A general lack of credit growth has been one of the key factors hampering both broader growth and inflation in the U.S. Not only has this muted activity and weak pricing pressure kept the Federal Reserve on the easier side of policy, the absence of lending growth has further depressed real rates as demand for loanable funds remains low. Can credit pick up from here, and what are the implications for the USD? Room For Optimism There are good reasons to lean a bit more on the positive side regarding the U.S. credit growth outlook. As Chart I-1 illustrates, U.S. commercial and industrial loan growth seems to be rebounding. Confirming that this impulse could gain momentum, it follows an easing in lending standards and a pick-up in durable goods orders - two leading indicators of business borrowings. Household debt is also showing some signs of revival. While the annual growth rate of household borrowings from banks has yet to trough, the annualized quarterly growth rate has picked up significantly - a development that tends to precede accelerations in the yearly measure. Moreover, this improvement is broad based among all the key components of household borrowings (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Upside For U.S. C&I Loans... Chart I-2... And For Household Debt As Well This has positive implications for U.S. nonfinancial private credit, which has been in the process of forming a shallow bottom relative to GDP. Moreover, based on the low level of debt servicing costs for both households and businesses, this trend has room to develop (Chart I-3). However, most of the increase in the debt-to-GDP since 1994 has been caused by financial engineering, with firms swapping equity for debt in their capital structure, and has therefore not lifted domestic demand nor created inflationary pressures. However, we posit that this phenomenon is toward its tail end, and that additional debt accretion could have a meaningful impact on growth. Why? On the business front, capex - an essential but volatile component of aggregate demand - is set to accelerate further. Business investment is led by firms' capex intentions, a series that has surged since the summer of 2016 (Chart I-4, top panel). Confirming the message from this indicator, profits from U.S.-listed businesses have also sharply rebounded, a signal that leads capex by a year, as highlighted last Monday by Anastasios Avgeriou, who heads BCA's U.S. Equity Sector Strategy service (Chart I-4, bottom panel).1 Chart I-3The U.S. Has Room To Relever Chart I-4Capex Outlook Looks Good On the household front, three factors support our assessment: First, household nominal and real wages and salaries should enjoy further upside as the labor market remains very healthy. This means more consumption and more capacity to accumulate debt, especially as household financial obligations remain near multi-generational lows (Chart I-5). In fact, U.S. real median household income already hit an all-time high in 2016. Chart I-5Supports To Household Consumption Second, household confidence is still near record-high levels, a factor which tends to lead credit growth and consumption. Optimistic households are more likely to spend their income gains and buy durable goods like houses or apartments, especially as the household formation rate has regained vigor. Third, U.S. net wealth has hit 430% of disposable income, a record, which will keep supporting consumption. As households see their net worth increase, they can boost consumption and debt as their leverage ratios improve, especially when financial obligation ratios are as low as they are today. These factors point toward a continued increase in the indebtedness of the U.S. private sector, one which this time we anticipate will add to demand through investments, real estate purchases and general consumption. This also means that real rates are likely to experience upside. More debt-fueled aggregate demand implies more demand for loanable funds, and thus higher real rates. In an economy operating near full capacity, it can also lift inflation. Tax cuts and fiscal stimulus would only be a bonus in this environment. This should give the Fed room to increase interest rates in line with its dot plot, or more than the two-and-a-half hikes priced into the OIS curve over the next two years. However, as 2017 has vividly demonstrated, movements in U.S. rates alone are not enough to make a call on the U.S. dollar. One needs to have a sense of how U.S. rates could evolve vis-à-vis the rest of the world. In the context of debt accumulation, we are optimistic that the U.S. could experience a re-leveraging relative to the rest of the G10, putting upward pressures on U.S. real rates relative to the rest of the world. To begin with, U.S. non-financial private credit stands at 150% of GDP, a drop of 20% of GDP since its peak in 2009. The rest of the G10 has not experienced the same extent of post-financial crisis deleveraging, and nonfinancial private credit there still hovers around 175% of GDP (Chart I-6). Today, the indebtedness of the U.S. relative to other advanced economies is near its lowest levels of the past 50 years. Debt levels are obviously not the only consideration; the ability to service that debt also must enter the equation to judge the capacity of an economy to accumulate debt relative to the rest of the world. Currently, according to the BIS, the debt-service ratios of the U.S. nonfinancial private sector still stand well below the GDP-weighted average of the rest of the G10 (Chart I-7). This also highlights that the U.S. has plenty of room to have both higher debt accumulation and higher real rates than the rest of the G10. Chart I-6U.S. Vs. G10: Debt Upside Chart I-7Lower Private Sector Debt-Servicing Costs In The U.S. This should support the dollar in 2018. As Chart I-8 shows, 10-year bond yield differentials between the U.S. and other large advanced economies lead tops in the dollar by one year. To highlight this relationship, this chart de-trends the DXY by plotting it as a deviation from its 10-year moving average. Not only does the current trend in real rate differentials already point to a higher dollar, but room for more debt accumulation in the U.S. relative to the rest of the G10 supports the notion that the elevated level of spreads could even expand, implying the era of monetary divergence has yet to end. As we highlighted last week, the dollar may not be as expensive as seems at first glance. We have expanded on our 'modelization' exercise this week, using methods employed by the Swiss National Bank to incorporate the Balassa -Samuelsson effect.2, 3 This metric, which incorporates the relative price of manufactured goods in each economy, further confirm our assessment from last week that the dollar is not expensive enough to warrant a sell-signal (Chart I-9). Thus, with competitiveness a non-issue for the dollar for now, the USD is likely to be able to take advantage of potentially supportive real interest rate spreads. Chart I-8Real Rates Point To A Higher Peak For The USD Chart I-9U.S. Only Sightly Expensive On the technical side, our U.S. Dollar Capitulation Index hit very depressed levels earlier this year, but is now rebounding. Crucially, it has moved meaningfully back above its 13-week moving average, an event which normally characterizes uptrends in the dollar (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Dollar: From Bearish To Bullish Mood Bottom Line: The U.S. economy looks set to enjoy an episode of rising debt supporting increasing economic activity and higher rates as capex should grow further and a supportive backdrop continues to emerge for households - whether or not tax cuts happen. Because the U.S. private sector has comparatively healthy balance sheets relative to the rest of the G10, this means that U.S. re-leveraging should outpace the rest of the world. Even if this U.S. re-leveraging is only a cyclical phenomenon and not a resumption of the debt super-cycle, it would imply that monetary policy divergences have yet to reach their apex, and thus the dollar could experience additional upside. Even Against The Euro? We tend to view the euro as the anti-dollar. It is the main vehicle to play both uptrends and downtrends in the dollar and it is also the most liquid instrument, backed with an economy similarly sized as the U.S. Thus, the views expressed above would imply a negative slant on EUR/USD. Such a framework can give an impetus to a EUR/USD view, but is also not enough. Indeed, factors more specific to this pair argue that EUR/USD does have downside. When it comes to valuations, using the SNB's methodology, the EUR/USD is more or less the mirror image of the DXY. This pair is slightly cheap, essentially within the statistical definition of fairly valued (Chart I-11). Thus, valuations alone are fully neutral for the euro. This means EUR/USD remains prisoner to relative interest rate dynamics. On this front, a key driver of this pair paints a risky picture for euro bulls. The 1-year/1-year forward risk-free rate spread between the euro area and the U.S. has been a reliable guide of the EUR/USD's trend for the past 12 years. Yet, the euro's rally has not been matched by a similar move in this spread. As a result, the gap between the currency pair and its rates-implied fair value is at its highest since the summer of 2014 (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Euro: Not That Cheap Chart I-12Forward Interest Rates Point To Euro Risk But then again, the differential between the European and U.S. 1-year/1-year forward risk-free rate is at its lowest ever over the time frame of this chart. However, it was even lower than current levels in 1999 and 1997. This suggests that if the U.S. can re-leverage relative to the rest of the G10, the spread could grow as negative as it was in these two previous instances. Supporting this assessment, we anticipate U.S. inflation to outperform euro area measures going forward. Last week, we explored the reasons why we see an upcoming uptick in U.S. inflation next year: U.S. financial conditions have eased, American velocity of money has increased, pipeline inflationary pressures are growing and underlying wage growth seems to be improving.4 Meanwhile, European financial conditions have tightened, especially against the U.S., which historically leads to an underperformance of European inflation measures. Very importantly, the euro area core CPI diffusion index has rolled over and is now below 50%, suggesting that euro area core CPI has limited upside (Chart I-13). This means potential downside vis-à-vis the U.S. and room for upside in U.S. rates relative to the euro area, especially as the European Central Bank is likely to craft its message carefully next week when it announces the tapering of its asset purchases, to prevent quick upward movement in interest rate expectations. Additionally, the dollar is still quite under-owned by speculators relative to the euro. Our favorite positioning measure, which sums long bets in the euro with short bets on the DXY - two equivalent wagers - continues to hover near record-high levels, suggesting potential downside in EUR/USD (Chart I-14). This continues to highlight the risks to the euro created by a repricing of the Fed. Chart I-13Euro Area CPI Peaking? Chart I-14Excess Bullishness In Euro Intact Bottom Line: The euro is obviously at risk if the dollar gets lifted by rising economic activity and indebtedness in the U.S., even if this cyclical upswing in debt does not represent a resumption of the debt super-cycle. Moreover, 1-year/1-year forward rates differentials point to heightened EUR/USD vulnerability, especially if U.S. inflation bottoms relative to the euro area. Moreover, long euro bets have yet to be washed out, deepening the EUR/USD's vulnerability. A Few Words On China Chart I-15China: Good Reasons For Policy Tightening Despite a marginal slowdown in Chinese real GDP growth and slightly disappointing industrial production and fixed asset investment numbers for the third quarter, some key Chinese economic activity metrics have been very robust. Imports are growing at a 19% annual pace, credit growth continues to outperform expectations and electricity production and excavator sales remain robust. Should this make investors bullish on China plays? In our view, two key risks lurk on the horizon. The first is monetary tightening. Pricing pressures in China are growing and are looking increasingly genuine. As Chart I-15 shows, core CPI is clocking in at 2.3%, the highest level since 2010-2011, a level which in the past prompted monetary tightening by the Chinese authorities. Additionally, services inflation - a purely domestic sector and thus one reflective of domestic inflationary pressures - is now above 3% and accelerating. Also, PPI has re-accelerated to 6.9%, pointing to a paucity of deflationary forces in the Chinese economy that could potentially give the People's Bank of China the green light to tighten further. We would expect the rise in the Shibor 7-day rate to continue and monetary conditions, which have been tightening since the end of 2016, to become an even bigger handicap in the future. The second risk lies around the Communist Party Congress underway in Beijing. Xi Jinping's marathon speech highlighted his vision for Chinese socialism in a new era. Xi is very clearly dedicated to the primacy of the Chinese communist party. He did highlight, however, that the new principal problem for the Chinese population is the need for a better life, with less imbalances, less inequalities. This fits with his previously revealed policy preferences. As Matt Gertken, who heads the Asian efforts on our Geopolitical Strategy team, has shown, Xi's administration has massively increased spending to protect the environment and increased financial regulation (Table 1).5 These preferences fit in the optic of addressing China's new principal problems: too much pollution and too much debt. Table 1Fiscal Priorities Of Recent Chinese Presidents Moreover, the continued fight against corruption also fits into that mold. It is a key tool to maintain the legitimacy of the Communist party, and a popular way to address some of the inequalities and imbalances plaguing China today. What does this mean? China has continued to accumulate debt over the past 10 years, with debt to GDP increasing by nearly 120% between 2008 and 2017 (Chart I-16). If a window is opening to tighten monetary policy because inflationary pressures are growing while there is political will to combat inflation and imbalances, it is likely that investment - which pollutes heavily - and debt - a byproduct of large capex programs - could be curtailed. Moreover, the Chinese government still has the wherewithal to support aggregate economic activity through fiscal stimulus. In addition, in the context of the above, much fiscal stimulus could be deployed to fight pollution and decrease inequalities by supporting households. This means that while Chinese GDP growth is unlikely to weaken substantially, the capex intensity of the economy could decrease. So would imports of raw materials and capital goods. As a result, this could be a very negative environment for metals. Metals prices have rebounded sharply since 2016 as Chinese investment has increased. But now that policy could be tightened further and that Xi's new administration has more freedom to move away from an investment-heavy, deeply polluting growth model, the rally in metals could be at risk. Copper, a bellwether for the metals complex, has surged nearly 70% since 2016, and bullish sentiment on the red metal is now at levels historically associated with imminent corrections (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Is This What Deleveraging Looks Like? Chart I-17Tighter Policy And A Reform Push Put Metal At Risk This means that currencies for which metals prices are a key driver of terms of trade are at great risk, specifically the BRL, the CLP and the AUD. Moreover, the latter is expensive, having recently been buoyed by some positive economic numbers, and is now widely owned by very bullish investors. We have a short sell AUD/USD at 0.79 and our short AUD/NZD trade at 1.11 was triggered following the Labor/NZ First/Green coalition announced Thursday in New Zealand. Bottom Line: Chinese authorities are set to tighten monetary conditions further as domestic inflationary pressures are growing. Moreover, while short on details, this week's speech by Xi Jinping at the opening of the 19th Communist Party Congress in Beijing seemed to confirm that addressing imbalances, inequalities, and environmental problems will be a key objective of this administration. This points toward a less debt-/investment-driven economic model - at least until deflationary problems re-emerge. While overall GDP growth could be supported by targeted fiscal support, investment plays linked to Chinese capex and real estate could suffer. The AUD is at risk, and we are entering our proposed short AUD/NZD trade. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, titled “Top 5 Reasons To Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives” dated October 16, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 2 The Balassa Samuelson effect is an empirical observation that countries with higher productivity tend to experience an appreciating trend in there real exchange rate. Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Is The Dollar Expensive?”, dated October 13, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Samuel Reynard, “What Drives the Swiss Franc?” Swiss National Bank Working Papers (2008 – 14). 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Is The Dollar Expensive?”, dated October 13, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, titled “How To Read Xi Jinping’s Party Congress Speech”, dated October 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1 Chart II-2 U.S. data was mixed: Last week's CPI releases showed that inflation disappointed in September, with headline CPI increasing by only 2.2%, below the expected 2.3%; and Core CPI coming in at 1.7%, in line with expectations; However, long-term TIC data showed a large inflow of funds of USD 67.2 bn, much larger than the expected USD 14.3 bn. The labor market continues to tighten with initial jobless claims and continuing claims dropping to 222,000 and 1.888 million respectively. The DXY has rebounded this week on this news, and also helped by a somewhat disappointing ZEW survey from the euro area, but pared its gains on Wednesday. Regardless, positive developments in the U.S. fiscal space and disappearing slack will provide a tailwind for the greenback. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day -August 25, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3 Chart II-4 Data from the euro area has been mixed: Industrial production grew at an annual rate of 3.8% in August; The trade balance contracted to EUR 16.1 bn from EUR 23.2 bn on a non-seasonally-adjusted basis, but improved on a seasonally-adjusted basis. The final estimate for core CPI hit 1.1%, in line with expectations; The ZEW Survey dropped and underperformed expectations; Despite largely weak data, the euro has pared all of last week's losses. Markets may be pricing in Catalan developments as a bullish case. The Spanish government has threatened to enact Article 155 of the constitution if Catalonia does not comply, which will give Spain the authority to take measures to ensure compliance by the rogue region. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5 Chart II-6 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Bank lending outperformed expectations, growing at a 3% year-on-year pace. Machinery orders yearly growth also outperformed to the upside, coming in at 4.4% However, the annual growth of both imports and exports underperformed expectations and declined significantly from last month, coming in at 12% and 14.1% respectively. The yen has remained relatively flat these past two weeks. Overall, we expect USD/JPY to have additional upside, given that the U.S. OIS curve is not pricing in enough rate hike over the next 2-years. Ultimately, the driver of USD/JPY will simply be U.S. rates as Japanese 10-year rates are capped near 0%. This situation is not likely to change any time soon, as the Japanese economy is still hampered by very low inflation. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day -August 25, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7 Chart II-8 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Average hourly earnings outperformed expectations, growing at a 2.2% pace from a year ago. Both headline and core inflation came in line with expectations at 3% and 2.7% respectively. However, both retail sales and retail sales ex-fuel growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 1.2% and 1.6% respectively. Overall, we do not expect much more upside for the pound relative to the U.S. dollar, given that there is already a hike priced for November. At this point, the economic situation does not warrant any more hikes beyond just removing the emergency measures implemented after the Brexit fallout. Furthermore inflation has stopped climbing, and could start to come down in the coming months as the effects of the currency dissipate. Finally, Brexit negotiations have hit a bit of a temporary impass. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9 Chart II-10 The AUD has not seen much action this week. The RBA minutes highlighted that "slow growth in real wages and high levels of household debt were likely to be constraining influences". This is largely in line with our argument that spare capacity is limiting wage growth and inflation in the economy. Going forward, China remains a risk to our view, with the most recent import figures having provided a welcomed fillip to the AUD. Nevertheless, remarks by RBA Governors will limit the upside in the AUD. Expectations of a rate hike by the RBA depend upon growth numbers, which are unlikely to be achieved given the current trajectory of wages and consumer spending. Furthermore, high underemployment in the economy also remains a drag on spending, dampening the positive effect of a strong job report. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11 Chart II-12 Recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: Electronic card retail sales year-on-year growth declined form 4.4$ to 2.9%. Business NZ PMI softened from 57.9 to 57.5. However, headline inflation came in at 1.9%, rising from the previous month reading of 1.7% and outperforming expectations. The kiwi sold off by almost 2% yesterday, as Jacinda Ardern was elected as the new prime minister of New Zealand. The market is now pricing the risk that the Labor party, which Ardern leads, could change the mandate of the central bank from just targeting inflation to also seeking full employment. Moreover, Labor and its coalition partner, NZ First, want to curtail immigration, one of the tailwind to New Zealand growth. These development would structurally limit the upside for kiwi rates, acting as a headwinds to the New Zealand dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13 Chart II-14 The CAD has been somewhat strong recently due to developments in the oil market. KSA-Russia support for an extension of supply cuts to OPEC 2.0, as well as developments in Iraq, have pointed to an increase in prices. While the path for Canadian interest rates seem fairly priced, oil prices could buoy the CAD. Risks surrounding NAFTA remain, as President Trump stays inflexible with regards to tariffs, although this is likely to have a greater effect on Mexico than on Canada. Furthermore, albeit still in its infancy Morneau's tax plan, which is anticipated to mostly affect the richest of small business, could have an effect on investment intentions. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15 Chart II-16 Recent data in Switzerland has surprised to the upside: The unemployment rate decreased from 3.2% and 3.1%, outperforming expectations. Producer and import prices yearly growth came in at 0.8%, also surprising to the upside. Finally, the trade balance also outperformed, coming in at 2.918 billion dollars for September. It seems that the fall in the franc has been very positive to the Swiss economy. Overall, it would be difficult to see much more upside in EUR/CHF, as the euro already reflects euro area positives. That being said, we are reticent to be outright bearish on this cross as the economic data is still too weak for the SNB to change its monetary policy stance. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17 Chart II-18 Recent data in Norway has been negative: Manufacturing yearly output growth underperformed expectations, contracting at 5.7%. Both core and headline inflation also surprised to the downside, coming in at 1% and 1.6% against expectations of 1.2% and 1.7% respectively. Finally, the Norwegian trade balance declined from 12.4 billion dollars to 9.2 billion dollars USD/NOK has risen 3% since September, even as oil prices have continued their path upward. This was first and foremost reflective of the higher probability of rate hikes in the U.S. in December. Additionally, the recent Norwegian inflation and trade balance numbers are showing that the krone rebounds has tightened monetary conditions in this Scandinavian economy. Overall, we remain bullish on USD/NOK and bearish on EUR/NOK. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19 Chart II-20 The most recent inflation data was slightly weak, with CPI increasing by 0.1% monthly, and 2.1% yearly. Unemployment worsened as the rate rose to 6.2% from 6%. The krona depreciated against the euro on the news, but was flat against the dollar. Despite this temporary setback, PMIs are still perky across the board, and credit is hooking up. China and Europe's recent performance has likely provided a tailwind for growth, which should translate into higher inflation as capacity utilization is extremely tight. Furthermore, the depreciation of the SEK since the beginning of September has eased monetary conditions, making way for the central bank to begin a tightening process in the wake of the ECB's tapering program. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The uptick in world oil demand in the wake of a strengthening global upturn - the first since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) - coupled with continued production discipline by OPEC 2.0, will accelerate inventory draws, and lift prices above our previous expectation. Even though we expect - and model for - U.S. shale producers to step up drilling as a result, we are lifting our base case forecast for 2018 Brent and WTI to $65.15/bbl and $62.95/bbl, respectively. These estimates are up $5.51 and $5.98/bbl from our forecast last month.1 Energy: Overweight. Given our view (discussed below), we are taking profits on the long Dec/17 WTI call spread we recommended June 15 - long $50/bbl calls vs. short $55/bbl calls - on the close tonight. This position was up 116% Tuesday. We will replace this spread with long $55/bbl WTI calls vs. short $60/bbl WTI calls in Jul/18 and Dec/18. Base Metals: Neutral. We closed our short Dec 2016 copper trade last week, after our trailing-stop of $3.10/lb was elected, with a 0.75% return. Our trade was up 6% by the end of September, however bullish data in October - including an earthquake in Chile and worries over a potential metal shortage in China - lifted prices back up. Chinese copper import data showed a 26.5% year-on-year (yoy) jump in September. Even so, we expect copper imports to end 2017 with a yoy decline. Precious Metals: Neutral. Palladium continues to trade premium to platinum following its breakout at the end of September. We expect this to continue, given the supply-demand fundamentals we highlighted in June.2 Ags/Softs: Neutral. The USDA's latest World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) is supportive of our grains view - projections for 2017/18 wheat ending inventories were revised upward, while corn and soybeans stock estimates were lowered. Our long corn vs. short wheat position recommended October 5 is up 1.5% (please see p. 8 for further discussion.) Feature The global uptick in GDP growth noted this month by the IMF, along with continued production discipline from OPEC 2.0 - the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - will lift 2018 average Brent and WTI prices to $65.15/bbl and $62.95/bbl, respectively. These estimates are up $5.51 and $5.98/bbl from our forecast last month (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekHigher Demand, Lower Supply,##BR##Tighter Inventories Lift Prices We expect the fortuitous combination of fundamentals - for oil producers, that is - to accelerate the drawdown in oil inventories globally, which also will be supportive for prices (Chart 2). This, in turn, will set off a new round of U.S. shale-oil production, which will temper the price rise we expect, but still force inventories to draw harder than expected (Chart 3). Our base case calls for OPEC 2.0 to extend its 1.8mm b/d production cutting deal to end-June 2018, and for compliance within the KSA-Russia-led coalition to remain strong. OPEC 2.0 member states compliance with self-imposed quotas stood at 106% of agreed cuts, according to a state-by-state tally published by S&P's Global Platts earlier this month.3 Iraq continues to flaunt its OPEC 2.0 production quota, at 4.54mm b/d by our estimate, or 153k b/d over its quota. OPEC as a whole is producing 32.74mm b/d of crude oil, by our reckoning, vs. Platts' estimate of 32.66mm b/d. We have Libya and Nigeria, which are not parties to the OPEC 2.0 Agreement, producing 930k b/d and 1.71mm b/d last month, vs. Platts' estimates of 910k b/d and 1.84mm b/d, respectively (Table 1). KSA and Russia continue to lead OPEC 2.0 by example, with the former's crude oil production coming in at 9.97mm b/d in September, vs. 9.95mm b/d in August; the latter's total liquids production was 11.12mm b/d, vs. 11.13mm in August (Chart 4). Chart 2Market Will Get##BR##Tighter Sooner Chart 3BCA Expects Sharper##BR##Inventory Draw Than EIA Chart 4KSA And Russia Continue##BR##Providing Leadership To OPEC 2.0 Global GDP, Oil Demand Growth Strengthens The IMF earlier this month raised its forecast for global GDP growth this year to 3.6% and to 3.7% for next year, up 0.1% for each year vs. previous forecasts. In its analysis, the Fund drew attention to: Notable pickups in investment, trade, and industrial production, coupled with strengthening business and consumer confidence, are supporting the recovery. With growth outcomes in the first half of 2017 generally stronger than expected, upward revisions to growth are broad based, including for the euro area, Japan, China, emerging Europe, and Russia. These more than offset downward revisions for the United States, the United Kingdom, and India.4 On the back of the IMF's revised global growth estimates, we lifted our 2017 and 2018 oil demand expectation to just under 47.5mm b/d on average for the OECD and to just under 52mm b/d for non-OECD economies (Table 1). This translates into global demand growth of 1.65mm b/d in 2017 and 1.69mm b/d in 2018. Notably, we expect global demand to exceed 100mm b/d on average next year in our base case. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Our estimated demand is driven by global growth projections, particularly for EM economies, which make up the bulk of demand and growth in our balances estimates (Table 1). And, as before, our estimates remain above the EIA's (Chart 5). The indicators we look at to confirm or refute our demand assessment - global trade, particularly EM imports, and manufacturing - remain strong. Global trade continues to expand, particularly in EM ex-Middle East and Africa, as does manufacturing globally, both of which supports the IMF's assessment of growth generally (Charts 6 and 7). Rising incomes lead to rising trade, and also to increased oil and base metals consumption in EM economies. Chart 5We Continue To##BR##Estimate Higher Demand Than The EIA Chart 6Rising Trade Volumes##BR##Support Growth Story ... Chart 7... Expanding Manufacturing##BR##Does, Too Higher Prices, Greater USD Risk Expected In 2018 Given the upward revisions to global growth and our expectation OPEC 2.0 compliance will remain fairly stout, our baseline forecast now calls for WTI prices to average $56.40/bbl in 4Q17 and $62.95/bbl in 2018. Brent is expected to average $58.40/bbl in 4Q17 and $65.15/bbl next year (Chart 1 and Table 2). These estimates are up from last month's averages of $54.89 and $57.44/bbl for 4Q17 and 2018 WTI, and $56.67 and $59.17/bbl for 4Q17 and 2018 Brent.5 Our increasing bullishness is tempered by the risk of a stronger USD, particularly the broad trade-weighted USD index, which captures EM currency weakness. With the Fed set on a course to lift rates - our House view anticipates a Dec/17 rate hike and two or three hikes next year - and the oil market getting fundamentally tighter, we have seen the oil-USD linkage being re-established recently (Chart 8). Table 2Upgrading Our##BR##Price Forecasts Chart 8Expect The USD To Be Less##BR##Determinant For Oil Prices The persistent negative correlation between oil prices and the USD broke down following the global asset sell-off in 1Q16. However, this relationship converged to its long-term equilibrium in recent months. In our view, this reflects market participants' increasing conviction - expressed in market-cleared prices - that OPEC 2.0 will maintain its supply-management accord for an extended period, and that supply is now stabilizing. With demand remaining robust as the global synchronized upturn continues, the fundamental side of price determination has stabilized, and financial variables once again will strongly influence oil prices at the margin. Given our view the USD will trade off interest-rate differentials going forward, and our expectation that U.S. rates are set to increase relative to other systemically important rates, the USD likely will appreciate over the next 12 months. This will be a headwind for oil prices, and may be an additional factor OPEC 2.0 member states have to account for in 2018. Bottom Line: We are raising our price forecast for 4Q17 and 2018 in line with our expectation for stronger global growth and continued strong compliance from OPEC 2.0. With markets getting tighter, we expect the USD to become more important to the evolution of oil prices in 2018. Ag Update: Stay Long Corn, Short Wheat Global grain fundamentals continue to be supportive to our long corn vs. short wheat position, recommended October 5. The USDA's latest WASDE are projecting higher 2017/18 ending wheat inventories, while corn and soybeans stock estimates were lowered (Chart 9).6 Chart 9Fundamentals Support Long Corn##BR##Vs. Short Wheat Trade The USDA lowered its expected global corn stocks-to-use ratio, and increased its wheat stocks-to-use ratio for the current crop year. Revisions to the estimates for the 2016/17 crop year also reflect similar dynamics. We expected this going into the WASDE report at the beginning of the month when we published our Special Report on the Ag markets, and got long corn vs. short wheat. December 2017 corn futures traded on CME are up 0.14% since October 5, while wheat futures are down 1.36%. This brings the return on our long corn/short wheat trade to 1.5%, to date. Highlights from the current WASDE include: Upward revisions to wheat production from India, the EU, Russia, Australia, and Canada more than offset greater projected global demand, most notably from India and the EU. Overall, global ending stocks were revised up by 4.99mm MT, and are projected to stand at 268mm MT by the end of the 2017/18 marketing year. Greater projected corn demand, most notably from the U.S. and China, more than offset the ~ 6mm MT upward revision to global production in the USDA's estimates. Higher projected Chinese demand reflects greater food and seed demand, and higher expected industrial use. Corn stocks are expected to end 2017/18 at 200.96mm MT - 1.51mm MT below September projections. Similarly, in its October Chinese Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, China's Agriculture Ministry increased its forecast for the 2017/18 corn deficit to 4.31mm MT from 0.89mm MT projected last month. The Ministry expects lower output and greater consumption on the back of stronger demand from ethanol plants.7 Furthermore, in a move towards market pricing, Heilongjiang - China's top corn province - will be reducing the subsidy it gives corn farmers from 153.92 yuan/mu last year to 133.46 yuan/mu. The province will reorient its subsidies to incentivize more soybean production.8 In soybean markets, USDA projections for ending stocks were reduced by 1.48mm MT to 96.05mm MT by end-2017/18, largely on the back of lower expected U.S. and Brazilian inventories in 2016/17. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "OPEC 2.0 Will Extend Cuts To June 2018," published September 21, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "Precious Metals Update," in the June 29, 2017 issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "EM Trade Volumes Continue Trending Higher, Supporting Metals". It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see S&P Global Platts OPEC Guide published October 6, 2017. 4 Please see Chapter 1 of the IMF's World Economic Outlook for October 2017, which is available online at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2017/09/19/world-economic-outlook-october-2017. 5 Our base case continues to call for an end-June 2018 extension of the OPEC 2.0 production deal. Should the deal be extended to end-December 2018, we estimate 2018 WTI prices would average $67.35/bbl, while Brent prices would average just under $70.00/bbl. We are becoming increasingly confident OPEC 2.0 will become a durable production-management coalition, given the increasing cooperation and mutual investment between KSA and Russia. We will be exploring this further in future research. Please see "King Salman Goes To Moscow, Bolsters OPEC 2.0," published October 11, 2017, by BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy. It is available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report titled "Ags In 2017/18: Move To Neutral," dated October 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see "China Raises Forecast For 2017/18 Corn Deficit On Lower Output," dated October 12, 2017, available at reuters.com. 8 Please see "Top China Corn Province Cuts Subsidy For Farmers Growing the Grain," dated October 16, 2017, available at reuters.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Special Report Highlights Since the release of our currency hedging report on September 29, 2017,1 we have received an overwhelming positive response from clients around the globe. We thank our clients for their appreciation of our research. Instead of answering client requests individually, we have decided to publish this follow-up report, in which we apply the same methodology to analyze both static and dynamic hedging strategies to hedge a global equity portfolio for the remaining three home currencies (Swiss franc, Swedish krona and Norwegian krone) in our nine-currency global equity universe. For investors based in Switzerland and Sweden, BCA's dynamic hedging framework, based on the proprietary currency indicators from BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy (FES) service,2 has also outperformed all the static hedging strategies on a risk-adjusted basis since 2001. For Norway-based investors, however, BCA's dynamic hedging strategy does not generate consistently superior performance. Using static hedging, we find that the Swiss franc, together with U.S. dollar and Japanese yen, maintain their "safe-heaven currency" status, in the sense that CHF-, JPY- and USD-based investors should fully hedge foreign-currency exposure to minimize risk. However, our proposed dynamic hedging can achieve a better return/risk profile with less than 100% hedging. Over a four-year moving performance cycle (in line with how most portfolio managers are evaluated), BCA's dynamic hedging adds little career risk to portfolio managers in Switzerland and Sweden, compared to the "least regret" 50% static hedging, but the same cannot be said for Norwegian PMs. We recommend global equity investors based in the U.S., U.K., euro area, Japan, Canada, Australia, Switzerland and Sweden to use the BCA dynamic hedging framework to manage their foreign currency exposure. For Norwegian investors, we suggest "the least regret" 50% static hedging. Feature Dynamic Hedging Vs. Static Hedging We apply the same methodology as described in the previously published Special Report 3 to hedge an identical global equity portfolio into CHF, SEK and NOK using static and dynamic hedging strategies. As shown in Chart I-1, BCA's dynamic hedging strategy, based on the proprietary Intermediate-Term Timing Model (ITTM)4 indicators from the Foreign Exchange Strategy service, outperforms all static hedging strategies on a risk-adjusted basis for the CHF and SEK portfolios, in line with our findings for the other six home currencies. However, the same is not true for the NOK portfolio. Chart I-1Identical Investment, But Different Risk/Return Profiles The Swiss Perspective: On a static-hedging basis, the Swiss franc holds its "reserve currency" status as classified by Campbell et al,5 in the sense that risk-minimizing Swiss-based investors should fully hedge foreign currency exposure. Unlike the other two "safe-haven" home currencies, the USD and JPY, for which a higher hedge ratio results in lower risk and lower return in both the 16-year period from 2001 and the 41-year period form 1976, the CHF-based portfolio has achieved higher return/lower risk in the 16-year period from 2001 as the hedge ratio increases. The ITTM-based dynamic hedging outperforms the best static hedging (100%) in the shorter period, but the simple momentum-based dynamic hedging is inferior to the best static hedging (90%) in the longer period (Chart I-1, top two graphs and Tables II-1 and II-2). Chart I-2Little Career Risk For Swiss ##br##And Swedish Portfolio Managers The Swedish Perspective: On a static-hedging basis, the SEK-based portfolio behaves in a similar way to the euro-based portfolio in both the shorter and longer periods. In the shorter period from 2001, a higher hedge ratio results in higher returns, albeit gradually, but risk decreases until the hedge ratio hits 30% and then starts to increase such that the full hedge has the highest risk. In the longer period from 1976, a higher hedge ratio results in a lower return, while risk decreases until the hedge ratio hits 70% and then starts to rise, such that the unhedged portfolio has the highest risk and the fully hedged portfolio has the lowest return. On a risk-adjusted basis, the best static hedge ratio is 50% for both the shorter and longer periods. Both the ITTM-based dynamic hedging and the momentum-based dynamic hedging are superior to the best static hedge ratio of 50% (Chart I-1, middle 2 graphs and Table II-3 and II-4). The Norwegian Perspective: On a static-hedging basis, the NOK-based portfolio behaves like the GBP-based portfolio in the longer period from 1976, with return increasing and risk decreasing as hedge ratio increases, but it behaves like the euro- and SEK-based portfolios in the shorter period from 2001. On a risk-adjusted return basis, both the ITTM-based and momentum-based dynamic hedging strategies underperformed the best static hedge which is about 80% hedged (Chart I-1, bottom 2 graphs and Tables II-5 and II-6). Little Career Risk for Swiss and Swedish Portfolio Managers: As shown in Chart I-2, on a rolling four-year basis, the ITTM-based dynamic hedging strategy has outperformed the best static hedging strategy for CHF portfolio (which is 100%) and the best static hedging strategy for SEK portfolio (which is 50%). For the NOK portfolio, however, neither the ITTM-based dynamic strategy, nor the "best static hedging" strategy (which is 80%) can consistently outperform the "least regret" 50% hedging strategy. Equal Playing Field: In theory, if hedges were effective, then an identical global investment should have similar returns for all investors, no matter which home currency they hold. While neither the static hedging strategies nor the momentum-based dynamic hedging approach pass this criteria, BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedging approach has indeed achieved this: it levels out the playing-field for all investors globally. As shown in Chart I-3, in the period from March 2001 to August 2017, if left unhedged, the same global investment exhibits very different annualized returns for investors in different home currencies, with CHF investors at the low end at around 2.8%, and GBP investors at the high end at around 7%. With BCA's ITTM-based dynamic hedge, however, returns for all investors are similar, no matter which currency is their home currency. Chart I-3BCA Dynamic Hedging Strategy Levels Out The Playing Field Bottom Line: We have back-tested the efficacy of BCA's proprietary currency indicators from the Foreign Exchange Strategy team's Intermediate-Term Timing Models to dynamically hedge a global investment portfolio into nine different home currencies. These indicators have proven to add significant value to eight out of the nine home currencies. Granted, back-tests show good results by default. But our FES team will strive to ensure that these indicators continue to work well going forward. We recommend global equity investors based in the U.S., U.K., euro area, Japan, Canada, Australia, Switzerland and Sweden to use BCA's ITTM currency indicator-based dynamic hedging framework to manage their foreign currency exposure. For Norway-based global equity investors, we suggest the "least regret" 50% static hedging. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaolit@bcaresearch.com Appendix 1: Dynamic Hedging For Three Home Currencies 1.1 The Swiss Perspective Correlations: For Swiss investors, foreign currencies in aggregate have generally been positively correlated with foreign equities and domestic equities (Chart II-1). In addition, the Swiss franc has strengthened over time, especially after 1999. This explains why, on a static basis, the fully hedged portfolio generates the best risk/return profile. (Table II-1 and Table II-2). Chart II-1Swiss Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Table II-1Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In CHF (2001-2017) Table II-2Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In CHF (1976-2017) Historical Performance: Since 2001, ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in CHF. The risk is slightly higher than the best static hedging (which is 100%), but the return is over 200 bps higher, resulting in a 40% increase in the risk-adjusted return (Table II-1). In addition, this is achieved with far fewer hedging transactions than the fully hedged strategy as shown in Chart II-2 panel 2. Over the longer period from 1976, the optimal static hedge ratio is about 90%, almost fully hedged as well, as shown in Table II-2. Chart II-2Swiss Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging On a 60-month rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-2, the ITTM-based dynamic risk/return profile also prevails. Current State: Currently our indicators show that Swiss investors should not hedge any foreign currency. Chart II-3 shows how the Swiss investors should have hedged their exposure in U.S. dollar. Chart II-3Swiss Perspective: MSCI U.S. Index Dynamically Hedged 1.2 The Swedish Perspective Correlations: For Swedish investors, foreign currencies in aggregate have little correlation with domestic equities as the average correlation from 1980 is almost 0. This overall average can be misleading, however, as evidenced by the rolling 60-month correlation, which was positive before 1998 and then was negative until recently, and is now in the positive territory again (Chart II-4). This is a typical case where dynamic hedging would outperform static hedging, because the latter assumes constant mean and covariance for the chosen time period (Tables II-3 and II-4) Chart II-4Swedish Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Table II-3Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In SEK (2001-2017) Table II-4Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In SEK (1976-2017) Historical Performance: Since 2001, ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced the highest risk-adjusted return in SEK for a global portfolio. The risk profile looks similar to that of the 50% hedged portfolio, but return is much higher, resulting in a 35% increase in the risk-adjusted return (Table II-3). Over the longer period, the optimal static hedge ratio is also 50%, as shown in Table II-4. On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-5, the ITTM-based dynamic risk/return profile also prevails. Chart II-5Swedish Perspective: Dynamics Vs. Static Hedging Current State: Currently Sweden-based investors should be hedging only their exposure in Norwegian krona. Chart II-6 shows how the Swedish investors should have hedged their exposure in Canadian dollar. Chart II-6Swedish Perspective: MSCI Canadian Index Dynamically Hedged 1.3 The Norwegian Perspective Correlations: For Norway-based investors, foreign currencies in aggregate have a slightly negative correlation with domestic equities as the average correlation from 1980 is -0.12. This overall average can be misleading, however, as evidenced by the rolling 60-month correlation, which was above this long-run average before the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), but has been in negative territory ever since. On the other hand, the correlations between foreign currencies and foreign equities, and between foreign equities and domestic equities, have also gone though some regime changes (Chart II-7). Chart II-7Norwegian Perspective: Domestic And Unhedged Foreign Equities Vs. Foreign Currencies Historical Performance: Since 2001, ITTM-based dynamic hedging has produced 7% lower risk-adjusted return for the global portfolio in NOK compared to the best static hedging strategy of 80% (Tables II-5). In the longer period from 1976, the momentum-based dynamic also underperformed the 80% static hedging strategy by 3% on a risk-adjusted return basis (Tables II-6). Table II-5Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In NOK (2001-2017) Table II-6Risk/Return Profile For Global Equities In NOK (1976-2017) On a five-year rolling basis, as shown in Chart II-8, the ITTM-based dynamic risk/return profile also looks less attractive. Chart II-8Norwegian Perspective: Dynamic Vs. Static Hedging Why does dynamic hedging not work? We do not have a good understanding on this yet. Looking at the individual currency pairs, we notice that our indicators work very well for CAD/NOK, SEK/NOK and JPY/NOK, but not for other pairs, especially during the period between 2011 and 2016 when NOK was strong against most of these currencies. Chart II-9 and Chart II-10 show how JPY/NOK and USD/NOK should have been hedged based on our indicators. The former worked very well, while the latter failed terribly in the period between 2013 and 2016. Chart II-9Norwegian Perspective: MSCI Japanese Index Dynamically Hedged Chart II-10Norwegian Perspective: MSCI U.S. Index Dynamically Hedged 1 Please see Global Asset Allocation and Foreign Exchange Strategy joint Special Report "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Gide For Global Equity Investors," dated September 29, 2017. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "In Search Of A Timing Model", dated June 22, 2016 3 Please see Global Asset Allocation and Foreign Exchange Strategy joint Special Report "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Gide For Global Equity Investors," dated September 29, 2017. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "In Search of A Timing Model", dated June 22, 2016 5 Campbell, J., K. de Medeiros and L. Viceira, 2010, "Global Currency Hedging," Journal of Finance LXV, 87-122
Highlights It is often argued that the U.S. dollar is expensive, but models do not offer a unanimous picture. The U.S. current account, exports share, and cyclical inflation do not point to an obvious dollar overvaluation either. Without a clear valuation signal, the dollar will continue to trade off rate differentials. An increasing body of evidence points toward a rebound in U.S. inflation. As such, U.S. rates are likely to move up relative to the rest of the world, lifting the USD over the next 12 months. Feature We are sending you a shorter regular bulletin this week as we are also publishing a follow up to our joint Special Report titled, "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors," released with the Global Asset Allocation team two weeks ago. In this follow-up, my colleague Xiaoli Tang expands on the same methodology, testing various FX-hedging strategies for international investors - but this time looking at portfolios based in the CHF, the SEK, and the NOK. In this week's regular bulletin, we take a closer look at the U.S. dollar's valuations. The consensus view is that the dollar is expensive. We explore how this claim stacks up against the facts. At this juncture, the U.S. economy is not exhibiting some of the key consequences typical of an economy burdened by an expensive currency. Valuation Models The main argument used by some investors to show that the U.S. dollar is expensive is the traditional purchasing power parity model. This indicator does indeed flag a large 17% overvaluation for the greenback (Chart I-1). However, this is only one metric based on producer price indices. We also like to look at measures that focus on the true determinant of competitiveness: the cost of labor. When we deflate the U.S. dollar's exchange rate using unit labor costs, the dollar is neither a screaming sell nor a screaming buy. It is in line with its long-term average (Chart I-2). The same IMF real effective exchange rate model based on unit labor costs also shows the euro as fairly valued. Thus, on this metric, valuations do not seem to provide a compelling argument to go long or short the dollar, which challenges the universally bearish take on the dollar's perceived overvaluation. Chart I-1An Argument For An###br## Expensive USD Chart I-2But Not All Valuation Approaches ##br##Are That Clearcut We can also double-check the result of this metric using our own long-term fair value model, which incorporates long-term relative productivity trends. This model tries to capture the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect. This effect is an empirical observation that countries with superior long-term labor productivity trends tend to experience a secular upward bias on their real exchange rates. The perceived overvaluation of the U.S. dollar may in fact be an illusion, because when the Balassa-Samuelson effect is taken into account, the dollar currently trades in line with its fair value (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Another Global Approach With USD At Fair Value Bottom Line: Valuing currencies is always an exercise to be approached with plenty of circumspection. It is easy to look at simple PPP models and argue that the dollar looks very expensive. However, when one takes into account labor market costs and productivity trends, the dollar seems fairly valued. A Look At The Symptoms Chart I-4The U.S. Current Account##br## Shows Little Dollar Strain Models are only as good as their inputs. It is important to try to corroborate their insights with economic reality. An expensive currency should produce three major outcomes: the country's current account position should be deteriorating, its market share of global exports should be falling, and it should be experiencing deep deflationary pressures relative to the rest of the world. Let's begin with the current account. Despite a 17% increase in the U.S. dollar since 2014, the U.S. current account has remained stable (Chart I-4). It is undeniable that this reflects an improvement in the energy trade balance of the U.S., itself a byproduct of the shale revolution. Nonetheless, it also highlights that there is little balance-of-payments strains in the U.S. In fact, the move away from energy imports in itself should point to a higher level of equilibrium for the dollar. The export share of the U.S. also does not point to too much stress created by the dollar bull market. As Chart I-5 illustrates, in contrast to the early 1980s or late 1990s-early 2000s, U.S. exports has been faring well when compared to the rest of the world. This exercise needs to be conducted by comparing U.S. exports to the rest of the world excluding China. China has been grabbing global market share from everyone for 30 years. As an aside, the continued rise of China, as well as its still-large current account surplus of more than US$155 billion, supports the idea that the RMB is indeed cheap and remains attractive on a long-term basis - a message also flagged by our long-term fair value model for the CNY (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Growing U.S. Market Share Chart I-6The Yuan Is Clearly Cheap Finally, there is little evidence that the U.S. dollar is depressing U.S. inflation on a cyclical basis. Changes in financial conditions can temporarily redistribute inflationary pressures between the U.S. and the rest of the world, but an expensive dollar should depress U.S. inflation for an extended period of time on a global relative basis. An expensive U.S. dollar makes the U.S. uncompetitive, and should force some degree of internal adjustment on the U.S. economy. So far, the two-year moving average of U.S. core inflation relative to the OECD does not show the same kind of swoon as in the 1980s or late 1990s. In fact, even after this year's inflation slowdown in the U.S., American inflation remains in an uptrend relative to the rest of the OECD (Chart I-7). One source of worry remains the U.S. net international investment position (NIIP). The U.S.'s NIIP currently stands at -41% of GDP, and despite stabilizing for the past two years, has been in a pronounced downtrend over the past 35 years. Historically, countries like Switzerland or Japan with strong NIIPs have tended to experience long-term upward pressure on their exchange rates, while those with poor NIIPs such as South Africa tend to experience negative secular trends, even in real terms. For the time being, what keeps the negative impact of the NIIP on the USD at bay is that the U.S. continues to earn a positive net income - despite negative net assets abroad (Chart I-8). This reflects the willingness of investors to hold the U.S. dollar for its reserve currency status. For the time being, with a lack of alternative to challenge the U.S. dollar's reserve status, the NIIP should not represent a key hurdle for a few more years. Chart I-7The U.S. is Not Experiencing##br## An Internal Devaluation Chart I-8The Exorbitant ##br##Privilege Bottom Line: The U.S. economy is currently exhibiting few of the signals that would be associated with an expensive dollar: the current account remains well behaved, the country is not losing export market shares to its main competitors, and U.S. inflation remains well behaved relative to the rest of the OECD on a cyclical basis. A key risk remains the U.S.'s net international investment position, but so long as the USD can maintain its unchallenged role as the key reserve in the global financial system, the U.S. is likely to continue to run an income surplus vis-à-vis the rest of the world. So What? When it comes to the FX space, long-term valuations only become binding constraints when they are in the extreme. Right now, there is enough conflicting evidence to suggest that if the dollar is indeed expensive, it is not expensive enough to flash a bright sell signal. In this case, the U.S. dollar's dynamics are likely to be dominated by interest rate differentials. Interest rate curves outside of the U.S. seem currently fairly priced, but this is not the case in the U.S. Thus, with only two full hikes priced in over the next 24 months, one needs to see upside for U.S. interest rates if one is to be bullish on the greenback. Despite last month's very poor employment numbers, a consequence of hurricanes Harvey and Irma, the labor market remains strong enough to justify the Federal Reserve's desire to hike rates. The ISM surveys also remains very strong, with the headline numbers and new order components pointing toward robust growth. The only factor that could impede the Fed is inflation. On this front, we remain optimistic that inflation will not deteriorate much further and that, in fact, it is likely to pick up over the next six months, giving the Fed a green light to increase rates in line with its own forecast: First, in the past, we have highlighted that velocity of money - based on the money of zero maturity and nominal GDP - has been a very reliable leading indicator of inflation over the past 20 years, and is pointing toward a rebound in core inflation measures toward year-end.1 Moreover, the easing in U.S. financial conditions over the past 18 months also points toward upside risks to both U.S. growth and inflation. Second, the strength in the Prices-Paid component of both ISM surveys further increases our optimism. Moreover, the recent vigor of the Supplier Delivery subcomponent - a measure of bottlenecks in the system - also points to pipeline inflationary pressures. It is true that some of the recent spike is most likely skewed by the devastating impact of the hurricanes, but this improving trend began much earlier this year. Historically, a combined improvement in both the Prices-Paid and the Supplier Delivery components of the ISM survey tends to provide long leads on core inflation (Chart I-9). Third, the New York Fed has recently started publishing an underlying inflation trend estimate. This measure has also been rebounding sharply, hitting its highest level in 10 years, also pointing toward higher core inflation (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Pipeline Inflationary Pressures##br## Are Growing In The U.S. Chart I-10Underlying Inflationary ##br##Pressures Are Growing Fourth, the behavior of inflation itself is somewhat encouraging. While the recent core PCE year-over-year numbers have been disheartening, the three-month annualized rate of change has picked up robustly. Historically, this has also led to turning points in the year-on-year number (Chart I-11). Finally, there are signs of underlying vigor in wages. Last week's U.S. average hourly earnings number clicked in at 2.9%.It was likely overinflated by the effect of the hurricanes, which have temporarily dropped workers in low-paid industries out of the sample used by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to compute this data. However, the median average hourly earnings across the key sectors covered by the BLS has been in an uptrend since the beginning of the year (Chart I-12), pointing to some faint but real early signs of rising underlying wage growth. Moreover, while much ink has been spilled regarding whether or not the Philips curve is flat, there remain a well-defined tight relationship between the U.S. employment cost index (ECI) and the level of employment-to-population ratio in the U.S. (Chart I-13). Our view that employment growth will likely continue to tick in north of 120,000 jobs for the next 12 months, implies further improvement in the employment-to-population ratio, and thus a growing ECI. This will both support household income and consumption as well as our inflation view. Chart I-11Sequential Inflation Pointing ##br##To A Turning Point Chart I-12Cross-Sectional Median ##br##Of Wages Improving Chart I-13The Cross-Sectional Median##br## Of Wages Improving Bottom Line: With no clear message from long-term valuation, the key driver of the dollar is likely to remain interest rate differentials. At this point, U.S. interest rates need U.S. inflation to be able to rise by more than what is implied in the OIS curve and lift the dollar. Signs continue to accumulate that U.S. inflation is likely to turn the corner over the next six months, thanks to an easing in U.S. financial conditions and the pick-up in the velocity of money: the Prices-Paid and Supplier Deliveries components of the ISM have hooked up significantly, the NY Fed's underlying inflation measure is strong, the sequential growth rate in core inflation is improving, and there are growing signs that wage growth in the U.S. is picking up. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen", dated August 11, 2017, or Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Conflicting Forces For The Dollar", dated September 8, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades
Highlights Tipping points tend to occur when too many long-term value investors are uncharacteristically behaving like short-term momentum traders. Long IBEX35 versus Eurostoxx50 constitutes a good tactical trade. The underperformance of Spanish equities appears excessively pessimistic. Euro/dollar is technically extended by about 4 cents. The near term event risk is the ECB meeting on October 26, when a taper of asset purchases which extends well beyond 12 months might be regarded as dovish. But in the medium term, euro/dollar will head well north of 1.30. Underweight Basic Materials equities relative to the market as a tactical trade. Feature Spain: Red Herring Or Red Flag? Long Spanish equities is an excellent tactical trade provided that the imbroglio in Catalonia turns out to be a red herring. The IBEX35 index is at a classic tipping point of excessive short-term (negative) groupthink and herding (Chart of the Week). Chart Of The WeekThe Underperformance Of Spanish Equities Seems Excessive But is the imbroglio in Catalonia a red herring? Most likely, yes. As my colleague Marko Papic, BCA Chief Geopolitical Strategist points out, any unilateral declaration of independence from Catalonia would be vacuous if it lacked international legitimacy, or the ability to enforce it with arms. German sociologist Max Weber famously defined a nation's sovereignty as a "monopoly over the use of legitimate force." Unlike the Basque separatists, Catalan separatists have never resorted to force. A descent into violence remains unlikely because the Catalan independence movement is mainly a bourgeois, middle and upper class intellectual vision. The majority of Catalonia's working class are neither Catalan, nor support independence. Any unilateral declaration of independence would also lack political credibility because the opponents of independence largely boycotted the recent referendum to avoid giving it legitimacy. The vote for independence comprised only 37% of the electorate, meaning that popular support for independence remains questionable. The real (and unspoken) reason for the independence referendum was that it was the only glue holding together the Junts Pel Si (Together For Yes) four party coalition forming Catalonia's regional government. Without this glue, the two nationalist parties from opposite sides of the ideological spectrum would not be in bed with each other. And it is unclear whether this unholy alliance can stay entwined. To sum up, Catalan independence is an intellectual vision which at the moment lacks political and implementation credibility. For the imbroglio to become a full-blown crisis, the Catalan government, or militant groups, or the Spanish government would have to escalate tensions with the use of force. We do not expect this to happen. So the underperformance of Spanish equities appears excessively pessimistic, and long IBEX35 versus Eurostoxx50 constitutes a good 3-month trade (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2The IBEX 35 And Euro Stoxx 50 Have Parted Company Chart I-3The IBEX 35 Has Catch-Up Potential Identifying Tipping Points Of Price Trends Let's take this opportunity to review how we identify such tipping points of excessive groupthink and herding. Tipping points tend to occur when too many long-term value investors are uncharacteristically behaving like short-term momentum traders. Instead of dispassionately investing on the basis of value, long-term investors get sucked into chasing a price trend, and thereby amplify it. These price trends reach exhaustion when there are no more value investors left to suck in, and at the margin, someone wants to get out. The following analysis describes the tipping point of a price uptrend, but exactly the same analysis applies in reverse to the tipping point of a price downtrend. When a financial asset price starts to rise, the momentum trader's natural inclination is to chase the price rise, and buy. Conversely, the long-term value investor's natural inclination, ordinarily, is to lean against the price rise, and sell. The two investors interpret the same information in polar opposite ways because they have very different time horizons. Importantly, their different interpretations of the same information - stemming from their different time horizons - allow the momentum trader and the value investor to trade with one another in very large volume at the current price. This is what creates a healthy market with plentiful liquidity. Now consider what happens when a long-term value investor flips out of character and acts like a momentum trader. With the numerical balance shifting to the momentum traders, the price has to move up to balance buy and sell orders. As more and more value investors defect to momentum trading, the price uptrend gathers steam. This uptrend is exhausted when the long-term value investors have all joined the trend. Regular readers know that we identify these tipping points by comparing the behaviour of investors with 'short-term' 1-day horizons and investors with 'long-term' 65-day horizons. For any financial asset, a near term price reversal is likely to occur when its 65-day fractal dimension hits a lower limit of 1.25 (Chart I-4), which we have found to be the 'universal constant of finance'.1 Chart I-4When The Valuation Framework Changes, It Is More Difficult To Assess Tipping Points At this remarkably consistent limit, the long-term investor reverts back to character, realises the stock is now overvalued and wants to sell. The trouble is that everybody has already joined the trend. To sell, there needs to be a buyer. But who will buy at the current price? Usually, the answer is nobody. The marginal buyer will be a new category of investor: an 'ultra-long term' value investor - let's say, with a 130-day horizon - who stayed true to character and refused to join the uptrend. As this investor knows that the stock is overvalued at the current price, he will only provide liquidity at the 'correct' lower price. So this is the tipping point at which the price trend reverses. Occasionally, there is another possibility. The ultra-long term value investor could also join the trend at the current price. This might happen when the valuation framework for an investment is especially uncertain, leaving long-term value investors extremely disoriented and unable to assess the 'correct' price. An important conclusion is that when the valuation framework for an investment is undergoing a major change, it is much more difficult to assess the tipping point of a price trend. Which brings us to the euro. Is The Euro Overbought? Through the second half of 2014 and early 2015, the euro was in a major downtrend as the ECB first signalled and then implemented its QE program. On several occasions, the 65-day downtrend seemed technically exhausted but after only minor reversals, the downtrend continued (see Chart I-4 again). Even after the 130-day downtrend seemed exhausted at the start of 2015, it persisted into the spring (Chart I-5). The reason was that as the ECB moved into the uncharted territory of QE, ZIRP and NIRP, the valuation framework for the euro also moved into uncharted territory. Without a reliable valuation anchor, longer and longer term investors jumped on the euro bear bandwagon. Chart I-5The Euro Is Overbought, But The Reversal Might Be Minor Today, we face the mirror-image situation. The euro has been in a major uptrend for most of 2017 as the ECB has signalled a recalibration of its extraordinary monetary easing. But though the 65-day uptrend seemed exhausted in the early summer, the uptrend continued as longer term investors joined the trend. Just as in 2014-15, the question today is: at a major turning point in ECB policy, what is the most reliable valuation anchor? For us, the best explanatory model for euro/dollar is the expected difference in ECB versus Fed policy rates 5 years ahead. As this differential compressed from -230 bps to -160 bps, euro/dollar rallied in perfect lockstep from 1.03 to 1.15. However, the subsequent rally has deviated from the expected policy rate differential, suggesting that the euro's uptrend is indeed overdone by about 4 cents. But in the medium term, the much bigger question is: what will happen to the expected policy rate differential? As we explained in Positioning For A Sea-Change2 the differential must eventually compress to around -40 bps, because this is the mid-point of a very well established multi-decade cycle (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). In which case, euro/dollar must eventually head well north of 1.30 (Chart I-8). Chart I-6The Euro Area - U.S. Average ##br##Interest Rate Differntial = -40 bps... Chart I-7...Because The Euro Area-U.S. ##br##Inflation Differential = -40 bps Chart I-8An Expected Interest Differential ##br##Of -40 bps Means EUR/USD Goes North Of 1.30 To be clear, north of 1.30 is the medium term direction of travel, and the journey will not be a straight line. The near term event risk is the ECB meeting on October 26, when the central bank will very likely announce a recalibration of its monetary policy. A taper of asset purchases which extends well beyond 12 months might be regarded as dovish, as it would delay the timing of policy rate normalisation. In which case, euro/dollar could retest 1.15. Finally, and very briefly, Chart I-9 shows the major equity sector most at risk of a price trend reversal is Basic Materials. Although global growth seems healthy and synchronized, materials equities seem to have run much too far ahead, especially relative to other cyclical equity sectors. We recommend tactically underweighting Basic Materials relative to the market. Chart I-9Tactically Underweight Basic Materials Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Universal Constant Of Finance," September 25 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Published on September 7 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* As decribed in the main body of this report, this week’s new trade recommendation is to go long Spain’s IBEX35 versus the Eurostoxx50 with a profit target/stop loss of 2.5%. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights EM currencies are fairly valued at the moment - they are neither cheap nor expensive. Unit labor cost-based REER is a superior currency valuation measure to those based on consumer and producer prices. Based on this measure, the U.S. dollar is not expensive - rather its valuation is neutral. When valuations are neutral, directional market indicators are more imperative than valuations. We expect directional indicators to favor the U.S. dollar and the euro versus EM currencies. In Turkey, inflation is breaking out - the currency, stocks and bonds will be under assault (page 9). The Philippines economy is overheating warranting policy tightening. Share prices are at risk (page 16). Feature EM currencies have recently begun to sell off. Does this represent a major reversal, or just a pause in a bull market? Our bias is that it is the former. In this week's report, we discuss the valuation aspect of foreign exchange markets. One of the oft-cited bullish arguments for EM currencies is that they are cheap. Similarly, the contention goes that the U.S. dollar is expensive. Our exchange rate valuation measures do not support these claims. According to our most favored currency valuation measure - the real effective exchange rate (REER) based on unit labor costs - the U.S. dollar is currently fairly valued (Chart I-1). More specifically, the greenback is not cheap, per se, but it is not expensive either. Meanwhile, the euro is at its fair value and the yen is undervalued (Chart I-2). The source of this data is the IMF. Below we elaborate in detail why we believe the unit labor cost-based REER valuation measure is superior to those based on consumer or producer prices. Chart I-1The U.S. Dollar Is Neither Cheap Nor Expensive Chart I-2The Euro Is Fairly Valued, The Yen Is Cheap As to EM currencies, there is no data on REER based on unit labor costs across all EM countries. The IMF and OECD have data for only a few developing countries, shown in Chart I-3A and Chart I-3B. With the exception of the Mexican peso and the Polish zloty, EM currencies shown in these charts are not cheap. Chart I-3AEM Currencies Are Not Universally Cheap Chart I-3BEM Currencies Are Not Universally Cheap In the absence of unit labor cost-based REER for EM, we deduce EM currency valuations in a number of ways: First, if the U.S. dollar, the euro and yen are not expensive, EM currencies by definition cannot be cheap. Second, provided exchange rates of commodities-producing advanced countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Norway are still expensive, according to unit labor cost-based REER (Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B), it is fair to argue that currencies of commodities-producing EM economies probably are not cheap as well given they move in tandem with their advanced countries peers. Chart I-4ACAD Is At Fair Value, NOK Is Slightly Expensive Chart I-4BAUD & NZD Are Expensive Third, Chart I-5 illustrates consumer and producer prices-based REER for EM. Excluding China, Korea and Taiwan, the equity market cap-weighted EM REER based on the average of consumer and producer prices is at its historical mean (Chart I-5). This denotes that EM currencies are by and large fairly valued. Notably, the BRL is slightly above its fair value, according to the REER based on average of consumer and producer prices (Chart I-6, top panel). Similarly, the same measure for the RUB and ZAR is no longer depressed after the appreciation witnessed in both currencies over the past 18 months (Chart I-6, middle and bottom panels). Chart I-5EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: ##br##Exchange Rates Valuations Are Neutral Chart I-6EM High-Yielding ##br##Currencies Are Not Cheap All in all, we conclude that EM currencies are fairly valued at the moment - they are neither cheap nor expensive. This message is also corroborated by current account profiles across EM economies. In many developing countries, current account balances have improved, but are still in deficit. Consistently, the U.S. current account deficit excluding oil is at 1.75%, and with oil is at 2.4% of GDP - not wide at all. So, the current account does not presage that the greenback is expensive. Importantly, when valuations are neutral, they do not necessarily prevent the market from either rallying or selling off. Neutral valuations in any market have little impact on the market outlook. Thereby, we conclude that valuations are not an impediment for both EM currencies and the U.S. dollar to move in any given direction. When valuations are neutral, directional market indicators are more imperative than valuations. The best directional indicators for EM currencies have been commodities prices and the EM business cycle. Chart I-7 illustrates the EM aggregate currency index has historically correlated with commodities prices and EM industrial production. If commodities prices relapse and the EM business cycle slows down, as we expect, EM currencies will depreciate. As to U.S. bond yields and the greenback, we believe U.S. interest rate expectations will rise and the U.S. dollar will strengthen, at least, relative to EM currencies. That said, there has been no historical correlation between high-yielding exchange rates such as the BRL and ZAR and their interest rate differential over the U.S. (Chart I-8). Chart I-7These Factors Drive ##br##EM Exchange Rates Chart I-8Interest Rate Differential And ##br##Exchange Rates: No Correlation The euro and European currencies have the least downside versus the U.S. dollar. Hence, we expect EM currencies to weaken materially versus both the dollar and the euro (Chart I-9). Bottom Line: EM currencies are neither cheap nor expensive. We expect commodities prices to relapse and U.S. interest rate expectations to rise. This warrants a material down leg in EM currencies. We continue recommending a short position in a basket of the following currencies: ZAR, TRY, BRL, MYR and IDR versus the U.S. dollar. Investors, who are not comfortable being long the U.S. dollar, can short these same EM currencies versus the euro. Our overweights within the EM currency space are the TWD, THB, RMB, RUB, MXN, PLN and CZK. The Superior Currency Valuation Measure Unit labor cost-based REER is a superior currency valuation measure to those based on consumer and producer prices. The key idea behind currency valuation measures in general is to gauge competitiveness. Rising consumer and producer prices relative to trading partners signifies deteriorating competitiveness, and usually entails more expensive currency valuations. However, nowadays, labor costs in many economies, especially advanced ones, represent the largest cost component, even for manufacturing businesses. Therefore, it makes sense to compare wages across trading partners, not consumer and producer prices. However, rising wages in a country relative to its trading partners do not always signify worsening competitiveness. Wages might be rising, but productivity of employees may well be growing faster than wages. Therefore, true labor costs for businesses are not wages, but unit labor costs. Unit labor costs equal wages divided by productivity. They show the labor cost per unit of output. To estimate an economy's true competitiveness, one should compare its unit labor costs relative to its trading partners. REER based on unit labor cost does that. Hence, this measure captures two critical variables to competitiveness: wages and productivity. On the whole, unit labor costs measure competitiveness better than consumer and producer prices. Therefore, we argue that REER based on unit labor costs is superior to those based on consumer and producer prices. For comparison purposes, Chart I-10 illustrates the two REER measures for the U.S. dollar. Chart I-9EM Currencies Versus The USD And Euro Chart I-10U.S. Dollar: Two Valuation Measures Based on the above analysis, we conclude that the greenback and the euro are fairly valued, while the Japanese yen is cheap. In addition, EM currency valuations are neutral and currencies of commodities producing advanced countries are modestly expensive. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Turkey: Ride The Sell-Off Turkish stocks were among the best performing equity markets worldwide in the January-August period of this year before relapsing by 16% in U.S. dollar terms since September 1st (Chart II-1). We remain bearish/underweight Turkish financial markets. A Genuine Inflation Breakout Despite the currency being stable since the beginning of the year, inflation has been rising. Core consumer price inflation has surpassed 10% for the first time in the past 14 years (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Turkish Stocks Have More Downside Chart II-2Turkey: Inflation Is Breaking Out The country's double-digit wage growth is not supported by productivity gains. The latter has been stagnant (Chart II-3, top panel). Consequently, unit labor costs have surged in both the manufacturing and services sectors (Chart II-3, bottom panel). This combination of strong wage growth paired with low productivity growth depresses companies' profit margins. This in turn will force businesses to raise prices. Provided stimulus-propelled domestic demand is robust, businesses will succeed in raising their prices leading to escalating inflation. Typically, when a country is witnessing heightening inflationary pressures, the natural policy response should be monetary and/or fiscal tightening. However, Turkish authorities have been doing the opposite - running loose monetary and fiscal policies: Government expenditure excluding interest payments have accelerated significantly (Chart II-4). The rise in government spending has been partially funded by commercial banks - the latter's holdings of government bonds have been growing, boosting money supply, as a result. Chart II-3Turkey: Surging Unit Labor Costs Chart II-4Turkey: Fiscal Expenditures Are Booming This year the Turkish authorities have been able to generate growth through the recapitalization of the Credit Guarantee Fund. The aim of this fund is to incentivize banks to lend by essentially assuming credit risk on loans extended to small and medium enterprises. Under this scheme, the government has effectively given a green light to flood the economy with credit, in turn, boosting economic growth. So far, the scheme has been responsible for the creation of TRY 200 billion, or 7% of GDP, worth of new credit out of the TRY 250 billion limit. This TRY 250 billion is considerable as it compares with a total of TRY 367 billion worth of loan origination by commercial banks last year. Turkey's banking system has been relying on enormous amounts of liquidity provisions by the central bank (Chart II-5, top panel) to sustain its ongoing credit boom and strong economic growth. On the whole, the central bank's net liquidity injections into the banking system continue to increase rapidly. Interestingly, the nature of the central bank's funding of commercial banks has increasingly shifted away from open market operations and more towards direct lending to banks (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Adding all the liquidity facilities - the intraday, overnight and late window facilities - the Central Bank Of Turkey's outstanding funding to banks is TRY 86 billion, or 3% of GDP, abnormally elevated relative to the data series' history. This entails that monetary policy is loose even though the price of liquidity provided by the central bank to banks has been rising. Consistently, local currency bank loan growth stands at 25% (Chart II-6, top panel). Chart II-5Central Bank Of Turkey's Liquidity Injections Chart II-6Turkey Is Experiencing A Credit Binge On the whole, commercial banks are requiring more and more liquidity, and the CBT is continuously supplying it. These injections maintain liquidity in the banking system to a sufficiently high level that allow money/credit creation by commercial banks to continue mushrooming (Chart II-6, bottom panel). Fiscal and monetary policies are overly simulative and the country's twin - fiscal and current account - deficit is widening (Chart II-7). The widening current account deficit - which is a form of hidden inflation - substantiates the case of an inflation outbreak in Turkey. Remarkably, despite extremely strong exports due to the robust growth in the Euro Area, Turkey's current account deficit has been unable to narrow at all. This confirms excessive growth in domestic demand. In regard to currency valuation, Chart II-8 demonstrates that the lira is not cheap, especially according to unit labor cost-based REER. It is therefore questionable how long Turkish exports can remain competitive if unit labor costs continue mushrooming at a rapid pace. Chart II-7Turkey: Widening Twin Deficit Chart II-8The Lira Is Not Cheap Bottom Line: Despite high inflation, the Turkish authorities have opted to stimulate the economy further, aiming to boost short-term growth at all costs. The outcome will be an inevitable inflation outbreak. The Monetary Regime And Exchange Rate Chart II-9Excessive Money Printing Is Bearish For Lira The monetary regime in Turkey will lead to a major lira depreciation: The money multiplier - calculated as broad local currency money divided by banks' excess reserves at the central bank - has been rising sharply since 2012 (Chart II-9, top panel). This measure illustrates the degree of leverage banks have assumed. Also, the money multiplier reveals how much broad money/purchasing power banks have created per unit of liquidity provided by the central bank. To put into perspective the vast amount of money that has been created, the bottom panel of Chart II-9 demonstrates that the current net level of foreign exchange reserves (currently US$ 32 billion) covers only 11% of broad local currency money M3. Not only is excessive money creation bearish for the currency but it is also highly inflationary. As inflation rises, residents' desire to convert their deposits from local to foreign currency will increase, further exerting downward pressure on the lira. In fact, this is already happening - households' foreign currency deposits - measured in U.S. dollars - are growing at rapid annual pace of 13%. Given this inflationary backdrop and the risk of further depreciation, interest rates will have to rise. This will inevitably trigger another NPL cycle. Banks are very under-provisioned for non-performing loans (NPL). NPLs have not risen, and NPL provisions are also very low (Chart II-10). Both are set to rise considerably, and banks' capital and ability to expand credit will be severely undermined. Lastly, higher interest rates will be negative for loan growth and bank's profitability. Bank stocks are starting to roll-over. Given the extent to which they have decoupled from interest rates, we believe there is much more downside (Chart II-11). Chart II-10Turkey: A New NPL Cycle Will Start Chart II-11Turkish Bank Stocks Have Considerable Downside The current monetary policy stance is unsustainable. Inflation is breaking out and this is bearish for Turkish financial markets. Box 1 on page 15 addresses the geopolitical dimension of Turkey's recent spat with the U.S. Investment Conclusions We expect policy makers to remain behind the curve amid rising inflation and this will weigh on the lira. As such, we suggest currency traders who are not shorting the lira to do so at this time. We remain short the lira versus the U.S. dollar but the lira will continue to plummet versus the euro too. A weaker lira will undermine U.S. dollar and euro returns on Turkish stocks and domestic bonds. Dedicated EM equity investors as well as those overseeing EM fixed income and credit portfolios should continue to underweight Turkish assets within their respective EM universes. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com BOX 1 Turkey's Unstable Geopolitical Position On the political front, the recent spat with the U.S. over visas is just another sign of how far Turkey has descended into the geopolitical unknown. The U.S. has closed its visa offices as a response to the detention of a Turkish national working for the U.S. consulate in Istanbul by the local authorities. The arrest was made over alleged links to Fethullah Gulen, the cleric that Turkish authorities blame for the July 2016 botched coup. That Gulen remains the obsession of Turkish authorities is a clear sign that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to feel threatened. Whether the Gulen threat is real or imagined is not for us to determine. But it is clear that Turkey remains a deeply divided country. The April 2017 constitutional referendum giving the president greater powers barely passed, despite numerous reports of irregularities. As BCA's Geopolitical Strategy posited following the vote, the referendum did nothing to reinforce Erdogan's power or reduce domestic tensions.1 It would only deepen his instinct to use "rally-around-the-flag" strategy by emphasizing external threats to quell domestic opposition. Now Turkey finds itself at the crossroad on three different fronts: Iraq: Neighboring Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has just held an independence referendum, prompting Erdogan to threaten military action against the Iraqi Kurds. Although no regional or global power overtly supports KRG's moves towards independence, Turkey is under pressure to respond in order to snuff out any secessionist ambitions by the Kurds in Turkey and Syria. Syria: President Erdogan has also threatened invasion of the self-declared Kurdish canton of Afrin in northwestern Syria. The enclave is held by the U.S.-allied People's Protection Units (YPG), which fought against the Islamic State in Syria. According to various news reports, Turkish troops are amassing on the border with Syria for the intervention. This could put the Turkish military in direct contact with Russian troops, which have a presence in Afrin. The West: Relations with the West, with whom Turkey remains in a formal military alliance (NATO) remain in the doldrums. Aside from the visa spat with the U.S., Turkey's relations with Europe, and Germany in particular, are at their lowest point in years. Bottom Line: In a month's time, Turkey may have invaded both Syria and Iraq while simultaneously hitting a low point in its relationship with traditional Western allies. At the very least, this complicated geopolitical environment will make it difficult for Ankara to focus on the economy. At its greatest, it is a recipe for geopolitical overreach, military disaster, domestic crisis, or any combination of all three. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "What About Emerging Markets?," dated May 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. The Philippines: An Overheating Economy Requires Policy Tightening Since early 2016, the Philippine stock market has been massively lagging the EM benchmark (Chart III-1, top panel). Similarly, the Philippine peso has been extremely weak, recording new lows versus the U.S. dollar, despite the broad-based EM currency rally (Chart III-1, bottom panel). In fact, the symptoms of this economy and its financial markets are consistent with an overheating economy that is expanding above potential, and where inflationary pressures are heightening. Going forward, inflation will keep rising and the central bank will have to tighten monetary policy meaningfully. These developments will weigh on Philippine growth and financial markets. Consumer price inflation, both headline and core, are rising briskly and currently stand at 3% - in the middle of the central bank's 2-4% target (Chart III-2). With the policy rate at 3%, this entails that real rates have dropped to zero. Chart III-1Philippine Stocks Relative ##br##To EM Have Underperformed Chart III-2Philippine Inflation ##br##Is Creeping Higher The Central Bank of the Philippines (BSP) has kept monetary policy too easy for too long. It injected liquidity into the banking system on various occasions in 2013-2014 and 2016-2017 via its banking liquidity management tool - the Special Deposit Account (Chart III-3, top panel). These liquidity injections incentivized commercial banks to create enormous amounts of credit in the economy (Chart III-3, middle and bottom panels). Booming credit growth in turn is creating excessive purchasing power in the economy, resulting in a current account deficit for the first time since 2000. In addition, the fiscal deficit is now widening (Chart III-4). Chart III-3Credit Growth Is Rampant Chart III-4Philippines Twin Deficit On the wage front, non-agriculture workers' salaries are accelerating, pushing unit labor costs higher (Chart III-5). Remarkably, despite real GDP growth of about 6.5% since 2014, consumer staples EPS growth is on the verge of contracting. It seems that costs (including wages) have been mushrooming while productivity gains have been lagging. This also corroborates the overheating thesis. With Philippines' inflationary dynamics intensifying, the BSP will have to tighten monetary policy. In fact, the top panel of Chart III-3 shows that the BSP has already begun its tightening cycle by withdrawing some banking liquidity via its Special Deposit Account. In addition, interest rate hikes by the central bank are also an option. Monetary tightening amid very strong loan growth will lead a meaningful slowdown in the economy. Loan growth deceleration will affect primarily capital spending and the property market. Both segments are cooling off (Chart III-6). Chart III-5Philippines: Wages Are Accelerating Chart III-6Cyclical Slowdown On The Horizon Importantly, banks' net interest margins have been falling - a trend that will likely continue due to potential liquidity tightening and higher policy rates (Chart III-7, top panel). This, along with slow loan growth and rising NPL provisions, will intensify banks' EPS contraction (Chart III-7, bottom panel). Chart III-8 illustrates that both NPL and NPL provisions as a percent of total loans are at their lowest level since 1997. Higher borrowing costs following a decade-long lending boom, necessitates higher NPL provisions. Chart III-7Banks' Interest Rate Margins And Profits Chart III-8Bank NPLs To Rise Along With Provisions NPLs are likely to emanate from the real estate and construction sectors. Loans to these two sectors account for 20% of total bank loans. Hence, higher interest rates are negative for banks and real estate stocks which, together, account for 40% of the Philippines MSCI index market cap. If the central bank decides not to tighten, however, the economy will continue to overheat and bond yields - as well as the currency - will sell-off. Such a scenario is equally bearish for the equity market. Philippines equity valuations are elevated and, hence, are not priced for any of these scenarios. For dedicated EM equity investors, we continue recommending a neutral allocation to this bourse. We are reluctant to underweight this stock market because the Philippines remains less leveraged to China and the commodities cycle vis-à-vis other emerging markets (EM). Besides, it has already considerably underperformed the EM equity benchmark. Therefore, it might not underperform substantially relative to other EM countries - if and when commodities start selling off as a result of a growth slowdown in China. Within ASEAN, we favor Thailand, underweight Malaysia and are neutral on the Philippines, Indonesia, and India relative to the EM equity benchmark. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations