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Highlights An expansion in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet will increase dollar liquidity. This should be negative for the greenback, barring a recession over the next six to 12 months. Interest rate differentials have largely moved against the dollar. The biggest divergences are versus the more export-dependent NOK, SEK and GBP. A weak dollar will supercharge the gold uptrend. Gold will also benefit from abundant liquidity, and persistently low/negative real rates. Remain short USD/JPY. The path to a lower yen is via an overshoot, as the BoJ will need a shock to act more aggressively. The Bank of Canada left rates on hold, but may be hard-pressed to continue meeting its inflation mandate amid a widening output gap. Go long AUD/CAD for a trade. Feature Chart I-1A Well-Defined Channel The DXY index has been trading within a very narrow band this year, defined by the upward-sloped channel drawn from the February lows (Chart I-1). At 97, the DXY index is just a few ticks away from the lower bound of this channel, which could be tested in the coming weeks. A decisive break below will represent an important fundamental shift, since it will declare the winner in the ongoing battle between deteriorating global growth and easing financial conditions. Global Growth And The Dollar One of the defining features of the currency landscape last year was that U.S. interest rates became too tight relative to underlying conditions. This tightened dollar liquidity both domestically and abroad. Chart I-2 plots the neutral rate of interest in the U.S. relative to the fed funds target rate. A widening gap suggests underlying financing conditions are low relative to the potential growth rate of the economy. Not surprisingly, this also tends to track the yield curve pretty closely, assuming long-term rates are a proxy for the economy’s structural growth rate, while short-term rates reflect borrowing costs. For economic agents, a narrowing spread suggests a rising risk of capital misallocation, as the gap between the cost of capital and return on capital closes. This is most evident for banks through their net interest margins. At the epicenter of this shrinking spread are the Fed’s macroeconomic policies. These include raising interest rates (especially in the face of a trade slowdown) and/or shrinking its balance sheet. These are the very policies that also tend to strengthen the greenback. The result is a rise in the velocity of international U.S. dollars, pushing up offshore rates and lifting the cost of capital for borrowing countries. A widening gap between U.S. neutral rate of interest and fed funds target rate suggests underlying financing conditions are low relative to the potential growth rate of the economy.  This has been the backdrop for the dollar for much of the past two years. The good news is that more recently, the Fed has been quick to rectify the situation. The funding crisis among U.S. domestic banks will be resolved through repurchase agreements and a resumption of the Fed's bond purchases. Chart I-3 shows that the interest rate the Fed pays on excess reserves may soon exceed the effective fed funds rate, meaning the liquidity crisis among U.S. banks may soon be over. Correspondingly, banks’ excess reserves should start rising anew. The drop in rates and the easing in funding conditions have been partly sniffed out by a steepening yield curve (Chart I-3, bottom panel). This will incentivize banks to lend, which in turn, will boost U.S. money supply. As the economy recovers and demand for imports (machinery, commodities, consumer goods) rises, this will widen the current account deficit and increase the international supply of dollars. This should further calm dollar offshore rates, helping short-circuit any negative feedback loops that might have hampered growth in the past. Chart I-2The Fed Has Pivoted Chart I-3Easing Liquidity Strains The message from both global fixed-income markets and international stocks is that we may have reached a tipping point, where easing in financial conditions is sufficient to end the manufacturing recession. This is especially the case given this week’s breakout in the S&P 500, the Swedish OMX, and the Swiss Market Index (Chart I-4) – indices with large international exposure and very much tied to the global cycle. Such market cycles also tend to correspond with a weaker dollar, especially when the return on capital appears marginally higher outside the U.S. (Chart I-5). Chart I-4A Few Equity Breakouts Chart I-5Europe And EM Leading The Rally Chart I-6Less Stress In Offshore USD Funding Bottom Line: Rising dollar liquidity appears to have started greasing the international financial supply chain. One way to track if dollar funding is becoming more abundant is through the convenience yield, or cross-currency basis swap.1 This measures the difference in yield between an actual Treasury bond and a synthetic one trading in the offshore market. On this basis, we are well below the panic levels observed over the past decade (Chart I-6). Interest Rate Differentials And International Flows If the rise in global bond yields reflects a nascent pickup in growth, then the message from interest rate differentials has been clear: This growth pickup will be led by non-U.S. markets, similar to the message from international equities. Should the nascent pickup in global growth morph into a synchronized recovery, this will go a long way in further eroding the U.S.’ yield advantage. More specifically, the currencies that have borne the brunt of the manufacturing slowdown should also experience the quickest reversals. This is already being manifested in a very steep rise in their bond yields vis-à-vis those in the U.S. (Chart I-7A and Chart I-7B). For example, yields in Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan have risen by an average of 75 basis points versus those in the U.S. since the bottom. Should the nascent pickup in global growth morph into a synchronized recovery, this will go a long way in further eroding the U.S.’ yield advantage. Chart I-7AInterest Differentials And Exchange Rates Chart I-7BInterest Differentials And Exchange Rates International investors might still find U.S. bond markets attractive in an absolute sense, but the currency risk is just too big a potential blindside at the current juncture. Markets with the potential for currency appreciation such as Australia, Canada, Norway or even the European periphery within Europe might be better bets. Flow data highlights just how precarious being long U.S. dollars is. As of last August, overall flows into the U.S. Treasury market have been negative, which may have contributed to the bottom in bond yields. Net foreign purchases by private investors are still positive at an annualized US$166 billion, but the momentum of these flows is clearly rolling over. This is more than offset by official net outflows that are running at $314 billion (Chart I-8). As interest rate differentials have started moving against the U.S., so has foreign investor appetite for Treasury bonds. More importantly, private purchases have not been driven on a net basis by foreign entities, but by U.S. domestic concerns repatriating capital on the back of the 2017 Trump tax cuts. On a rolling 12-month basis, the U.S. was repatriating back close to net $US400 billion in assets, or about 2% of GDP. Given that the tax break was a one-off, flows have since started to ease, contributing to the ebb in Treasury purchases (Chart I-9). Chart I-8A Growing Dearth Of Treasury Buyers Chart I-9Repatriation Flows Are Ebbing Meanwhile, while U.S. residents have been repatriating capital domestically, foreign investors have been fleeing U.S. equity markets at among the fastest pace in recent years. On a rolling 12-month total basis, the U.S. saw an exodus of about US$200 billion in equity from foreigners earlier this year, the largest on record. Foreigners are still net buyers of about $265 billion in U.S. securities (mostly agency bonds), but the downtrend in purchases in recent years is evident. Bottom Line: Flows into U.S. assets are rapidly dwindling. This may be partly because as the S&P 500 makes new highs amid lofty valuations, long-term investors are slowly realizing that future expected returns will pale in comparison to history. Given that being long Treasurys and the dollar remains a consensus trade (Chart I-10), international investors run the risk of a potential blindside from a sharp drop in the dollar. Chart I-10Unfavorable Dollar Technicals Dollar Reserve Status And Gold The decline in the dollar may not mark the ultimate peak in the bull market that began in 2011, but at least it will unveil some of the underlying forces that have been chipping away at the dollar’s reserve status over the past few years. China has risen within the ranks to become the number one contributor to the U.S. trade deficit over the past few years. At the same time, Beijing has been destocking its holding of Treasurys, if only as retaliation against past U.S. policies, or perhaps to make room for the internationalization of the RMB. In a broader sense, there has been an underlying shift in the global economy away from dollars and towards a more diversified basket of currencies. This makes sense, given that a growing proportion of trading – be it in crude, natural gas, bulk commodities or even softs – is being done outside U.S. exchanges. Gold continues to outperform Treasurys, which has historically been an ominous sign for the U.S. dollar. Ever since the end of the gold/dollar link in the early ‘70s, bullion has stood as a viable threat to dollar liabilities. With the Fed about to embark on a renewed expansion of its balance sheet, we may have just triggered one of the necessary catalysts for a selloff in the U.S. dollar. This means that holding gold in dollars may become more profitable compared to other currencies (Chart I-11). Given that being long Treasurys and the dollar remains a consensus trade, international investors run the risk of a potential blindside from a sharp drop in the dollar.  The one tectonic shift that has happened over the past decade is that central banks have become net gold buyers, holding 20% of all gold that has ever been mined. If that number were to rise to say 25% or even 30%, it could have the potential to propel the gold price up towards $2800/oz (Chart I-12). If you think such an idea is far-fetched, just ask the Swiss, who a few years ago called a referendum to increase their gold holdings from 7% of total reserves to 20%, or Russia that has seen its gold holdings rise from 2% to over 20% of total reserves. Chart I-11Watch Gold In ##br##USD Terms Chart I-12What If Central Banks Bought Gold More Aggressively?   Bottom Line: Reserve diversification out of U.S. dollars is a trend that has been underway for a while now, and unlikely to change anytime soon. Gold will be a big beneficiary of this tectonic shift. A Few Trade Ideas If the dollar eventually weakens, the more export-dependent economies should benefit the most from a rebound in global growth, and by extension their currencies should be the outperformers. Within the G-10 universe, there would notably be the European currencies led by the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone and the pound. The countries currently experiencing the steepest rise in interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the U.S. could be a prelude to which currencies will outperform (previously mentioned Chart I-7A). We expect commodity currencies to also hold firm, but this awaits further confirmation of more pronounced Chinese stimulus, which so far has not yet materialized. The Canadian dollar should also be a beneficiary from dollar weakness, with a technical formation that looks categorically bearish USD/CAD (Chart I-13). Should the 1.30 level be breached, the next level of support is around the 2017 lows of 1.20. The BoC left rates unchanged this week, but the dovish tone from Governor Stephen Poloz was a big reminder that no central bank wants to tolerate a more expensive currency for now. Looser fiscal policy and rising oil prices will eventually become growth tailwinds. Chart I-13A USD/CAD Breakout Or Breakdown? Chart I-14Canadian House Prices However, we will favor the Aussie over the loonie since the downturn in the Australian housing market appears much further advanced compared to Canada. And with macro-prudential measures already implemented in Vancouver and Toronto, there is a rising risk that Montreal could follow suit (Chart I-14). Historically, policy divergences between the Reserve Bank of Australia and the BoC have followed the relative growth profiles of their biggest export markets, and the message so far is that the RBA is well ahead of the curve in its dovish bias (Chart I-15). Go long AUD/CAD for a trade. Chart I-15Buy AUD/CAD Finally, the Bank Of Japan left interest rates unchanged but signaled it was willing to ease should the path towards their 2% inflation target be in question. As the central bank that has been pursuing the most aggressive monetary stimulus over the last few years, it is fair to say this week’s policy meeting was a non-event. The yen will continue to be buffeted by powerful deflationary tailwinds that are holding the Japanese economy hostage, as well as global economic uncertainty. In the event that global growth picks up, the yen will depreciate at the crosses, but can still rise versus the dollar. This puts long yen bets in a “heads I win, tails I don’t lose much” scenario. Bottom Line: Go long AUD/CAD and stay short USD/JPY. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Arvind Krishnamurthy and Hanno Lustig, “Mind the Gap in Sovereign Debt Markets: The U.S. Treasury basis and the Dollar Risk Factor,” Stanford University, August 29, 2019. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. have been mixed: Preliminary GDP growth slowed to 1.9% quarter-on-quarter from 2% in Q3. PCE slowed to 1.5% quarter-on-quarter in Q3. Core PCE, on the other hand, increased to 2.2%. New home sales contracted by 0.7% month-on-month in September, while pending home sales grew by 1.5% month-on-month. The trade deficit narrowed marginally by $2.7 billion to $70.4 billion in September. Initial jobless claims increased by 5K to 218K for the week ended October 25th. The DXY index fell sharply after the Fed's press conference, ending with a loss of 0.6% this week. On Wednesday, the Fed cut interest rate by 25 bps for the third time this year to 1.75%, as widely expected. The fading interest rate differential will continue to be a headwind for the U.S. dollar. Report Links: On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been firm: GDP growth in the euro area slowed marginally to 1.1% year-on-year in Q3, down from 1.2% in the previous quarter. On a quarter-on-quarter basis, the growth was unchanged at 0.2%. Headline inflation in the euro area slowed slightly to 0.7% year-on-year in October. Core inflation however, increased to 1.1% year-on-year. Retail sales in Germany grew by 3.4% year-on-year in September, up from 3.1% in the previous month. EUR/USD increased by 0.5% this week amid broad dollar weakness. The current debate among central bankers in the Eurozone is whether ultra accommodative monetary policy is still warranted. This espouses the view that at least, to some members of the ECB, the neutral rate of interest in the Eurozone is higher than perceived. Report Links: On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-6JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mostly positive: Headline inflation was unchanged at 0.4% year-on-year in October. Core inflation however, increased marginally to 0.7% year-on-year in October. Retail sales soared by 9.1% year-on-year in September in anticipation of the consumption tax hike. Industrial production grew by 1.1% year-on-year in September, compared to a contraction of 4.7% year-on-year the previous month. Consumer confidence increased marginally to 36.2 from 35.5 in October. The yen appreciated by 0.5% this week against the U.S. dollar. The BoJ left its policy rate unchanged this Thursday, while reassuring markets that more stimulus could be added if needed in the future. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. have been mixed: On the housing front, nationwide house prices increased by 0.4% year-on-year in October. Mortgage approvals increased marginally to 65.9K in September. Money supply (M4) grew by 4% year-on-year in September, up from 3.3% in the previous month. GfK consumer confidence fell further to -14 in October. The pound appreciated by almost 1% against the U.S. dollar this week. The E.U. has agreed on yet another Brexit extension until January 31st. An earlier exit is also possible if the U.K. so chooses. Meanwhile, the U.K. economy is holding up quite well despite the cloud of uncertainty. We remain tactically long GBP/JPY. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mostly positive: Headline inflation increased to 1.7% year-on-year in Q3, up from 1.6% in the previous quarter. HIA new home sales grew by 5.7% month-on-month in September. Building permits contracted by 19% year-on-year in September. However on a monthly basis, it grew by 7.6% in September. AUD/USD surged by 1.2% this week. During a speech this Monday, RBA Governor Philip Lowe ruled out the possibility of negative interest rates in Australia, and urged businesses to start investing given historically low interest rates. Going forward, we expect the Aussie dollar to rebound amid a global growth recovery.  New Report Links: A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been mixed: Building permits increased by 7.2% month-on-month in September. Business confidence came in at -42.4 in October. This was an improvement from -53.5 in the previous month. The activity outlook fell further to -3.5 from -1.8 in October. The New Zealand dollar soared by 0.9% against the USD this week. While we expect the kiwi to outperform the USD amid global growth recovery, it will likely underperform its pro-cyclical peers. Report Links: USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in the Canada have been firm: GDP grew by 0.1% month-on-month in August. Bloomberg Nanos confidence index fell marginally to 57.4 for the week ended October 25th. The Canadian dollar has depreciated by 0.7% against the U.S. dollar, making it the worst performing G-10 currency this week. The BoC decided to keep interest rates on hold this Wednesday, with relatively strong domestic growth and inflation on target. While growth in Canada has surprised to the upside, it might not prove sustainable. We are shorting the Canadian dollar this week against the Australian dollar. Report Links: Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15HF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been mixed: KOF leading indicator increased to 94.7 in October, up from 93.9 in the previous month. ZEW expectations fell further to -30.5 in October. The Swiss franc has increased by 0.7% against the U.S. dollar this week. Domestic fundamentals remain strong in Switzerland, but are at risk from the global growth slowdown. As a safe-haven currency, a rising gold-to-oil ratio points to a higher franc. Report Links: Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been positive: Retail sales increased by 0.8% year-on-year in September. USD/NOK is flat this week amid broad dollar weakness. The Norwegian krone has diverged from the ebb and flow of energy prices, and is currently trading around two standard deviations below its fair value. While energy prices have recently been soft, the selloff in the Norwegian krone is exaggerated. We are looking to short CAD/NOK. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been positive: Consumer confidence rebounded to 92.7 in October. Retail sales increased by 2.6% year-on-year in September. Trade balance of goods shifted back to a surplus of SEK 2 billion in September, following the deficit of SEK 5.5 billion in August. Both imports and exports increased by SEK 6.6 billion and SEK 14.1 billion month-on-month, respectively. USD/SEK fell by 0.6% this week. The Swedish krona is much undervalued. A cheap krona should help to improve the balance of payments dynamics in Sweden. We expect the krona to bounce back sharply once global growth shows more signs of recovery amid a U.S.-China trade war détente. Report Links: Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
  The key question for asset allocators over coming months will be when (or, perhaps, whether) the global manufacturing cycle will turn up. This would trigger a move into more cyclically sensitive markets, for example euro zone equities and Emerging Market assets. It would push up commodity prices and government bond yields, and lead to a weakening of the U.S. dollar. Recommended Allocation Chart 1First Inklings Of A Pick-Up?   For now, the evidence of this turning-point remains ambiguous, and so we hesitate to pull the trigger. BCA Research's calculation of the global OECD Leading Economic Indicator bottomed earlier this year and should lead to a pick-up in manufacturing activity soon (Chart 1). However, only in EM have the manufacturing PMIs bottomed (Chart 1, panel 2) and this was due mainly to a questionably strong September PMI in China which might be reversed when the latest data-point is published on October 1. In the euro zone, the best that one can say is that the PMIs have stopped falling but they remain at a low level (41.9 in Germany, for instance). Some market-based indicators also signal a pick-up – but not yet convincingly (Chart 2). Defensive currencies such as the U.S. dollar and yen have fallen a little against cyclical currencies like the Korean won and Australian dollar. Euro zone equities have shown some strength, especially in the beaten-down auto sector. The global stock-to-bond ratio looks to be about to break out of its recent range. And copper has bounced off its lows. But these moves could turn out to be just noise rather than the beginning of a trend. Chart 2Are Markets Sniffing Out A Turn? Easier financial conditions are the most likely cause of a rebound. BCA Research's Financial Liquidity Index tends to lead both manufacturing activity and the relative performance of global stocks by around 12-18 months (Chart 3). With the dovish turn of central banks this year, the decline in long-term interest rates (the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, even after its recent rebound, is only at 1.7% compared to 3.2% a year ago), the contraction in credit spreads, and a pick-up in money supply growth especially in the U.S. (where M2 is now growing 6.5% year-on-year), it would be surprising if these looser monetary conditions do not feed through into stronger activity over coming quarters. Chart 3Financial Liquidity Propels Growth Chart 4Could Inflation Now Slow? Indeed, one can easily imagine a scenario next year where growth rebounds but inflation slows (due to the lagged effect of this year’s weaker growth, Chart 4), allowing central banks to remain dovish for some time. This non-inflationary accelerating growth would be highly positive for risk assets and negative for the U.S. dollar. Chart 5 shows how various asset classes behaved in such an environment in the past. Chart 5How Assets Behaved Under Rising Growth/Falling Inflation Easier financial conditions are the most likely cause of a rebound. There are some risks to this optimistic scenario, however. Chinese growth remains sluggish with, for example, imports – the most important factor as far as the rest of the world is concerned – falling by 8.5% year-on-year in September and showing no signs of recovery (Chart 6). The acceleration of Chinese credit growth in early 2019 has petered out since the summer and points to a much flatter recovery of activity than was the case in 2016 (Chart 7). A politburo meeting in late October could lead to monetary stimulus being ramped up but, for now, investors should not assume a big reflationary impulse from China. In the developed world, the biggest risk is that the slowdown in manufacturing spills over into employment, consumption, and services. There are some signs in the U.S. that companies are delaying hiring decisions: job openings have fallen, and the employment component of both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISMs points to a deterioration in the labor market (Chart 8). Growing CEO pessimism, presumably because of anemic earnings and the trade war, points to continuing weakness in capex and a further decline in activity indicators (Chart 9). Chart 6Chinese Growth Still Sluggish... Chart 7...As Credit Growth Peters Out   Chart 8Are Firms Starting To Delay Hiring? Chart 9CEOs Are Not Happy Chart 10Stocks Should Outperform Cyclically On balance, we still expect global growth to accelerate next year, and therefore global equities to outperform bonds over the next 12 months (Chart 10). But we want to have greater conviction for that view before we recommend more aggressive pro-cyclical tilts. We remain overweight equities versus bonds, but hedge the downside risk through an overweight in cash, and through tilts towards U.S. equities, and DM over EM equities. We continue to recommend hedging against the upside risk of greater Chinese stimulus and a strong rally in cyclical assets through an overweight in global Financials, Industrials, and Energy, and also through a neutral stance on Australian equities, which are a clean play on a Chinese rebound. We continue to look for the right timing to turn more positive on pure cyclical assets such as euro zone equities, and Emerging Markets. Fixed Income: A cyclical pick-up would imply that global government bond yields have further to rise (Chart 11). Our global fixed-income strategists have a short-term target for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield of 2.1% (versus 1.7% now) and -0.2% for Bunds (-0.4% now), which would take yields back to their 200-day moving averages (Chart 12).1 We continue to recommend a moderate underweight on duration, and prefer TIPS to nominal bonds, since inflation breakevens imply that the Fed will miss its inflation target by 80 basis points a year on average over the next 10 years. In an environment of accelerating economic growth, credit (both investment grade and high-yield)should outperform in both the U.S. and Europe. The most attractive points on the credit curve are BBB-rated bonds in IG, and the riskiest bonds in HY. For more risk-averse investors, agency MBS currently offer an attractive yield pickup over quality corporate credits. Chart 11Growth Will Push Up Yields Further... Chart 12...Initially To Their 200-Day Average     Equities: Any upside for U.S. equities must come from improved earnings performance. Throughout 2019, earnings have been beating overly pessimistic analysts’ forecasts and Q3 looks to be no exception, with EPS growth on track to be much stronger than the -5% year-on-year that analysts forecast going into the results season (Chart 13). Next year, nominal GDP growth of 4% and a weaker U.S. dollar should produce 7-8% EPS growth. But, with a forward PE of 17x and the Fed unlikely to boost the multiple by further rate cuts, upside is limited. In the right economic environment (as described above), euro zone and EM stocks should do much better. We are currently neutral on euro zone equities, but the recent stronger performance by European banks gives us more confidence that we may be able to move to overweight soon (Chart 14). Similarly, our EM strategists have instituted a buy stop on the MSCI EM index and say they will go overweight EM equities if the index in USD terms rises 3% from its current level.2 Chart 13Analysts Are Too Pessimistic On Earnings Currencies: The first inklings of U.S. dollar weakness over the past month suggest that it may, too, be sniffing out the start of a cyclical rebound, since it tends to be a very counter-cyclical currency (Chart 15). Going forward, relative interest rates are also unlikely to be as bullish a force for the U.S. dollar as they have been in the past few years. For now, we are neutral on the U.S. dollar on a trade-weighted basis, but do see it depreciating against the Australian dollar and the euro over the next 12 months. The British pound has already risen to take into account the lesser probability of a no-deal Brexit, and we would not expect it to move much either way until the General Election result is clear. There are some risks to the optimistic scenario: Chinese growth remains sluggish, and there are signs that U.S. companies are delaying hiring decisions. Chart 14First Signs Of Euro Banks Recovering? Chart 15Recovery Would Be Dollar Bearish Commodities: Industrial metals prices have bottomed out in recent months, in line with Chinese leading indicators (Chart 16). But we will need to see greater Chinese stimulus before we become more positive. Crude oil has moved largely in a range for the past six months, with tightness in supply offset by some weakness in demand, especially from developed economies (Chart 17). With demand likely to pick up in line with the global economy, and supply still constrained by the Saudi/Russia production pact and geopolitical disturbances, our energy strategists see Brent crude averaging $66 a barrel in Q4 and $70 in 2020, versus $60 now. Chart 16Not Enough China Stimulus For Metals To Bounce Chart 17Oil Kept Down By Weak Demand As last year, the Global Asset Allocation service will not publish a Q1 Quarterly in mid-December. Instead, we will send clients on November 22 our annual report of the conversation between Mr and Ms X and BCA Research’s managing editors. This report will detail BCA's house views on the outlook for the macro environment and investment markets in 2020. We will publish GAA Monthly Portfolio Outlooks on the first business days of December and January.   Garry Evans Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report “Big Mo(mentum) Is Turning Positive,” dated 29 October 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2For an explanation, please see the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report " EM Local Bonds: A New Normal?" dated 24 October 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com.   Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)  
While we remain overweight S&P banks and the broad financials sector, we continue to recommend an underweight stance in the S&P insurance index. This early cyclical subgroup continues to underperform the broad equity market as the industry is facing…
Martin Barnes and I spent last week visiting clients in Hong Kong and Singapore in celebration of BCA’s 70th anniversary. Martin has been with BCA Research for 32 years and has been a keen observer of market trends for much longer than that. It is always fascinating to hear his thoughts on the state of world affairs. I have spent this week visiting clients in Sydney and Melbourne. I made the case that global growth will accelerate next year. Stronger growth will pull down the U.S. dollar, while pushing up bond yields, equities, and commodity prices. EM and European stocks will begin to outperform their global benchmark. Cyclical equity sectors (including financials) will outperform defensives. What follows are my answers to some of the most common questions I have been receiving. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature Q: What makes you confident that global growth will rebound? A: Three things. First, global financial conditions have eased significantly thanks largely to the dovish pivot of most central banks. Reflecting this development, credit growth has picked up. This should support economic activity in the months ahead (Chart 1). Second, the manufacturing downturn seems to be running its course, as excess inventories continue to be liquidated (Box 1). As we have noted before, manufacturing cycles tend to last about three years, with 18 months of weaker growth followed by 18 months of stronger growth (Chart 2). Given that the current downturn began in the first half of 2018, we are probably approaching a bottom in growth. Chart 1Lower Rates Should Help Spur Growth Chart 2A Fairly Regular Three-Year Manufacturing Cycle Third, while there will be plenty of bumps along the road, trade tensions are likely to continue easing. As a self-described master negotiator, President Trump has to produce a “tremendous” deal for the American people. Had he negotiated an agreement with China a year or two ago, he would currently be on the hook for showing that it resulted in a smaller trade deficit. But with the presidential election only a year away, he can semi-credibly claim that the trade balance will only improve after he is re-elected. For their part, the Chinese would rather grapple with Trump now than risk either having to negotiate with him during his second term (when he will be unconstrained by re-election pressures) or having to negotiate with Elizabeth Warren (who may insist on including stringent environmental and human rights provisions in any trade deal). Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t, as they say. Q: Will a ceasefire between the U.S. and China really be enough to boost business confidence? Don’t we need to see an outright rollback of tariffs? A: We do not know if any tariffs will be rolled back as part of the “phase 1” deal that is currently being negotiated. Right now, the U.S. has only agreed to cancel the previously announced October 15th tariff hike on $250 billion of Chinese imports. A Reuters news story earlier this week indicated that China is also asking the U.S. scrap its plan to levy tariffs on $156 billion of Chinese imports on December 15th and to abolish the 15% tariffs on $125 billion in imports which were imposed on September 1st.1 Chart 3China Is No Longer As Dependent On Trade With The U.S. As It Once Was While the removal of some tariffs would be a positive development, it is not a necessary condition for a global growth revival. Remember that U.S. exports to China account for only 0.5% of GDP while Chinese exports to the U.S. account for 3.4% of GDP (Chart 3). The numbers are even smaller when measured in value-added terms. That does not mean that the trade war is irrelevant. An out-of-control trade war could cause the global supply chain to break down, leading to significant economic disruptions. To the extent that a détente greatly reduces the odds of such an outcome, it justifies a meaningful upgrade to the probability-weighted economic outlook. Q: What’s your read on the Chinese economy right now? A: China’s growth data have been mixed. The Caixin manufacturing purchasing managers’ index rose to 51.7 in October, the best reading since December 2016. The new orders subcomponent reached the highest level since September 2013. Export orders rose back above 50, registering the largest month-on-month increase of any of the subcomponents. In contrast, the “official” National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) manufacturing PMI, which mainly samples larger, state-owned companies, remained below 50 and sank to the lowest level since February. The NBS nonmanufacturing PMI also weakened. It is worth noting that unlike most of the industries tracked by the NBS, the construction sector PMI moved back above 60 in October. This is consistent with industry data showing that sales of reinforced steel bars, a good proxy for property construction, have accelerated. Electricity consumption has also picked up, which often bodes well for industrial output (Chart 4). Policy has generally remained supportive: Bank reserve requirements have been cut. Benchmark interest rates should come down over the coming months. Credit growth surprised on the upside in September. While the acceleration in credit formation has been more muted this past year than in 2015-16, the credit impulse has nevertheless moved off its late-2018 lows. The Chinese credit impulse leads global growth by about nine months (Chart 5). Chart 4A Positive Sign For Chinese Growth Momentum Chart 5The Chinese Credit Cycle Should Support Global Growth   Chart 6China Stepped Up Fiscal Stimulus In 2019 Less noticed is the fact that fiscal policy has been eased significantly. According to the IMF, the augmented budget deficit – which includes spending through local government financing vehicles and other off-balance sheet expenditures – is on track to reach nearly 13% of GDP in 2019, a bigger deficit than during the depth of the Great Recession (Chart 6).  Looking out, we expect Chinese growth to rebound next year as the global manufacturing downturn ends and trade war tensions subside. Q: How much of a growth rebound can we expect in Europe? A: The slowdown in the euro area has been concentrated in Italy and Germany. In contrast, growth in Spain and France has held up relatively well (Chart 7). Looking out, Italian growth should rebound thanks to the 270 bps decline in 10-year bond yields that has taken place since October 2018 (Chart 8). German growth should also recover on an improvement in world trade and a stabilization in global auto production and demand. Chart 7Euro Area Growth: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly Chart 8Lower Yields Should Lift Italian Growth     Q: Will we see fiscal stimulus in Europe? A: Yes. Fiscal policy remains quite tight in the euro area, but it is starting to loosen at the margin. The fiscal thrust should reach 0.4% of GDP this year, the highest level since 2010 (Chart 9). We expect further modest fiscal easing in 2020, even against a backdrop of stronger domestic economic growth.   Chart 9Euro Area Fiscal Stimulus Will Also Boost Growth Chart 10Germany's Competitive Advantage Against The Rest Of The Euro Area Is Deteriorating       Germany has been reluctant to increase its own budget deficit in the past. However, there are at least two reasons why this attitude may slowly change. First, there are growing calls within Germany for more spending on public infrastructure, including on ”green” measures to mitigate climate change. The fact that Germany can issue debt at negative rates only incentivizes fiscal easing. If you can get paid to issue debt, why not do it? Second, relatively fast wage growth has caused Germany to become less competitive against its neighbors over the past eight years. As a result, Germany’s trade surplus with the rest of the euro area has fallen in half (Chart 10). A shrinking trade surplus will require a bigger budget deficit to compensate for the loss of aggregate demand.   Q: Is A “No Deal” Brexit still a risk? A: No. Westminster and the British Supreme Court have both rebuked Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s threat of a “no deal” Brexit. This means that the only outcome that would unsettle markets – a disorderly U.K. exit from the EU – is practically off the table. Two options remain: An orderly Brexit in which an eventual trade deal minimizes tariffs, or another referendum. There is no appetite for a no-deal exit. Furthermore, if another referendum on EU membership were held today, the remain side would probably win (Chart 11). Chart 11Brexit Angst: A Case Of Bremorse Q: Is the Fed done cutting rates? A: Yes. The FOMC statement removed the promise to “act as appropriate to sustain the expansion” and replaced it with a more neutral pledge to “monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook”. If there were any ambiguity left about what this meant, Chair Powell squelched it by noting in his press conference that “monetary policy is in a good place” and “the current stance of policy [is] likely to remain appropriate.” This week’s “insurance cut” brings the total for this year to 75 bps. This is exactly the same amount of easing the Fed delivered in 1995/96 and 1998 — two episodes that are widely seen as successful mid-cycle course corrections. Today’s strong employment report and uptick in the ISM manufacturing index provide further evidence that the U.S. economy is on the right track. If U.S. and global growth continue to pick up as we expect, there will not be any need to cut rates further. Q: When can we expect the Fed to start hiking rates again? Chart 12Inflation Expectations Are Too Low A: Probably not until December 2020 at the earliest. This is partly because the Fed will want to stay out of the political fray leading up to the presidential election (perhaps wishful thinking). Arguably more important, the Fed, along with most market participants, has convinced itself that the neutral rate of interest is very low. If that is truly the case, raising rates is a risky strategy because it could cause growth to weaken at a time when inflation expectations are still below the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 12). In his recent press conference, Powell seemed to go out of his way to stress that he would not make the same mistake he did last October when he said rates were “a long way from neutral”. Most notably, he said this week that the FOMC “would need to see a really significant move up in inflation that is persistent before we even consider raising rates to address inflation concerns.” Q: How worried should equity investors be about the prospect of President Warren? A: While Elizabeth Warren would not be a welcome treat for shareholders, she probably would not be a disaster either. Right now she is trying to elbow Bernie Sanders out of the race in order to lock up the “progressive” vote. Thus, it is not surprising that she has dialed up the far-left rhetoric. If Warren succeeds in securing the Democratic Party nomination, she will pivot to the centre. Remember this is the same person who said last year she was “a capitalist” and “I love what markets can do… They are what make us rich, they are what create opportunity.”2 Considering that financial sector reform has been the focus of Warren’s academic and legislative career, bank shareholders are understandably worried about what a Warren presidency would entail. They probably shouldn’t be. Banks today operate more like staid utilities than the reckless casinos they were prior to the financial crisis. A lot of the rules and regulations that Warren champions have already been implemented in one guise or another. In fact, it would not be a stretch to say that had these rules been in place 15 years ago, the share prices of many financial institutions would be a lot higher today (especially the ones that went under!). Lastly, one should keep in mind that the U.S. political system has numerous checks and balances. Even if Elizabeth Warren did want to pursue a radical agenda, she would be stymied by moderate Democrats and a Senate which, more likely than not, will remain in Republican control. Q: Taking everything you said on board, how should investors position themselves over the next 12 months? A: Despite the risks facing the global economy, investors should continue to overweight stocks relative to bonds in a balanced portfolio. A rebound in global growth next year will give corporate earnings a lift. As a countercyclical currency, the U.S. dollar is likely to weaken in an environment of improving global growth (Chart 13). The combination of stronger growth and a weaker dollar will boost commodity prices (Chart 14). Chart 13The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 14Dollar Weakness Is A Boon For Commodities Cyclical equity sectors normally outperform defensive sectors when the global economy is strengthening and the dollar is weakening (Chart 15).     Chart15ACyclical Stocks Will Outperform If The Dollar Weakens Chart 15BCyclical Stocks Are More Attractive Than Defensives       We would include financials in our definition of cyclical sectors. As global growth improves, long-term bond yields will increase at the margin. Since central banks are in no hurry to raise rates, yield curves will steepen. This will boost bank net interest margins, flattering profits and share prices (Chart 16). Emerging market and European stocks have more exposure to cyclical sectors than U.S. stocks. Thus, it stands to reason that EM and European equities will outperform their U.S. peers over the next 12 months (Chart 17). Chart 16Steeper Yield Curves Will Benefit Financials Chart 17EM And Euro Area Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves   Non-U.S. stocks also have the advantage of being cheaper, even if adjusted for differences in sector weights. U.S. equities currently trade at a forward PE ratio of 18, compared to 13 for non-U.S. stocks. Since interest rates are generally lower outside the U.S., the equity risk premium is especially wide for non-U.S. stocks (Chart 18). Chart 18Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High Box 1 Evidence of Inventory Liquidation In The Manufacturing Sector   U.S. (October 2019): “Finally, despite a renewed rise in input buying, the stronger increase in new business meant firms increasingly dipped into stocks to ensure new orders were fulfilled in a timely manner. Therefore, pre-production inventories fell at the quickest rate for three months and stocks of finished goods decreased slightly.” Markit “The [inventory] index contracted for the fifth straight month, but at a slower rate. Improvements in new orders and stocking for the fourth quarter both contributed positively to the index compared to September” ISM (Institute for Supply Management) Germany (October 2019): “However, weighing on the index were faster decreases in employment and stocks of purchases, alongside a more marked improvement in supplier delivery times.” Markit U.K. (October 2019): “A number of firms revisited their Brexit preparations during October, leading to higher levels of input purchasing and a build-up of safety stocks. Growth in inventories of finished goods and purchases were at six-month highs, but remained below the survey-record rates reached during the first quarter.” Markit Japan (October 2019): “A reluctance to hold items in stocks was also signalled by simultaneous draw-downs to pre- and post-production inventories during the latest survey period. In fact, rates of depletion in both cases accelerated during the month, with stocks of finished goods falling at the fastest rate since survey data were first collected 18 years ago.” Markit Canada (October 2019): “Latest data signalled a marginal accumulation of preproduction inventories across the manufacturing sector. In contrast, stocks of finished goods were depleted for the first time in three months. A number of survey respondents commented on efforts to boost cash flow by streamlining their post-production inventories.” Markit China (October 2019): “Improved client demand led firms to expand their purchasing activity, with the rate of growth the quickest since February 2018. This contributed to a further rise in stocks of inputs, albeit marginal. Inventories of finished goods meanwhile declined amid reports of the greater use of stocks to fulfil orders.” Markit Taiwan (October 2019): “Stocks of both pre- and postproduction goods contracted at accelerated rates, with the latter falling solidly overall.” Markit Korea (October 2019): “Elsewhere, latest survey data highlighted a strong drive towards cost cutting, with firms clearing their existing stocks of both inputs and finished goods at accelerated rates.” Markit India (October 2019): “Both pre- and post-production inventories decreased in October. The fall in the latter was sharper and the quickest in 16 months.” Markit Russia (October 2019): “Finally, firms reduced their purchasing activity further as they supplemented production through the use of preproduction inventories. Stocks of finished goods also fell amid lower client demand and efforts to run down stores.” Markit Turkey (October 2019): “A muted easing of purchasing activity was recorded in October, while stocks of both purchases and finished goods were scaled back.” Markit Brazil (October 2019): “As a result, stocks of purchases fell at the quickest rate in 16 months. Post-production inventories likewise decreased to the greatest extent since mid-2018 during October. According to panel members, the fall was due to sales growth.” Markit   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Please see David Lawder, and Andrea Shalal, “U.S., China say they are 'close to finalizing' part of a Phase One trade deal,” Reuters (October 25, 2019); and Alexandra Alper, and Doina Chiacu,"Trump: 'ahead of schedule' on China trade deal," Reuters (October 28, 2019). 2Please see John Harwood, “Democratic Sen. Elizabeth Warren: ‘I am a capitalist’ – but markets need to work for more than just the rich,” CNBC (July 24, 2018).   Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores   Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Underweight The S&P restaurants index is often mistakenly used as an early cyclical vehicle to express the “vibrant consumer” theme. However, the name of the index is deceiving as MCD and SBUX comprise ~80% of the index’s market cap. Such a heavy tilt toward low-cost dining gives the index its defensive properties; up to very recently the relative share price ratio had been joined at the hip with our defensive sector gauge (top panel, on the next page). We remain underweight the S&P restaurants index and expect that the recent steep divergence with safe haven stocks will narrow via a “catch down” phase in the former. Forward looking profit fundamentals also corroborate that relative share prices have run way ahead of themselves. Real dining PCE is falling like a stone, and has historically been an excellent leading indicator of relative share prices, warning that restaurant stocks are vulnerable to a sizable pullback (PCE shown advanced, middle panel, on the next page). Further, the restaurant performance index is sending a similar message that the relative share price ratio’s path of least resistance remains to the downside (third panel, on the next page). Bottom Line: We remain underweight the S&P restaurants index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5REST - MCD, SBUX, YUM, DRI, CMG.
Three cuts and done. This is very reminiscent of the 1995 and 1998 mid-cycle slowdowns. By flagging policy as being “appropriate” and “accommodative”, Fed Chair Jerome Powell indicated that the Fed will not cut rates anymore, unless global and U.S. growth…
Following the BoC’s press conference, Canadian 10-year yields collapsed 15 basis points and the CAD depreciated 0.6% versus the USD, on a day when the greenback was weak. During Governor Poloz's press conference, market participants latched on to the mention…
The first thing that sticks out in the chart above is that the 5-year note offers poor value. We also note that the curve steepens sharply beyond the 5-year maturity point, so maturities greater than 5 years benefit a lot from rolldown. The simple…
In lieu of the next weekly report I will be presenting the quarterly webcast ‘The Japanification Of Europe: Should We Fear It, Or Celebrate It?’ on Monday 4 November at 10.00AM EST, 3.00PM GMT, 4.00PM CET, 11.00PM HKT. As usual, the webcast will take a TED talk format lasting 18 minutes, after which I will take live questions. Be sure to tune in. Regards, Dhaval Joshi Highlights Global and European growth is experiencing a welcome rebound. Favour a cyclical investment stance, albeit tactical – as there is no visibility in the growth rebound beyond early 2020. Close the overweight to healthcare versus industrials at a small profit. Upgrade Sweden and Spain to overweight, and Norway to neutral. Downgrade Denmark to underweight, and Ireland to neutral. Expect heightened volatility in sterling in the build up to a highly ‘non-linear’ UK election. Fractal trades: 1. long oil and gas versus telecom; 2. long tin. Feature Global and European growth is experiencing a welcome rebound. This we can see from the best real-time indicators of activity, such as the ZEW sentiment, IFO expectations and of course the equity and bond markets (Chart of the Week). Nevertheless, investors make three very common mistakes in interpreting, predicting, and implementing such rebounds. This week’s report describes these three mistakes and the underlying realities. Chart of the WeekGrowth Is Experiencing A Welcome Rebound Mistake #1: Real-Time Indicators Do Not Lead The Market Reality #1: In the short term, markets move in lockstep with indicators such as the ZEW sentiment, IFO expectations, and PMIs (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Economic Indicators Do Not Lead The Markets... Having said that, the evolution of economic indicators can still provide a useful long-term investment signal. If an indicator – like IFO expectations – tends to revert to its mean, and is now near its historical lower bound, the scope for an eventual move up is greater than the scope for a further move down.1 Based on such a reversion to the mean, we are maintaining a structural overweight to the DAX versus the German long bund (Chart I-3). Chart I-3...But Depressed Performances Have Scope For Long-Term Upside But to reiterate, in the short term, the market moves in lockstep with the real-time economic indicators. Hence, to get a useful short-term investment signal, we need to predict where these indicators will be in the coming months – in other words, to predict whether growth will continue to accelerate. In the short term, the market moves in lockstep with real-time economic indicators.  Which brings us neatly to the second mistake. Mistake #2: When Financial Conditions Ease, Growth Does Not Necessarily Accelerate Reality #2: It is not the change of financial conditions but rather its impulse – the change of the change – that causes growth to accelerate or decelerate. For example, a 0.5 percent decline in the bond yield decline will trigger new borrowing through, inter alia, an increase in the number of mortgage applications. The new borrowing will add to demand, meaning it will generate growth. But in the following period, a further 0.5 percent decline in the bond yield will generate the same additional new borrowing and thereby the same growth rate. The crucial point being that if the decline in the bond yield is the same in the two periods, growth will not accelerate. Growth will accelerate only if the first 0.5 percent bond yield decline is followed by a bigger, say 0.6 percent, decline – meaning a tailwind impulse. But growth will decelerate if the first 0.5 percent decline is followed by a smaller, say 0.4 percent, decline – meaning a headwind impulse. To repeat, the counterintuitive thing is that for a growth acceleration it is not the change in the bond yield that is important but rather its impulse. There are four impulses that matter for short-term growth: The bond yield 6-month impulse. The credit 6-month impulse. The oil price 6-month impulse (for oil importing economies like Germany). The geopolitical risk impulse. To be clear the geopolitical risk impulse is not an impulse in the technical sense, but it is a similar concept: is the number of potential geopolitical tail-events going up or down? In the fourth quarter, our subjective answer is down. The Brexit deadline has been pushed back to January 31 2020; the new coalition government in Italy has removed Italian politics as an imminent tail-event; and the US/China trade war and Middle East tensions are most likely to be in stasis. Turning to the other impulses, the credit 6-month impulse should briefly rebound in the fourth quarter following the rebound in the global bond yield 6-month impulse (Chart I-4). All of this favours a cyclical investment stance – albeit tactical, because there is no visibility in this growth rebound beyond early 2020. Chart I-4The Credit 6-Month Impulse Should Briefly Rebound Meanwhile, the recent evolution of the oil price 6-month impulse should provide an additional short-term tailwind for oil importing economies (Chart I-5). Justifying a near-term overweight stance to the cyclical heavy German stock market within a European or global equity portfolio. Chart I-5The Oil Price 6-Month Impulse Should Help Oil Importing Economies Which brings us to the third mistake. Mistake #3: Major Stock Markets Are Not Plays On Their Economies Of Domicile Reality #3: Major stock markets are dominated by multinational corporations, and such companies are plays on their global sectors, rather than the country in which they have a stock market listing. Hence, a stock market’s relative performance is predominantly a play on its distinguishing overweight and underweight ‘sector fingerprint’. What confuses matters is that sometimes the sector fingerprint happens to align with the tilt of the domicile economy. Germany has an exporter heavy stock market and an exporter heavy economy while Norway has an oil heavy stock market and an oil heavy economy, so in these cases there is a connection between the stock market and the economy. But in most instances, there is no alignment: the connection between the UK stock market and the UK economy is minimal, and the same is true in Spain, Denmark, Ireland, and most other countries. When bond yields were declining most sharply, and growth was decelerating, it weighed on cyclical sectors such as industrials and banks versus the more defensive sectors such as healthcare. Banks suffered doubly because the flattening (or inverting) yield curve also ate into their margins. But if the sharpest decline in bond yields has already happened, it suggests that cyclicals could experience a burst of outperformance, at least for a few months (Chart I-6). Hence, today we are closing our four month overweight to healthcare versus industrials at a small profit. Chart I-6If The Sharpest Decline In Bond Yields Is Over, Cyclicals Could Outperform Based on sector fingerprints, this also necessitates the following changes to our country allocation: Overweight banks versus healthcare means overweight Sweden versus Denmark (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Long Sweden Versus Denmark = Long Financials And Industrials Versus Biotech Overweight banks means overweight Spain (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Long Spain = Long Banks Meanwhile, removing our underweight to the cyclical oil sector means removing the successful underweight to Norway (Chart I-9). And indirectly, it means removing the equally successful overweight to Ireland, given its high weighting to Airlines (Chart I-10).  Chart I-9Long Norway = Long Oil And Gas Chart I-10Long Ireland = Long Airlines   Bonus Mistake: You Can Not Hit A Point Target In A Non-Linear System Boris Johnson said that he “would rather be dead in a ditch” than miss the October 31 deadline for delivering Brexit. Well Johnson had to ditch his ditch. Why? Because the UK’s parliamentary arithmetic has made Brexit an inherently non-linear system, and you cannot hit a point target in a non-linear system. Boris Johnson had to ditch his ditch. In a non-linear system a tiny change in an input might have no impact on the output, or it might have a huge impact on the output. The Brexit process is inherently non-linear because a tiny shift in parliamentary votes one way or another, or a tiny shift in the tabled amendments to laws one way or another has had a huge impact on the outcome. That’s why it proved impossible for Johnson to hit his point target of delivering Brexit by October 31. Attention now shifts to another non-linear system – the upcoming UK general election. The UK’s first past the post electoral system is designed for a head-to-head between two dominant parties. But right now, there are five parties in play – Labour, Liberal Democrat, Conservative, Brexit, plus the SNP in Scotland. Mathematically, this creates the possibility of ten types of swings, compared with the usual single swing between Labour and Conservative. Making the outcome of the election highly sensitive to a tiny shift in votes either way in ten different directions. The UK general election is a non-linear system. In The Pound Is A Long Term Buy (And So Are Homebuilders) we initiated a structural long position in the undervalued pound.2 Given that our overweight to the international focused FTSE100 versus the domestic focussed FTSE250 is effectively an inverse play on the pound, it is inconsistent with our long-term view on the currency (Chart I-11). Nevertheless, over the course of the election campaign we expect heightened volatility in sterling as the non-linearity of the election outcome becomes clear. Hence, we await an upcoming better opportunity to remove our overweight FTSE100 versus FTSE250 position. Chart I-11Long FTSE250 Versus FTSE100 = Long Pound Fractal Trading System* There are two recommended trades this week. The underperformance of US oil and gas versus telecom is ripe for a technical rebound based on its broken 130-day fractal structure. Go long US oil and gas versus telecom, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 8 percent. The recent sell-off in tin is undergoing a similar technical bottoming process. Go long tin, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 5 percent. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12US: Oil & Gas Vs. Telecom Chart I-13Tin The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European  Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In technical terms, if the time-series is ‘stationary’, it must eventually rebound from its lower bound. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Pound Is A Long-Term Buy (And So Are Homebuilders)," dated October 17, 2019 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II_8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  
Special Report Highlights The Cold War is a limited analogy for the U.S.-China conflict; In a multipolar world, complete bifurcation of trade is difficult if not impossible; History suggests that trade between rivals will continue, with minimal impediments; On a secular horizon, buy defense stocks, Europe, capex, and non-aligned countries. Feature There is a growing consensus that China and the U.S. are hurtling towards a Cold War. BCA Research played some part in this consensus – at least as far as the investment community is concerned – by publishing “Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” in September 2012.1 For much of this decade, Geopolitical Strategy focused on the thesis that geopolitical risk was rotating out of the Middle East, where it was increasingly irrelevant, to East Asia, where it would become increasingly relevant. This thesis remains cogent, but it does not mean that a “Silicon Curtain” will necessarily divide the world into two bifurcated zones of capitalism. Trade, capital flows, and human exchanges between China and the U.S. will continue and may even grow. But the risk of conflict, including a military one, will not decline. In this report, we first review the geopolitical logic that underpins Sino-American tensions. We then survey the academic literature for clues on how that relationship will develop vis-à-vis trade and economic relations. The evidence from political theory is surprising and highly investment relevant. We then look back at history for clues as to what this means for investors. Our conclusion is that it is highly likely that the U.S. and China will continue to be geopolitical rivals. However, due to the geopolitical context of multipolarity, it is unlikely that the result will be “Bifurcated Capitalism.” Rather, we expect an exciting and volatile environment for investors where geopolitics takes its historical place alongside valuation, momentum, fundamentals, and macroeconomics in the pantheon of factors that determine investment opportunities and risks. The Thucydides Trap Is Real … Speaking in the Reichstag in 1897, German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow proclaimed that it was time for Germany to demand “its own place in the sun.”2 The occasion was a debate on Germany’s policy towards East Asia. Bülow soon ascended to the Chancellorship under Kaiser Wilhelm II and oversaw the evolution of German foreign policy from Realpolitik to Weltpolitik. While Realpolitik was characterized by Germany’s cautious balancing of global powers under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Weltpolitik saw Bülow and Wilhelm II seek to redraw the status quo through aggressive foreign and trade policy. Imperial Germany joined a long list of antagonists, from Athens to today’s People’s Republic of China, in the tragic play of human history dubbed the “Thucydides Trap.”3 Chart II-1Imperial Overstretch The underlying concept is well known to all students of world history. It takes its name from the Greek historian Thucydides and his seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides explains why Sparta and Athens went to war but, unlike his contemporaries, he does not moralize or blame the gods. Instead, he dispassionately describes how the conflict between a revisionist Athens and established Sparta became inevitable due to a cycle of mistrust. Graham Allison, one of America’s preeminent scholars of international relations, has argued that the interplay between a status quo power and a challenger has almost always led to conflict. In 12 out of the 16 cases he surveyed, actual military conflict broke out. Of the four cases where war did not develop, three involved transitions between countries that shared a deep cultural affinity and a respect for the prevailing institutions.4 In those cases, the transition was a case of new management running largely the same organizational structure. And one of the four non-war outcomes was nothing less than the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The fundamental problem for a status quo power is that its empire or “sphere of influence” remains the same size as when it stood at the zenith of power. However, its decline in a relative sense leads to a classic problem of “imperial overstretch.” The hegemonic or imperial power erroneously doubles down on maintaining a status quo that it can no longer afford (Chart II-1). The challenger power is not blameless. It senses weakness in the hegemon and begins to develop a regional sphere of influence. The problem is that regional hegemony is a perfect jumping off point towards global hegemony. And while the challenger’s intentions may be limited and restrained (though they often are ambitious and overweening), the status quo power must react to capabilities, not intentions. The former are material and real, whereas the latter are perceived and ephemeral. The challenging power always has an internal logic justifying its ambitions. In China’s case today, there is a sense among the elite that the country is merely mean-reverting to the way things were for many centuries in China’s and Asia’s long history (Chart II-2). In other words, China is a “challenger” power only if one describes the status quo as the past three hundred years. It is the “established” power if one goes back to an earlier state of affairs. As such, the consensus in China is that it should not have to pay deference to the prevailing status quo given that the contemporary context is merely the result of western imperialist “challenges” to the established Chinese and regional order. Chart II-2China’s Mean Reverting Narrative In addition, China has a legitimate claim that it is at least as relevant to the global economy as the U.S. and therefore deserves a greater say in global governance. While the U.S. still takes a larger share of the global economy, China has contributed 23% to incremental global GDP over the past two decades, compared to 13% for the U.S. (Chart II-3). Chart II-3The Beijing Consensus Bottom Line: The emerging tensions between China and the U.S. fit neatly into the theoretical and empirical outlines of the Thucydides Trap. We do not see any way for the two countries to avoid struggle and conflict on a secular or forecastable horizon. What does this mean for investors? For one, the secular tailwinds behind defense stocks will persist. But what beyond that? Is the global economy destined to witness complete bifurcation into two armed camps separated by a Silicon Curtain? Will the Alibaba and Amazon Pacts suspiciously glare at each other the way that NATO and Warsaw Pacts did amidst the Cold War? The answer, tentatively, is no. … But It Will Not Lead To Economic Bifurcation President Trump’s aggressive trade policy also fits neatly into political theory, to a point. Realism in political science focuses on relative gains over absolute gains in all relationships, including trade. This is because trade leads to economic prosperity, prosperity to the accumulation of economic surplus, and economic surplus to military spending, research, and development. Two states that care only about relative gains due to rivalry produce a zero-sum game with no room for cooperation. It is a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” that can lead to sub-optimal economic outcomes in which both actors chose not to cooperate. Diagram II-1 illustrates the effects of relative gain calculations on the trade behavior of states. In the absence of geopolitics, demand (Q3) is satisfied via trade (Q3-Q0) due to the inability of domestic production (Q0) to meet it. Diagram II-1Trade War In A Bipolar World However, geopolitical externality – a rivalry with another state – raises the marginal social cost of imports – i.e. trade allows the rival to gain more out of trade and “catch up” in terms of geopolitical capabilities. The trading state therefore eliminates such externalities with a tariff (t), raising domestic output to Q1, while shrinking demand to Q2, thus reducing imports to merely Q2-Q1, a fraction of where they would be in a world where geopolitics do not matter. The dynamic of relative gains can also have a powerful pull on the hegemon as it begins to weaken and rethink its originally magnanimous trade relations. As political scientist Duncan Snidal argued in a 1991 paper, When the global system is first set up, the hegemon makes deals with smaller states. The hegemon is concerned more with absolute gains, smaller states are more concerned with relative, so they are tougher negotiators. Cooperative arrangements favoring smaller states contribute to relative hegemonic decline. As the unequal distribution of benefits in favor of smaller states helps them catch up to the hegemonic actor, it also lowers the relative gains weight they place on the hegemonic actor. At the same time, declining relative preponderance increases the hegemonic state’s concern for relative gains with other states, especially any rising challengers. The net result is increasing pressure from the largest actor to change the prevailing system to gain a greater share of cooperative benefits.5 The reason small states are initially more concerned with relative gains is because they are far more concerned with national security than the hegemon. The hegemon has a preponderance of power and is therefore more relaxed about its security needs. This explains why Presidents George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, and George Bush Jr. all made “bad deals” with China. Writing nearly thirty years ago, Snidal cogently described the current U.S.-China trade war. Snidal thought he was describing a coming decade of anarchy. But he and fellow political scientists writing in the early 1990s underestimated American power. The “unipolar moment” of American supremacy was not over, it was just beginning! As such, the dynamic Snidal described took thirty years to come to fruition. When thinking about the transition away from U.S. hegemony, most investors anchor themselves to the Cold War as it is the only world they have known that was not unipolar. Moreover the Cold War provides a simple, bipolar distribution of power that is easy to model through game theory. If this is the world we are about to inhabit, with the U.S. and China dividing the whole planet into spheres like the U.S. and Soviet Union, then the paragraph we lifted from Snidal’s paper would be the end of it. America would abandon globalization in totality, impose a draconian Silicon Curtain around China, and coerce its allies to follow suit. But most of recent human history has been defined by a multipolar distribution of power between states, not a bipolar one. The term “cold war” is applicable to the U.S. and China in the sense that comparable military power may prevent them from fighting a full-blown “hot war.” But ultimately the U.S.-Soviet Cold War is a poor analogy for today’s world. In a multipolar world, Snidal concludes, “states that do not cooperate fall behind other relative gains maximizers that cooperate among themselves. This makes cooperation the best defense (as well as the best offense) when your rivals are cooperating in a multilateral relative gains world.” Snidal shows via formal modeling that as the number of players increases from two, relative-gains sensitivity drops sharply.6 The U.S.-China relationship does not occur in a vacuum — it is moderated by the global context. Today’s global context is one of multipolarity. Multipolarity refers to the distribution of geopolitical power, which is no longer dominated by one or two great powers (Chart II-4). Europe and Japan, for instance, have formidable economies and military capabilities. Russia remains a potent military power, even as India surpasses it in terms of overall geopolitical power. Chart II-4The World Is No Longer Bipolar A multipolar world is the least “ordered” and the most unstable of world systems (Chart II-5). This is for three reasons: Chart II-5Multipolarity Is Messy Math: Multipolarity engenders more potential “conflict dyads” that can lead to conflict. In a unipolar world, there is only one country that determines norms and rules of behavior. Conflict is possible, but only if the hegemon wishes it. In a bipolar world, conflict is possible, but it must align along the axis of the two dominant powers. In a multipolar world, alliances are constantly shifting and producing novel conflict dyads. Lack of coordination: Global coordination suffers in periods of multipolarity as there are more “veto players.” This is particularly problematic during times of stress, such as when an aggressive revisionist power uses force or when the world is faced with an economic crisis. Charles Kindleberger has argued that it was exactly such hegemonic instability that caused the Great Depression to descend into the Second World War in his seminal The World In Depression.7 Mistakes: In a unipolar and bipolar world, there are a very limited number of dice being rolled at once. As such, the odds of tragic mistakes are low and can be mitigated with complex formal relationships (such as U.S.-Soviet Mutually Assured Destruction, grounded in formal modeling of game theory). But in a multipolar world, something as random as an assassination of a dignitary can set in motion a global war. The multipolar system is far more dynamic and thus unpredictable. Diagram II-2 is modified for a multipolar world. Everything is the same, except that we highlight the trade lost to other great powers. The state considering using tariffs to lower the marginal social cost of trading with a rival must account for this “lost trade.” In the context of today’s trade war with China, this would be the sum of all European Airbuses and Brazilian soybeans sold to China in the place of American exports. For China, it would be the sum of all the machinery, electronics, and capital goods produced in the rest of Asia and shipped to the United States. Diagram II-2Trade War In A Multipolar World Could Washington ask its allies – Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. – not to take advantage of the lucrative trade (Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1) lost due to its trade tiff with China? Sure, but empirical research shows that they would likely ignore such pleas for unity. Alliances produced by a bipolar system produce a statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows, a relationship that weakens in a multipolar context. This is the conclusion of a 1993 paper by Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield.8 The authors draw their conclusion from an 80-year period beginning in 1905, which captures several decades of global multipolarity. Unless the U.S. produces a wholehearted diplomatic effort to tighten up its alliances and enforce trade sanctions – something hardly foreseeable under the current administration – the self-interest of U.S. allies will drive them to continue trading with China. The U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system; nor will China be able to achieve Xi Jinping’s vaunted “self-sufficiency.” A risk to our view is that we have misjudged the global system, just as political scientists writing in the early 1990s did. To that effect, we accept that Charts II-1 and II-4 do not really support a view that the world is in a balanced multipolar state. The U.S. clearly remains the most powerful country in the world. The problem is that it is also clearly in a relative decline and that its sphere of influence is global – and thus very expensive – whereas its rivals have merely regional ambitions (for the time being). As such, we concede that American hegemony could be reasserted relatively quickly, but it would require a significant calamity in one of the other poles of power. For instance, a breakdown in China’s internal stability alongside the recovery of U.S. political stability. Bottom Line: The trade war between the U.S. and China is geopolitically unsustainable. The only way it could continue is if the two states existed in a bipolar world where the rest of the states closely aligned themselves behind the two superpowers. We have a high conviction view that today’s world is – for the time being – multipolar. American allies will cheat and skirt around Washington’s demands that China be isolated. This is because the U.S. no longer has the preponderance of power that it enjoyed in the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century. Insights presented thus far come from formal theory in political science. What does history teach us? Trading With The Enemy In 1896, a bestselling pamphlet in the U.K., “Made in Germany,” painted an ominous picture: “A gigantic commercial State is arising to menace our prosperity, and contend with us for the trade of the world.”9 Look around your own houses, author E.E. Williams urged his readers. “The toys, and the dolls, and the fairy books which your children maltreat in the nursery are made in Germany: nay, the material of your favorite (patriotic) newspaper had the same birthplace as like as not.” Williams later wrote that tariffs were the answer and that they “would bring Germany to her knees, pleading for our clemency.”10 By the late 1890s, it was clear to the U.K. that Germany was its greatest national security threat. The Germany Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 launched a massive naval buildup with the singular objective of liberating the German Empire from the geographic constraints of the Jutland Peninsula. By 1902, the First Lord of the Royal Navy pointed out that “the great new German navy is being carefully built up from the point of view of a war with us.”11 There is absolutely no doubt that Germany was the U.K.’s gravest national security threat. As a result, London signed in April 1904 a set of agreements with France that came to be known as Entente Cordiale. The entente was immediately tested by Germany in the 1905 First Moroccan Crisis, which only served to strengthen the alliance. Russia was brought into the pact in 1907, creating the Triple Entente. In hindsight, the alliance structure was obvious given Germany’s meteoric rise from unification in 1871. However, one should not underestimate the magnitude of these geopolitical events. For the U.K. and France to resolve centuries of differences and formalize an alliance in 1904 was a tectonic shift — one that they undertook against the grain of history, entrenched enmity, and ideology.12 Political scientists and historians have noted that geopolitical enmity rarely produces bifurcated economic relations exhibited during the Cold War. Both empirical research and formal modeling shows that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime.13 This was certainly the case between the U.K. and Germany, whose trade steadily increased right up until the outbreak of World War One (Chart II-6). Could this be written off due to the U.K.’s ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics? Or perhaps London feared a move against its lightly defended colonies in case it became protectionist? These are fair arguments. However, they do not explain why Russia and France both saw ever-rising total trade with the German Empire during the same period (Chart II-7). Either all three states were led by incompetent policymakers who somehow did not see the war coming – unlikely given the empirical record – or they simply could not afford to lose out on the gains of trade with Germany to each other. Chart II-6The Allies Traded With Germany ... Chart II-7… Right Up To WWI   Chart II-8Japan And U.S. Never Downshifted Trade A similar dynamic was afoot ahead of World War Two. Relations between the U.S. and Japan soured in the 1930s, with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In 1935, Japan withdrew from the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty – the bedrock of the Pacific balance of power – and began a massive naval buildup. In 1937, Japan invaded China. Despite a clear and present danger, the U.S. continued to trade with Japan right up until July 26, 1941, few days after Japan invaded southern Indochina (Chart II-8). On December 7, Japan attacked the U.S. A skeptic may argue that precisely because policymakers sleepwalked into war in the First and Second World Wars, they will not (or should not) make the same mistake this time around. First, we do not make policy prescriptions and therefore care not what should happen. Second, we are highly skeptical of the view that policymakers in the early and mid-twentieth century were somehow defective (as opposed to today’s enlightened leaders). Our constraints-based framework urges us to seek systemic reasons for the behavior of leaders. Political science provides a clear theoretical explanation for why London and Washington continued to trade with the enemy despite the clarity of the threat. The answer lies in the systemic nature of the constraint: a multipolar world reduces the sensitivity of policymakers to relative gains by introducing a collective action problem thanks to changing alliances and the difficulty of disciplining allies’ behavior. In the case of U.S. and China, this is further accentuated by President Trump’s strategy of skirting multilateral diplomacy and intense focus on mercantilist measures of power (i.e. obsession with the trade deficit). An anti-China trade policy that was accompanied by a magnanimous approach to trade relations with allies could have produced a “coalition of the willing” against Beijing. But after two years of tariffs and threats against the EU, Japan, and Canada, the Trump administration has already signaled to the rest of the world that old alliances and coordination avenues are up for revision. There are two outcomes that we can see emerging over the course of the next decade. First, U.S. leadership will become aware of the systemic constraints under which they operate, and trade with China will continue – albeit with limitations and variations. However, such trade will not reduce the geopolitical tensions, nor will it prevent a military conflict. In facts, the probability of military conflict may increase even as trade between China and the U.S. remains steady. Second, U.S. leadership will fail to correctly assess that they operate in a multipolar world and will give up the highlighted trade gains from Diagram II-2 to economic rivals such as Europe and Japan. Given our methodological adherence to constraint-based forecasting, we highly doubt that the latter scenario is likely. Bottom Line: The China-U.S. conflict is not a replay of the Cold War. Systemic pressures from global multipolarity will force the U.S. to continue to trade with China, with limitations on exchanges in emergent, dual-use technologies that China will nonetheless source from other technologically advanced countries. This will create a complicated but exciting world where geopolitics will cease to be seen as exogenous to investing. A risk to the sanguine conclusion is that the historical record is applicable to today, but that the hour is late, not early. It is already July 26, 1941 – when U.S. abrogated all trade with Japan – not 1930. As such, we do not have another decade of trade between U.S. and China remaining, we are at the end of the cycle. While this is a risk, it is unlikely. American policymakers would essentially have to be willing to risk a military conflict with China in order to take the trade war to the same level they did with Japan. It is an objective fact that China has meaningfully stepped up aggressive foreign policy in the region. But unlike Japan in 1941, China has not outright invaded any countries over the past decade. As such, the willingness of the public to support such a conflict is unclear, with only 21% of Americans considering China a top threat to the U.S. Investment Implications This analysis is not meant to be optimistic. First, the U.S. and China will continue to be rivals even if the economic relationship between them does not lead to global bifurcation. For one, China continues to be – much like Germany in the early twentieth century – concerned with access to external markets on which 19.5% of its economy still depend. China is therefore developing a modern navy and military not because it wants to dominate the rest of the world but because it wants to dominate its near abroad, much as the U.S. wanted to, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine. This will continue to lead to Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas, raising the odds of a conflict with the U.S. Navy. Given that the Thucydides Trap narrative remains cogent, investors should look to overweight S&P 500 aerospace and defense stocks relative to global equity markets. An alternative way that one could play this thesis is by developing a basket of global defense stocks. Multipolarity may create constraints to trade protectionism, but it engenders geopolitical volatility and thus buoys defense spending. Second, we would not expect another uptick in globalization. Multipolarity may make it difficult for countries to completely close off trade with a rival, but globalization is built on more than just trade between rivals. Globalization requires a high level of coordination among great powers that is only possible under hegemonic conditions. Chart II-9 shows that the hegemony of the British and later American empires created a powerful tailwind for trade over the past two hundred years. Chart II-9The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex of Globalization has come and gone – it is all downhill from here. But this is not a binary view. Foreign trade will not go to zero. The U.S. and China will not completely seal each other’s sphere of influence behind a Silicon Curtain. Instead, we focus on five investment themes that flow from a world that is characterized by the three trends of multipolarity, Sino-U.S. geopolitical rivalry, and apex of globalization: Europe will profit: As the U.S. and China deepen their enmity, we expect some European companies to profit. There is some evidence that the investment community has already caught wind of this trend, with European equities modestly outperforming their U.S. counterparts whenever trade tensions flared up in 2019 (Chart II-10). Given our thesis, however, it is unlikely that the U.S. would completely lose market share in China to Europe. As such, we specifically focus on tech, where we expect the U.S. and China to ramp up non-tariff barriers to trade regardless of systemic pressures to continue to trade. A strategic long in the secularly beleaguered European tech companies relative to their U.S. counterparts may therefore make sense (Chart II-11). Chart II-10Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Chart II-11Is Europe Really This Incompetent? USD bull market will end: A trade war is a very disruptive way to adjust one’s trade relationship. It opens one to retaliation and thus the kind of relative losses described in this analysis. As such, we expect that U.S. to eventually depreciate the USD, either by aggressively reversing 2018 tightening or by coercing its trade rivals to strengthen their currencies. Such a move will be yet another tailwind behind the diversification away from the USD as a reserve currency, a move that should benefit the euro. Bull market in capex: The re-wiring of global manufacturing chains will still take place. The bad news is that multinational corporations will have to dip into their profit margins to move their supply chains to adjust to the new geopolitical reality. The good news is that they will have to invest in manufacturing capex to accomplish the task. One way to articulate this theme is to buy an index of semiconductor capital companies (AMAT, LRCX, KLAC, MKSI, AEIS, BRIKS, and TER). Given the highly cyclical nature of capital companies, we would recommend an entry point once trade tensions subside and green shoots of global growth appear. “Non-aligned” markets will benefit: The last time the world was multipolar, great powers competed through imperialism. This time around, a same dynamic will develop as countries seek to replicate China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.” This is positive for frontier markets. A rush to provide them with exports and services will increase supply and thus lower costs, providing otherwise forgotten markets with a boon of investments. India, and Asia-ex-China more broadly, stand as intriguing alternatives to China, especially with the current administration aggressively reforming to take advantage of the rewiring of global manufacturing chains. Capital markets will remain globalized: With interest rates near zero in much of the developed world and the demographic burden putting an ever-greater pressure on pension plans to generate returns, the search for yield will continue to be a powerful drive that keeps capital markets globalized. Limitations are likely to grow, especially when it comes to cross-border private investments in dual-use technologies. But a completely bifurcation of capital markets is unlikely. The world we are describing is one where geopolitics will play an increasingly prominent role for global investors. It would be convenient if the world simply divided into two warring camps, leaving investors with neatly separated compartments that enabled them to go back to ignoring geopolitics. This is unlikely. Rather, the world will resemble the dynamic years at the end of the nineteenth century, a rough-and-tumble era that required a multi-disciplinary approach to investing. Marko Papic Consulting Editor, BCA Research Chief Strategist, Clocktower Group Footnotes 1   Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?,” September 25, 2012, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think,” October 4, 2013, “The Great Risk Rotation,” December 11, 2013, and “Strategic Outlook 2014 – Stay The Course: EM Risk – DM Reward,” January 23, 2014, “Underestimating Sino-American Tensions,” November 6, 2015, “The Geopolitics Of Trump,” December 2, 2016, “How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia,” March 1, 2017, and others available at gps.bcaresearch.com or upon request. 2   Please see German Historical Institute, “Bernhard von Bulow on Germany’s ‘Place in the Sun’” (1897), available at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 3   See Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017).  4  The three cases are Spain taking over from Portugal in the sixteenth century, the U.S. taking over from the U.K. in the twentieth century, and Germany rising to regional hegemony in Europe in the twenty-first century. 5   Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” The American Political Science Review, 85:3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726. 6   We do not review Snidal’s excellent game theory formal modeling in this paper as it is complex and detailed. However, we highly encourage the intrigued reader to pursue the study on their own.  7   See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 8   Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” The American Political Science Review, 87:2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. 9   See Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press), available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830. 10   Quoted in Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014). 11   Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,” international Security, 21:1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175. 12  Although France and Russia overcame even greater bitterness due to the ideological differences between a republic founded on a violent uprising against its aristocracy – France – and an aristocratic authoritarian regime – Russia.  13  See James Morrow, “When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1 (February 1997), pp. 12-37; and Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri, “Trading With the Enemy During Wartime,” Security Studies, 13:3 (December 2004), pp. 1-47.