Economy

Highlights So What? U.S. policy uncertainty adds to a slew of geopolitical reasons to remain tactically cautious on risk assets. Why? U.S. fiscal policy should ultimately bring market-positive developments – though the budget negotiation process could induce volatility in the near-term. We expect spending to go up and do not expect a default due to the debt ceiling or another prolonged government shutdown. Former Vice President Joe Biden remains the frontrunner for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination in 2020. But left-wing progressive candidates are gaining on him and their success will trouble financial markets. With Persian Gulf tensions still elevated, go long Q1 2020 Brent crude relative to Q1 2021. Feature Chart 1U.S. Politics Poses Risks Through Next November Economic policy uncertainty is rising in the United States even as it falls around the world (Chart 1). Ongoing budget negotiations and the Democratic primary election give equity investors another reason to remain cautious in the near term. We expect more volatility. There also remain several persistent global threats to markets posed by unresolved geopolitical risks – rising Brexit risks with Boris Johnson likely to take the helm in the United Kingdom; oil supply threats amid Iran’s latest rejection of U.S. offers to negotiate its missile program; and a major confirmation of our theme of geopolitical risk rotation to East Asia, with Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the South China Sea all heating up at once. In sum, political and geopolitical risks are showing investors a yellow light, even though the macroeconomic outlook still supports BCA’s cyclical (12-month) equity overweight. U.S. Fiscal Policy Will Remain Accommodative While U.S. monetary policy has taken a dovish turn – supported by other central banks – fiscal spending is now coming into focus for investors. We expect the budget battle to be market-relevant this year, injecting greater economic policy uncertainty, but the end-game should be market-positive. Brinkmanship will not get as bad as during the debt ceiling crises of 2011 and 2013, though market jitters will be frontloaded if Pelosi and the White House fail to conclude a deal immediately. Chart 2The 'Stimulus Cliff' Awaits President Trump The U.S. budget process is always rocky and is usually concluded well into the fiscal year under discussion. This year the fight will be more important than over the past few years because, as the two-year bipartisan agreement of 2018 lapses, the so-called “stimulus cliff” looms over the U.S. economy and will get caught up in the epic battle over the 2020 election. The stimulus cliff is the automatic imposition of fiscal spending cuts (“sequestration”) in FY2020 that would take effect as a result of the Budget Control Act of 2011. Standard estimates of the U.S. budget deficit expect that the deficit will shrink in 2020 if the spending caps are not raised, resulting in a negative fiscal thrust (Chart 2). The result would be to decrease aggregate demand at a time when the risk of recession is relatively high (Chart 3). Chart 3Recession Odds Still High Over Next 12 Months This is clearly not in President Trump’s interest, since a recession would devastate his reelection odds. Hence, Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin and other White House officials are pushing for a budget deal before the House of Representatives goes on recess on July 26 and the Senate on August 2. Ideally, an agreement would raise the spending caps, appropriate funds for the rest of the budget, and lift the “debt ceiling,” the statutory limit on U.S. debt. But it would be surprising if a deal came together as early as next week. A failure to agree on a budget deal before Congress goes on recess will make the market increasingly jittery. Congress can cancel the August recess, or wait until September 9 when they reconvene, but a failure to agree on something between now and then will make the market increasingly jittery. The U.S. has already surpassed the current debt limit and the latest estimates suggest that the Treasury Department’s “extraordinary measures” to meet U.S. debt payments could be exhausted by early-to-mid September.1 This would give Congress only a week in September to raise the debt limit. There are three main reasons to expect that the debt ceiling fight will not get out of hand: Chart 4Americans Stopped Worrying And Love Debt First, a technical default on U.S. debt could result in a failure to meet politically explosive obligations, such as sending social security checks to seniors. No one in Washington would benefit from such a failure and President Trump would suffer the most. Second, the public is not as worried about national deficits and debt today as it was in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Chart 4). Democrats, as the pro-government party, do not have an incentive to stage a showdown over the debt like Tea Party Republicans did under the previous administration. To be fair, they did do so in January 2018, but backed off after merely two days due to high political costs. Third, the one budget conflict that could create a catastrophic impasse – funding for Trump’s border wall – can be assuaged by Trump’s use of executive action, as he demonstrated by declaring a national emergency and appropriating military funds for fencing. Trump is fighting a general election in 2020 and is unlikely to use the debt ceiling as leverage to the point that the U.S. defaults on its obligations. The risk to investors, however, is that he goes back to threatening a 25% tariff on Mexico if it fails to staunch the flow of immigrants from Central America. What if the Republicans and Democrats cannot agree on the budget and spending caps? Democrats say they will not raise the debt limit unless they get non-defense spending increases. House Democrats need to reward their constituents for voting for them in 2018 and want to increase non-defense spending at “parity” with increases to defense spending. They also want to reduce the defense increases that Republicans seek in order to pay for non-defense increases. President Trump and the Republicans have a higher defense target and a lower non-defense target. The truth is that the Republicans and Democrats have agreed three times to increase spending caps beyond the levels required under the 2011 law – and they have done so most emphatically under President Trump with the FY2018-19 agreement (Chart 5). This year the two parties stand about $17 billion apart on defense and $30 billion apart on non-defense spending.2 We would expect both sides to splurge on spending and get what they want, but they could also split the difference: the amounts are small but the acrimony between the two parties could extend the talks. Congress may have to pass one or more “continuing resolutions” (stopgap measures keeping spending levels constant) to negotiate further. A continuing resolution could at least raise the debt ceiling and leave the rest of the budget negotiation until later, removing the majority of the political risk under discussion. Is another government shutdown possible? Yes, but not to the extent of early 2019. Trump saw a sharp drop in his approval ratings during the longest-ever government shutdown last year (Chart 6). Brinkmanship could lead to another shutdown, but he is likely to capitulate before it becomes prolonged. In early 2020, he wants to be lobbing grenades into the Democratic primary election rather than giving all of the Democrats an easy chance to criticize him for dysfunction in Washington. Ultimately, Trump can simply refrain from vetoing whatever the House and Senate agree – it is not in his interest to shrink the budget deficit in an election year. The Democrats’ spending increases would boost aggregate demand and are thus in President Trump’s personal interest. Trump is the self-professed “king of debt” – he is not afraid to agree to a deal that will be criticized by fiscal hawks. The latter have far less influence in Congress anyway since the 2018 midterm election. Why should House Democrats extend the economic expansion knowing that it would likely improve President Trump’s reelection chances? Because Trump will capitulate to most of their spending demands; voters would punish them if they are seen deliberately engineering “austerity”; and they need to show voters that they can govern. As for the 2020 race, they will focus on other issues: they will attack Trump on trade and immigration and focus on social policy: health care, the minimum wage, taxes and inequality, climate change, and student debt. What will be the fiscal and economic impact of a budget deal? The budget deal under negotiation ($750 billion in defense discretionary spending, $639 billion in non-defense discretionary spending) would raise the spending cap by about $145 billion – this is slightly above the $112 billion negative fiscal thrust expected in 2020.3 The result is that the U.S. fiscal drag expected in 2020 will at least be eliminated (if not turned into a fiscal boost), helping to prolong the cycle. The removal of fiscal drag will coincide with monetary easing, which is positive for markets since inflation is subdued. The Federal Reserve abandoned rate hikes this year (after four last year) because of the asymmetric risk of deflation relative to inflation (Chart 7). The FOMC believes that they can always jack up interest rates to combat an inflation overshoot, as their predecessors did in the 1980s, but that they are constrained by the zero lower-bound in interest rates. They may never recover from a loss of credibility and collapse of inflation expectations, so an insurance policy is necessary. The result is likely to be one or two rate cuts this year, which has already improved financial conditions. Chart 7The Fed Fears The Asymmetric Threat Of Deflation Bottom Line: Budget brinkmanship could become a near-term source of volatility but it is ultimately likely to be resolved with the pro-market outcome of less fiscal drag in 2020. The debt ceiling debate is unlikely to result in a U.S. default and any government shutdown is likely to resemble the short one of 2018 more than the long one of 2019. We expect U.S. equities to grind higher over the 12-month cyclical horizon, but we remain exceedingly cautious on a three-month tactical horizon. The price of Trump’s capitulation on border funding could be a renewed threat of tariffs against Mexico. The Budget Deal, Geopolitics, And The Dollar Chart 8China Shifts From Reform To Stimulus What does this fiscal outlook imply for the U.S. dollar? Near-term moves will probably be negative, since the fiscal boost outlined above will not be comparable to 2018-19, and meanwhile our view on China’s stimulus is bearing out reasonably well (Chart 8). Improvements in global growth, Fed cuts, and rising oil prices will weigh on the greenback even though later we expect the dollar to recover on the back of renewed U.S.-China conflict and global recession in 2021 or thereafter. Beyond the recession, two of our major political and geopolitical themes continue to point to large downside risk to the dollar: populist politics and multipolarity, or geopolitical competition among the world’s great powers. Beyond the recession, two of our major political and geopolitical themes continue to point to large downside risk to the dollar: populist politics and multipolarity. Populism and the Fed: Domestically, the United States is seeing a rise in populism that is continuing across administrations and political parties. This is conducive to easier monetary policy. Left-wing firebrand Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s (AOC) recent exchange with Fed Chairman Jay Powell highlights the trend. AOC asked one of the most frequent questions that BCA’s clients ask: Does the Phillips Curve still work? Powell answered that in recent years it has not. President Trump’s Economic Director Larry Kudlow applauded AOC, saying “she kind of nailed that” (obviously the administration is pushing for lower rates). If inflation is not a risk, monetary policy need not guard against it. This interchange should be taken in the context of President Trump’s attempts to jawbone Powell into rate cuts and the notable monetary promiscuousness of his ostensibly “hard money” Federal Reserve nominees. The extremely different ideological and institutional profiles of these various policymakers suggests that a new consensus is forming that is conducive to more dovish monetary policy than otherwise expected over the long run. Populists of any stripe, from Trump to AOC, would like to see lower interest rates, higher nominal GDP growth, and a lower real debt burden on households. We are reminded of an oft-overlooked point about the stagflation of the 1970s. Fed Chair Arthur Burns is usually depicted as a lackey of President Richard Nixon who succumbed to political influence and failed to raise interest rates adequately to fight inflation. But this is only part of the story. Leaving aside that the Fed only had a single mandate of minimizing unemployment at that time, Burns was conflicted. He saw the need to fight inflation, but he had more than Nixon’s wrath to fear. He also dreaded the impact on the Fed’s credibility and popular support as an institution if he hiked rates too aggressively and stoked unemployment (Chart 9).4 Chart 9Rate Hikes Are Hard To Defend Amid High Unemployment In other words, populism can constrain the Fed from the bottom up as well as from the top down in a context of rising unemployment.5 Multipolarity and Currency War: Since President Trump’s election we have highlighted that dollar depreciation is likely to be the administration’s ultimate aim if President Trump’s overall economic strategy is truly to stimulate growth, reduce the trade deficit, and repatriate manufacturing. Jacking up growth rates relative to the rest of the world while disrupting global trade via tariffs is a recipe for a strong dollar that undermines the attempt to bring jobs back from overseas. We have always argued that China would not grant the U.S. “shock therapy” liberalization and market opening – and that neither China, nor Europe, nor Japan would or could engage in currency appreciation along the lines of a new Smithsonian or Plaza Accord. The U.S. does not have as much geopolitical clout as it had in the 1970s-80s when it forced major currency deals on its allies and partners. The remaining option is for the U.S. to attempt unilateral depreciation. The combination of profligate spending, easy monetary policy, and populism may do the trick. But it is also possible that President Trump will attempt to engineer depreciation through Treasury Department intervention. If a slide toward recession threatens his reelection – or he is reelected and hence gets rid of the first-term reelection constraint – his unorthodox policies pose a significant risk to the dollar. Bottom Line: The U.S. dollar faces near-term risks as growth rebalances towards rest of the world, but will probably resume its rise in the impending recessionary environment and expected re-escalation of tensions with China. Over the long run, it faces severe risks due to fiscal mismanagement, domestic populism, and geopolitical struggle. A Progressive Overshoot Will Hurt Democrats … And Equities Chart 10A Democratic Win Will Weigh On Animal Spirits The Democratic Party’s primary election is also a risk to the equity rally. We see a 45% risk that President Trump will be unseated in November 2020 and hence that the U.S. will once again experience a dramatic policy reversal (as in 2000, 2008, and 2016). The risks are to the downside because the market is at all-time highs and Democratic proposals include raising taxes on corporations and re-regulating the economy (Chart 10). Whether you accept our 55% odds of Trump reelection, the race will be a continual source of uncertainty for investors going forward. How extreme is the uncertainty? Former Vice President Joe Biden remains the frontrunner in the race, though he has lost his initial bump in opinion polls (Chart 11). Biden’s success is market-positive relative to the other Democratic candidates since he is an establishment politician and a known quantity. Given his age, a Biden presidency would likely last for one term and focus on repudiating Trumpism and consolidating the Obama administration’s signature achievements (the Affordable Care Act, Dodd-Frank, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, environmental regulation, etc). Greater predictability in the health care sector and a return to lower-level tensions with Iran would be market-positive. The financial sector would be consoled by the fact that nothing worse than Dodd-Frank would be in the offing. A Biden victory would be more likely to yield Democratic control of the senate than a progressive candidate’s victory.6 This means that the risk of Democrats taking full control of government and passing more than one major piece of legislation after 2020 increases with Biden. Yet any candidate capable of defeating Trump is likely to take the senate in our view; and Biden’s legislative initiatives are likely to be more centrist.7 So as long as Biden remains in the lead in primary polling, he increases his chances of winning the nomination, maximizes the 45% chance of Democrats winning the White House, and decreases the intensity of the relative policy uncertainty facing markets. The risk to the Democrats is … a left-wing or progressive overshoot that knocks out Biden in the primary, replacing him with a progressive candidate who may not be as electable in the general election.  The risk to the Democrats is that the leftward policy shift within the party (Chart 12) may lead to a left-wing or progressive overshoot that knocks out Biden in the primary, replacing him with a progressive candidate who may not be as electable in the general election. This would give President Trump the ability to capitalize on his advantage as the incumbent by inveighing against socialism. Most of the major progressive candidates are electable – they have a popular and electoral path to the White House – as revealed by their successful head-to-head polling against Trump in battleground state opinion polling (Chart 13). But these pathways are narrower than Biden’s. Biden is the only candidate whose name has been on the ballot in two presidential elections carrying the critical Rust Belt swing states Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin (not to mention Ohio and Florida). He is from Pennsylvania. And he is more competitive than most of his rivals in the American south and southwest, giving him the potential to pick up Florida or Arizona in the general election. But none of this matters if Biden cannot win the Democratic nomination first. The risk of a progressive overshoot is growing at present. Biden is losing his lead in the primary polling, as mentioned. Progressive candidates taken together are polling better than centrists, contrary to previous Democratic primaries (Chart 14). This is true even if we define centrists broadly, for instance to include Buttigieg (Chart 15). Biden is in a weaker position than Hillary Clinton in 2007 – and the more progressive candidate Obama ultimately defeated her (Chart 16). Biden has now slipped to second place in one national poll and some state polls. The second round of Democratic debates on July 30-31 will be a critical testing period for whether Biden can maintain frontrunner status. The first round fulfilled our expectation of boosting the progressives at his expense, especially Elizabeth Warren. It surprised us in dealing a blow to the campaign of Bernie Sanders, the independent Senator from Vermont who initiated the progressive left’s surge with his hard-fought race against Hillary Clinton in 2016. Sanders is more competitive than the other progressives in the Rust Belt, and in the general election, based on his head-to-head polling against Trump. Yet he has fallen behind in recent Democratic primary polling, ceding ground to Warren, Harris, and Buttigieg, who are all his followers in some sense. The second debate is a critical opportunity for him to arrest the loss of momentum. Otherwise he is likely to be fatally wounded: a collapse in polling beneath his floor of about 15%, and relative to other progressives, despite extensive name recognition, will make it very difficult for him to recover in the third round of debates in September. His votes will go toward other progressives, particularly Buttigieg – the other white male progressive-leaning candidate who is competitive in the Midwest.8 Our 55% base case that Trump is reelected rests on the high historical reelection rate for incumbents, particularly in the event of no recession during the first term – yet discounted due to Trump’s relatively low nationwide popularity, as it is reminiscent of a president in a recessionary environment (Chart 17). Trump has his ideological base more fired up than Obama did (Chart 18), which helps drive voter turnout, although as a result he risks losing support from the rest of the population. Still, Trump’s approval rating is in line with Obama’s at this stage in his first term. As long as the economy holds up and Trump does not suffer a foreign policy humiliation, he should be seen as a slight favorite. A Trump victory is not positive for risk assets, aside from a relief rally on policy continuity. This is because in a second term he cannot reproduce the same magnitude of pro-market effects (huge tax cuts and deregulation) yet, freed from the need for reelection, he has fewer political constraints in producing higher magnitude anti-market effects (tariffs and/or sanctions on China, Iran, Russia, and possibly the EU and Mexico). This view dovetails with the BCA House View which remains overweight equities relative to bonds and cash over a cyclical (12 month) horizon but underweight over the longer run with the expectation that a recession will loom. Bottom Line: The Democratic Primary election should start having an impact on markets – the general election is likely to be too close for market participants to have a high conviction, driving up uncertainty. Uncertainty will be especially pronounced if, and as, leftwing or progressive candidates outperform in the primary races and poll well against Trump in the general election. This dynamic is negative for business sentiment and the profit outlook, especially if Biden’s polling falls further in the wake of the second debate. Investment Conclusions We recommend staying long JPY-USD, long gold, and short CNY-USD. We remain overweight Thai equities within emerging markets, a defensive play. And we would not close our tactical overweight in health care sector and health care equipment sub-sector relative to the S&P 500. The rally in Chinese equities – despite China’s Q2 GDP growth rate of 6.2%, the worst in 27 years – brings full circle the view we initiated in April 2017 that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power would result in a major deleveraging drive that would drag on the global economy. Since February we have argued that the U.S. trade war has pushed Chinese policymakers to favor stimulus over reform – but we have also maintained that the effectiveness of stimulus is declining, especially as a result of the trade war hit to sentiment. Nevertheless, as a result of this turn in Chinese policy – along with the turn in U.S. monetary and fiscal policy – we see the global macroeconomic outlook improving. Combining this view with ongoing tensions in the Persian Gulf and the expectation that oil markets will tighten, we recommend our Commodity & Energy Strategy’s trade of going long Brent crude Q1 2020 versus Q1 2021.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See U.S. Department of Treasury, “Secretary Mnuchin Sends Debt Limit Letter to Congress,” July 12, 2019, home.treasury.gov. Jordan LaPier, “New Projection: Debt Limit “X Date” Could Arrive in September,” July 8, 2019, bipartisanpolicy.org. 2 See Jordain Carney and Niv Elis, White House, Congress inch toward debt, budget deal,” July 17, 2019, thehill.com. 3 See the Congressional Budget Office, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2019 to 2029,” January 2019; “Final Sequestration Report for Fiscal Year 2019,” February 2019; and Theresa Gullo, “Discretionary Appropriations Under the Budget Control Act,” Testimony before the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, February 27, 2019, www.cbo.gov. 4 See James L. Pierce, “The Political Economy of Arthur Burns,” The Journal of Finance 34: 2 (1979), pp. 485-96, esp p. 489 regarding a congressional testimony: “Interestingly, no questions were raised or innuendo offered that monetary expansion would be excessive to support Richard Nixon’s reelection efforts. Instead, Burns was urged by the Democrats to follow an expansionary monetary policy in order to reduce the level of unemployment.” See also Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams, “Monetary Policy Mistakes and the Evolution of Inflation Expectations,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper 2010-12 (2011), www.frbsf.org. 5 An analogy might be drawn with the Supreme Court, whose independence as one of three constitutional branches is much more firmly grounded in U.S. law than the Fed’s, but nevertheless cannot make decisions in an ivory tower. It must consider the effects of its judgments on popular opinion, since universally deplored decisions would reduce the court’s credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the public over time and ultimately the other government branches’ adherence to those decisions. 6 This is both because Biden is more electable (thus more likely to bring a vice president who can break a tie vote in the senate) and because his candidacy can help Democrats in all of the senate swing races – for example, Arizona as well as Colorado and Maine. Harris is not as helpful in Maine while Warren and Sanders are not as helpful in Arizona. 7 Biden would return to the 39.6% top marginal individual tax rate and double the capital gains tax on those earning incomes of more than $1 million. See Biden For President, “Health Care,” joebiden.com. 8 Conversely, if Biden somehow collapses, Buttigieg unlike Sanders has the option of moving toward the political center to absorb Biden’s large reservoir of support.

Following up from our earnings preview from the July 8thWeekly Report, the latest ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment made for grim reading. BCA’s global ex-U.S. ZEW took a turn for the worse and is challenging seven year lows. Given that roughly 40% of SPX revenues are internationally sourced, deteriorating global ex-U.S. sentiment will dampen sales and profit prospects. Using national accounts data, the chart shows that corporate profits sourced overseas are on the verge of contraction. While part of this reflects the income translation drag from the appreciating greenback, persistently scarce final demand abroad also weighs on earnings. Bottom Line: Stay cautious on the prospects of the broad equity market on a cyclical three-to-twelve month time horizon.

Special Report

Highlights Mutual Funds & ETFs: The liquidity mismatch between easily tradeable mutual fund shares and the less liquid underlying corporate bonds makes it possible for negative feedback loops to emerge between fund flows and corporate bond spreads. The growing presence of open-ended mutual funds and ETFs in the corporate bond market should be seen as a risk that could exacerbate future periods of spread widening, leading to worse economic outcomes. BBB Securities: The large amount of outstanding BBB debt could lead to fire sales from corporate bond holders with investment grade-only mandates when the debt is downgraded to junk. However, in contrast to the negative feedback loop that can be generated by mutual fund flows, the evidence shows that the negative price pressure from fallen angel fire sales is fleeting. Leveraged Loans: The rapid surge in leveraged loans has been partially offset by reduced high-yield issuance, helping mitigate a potentially destabilizing rise in all riskier corporate debt. At the same time, bank exposure is focused on the safest CLO tranches, limiting the potential systemic risks from bank losses. Feature In April, we published a Special Report that investigated whether corporate debt poses a risk to the U.S. economy.1 That report focused on what economic theory and empirical evidence say about the relationship between corporate debt and future economic growth. We arrived at the following conclusions: The empirical evidence decisively shows that private (household + business) debt helps predict future economic outcomes. Some evidence shows that household debt is more important than corporate debt in this regard. In contrast to mainstream economic theory, the level of private debt-to-GDP does not help predict future economic outcomes. Rather, it is rapid private debt growth that is linked to more severe economic downturns. Ebullient credit market sentiment is also shown to predict weak economic growth. Tight credit spreads should be viewed as a warning sign, similar to rapid private debt growth. In this follow-up Special Report, we consider three credit market developments that are unique to this cycle: The large ownership stake of open-ended mutual funds and ETFs in the U.S. corporate bond market. The elevated amount of BBB-rated debt outstanding relative to other credit tiers. The rapid issuance of leveraged loans. All three of these developments could mediate the relationship between corporate debt and economic growth, potentially increasing risks to the economy. We consider each factor in turn. 1. Fund Flows One unique feature of the current cycle is that open-ended mutual funds and ETFs own a much larger share of outstanding corporate bonds than in the past. Back in 1990, insurance companies and pension funds were the largest holders of corporate debt, controlling 54% of the market. Meanwhile, open-ended funds owned a paltry 3%. Since then, fund ownership has surged to 16%, mostly at the expense of financial institutions, insurance companies and pensions. Foreign holdings of U.S. corporate bonds have also increased during this period, from 13% of the market to 28% (Charts 1 & 2). Chart 2Mutual Funds Now An Important Market Player Why Does Fund Ownership Matter? We focus on fund ownership of corporate bonds because it has been theorized that flows into and out of open-ended mutual funds can have a similar impact on market prices as leverage, amplifying price moves in either direction. As described in a 2014 paper by Feroli, Kashyap, Shoenholtz, and Shin:2 [W]hen asset flows for certain fixed income securities are high, prices persistently rise and a feedback loop emerges. High flows lead to rising prices, which attract more flows, which further raises prices. Obviously, the proposed feedback loop also works in reverse: Outflows cause prices to decline, and lower prices lead to further outflows. This sort of feedback loop is unique to mutual funds. Insurance companies and pension funds, for example, do not experience investor capital flight in response to a near-term price drop. This makes the larger presence of mutual funds in the corporate bond market potentially destabilizing. Fund ownership has surged to 16%, from a paltry 3% back in 1990. Why Do Fund Flows Behave This Way? Mutual fund shares are much more liquid than the corporate debt securities they hold. As described in a 2017 paper by Goldstein, Jiang and Ng:3 When [mutual] fund investors redeem their shares, they get the net asset value as of the day of redemption. The fund then has to conduct costly liquidation that hurts the value of the shares for investors who keep their money in the fund. Hence, the expected redemption by some investors increases the incentives for others to redeem. In other words, during times of stress, mutual fund investors have an incentive to withdraw their money before other fund shareholders get the chance. Otherwise, they could be stuck holding a basket of illiquid corporate bonds. This bank-run like behavior is well documented for corporate and municipal bond funds, though it appears not to exist for funds that traffic in more liquid instruments, such as Treasuries and equities. In fact, when Goldstein et al looked at how flows into and out of individual corporate bond and equity funds respond to past fund performance, they found that the Flow-Performance curve for an individual corporate bond fund exhibits a pronounced concave shape. Meanwhile, the same curve for an individual equity fund is convex (Chart 3). This means that corporate bond mutual fund shareholders are quick to redeem their shares in response to poor fund performance, while equity fund shareholders are more inclined to stand pat. On the flipside, positive fund performance leads to large equity fund inflows, but doesn’t attract capital to corporate bond funds to the same extent. The above results apply to individual funds, but Goldstein et al also performed the same analysis for corporate bond funds in the aggregate. That is, rather than measuring whether investors sold a particular corporate bond mutual fund in response to its poor performance, they measured whether investors exited the corporate bond mutual fund space altogether in response to poor corporate bond performance. Interestingly, they found a very similar result (Chart 4). Investors are inclined to exit the corporate bond space entirely following periods of poor performance. Meanwhile, they found no relationship between aggregate equity fund flows and performance. Investors might switch between different equity funds in response to recent performance trends, but they don’t exit the asset class altogether.   These results provide a clear indication for why the large presence of corporate bond mutual funds might be destabilizing. Corporate bond fund investors are quick to flee the space during periods of poor performance. For more liquid securities, such as equities and Treasuries, a large mutual fund presence in the market is not a concern, since flows do not respond as aggressively to price shocks. Empirical Evidence For The Flow-Performance Feedback Loop The evidence presented above shows that fund flows respond to performance, but for the theorized feedback loop between fund flows and corporate bond prices to exist, we also need evidence that fund flows impact corporate bond performance. In that regard, a 2019 Banque de France working paper examines the impact of aggregate flows into French corporate bond funds on the yields of the underlying securities.4 It finds that not only do flows impact yields contemporaneously, but also that outflows have a larger influence on yields than inflows. Using a different methodology, a 2015 paper by Hoseinzade finds no material impact of fund flows on underlying corporate bond yields, but for an interesting reason.5 The paper confirms that corporate bond fund shareholders demonstrate bank-run like behavior in response to poor performance, but also argues that “bond fund managers hold a significant level of liquid assets, allowing them to manage redemptions without excessively liquidating corporate bonds.” Chart 5Funds Deploy Cash Before Selling Bonds It’s true that corporate bond mutual funds often hold significant allocations to cash and U.S. Treasuries, and Hoseinzade shows that fund managers tend to discharge their most liquid holdings first, before attempting to sell corporate bonds. This result lines up with our casual observation. Chart 5 shows the aggregate liquid asset (cash and Treasury) holdings of corporate bond mutual funds. It is apparent that they tend to fall during periods of spread widening. We also note that corporate bond mutual funds, in aggregate, currently hold about 6% of their assets in liquid securities. This buffer can probably withstand a sizeable shock, but liquid assets fell from similar levels into negative territory during each of the past two recessions. One other factor that could help break the feedback loop between fund flows and prices is the institutional ownership of corporate bond mutual funds. Goldstein et al find that mutual funds mostly owned by institutional investors exhibit less of a feedback loop between flows and performance. That is, large institutional investors are less likely to redeem their shares in response to a bout of poor performance. While we don’t have data on corporate bond mutual fund ownership specifically, Federal Reserve data reveal that insurance companies and pension funds own a significantly larger proportion of outstanding mutual fund shares than in the 1990s, though less than they did in the mid-2000s (Chart 6). Note that Chart 6 shows data for all mutual funds, including equity funds, Treasury funds, etc… Chart 6Institutional Ownership Of Mutual Funds We conclude that there is enough evidence of a feedback loop between fund flows and corporate bond prices that we should be wary of the growing presence of open-ended mutual funds and ETFs in the corporate bond space. Cash holdings and institutional ownership can help mitigate negative flow/performance feedback loops to some extent, but probably shouldn’t be counted on in the event of a severe shock. What’s The Economic Impact? In our corporate debt Special Report from April, we postulated that changes in corporate bond spreads might, themselves, cause an economic downturn, rather than simply reflect one. The mechanism is summarized nicely by Lopez-Salido, Stein and Zakrajsek (2016):6 [a] sentiment-driven widening of credit spreads amounts to a reduction in the supply of credit, especially to lower credit-quality firms. It is this reduction in credit supply that exerts a negative influence on economic activity. With that in mind, in the current environment it seems very possible that an initially sentiment-driven credit spread widening could be exacerbated by outflows from corporate bond mutual funds. A larger shock to credit spreads leads to a larger reduction in credit supply and a more severe economic impact. Aggregate liquid asset holdings of corporate bond mutual funds tend to fall during periods of spread widening. Bottom Line: The liquidity mismatch between easily tradeable mutual fund shares and the less liquid underlying corporate bonds makes it possible for negative feedback loops to emerge between fund flows and corporate bond spreads. The growing presence of open-ended mutual funds and ETFs in the corporate bond market should be seen as a risk that could exacerbate future periods of spread widening, leading to worse economic outcomes. 2: BBB Debt Outstanding Chart 7The Large Amount Of BBB Debt It has been widely reported that an unusually large amount of outstanding corporate bonds are rated BBB, the lowest credit rating that is still considered investment grade. In fact, the par value of BBB-rated securities now makes up 50% of the Bloomberg Barclays Investment Grade index, up from 21% in 1990 (Chart 7). The amount of outstanding BBB securities is more than double the par value of the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index, and BBBs represent 41% of the total combined par value of the investment grade and high-yield indexes. The reason to be wary about the large amount of outstanding BBB debt is that when the credit cycle turns and ratings downgrades start to occur, a larger than normal amount of debt will be downgraded from investment grade into high-yield. When that happens, any investors with an investment grade-only mandate will be forced to sell. The concern is that such forced selling could set off a negative feedback loop very similar to the one discussed in the first section. An added layer of risk comes from the fact that in addition to investment grade-only mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds – who still control 35% of the corporate bond market (see Chart 2 on page 3) – are often burdened with larger capital costs for high-yield debt. This means that a very large pool of investors could be impacted by a spate of BBB downgrades. In terms of the potential market impact, a 2010 paper by Ellul, Jotikasthira and Lundblad investigated fire sales of downgraded corporate bonds induced by regulatory constraints.7 The authors found that insurance companies often engage in the forced selling of bonds that have been recently downgraded into high-yield. Further, the downgraded bonds experience negative near-term price pressure from the fire sale, but that pressure tends to reverse after a few months. The finding that the negative price pressure is fleeting is important. In contrast to the negative feedback loop that can be generated by mutual fund flows, BBB securities can only be downgraded to high-yield once. In other words, once the initial fire sale of fallen angel debt takes place, there is no mechanism to force the downward price pressure to continue.8 Bottom Line: The large amount of outstanding BBB debt could lead to fire sales from corporate bond holders with investment grade-only mandates when the debt is downgraded to junk. However, in contrast to the negative feedback loop that can be generated by mutual fund flows, the evidence shows that the negative price pressure from fallen angel fire sales is fleeting. 3. Leveraged Loans The rapid growth of leveraged loans – lending made to below investment-grade borrowers - over the past couple of years has caught the attention of global central banks and financial regulators. That concern is understandable, as it would be a dereliction of duty for any policymaker or regulator who lived through the 2008 financial crisis to not consider the potential risks to financial stability and future economic growth from a surge in lower quality lending. This is especially true given the increase in the number of securitized instruments linked to leveraged loans – collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs – which evokes memories of the toxic subprime mortgage products that helped trigger the 2008 crisis. Although as the Fed’s Vice Chair for Supervision, Randal Quarles, recently noted, the financial media has been overplaying the leveraged loan story in such a way that it felt like “the Earth must be getting hit by an asteroid.” The BoE estimates that the CLOs would have to suffer a loss more than twice as severe as seen during the 2008 financial crisis for the AAA-rated piece of CLOs issued in 2018 to incur losses. The leveraged loan and CLO markets can be opaque. However, based on the information we do have from credible sources like central banks, the IMF and the BIS, some conclusions can be made about the potential economic risks from the rapid build-up of U.S. leveraged loans: Leveraged loan expansion has been partially offset by high-yield contraction. Chart 8More Leveraged Loans, Less Junk Bonds Based on estimates from the BIS and IMF, there are around $1.4 trillion in U.S. leveraged loans outstanding, which is greater than the $1.2 trillion U.S. high-yield bond market (Chart 8). That is an all-time high in the dollar amount of leveraged loans, as well as for the share of all lower-rated corporate debt accounted for by loans. The annual growth rate of U.S. leveraged loans is now a whopping 29% - the fastest pace seen since 2007. Yet the growth of the total amount of leveraged loans plus high-yield bonds is a much lower 12%. While that is still a large number, it is below the peak growth rates seen during the past fifteen years. This is because the amount of high-yield bonds outstanding has been modestly contracting since 2015. Much of that run-up in leveraged loan growth has been to satiate the demand for loans created by private equity funds and, more importantly, CLOs. The strong risk appetite from investors resulted in a notable deterioration in lending standards, with loans coming out at higher leverage multiples (debt/EBITDA) and with reduced investor covenant protection. Yet since lower-rated companies were not ramping up high-yield bond issuance at the same time, the economic stability risks from a rapid run-up in total riskier borrowing are lower, on the margin. The ownership structure of leveraged loans (and CLOs) is diverse enough to not create systemic problems. To date, the Bank of England (BoE) has compiled the most detailed estimates of the ownership breakdown of both leveraged loans and CLOs.9 In Chart 9, we have recreated a chart from the BoE’s July 2019 Financial Stability Report, which colorfully shows the ownership of global leveraged loans and CLOs. The way to read the chart is that each square represents a 1% share of the estimated $3.2 trillion of global leveraged loans and CLOs. The split in the chart is 75% loans and 25% CLOs (CLO ownership is shown on the right side of the thick dotted line). The biggest category of leveraged loan investor is what the BoE titled “U.S. and other global banks”, a group that represents 38% of total loans and CLOs. European banks own 12%, U.K. banks own 3% and Japanese banks own 3% (entirely through CLOs), thus bringing the global bank exposure to 56% of all leveraged loan instruments. While that sounds like a large number, the majority of that is in the form of revolving credit facilities – effectively, overdraft facilities to lower-rated borrowers. Revolving credit facilities are typically less risky than leveraged loans, because credit facilities have greater covenant protection and even more seniority in terms of creditor claims on borrower assets. The BoE estimates that 40% of all global leveraged loans and CLOs are owned by non-bank investors. This includes pension funds, insurance companies and investment funds (mutual funds and ETFs). Chart 9 shows how much more diverse the investor base is for CLOs than for other leveraged loans. It suggests that any future potential losses from CLOs will be distributed more evenly within the financial system, rather than being concentrated in the banks. Chart 10Leveraged Loan Losses Are Typically Lowered Compared To Junk Even within the bank holdings of CLOs, the systemic risks are lessened. The BoE noted that the increased amount of subordination (i.e. lower-rated tranches) of more recent CLO deals helps protect the senior tranches from losses. According to the BoE, the AAA-rated piece of a representative sample of CLOs issued in 2018 was 63%; this compares to 70% for CLOs issued in 2006.10 Furthermore, the central bank estimates that the CLOs would have to suffer a loss more than twice as severe as seen during the 2008 financial crisis for the AAA-rated piece of CLOs issued in 2018 to incur losses. That would be an extraordinary outcome, given how 2008 generated losses on leveraged loans that were over twice as bad as the previous worst year in 2002 (Chart 10). Potential losses from AAA tranches are important from a financial stability perspective. The BoE estimates that 40% of all CLOs are owned by global banks (including a large 13% share from yield-chasing Japanese banks). These banks tend to focus on safer AAA-rated CLO tranches. The demand for leveraged loan products is volatile, but that might actually be a good thing for economic stability. The surge in leveraged loans over the past two years has not only been related to demand from private equity funds and CLOs. U.S. retail investors have also been big buyers of mutual funds and ETFs linked to the leveraged loan market, as a way to seek out higher credit returns against a backdrop of Fed rate hikes. Chart 11Fed Rate Expectations Drive The Demand For Loans Vs Bonds Leveraged loans are floating rate instruments. Thus, they are more desirable than fixed-rate high-yield corporate debt when short-term interest rates are rising. This is seen in Chart 11, where we show net flows into the largest U.S. junk bond and leveraged loan ETFs. These flows are plotted with the JP Morgan survey of bond investor duration positioning (top panel) and our Fed Funds Discounter that measures the market-implied expected change in the fed funds rate over the next year (bottom panel). The conclusion is obvious – there was very strong retail demand for floating-rate leveraged loans over fixed-rate junk bonds during 2016-18 when expected rate hikes justified defensive duration positioning. In 2019, the tables have turned. The Fed is more dovish, rate cuts are now expected, investors have been adding duration exposure, and demand for leveraged loan funds has plunged while high-yield bond funds have been seeing inflows. The exodus from all leveraged loan funds has been historically large, with Lipper reporting that there were 33 straight weeks of outflows to July 3, 2019, for a total of $32 billion.11 Already, that reduced demand for leveraged loans has translated into sharply reduced issuance of new U.S. CLOs, which was 73% lower in the first half of 2019 versus the same period in 2018 (Chart 12). At the same time, high-yield bond issuance was up 20% in the first six months of 2019 versus 2018. The reduced demand for leveraged loans has also shifted the balance of power back to lenders, as the share of U.S. leveraged loans that have been issued with limited covenant protection (“cov-lite”) has plunged from 72% in 2018 to around 40% (Chart 13). Chart 12Lower-Rated Issuance Is "Self-Regulating" Chart 13Reduced Covenant-Lite Issuance So Far In 2019     This is a critical point on the potential stability risks from leveraged loans – the market for those loans is “self-regulating”, based on final demand from investors who “toggle” between floating rate and fixed rate credit instruments. This helps limit the growth in overall corporate indebtedness, helping to put off the date when credit booms turn into future credit busts. Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA, Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “The Risk From U.S. Corporate Debt: Theory And Evidence”, dated April 23, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2     https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/DownloadEBook/9781680834864?format=pdf 3     http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~itayg/Files/bondfunds-published.pdf 4     https://ideas.repec.org/p/bfr/banfra/706.html 5     https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5a60feab84a7d10de084abfce414b5888d5586e2.pdf 6     https://www.nber.org/papers/w21879 7     https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/55a4/8602b17bc7e7f8428695ab6a3ef2c87756ab.pdf 8      Corporate bonds that are downgraded from investment grade to high-yield are called fallen angels. 9      The Financial Stability Board, the international body that monitors and makes recommendations on the global financial system, is due to publish a comprehensive analysis of the ownership structure of the leveraged loan market in the autumn of 2019. 10     For a more detailed description of this analysis, see pages 28 & 29 of the Bank of England’s July 2019 Financial Stability report, which can be found here: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability-report/2019/july-20… 11     https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/leveraged-loan-news/leveraged-loan-fund-withdrawal-streak-hits-record-33-weeks-totaling-32b