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Highlights EM equity valuations are neutral. Relative to the U.S., EM share prices do offer some value, but this primarily reflects elevated valuations within the S&P 500. According to the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio, EM stocks are cheap for investors with a long-term time horizon - longer than two to three years. Corporate profits are much more important than equity valuations in driving share prices in the next 12 months. Our outlook for EM EPS is downbeat for the next 12 months. Maintain a defensive posture and an underweight allocation in EM stocks versus DM. A new trade: go long Russian energy stocks / short global energy ones. Feature Chart I-1EM P/E Ratio And EPS There is ongoing debate in the investment community concerning whether emerging markets (EM) equities are or are not cheap, in both absolute terms and relative to developed markets (DM). In this week's report we review various equity valuation indicators and reiterate that EM stocks are neither cheap nor expensive in absolute terms. For example, the average of trailing and forward P/E ratios is slightly above its historical mean (Chart I-1, top panel). Relative to the U.S., EM share prices do offer value, but this reflects elevated valuations within the S&P 500. Despite this, we recommend underweighting EM vs U.S./DM because the cyclical growth dynamics is much better in DM than EM. EM stocks are cheap if one assumes a strong earnings recovery (Chart I-1, bottom panel). If earnings per share (EPS) begin contracting anew, as we expect, then the current rally will be reversed sooner than later. Overall, we continue to recommend a defensive posture for absolute-return investors and maintaining an underweight allocation in EM stocks versus DM for asset allocators. Valuation Perspectives Below we consider several valuation ratios: The equal-sector weighted trailing P/E ratio is 17.7 for EM (Chart I-2). Table I-1 displays equal-sector weighted P/E ratio, price-to-book value ratio and dividend yields for major equity markets globally. This is an apples-to-apples comparison, as it assigns equal weights to each of the 10 MSCI sectors - i.e., it removes sector biases. Chart I-2Equal-Sector Weighted Trailing P/E Ratio Table I-1Equal-Sector Weighted Valuation Ratios Across EM And DM Hence, on a comparable basis, EM equities are only slightly cheaper than DM stocks as is evident in Table I-1. Besides, the composite valuation indicator based on equal-sector weighted trailing and forward P/E, price-to-book value, price-to-cash earnings ratios and dividend yield indicate that EM stocks are fairly valued (Chart I-3). The cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio. The CAPE ratio is a structural valuation measure, i.e. it matters in the long run. Importantly, it assumes that real (inflation-adjusted) EPS will revert to its historical mean or trend. In short, the CAPE ratio tells us what the P/E ratio would be if EPS were to revert to its historical trend. Chart I-4 illustrates the EM CAPE ratio. If EM EPS in inflation-adjusted U.S. dollar terms reaches its historical time trend, one can safely assume that EM stocks are cheap and currently worth buying. In a nutshell, the current CAPE ratio of 15 assumes that EM EPS should rise by about 30% in nominal U.S. dollar terms over an investor's time horizon. Chart I-3EM Equities Valuations Are Neutral Chart I-4EM CAPE Ratio Given that our time horizon is 12 months, the assumption that EM EPS will surge by about 30% in U.S. dollar terms is in our view ambitious. Therefore, we posit that EM share prices do not offer compelling value at all in the next 12 months. If one's investment horizon were two-to-three years or longer, the assumption that EPS will rise by 30% or more in U.S. dollar terms is much more plausible. In this sense we would concur that EM share prices offer decent value from a longer-term perspective. Our methodology of calculating the CAPE ratio for EM varies from the well-known Robert Shiller's CAPE ratio for the U.S.1 However, even when applying our CAPE methodology to U.S. equities, the resulting ratio is not very different from Shiller's CAPE (Chart I-5). Trimmed-mean equity valuation ratios. Chart 6 illustrates 20% trimmed-mean trailing and forward P/E, price-to-book value, price-to-cash earnings ratios and dividend yields for the EM equity universe. A 20% trimmed-mean ratio excludes the top 10% and bottom 10% of industry groups, and then calculates the average. All calculations are based on 50 EM industry group data available from MSCI. Why look at trimmed-mean valuation ratios? Because by removing the top and bottom 10% of industry groups, this measure excludes outliers and provides a better perspective on valuation. A few observations are in order: First, according to the trimmed-mean valuation ratios, EM equities are not cheap. The trimmed-mean ratios are close to their historical mean (Chart I-6). Second, the trimmed-mean ratios are well above their market cap ones. This indicates that there are a few industry groups with large market caps that pull EM multiples lower. In other words, market-cap weighted multiples are skewed to the downside by a few large industry groups. There are reasons why some sectors and countries have low or high equity multiples. It makes sense to exclude them. Finally, the composite valuation indicator based on trimmed-mean trailing and forward P/Es, PBV and price-to-cash earnings ratios and dividend yield demonstrates that EM equity valuations are neutral (Chart I-7). Chart I-5U.S. CAPE Ratios Chart I-6EM Stocks Are Close to Fair Value Chart I-7EM Equities Have Neutral Value Bottom Line: EM equities by and large command a neutral valuation. According to the CAPE ratio, EM equities are cheap for investors with a long-term time horizon, say two-to-three years or longer. Profits Hold The Key Valuations are not a good timing tool. For low equity valuations to be realized, i.e., to produce solid price gains, corporate profits should grow. The reverse is also true: for an overvalued market to decline, company earnings should contract, or at least disappoint. When valuations are neutral - as they currently are for the EM equity benchmark - a recovery in EPS should entail higher share prices, while EPS shrinkage should lead to a selloff. EM EPS will continue to recover in the next three to six months, given the rally in commodities prices in 2016, amelioration in China's business cycle and the technology sector boom in Asia. However, this moderate and short-lived EPS recovery is already priced in. For the market to rally further, EPS will need to expand beyond the next three to six months. Remarkably, there has been little improvement in EM ex-China domestic demand. Besides, the risk to bank loan growth remains to the downside both in China and EM ex-China. Slower loan growth and the need to recognize and provision for potentially large NPLs will pressure banks' profits in many EM countries. Finally, we expect oil and industrial metals prices to decline considerably over the course of this year. If and as this view plays out, energy and materials stocks will fall. Energy and materials share prices correlate not with their past or current profits but rather with underlying commodities prices. One area where we remain bullish is the technology sector. Even though tech share prices are overbought and could correct in absolute terms in the months ahead, they will continue to outperform the benchmark. Bottom Line: Corporate profits are much more important in driving share prices in the next 12 months than equity valuations. Our outlook for EM EPS is downbeat for the next 12 months or so, even though EPS will continue to recover in the next three to six months. Timing Reversal: Watch Credit Quality Spreads Chart I-8Credit Quality Spreads: ##br##A Correction Or Reversal? Following are some of the indicators we are monitoring to gauge a reversal in EM share prices. EM corporate spreads have widened a notch relative to EM sovereign spreads (Chart I-8, top panel). Similarly, Chinese off-shore corporate spreads have widened versus Chinese sovereign spreads (Chart I-8, middle panel). Credit quality spreads - the gap between B- and BAA-grade corporate bonds - have widened slightly in the U.S. (Chart I-8, bottom panel). These moves are still very small, and do not constitute a definite sign of a major trend reversal. Nevertheless, such widening in credit quality spreads is an important development. If they persist, they will certainly sound the alarm for the reflation trade. Interestingly, this is the first time a simultaneous widening in credit quality spreads has occurred since the risk assets rally began in early 2016. Bottom Line: Major equity market selloffs will occur when lower quality credit begins to persistently underperform better quality credit. There have been budding signs of quality spread widening that are worth being monitored. Identifying Relative Value Within the EM equity universe, valuation ratios differ greatly. For example, banks trade at a trailing P/E of 9.7, while consumer staple stocks trade at 24.8. Table I-2 portrays the trailing P/E ratio and its historical mean as well as 12-month forward EPS growth and the forward P/E ratio for each sector - as well as average of trailing and forward P/E ratios. Table I-3 shows the same valuation measures but for EM countries. Table I-2Stock Valuation Snapshot: EM Sectors Table I-3Equity Valuation Snapshot: EM Countries It is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from these tables. On a general level, a simplistic approach to investing based on trailing and forward P/E ratios would not have produced great outcomes in EM in recent years. When analyzing EM stock valuations, we prefer to use the trailing rather than forward P/E ratio because historically, EM forward EPS have had a very poor record forecasting actual EPS. One of our favorite ways to identify relative value is to compare the PBV ratio and return on equity (RoE) across countries/sectors. Chart I-9 plots RoE on the X-axis and the PBV ratio on the Y axis. Countries and sectors located in the bottom right corner (at the low end of the shaded area) have a low PBV ratio compared to their RoE. In contrast, in the north-west side of the distribution (at the upper end of the shaded zone), these have an elevated PBV ratio, taking into account their RoE. Chart I-9Searching For Relative Value Among countries, Korea, Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and China appear cheap, while Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Colombia, Malaysia and Poland are on the expensive side. Chart I-10EMS's Recommended ##br##Equity Portfolio Performance Concerning equity sectors, utilities and financials/banks are cheap, yet consumer staples and consumer discretionary, health care, telecom and materials appear expensive in relative terms. Our recommended country equity allocation is based on a qualitative assessment of many variables including but not limited to valuation. Chart I-10 displays the performance of our fully invested EM Equity Portfolio Model versus the EM benchmark. Our overweights presently include: Korea, Taiwan, India, China, Thailand, Russia and central Europe. Our underweights are Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia and Peru. We are neutral on Mexico, Chile, Colombia, South Africa and the Philippines. The lists of our country allocation and other equity investment recommendations are presented each week at the end of our reports. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Bet On Russia's Non-Compliance With OPEC Odds of Russia's compliance with the OPEC agreement to cut oil output by 300k b/d in the next two months are low. This poses downside risk to oil prices. Russia has so far done only 120k b/d cuts. Hence, in the next two months it should reduce its output by 180k b/d which amounts to 1.6% of the nation's oil output. One way to bet on Russia's non-compliance, regardless the direction of oil prices, is to go long Russian energy stocks / short global energy ones (Chart II-1). There are a number of political, economic and financial motives why Russia might care less about lower oil prices than Saudi Arabia in the next 12-18 months or so. As a result, Russia might not cut as much as it is expected by the OPEC agreement. Russia is able to increase oil production due to a cheaper ruble and technology advances. BCA's Energy Sector Strategy team has been highlighting that there have been concerted efforts by Russia's largest producers to employ horizontal drilling and multi-zone hydraulic fracturing in Western Siberia.2 These have stemmed declines from those aging fields and allowed production to rise (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Long Russia Energy / ##br##Short Global Energy Stocks Chart II-2Russian Oil ##br##Production Will Increase Russia will not shy away from being opportunistic and increase its market share when it can ramp up oil production. A rising global oil market share will allow Russian companies to outperform their global peers regardless the direction of oil prices. There are major cyclical divergences between Russian and Saudi economies. Russia's economy is gradually picking up while there is less certainty about Saudi's growth recovery. The reason is that Russia has allowed the ruble to depreciate and act as a shock absorber. Meanwhile, Sa­­­­udis have stuck to the currency peg. ­­­Oil prices are down by 27% from their top in rubles and 55% in Saudi riyals (Chart II-3). This has reflated Russia's fiscal revenues and the economy, while Saudi Arabia is still struggling with the consequences of low ­oil prices. On the fiscal front, Russia went through a notable fiscal squeeze and its budget deficit is projected to be 3.2% of GDP in 2017 (Chart II-4). In contrast, the Saudi Arabian fiscal deficit in 2016 reached an outstanding 17% of GDP, accounting for the drawdown in reserves by our estimates.3 Chart II-3Ruble's Depreciation ##br##In 2014-15 Made a Difference Chart II-4Fiscal Deficit: Small In ##br##Russia & Large In Saudi More importantly, Russia's federal budget for 2017 was constructed on the oil price assumption of $40/bbl. The 2017 Saudi budget assumes oil price of $50/bbl.4 Therefore, Russia would not mind if oil prices drop toward or slightly below $40 in the second half of this year. Therefore, Saudis care much more about sustaining oil prices at a higher level than Russians do. Finally, Rosneft has already conducted its IPO while Aramco's IPO has not taken place yet. As such, the need for higher oil prices is much greater in Saudi Arabia - to justify a higher value of their oil giant - than in Russia. Bottom Line: Odds are considerable that Russia will not comply with the OPEC deal and this could cause oil prices to selloff more. Regardless of direction of oil prices, we expect the Russian energy sector to outperform their global peers due to Russia's rising market share in the global oil market. Go long Russian energy stocks / short global ones. Stephan Gabillard, Research Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 For more detailed discussion on our methodology of CAPE, please refer to January 20, 2016 Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled "EM Equity Valuations: A CAPE Model", available at ems. bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Russian Oil Production: Surpassing Expectation", dated December 14, 2016, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Saudi Arabia: Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Pain", dated February 1, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 4 https://mof.gov.sa/en/budget2017/Documents/The_National_Budget.pdf Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Special Report Geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea are here to stay; China has reached the ability to impose massive costs on any state that tries to roll back its control; U.S. advantages in the region are significant, but declining and overrated. We put together a portfolio of stocks that give investors exposure to the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea. Dear Client, Today's Special Report is jointly authored by BCA's Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Equity Strategy services and focuses on the tail risks around the South China Sea conflict. In this report, our colleagues Matt Gertken of the Geopolitical Strategy and Oleg Babanov of the Emerging Markets Equity Sector Strategy ask whether China has "won" the South China Sea, and what the implications might be for investors. At the end of the report, we provide detailed investment recommendations for both EM-dedicated as well as global investors. Kindest Regards, Garry Evans Senior Vice President EM Equity Sector Strategy Marko Papic Senior Vice President, Geopolitical Strategy "We're going to war in the South China Sea in five to 10 years ... There's no doubt about that." - Steve Bannon, prior to becoming President Donald Trump's Chief Strategist, Breitbart News, March 2016 The South China Sea is a headline grabber that has failed to produce any market-disruptions despite years of rising tensions. In fact, it would appear that the issue has been relegated to the backburner, with the Trump administration laying off its earlier aggressive rhetoric and America's Asian allies focusing on building a trade relationship with China. Compared to the Koreas, in particular, where geopolitical risk is spiking due to political turmoil in the South and weapons advances in the North, the South China Sea seems relatively calm.1 We are not so sanguine, however, and advise investors to take the tail-risk of a conflict in the South China Sea seriously. First, there has been a general "rotation" of global geopolitical risk from the Middle East to Asia Pacific, as BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has chronicled over the years.2 China's transformation into a "peer" or "near-peer" competitor to the United States, and the U.S.'s various reactions, are transforming the region and sowing the seeds of a new Cold War. Second, despite a thaw in the relationship between China and the Trump Administration, the latest positive signals have not extended to the South China Sea.3 In North Korea, China is offering to enforce sanctions. In Taiwan, Trump has backed away from hints of encouraging independence. But in the South China Sea, the two sides have increased activity even as they have made reassuring statements.4 Third, fact remains that despite headline grabbers, China has managed to expand its military installations in the region over the past half-decade and now possesses a layered-defense system in the region. In this report, we ask whether China has "won" the South China Sea, and what the implications might be for investors, particularly EM-dedicated investors, on the sectoral level. We find that China has reached the ability to impose massive costs on any state that should try to roll back its control of the disputed islands. We also do not think that the U.S. is ready to accept this new Chinese "sphere of influence." This means that the two countries are in a "gray zone" in which policy mistakes could occur. This uncertainty is driving the odds of a crisis higher. China is flush with recent victories in the islands, and yet the United States will continue to insist on free passage and the defense of allies and partners. Nationalism and rising jingoism in both countries also raises the odds of misunderstanding and miscalculation. Until the Trump and Xi administrations agree to a robust strategic deal that arranges for de-escalation, the South China Sea will remain a source of low-probability, high-impact geopolitical risk for investors. It is only one aspect of a broader deterioration in U.S.-China relations that we see as the ultimate driver of a secular rise in geopolitical risk in Asia Pacific.5 Unfortunately, history also teaches us that such "strategic resets" are normally motivated by a dramatic crisis. At the end of this report, we provide investment recommendations for investors in emerging markets (and a couple for the U.S. as well). Why Not Ignore The South China Sea? Map 1Nine-Dash Line Reaches Far Beyond China Maritime territorial disputes between China and several of its neighbors - Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and partly Indonesia - have a long history. China declared its "Nine Dash Line," an expansionist claim of sovereignty over almost the entirety of the sea, in 1947 (Map 1). Since then, conflicts have flared up sporadically. The most notable skirmishes illustrate that the maritime disputes are always simmering but tend to boil over only when larger geopolitical issues heat up.6 Since the 1990s, China and the other claimants have raced to "grab what they can," particularly in the Spratly Islands. However, conflicts have especially intensified since the mid-2000s (Charts 1 and 2). A major factor has been the rise in competition for subsea resources: Chart 1Territorialism Rising In South China Chart 2Rising Number Of Confrontations Energy and minerals - Although estimates vary widely, the South China Sea contains respectable reserves of oil and natural gas (Chart 3) and there are also hopes of extracting other minerals from the sea floor. Most of the region's states are net importers. Several conflicts have been sparked by exploration, test drilling, and unilateral development.7 It is a fact that the past decade's buildup in tensions has coincided with a global bull market for energy prices and offshore energy investment and capex (Chart 4). Chart 3Not Insignificant Reserves Of Oil And Gas In South China Sea Fishing Grounds - The South China Sea holds vast fish resources, a source of food security, exports, and jobs for littoral countries. It is estimated that over 10% of global fishing catches come from here. Fishing as a whole accounts for about 1-3% of GDP for the countries involved in the disputes (Chart 5), and the South China Sea is a large chunk of that. A quick glance at recent skirmishes reveals that fishing rights are a major cause of conflict (Table 1). Chart 4Offshore Oil Production In Decline Chart 5Fisheries Non-Negligible For Asian States Table 1Notable Incidents In The South China Sea (2010-16) Nevertheless, resource extraction is not the main driver of discord. Frictions spiked in 2015-16 despite the collapse in China's and other countries' offshore rig counts (Chart 6). And fishing rights are also clearly a pretext for attempts to assert control over waters and rocks.8 Chart 6Energy Interest Declining, Tensions Still Elevated Moreover, China's conversion of the sea's various geographical features into artificial islands through a process of land reclamation, and its construction of military facilities and stationing of armaments on these islands, points not to strictly economic interests but to broader strategic security interests. Similarly, the United States' enforcement of international rights of free navigation and overflight is not related to oil and fish. What is really at stake is national security, supply-line control, and international prestige. First, the United States has long executed a grand strategy of preventing any country from forming a regional empire and denying the U.S. access. China has the long-term potential to make this happen, and the South China Sea is its earliest foray into empire-building abroad. (Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet are all old news and expand Chinese hegemony into the largely useless Eurasian hinterland.) Second, the main global trading lines from Eurasia and Africa to and from Asia mostly go through the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands. We illustrate this process through our diagram of the sea as a large traffic roundabout (Diagram 1). China is attempting to control the centerpiece of the roundabout, which - in combination with China's southern mainland forces - would eventually give it veto power over transit. Diagram 1South China Sea As A Vital Supply Roundabout The economic value of the trade potentially affected by power struggles is what makes this all highly market relevant if a full-blown war ever occurs. We estimate that roughly $4.8 trillion worth of trade flowed through this area in 2015, which is comparable to the $5.3 trillion estimate from 2012 frequently cited in news media.9 Moreover, the trade does not consist merely of manufactured goods from Asian manufacturing centers but also basic commodities vital to the Asian countries' economic and political stability. Essential commodities account for about 20-35% of Northeast and Southeast Asian imports, and almost all of this by definition flows through the South China Sea (Charts 7 and 8). Chart 7Commodity Imports Go Through South China Sea... Chart 8...And Greatly Affect Asian Economies The numbers belie how vital the supply lanes are for individual countries: Japan, for instance, gets 80% of its oil via the South China Sea. A total cutoff would be devastating after strategic reserves were exhausted; and even a marginal hindrance of energy imports would bite into the current account surpluses that grease the wheels of high-debt Asian economies. The South China Sea is therefore vital even to countries like Japan and South Korea that are not party to the maritime-territorial disputes. A commerce-destroying war could strangle their economies. Military access is another reason states seek control. This is separate but related to the need to secure economic supplies. Chinese military planners are clear that they want to be able to deny access to foreign powers if need be, in order to secure the southern half of the country, or cut off Taiwan's or Japan's supply lines. American military planners are equally clear that they will not allow a state to deny them access to international commons, or to coerce others through supply-lane control.10 Finally, there are political and legal aspects to the South China Sea disputes. China's successful alteration of the status quo in the face of opposition from the U.S., Asian neighbors, and a high-profile international tribunal (the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague), has undermined international legal institutions and the U.S. prestige in the region. Over time, regional states, perceiving that "might makes right," may feel the need to cling more closely to China or the U.S., giving rise to proxy battles.11 With supply security and national defense at risk - and China in the process of "militarizing" the islands - there is a rising probability of a major "Black Swan" incident. The involvement of a number of major powers and minor allies means that a small incident could escalate into something significant. The friction between U.S. global dominance and China's rising regional sway is the chief source of instability. China could agree to a "Code of Conduct" with the Asian states possibly as early as this year. But without improvement in U.S.-China relations, the geopolitical consequences of such a code will be moot. Southeast Asian risk assets could benefit temporarily, but the chief tail-risks of the U.S. and China falling out would be unresolved. Bottom Line: He who controls the sea routes controls the traffic. China has made an overt bid for the ability to govern the sea routes and deny foreign powers access to the sea. The U.S. has threatened forceful responses to acts of "area-denial" or military coercion. Thus, geopolitical uncertainty and risks in the region remain elevated. How Do The Contenders Size Up? If China had clearly achieved full control of the waterways, airways, and geographical features of the South China Sea, then geopolitical risk over the area might decline. Countries would adjust to Beijing's rules of the game and the region would enter a period of hegemonic stability. The reason we are in a gray area today is that China has not yet reached dominance. China's advantages are significant, growing rapidly, and underrated; meanwhile the U.S.'s advantages are significant, declining, and overrated. A simple comparison of the U.S.'s and China's military advantages and disadvantages will make this clear. China Considering that the South China Sea is China's backyard, the country has a major advantage of playing on its "home court" versus the United States. China can afford to concentrate its military capabilities and planning specifically on its near seas, whereas American resources are dispersed globally and reduced to an "expeditionary force" when operating in China's neighborhood.12 Even so, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Navy (PLAN), and Air Force (PLAAF) have major obstacles to overcome if they are to contend with American forces. Until relatively recently, China's defense buildup focused on traditional ground capabilities, creating weak spots in its ability to project military power over the South China Sea. What matters is whether China has addressed these shortfalls sufficiently to raise the costs of U.S. intervention to a prohibitive level. So far, it is attempting to do so in the following ways: Sea Power - China's naval capabilities have generally lagged far behind those of the U.S. and Japan. An important step was the commissioning of China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in 2012. It is a renovated Soviet carrier of the type that Russia has recently used in Syria. A second carrier, Shandong, is 85% complete and set to be commissioned in 2018 - it is an indigenously produced copy of the former. It is set to be stationed in Hainan, which will influence the balance of power given that the U.S. only has one carrier permanently in the region (though several more dock in San Diego). A third carrier is slated for 2022 and expected to be stationed in the South China Sea. The navy has also significantly increased China's logistic and support capabilities in the area, with amphibious warships and air cover. China has also vastly expanded its destroyers and smaller ships. Only its submarine capabilities face serious doubts about the degree of improvement and capability. Air Transport - China's naval and air force lifting capabilities, necessary to transport troops and equipment quickly to disputed territories, were initially very limited. But in recent years, China has improved these capabilities. Considering satellite pictures of the Spratly and Paracel Islands with new hangars and landing strips, China has made considerable progress toward the goal of quick material and troop supply for the islands. Of course, it is notoriously difficult to resupply small scattered islands amid enemy disruptions, but it is also difficult to disrupt without committing more than one aircraft carrier wing to the problem. Clearly China's capacity has improved. Infrastructure - China has converted Hainan, its southernmost island (and smallest province) into a major military and logistics base. Its new Yulin Naval Base can host up to 20 nuclear submarines as well as two carrier groups and several assault ships. This is China's "Pearl Harbor," and unlike the American version, it is in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, on the disputed islands, China had not built infrastructure until very recently. It was in fact the last of the island claimants to pave an airstrip. But its construction has been bigger, faster, and more ambitious - including for air transport, fighter jets, and surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, all of which have added greatly to its ability to deny the U.S. access to the sea. Air Power - One of the main issues the PLAAF had over the years was the limited radius of its fighter planes, which would not allow full air superiority in the South China Sea. Airfield infrastructure was built on the disputed islands so that fighter planes could be stationed closer to the area. China therefore does not possess just one aircraft carrier, but rather numerous ones if we think of islands as aircraft carriers. Also, Russia is delivering to China a number of multirole fighters that can cover the South China Sea from bases on the mainland. And China's fifth-generation fighter is coming along. By far the most significant military development in China's arsenal, however, is its development of short- and medium-range missiles. This development greatly increases the danger to American ships and aircraft seeking access to the region. First, China has concentrated on building short-range, DF-21D "Carrier Killer" anti-ship missiles, which pack enough punch to take out an American aircraft carrier with one hit, and which the U.S. has limited means to defend against.13 China has also paraded around the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, or "Guam Killer," which can reach as far as Guam, can carry a nuclear charge, and has a mobile launch platform that would be difficult for U.S. forces to detect and knock out before the launch. In turn, the U.S. has deployed Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems in Guam and South Korea in preparation for precisely this kind of attack.14 Second, China has amassed around 500 surface-to-air missiles on Hainan Island, waiting to be shipped to the disputed rocks. The armory consists of a combination of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles to create a layered air-defense perimeter. Satellite images of the islands show that China has also positioned short-range and medium-range missile systems on some of the islands, namely Woody Island in the Paracels. Finally, China has fielded better radar systems to gain full coverage of the South China Sea (as well as other nearby waters) in order to find or guide friendly or hostile ships or planes and to support the various activities of its air and ship defenses. This combination of radar and missile capabilities amounts to a game changer. They make it possible for China to raise the costs of conflict to such a level that the United States might balk. Will the U.S. seek to change the balance of power with force? No. But Washington has reaffirmed its "red lines" in the region, namely freedom of passage. This was the takeaway from Secretary of Defense James Mattis's first foreign trip, not incidentally to Japan and South Korea. Mattis indicated that freedom of passage is "absolute" not only for the U.S. merchant fleet but also for the navy. However, he also said the U.S. will exhaust "diplomatic efforts" and eschew "any dramatic military moves" in the South China Sea, while maintaining the U.S.'s neutrality on sovereignty disputes. This is status quo, and the status quo favors China's rapidly growing ability to deny others' access to the area. The United States The U.S. has several bases in the Indo-Pacific area, with ground, air, naval, and marine assets. It also has extensive experience conducting wars and special operations in East Asia. Yet despite this dispersed and historic basing, China poses a challenge the likes of which it has not seen in the region. The distances to be covered, the complexities of the logistics, and China's growing strengths, make any U.S. intervention in the South China Sea harder than is typically assumed. The U.S.'s key five bases make these advantages and disadvantages clear: Guam, with almost 6,000 troops, will most likely be the first base to respond to a threat in the South China Sea, or to become engaged in a conflict there. It hosts part of the Seventh Fleet, including a ballistic-missile submarine squadron. It would be a key launch pad for regional operations. It could also be an early target for China's long-range ballistic missiles in a major conflict. Guam sits almost 3,000km from the South China Sea. South Korea hosts one of the U.S.'s oldest and largest regional deployments, with about 28,000 troops. Korea hosts the Eighth U.S. Army and Seventh Air Force, as well as Special Operations Command Korea. Its chief advantage is its proximity to China. However, assuming a conflict involves no direct engagement with mainland China, Korea comes with some disadvantages. Most of the ground staff is located around the North Korea border. The U.S. command in the region will be wary of lifting troops from the border and exposing its northern flank. North Korea (or conceivably China itself) could take advantage of U.S. distraction in the South China Sea. At the same time, the operational radius of planes on the Osan Air Base would not allow direct engagement in the South China Sea, though they could cover the southeast to hinder any maneuvers of the Chinese air force. Japan is the United States' largest overseas deployment with about 49,000 troops - heavily tilted toward naval and air power. The Fifth U.S. Air Force is spread across three main bases in Misawa, Yokota, and Kadena, while the Seventh Fleet is the largest forward-deployed U.S. fleet. It has several powerful task forces including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and naval special warfare, amphibious assault, mine warfare, and marine expeditionary forces. The strong presence and firepower of this fleet as well as its maneuverability make it the prime candidate for any sort of engagement in the South China Sea (or East China Sea for that matter). The air bases around Tokyo and Okinawa can provide air support down to Taiwan and run airlift operations down to China's Hainan Island, the base of China's southern fleet. The only disadvantages stem from vulnerability to layered air defense and long supply lines for the navy, which will become targets after any lengthy engagement. Moreover, U.S. Forces Japan lack large ground units to organize landing operations, which will need to be sourced from South Korea or Hawaii. Hawaii is the home of the U.S. Pacific Command, which oversees regional forces, and contains sizable ground units to reinforce regional bases. It hosts the U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet stationed in Pearl Harbor (with a second base in San Diego). Hawaii has a large ground troop presence, which, together with U.S. air-lift capabilities, would provide the main ground forces for offensive operations. The large fleet secures U.S. presence in the region. Hawaii would host and resupply the core of any naval operations in the South China Sea. The only disadvantage is geographic: the distance to any U.S. ally's territory is significant, and main operational areas in the South China Sea cannot be reached in a single lift. This means that troop and equipment movement will take time and will not go unmolested. In any scenario involving land operations, the redeployment of troops will give the other side time to prepare. Alaska is also worth mention as it houses infantry brigades and air force combat units, albeit no significant naval presence. We only give small consideration to the base here because of its proximity to Russia. Assuming the neutrality of Russia during a hypothetical conflict, the U.S. would still be unlikely to draw resources from Alaska to aid operations in the South China Sea, since that would leave its own territory exposed to some degree. Other Allied Bases - We do not feature other allied bases in the region mainly because of the small numbers of troops that can be deployed and the low capabilities of U.S. allies. Some countries, such a Singapore, which has a respectably army, could disappoint the U.S. by trying to remain neutral. The most reliable help would come from Japan and Australia, but even Australia would face a very intense internal dilemma as a result of its economic dependency on China. South Korea would also be preoccupied with North Korea's ability to take advantage. A quick survey of the "order of battle" of the U.S. and China in the region would make our assertion that China has gained supremacy laughable. Then again, geopolitics does not work in ceteris paribus terms. Yes, the U.S. maintains military hegemony in the region, but China's abilities to impose real pain on American naval forces creates a complicated political dilemma for the U.S.: is Washington prepared to expend blood and treasure to defend allies and their supply lines in case of a conflict over this area? China is not yet looking to project power globally. It is not actively trying to compete for supremacy with the U.S. in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, or Caribbean Sea. As such, it can concentrate its forces in the South and East China Seas and dedicate its entire naval strategy to the sole purpose of denying the U.S. navy access there. The U.S., meanwhile, has to plan for a global confrontation and then dedicate a portion of its forces to China's home court. Japan may very well hold the balance of power in a potential conflict over the region. Its import dependency is at the core of its national psyche and it would view a Chinese blockade of the South China Sea as an existential threat - not unlike the American threat of oil embargo that precipitated war in the early 1940s. Japan is not likely to go rogue, but it would be a tremendous addition to the American effort, even in a situation where other states refrained from action out of fear. However, while China will see the above as a reason not to initiate armed conflict with the United States, it will not be able to retrench in the South China Sea in the face of domestic nationalism either. These pressures virtually ensure that it is locked into the assertive foreign policy it has pursued over the past ten years. Bottom Line: A simple analysis of the current disposition shows that the military capabilities of the two countries - in this limited theater - are not as disparate as one might think. Both sides have weaknesses: the U.S. is bound to a handful of distant bases and has a global range of obligations and constraints, while China lacks technology, experience, and cooperation among its military branches. Nevertheless, China is approaching full air and sea cover of the area within the Nine Dash Line (Map 1) and is rapidly gaining greater ability through radar and missiles to inflict politically unacceptable damage on the U.S. The U.S.'s interest in the South China Sea is ultimately limited to free passage and the defense of treaty allies. The Trump administration is primed to strengthen the country's rights and deterrence, namely through a large increase in defense spending that focuses heavily on the navy - aiming at a 600-ship fleet - and likely on Asia Pacific. In the context of a massive new assertion of U.S. regional presence and power, it is significant that China has not yet given any concrete indication of slowing down its island reclamation, militarization, or control techniques. Investment Implications BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has been warning clients of the rising risks in the South China Sea, and East China in general, since 2012. However, it has been a challenge to construct an investment strategy based on our view. For starters, it is unclear when the crisis could emerge. It is difficult to know when accidents and miscalculations will happen. What we can say with some degree of certainty, however, is that the window of opportunity for any realistic campaign to reverse the militarization of the disputed islands will probably be closed by the end of this year. By "realistic," we mean operations that would promise control over the disputed territory with a calculated degree of risk and an acceptable degree of casualties. At the same time, the U.S. still has the ability to win a full-blown war with China. We have not addressed scenarios like cutting off China's oil supplies at the Strait of Hormuz, for instance, but have limited our discussion to a conflict in the South China Sea over control of the newly militarized islands. In that context, the American threshold for pain is low and its military advantages are narrowing. We are therefore entering a danger zone now because both China and the U.S. stand at risk of becoming overly assertive in the near future: Chart 9Will Trump Seek Political Recapitalization Via Conflict? China because it has domestic nationalist pressures that the Communist Party needs to vent as the economy slows; The U.S. because it has an unpopular (Chart 9), nationalist leadership that seeks to increase its defense presence in the region and may fall to brinkmanship in order to extract major trade concessions from Beijing. The tail-risk in the South China Sea suggests that global investors should also continue to hedge their exposure to risk assets with exposure to safe-haven assets receptive to geopolitical risk, like gold, Swiss bonds, though perhaps not U.S. Treasuries. The persistence of Sino-American distrust - beyond whatever happy encounter Trump and Xi may have at Mar-a-Lago in April - suggests that Chinese economic policy uncertainty will remain elevated and global financial volatility to rise. U.S.-China tension also feeds our broader narrative of rising mercantilism and protectionism. Investors will want to overweight domestic-oriented economies, consumer-oriented sectors, and small cap companies relative to their export-oriented, manufacturing, and large cap counterparts. We also recommend that EM-dedicated investors be wary about Asian states caught in the middle of de-globalization and vulnerable to geopolitical tail-risks. We are neutral to bearish on South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Our long Vietnam equities trade has been downgraded to tactical. We prefer Thailand and Japan, U.S. allies that are removed from conflict zones (Thailand) or domestically oriented and reflationary (Japan). We are also long China relative to Hong Kong and Taiwan, given the risks of both de-globalization and Chinese political troubles for the latter two. We are bullish on U.S. defense stocks.15 The U.S. defense establishment is conducting extensive reviews of the navy's force structure and future strategic needs - the fleet peaked in 1987 and fell below 300 battle force ships in 2003, but has projected that 355 battle force ships is necessary. This would require a major injection of funds in the coming decade. The Trump administration has endorsed this assessment in principle and is planning a significant increase in defense spending, marked by a requested increase of $50 billion in his first annual budget. Trump has signaled that defense manufacturing, notably shipbuilding, will be one of the ways in which he seeks to boost American manufacturing and jobs. This plays to his blue-collar base of support and could move the needle in battleground states like Virginia. It should be beneficial on the margin for U.S. defense companies.16 Below are our corporate-level recommendations for both EM-dedicated and global investors. The Companies Given the likelihood that tensions in the SCS will continue, and the projected build up in defense spending in both the U.S. and China, EMES recommends investors look to take exposure to defense stocks. We have put together a portfolio of such stocks that is intended to give exposure to the developments between China and the U.S. in the South China Sea. We recommend the following basket of companies: AviChina Industry & Technology (2357 HK); AVIC Jonhon Optronic (002179 CH); AVIC Helicopter Company (600038 CH); AVIC Aviation Engine Corporation (600893 CH); China Avionics Systems (600372 CH); Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII US); General Dynamics Corporation (GD US). The basket consists of four Chinese defense companies, mostly centered around the aviation industry. The choice of listed companies in China is constrained and hence we have been forced to gain exposure through aviation companies rather than naval. We recommend two companies in the U.S. that are involved in military vessel production for the U.S. Navy. We believe that the main ramp-up in defense spending from the U.S. side will come through a significant increase in the number of ships in the Asian region. Chart 10Performance Since March 2016: ##br## AviChina Vs. MSCI EM AviChina Industry & Technology (2357 HK): Chinese aviation holding company (Chart 10). AviChina is the listed subsidiary of the government-controlled Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). Airbus is another large shareholder, with over 11% of the free float. The company produces dual-purpose aircraft - civil and military -- including helicopters, trainers, parts and components (including radio-electronic), avionics and electrical products and components. AviChina itself is a holding company with a rather complicated structure, which makes it difficult for investors to access its market value. Listed subsidiaries include AVIC Helicopter Company (600038 CH), China Avionics (600372 CH), AVIC Jonhon Optronic (002179 CH) and Hongdu Aviation (600316 CH). In terms of the revenue stream, 49% is generated from whole aircraft production, 28% from engineering services and another 23% from parts and components manufacturing. The company reports semi-annual results. The latest full-year report released on March 15 came out mixed. Revenues were strong, up 39% year over year, but costs accelerated at a faster pace (+45% year over year). Operating income was still strong, growing 12.3% year over year, but margins declined across the board. EBITDA margin contracted by 257 basis points to 9.94%, while operating margin fell by 170 basis points to 7.32%. Despite this, the bottom line still managed to grow by 18.75% year over year. AviChina is currently trading at a forward P/E of 21.2x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 9.5% for the next three years. Chart 11Performance Since March 2016: ##br## AVIC Jonhon Optronic Vs. MSCI EM AVIC Jonhon Optronic (002179 CH): Profiting from growing military and EV spending (Chart 11). A subsidiary of AVIC and AviChina, the company specializes in production of optical and electric connectors (third largest in China), and cable components. Jonhon is unrivalled in the defense market. It profits from rising electronic content and from supplying major components to other parts of the AVIC group, shipbuilders, railways and aerospace. It is also successfully developing its civil offering, specifically for the fast-growing electric vehicle market and the 4G space in the telecoms industry. Looking at the revenue composition, 54% is generated by sales of electric connectors, a further 24% from fiber-optic cables, and 19% from conventional cable and assembly products. As for the civil-military split, the company is expected to receive 60% of total revenues from its civil applications, growing approximately 10% per annum. Jonhon Optronics reported its full-year results on March 15. Revenues saw a strong increase, jumping 23.7% year over year. Cost growth was also higher, though it slowed from the previous year (up 23.8% year over year). This led to an operating profit increase of 19.7%, but slight margin deterioration. EBITDA margin fell by 77 basis points to 16.98%, and operating margin was down 5 basis points to 14.32. On the other hand, profit margins improved to 12.6% (up 54 basis points) as the bottom line grew by 29.8% year over year. Jonhon Optronics is currently trading at a forward P/E of 24.4x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 15.2% for the next three years. Chart 12Performance Since March 2016: ##br## AVIC Helicopter Company Vs. MSCI EM AVIC Helicopter Company (600038 CH): AVIC's helicopter arm (Chart 12). As the name already suggests, the company specializes in helicopter production, which accounts for almost 100% of the overall revenue stream. The main helicopters currently marketed are from the AC series, in particular the AC311, AC312 and AC313, the Z series - Z-8, Z-9 and Z-11. We expect further tailwinds for the company stemming from China's future defense budget. The country's helicopter fleet is still only a tenth of the size of the U.S.'s fleet. It will continue to ramp up production. Export contracts will also support revenue growth for AVIC Helicopter Co. With a strong advance on the Asian military helicopter market, the company is looking to expand in the region. Furthermore, we see some promising developments in the civil helicopter space, with Chinese emergency services and the Civil Aviation Administration ramping up demand. The main headwind might come from the transition to new models, with the new production cycle to be in full force in 2018. AVIC Helicopter Co reported full year results on March 15, which came out weaker than expected. Revenues were virtually flat, contracting by 0.3% year over year, while cost of revenue grew 1.3% year over year. Operating income was also stable relative to last year, contracting 0.4% year over year, helped by an operating expense reduction of 12% year over year. Nevertheless, EBITDA margin declined slightly by 19 basis points to 6.77%, while operating margin fell by 131 basis points to 13.99%. A marginally lower income tax in FY16 allowed the firm to eke out 1.3% year-over-year bottom-line growth. AVIC Helicopters is currently trading at a forward P/E of 48.2x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 13.8% for the next two years. Chart 13Performance Since March 2016: ##br## AVIC Aviation Engine Vs. MSCI EM AVIC Aviation Engine Corporation (600893 CH): Sole leader in Chinese engine production (Chart 13). Aviation Engine Corporation is part of the government-controlled Aeroengine Corporation of China (AECC), which was established in August 2016 and contributes just under 50% to Being in a monopolistic position on the Chinese market, the company profits from rising military aircraft procurement and prices. As part of the AECC, the company also receives tailwinds from scale effects within the company as well as cost savings in the supply chain. AVIC Aviation Engine Corporation reported weak full year results on March 16. Revenue slid 5.5% year over year, but management kept costs under control (down 7.3% year over year). Operating expenses grew only marginally (up 5.2% year over year), which left operating profit flat compared to last year. Margin trends have been strong; EBITDA margin improved by 78 basis points to 13.05%, while operating margin grew by 42 basis points to 7.78%. However, high net interest expense depressed the bottom line, which fell 13.3% year over year. At the same time the company managed to decrease its debt level for the fourth year in a row. AVIC Aviation Engine Corporation is currently trading at a forward P/E of 52.0x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 14.4% for the next two years. Chart 14Performance Since March 2016: ##br## China Avionics Systems Vs. MSCI EM China Avionics Systems (600372 CH): Leading developer and producer of avionics equipment (Chart 14). China Avionics Systems is also a subsidiary of AviChina, which controls 43% of the free float. The company is active in R&D, running several research institutes in the fields of radar, aviation and navigation control as well as aviation computers and software. China Avionics enjoys a near-monopoly on the Chinese aviation electronics market, and also controls over 90% of the military market for air data systems. Looking at the revenue breakdown, 80% of total revenues come from military contracts, while it is expected that the share of civil revenues will increase with the development of civil aircraft in the country. Aircraft data acquisition devices contribute the most to overall revenue, at 25% of total, followed by airborne sensors at 15%, auto-pilot systems at 14%, distance-sensing alarm systems at 9.5%, and air data systems at 9%. The company reported full year results on March 16. Revenues experienced a mild increase of 1.9% year over year, while costs increased at the same pace (2% year over year). On the operating side, costs increased by 3% year over year, suppressing income by 1% year over year. EBITDA margin fell 37 basis points to 15.15%, while operating margin contracted 30 basis points to 10.60%. The bottom line contracted 3.5% year over year. China Avionics Systems is currently trading at a forward P/E of 55.0x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 13% for the next two years. Chart 15Performance Since March 2016: ##br## Huntington Ingalls Industries Vs. S&P 500 Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII US): Largest listed U.S. military shipbuilder (Chart 15). Initially a part of Northrop Grumman, Huntington was spun off and listed in 2011. Huntington enjoys a monopolistic market position, as over 70% of the current U.S. Navy fleet was designed and built by the company's Newport News or Ingalls divisions in Virginia and Mississippi. Huntington is currently the sole designer, builder and re-fueler of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in the U.S. In the nuclear submarines space, the company has one competitor: the Electric Boat unit of General Dynamics. The company also provides a range of services through its Technical Solutions division, centered around fleet support, integrated missions solutions and nuclear and oil and gas operations. Huntington reported full-year results on February 16. Full year revenue was virtually flat (+1% on quarterly basis), while costs increased slightly by 1.6% year over year. The company managed to reduce operating expenses, which fell by 16% to the lowest level since 2010. This helped boost operating profit by 13% year over year. EBITDA margin improved by an impressive 125 basis points to 14.77%, and operating margin was up by 119 basis points to 12.14%. New orders grew by US$5.2 billion, bringing the total pipeline to US$21 billion. The bottom line jumped by 45% year over year, helped by a lower income tax bill and a one-off after-tax adjustment. Huntington Ingalls Industries is currently trading at a forward P/E of 18.1x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 4.2% for the next two years. Chart 16Performance Since March 2016: ##br## General Dynamics Vs. S&P 500 General Dynamics (GD US): Primary contractor for U.S. Navy submarines (Chart 16). General Dynamics is a multinational defense corporation and currently the fourth-largest defense company in the world. The company has four business segments, from which we are mainly interested in the marine systems segment, contributing 25% of overall group revenue. The marine systems segment is represented by General Dynamics' unlisted subsidiary, GD Electric Boat. Electric Boat has long been the main builder of nuclear submarines for the U.S. Navy out of Connecticut, and is expected to be one of the main beneficiaries of the U.S. Navy expansion program under the Trump administration. General Dynamics reported full-year results on January 27, which generally came in flat. Revenue fell by a marginal 0.4% year over year (after the adoption of a new revenue-recognition standard), but the company did a good job in managing costs, which contracted by 1% year over year. Operating income grew by 4% year over year, helped by lower operating costs. Margins improved across the board; EBITDA margin went up 45 basis points to 15.19%, while operating margin was up 54 basis points to 13.74%. The bottom line grew 5% year over year. Management seem confident in their guidance through 2020, including detailed but conservative estimates. Especially promising was the good pipeline visibility in the marine segment, driven by the company's Columbia-class submarine sales. General Dynamics is currently trading at a forward P/E of 19.3x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 6.5% for the next two years. How To Trade? The GPS/EMES team recommends gaining exposure to the sector through a basket of the listed equities, which would consist of five Chinese companies and two U.S. companies. The main goal is active alpha generation by excluding laggards and including out-of-benchmark plays, to avoid passive index hugging via an ETF. Direct: Equity access through the tickers (Bloomberg): AviChina Industry & Technology (2357 HK); AVIC Jonhon Optronic (002179 CH); AVIC Helicopter Company (600038 CH); AVIC Aviation Engine Corporation (600893 CH); China Avionics Systems (600372 CH); Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII US); General Dynamics Corporation (GD US). ETFs: At current time there is one listed ETF covering the China defense sector: Guotai CSI National Defense ETF (512660 CH); And three listed ETFs covering the U.S. defense sector: iShares U.S. Aerospace & Defense ETF (ITA US); SPDR S&P Aerospace & Defense ETF (XAR US); PowerShares Aerospace & Defense Portfolio (PPA US). Funds: At current time there are no funds with significant defense sector exposure. Please note that the trade recommendation is long-term (1Y+) and based on a straight long trade. We don't see a need for specific market timing for this call (for technical indicators please refer to our website link). For convenience, the performance of both market cap-weighted and equally-weighted equity baskets will be tracked (please see upcoming updates as well as the website link to follow performance). Risks To The Investment Case The largest risk to our investment case - leaving aside company-specific risks - would be an unexpected fading away of the tensions in China's near seas, and of China's and America's military spending ambitions. Such a development - which would require a robust diplomatic agreement and an about-face from what the leaders have stated - would hit the weapons producers. Though such a settlement would not necessarily occur overnight, or receive immediate publicity, it would be observable over the course of negotiations between the Trump and Xi administrations. A key event to watch is the upcoming April summit between the two leaders. At the same time, the large momentum in the defense industry (with very long production pipelines), and the very low flexibility of defense budgeting, means that we are comfortable in terms of timing an exit should geopolitical tensions begin to recede. Another risk might come from a slowdown in economic growth in China or the U.S., which could lead to cuts in defense budgets. Nevertheless, in a case of a further escalation in China's near-abroad, we would most likely see defense spending continue to grow despite any weak economic performance, warranted by strategic needs. This is a key dynamic that investors should understand. Strategic distrust between the U.S. and China has worsened since the Great Recession, indicating that the preceding period of strong growth helped keep a lid on U.S.-China tensions. Now the two countries have entered a dilemma in which relations have soured despite their economic recoveries, since both sides are using growth to fuel military development, yet an economic relapse would fuel further distrust. Only a high-level political settlement can break this spiral and such settlements between strategic rivals traditionally require a "crisis." Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Oleg Babanov, Editor/Strategist obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was," dated March 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 The United States sent the USS Carl Vinson carrier group to the South China Sea as part of Freedom of Navigation Operations that the Trump administration may intensify; China is involved in a new spat about "environmental" monitoring stations in the Paracel Islands and in Scarborough Shoal, and is also increasing activity east of the Philippines; it is threatening to impose a new law that would govern foreign ships' access; the question of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone lingers; and China has also begun sending large tourist groups to the Paracels. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2017, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013 and "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Most notably in 1971, 1974, 1988, 1995, 2001, and 2011-14. In the two biggest "battles," 1974 and 1988, China kicked Vietnamese forces out of the Paracel Islands and parts of the Spratly Islands, respectively. These conflicts took place in the context of Vietnam's wars with itself, the U.S., and China, just as the recent rise in tensions takes place in the context of China's emergence as a global power - in other words, international tensions are the cause and maritime-territorial disputes are but a symptom. 7 Most notably the HS981 showdown between China and Vietnam in 2014, which occurred when China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) moved a large mobile drilling rig into the farthest southwest island of the Paracel Islands, near Triton Island, triggering a months-long skirmish with Vietnamese coast guard ships and fishermen that involved Chinese warships and aircraft and the sinking of at least one Vietnamese fishing boat. 8 In fact, officers from China's People's Liberation Army-Navy's southern fleet have recently written publicly and approvingly of the well-known Chinese tactic of fighting "behind a civilian front" to establish control over the sea - which has involved a host of private and public actions covering fishing, energy, coast guard, administration, science and environment, and tourism. Please see "Chinese Military's Dominance in S. China Sea Complete: Report," Kyodo News, March 20, 2017. 9 Please see Bonnie S. Glaser, "Armed Clash In The South China Sea," Council on Foreign Relations, Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14, April 2012, available at cfr.org. Separately, an American diplomatic estimate from 2016 claims that "more than half the world's merchant fleet tonnage" passes through these waters; see Colin Willett, "Statement ... Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee ... 'South China Sea Maritime Disputes,'" July 7, 2016, available at docs.house.gov [http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20160707/105160/HHRG-114-AS28-Wstate-WillettC-20160707.pdf]. A Chinese study estimates that 47.5% of China's total foreign trade in goods transited the sea in 2014; see Du D. B., Ma Y. H. et al, "China's Maritime Transportation Security And Its Measures Of Safeguard," World Regional Studies 24:2 (2015), pp. 1-10. 10 When President Trump's Secretary of State Rex Tillerson clarified remarks at his senate confirmation hearing in which he threatened that the U.S. would deny China's access to the islands in the South China Sea, he reformulated his statement to say that in the event of a contingency the U.S. needed to be "capable of limiting China's access to and use of its artificial islands" to threaten the U.S. and its allies and partners. 11 Please see footnote 3 above. Another potential implication might be a weaker U.S. position in the partition of the Arctic shelf (which has far more hydrocarbon reserves than the South China Sea), which U.S. rivals like Russia will pursue next against the claims of the U.S. and its allies Norway, Canada, and Denmark. 12 Please see Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014). 13 It is understood by multiple sources that these missiles cannot be defended successfully against by current anti-missile technology, with one potential exclusion - the recently tested SM-6 Dual I. Otherwise, possible defense methods would lie in the realm of electronic countermeasures. 14 We believe, with medium conviction, that the incoming administration in South Korea will remove the THAAD missile defense sometime in 2017 or 2018 in what would be a major diplomatic quarrel between Seoul and Washington. This is because the soon-to-be ruling Minjoo Party (Democratic Party) will seek to engage North Korea and mend relations with China, and the latter countries' top demand will be removal of the missile defense system that was only put in place in a rushed manner in the final days of the discredited and impeached Park Geun-hye administration. Such a removal would illustrate the U.S.'s disadvantages relative to China in having to deal with alliances, basing, and force structure in a foreign region. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Alpha Sector Strategy Joint Special Report, "Brothers In Arms," dated January 11, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see "2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment (FSA)," dated December 14, 2016, and Ronald O'Rourke, "Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, September 21, 2016.
Highlights Spread Product: Any near-term correction in risk assets is likely to be fleeting. Investors should take the opportunity to increase credit exposure and maintain overweight spread product allocations on a 6-12 month horizon. Duration: Our 2-factor Global PMI model pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.54%. Economy: U.S. economic growth will remain solidly above-trend this year, helped along by renewed strength in both residential and non-residential investment. Above-trend growth will ensure that inflation remains in its current gradual uptrend. Feature Chart 1Back Above 400 bps The reflation trade has come under question during the past couple of weeks. The S&P 500 is 1.7% off its recent high, the VIX has bounced and the average spread on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index is back above 400 basis points (Chart 1). After such a move, it is reasonable to ask if the economic landscape has changed enough to warrant a reversal of our current overweight spread product allocation. We think not, and we advise investors to buy the dips, adding credit risk to their portfolios from more attractive levels. This week we examine why risk assets are vulnerable to a near-term correction, but also why these corrections are likely to be short lived. On a 6-12 month investment horizon we continue to recommend a pro-risk portfolio characterized by: below-benchmark duration, overweight spread product, curve steepeners and TIPS breakeven wideners. Three Catalysts For A Near-Term Sell Off... Three main factors suggest that risk assets might continue to correct in the near-term. The first is that Fed rate hike expectations might be increasing too quickly. Chart 2 shows the fed funds rate that is priced into the overnight index swap curve for the end of this year. The lower dashed horizontal line is the level consistent with one more rate hike between now and the end of the year. The higher dashed horizontal line is the level consistent with two more rate hikes between now and the end of the year. We see that risk assets were able to handle the shift in rate expectations up to the lower dashed line with no trouble. The yield curve steepened and the cost of inflation compensation rose (Chart 2, bottom panel). But now, as rate expectations approach the higher dashed line, the reflation trade is starting to fray. The yield curve has started to flatten and TIPS breakevens are rolling over. A second reason why risk assets might sell-off in the near-term is the still elevated level of economic policy uncertainty (Chart 3, top panel). Last Friday, markets hung on every word related to the likelihood of a new healthcare bill being passed. Now that the bill has failed, attention will turn quickly to tax reform. It is very likely that risk assets will suffer if it appears as though tax reform will be delayed or scrapped altogether. Importantly, it is the opinion of our Geopolitical Strategy service that tax reform will be passed before the end of the year.1 Chart 2How Much Hawkishness Can Markets Take? Chart 3Correction Catalysts? A third reason why risk assets are vulnerable to a near-term correction is that investors have bought into the reflation trade, and sentiment is extremely bullish (Chart 3, bottom panel). Surveys of investors conducted by Yale University show that 99% of investors expect the Dow to increase during the coming year, while simultaneously only 47% of investors characterize the stock market as "not too high" relative to its fundamental value. The divergence in itself suggests that the equity rally is built on a shaky foundation. It seems likely that either confidence needs to wane or valuations need to correct for the rally to be prolonged. ...But The Fed Cycle Trumps Them All In previous reports2 we outlined the four phases of the Fed Cycle (see Box), and observed that in all likelihood we are currently in Phase I. Box: The Four Phases Of The Fed Cycle Chart 4Stylized Fed Cycle The four phases of the Fed Cycle are illustrated in Chart 4 and defined as follows: Phase I represents the early stage of the withdrawal of monetary stimulus. This phase begins with the first hike of a new tightening cycle and ends when the fed funds rate crosses above its equilibrium (or neutral) level. Phase II represents the late stage of the tightening cycle, when the Fed hikes its target rate above equilibrium in an effort to slow the economy. Phase III represents the early stage of the easing cycle. It begins with the first rate cut from the peak and lasts until the Fed cuts its target rate below equilibrium. Phase IV represents the late stage of the easing cycle. It encompasses both the period when the fed funds rate descends to its cycle trough and the subsequent adjustment period when the Fed remains on hold in an effort to kick start an economic recovery. In Phase I, the Fed has begun to remove monetary accommodation but still needs inflation to rise back to target. In other words, if risk assets sell off and financial conditions start to tighten the Fed will adopt a more dovish policy stance to ensure that the recovery persists and inflation continues to trend higher. We note that core PCE inflation is running at 1.74% year-over-year, still below the Fed's 2% target. Further, the St. Louis Fed Price Pressures Measure3 is signaling only a 19% chance that PCE inflation will exceed 2.5% during the next twelve months, and market-based measures of inflation compensation are well below levels that are consistent with the Fed's inflation target (Chart 5). Chart 5Fed Still Needs Higher Inflation In this environment, if risk assets sell off because of overly aggressive rate hike expectations, fiscal policy disappointments or over-extended sentiment, the Fed will quickly adopt a more dovish policy stance, lending support to the reflation trade. Of course, if any of the catalysts for the market correction also cause a severe contraction in economic growth, then the reflation trade would face a more lasting setback. However, none of the three reasons for a market correction listed above seem likely to have significant pass-through effects on the economy. Even if fiscal stimulus turns out to be much less than was previously anticipated, there appears to be sufficient momentum in economic growth to maintain inflation on its upward trajectory (see section titled "Above-Trend Growth: Aided By Housing & Capex" below). It follows from this analysis of the Fed Cycle that a strategy of "buying the dips" should work whenever we are in an environment where the Fed needs inflation to move higher. It is only when inflation is more firmly anchored around the Fed's target that the Fed will be less willing to support markets, making a "buy the dips" strategy less effective. To test this theory, we devised a trading rule for high-yield bonds where we buy the High-Yield index whenever spreads widen by 20 bps or more during a month. We then hold that position for a period ranging from 1 to 3 months and calculate excess returns relative to duration-matched Treasuries during that period. Our goal is to see if the effectiveness of this "buy the dips" strategy differs depending on the stage of the Fed Cycle. For this test we define the stages of the Fed Cycle using the aforementioned St. Louis Fed Price Pressures Measure, which we split into four ranges: 0% to 15%: An environment of very limited inflation pressure most consistent with Phase IV of the Fed Cycle. 15% to 30%: Still muted inflation pressures. Roughly consistent with Phase I of the Fed Cycle. 30% to 50%: Rising inflation pressures, but still less than a 50% chance that PCE will exceed 2.5% in the coming 12 months. This likely coincides with some Phase I periods and some Phase II periods of the Fed Cycle. 50% to 70%: Strong inflation pressures, and a good chance of inflation overshooting the Fed's target. Most likely coincides with Phase II or Phase III of the Fed Cycle. We indeed find that a "buy the dips" strategy is more effective when inflation pressures are lower (Table 1). A strategy of buying the junk index after spreads widen by at least 20 bps and holding it for three months produces positive excess returns 65% of the time when the St. Louis Fed Price Pressures Measure is between 0% and 15%. This same strategy works 59% of the time when the Price Pressures Measure is between 15% and 30%, 44% of the time when the Measure is between 30% and 50% and only 25% of the time when the Measure is between 50% and 70%. Table 1High-Yield Corporate Bond Returns* Achieved By Holding The Junk Index Following ##br##A 20 BPs Widening In High-Yield Corporate OAS** Under Different Ranges##br## Of The St. Louis Fed Price Pressure Measure*** (February 1994 To Present) With the Price Pressures Measure at only 19% currently, we advise investors to increase exposure to spread product on any near-term correction. Bottom Line: Any near-term correction in risk assets is likely to be fleeting. Investors should take the opportunity to increase credit exposure and maintain overweight spread product allocations on a 6-12 month horizon. Above-Trend Growth: Aided By Housing & Capex For the analysis of the Fed cycle performed above to be applicable, we must have confidence in the view that GDP will continue to grow at an above-trend pace. That is, growth must at least be strong enough to remove slack from the labor market and cause inflation to trend gradually higher. This has mostly been the case since measures of core inflation bottomed in early 2015 and we see no evidence at the moment to suggest it is about to change. In fact, measures of global growth most relevant for Treasury yields have hooked up strongly in recent months, and our model now suggests that fair value for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield is 2.54% (Chart 6). At the time of publication the 10-year yield was 2.40%. The fair value reading from our model moved higher during the past month even though PMIs in both the U.S. and Japan ticked down. This negative move was offset by an acceleration in Eurozone PMI and a decline in bullish sentiment toward the dollar (Chart 6, bottom two panels). Less bullish dollar sentiment is a signal that the global recovery is becoming more synchronized which means that U.S. Treasury yields must rise more quickly for a given level of global growth.4 Returning to the U.S. growth outlook specifically, a recent BCA Special Report 5 showed that cyclical spending as a percent of overall GDP is an excellent leading indicator of economic downturns (Chart 7). Cyclical spending has been relatively firm as a percent of GDP during the past couple of years, and would have been stronger if not for stagnant residential investment (Chart 7, panel 3) and contracting non-residential investment in equipment & software (Chart 7, bottom panel). However, leading indicators suggest that both of these factors should shift from being sources of disappointment to sources of strength in the coming months. Chart 610-Year Treasury Fair Value Model Chart 7Cyclical Spending Is Firm... Chart 8 shows the year-over-year change in each of the three cyclical components of GDP as a percent of overall growth alongside a reliable leading indicator. Consumer confidence suggests that consumer spending on durables will remain firm (Chart 8, panel 1). Our composite indicator of New Orders surveys also points to a rebound in nonresidential investment on equipment & software (Chart 8, panel 2). In prior reports we observed that nonresidential investment was held back by the 2014 oil price shock and should recover now that oil prices have found a floor.6 Also, any potential benefit from a more favorable tax and regulatory environment under the new federal government would only increase the upside for capex. Residential investment as a percent of GDP also rolled over last year, but homebuilder confidence has been trending sharply higher during the past few months (Chart 8, bottom panel). Home construction will be strong this year, despite the recent increase in mortgage rates. As was recently observed by our U.S. Investment Strategy service,7 the constraint on housing demand since the financial crisis has not come from un-affordable monthly mortgage payments. In fact, we calculate that even if mortgage rates rise by another 200 bps from current levels, the mortgage payment as a percent of income for the median household would still be below its long-run average (Chart 9). Chart 8...And Likely To Increase Chart 9Higher Rates Won't Kill Housing Rather, the constraint on housing demand has come from insufficient savings on the part of potential first time homebuyers relative to required down payments. This constraint can only subside as household savings increase and mortgage lending standards ease, two trends that are ongoing. Finally, housing supply is approaching historically low levels relative to demand (Chart 9, bottom panel) even including the "shadow inventory" from foreclosed properties which has now mostly vanished in any case. With supply at such depressed levels and demand likely to remain firm, it is no wonder that homebuilders are feeling more confident. Bottom Line: U.S. economic growth will remain solidly above-trend this year, helped along by renewed strength in both residential and non-residential investment. Above-trend growth will ensure that inflation remains in its current gradual uptrend. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was", dated March 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 A composite of 104 economic indicators designed to capture the probability of PCE inflation exceeding 2.5% during the subsequent 12 month period. https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2015/11/06/introducing-the-st-louis-fed-price-pressures-measure 4 A more detailed explanation of the inverse relationship between dollar sentiment and Treasury yields can be found in the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: Another Update", dated January 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see BCA Special Report, "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession", dated March 7, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Housing: What Comes Next?", dated March 27, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Internal dynamics warn that a broad market consolidation phase has begun. The jump in growth vs. value stocks has provided an opportunity to shift to a neutral style bias. Transports have sold off sharply, but downside risks have not yet been fully expunged, especially for the airline group. Recent Changes Growth Vs. Value - Shift to a neutral stance. Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Feature The perceived dovish Fed shift and doubts about the achievability of Trump's policy goals are causing equity market consternation. To the extent that the run up in stocks has largely reflected an improvement in sentiment and other 'soft' economic data, the lack of follow through in 'hard' data has created a validation void. While a weaker U.S. dollar, lower oil prices and less hawkish Fed imply easier monetary conditions, which are ultimately positive for growth, profits and the stock market, a digestion phase still looms. Financials, and banks in particular, had been market leaders, driven up by hopes for a meaningful upward shift in the yield curve and unleashing of animal spirits. But these assumptions are being challenged and there is limited fundamental support. Indeed, bank lending growth remains non-existent and there is no tailwind from improving credit quality. Our view remains that banks carry the most downside risk of all financial groups (please see the March 6 Weekly Report for more details). Regional banks are now down on a year-to-date relative performance basis (Chart 1). In fact, our newly constructed gauge of the equity market's internal dynamics suggests that additional tactical broad market turbulence lies ahead. A composite of relative bank stock, relative transport, small/large cap and industrials/utilities share prices has been a good coincident to leading market indicator in recent years (Chart 2). While no indicator is infallible, the message is that overall market risk is elevated and a choppy period lies ahead, reinforcing our defensive vs. cyclical bias. Nevertheless, it will be important to put any corrective action into a longer-term context. Over the years, we have kept an eye on several qualitative 'unconventional indicators' that have helped time major market turning points. They are meant to augment rather than replace fundamental factors. Chart 1Market Leaders Are Stumbling Chart 2A Yellow Flag From Internal Dynamics Below we highlight five critical variables to gauge whether a correction will devolve into a sustained sell-off. Each of the indicators measures either; profits; business confidence; investor confidence; and/or reflects how liquidity conditions are impacting market dynamics. Investor confidence can be measured through margin debt. While extremely elevated (Chart 3), there is no concrete sign that access to funds is being undermined by the modest backup in interest rates. When the cost of borrowing becomes too onerous, it will manifest in reduced margin debt and forced selling, which will be a serious threat to stocks given that leverage is challenging levels experienced at prior peaks, as a share of nominal income. M&A activity is losing momentum (Chart 4). A peak in merger activity typically coincides with a rising cost of capital. If corporate sector capital availability becomes a pressing issue, then M&A activity will decline further, signaling that the corporate sector is facing growth headwinds. Economic signals are mostly positive. Durable goods orders have tentatively perked back up (Chart 5), reinforcing that profits and confidence have improved after a soft patch. Temporary employment continues to rise (Chart 5). When temp workers shrink, it is often an early warning sign that companies are entering retrenchment mode, given the ease and low cost of reducing this source of labor costs. If temporary employment falls at the same time as share prices, that would be a red flag. The relative performance of consumer discretionary to consumer staples can provide a read on purchasing power and/or the marginal propensity to spend. This share price ratio does not suggest any consumption concerns exist (Chart 4, bottom panel). If consumer staples begin to outperform, then it would warn of a more daunting economic outlook. Chart 3Borrowing Costs Are Not Yet Restrictive Chart 4M&A Is Starting To Labor Chart 5Economic Signals Are Decent In all, these indicators suggest that any pullback will be corrective rather than a trend change. If the profit cycle continues to improve and the Fed has no inflationary need to become restrictive, then any broad market correction could provide an opportunity to selectively add cyclical exposure to portfolios in the coming weeks. In the meantime, we are revisiting our growth vs. value view and providing an update on transports. Growth Vs. Value: Shifting To Neutral Our last style bias update in the December 19 Weekly Report concluded that we would likely recommend moving to a neutral stance over the coming weeks/months from our current growth vs. value (G/V) stance, but expected to do after growth stocks had staged a comeback. That recovery is now well underway and so we are revisiting the outlook. Growth indexes have outperformed value since the depths of the Great Recession. The preference for growth reflected central bank interest rate suppression, which boosted the multiple investors were willing to pay for perceived growth at a time when growth was scarce. In addition, the composition of the growth index is much longer duration than that of the value space. The surge in long-term earnings growth expectations suggests that investors have increased conviction in the durability of the expansion, which has aided the G/V recovery (Chart 6). That monetary experiment has recently begun to pay off, as global economic growth has finally demonstrated evidence of self-reinforcing traction, led by developed countries. As a result, most central banks are well past the point of maximum thrust, which would mean the loss, albeit not a reversal, of the primary support for the secular advance in growth vs. value indexes. Keep in mind that growth benchmarks have a massive technology sector weight, at just over 1/3 of the total index capitalization. Value indices carry only a 7% weight. As shown in previous research, the technology sector underperforms when economic growth is fast enough to create inflationary pressure and therefore, the interest rate structure. Furthermore, value benchmarks have more than 25% of their weight in the financials sector vs. less than 5% for growth indexes. The upshot is that a meaningful interest rate increase would pad the profits of financials-rich value indices while having little to no impact on growth benchmarks by virtue of their tech-dependence. It is no surprise that the G/V ratio trends with technology/financials relative sector performance (Chart 7). The latter has clearly peaked, with an assist from the renormalization in Fed policy. Chart 6Time To Shift Chart 7Two Key Sector Influences These sector discrepancies mean that a critical question for the style decision is what is the path for government bond yields? The U.S. economy is exhibiting signs of self-reinforcing behavior. The small business sector's hiring plans have surged, and the ISM employment index remains solid (Chart 8). Chart 8Economy No Longer Favors Growth Chart 9A Mixed Bag While at least a modest employment slowdown is probable given that the corporate sector is feeling the profit margin pinch from higher wage costs, these gauges do not suggest a major crunch is imminent. The personal savings rate is drifting lower, supporting consumption growth (Chart 8). Value indexes have a higher economic beta than growth benchmarks, owing to their exposure to shorter duration sectors. The gap between growth and value operating margins tends to close when the economy enjoys a meaningful acceleration (Chart 8). Chart 10Volatility Is A Style Driver Other markers of global economic growth are more mixed. The global manufacturing PMI survey is very strong, but oil and other commodity prices have started to diverge negatively (Chart 9). That may soon change if the U.S. dollar has crested, which would provide a much needed fillip to emerging markets and remove a source of deflationary pressure. Real global bond yields are grinding higher, suggesting that in all, economic prospects have improved, and alleviating a major constraint on value stocks. Against this backdrop, it is timely to shift to a neutral style preference after the sharp rebound in the G/V ratio since late last year. Why not a full shift into value indexes? Developing countries are conspicuously lagging developed countries, which caps the outlook for commodities and their beneficiaries. EM capital spending is still very weak in real terms. Deep cyclical sectors are much more heavily-weighted in value benchmarks. A global recovery that has a greater thrust from consumption than investment, at least at the outset, argues against expecting value stocks to outperform. Moreover, the fallout from potentially protectionist U.S. trade policies remains unknown, which could restrain economic growth momentum and unleash volatility in the equity markets. The latter has been incredibly muted in recent months. In fact, BCA's VIX model, which incorporates corporate sector health and interest rate expectations, is heralding a higher VIX. Clearly, elevated volatility has supported the G/V ratio over meaningful periods of time (Chart 10). Bottom Line: Shift to a neutral style bias. A full shift to a value preference would require BCA to forecast a much weaker U.S. dollar and/or demand-driven inflationary pressure. Transports: Stuck In Neutral The S&P transports index peaked in mid-December versus the broad market, the first major sub-group to fizzle after the post-election sugar high (Chart 11). The recent setback has been broad-based. We had been overweight both the rails and air freight & logistics industry sub-groups, but booked gains in both prior to their respective pullbacks. Is it time to get back in? Transportation equities are ultra-sensitive to swings in global economic growth. Chart 12 shows that the relative share price ratio is an excellent leading indicator of both the ISM manufacturing survey and Citi's economic surprise index. The message is that at least a mild mean reversion in both of these indexes looms in the coming months, i.e. beware of some form of economic cooling. Chart 11Transports Have Cracked... Chart 12... Signaling Economic Cooling Ahead Against this backdrop, we are revisiting our last remaining underweight, the S&P airlines index. While rails and air freight & logistics stocks are directly linked to global trade, the same does not hold true for the S&P airlines index. Business and consumer travel budgets are the key drivers of industry demand. A revival in animal spirits and a healthy U.S. consumer could be clear positives for air travel. Moreover, the recent pullback in fuel costs should cushion profit margins for unhedged airline operators (Chart 13). Finally, renowned investor Warren Buffett has recently become a major shareholder in the U.S. airline industry, raising its profile. While betting against Buffett is always fraught with risk, our cautious take on the airline industry boils down to our view that excess capacity will continue to hold back profitability. If the overall transport index is accurately signaling that some loss of economic momentum looms, then a rapid expansion in business and travel spending may not be quick to materialize. A pricing war has already gripped the industry, as airlines are scrambling to fill up planes. Revenue-per-available-seat-mile and U.S. CPI airfare are contracting (Chart 14), reflecting a fight for market share. That is a serious impediment to profit margins. Chart 13Airlines Are Losing Altitude... Chart 14... As Price Wars Persist The headwinds extend beyond the U.S. Chart 15 shows that global airfare deflation also bodes ill for top line industry growth. The lags from previous U.S. dollar strength could compound this source of drag. Absent a decisive recovery in total travel spending, there does not appear to be any catalysts to reverse deflationary conditions. Carriers are still allocating an historically high portion of cash flow to capital spending. While upgrading aging fleets to become more fuel-efficient in an era of low interest rates is a long-term positive, the payback period may be extended. Revenue has failed to keep up with the increase in capital expenditures (Chart 16, bottom panel), suggesting that capacity growth continues to outpace industry demand, a recipe for ongoing pricing pressure. Chart 15Deflation Is Global Chart 16Too Much Capacity This difficult backdrop has begun to infect analyst earnings estimates. Net earnings revisions have nosedived. Relative performance momentum is tightly lined with the trend in earnings estimates (Chart 16). The message is that the breakdown in cyclical momentum has further to run. Indeed, the 52-week rate of change rarely troughs until it reaches much lower levels, warning of additional downside relative performance risks. Bottom Line: The S&P transports group is heralding a period of economic cooling, but the airline sub-component has not yet fully discounted such an outcome. Stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P airlines index are: UAL, AAL, DAL, LUV & ALK. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.
Special Report Highlights A gradual rise in interest rates will not be problematic for the housing market. Throughout the cycle, it has been potential homebuyers' lack of savings, and tougher lending standards, that has held back the housing expansion. A steady improvement in household balance sheets is now allowing more households to qualify for loans. We assign low odds that housing policy reform will have a direct impact on the market over the next year; macroeconomic forces will be the primary driver for residential real estate activity and prices. Feature Since 2013, the U.S. housing market has enjoyed a relative period of calm after the bubble (2004-2007), bust (2008-2011) and prolonged clean-up period (2011-2014). Indeed, since 2013, the residential real estate market has made steady gains both in terms of construction and price returns. Rock-bottom interest rates, an improving labor market, and tight supply have provided good conditions for the housing market to expand. But these conditions are changing. Both residential investment and home prices are procyclical and highly sensitive to interest rates. With the Fed now beginning to deliberate its fourth rate hike of the cycle, investors should wonder whether this poses a risk to housing. Meanwhile, there is much talk about tax reform from Washington. This Special Report focuses on the top questions relating to the U.S. housing market. Question #1: Won't rising mortgage rates kill the nascent recovery in mortgage activity? Throughout this expansion, the level of interest rates has not been the major hurdle to the housing recovery; it was a lack of savings and tighter credit conditions that kept potential homebuyers out of the market. Table 1 is a breakdown of the National Association of Realtors' Affordability of First-time Homebuyers. The median price of a starter home is currently $199,800 and the qualifying income on such a home (assuming 10% down payment) is $42,000. Since the median family income is currently $46,040, this implies that at today's interest rates, potential first-time homebuyers do have the required income to enter the housing market. Earlier in the recovery, the problem had been the 10% down payment. According to the Federal Reserve's triennial survey of Consumer finances in 2014, median net worth for non-homeowners (i.e. renters) was $5,400, i.e. far short of the down payment required. A meaningful rise in the homeownership rate was always going to be difficult to pull off until consumers built sufficient savings for a down payment and/or mortgage lending standards loosened significantly. Table 1Potential Homebuyers: Savings A Bigger Hurdle Than Rates We do not have up-to-date median renter savings data (the next Federal Reserve survey of consumer finances will only be published in September), but the savings rate has risen over the past several years. It is likely that an improvement in renter finances is alleviating the major hurdle that exists for potential home buyers. Outside of the down payment issue, housing affordability is very good even under an aggressive interest rate scenario. In Chart 1, we stress-test housing affordability under different rate scenarios. Even if mortgage rates rise by 200bps, mortgage payments relative to income will remain well below their long-term average. The bottom line is that we do not see a rise in interest rates as overly problematic for the housing market. Throughout the cycle, it has been potential homebuyers' lack of savings, and tougher lending standards that have held back the expansion. A steady improvement in household balance sheets is now allowing more households to qualify for loans. Question #2: And how are lending standards today? Historically, lending standards always swung between very tight at the beginning of an economic cycle and very loose at the height of the expansion. This time, it appears that banks have kept a more cautious attitude toward consumers relative to past cycles (Chart 2). This shouldn't be a surprise, given that this was the area of greatest excesses during the past business cycle. Chart 1Higher Rates Won't Kill ##br##The Housing Recovery Chart 2Improved Household Balance Sheets Mean ##br##More Qualifying Borrowers As mentioned above, consumers' balance sheets have largely been mended over the course of this cycle. In fact, the average U.S. FICO score is now at an all-time high. This is great news, although still perhaps not great enough for banks. According to Deutsche Bank, the average credit score required is 750, and this number has not changed much since 2007. The average FICO score for the total U.S. population is still considerably below this. However, as scores improve, over time more and more people are qualifying. Overall, while it appears that banks have not drastically changed lending standards, more prospective buyers are meeting the criteria. Question #3: Is there still a supply glut? No- as Chart 3 shows, on a national basis, traditional measures of housing inventory for sale are near-record lows. Of course, geography is very important for real estate and some markets are tighter than others, but aggregate data does not show any meaningful imbalances. If anything, a catch-up building phase may be required in some areas. Question #4: How will Trump affect the housing market? We do not anticipate that any direct policy measures will impact the housing market in 2017. If interest rates rise over the next year because the Fed believes that monetary policy needs to tighten in the face of expansive fiscal policy, then this will surely provide a mild brake on lending activity. We address the impact of higher rates in Question #1. As for direct policy measures, perhaps the most impactful one would be a change to the mortgage interest deduction. Recall that U.S. taxpayers currently can deduct the interest expense on their mortgage to reduce their taxable income. Trump had previously floated the idea to adjust the cap on the amount of eligible debt (currently at $1 million for married couple jointly filing taxes). But earlier this month, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin dismissed this idea. Tax cuts or broader tax reform are unlikely to pass until the second half of the year at earliest. Until the legislation is written it is impossible to know what aspects of the Trump or House GOP proposals will be included. Similarly, Mnuchin has voiced that he is keen to privatize the GSEs. But that is unlikely to occur this year and the implications of such a development are unclear. The bottom line is that we assign low odds that housing policy reform will have a direct impact on the market over the next year; macroeconomic forces will be the primary driver for residential real estate activity and prices. Question #5: How much will residential real estate contribute to GDP? Residential investment currently stands at 4% of GDP (Chart 4). This is way above the low reached in 2009, but is still short of the pre-recession high of 6% of GDP and is still significantly shy of the thirty year average of 5%. Based on the still low level of inventories, and the potential for household formation to rise, a reasonable expectation is that construction climbs back to 5% of GDP over the next several years. If that occurs, then the contribution to GDP growth from construction should rise toward 0.8% this year and stay at a high level. Chart 3Inventory Is Tight Chart 4Construction Will Be A More Significant GDP Contributor Question #6: 4% of GDP is pretty small. How else does the housing market contribute to growth? The housing market affects the economy through multiple channels; even a casual observer of the 2008/09 meltdown can attest to that! Besides the banking system, it is especially homeownership that affects consumer spending patterns. First, the overall wealth effect - the change in spending that accompanies a change in perceived wealth - is driven primarily by the change in the value of housing assets, rather than financial assets (Chart 5). On average, a one-dollar decline in housing wealth tends to reduce consumption by 12 cents. This is two-to-four times as large as the impact on consumption from a one-dollar increase in housing wealth, and much larger than the impact from a one-dollar decline in stock market wealth.1 Second, homeownership impacts spending decisions through the collateral effect. Real consumption and real debt growth have been strongly correlated since 1960. As the top panel of Chart 5 shows, greater credit availability for households has been associated with lower saving rates -and thus higher consumption (this process went into reverse during the GFC).2 Since homeownership is the most significant means for households in the U.S. to access credit (over 80% of household debt is held as mortgage debt), it is really the trend in homeownership and its accompanying mortgage debt that drives the changes in household debt positions, and therefore their ability to boost spending above incomes. Now that there are reasons for the homeownership rate to rise, this wealth effect could play a larger role than during the past few years. Question #7: And how much will prices rise? The U.S. housing recovery has closely followed the classic cycle - our stylized roadmap based on the experience of countries that previously recovered from a housing/financial crisis (Chart 6). If the path of home prices continues to follow this roadmap, then real home price appreciation will be around 4% in 2017 (6% in nominal terms). Chart 5Homeownership = Leverage Chart 6More Price Gains Ahead Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Case, Quigley and Shiller. "Wealth Effects Revisited". February, 2011. 2 The Fed has done extensive work on this topic. A comprehensive background piece is available here: http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2007/PDF/Muellbauer_0415.pdf
Highlights Beyond the healthcare vote and its implication for Trump's fiscal stimulus, other risks lurk in the background. Market complacency is at historical extremes but Chinese reflation is rapidly dissipating. The euro could benefit in this environment, especially as markets price in a Macron victory. Longer-term, the euro remains hampered by its two-speed recovery, which will limit the capacity of the ECB to lift rates. Stay long EUR/AUD, short USD/JPY and NZD/JPY. Feature The dollar correction continues. The recent wave of dollar weakness has been dubbed a reversal of the "Trump trade". There is some truth to this. The difficulty President Trump and House Speaker Ryan are facing to pass the American Health Care Act (their replacement for Obamacare) is raising questions about how much tax cuts and infrastructure spending Trump will actually be able to implement. Even if the House votes in favor of the new bill (which is still an unknown at the time of writing), the Senate remains a question mark. So the narrative goes, if the Trump stimulus is at risk, the economy will be weaker, the Fed will not hike interest rates as much as anticipated, and the dollar will falter. While there is validity to this thesis, we think the picture is more nuanced. The potential for less fiscal stimulus in the U.S. is a real worry, but our main concern is that the global industrial sector's growth improvement does not continue the way investors expect. In this environment, the dollar is likely to perform poorly against European currencies and the yen, but hold its own against EM and commodity currencies. We are positioned for such a development. These trends would be reminiscent of the kind of dollar dynamics that emerged in late 2015 / early 2016. Chinese Reflation Matters Too! What underpins our thesis? As our sister service, Global Alpha Sector Strategy, has highlighted in this week's report, the Yale Crash Confidence index has hit 100%, indicating that all of the respondents surveyed expect the stock market to go up in 2017. Moreover, the Minneapolis Fed's market-based implied probability of a 20% or more selloff in the S&P 500 has fallen below 10%, the lowest level since 2007.1 With this high degree of complacency, a rollover in the global economic surprise index represents a major risk for the asset most levered to the global industrial sector (Chart I-1). To us, the key behind the 2016 rebound in global industrial activity was China. While Chinese growth is not about to experience a sharp slowdown, it is unlikely to improve further. To begin with, Chinese monetary conditions are already rolling over (Chart I-2). The big improvement in this indicator in 2016 was the crucial ingredient behind the rebound in global trade, global industrial activity, and all the assets levered to these phenomena. Chart I-1Surprises Are Not ##br##Growing Anymore Chart I-2Chinese Monetary Conditions ##br##Are Tightening We are seeing tentative signs of a mini liquidity crunch emerging in the Chinese interbank system. Seven-day repo rates, a key benchmark for Chinese lending terms, have surged from 3.8% at the end of last week to 5.5% on Tuesday, before settling at 5%, the highest level in two and a half years (Chart I-3). By allowing this volatility, policymakers are most likely sending a warning shot to the Chinese real estate sector, which has been a key driver of Chinese metal demand in 2016. This sector alone accounts for 20% and 32% of global refined copper and steel consumption, respectively. Also, as we have highlighted previously, fiscal stimulus was another key factor behind the floor put under Chinese industrial production and fixed asset investment last year. However, Chinese fiscal spending peaked at a 25% yoy growth rate in November 2015 and is now near 0%. This suggests that a key source of stimulus in China has been removed. It is true that Chinese fiscal stimulus is heavily conducted through credit policy. In this context, the recent rise in Chinese borrowing rates does indicate that the Chinese authorities are not intent in jacking up growth anymore. The reduced growth target for this year is a clear re-affirmation of this change in focus. We are seeing signs that these adjustments are starting to bite. The growth rate of new capex projects started has rolled over and is now flirting with the zero line. As Chart I-4 highlights, this indicator provided a very positive signal for the AUD last year and is now forewarning potential risks. Chart I-3Is The PBoC Sending A Message##br## To The Real Estate Industry? Chart I-4Big Risk For##br## The AUD Additionally, the Canadian venture exchange, an index of high risk, small-cap Canadian equities has historically displayed a tight correlation with Chinese GDP growth (Chart I-5). This market is experiencing a negative divergence between its MACD and prices, potentially an early sign that investors are beginning to worry about China. Risk assets globally are not ready for these developments. In fact, EM spreads are hovering near cycle lows, junk spreads are extremely narrow, the VIX is also near cycle lows, and our global complacency indicator suggests that investors are not ready for negative Chinese surprises (Chart I-6). Not only would a negative surprise out of China cause a repricing of all these factors, but periods of market stress - even shallow stress - are associated with rising correlation among assets and among individual equities. The low level of correlation among S&P 500 constituents has been an important factor behind the fall in the VIX and the rise in margin debt. A rise in risk aversion could get turbo-charged by a rectification of these low correlations, prompting a temporary wave of debt liquidation (Chart I-7). Chart I-5A Key China Gauge Is Losing Momentum Chart I-6Complacency Abounds Chart I-7Correlation Risk In this environment, U.S. stocks could easily correct by 5% to 10%. EM stocks may have even more downside as they are more directly exposed to the biggest risk factor: China. From a currency market perspective, this means that defensive currencies could outperform pro-cyclical ones. This is why we remain long the USD against a basket of commodity currencies, but short against the yen - the most countercyclical currency of all. We also are long the euro against the AUD. These views make our publication more cautious about the near-term outlook than BCA's house view. Bottom Line: Risks beyond the outlook for tax cuts in the U.S. lurk in the background. The Chinese authorities have moved away from stimulating the economy, and some early cracks are showing. A collapse is not in the cards, but given the high degree of complacency present across markets, a disappointment in a supposedly perfect environment would create a headwind for EM and commodity currencies but boost the defensive EUR and JPY. Why Long EUR/AUD Tactically? While the negative view on the AUD fits cleanly in the narrative described above, our motivation to be long the euro is more multifaceted: The euro area has negative nominal interest rates and a current-account surplus of 3.3% of GDP, meaning it exhibits key characteristics of a funding currency. In a risk-off event where unforeseen FX market volatility rises, funding currencies perform well. We expect a further normalization of the French OAT / German bunds spread as we get closer to the French election. Macron is beating Le Pen by more than 20% in second-round polling (Chart I-8). This gap is five times greater than the advantage Clinton held over Trump at a similar point in the U.S. presidential campaign. As we argued in a joint Special Report co-published with our Geopolitical Strategy team seven weeks ago, this kind of advantage is highly unlikely to be overcome by May 7. Thus, the euro area break-up risk premium can narrow between now and then.2 Finally, the number of investors expecting rising short and long rates has bottomed in Europe relative to the U.S. Historically, this indicator has provided valuable lead on EUR/USD. It is currently painting a tactically bullish story for the euro (Chart I-9). Moreover, in the event of market stress, with investors pricing in two more rate hikes by year end in the U.S., but none in Europe, the scope for temporary downward revisions in the U.S. is higher than in Europe. This could put more upward pressure on this indicator and therefore, the euro. Chart I-8Macron: En Marche! Chart I-9Short-Term Euro Upside Together, these factors suggest that the euro could rebound toward 1.12 before the middle of 2017. Again, our favored currency to play this move is against the AUD. EUR/USD: Short-Term Gain But Long-Term Pain Chart I-10Monetary Policy Is The ##br##Common Shock In Europe What about the longer term dynamics for the euro? We are more skeptical of the common currency's ability to rally durably, and we are expecting the euro to fall below parity by mid-2018. Based on our months-to-hike indicator, the market expects the ECB to hike by the fall of 2018. We disagree and think the first hike could come much later. While the economic rebound in Europe is real, it seems to be very dependent on the high degree of easing that has been put in place by the ECB. As Chart I-10 illustrates, the credit impulse - a measure underpinning domestic economic activity - and the euro have moved very closely together. While we do not imply that the credit impulse's rebound has reflected the fall in the euro, their tight co-movement has been driven by a similar factor: easy money. Thus, a removal of that easy money could prompt a reversal of that domestic improvement. Even more crucially, the conditions in the periphery are what really matters to the ECB. At the beginning of the millennium, the ECB was acting as Germany's central bank, keeping rates too low for the periphery, but alleviating Germany's deflationary tendencies. Today, the ECB behaves as the periphery's central bank. Germany seems ready to handle higher interest rates, but the same is not true for most other European countries. To begin with, even within the core, wage dynamics remain tepid. French and Dutch wages continue to slow while Austrian wage growth has collapsed near 0% (Chart I-11A). If the situation is poor in most core countries, it is dismal in the periphery. Wages are still contracting in Greece and Portugal, and growing at a sub 1% pace in Spain and Italy (Chart I-11B). These differentiated wage trends reflect the fact that worker shortages in the periphery are simply inexistent, while in Germany, they are commonplace (Chart I-12). Chart I-11AOnly Germany Is Witnessing##br## Strong Wages... Chart I-11BOnly Germany Is Witnessing ##br##Strong Wages... Chart I-12...Because Germany Has The##br## Tightest Labor Market.... As a result, the dynamics in core inflation remain muted. German core inflation has been extremely stable near 1% for six years now, but is hitting record lows levels of 0.3% in France (Chart I-13A and Chart I-13B). Core inflation also remains near 0% in most peripheral nations. Chart I-13A...Explaining Europe's Bifurcated Core Inflations Chart I-13B...Explaining Europe's Bifurcated Core Inflations When the Fed first increased rates in 2015, U.S. wages were growing at 2%. This is a far cry from current levels in Europe. Moreover, the first U.S. rate hike was a mistake considering the subsequent deceleration in growth and poor performance of risk assets. Thus, the Fed experience is probably not an example for the ECB to emulate. Moreover, rising interest rates represent a risk for debt servicing ratios in many European countries, limiting the ECB's ability to hike if nominal growth does not pick up further. The Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, and France rank amongst the countries with the highest private-sector debt servicing costs as a percent of income. Meanwhile Italy and Portugal score extremely poorly when this metric is applied to the public sector (Chart I-14). The Italian and Portuguese cases are especially worrisome as rising stress caused by rising rates will further lift government rates. An argument has also been made that for the ECB, what matters is the headline rate of inflation. We would argue that since Draghi became the leader, this inflation measure is less relevant. But nonetheless, let's temporarily entertain this premise. It has also been argued that if European and U.S. statistical agencies treated housing similarly, inflation on both sides of the Atlantic would be the same. As Chart I-15 illustrates, this is no longer true. Chart I-14Debt Service Payments Are ##br## A Problem In Europe Chart I-15European Inflation Is Lower, ##br##No Matter What This line of reasoning also forgets that since 2014, the U.S. has endured a 22% appreciation in the trade-weighted dollar, which could have already curtailed nearly 1% to U.S. GDP growth, a significant amount of monetary tightening. However, the euro has greatly depreciated over this time frame, representing a large monetary easing. Due to these highly divergent monetary backdrops, one can deduce that endogenous inflationary pressures are much greater in the U.S. than in the euro area. All these factors suggest that it will be hard for the ECB to increase rates by the end of 2018. Thus, on a cyclical basis we would fade this recent massive fall in the ECB's months-to-hike metric (Chart I-16). On the U.S. ledger, the labor market is clearly tightening and the U6 unemployment rate is now congruent with levels where wages have gained traction in previous cycles (Chart I-17). This suggests that the market is correct to expect the Fed to hike much more aggressively in the coming years. In fact, while the near future might be filled with political complexity, we continue to expect fiscal stimulus to materialize in the U.S by 2018, suggesting upside risk to the Fed's forecast. Chart I-16Too Soon! Chart I-17The U.S. Labor Market Is Tight Finally, equilibrium real rates in Europe are probably substantially lower than in the U.S. Not only have European interest rates been historically lower than in the U.S., but also, slower population growth alone would justify lower neutral rates. This highlights that the scope for the ECB to hike is limited compared to the Fed. These bifurcated monetary dynamics will continue to support the USD on a 12-18 months basis, and as a corollary, hurt the euro despite its apparent cheapness on a PPP basis. Bottom Line: The months-to-hike in the euro area has fallen to less than 20 months. While Germany could handle higher rates, poor wage and core inflation dynamics in the rest of the euro area suggest it is still much too early to increase rates. Moreover, without a more significant pick-up in growth, many European nations will face dire debt-servicing situations if the ECB hikes rates durably. Meanwhile, the U.S. is moving closer to full employment, a situation warranting higher rates. The euro could fall below parity by mid-2018. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Caveat Emptor" dated March 24, 2017 available at gss.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution" dated February 3, 2017 available at fes.bcaresearch.com and gps.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 March weakness has been because of a mix of monetary and fiscal disappointments. The Fed's "unhike" initiated the downtrend as markets were surprised by the dovish tone of the Fed's communications. Now, President Trump and his team are facing difficulties passing the American Health Care Act. Markets are extrapolating this difficulty to the realm of fiscal policy in general. Nevertheless, it is unlikely for the DXY to breach the 98-99 support level this month. The stronger current account number of USD -112.4 billion was supported by high foreign income, suggesting a key warning sign for the USD cyclical bull market is not present. Stronger new home sales monthly growth of 6.1% highlights that domestic economic activity remains robust, meaning the Fed is unlikely to disappoint over the life of the business cycle. Report Links: USD, Oil Divergences Will Continue As Storage Draws - March 17, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Political risks have been exaggerated in Europe, with the Dutch and Austrian elections confirming that populist successes in Europe are overstated. As such, the French election will likely be market-bullish with a Le Pen defeat. This entails a further normalization of OAT / Bund spreads, and a short-term bullish outlook for the euro, which is likely to settle above 1.10. Corroborating this view, the MACD is currently above 0 and outpacing the signal line, a bullish development. Inflationary pressures are building up in Europe with German PPI at 3.1% annually in February. However, outside Germany, even the core, let alone the periphery, seems to be struggling, with poor wage growth. The ECB will therefore need to stay easy for longer to protect the euro area's weakest members, capping the long-term upside to rates and the euro. Report Links: Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 The French Revolution - February 3, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 The yen has continued to rally, with USD/JPY trading below 111 over the last couple of days. We continue to be bullish on the yen on a tactical basis, as we believe that the global industrial sector will fall short of investors' expectations. This is an environment where the dollar will probably appreciate against EM currencies, but falter against the yen. On a cyclical basis we remain yen-bearish, as U.S. rates should continue to go up, while Japanese rates will continue to be anchored around 0%. The Bank of Japan will continue with this policy, as the depreciation of the yen has given a boost to exports, which are now growing at 11.3% on a yearly basis, as well as to the economy as a whole, which should yield higher inflation expectations over time. Report Links: Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 JPY: Climbing To The Springboard Before The Dive - February 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 The British pound rallied on Tuesday following the unexpected surge in headline inflation in February from 1.8% to 2.3%. This number is significant, because inflation has broken through the BoE's target. The central bank remains cautious, as the MPC pointed out that the rise in inflation is not domestic, but rather a reflection of the fall in the pound. However, we believe that internal inflationary pressures might start to emerge: the U.K. economy is doing much better than expected and the labor market is tight. Recent data highlights this, and opens the possibility that the pound could rally, particularly against the euro: Retail sales growth and retail sales ex fuel growth came in at 3.7% and 4.1% respectively, outperforming expectations. The CBI Distributive Trades Survey monthly growth also beat expectations, coming in at 9%. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 As mentioned last week, the AUD's strength was a temporary feat. Before declining, the Aussie was initially lifted by high house price growth of 7.7% annually for 4Q2016, really surpassing expectations. The RBA minutes highlighted a need for the current monetary policy to remain very accommodative: labor market conditions remain mixed, household perceptions of personal finances is at average levels, wage growth remains subdued, and inflation is expected to rise only slowly. The outlook for the AUD is therefore likely to remain poor. Corroborating this view is a contracting Westpac Leading Index number of -0.1% that may be foretelling weak data. Report Links: AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Yesterday, the RBNZ kept its policy rate unchanged at 1.75%. Governor Graeme Wheeler once again asserted that the kiwi remains overvalued, although he welcomed the recent depreciation of the trade-weighted kiwi. More depreciation might be in the cards, particularly against the U.S. dollar and the yen. Global FX Vol stands at very low levels, thus any uptick could severely hamper the NZD, a carry currency. Furthermore, the tightening in Chinese monetary conditions will likely weigh on commodity currencies. Nonetheless, the NZD could perform well against the AUD as domestic inflationary pressures in Australia are much weaker than in New Zealand. Additionally, the tightening in Chinese monetary conditions should be more harmful for the AUD, given that iron is more sensitive to economic activity than dairy products. Report Links: Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The oil-based currency has sustained the recent oil shocks well, helped by the USD's weakness. Indeed, Canadian data has generally been positive: Manufacturing shipments increased 0.6% monthly in January, much above the expected -0.4%; Wholesale sales increased 3.3% in January on a monthly basis; Monthly retail sales picked up to 2.2% and 1.7% when autos are excluded; The 2017 government budget marginally loosened fiscal policy. As the greenback is likely to display further downside, the short-term outlook for USD/CAD is negative. This is corroborated by the negatively trending MACD line. However, Governor Poloz is likely to maintain a dovish tilt relative to the Fed, signifying longer-term CAD weakness. Report Links: AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Following the surge in the Euro, EUR/CHF has moved back to 1.07. This has eased some pressure off the SNB, which was active in the foreign exchange market to preserve the floor in this cross. The early returns of this policy seem positive, as data is showing a gradual recovery in Switzerland: The SNB's trimmed mean core inflation measure (TM15) is now in positive territory and continues to rise. Swiss PMI has surged so far this year, and now stands at the highest level since 2011. So far these improvements are not enough to prompt a change in policy by the SNB, as inflation needs to be sustained at a higher level and corroborated by wages. Nevertheless, we will continue to monitor economic developments in Switzerland to assess whether the SNB could remove its floor under EUR/CHF. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK has been relatively flat this week, as the sharp decline in oil has been offset by a downturn in the U.S. dollar. The outlook for the krone remains poor though, as the economy is weak, and inflation is falling quickly. Recent data illustrates this: After a gradual slowdown, non-financial business credit is now heading into outright contraction. Employment is contracting at a 1% rate, while wages are contracting at a 4% pace. Core inflation has plunged to 1.5% from its peak of 4% around 6 months ago. This poor economic outlook leads us to believe that the dovish bias of the Norges Bank will stay entrenched for the time being, putting downward pressure on the krone. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Inflationary pressures continue to emerge in Sweden. We believe these pressures are likely to pick up further. USD/SEK has broken down below a key trend line that has underpinned its rally since May 2016, suggesting that as the euro continues to rebound, the SEK will also outperform the USD. However, it remains to be seen if the SEK can outperform the euro: while the SEK tends to be more sensitive to the dollar's weakness than the euro, the Riksbank is likely to want to make sure that the early signs of inflation in Sweden do indeed generate a durable way out of any deflationary tendencies in this economy. This means that the Swedish central bank is likely to try to weigh on any strength in the SEK, especially against the euro. However, as inflation is indeed coming back, the Riksbank will likely be forced to abandon its super-dovish stance later this year. The SEK will ultimately rally further against the euro on a 12-18 months basis. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Special Report The aim of this Special Report is to elaborate on and explain the different views on China that have coexisted at BCA in recent years. Although BCA strives to achieve consensus among its strategists, this is not always possible, as has been the case with China. Peter Berezin of the Global Investment Strategy service and Yan Wang of China Investment Strategy have been positive, while Arthur Budaghyan of Emerging Markets Strategy has been negative on both China's business cycle and China-related plays. The focal points of divergence are centered on how Peter, Yan, and Arthur view and explain the relationship between savings, debt, and the misallocation of capital, as well as how they see China's potential roadmap going forward. The debate is moderated by BCA Global Strategist Caroline Miller. Caroline: Peter and Yan, the world - including the Chinese government - is climbing a wall of worry about China's debt load. Why are you guys still smiling? How many Maotai did you have last night? Peter: I don't know what a Maotai is, but I am sure that if I had more than one I wouldn't be smiling this morning. But yes, I am not as worried as Arthur that China is in the midst of an unsustainable credit bubble. Genuine credit bubbles tend to happen during periods of euphoria. U.S., Spanish, and Irish banks all traded at lofty multiples to book value on the eve of the financial crisis, having massively outperformed their respective indices in the preceding years. That's obviously not the case for Chinese banks today, which remain one of the most loathed sectors in the global equity market (Chart 1). The U.S., Spanish, and Irish housing booms also occurred alongside ballooning current account deficits, something that doesn't apply to China (Chart 2). One can debate whether China is in the midst of a property bubble, but even if it is, it looks a lot more like the one Hong Kong experienced in the late 1990s. When that bubble burst, property prices plummeted by 70%. Yet, Hong Kong banks were barely affected (Chart 3). Chart 1Chinese Banks: Unloved And Unwanted Chart 2Recent Credit Bubbles Developed ##br##Amid Widening Current Account Deficits Chart 3Hong Kong Is The Correct Analogy Yes, there is a lot of debt in China. But there is a lot of savings too. In fact, to a large extent, China's high debt levels are just a function of its high saving rate. The evidence suggests that national saving rates and debt-to-GDP ratios are positively correlated across emerging economies (Chart 4). China sits close to the trend line, implying that its debt stock is roughly what you would expect it to be. Chart 4Positive Correlation Between National Savings And Indebtedness Arthur: Allow me to both agree and disagree with Peter. No, there is no bubble in Chinese equities, but yes, there is a bubble and euphoria in China's property market. Property prices have risen exponentially and are extremely high by any metric. Chinese bank equity valuations have already adjusted, but bank stocks could still sell off if their profits shrink considerably, as I expect. Bank shares are not expensive, but not cheap either, if one adjusts for non-performing loans. I concur that China's property market adjustment will likely resemble that of Hong Kong as opposed to that of the U.S. As Peter noted, in Hong Kong in the late 1990s, property prices plunged by 70%, but few homeowners defaulted on their mortgages. Yet property starts/construction also collapsed by 80% (Chart 5). Chart 5Hong Kong's Property: ##br##Few Mortgage Defaults ##br##But Collapse In Construction Presently in China, the risk is not mortgage defaults but a renewed drop in property construction as well as other types of capital spending. Less construction/capital spending entails less demand for commodities, materials/chemicals and industrial goods. China's residential and non-residential construction activity will contract anew as speculative/investment demand for property weakens. Yan: I agree with Peter that China's rising debt is fundamentally a function of the country's abundant savings. Moreover, the fact that the country's massive savings pool is primarily intermediated via the banking sector and other debt instruments exacerbates the debt buildup. If a country's savings are primarily intermediated by the stock market through equity financing, then high savings do not necessarily lead to high debt, as "savers" become "shareholders" rather than "creditors." In China's case, the country's still relatively undeveloped and volatile equity market has not yet been able to play a meaningful role in financial intermediation. Instead, banks still play a dominant role channeling financial resources. In other words, China's high savings and a banking-centric financial intermediation system are key drivers of the ever-rising debt level. In fact, as long as these two features persist, the country's debt will inevitably continue to rise, as it simply reflects the accumulated savings. Caroline: Arthur, does this line up with how you think about the relationship between savings and debt? Arthur: My thesis has been that China's abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative, euphoric behavior among Chinese banks and the shadow banking system - and not the natural result of the country's "excess savings," as Peter and Yan have argued. What economists call "savings" or "excess savings," non-economists refer to as "overproduction" or "excess capacity." This is about concepts, not about China. In economic science, the term "savings" is used to denote the number of goods and services that a nation has produced but not consumed - i.e., they can be used for investment or exports. Peter and Yan are using this textbook definition of "savings." Hence, by "savings" or "excess savings" they mean "excess production." Logically, the glut of goods and services does not flow to banks and create deposits. In brief, "savings" or "excess savings" are real economic variables and have nothing to do with bank deposits - i.e., "monetary savings." Peter, Yan and many other commentators make this mistake by mixing up national savings - which is literally output of goods and services that were not consumed by households and government - with "monetary savings," i.e., deposits in the banking system. I have no doubt China has had a high savings rate, i.e., it has had overcapacity and over-production in a number of sectors. The textbook concept of national savings is calculated as a residual from the national accounts and balance of payments. In particular: Savings - Investments = Current Account Balance and Savings = Investments + Current Account Balance A few remarks on the economic interpretation of this equation are in order. First, in any country, "excess" national savings over investment, i.e., current account surpluses, lead to an accumulation of net foreign assets, but has no implication on domestic loan creation.1 Second, a country that invests a lot and does not run a large current account deficit will have a high savings rate as per the economic textbook's definition of national savings. The opposite also holds true. Critically, national or household savings are in no way linked to the amount of deposits at banks. When households decide to save a part of their income, they do not create new deposits or "monetary savings." They save deposits that already exist in the banking system. To sum up, the amount of deposits in the banking system does not change as a result of households' decision to save a part of their income. When a person gets paid in cash and deposits that cash in a bank as a savings deposit, there is no new money created either. That cash was a deposit and was withdrawn from a bank a few days before, and now this cash returns to the banking system as a deposit again. In this case, the amount of total outstanding money supply in the economy (cash plus deposits) has not changed. In general, when a bank receives a deposit, it does not create new money, or "monetary savings." The deposit simply moves from one bank to another or from cash to deposit. The amount of money supply does not change. When a country enjoys a lot of overcapacity, strong bank loans or money growth will not cause inflation and interest rates will stay low, encouraging more borrowing. This is why in Peter's Chart 4 there is a positive correlation between the national savings rate and debt-to-GDP ratio across countries. Overcapacity entails low inflation; the latter keeps nominal interest rates low, which in turn entices more borrowing and debt build-up. In brief, the linkage between national savings/excess capacity and the credit-to-GDP ratio is indirect via subdued inflation and low interest rates that encourage debt build-up. Caroline: Arthur, you have made the case that savings are not a constraint to loan origination. Can you elaborate? Arthur: The banking system does not intermediate "savings" or "excess savings" from the real economy into loans. The commercial banking system as a whole creates deposits at the time it originates loans. This is true of all countries. Indeed, whenever commercial banks make a loan, they simultaneously create a matching deposit in the borrower's bank account, therefore creating new money in the process (Chart 6). In other words, bank loan origination creates deposits and money.2 Chart 6Commercial Banks: Credit Origination Creates Deposits China's banking system has a lot of deposits because banks have created too many loans. In addition, a bank does not need liquidity (reserves at the central bank) for each loan it originates. It still requires some liquidity to settle its net balance with other banks or to meet minimum reserve requirements. If a bank creates a loan but still has excess reserves at the central bank, it may not require liquidity to "back up" the loan. There are many variables that constrain bank loan origination, but they do not include national savings or "excess savings." We discussed these constraints in detail in our EMS report titled Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses.3 Finally, when central banks opt to keep short-term interest rates steady, they must provide commercial banks with as much liquidity as the latter demands. This point is greatly relevant to China. For the past few years, China's central bank has silently moved away from controlling money growth (the quantity of money) to targeting interest rates (the price of money) (Chart 7). As a result, nowadays the People's Bank of China (PBoC) has very little quantitative control over money/credit creation by commercial banks. Chart 7The PBoC Has Begun Targeting Rates In Recent Years It is Chinese commercial banks that effectively drive money/credit/deposit creation. The PBoC decides whether or not to accommodate banks' liquidity needs by allowing interest rates to rise or fall, or by keeping them steady.4 To conclude, what habitually drives credit booms in any country are the "animal spirits" of banks and borrowers - not national savings. This has been the case in China too. Caroline: Peter, do you agree with Arthur's assessment? Peter: I don't want to get bogged down in the weeds of monetary theory, but let me briefly address two distinct points that I think Arthur is making. The first is the claim that the ability of banks to create money "out of thin air" is somehow not constrained by the volume of bank reserves and cash in circulation (the so - called "monetary base"). The second is the claim that there is no meaningful link between savings and deposits. I think Arthur is wrong on both counts. On the first claim, it is true that when a bank issues a loan, it also creates a deposit. To the extent that bank deposits are treated as "money," this expands the money supply. This is simply the "money multiplier" taught in introductory economics classes. Where Arthur's logic falls short is in his implicit assumption that all lending translates into additional bank deposits. It doesn't have to. Some of the deposits will be withdrawn and kept as cash. Governments have complete control over how much cash there is in circulation by virtue of their monopoly over the printing press. As long as cash exists, central banks can influence the broad money supply via open market operations. By the way, this is true even in banking systems where there are no reserve requirements. Regarding Arthur's claim that lending can occur without savings, this is often true when someone is borrowing money to buy an asset. However, it is generally not true if they are borrowing money to finance new spending. Let me offer a concrete, albeit somewhat whimsical, example to illustrate this point. Suppose I am living in a closed economy where no one saves anything. Now, let's imagine that I decide to throw a party for myself and need to borrow $1000 to do this. Who is going to provide me with the resources? Well, we just said that no one wants to save, so "something" has to adjust for me to have my party. That "something" is the interest rate. In order to entice someone to spend a bit less, the bank (on my behalf) will offer depositors a higher interest rate. If rates rise by enough, someone will decide to forego a bit of consumption today in order to have more consumption tomorrow. In other words, my decision to borrow must result in someone else's decision to save. So do savings create debt or does debt create savings? The answer is both: interest rates adjust to ensure that the two end up being different sides of the same coin. Caroline: Yan, what's your perspective on China's high debt profile? What could you be missing? Yan: As you can see Arthur and I view China's debt profile through different theoretical lenses. I don't think we can fully reconcile our different frameworks on the matter, but we hope our debate can deepen clients' own understanding of this issue, so they can make up their own minds. What I do want to stress is that those analysts who fear that China's corporate debt problem constitutes an alarming systemic financial risk focus exclusively on the rapid increase in the country's debt-to-GDP ratio. While undoubtedly there is merit to this ratio, I think it is also important to validate this judgement by looking at other indicators. In our previous research, we looked beyond this widely cited conventional indicator for corroborating evidence of a "debt bubble." Our findings suggest that the level of Chinese corporate sector leverage is not as precarious as widely perceived. For example, in the Chinese corporate sector, the area of China's economy where investors worry most about leverage, the debt-to-asset ratio of China's industrial sector has been falling since the late 1990s, down to 56% from 62%, contrary to popular belief (Chart 8). State-owned enterprises have witnessed an increase in their debt-to-asset ratio since the global financial crisis, but it has barely reached late 1990s levels, and has actually rolled over in recent years. Meanwhile, SOEs are a shrinking part of the overall economy and therefore, when looked at in conjunction with the private sector, have not moved the needle on the broader trend of corporate balance sheet "deleveraging." This stands in stark contrast to Japan's corporate sector at the peak of its debt bubble. In the early 1990s, Japan's corporate sector debt-to-asset ratio topped out at 78% when the country's "balance sheet recession" began (Chart 9). Even after two decades of deleveraging, Japan's current corporate debt-to-asset ratio is comparable to China's. To validate this conclusion, we also calculated several other key ratios to compare the leverage situation of Chinese listed companies relative to their global peers. Ratios such as liability-to-assets, net debt-to-EBITDA and interest coverage assess both leverage levels and debt servicing capacity. As Chart 10 shows, our extensive survey, both from the top down and the bottom up, suggests that China's leverage situation is comparable if not superior to its global peers. Chart 8The Leverage Picture From A Balance Sheet Perspective Chart 9Japan's Debt Bubble And Deleveraging Chart 10Leverage Ratios: How China Compares Therefore, I think we should be skeptical about the widely held view that China's corporate sector leverage is precariously high. It is at a minimum inaccurate, if not misleading, to rely solely on the debt-to-GDP ratio to reach such an ominous conclusion. Caroline: Arthur, I take it you don't agree? Arthur: Since January 2009, China's corporate and household debt has risen by RMB 130 trillion (about US$ 19 trillion) or by 100% of GDP (Chart 11). I do not believe even the most sophisticated financial/credit systems can allocate such amounts of credit in such a short time and not misallocate capital. By capital misallocation, I am implying investments in projects that do not generate sufficient cash flow to service debt. The accounting value (valuation) of assets is irrelevant in these cases; the cash flow generation is critical. The debt-to-GDP ratio is a much more superior measure to debt-to-asset-ratio. The basis is that the GDP is a proxy for cash flow, while accounting value of assets could be extremely inflated during a credit bubble. To be sure, I am not suggesting that all investments in China have gone sour. Nobody knows the extent of capital misallocation in China. But I suspect it is large enough to make a difference for the macro outlook/business cycle. Caroline: Peter, you have made the comparison between China today and Japan in the 1990s. Could you expand on that? Peter: Starting in the early 1990s, Japan entered an extended era where the private sector was trying to spend less than it earned (Chart 12). In order to keep unemployment from rising, the Japanese government was forced to run large budget deficits. In effect, the government ended up having to absorb the private sector's excess savings through its own dissaving. The same sort of fiscal trap now stalks China. Up until the Great Recession, China was able to export much of its excess savings. The current account surplus hit a record high of nearly 10% of GDP in 2007. The subsequent appreciation of the RMB undermined this strategy, forcing the government to take steps to boost domestic demand. It is no surprise that China's debt stock began to grow rapidly just as its current account surplus started to dwindle (Chart 13). Chart 11China: The Credit Boom Chart 12Japan Relied On Fiscal Largesse And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Chart 13China: Debt Increased When ##br##The Current Account Surplus Began Its Descent Keep in mind that fiscal policy in China entails much more than adjustments to government spending and taxes. Central government spending accounts for a fairly small share of GDP. The vast majority of fiscal stimulus is done via the banking system. This makes Chinese fiscal policy nearly indistinguishable from credit policy. From this perspective, China's so-called "debt mountain" is not much different from Japan's debt mountain once we acknowledge that the bulk of China's corporate debt is, in fact, quasi-fiscal debt. As evidence, note that in sharp contrast to the SOE sector, the ratio of liabilities-to-assets among private Chinese companies has actually been trending lower over the past decade (please see Chart 8). In effect, China's money-losing SOEs are the equivalent of Japan's fabled "bridges to nowhere": They are a necessary evil. Caroline: Arthur, your thoughts? Arthur: What Peter and Yan in effect propose is that Chinese banks should continue creating credit/money "out of thin air" in order to create demand for these "excess" goods, i.e., overcapacity sectors. In a nutshell, a number of Chinese companies made bad decisions by over expanding capacity, and now banks have to continue lending/creating demand to justify these bad investments. As a result, persisting explosive credit growth has allowed these unviable or zombie enterprises to survive, and they are not compelled to restructure. This is not how capitalism and markets work. This is de facto socialism. Socialism usually does not lead to prosperity. One of the key reasons behind the failure of socialist economic models is that productivity growth in socialist systems is very low, often close to zero. The basis is that productivity growth is generated not by government officials but by the private sector and entrepreneurs. China's economic success over the past 35 years or so has been due to allowing private enterprises to function and flourish - not because government officials necessarily made correct business and investment decisions. I am for countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies. However, the credit boom in China has gone well beyond the countercyclical policy framework. The concept of countercyclical policies does not suggest that the government or public banks should continue to spend in perpetuity to support fundamentally unviable businesses that invested too much and created excess capacity. Besides, "countercyclical" means for a couple of years. China has been expanding bank/credit/money for about nine years - since January 2009. Peter and Yan argue that they should keep doing it further. If the authorities do what Peter and Yan propose, investors should be structurally - not cyclically - bearish on Chinese stocks. Chart 14There Has Been No Shortage ##br##Of Demand Since 2010 The basis is that a socialist growth model is not friendly for shareholders. Shareholders often lose money when companies operate for maximizing employment rather than profits. This is why Chinese SOEs and bank stocks trade at low multiples - because they destroy capital and value for their shareholders. Notably, "overproduction" and "excess capacity" could be an outcome of either a demand downturn or oversupply/overproduction. Keynes recommended countercyclical policies to fill the gaps when demand shrinks. Chart 15Fiscal Outlays & Credit Origination ##br##Are Close To 50% Of GDP In China's case, there has been no domestic demand downturn to warrant multi-year countercyclical policies. China did the right thing in early 2009 to offset its export plunge amid the Global Financial Crisis, and it helped the global economy recover. However, since 2010 global demand and mainland exports have been stable (Chart 14), making the extended and ongoing credit boom in China unwarranted and excessive. As to the argument that most credit should be counted as a form of fiscal spending, I do not think Chinese policymakers themselves would agree with this statement. In fact, if this is correct, it would mean that government officials are allocating about 50% of GDP each year. Chart 15 illustrates general (central plus local) government spending and annual credit origination as a share of GDP. How fast would productivity grow in an economy where government bureaucrats allocate 50% of GDP annually? It is true that China's central government has a low debt load so it can afford to take over a large chunk of corporate debt. If and when they do so, I will change my view. So far, they have not done this, and will likely only contemplate such a policy move when things get really messy. Investors do not want to be long China plays going into such a scenario. That said, a tactical buying opportunity could emerge when the government takes over a large chuck of corporate debt. Caroline: Yan, how worried should we be about the misallocation of capital in China? Yan: Every economy experiences some level of capital misallocation. The real question is whether China's level of capital misallocation is more serious than that of its global peers. Theoretically, if a country has a bigger capital misallocation problem than others, the economy should have systemically lower capacity utilization, weaker pricing power, and lower profitability. These metrics are easily cross-referenced: Chart 16 contextualizes China's industrial sector capacity utilization ratio relative to global peers. By and large, most countries' capacity utilization ratios hover around 80%, not much different from China's, especially since the 2000s. In fact, barring some obvious outliers, capacity utilization ratios across countries have been largely synchronized, reflecting the ebb and flow of the global business cycle. Chart 16Capacity Utilization: A Global Perspective Industrial sector output prices have shown similar swings (Chart 17). Almost all countries suffered producer price deflation in recent years, and are now experiencing a synchronized upturn in wholesale pricing power. China's falling PPI was widely regarded as a tell-tale sign of misallocation of capital. Conversely, this was in fact more a reflection of stagnating global aggregate demand and weak resource prices worldwide than structurally weak pricing power among Chinese manufacturers. Chart 17Producer Prices: A Global Perspective Similarly, Chinese listed companies' deteriorating Return on Equity (ROE) was again singled out as a sign of capital misallocation. This view is easily debunked by Chart 18, as ROEs have fallen in all major markets. In fact, Chinese companies' ROEs have been structurally higher than the global averages. Even some Chinese sectors that have been derided as being plagued by massive overcapacity and inefficiency such as materials and energy exhibit ROEs almost identical to their global peers. The important point is that we should put China in a global context, rather than analyzing it in isolation. Some Chinese firms' efficiency and profitability have weakened notably over the past several years, but to me, this is more of a reflection of the sluggish global macro backdrop, rather than an indictment of China's discrete growth model. Caroline: Turning to the investment implications, Yan, how does the debt bubble concern impact your view on Chinese equities? Yan: Global investors' widespread concerns over Chinese debt levels and other macro issues have contaminated Chinese stocks with a broad-brushed bearish undertone. Chinese equities have been unduly punished, underweighted and under-owned for many years. As shown in Chart 19, Chinese investable stocks' ROEs have been structurally higher than the global benchmark, and have followed similar cyclical fluctuations. However, their stock prices are trading at massive discounts to the global benchmarks, based on conventional yardsticks (Chart 19). This in my view represents the "China risk premium," which is unjustified and unsustainable. I expect the misperception will eventually unwind, and Chinese shares will be re-rated. This is the fundamental factor supporting my positive view on Chinese equities. Strategically it makes sense to overweight Chinese stocks against their global peers. Chart 18Chinese ROEs Are Not Inferior To Global Peers Chart 19Chinese Equities' Large Valuation Gap Caroline: Arthur, how does your view impact your outlook for investment prospects in China and the rest of the emerging markets space? Arthur: There has not been any adjustment in China's corporate leverage. Deleveraging in China has not yet started. On the contrary, the credit bubble is getting larger. I mean the credit-to-GDP ratio continues rising exponentially and credit and bank loan growth remain in double digits (Chart 20). It is very risky to be bullish on financial assets linked to a bubble when the adjustment has not yet begun. It is like running in front of a steamroller trying to collect pennies. Besides, when there is a major imbalance in the system like the credit bubble happening in China now, I tend to overplay the importance of marginal policy tightening and underplay the significance of easing. Recent marginal policy tightening in China - in particular the clampdown on shadow banking, including banks' off-balance-sheet asset expansion - will cause credit growth to decelerate. This is a major risk to Chinese and EM growth in the second half of this year (Chart 21). Chart 20China: Money/Credit Is Still Booming Chart 21Is China's Recovery At Risk? Even if China does not have a full-blown crisis, we are likely to experience another down leg in China plays, commodities and EM risk assets similar to the second half of 2015, when Chinese import volumes contracted and global markets tanked. A few words about the potential adjustment trajectory are in order. I have been negative on China's growth and China-related plays in global financial markets since 2010, but I have never used the word "crisis." China may or may not have a crisis, but investors holding risk assets exposed to China's growth will suffer considerable losses again similar to the 2011-16 period. It is essential to differentiate cyclical from structural growth drivers. If the government does not allow credit growth to slow, cyclical growth will hold up. However, in this scenario, China will move toward a socialist model and structural growth will tumble. That said, the growth deceleration would be gradual, as depicted in Chart 22. Chart 22Toward Socialism = Secular Stagnation And Inflation If we assume China's productivity is currently growing at a rate of about 5.5-6% (which is already very high and hard to sustain), and if the country embarks on a socialist path, odds are that productivity growth will drop by 50-100 basis points in each of the following years. In five years or so, productivity growth would be only around 1-3%. This path is the ultimate recipe for economic stagnation in China. The only thing the authorities can do in this scenario is to boost growth from time to time via credit and fiscal stimulus. This will produce mini-cycles around a falling primary growth trend. The latest acceleration in China's growth is probably one of these mini-cycles. How can investors invest in this scenario? The stylized mini-cycles depicted in Chart 22 look nice, because we drew them ourselves. In reality, they will not be symmetric or smooth. In short, investing around economic mini-cycles is difficult because it assumes near-perfect timing. Caroline: Peter, is it all that bad? Peter: I think Arthur is too pessimistic. Investors have been predicting a Japanese debt crisis for years. It hasn't materialized and probably won't. They are making the same mistake about China. If China averts a debt crisis, as I think is likely, that's good news for global equities. In the developed market universe, Europe and Japan stand to benefit the most, given the cyclical bent of their stock markets. We are overweight both regions in local-currency terms. For global bonds, the implications are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, the high probability that the Chinese government can maintain the status quo of continued credit expansion for the foreseeable future means that a hard landing for the economy - and the associated drop in safe-haven developed economy government bond yields that this would trigger - is unlikely to occur. On the other hand, high levels of Chinese savings will continue to fuel the global savings glut, keeping real long-term bond yields lower than they would otherwise be. On balance, investors should maintain a modest underweight allocation toward global bonds. Caroline: Yan, do domestic politics play into your outlook for the RMB versus the dollar and on a trade-weighted basis? What is your outlook for monetary policy given recent signs of improving economic momentum? Yan: How President Donald Trump will deal with China on the RMB issue is a wildcard. Recent rhetoric suggests that the new U.S. administration intends to follow normal legal protocol to decide if China is manipulating its currency. This is a significant departure from Candidate Trump's repeated campaign trail promises. If the U.S. Treasury follows the formal process laid out in the statute, it is unlikely to label China a currency manipulator in the next semi-annual assessment to be published in April, simply because the country does not meet all the criteria for that label at the moment. The odds of an immediate clash between the U.S. and China on the RMB have ebbed. From China's domestic perspective, how the People's Bank of China intends to manage the exchange rate is also a thorny issue. From a long term point of view, the PBoC clearly wants to achieve a free-floating exchange rate, but the recent downward pressure on the RMB due to elevated capital outflows has forced the PBoC to heavily intervene to prevent a vicious, disorderly cycle, in which currency depreciation and capital flight reinforce each other. In terms of monetary policy, China's improving economic momentum has allowed the PBoC to follow the Fed in raising short-term interest rates. However, tighter capital account control measures will remain in place until the downward pressure on the RMB from capital outflow dissipates. Moreover, investors have been overwhelmingly focused on the negative economic effects of a weaker RMB, somehow ignoring the reality that as the world's largest manufacturer and exporter, China also stands to benefit from a weaker currency. In my view, the depreciation of the trade-weighted RMB since 2015 has played a critical role in reflating the Chinese economy (Chart 23). A weaker RMB has helped producer prices to reflate, and lowered the real cost of funding for manufacturers, which in turn has eased China's monetary conditions and supported cyclical growth improvement. In this vein, the downside of the RMB should be self-limiting, as the reflationary impact of a weaker exchange rate will help boost Chinese growth, which in turn will reduce downward pressure on the currency. Caroline: Peter and Arthur, is rampant capital flight still a risk? Where do you see the RMB heading over the coming 12-18 months? Peter: I think the RMB will weaken somewhat over the coming year, but that is more a reflection of my bullish view on the dollar than a bearish view on the yuan. Much of the capital flight that China has experienced recently has just been an unwinding of the hot money flows that entered the country over the preceding four years. Despite all the talk about a credit bubble, Chinese corporate external debt has fallen by around $400 billion since its peak in mid-2014 - a decline of over 50% (Chart 24). At this point, most of the hot money has exited the country and hence, I expect the pace of capital outflows to subside. Chart 23A Weaker RMB Leads Cyclical Recovery Chart 24The Rise And Fall Of Corporate Foreign Credit Nevertheless, the chronic shortfall of domestic demand that I described earlier will keep pressure on the Chinese government to try to export excess production abroad by running a larger current account surplus. This requires a weak currency. Thus, while I don't expect the yuan to plummet, I don't expect it to soar either. Arthur: I believe the RMB is set to depreciate by 10% or more against the U.S. dollar in the next 12 months or so. The Chinese yuan is not expensive, but it will stay under downward pressure because the mainland banking system has created too many yuan. When the supply of money goes vertical, its price drops. It seems the Chinese people are sensing there is too much RMB floating around, and they are trying to get rid of local currency. They have been overpaying for properties and have been shifting their wealth into foreign currencies. Finally, in China, the real deposit rate has turned negative (Chart 25, top panel). In the past, when the real deposit rate turned negative, the central bank hiked interest rates (Chart 25, bottom panel). If households do not get a more attractive deposit rate, they will opt for foreign currency, real assets like property or riskier investments domestically. All of this entails negative consequences for China's financial stability. Chart 25Real Deposit Rate Is Negative In brief, I expect capital outflows to persist and policymakers to allow the currency to depreciate further. Caroline: Peter/Yan/Arthur: Final thoughts: What are each of you watching for signs that China's macro landscape is evolving as you expect? Conversely, what would signal that your assessment has missed the mark? Peter: I am watching for signs of a policy mistake. Until China can reorient its economy towards one that is more consumer-centric, it will have to rely on high levels of investment to sustain aggregate demand. Any attempt to aggressively curb debt growth will only backfire. Arthur talks about resource misallocation from subpar investment projects, but there is no worse resource misallocation than a person who wants a job but can't find one. I am also watching trade policy. I don't think a trade war between China and the U.S. is in the cards for the time being, but if the U.S. economy turns down in 2019, as I expect, Trump will be backed into a corner. And with another election looming, he will strike out at China. That could trigger a global trade war. Yan: I agree with Peter that we should watch for policy mistakes and some sort of "Trump shock," both of which constitute downside risks. A less talked-about risk is potential growth overheating, which could require much tighter policy, leading to greater economic volatility. In fact, some cyclical indicators that are tightly linked to industrial activity have rebounded sharply, which is also reflected in the rebound in some raw materials prices. If exports get a further boost from continued improvement in the U.S. economy, the possibility of China's economy overheating cannot be completely dismissed. Another potential trouble spot is the housing market. The Chinese authorities have begun to tighten housing policy, but developers appear to be gearing up for another construction cycle. Sales of construction equipment such as heavy trucks and excavators have soared. Historically, construction machine sales have been tightly correlated with real estate development (Chart 26). If history is any guide, the renewed strength in construction equipment sales could be a harbinger of an impending boom in new home construction. This is good news for business activity and GDP growth, but probably antithetical to policymakers' broad agenda. We will follow up on these issues closely in our future reports. Arthur: The key variables to watch are various interest rates, credit/loan growth and inflation - in addition to keeping an eye on lending standards and credit demand. Recent increases in borrowing costs amid the enormous credit overhang give me confidence to argue that China's credit origination and economic growth are bound to decelerate later this year. A billion-dollar question is whether the recent rise in China's consumer inflation is transitory or the beginning of a notable uptrend (Chart 27). If consumer price inflation rises to 3% and higher, the game will be over - interest rates will need to go up and credit growth will tumble. If interest rates do not rise amid intensifying inflationary pressures, capital outflows will escalate and the currency will depreciate a lot. Chart 26An Upturn In Housing Construction? Chart 27China: Inflation Is Picking Up I will be wrong if policymakers manage to slow down credit growth from 11-12% toward 7-8% or so without generating notable economic weakness. This can occur only if productivity growth in China accelerates meaningfully. It is difficult to observe productivity growth in real time - it is a black box. 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?" dated January 18, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB," dated November 23, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Please note that today we are publishing an abbreviated Weekly Bulletin as tomorrow we will publish Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings? The latter report will elaborate on long-standing view differences on China within BCA. I will be debating my colleagues Peter Berezin and Yan Wang on the issues surrounding China's savings and debt as well as the growth outlook. Arthur Budaghyan Feature Singapore: MAS Will Cap Interest Rates Higher U.S. interest rates will temporarily place upward pressure on Singaporean local interest rates (Chart I-1). However, Singapore is not in position to tolerate higher borrowing costs due to lingering credit excesses and deflationary pressures that currently prevail in its economy. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) will therefore respond by injecting liquidity to keep interbank rates low. The MAS operates monetary policy by guiding the exchange rate - and by default - often allowing interest rates to fluctuate freely. Yet higher interest rates are not an optimal policy option at the moment. If and as U.S. interest rates and the U.S. dollar rise, the MAS will intervene to cap local rates even if it entails a weaker Singapore dollar. While there is a recovery going on in non-oil export volumes and narrow money (M1) (Chart I-2), many other cyclical indicators are still negative. Chart I-1Rising Libor Rates Will Exert ##br##Upward Pressure On Singaporean Rates Chart I-2Singapore: Non-Oil ##br##Exports Are Picking Up The exchange rate-targeting system was introduced in the early 1980s when exports stood at 150% of GDP. Today, exports relative to GDP have fallen substantially to 115% of GDP (Chart I-3). On the other hand, total private non-financial sector debt levels have risen to 180% of GDP (Chart I-3). Therefore, the Singaporean economy has become much more leveraged to interest rates and somewhat less exposed to global trade. Improving exports will not be sufficient to offset the negative impact of rising borrowing costs. Moreover, our proxy for interest payments on domestic debt has also surged and now stands at close to 10% of GDP (Chart I-4). What is precarious is that the rise in interest payments relative to income has occurred in a period when rates are close to record-low levels. Chart I-3Singapore: Debt Is ##br##Overshadowing Exports Chart I-4Singapore: Interest Payments Are ##br##Large Despite Record Low Rates If borrowing costs rise, it will likely cause major debt deflation concerns. The MAS will not allow this to happen. Employment is stagnating, while employment in the construction and manufacturing sectors is contracting (Chart I-5). Weak employment has weighed on the consumer sector. Retail and department store sales are still shrinking (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Singapore: Employment Is Weak Chart I-6Retail Spending Is Contracting Importantly, the real estate sector, one of the major pillars of the Singapore economy, is depressed. Property prices across the board are deflating, while vacancy rates are rising (Chart I-7). Bank loan growth to property developers has also stalled (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Weak economic growth should be reflected on banks' balance sheets. Surprisingly, non-performing loans (NPLs) among Singapore's three largest banks still stands at a low 1.4%. If and as loan losses begin to rise, commercial banks will rush to increase provisioning for these losses, which will hurt their profits and keep credit growth subdued. Furthermore, Singaporean banks are also very exposed to Malaysia. Singapore's largest banks have extended loans to Malaysia of approximately 67 billion Singapore dollars - or 16% of GDP. Aggregate external loans stand at 137% of GDP (Chart I-8). Economic fundamentals are currently very weak and will continue to deteriorate in Malaysia. This warrants more assets write-offs among Singapore banks and less appetite to expand their balance sheet. Chart I-7Property Sector In Singapore Chart I-8Singaporean External Loans Are Enormous On the whole, if Singaporean interest rates begin to rise due to either depreciation of the Singapore dollar or higher U.S. interest rates, the central bank will intervene to bring local rates down. It would not be the first time the MAS has intervened to bring down interest rates. In 2015 when EM risks escalated, local interbank rates spiked. The MAS promptly injected liquidity in the banking system by buying back its outstanding MAS bills, and by also purchasing government securities, supplying liquidity to the banking system. This essentially placed a cap on interbank rates. Chart I-9Go Long Singapore Real ##br##Estate Stocks Vs. Hong Kong What is noteworthy is that the Singapore dollar weakened as a result of the intervention, although the MAS's official monetary policy stance was not stimulative - i.e. the monetary authorities did not target to weaken the trade-weighted SGD. In that instance, the MAS decided to focus on interest rates/funding market stability and ignore the exchange rate's response. This highlights that despite the MAS's official monetary policy framework of guiding the exchange rate, it will not allow interest rates to rise. Unlike Singapore, Hong Kong does not operate an independent monetary policy and as such will be forced to import higher U.S. rates. As a bet on higher interest rates in Hong Kong and the U.S. relative to Singapore, investors should consider going long Singaporean real estate stocks and shorting Hong Kong real estate stocks. Chart I-9 shows that Singaporean real estate stocks outperform Hong Kong's when the latter's interest rates/bond yields rise relative to Singapore and when Singapore's M1 growth accelerate relative to Hong Kong. As discussed above, the MAS has the capacity and will to inject liquidity to lower interest rates. Hong Kong, however, does not have this privilege due to the currency's peg to the greenback. Besides, Singapore's property correction is now much more advanced than Hong Kong's. In fact, Hong Kong property prices are still rising, i.e., the real estate market adjustment in Hong Kong has not yet started. While both city states are vulnerable to a potential slowdown in Chinese inflows, Hong Kong real estate prices will ultimately fall from a higher starting point. Bottom Line: A rising U.S. dollar and U.S. interest rates may exert upward pressure on Singaporean local interest rates. However, the Singaporean central bank will respond by injecting liquidity, which will cap rates relative to the U.S. and Hong Kong. This opens a tactical trade opportunity (for the next 3 months): Long Singapore real estate stocks / short Hong Kong real estate shares. Asian equity portfolio investors should have a neutral allocation to Singapore stocks within the EM/emerging Asian benchmarks. Ayman Kawtharani, Research Analyst ayman@bcaresearch.com Colombia: Not Out Of The Woods Yet Even though global economic growth has been improving and commodities prices have rallied, Colombia's growth is still bound to disappoint. We remain structurally bullish on the nation's longer-term prospects. That said, there will still be more downside this year. Credit growth will continue to decelerate, despite the beginning of a rate cut cycle (Chart II-1). Interest rates are still high, both in nominal and real terms (Chart II-2). This along with poor consumer and business confidence (Chart II-3) will depress credit demand and spending. Chart II-1Colombia: Negative Credit Impulse Chart II-2Borrowing Costs Are Still High Chart II-3Consumer & Business Confidence Are Weak Furthermore, the central bank's liquidity injections into the banking system have dropped considerably (Chart II-4). In the past few years, abundant liquidity provisioning by the central bank had allowed commercial banks to sustain robust credit growth. Hence, a withdrawal of banking system liquidity will cap loan origination. The current account deficit remains wide at $12.5 billion, or 5.2% of GDP. Financing such a wide deficit will prove challenging. Besides, BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team believes oil prices are at risk of additional declines. Hence, we are bearish on the Colombian peso. Fiscal policy is set to tighten as the budget deficit has ballooned due to strong spending and shrinking revenues (Chart II-5). Recently introduced tax reforms represent a step forward with respect to the country's structural reforms agenda, as it will simplify the tax code and reduce corporate tax rates. Chart II-4Withdrawal Of Liquidity Will Cap Credit Growth Chart II-5Government Fiscal Balance Is Deteriorating However, redistributing the tax burden onto individuals, mainly by increasing the VAT from 16% to 19%, will reinforce the slump in household spending. In terms of high frequency data, there are little signs of economic revival (Chart II-6). Retail sales volume remain tame. The latest bounce in this series most likely reflects consumers front running the impending VAT hike. Furthermore, oil production is likely to decline further, and non-oil exports are still contracting. In terms of financial markets, we recommend the following: We are closing our bet on yield curve flattening - receive 10-year/pay 1-year swap rates. Initiated on September 16, 2015, this trade has produced a 190 basis-point gain (Chart II-7). At the moment, the risk-reward for this position is no longer attractive. Chart II-6Cyclical Economic Activity Remains Subdued Chart II-7Take Profits On The Yield Curve Trade We remain neutral on Colombian equities and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM universes. Even though our long Colombian bank stocks/short Peruvian banks bet has been deep in the negative, we are reluctant to cut it. The basis is that Colombia's central bank may opt to cut rates further, even if the peso depreciates anew. In contrast, the Peruvian central bank is more likely to hike rates if its currency comes under downward pressure. Bank share prices will likely react to marginal shifts in relative interest rates between the two countries. Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Duration & Fed Policy: The longer risk assets can withstand rising rates, the higher will be the ultimate resting place for Treasury yields. Maintain below-benchmark duration on a 6-12 month horizon and add a short fed funds futures trade to profit from increased Fed hawkishness in the near-term. Yield Curve: While the long-run trend will be for the yield curve to flatten as the Fed hiking cycle progresses, rising inflation expectations will cause the curve to steepen between now and the end of the year. Maintain a position long the 5-year bullet, short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell to profit from a steeper curve on a 6-9 month horizon. Feature Say Uncle Chart 1More Tightening To Come The Fed lifted rates last week but kept its median projected path for future rate hikes unchanged. Judging from the market's reaction, this was a more dovish outcome than was anticipated. Since last Wednesday's meeting the dollar is down 0.5%, junk spreads have tightened 10 basis points and the 2/10 yield curve has steepened 1 bp. In other words, financial conditions have continued to ease even as the Fed took another step toward more restrictive policy. All in all, money markets are now discounting only a slightly slower pace of rate hikes than the Fed's median forecast (Chart 1) and financial conditions suggest that further incremental tightening is in store. The financial conditions component of our Fed Monitor1 is above zero, meaning that financial conditions are more accommodative than the long-run average, and the Chicago Fed's Adjusted Financial Conditions Index also shows that conditions are easy relative to the strength of the economy (Chart 1, bottom panel). New York Fed President William Dudley has previously described how the Fed incorporates financial conditions into its decision making:2 Chart 2The Fed Policy Loop All else equal, if financial conditions tighten sharply, then we are likely to proceed more slowly. In contrast, if financial conditions were not to tighten at all or only very little, then - assuming the economic outlook hadn't changed significantly - we would likely have to move more quickly. In the end, we will adjust the policy stance to support financial market conditions that we deem are most consistent with our employment and inflation objectives. We have also described this process in the context of our Fed Policy Loop3 (Chart 2). In essence, the Fed will continue to nudge rate hike expectations higher until financial conditions tighten excessively. At that point - because with inflation below target the Fed still has an interest in supporting the recovery - it will quickly shift to a more dovish stance. Chart 3Short Jan 2018 Fed Funds Futures One implication of the Fed Policy Loop is that the longer risk assets can withstand rising rates, the higher will be the ultimate resting place for the fed funds rate and Treasury yields. As such, we continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration allocation on a 6-12 month horizon. Another implication is that because markets shrugged off the latest rate increase, Fed policy is likely to turn more hawkish in the very near term. We therefore recommend investors add a tactical trade: short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract (Chart 3). We calculate that this trade will return 11 bps in a scenario where the Fed lifts rates twice more before the end of the year and 37 bps in a scenario where the funds rate is raised three times. However, we do not expect to hold this trade until the end of the year. Rather, we expect the Fed will nudge rate expectations higher in the next month or two and that these gains will be realized over a much shorter horizon. We also add a caveat that, in the present environment, it is safer to implement any "hawkish Fed trades" in either fed funds futures or the overnight index swap market. The Eurodollar market does not provide the same potential for gains because the LIBOR / OIS spread is currently elevated and could tighten to offset the profits from rising fed funds rate expectations (Chart 3, bottom panel). Fed hawkishness also argues for a flatter yield curve in the very near term. While this could materialize, we continue to hold our position in the 5-year bullet over a duration-matched 2/10 barbell - a trade designed to profit from a steeper 2/10 slope. For reasons described in the next section we believe the yield curve will steepen between now and the end of the year, although the risks are tilted toward flattening in the very near term and in 2018 and beyond. What Drives The Yield Curve? In this week's report we present an overview of the main drivers of the slope of the Treasury yield curve. Specifically, we identify (i) the fed funds rate, (ii) inflation expectations, (iii) implied volatility and (iv) unit labor costs as factors that correlate strongly with the slope of the yield curve on a cyclical horizon. We review the outlook for each of these factors and conclude that the Treasury yield curve has room to steepen between now and the end of the year. Beyond that, the curve will likely resume flattening as inflationary pressures start to bite and the Fed's rate hike cycle picks up steam. Chart 4Fed Rate Hikes Flatten The Curve 1. The Fed Funds Rate Not surprisingly, the slope of the Treasury curve correlates very strongly with the level of short rates (Chart 4). Typically, short-maturity yields are much more influenced by the expected path of Fed rate hikes than long-maturity yields. As such, when the Fed is lifting rates the yield curve tends to bear-flatten - both the 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields rise, but the 2-year rises more quickly. In contrast, when the Fed is cutting rates the yield curve tends to bull-steepen - both the 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields fall, but the 2-year falls more quickly. In a typical cycle the yield curve will start to flatten as the Fed lifts rates and will eventually become completely flat when the end of the rate hike cycle is reached and the fed funds rate is at its "equilibrium" or "terminal" level. Usually, at that point in the cycle, the Fed will keep policy too tight in an effort to rein in inflation. This causes the economy to slow and the yield curve to invert, signaling the start of the next recession. A recent BCA Special Report4 speculates that if the federal government succeeds in delivering sizeable fiscal stimulus, inflationary pressures could start to build next year, leading to a more rapid pace of Fed rate hikes and a flat or inverted yield curve by the end of 2018. This would be consistent with a recession in 2019. In terms of the behavior of the yield curve, this is not far off from the Fed's own projections. At present, the median FOMC projection calls for the fed funds rate to reach its equilibrium level of 3% by the end of 2019. If this forecast plays out, it means that the 2/10 Treasury slope must flatten by roughly 117 bps between now and then. Turning back to Chart 4, we see that the Treasury curve has already flattened considerably even though the Fed has only raised rates three times. This means that either the equilibrium fed funds rate is much lower than the Fed's 3% projection and the 2/10 slope will reach zero with a much lower fed funds rate, or that the curve flattening is overdone and the curve has room to steepen before it resumes its cyclical flattening trend. As is explained below, we favor the latter interpretation. 2. Inflation Expectations The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is also highly correlated with the slope of the yield curve (Chart 5). As long-dated inflation expectations increase the yield curve tends to steepen, and vice-versa. Interestingly, the positive correlation between long-dated inflation expectations and the slope of the Treasury curve persists even when the Fed is hiking rates. Notice that in the 1999 rate hike cycle, the yield curve did not start to flatten until the 5-year/5-year breakeven fell. Also, in the 2004-06 hike cycle, curve flattening ebbed just as the breakeven started to widen. Chart 5Rising TIPS Breakevens Steepen The Curve Charts 6 and 7 show the relationship between the 2/10 Treasury slope and the 5-year/5-year breakeven in more detail. Chart 6 shows the correlation between monthly changes in the 2/10 Treasury slope and the 5-year/5-year breakeven using all available data back to January 1999. We see that a positive correlation between the slope and the breakeven prevailed in 64% of monthly observations, while only 36% of months displayed a negative correlation. Chart 62/10 Nominal Treasury Slope Vs. TIPS Breakeven ##br##Inflation Rate 5-Year/5-Year Forward (February 1999 - Present) Chart 72/10 Nominal Treasury Slope Vs. TIPS Breakeven Inflation Rate 5-Year/5-Year ##br##Forward During Fed Tightening Cycles (June 1999 To May 2000 & June 2004 To June 2006) In Chart 7, we focus exclusively on the past two Fed tightening cycles (1999-2000 & 2004-2006). Not only does a linear regression show an even stronger correlation than was achieved with the full sample, but we also see that a positive correlation between the slope and the breakeven existed in 73% of monthly observations, while only 27% of months displayed a negative correlation. At present, core PCE inflation is still below the Fed's 2% target and different measures of inflation expectations are all well below levels that prevailed during prior rate hike cycles (Chart 8). In other words, the Fed must proceed slowly enough with rate hikes to ensure that long-dated inflation expectations continue to trend higher, which argues for a steeper yield curve until inflation and inflation expectations are more firmly anchored around the Fed's target. For the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate we think a range of 2.4% to 2.5% would signal that inflation expectations are well anchored around the Fed's target. 3. Volatility Implied interest rate volatility - as measured by the MOVE volatility index - is another factor that correlates with the yield curve on a cyclical horizon (Chart 9). In theory, higher rate volatility should coincide with a steeper yield curve, all else equal, and this is exactly the correlation we observe. Chart 8Fed Wants Inflation Expectations To Rise Chart 9Higher Vol Steepens The Curve Let's consider that there is a risk premium applied to taking a unit of duration risk (usually called the term premium) and that said risk premium is larger for longer-maturity bonds that carry more duration risk. All else equal, the risk premium applied to one unit of duration risk should be larger when rate volatility is higher. This should also coincide with a steeper yield curve, since there is more duration risk at the long-end of the curve. In a recent report,5 we concluded that the level of disagreement among forecasters about future GDP growth and T-bill rates were the two most important drivers of cyclical swings in implied rate volatility, the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index has at times also played a role (Chart 9, bottom 3 panels). Chart 10Higher Unit Labor Costs Flatten The Curve At the moment, the amount of forecaster disagreement about future GDP growth is near its lows since 1990 and T-bill forecast disagreement has, until recently, been suppressed by the zero lower bound on interest rates. All this implies that the balance of risks favors higher implied interest rate volatility in the months ahead, which will apply steepening pressure to the yield curve. 4. Unit Labor Costs Unit labor costs are the final yield curve indicator we discuss in this report. Since faster wage growth tends to coincide with Fed tightening and slowing wage growth tends to correlate with Fed easing, it makes sense for wage indicators to be inversely correlated with the slope of the yield curve. While it is broadly true that all wage indicators show a reasonable inverse correlation with the slope of the curve, unit labor costs are the best. The reason is that unit labor costs (compensation per unit produced) actually measure both wage growth (compensation per hour) and labor productivity (output per hour) (Chart 10). It turns out that the yield curve can flatten in the traditional way - a bear-flattening driven by rising wages and Fed tightening - but occasionally it can also bull-flatten if the market starts to discount a lower equilibrium (or terminal) fed funds rate. We might expect this sort of curve behavior in an environment of extremely low productivity growth, and this is exactly what has occurred during the past few years. Notice in Chart 10 that compensation per hour does not explain the curve flattening that started in 2014, but unit labor costs do because they also factor in incredibly low productivity growth. In the longer-run, we would strongly expect unit labor costs to remain in an uptrend. Wage growth is accelerating and there are structural headwinds that will prevent productivity growth from returning to the levels seen at the height of the IT revolution in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As was discussed last year in a Special Report from our Global Investment Strategy service,6 the rate of human capital accumulation is in a secular downtrend as is the share of workers in their 40s - the age cohort when people are most productive. However, there has also been a cyclical component to the productivity slowdown and it is possible that productivity growth could accelerate somewhat in the near-term as the cycle matures. The capital stock per worker correlates strongly with productivity growth (Chart 11), and while capital investment has been depressed for most of the recovery there are finally some signs that it may return (Chart 12). Chart 11Productivity Held Back By Lack Of Investment Chart 12Getting Optimistic About Capex In fact, it is even conceivable that more rapid wage growth itself might encourage firms to replace labor with capital, causing traditional measures of wage growth to accelerate relative to unit labor costs. Also, the prospect of tax reform and regulatory relief could give capital spending a boost - it has already led to a jump higher in small business optimism (Chart 12, bottom panel). Unit labor costs will likely continue to accelerate on a cyclical investment horizon, applying flattening pressure to the yield curve. But this flattening pressure would be mitigated to the extent that there is any cyclical rebound in productivity growth. Yield Curve Strategy Upon consideration of the four factors described above, we conclude that while the slope of the yield curve will likely be close to zero sometime in late 2018, curve flattening won't start in earnest until late this year or early next year when inflation expectations are higher (2.4% to 2.5% on long-dated TIPS breakevens) and core PCE inflation is firmly anchored around the Fed's 2% target. This conclusion is based on our observations that: TIPS breakevens and the slope of the curve tend to be positively correlated, even during rate hike cycles. Interest rate volatility is more likely to rise than fall. Unit labor costs are likely to remain in an uptrend on a cyclical horizon, but there is scope for them to level-off if we see a modest late-cycle rebound in productivity growth. To position for a steeper yield curve between now and the end of this year we continue to recommend that investors favor the 5-year Treasury note relative to a duration-matched position in a 2-year/10-year barbell. Long bullet/short barbell trades tend to outperform when the yield curve steepens, and our model suggests that the 5-year yield is currently very cheap relative to the 2/10 slope (Chart 13). We have been recommending this trade since December 20, 2016 and it has so far returned +2 bps even though the 2/10 slope has flattened 13 bps during that time. The strong positive carry means that not much curve steepening is required for the trade to realize strong positive gains. Chart 13The 5-Year Bullet Is Cheap On The Curve Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 For further details on our Fed Monitor please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy The Back-Up In Junk Spreads", dated March 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/dud150605 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Caught In A Loop", dated September 29, 2015, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see BCA Special Report, "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession", dated March 7, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Road To Higher Vol Is Paved With Uncertainty", dated February 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians", dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Dear Client, In addition to an abridged Weekly Report, we are also including a Special Report written by our Global ETF Strategy team. BCA's Global ETF Strategy, launched in September joins comprehensive ETF analysis with BCA's global macroeconomic thematic research: its aim is to help clients connect the dots from BCA themes to individual ETF ticker symbols with real-time market expressions of our views. The team is currently producing a series of reports on smart-beta ETF selection, whereby they examine the key factors recognized by academia and investment practitioners as persistent drivers of market performance. In this second installment, the team focuses on dividend-focused funds. Although the team finds that dividends do not qualify as a true standalone factor consistently explaining equity returns, dividend policy can add to multi-factor models' explanatory power at the margin. Given the popularity of dividend investing, we think dividend policy could be a fruitful subject for further research. Best regards, Lenka Martinek Feature U.S. financial markets breathed a collective sigh of relief last week when the FOMC followed through on a fully discounted 25 bps rate hike, but did not increase the number of expected rate hikes for the year. In other words, the Fed successfully delivered a "dovish hike", thus reassuring investors that the policy sweet spot - the period when interest rates are rising but have not become restrictive - will last a while longer (Chart 1). Chart 1A "Dovish Hike" Chart 2Low Structural Unemployment Rate The Fed's assessment of the economy is not very different from our own, though there were a few details in the economic projections worth highlighting. First, the estimate for the structural rate of unemployment was scaled down further by a tenth of a percentage point to 4.7%. This may seem minor, but it suggests that policymakers believe the labor market has more running room before wage inflation moves higher. Granted, any forecast for structural unemployment should be taken with a dose of salt, but our bias throughout this cycle - and as outlined in our November Special Report - has been to expect wage inflation to lag relative to past cycles due to structural factors (Chart 2). And as can be seen in Chart 3, Japan provides a roadmap: in that country, demographic factors helped push the unemployment rate to below 3% without creating inflationary pressures. Of course, the U.S. economy is very different from Japan and we do not expect unemployment to drop as low. However, as occurred in Japan, we would not be surprised to see the FOMC trim its forecast for the structural unemployment rate further in the coming quarters. A related point is that the Fed also adjusted the wording of the FOMC statement regarding its inflation targets. The statement said that the Fed was looking for a "sustained" return to 2% inflation, while also referring to its inflation target as a "symmetric" one. Our interpretation is that the Fed is trying to clarify that it will not react too aggressively if core inflation were to drift somewhat above 2%. Clearly, the Fed is beginning to see the balance of risks toward higher inflation. That makes sense, given that the economy is operating close to full employment. However, we maintain that a sustained rise in inflation above the Fed's 2% core PCE target is not imminent. Indeed, the message from last week' CPI report reinforces our view that with the exception of a few components, inflation is very well contained (Chart 4). Our diffusion index of the major inflation components is in negative territory. Importantly, price surveys continue to show that businesses are not able to easily raise prices. For example, despite the continued optimism in the headline components of the NFIB small businesses survey, small businesses have not been able to - and do not yet anticipate being able to - raise prices. This reinforces our long-held view that after a long period of disinflation - and outright deflation in the retail sector - inflation expectations are extremely well-anchored and savvy consumers know how to extract a better deal. Core PCE inflation may converge on the Fed's target of 2% in the second half of 2017, but an inflation overshoot should not be a major driver of investment decision-making over the next 6-12 months. Chart 3Japan: A Low Unemployment Rate ##br##And Little Wage Inflation Chart 4Inflation ##br##Still Low In the end, it is Fed Chair Yellen's least sophisticated remarks that provide the best summation. During the FOMC press conference, she stated that "the simple message is the economy is doing well". Indeed, the moderate pace of growth that has prevailed since the beginning of the recovery means that the typical imbalances and pressure points that accumulate in the advanced stages of a business cycle are so far still absent. The backdrop overwhelmingly favors stocks relative to government bonds on a cyclical horizon. To be sure, equities are expensive, but as we wrote last week, relative to competing assets, valuations are not extreme. The greater near-term risk continues to be a phase of economic and earnings disappointments that could develop later this year, since there remains a tremendous amount of optimism in the business community regarding regime change in Washington. Note that the policy uncertainty index remains very elevated (Chart 5) and Trump's "skinny budget", which aims to slash spending across all discretionary items save military and veterans affairs, will be contested. Our geopolitical team notes that Democrats could threaten a government shutdown later this year to try to force Republicans' hand at removing the most controversial elements of the budget. Democrats can filibuster parts of the appropriations process which makes the concrete budget allocations. Chart 5Political Uncertainty Still Elevated On this basis, we remain skeptical that fiscal policy will be clean fuel for the equity bull market. However, we adhere to Yellen's "simple message" that the economy is on a stable footing. That implies that Washington disappointments will most likely lead to equity setbacks rather than a painful breakdown. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com Appendix Monthly Asset Allocation Model Update Our Asset Allocation (AA) model provides an objective assessment of the outlook for relative returns across equities, Treasuries and cash. It combines valuation, cyclical, monetary and technical indicators. The model was constructed as a capital preservation tool, and has historically outperformed the benchmark in large part by avoiding major equity bear markets. Please note that our official cyclical asset allocation recommendations deviate at times from the model's recommendation. The model is just one input to our decision process. The model's recommendation weightings for the major asset classes are unchanged: neutral equity exposure at 60% (benchmark 60%), neutral Treasury allocation at 30% (benchmark 30%) and cash at 10% (benchmark 10%). The diffusion index of the three components for The Equity Model remained neutral. The technical component "buy" signal strengthened, with sturdy advances for both the breadth & trend and momentum indicators. The monetary component, which measures overall liquidity conditions within the financial and economic system and designed to lead equity prices, is slightly more bullish and still favorable for equities. The earnings-driven component continues to give a cautious signal. Real operating earnings remain at a significant distance from positive economic expectations which have moved higher yet again. Moreover, earnings momentum is still sluggish, based on our earnings diffusion index, which compares nominal earnings growth relative to four key macro proxies for business costs. The model's recommendation for bonds remains at benchmark which still fits with our neutral qualitative stance for Treasuries in balanced portfolios since November 7, 2016. Although the cyclical component of the bond model is more constructive than the valuation component, the further deterioration in the technical component maintains the "sell" signal for Treasuries firmly in place. Chart 6Portfolio Total Returns Chart 7Current Model Recommendations Note: The asset allocation model is not necessarily consistent with the weighting recommendations of the Cyclical Investment Stance. For further information, please see our Special Report "Presenting Our U.S. Asset Allocation Model", February 6, 2009. Highlights Factor attribution began a half-century ago with the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"). Although the CAPM itself has been superseded, selected factors have exerted a consistent influence on equity performance. The empirical evidence does not support including dividends among the proven factors, yet dividend-focused funds are the most numerous in the smart-beta universe. The ambiguity surrounding dividends' effect on equity performance leaves plenty of room for smart-beta purveyors to build a better mousetrap, but our own research suggests that they will have to do so with something other than purely dividend-related metrics. Reflecting the fact that many of the dividend funds already incorporate multi-factor inputs, we evaluate them based on their exposure to all of the metrics within our Equity Trading Strategy service's multi-factor model. Feature Welcome to the second installment of our series on smart-beta ETF selection. Over the course of the series, we intend to examine the factors widely recognized by academia and investment practitioners as persistent drivers of equity performance. Each Special Report will weigh the evidence for the factor's efficacy, consider the metrics that best reveal its presence and compare our ideal metrics with the metrics utilized by our proprietary Equity Trading Strategy ("ETS") multi-factor model. It will then evaluate the menu of smart-beta ETFs using either our ETS model's metrics or an augmented version of them. The series began last month with a review of the Value factor, enshrined by Fama and French's research, and the current subset of Value smart-beta ETFs.1 This month we examine Dividend smart-beta ETFs. Subsequent installments will examine Quality, Momentum and Volatility,2 and we will likely wrap up the series with a review of Multi-Factor smart-beta ETFs. This installment provides some background on factor investing and the smart-beta process before subjecting Yield (Dividends) to scrutiny to determine whether or not it really constitutes a standalone equity factor. Back To The Beginning The ubiquity of beta in discussions of investing performance originates from the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), as advanced by William Sharpe and other researchers in the early 1960's. The CAPM posits that the expected return of stock XYZ is solely a function of XYZ's riskiness relative to the overall equity market. XYZ's riskiness is a function of its covariance with the market, and is represented in the CAPM's simple linear model as the coefficient "beta.3" The elegantly simple CAPM holds that any stock's expected return (E(rs)) is the sum of the risk-free rate (rf) and the product of its beta (ßs) and the difference between the expected market return (E(rm)) and the risk-free rate (rf): E(rs) = rf + ßs x (E(rm) - rf) As noted by several researchers, including Eugene Fama and Kenneth French,4 CAPM's return predictions are woefully errant when applied to stocks. As Chart 1 indicates, the returns projected by the CAPM bear little relationship to empirical results. It turns out that low-beta stocks have systematically outperformed high-beta stocks on a risk-adjusted basis (Chart 2), just as low-book-multiple stocks have crushed high-book-multiple stocks without regard for beta (Chart 3). This is powerful evidence for value, and for the low-volatility factor that we will examine in a subsequent report, but it is damning for the simple application of the CAPM to stocks. Chart 1CAPM Sounded Great In Theory ... Chart 2... But It Flopped In Practice Chart 3Low-Book-Multiple Stocks Systematically ##br##Flout CAPM Predictions A New Vocabulary Despite its empirical shortcomings, the CAPM provides an intuitive way of conceptualizing the risk-return tradeoff, and it paved the way for the asset-pricing research that followed it. The notion that individual securities' risks come in two flavors, market and idiosyncratic, is a critical element of portfolio theory and its thou-shalt-diversify commandment. It is also the basis, as we shall see, for beta, alpha and the factor-investing approach enabled by smart-beta ETFs. For that application, let us add an alpha term to the CAPM to account for the component of realized returns that cannot be explained by market exposures: rs = rf + ßs x (E(rm) - rf) + a Rearranging terms to solve for alpha shows it to be the difference between the realized return and the return expected by CAPM: a = rs - (rf + ßs x (E(rm) - rf)) From CAPM To Factors To Smart Beta In today's accepted usage, alpha is the ex-post difference between portfolio and benchmark return, adjusted for risk. It is the component of return attributed to portfolio manager skill, whereas beta is the return accruing to simple market exposure. As return-attribution research has uncovered the systematic factors underpinning performance, beta has claimed an increasing share of the pie from alpha. The salubrious effect for investors, especially those who employ third-party managers, has been to demystify the sources of portfolio returns. Beta's expanding share has also opened the door to a middle course between purely active and purely passive portfolio management strategies. Factor research has made it possible to join the main advantages of passive strategies - transparency, predictability and low cost - with active strategies' aim of delivering a risk-adjusted return profile distinct from those offered by cap-weighted benchmarks. Investors have embraced the factor approach and traditional asset managers have obliged them with a torrent of smart-beta ETF choices. Both should put investors on alert: according to the late Barton Biggs, there is no investment idea so good that it can't be destroyed by too much money, and fund company enthusiasm may correlate more closely with its own profits than its clients'. Biggs' admonition is always on our mind, but we don't think the established factors are in imminent danger of losing their zest. Factor excess returns are not new news. 25 years after Fama and French's paper, low-book-multiple stocks continue to outperform high-book-multiple stocks and smaller stocks continue to outperform larger stocks. We do not see the comparatively modest aggregate smart-beta ETF AUM as a catalyst for bidding away the returns that have durably accrued to factors. Are Dividends Really An Equity Factor? For the purposes of this report, our first objective is to determine whether or not Dividends can properly be considered a factor alongside the big five (Value, Quality, Momentum, Volatility and Size). Unable to find compelling evidence for their inclusion, we do not think they should. Yield may be a promising factor in fixed income, but extending the concept to equities is problematic. Across all capitalization buckets for the last 20 years, it cannot even be said that dividend payers outperform non-dividend payers (Chart 4). The empirical record for more sophisticated slicing and dicing is mixed, depending on the level of granularity. Breaking the universe of U.S. equities into non-dividend payers and dividend payers, and then segmenting the latter by yield into the lowest three deciles, the median four deciles and the highest three deciles, Fama and French's 90-year dataset supports the idea that higher-yielding stocks generate higher total returns (Chart 5). The breakout is neatly consistent, with dividend payers outperforming non-dividend payers, and each yield cohort of the dividend payers outperforming the lower-yielding cohorts beneath it (Chart 6, top panel). Zoom into the dividend payers at the quintile and decile levels, however, and the consistency disappears as the tidy staircase pattern begins instead to resemble a jagged picket fence (Chart 6, lower panels). Chart 4Dividends Have Been Hazardous To Investors' ##br##Wealth Over The Last 20 Years ... Chart 5... Though They've Rewarded Investors ##br##Over Nine Decades Chart 6Not Ready For A Close-Up Adjusting for risk makes the picture even murkier. While the non-payers and the lowest-yielding cohorts always post the smallest risk-adjusted returns, they are the only cohorts the highest-yielders manage to beat. The median 40 is the winner among our 30-40-30 cohorts, while the fourth and the second quintiles bracketing the median 40 easily outpace the top quintile, and the eighth, fourth and seventh deciles break away from the rest of the decile pack (Chart 7). It should come as no surprise that our long top 30%/short bottom 30% litmus test failed to reveal any viable excess return strategies based on dividend yields. Our attempts to develop simple portfolio construction rules based on markers of dividend quality and sustainability failed to conclusively advance the dividend cause. Long/short strategies founded on dividend growth added no value to a simple portfolio built from dividend yield and change in share count (Chart 8). Payout ratio metrics, which might shed some light on both quality and sustainability, provided pretty solid results, but they weren't enormous winners (Chart 9). Our analysis left us unable to conclude that Yield merits inclusion among the established equity factors. Chart 7No Theme To Risk-Adjusted Return Profiles Chart 8No Viable Long/Short Dividend-Growth Strategy ... Chart 9... But Payout Ratios Work Pretty Well An Ideal Dividend Index The fact that the way forward for dividend strategies is not obvious is good news for smart-beta sponsors. The ambiguity leaves plenty of room for developing better index-construction methods. Some sources of improvement might include: A means of identifying and sidestepping "yield traps," high and/or growing yields that are actually a distress signal. A way to review historical metrics to gain a sense of ongoing dividend growth. An evaluation of a dividend's source, valuing dividends supported by operating cash flows more highly than those supported by financing activities or asset dispositions. A process for limiting sector exposures, and an awareness of the most auspicious backdrops for taking on exposure to specialized yield plays like mortgage REITs, MLPs and BDCs. Ticking off every item on this wish list, however, would necessarily involve infringing on other factors' turf. Quality, Value, Size and Volatility could all spill into the process of assessing dividend quality and sustainability. Given that our attempts at creating our own tests to measure up to the wish list came up empty, it seems that a cross-disciplinary approach might be the only option. Even if the indexes are not based completely on dividend-derived metrics, it may be possible for a few dividend accents to add some incremental value to the overall stew. Smart-Beta Fund Evaluation These issues were on our mind when we set out to define the metrics that we would use to evaluate the indexes created by our Dividend smart-beta ETF subset. The two payout metrics in the ETS model, dividend yield and change in shares outstanding, are pretty thin gruel for evaluating the dividend ETFs. The ETS payout metrics were selected based on their interaction with the Value, Safety, Quality, Momentum and Sentiment metrics, 23 in all, that comprise the rest of the stock-level inputs into our model. They were not intended to be stand-alone measures. Many of the ETFs in our subset explicitly screen for Quality, Value and/or Low Volatility. They could just as accurately be described as multi-factor funds in a dividend-first wrapper, and we have therefore deployed the entire ETS model to evaluate them. To assess whether or not their constituent selection process consistently improves upon a simple dividend strategy, we compare their ETS scores to those of VIG, the Vanguard Dividend Appreciation ETF, which tracks the NASDAQ US Dividend Achievers Select Index of stocks (ex-REITs and LPs) with at least 10 consecutive years of dividend increases. First Trust Rising Dividend Achievers ETF (RDVY) RDVY's ETS scores have stood out from its smart-beta peers' since the fund's inception at the beginning of 2014. Its concentrated 50-stock portfolio allows it to focus on exposure to its preferred growth and sustainability metrics. Only stocks that have grown their dividends over 3- and 5-year periods, and their non-zero earnings per share over a 3-year period, make it through the growth filters. The sustainability filters admit only stocks with cash-to-debt ratios of at least 50% and dividend payout ratios of 65% or less. Chart 10Good Things Come To Those Who Wait Although the fund has outperformed VIG since inception, its relative performance has not been nearly as consistent as its relative ETS scores (Chart 10). It has taken a 40% surge over the 12 months ended February 28th to put RDVY over the top. We recognize that performance can be capricious, however, and place more weight on RDVY's consistently stellar relative ETS scores, which are 20% more, on average, than its smart-beta peers'.5 RDVY's 50-basis-point ("bps") expense ratio exceeds the 36-bps group average, but we think its screens and concentration are worth the incremental 14 bps. The fund is on the smaller side with $127 million of AUM, and daily turnover of just over $2 million, but larger investors can make use of the creation/redemption unit process to transact in larger volumes without concern. We recommend RDVY for investors seeking large- and mid-cap dividend exposure. FlexShares Quality Dividend Index Fund (QDF) QDF stands second to RDVY on an ETS score basis. Its relative scores have been remarkably stable, rarely falling below 110% en route to averaging 113% of the aggregate Dividend smart-beta score. QDF's selection process is proprietary, and it incorporates measures of cash flow, profitability, and management's skill at deploying capital and financing its activities. The mix has enabled QDF to outperform VIG from the get-go, and steadily pad its lead ever since (Chart 11). Its 37-bps expense ratio is right in line with the group's and its $1.7 billion AUM and $5 million average daily turnover provide a nice sense of ballast. We recommend QDF, along with RDVY, as the best Dividend smart-beta options. Chart 11Wire-To-Wire Outperformance WisdomTree MidCap Dividend Fund (DON) O'Shares FTSE US Quality Dividend ETF (OUSA) WisdomTree has been a pioneer in creating dividend-weighted indexes, but the formula it's applied to selecting constituents for DON, its mid-cap dividend ETF, has not found favor with the ETS model. The fund's constituents have repeatedly earned an aggregate ETS score below 40, holding its relative score below 80% for extended periods. OUSA is a newer fund, with less than a year of history, but its ETS scores have been noticeably weak. We would avoid OUSA until it compiles enough of a track record to permit more conclusions about its process and we would advise investors seeking targeted mid-cap exposure to gain it via funds other than DON. Dividends' Curious Attraction Our work in researching this Special Report has brought dividends' many contradictions to light. In countries like the U.S., where ordinary income is taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, dividends represent an especially tax-inefficient way of redeeming a portion of one's investment. Either share buybacks or sales to third parties would yield more after-tax cash. Humans feel a strong pull to book gains, and steadily redeeming portions of a successful investment has an intuitive emotional appeal: "Let's quit while we're ahead, let's go while the getting is good." It's exactly the wrong thing to do with investments, however. If the quarterly dividend flow assuages the remorse over a mistaken investment, encouraging an investor to stick with a losing position, it's even worse. It is possible that dividends, even though they're small, help reinforce our innate resistance to selling losers and letting winners run. From management's perspective, legacy dividend payments can act as handcuffs. Fearful of issuing a signal that is sure to be interpreted negatively by the market, firms take pains to refrain from cutting dividends. Dividend declarations, then, are a part of the capital budgeting process that is not rooted in economics. A rigorously utility-maximizing visitor from outer space may have found the oil majors' borrowing to fund their dividends in the midst of the severe downturn in crude prices to be very odd indeed. All of these shortcomings may help explain why we were unable to find clear evidence that dividends exert a clear and consistent influence on stock prices. And yet, dividends are enormously popular, with dividend funds by far outnumbering every other flavor of smart-beta ETF. We, too, like to think of positions in balanced portfolios on a total-return basis, as does our U.S. Investment Strategy service, which has successfully recommended the Dividend Aristocrats much longer than we have. Total return is important, but we are increasingly leaning toward the view that specialty dividend plays, purchased at the right point of the cycle, are the best way for an investor to capture income from equity holdings. Such an all-or-nothing approach may well be superior to the one-foot-in, one-foot-out stance that is embodied by the average 2% large-cap dividend yield. Our U.S. Investment Strategy service has successfully surfed the cyclical wave in mortgage REITs, and we are attempting to do so now with the inclusion of BIZD, the business development company ETF, in our U.S. portfolios. Adding cycle analysis would make our smart-beta studies too long, but we are conducting research into the interaction between factor performance and cycle phases, and we will share our findings with our clients in standalone Special Reports if they are insightful enough to merit their attention. Doug Peta, Vice President Global ETF Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com Jennifer Lacombe, Research Analyst Global ETF Strategy Jenniferl@bcaresearch.com Philippe Morissette, Associate Vice President Equity Trading Strategy philippem@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global ETF Strategy/Equity Trading Strategy Special Report, "Smart-Beta ETF Selection, Part I - Value Funds," published February 15, 2017, at etf.bcaresearch.com. 2 Size may be too straightforward to allow for an index-construction edge. 3 Stock XYZ's beta is equal to the covariance of its returns with the market's returns, divided by the variance of the market's returns, where its covariance with the market equals its returns' correlation with the market's times the product of XYZ's volatility and the market's volatility. 4 Fama, Eugene F. and French, Kenneth R., "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 18, Number 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 25-46. 5Befitting its benchmark status, VIG’s ETS scores have averaged 99.8% of the entire subset’s since inception.