Emerging Markets

Special Report

Highlights Our market-based China growth indicator has risen meaningfully since mid-December, but mostly due to the equity components. For now, we regard this as a mixed signal, rather than a green light for Chinese stocks. Our research suggests that the odds of a serious earnings contraction for Chinese investable stocks over the coming year are high. Stocks are only likely to bottom near the end of the earnings adjustment process, if the 2014-2015 episode is a guide. Despite reasonable relative valuation, the long-term downtrend in sales-to-GDP suggests that Chinese stocks may be a “value trap” even over a multi-year time horizon. Feature Over the past several months BCA’s China Investment Strategy service has focused heavily on the cyclical condition of China’s economy, and whether any “green shoots” are evident from the key indicators that we track. We noted in last week’s report that our leading indicator for China’s old economy continues to point to slower growth over the coming months,1 a conclusion that is generally supported by the December trade, money, and credit data. In today's special report we address six questions concerning the outlook for Chinese stocks in light of passive outperformance versus the global benchmark over the past 3 months. We highlighted in last week’s report that investors should not view recent outperformance as a positive cyclical sign for Chinese stocks, and our answers to the questions below will hopefully provide readers with a fuller understanding of our neutral stance over a 6- to 12-month time horizon. The bottom line of our analysis is that a cyclical (6-12 month) overweight stance toward Chinese investable stocks versus the global benchmark remains uncompelling until the earnings contraction that is likely to occur this year is well underway. Chinese stocks offer reasonable-to-good valuation relative to global stocks, but may be cheap for a reason even over a multi-year time horizon. We remain tactically overweight Chinese investable stocks in recognition of the fact that investors may bid up the market in the lead-up to a possible trade deal with the U.S., but a legitimate improvement in domestic fundamentals is likely needed before we recommend investors upgrade their medium-term equity allocation to China. Q: Are the market signals from China-related assets bullish or bearish for Chinese stocks? A: Our market-based China growth indicator has risen meaningfully since mid-December, but mostly due to the equity components. For now, we regard this as a mixed signal, rather than a green light for Chinese stocks. Chart 1 presents our market-based China growth indicator, its four asset class subcomponents, and the range between the strongest and weakest components. Table 1 shows the change in the indicator and its 17 individual components since December 10, when the indicator clearly broke out. Chart 1Largely Driven By EM Equity Relative Performance Both the chart and the table make it clear that the recent rise in the indicator is not uniform. While it is true that most of the individual components have improved over the past month, the equity components and two currency measures (the inverse of the dollar and Asian currencies), especially CNY-USD have accounted for most of the gains. Table 1(Anomalous) Equity Relative Performance Has Driven The Recent Improvement In Our MBCGI As we noted in last week’s report, the Q4 outperformance of Chinese / emerging market stocks has been passive in nature, meaning that they have outperformed simply because developed market equities have collapsed. This, in combination with the fact that the strongest currency components have been linked to declining interest rate expectations in the U.S., tell us that the aggregate indicator has largely risen due to a 1) generalized selloff in global risk assets, 2) perceptions of easier Fed policy, and 3) a modest improvement in sentiment concerning the U.S.-China trade war. While it would not normally be the case that a global equity selloff would cause the equity component of our indicator to rise, December was atypical because many China-related assets had already declined in advance of the selloff. Are the latter two factors noted above reason enough move to an overweight stance towards Chinese stocks over the coming 6- to 12-months? In our view, the answer is “not yet”. While easier U.S. monetary policy is certainly welcome (particularly given our view that a recession is unlikely), it is not yet clear that either of the negative factors waiting on Chinese stocks in absolute terms will be resolved over the coming year. The first factor is the trade war with the U.S. We agree that the odds of some sort of a deal that avoids further tariff imposition have risen significantly over the past two months, more than we anticipated in the lead-up to the G20 meeting in Argentina. However, given the deep, structural nature of the dispute between the U.S. and China, we think it is dangerous to pre-emptively act on an agreement that may not come or may take much longer to be reached than investors currently hope. This risk is in addition to what is likely to be a deceleration in export growth over the coming few months regardless of the outcome of negotiations, as the export front-running effect that has boosted trade volume over the past several months wanes. But as we address in the next question, the second negative factor impacting Chinese stocks is the upcoming impact of a slowing domestic economy on Chinese earnings, an effect that is not likely to be impacted by the changes in the global economy implied by financial markets since mid-December. Q: What is the outlook for Chinese earnings growth over the coming year? A: Our research suggests that the odds of a serious earnings contraction over the coming year are high. Chart 2 presents an update to a model for Chinese ex-tech (or “old economy”) earnings growth that is part of our analytical toolkit.2 The model paints a rosy outlook for earnings growth, suggesting that it is set to decelerate over the coming year but will continue to grow at a double-digit rate. Chart 2The Li Keqiang Index Suggests Ex-Tech Earnings Growth Will Stay Positive... However, one problem with the approach used in Chart 2 is the fact that we have used the Li Keqiang index (LKI) as the independent variable in the model. Historically the LKI has reliably led ex-tech earnings growth, but we have highlighted several times over the past few months that the index is currently being supported by trade front-running activity that is very likely to wane, a view that is strongly consistent with the very negative December trade data that was released earlier this week. Chart 3 presents a different approach, namely the prediction of the odds of a serious investable equity earnings contraction over the coming 12-months (defined as earnings growth falling below -5%). The statistical approach taken in Chart 3 (logistic regression) is similar to that often employed by researchers attempting to predict the odds of a recession, and the chart shows that the model successfully warned of the two major earnings contractions over the past decade. Crucially, the odds of a major contraction did not rise about the 50% mark in 2012, when investable earnings growth decelerated significantly and fell briefly into negative territory. Chart 3...But Other Measures Imply High Odds Of An Outright Contraction The current message from the model is clear: the odds of a significant earnings contraction over the coming 12-months are as high as 70%, implying that the deceleration in 12-onth trailing earnings growth shown in panel 2 of Chart 3 is likely to continue. Q: If earnings are set to contract, when will investors anticipate a recovery? A: Near the end of the earnings adjustment process (for investable stocks), if the 2014-2015 episode is any guide. Chart 4 presents some perspective on the issue of when investors are likely to anticipate an eventual bottom in earnings if a contraction does indeed occur. The chart shows the level of 12-month forward earnings for investable and domestic stocks, and circles at what point stocks in each market bottomed during the massive selloff in the Chinese equity market from 2014-2015. Chart 4The Forward Earnings Adjustment Process Has Yet To Begin The chart shows that the domestic market bottomed roughly halfway through the earnings adjustment process, whereas the investable market bottomed almost at the end of the process. The chart also shows that this adjustment process has barely begun, which (in combination with Chart 3) currently argues against a cyclically overweight stance towards global stocks. Q: In the developed world (particularly the U.S.), elevated profit margins are viewed as a potential risk to earnings over the coming few years. Is profit margin mean-reversion a risk in China? A: Based on the absolute level of profit margins, no. Relative to the history of poor profitability for Chinese stocks, yes. Chart 5 shows the 12-month trailing profit margins for global and investable Chinese stocks. It shows how global margins have now moved past their previous cycle highs, a circumstance that is even more extreme in the case of the U.S. Chart 5Chinese Profit Margins Are Very Low, But Very Elevated Relative To Their History Investable Chinese margins are very low, which at first blush implies less risk of a mean-reversion assuming a common mean. However, panel 2 shows that Chinese investable margins are as high relative to their own history as they are for global stocks, and they have followed a similar pattern over the past few years. This suggests that the central tendency for Chinese margins is indeed significantly lower than it is for the global benchmark, and that the risk of mean reversion is similarly elevated in the face of a major economic shock. How is it possible that Chinese investable ROE has been similar or even higher than that of the global benchmark, but that profit margins are substantially lower? The answer, with very high likelihood, is leverage. Panel 1 of Chart 6 shows ROE for both markets, whereas panel 2 shows ROE divided by the profit margins shown in Chart 5. Using the DuPont approach to decomposing ROE, ROE divided by profit margins is equal to sales over equity, or the product of the asset turnover (sales/assets) and leverage (assets/equity) ratios. Panel 2 shows that product of turnover and leverage is more than twice that of global stocks, implying that Chinese companies are either extremely efficient in the use of their assets to generate sales, or they are very highly levered compared with global stocks. Chart 6High Chinese ROE The Result Of High Leverage The latter is overwhelmingly more likely. We presented evidence in our August 29 Special Report suggesting that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) now have a negative net return on borrowed funds,3 a situation that has been caused by persistent leveraging since 2010. Not only does this explain the low profitability of Chinese stocks, it also magnifies the risk of significant mean reversion beyond a 6-12 month time horizon if Chinese policymakers panic and aggressively stimulate credit to stabilize a slowing economy. Q: Are Chinese stocks relatively cheap? A: The domestic equity market, yes. The investable market, somewhat. We presented Charts 7 and 8 in our final report of 2018,4 which showed the following: The forward P/E ratio for both domestic and investable Chinese stocks has improved substantially over the past several months. In relative terms, Chinese stocks are not as cheap as they have ever been but, depending on the measure employed, usually haven’t been cheaper (at least over the past decade). The A-share market particularly stands out, with all four relative valuation measures near, at, or above their 2014 levels. Chart 7Chinese Stocks Have Become Cheaper In Absolute Terms…   Chart 8…And Relative To Global Stocks Since we published our December report, global stocks sold off severely, which has somewhat diminished the relative cheapness of investable Chinese stocks. But the bottom line for investors is that Chinese stocks are not expensive in absolute terms, relative to global stocks, or compared with the history of relative valuation. Q: Given reasonable-to-good valuation, are Chinese stocks a good long-term buy? A: Not necessarily. It is distinctly possible that Chinese investable stocks are an example of a “value trap”. When discussing equity valuations in our last report of the year, we also mused about whether Chinese stocks are a great long-term buy. We noted that valuation is normally a powerful predictor of 10-year future performance, but that deviations from this relationship can exist. Chart 9 shows a vivid example of such a deviation, by presenting the profile of investable and domestic equities versus U.S. and global stocks, all rebased to the start of the U.S. recession in December 2007. The chart shows that for every $100 invested in equities at the end of 2007, local currency prices have fallen to $52 for domestic stocks and $86 for investable stocks. This is in sharp contrast to $128 for global equities, and a whopping $176 for the S&P 500. Chart 9A (Largely) Lost Decade For Chinese Stocks Excessive Chinese stock market valuation at the end of the last economic cycle has certainly contributed to the divergence shown in Chart 9. But Chart 10 shows another, less discussed factor: Chinese fundamental performance has not kept up with GDP growth, in contrast to developed markets. The chart shows the indexed ratio of sales per share to nominal GDP growth for the U.S. and China, and highlights that the latter has not only trended downward over time but has collapsed over the past four years. Chart 10Are Chinese Stocks Really A Play On Higher Chinese Growth? At root, the secularly bullish narrative surrounding Chinese stocks is based on the fact that China’s rate of economic growth is considerably higher than that of the developed world. But if the fundamental performance of China’s listed equities cannot keep pace with the economy, are they such a compelling buy simply because they are not expensive? An alternative view is that Chinese stocks are cheap for a reason, i.e. that they are a value trap. In combination with the sizeable risks facing the Chinese economy from extremely elevated levels of corporate debt, the best answer that we can give investors looking out over a multi-year horizon is that Chinese stocks are a great long-term buy for those who do not share our structural concerns. On a risk-adjusted basis, we do not yet find the value proposition to be compelling, meaning that our recommended multi-year allocation to Chinese stocks is neutral. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Monitoring The (Weak) Pulse Of The Data”, dated January 9, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Owing to the recent changes to the global industrial classification system (GICS), the chart shows Chinese earnings growth excluding the information technology and communication services sectors. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “Chinese Policymakers: Facing A Trade-Off Between Growth And Leveraging”, dated August 29, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Legacies of 2018”, dated December 19, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights So What? Our “Black Swan” risks for the year reveal several potential wars. Why? While we think it is premature to expect armed conflict over Taiwan, an outbreak of serious tensions is possible. Russia and Ukraine may have a shared incentive to go renew hostilities this year. Saudi Arabia has received a “blank cheque” from Donald Trump, so it may continue to be provocative. Everyone has forgotten about the Balkans … but tensions are building. A “Lame Duck” Trump could stage a military intervention in Venezuela. Feature Over the past three years, we have compiled a list of five geopolitical “Black Swans.” These are low-probability events whose market impact would be significant enough to matter for global investors. Unlike the great Byron Wien’s list of “Ten Surprises for 2018,” we do not assign these events a “better than 50% likelihood of happening.”1 Instead, we believe that the market is seriously underpricing these risks by assigning them only single-digit probabilities when the reality is closer to 10%-15%, a level at which a risk premium ought to be assigned. Furthermore, some of our events below are obscure enough that it is unclear how exactly to price them. But before we get to our list of the five things that keep us up at night,2 a quick note on the question for financial markets in 2019: Will the economic policy divergence between the U.S. and China continue? At the moment, momentum is building behind the narrative that both the U.S. and China have decided to reflate. In anticipation of this narrative switch, we closed our long DM / short EM equity trade on December 3, 2018 for a 15.70% return (originally opened on March 6, 2018). How sustainable is the EM outperformance relative to DM? Will the rest of the world “catch up” to U.S. growth momentum, thus hurting the U.S. dollar in the process? The global central bank – the Fed – is already expected to “back off,” even though members of the FOMC have simply pointed out that they remain data-dependent. Granting our BCA House View that the U.S. economy remains in decent health, U.S. economic data will continue to come in strong through the course of the year. This means that there is scope for a hawkish Fed surprise for the markets, given that the interest rate market already has dovish expectations, anticipating 4.33 basis points and 16.74 basis points of cuts over the next 12 and 24 months respectively (Chart 1). Meanwhile, the global demand engine – China – may disappoint in its reflationary efforts. We refer to China as the “global demand engine” because the combined imports and capex of China and other emerging markets dwarf that of the U.S. and EU (Chart 2 and Chart 3).3 Chinese imports alone make up $1.6 trillion, constituting 23% of the $7 trillion total of EM imports and about half of EM investment expenditures. Given that large swaths of EM are high-beta to the Chinese economy, the EM-plus-China slice of the global demand pie is leveraged to Beijing’s reflationary policies. Chart 2EM/China Imports Are Much Larger Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined Chart 3EM/China Capex Is As Large As U.S.'s And EU's Combined Chinese policymakers have gestured toward greater support for the economy. The communiqué published following the Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) in December called for a broad stabilization of aggregate demand as a focus of macro policy over the course of 2019. The language was still not very expansionary, but Beijing has launched stimulus despite relatively muted communiqués in the past. The massive stimulus of early 2016, for instance, followed a mixed CEWC communiqué in December 2015. So everything depends on the forthcoming data. Broad money and credit growth improved marginally in December, while the State Council announced that local government bond issuance could begin at the start of the year rather than waiting until spring. Meanwhile, a coordinated announcement by the People’s Bank of China, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Development and Reform Commission declares that a larger tax cut is forthcoming – that is, in addition to the roughly 1% of GDP household tax cuts that went into effect starting late last year. Monetary policy remains very lax with liquidity injections and additional RRR cuts. Before investors become overly bullish, however, we would note that Chinese policymakers are focusing their reflationary efforts on fiscal spending and supply-side reforms like tax cuts. The problem with the latter is that household tax cuts will not add much to global demand, given that consumer goods make up just 15% of China’s imports (Table 1). The vast majority of Chinese imports stem from the country’s capital spending. Table 1China’s Consumer-Oriented Stimulus Will Boost Different Imports Than Past Stimulus Fiscal spending, meanwhile, is as large as the overall credit origination in the Chinese economy (Chart 4). But without a revival in credit growth, more spending will mainly serve to stabilize the economy, not light it on fire. It is likely that part of the fiscal pump-priming will be greater issuance of local government bonds. However, even the recently announced 1.39 trillion RMB quota for new bonds this year is not impressive. And even a 2 trillion RMB increase would only be equivalent to a single month of large credit expansion (Chart 5). Chart 4China: Credit Origination Is As Large As Government Spending   As such, tactically nimble investors could profit from a reflationary narrative that sees both the global central bank – the Fed – and the global fiscal engine – China – turning more dovish and supportive of growth. However, we agree with BCA’s Emerging Markets Chief Strategist Arthur Budaghyan, who is on record saying that “Going Tactically Long EM Is Akin To Collecting Pennies In Front Of A Steamroller.” The bottom line for investors is that 2019 is the first year in a decade where the collective intention of policymakers – across the world – is to prepare for the next recession, rather than to prevent a deflationary relapse. This cognitive shift may be slight, but it is important. The Fed and Beijing are engaged in a macroeconomic game of chicken. Each camp is trying to avoid having to over-reflate at the end of the cycle. For the Fed, the goal is to have room to cut rates sufficiently when the recession finally hits. For China, the goal is to ensure that its leverage does not get out of hand. Into this uncertain macroeconomic context we now insert the five Black Swans for 2019. To qualify for our list, the events must be: Unlikely: There must be less than a 20% probability that the event will occur in the next 12 months; Out of sight: The scenario we present should not be receiving media coverage, at least not as a serious market risk; Geopolitical: We must be able to identify the risk scenario through the lens of BCA’s geopolitical methodology. Genuinely unpredictable events – such as meteor strikes, pandemics, crippling cyber-attacks, solar flares, alien invasions, and failures in the computer program running the simulation that we call the universe – do not make the cut. Black Swan 1: China Goes To War With Taiwan One could argue that a military conflict between China and Taiwan in 2019 should not technically qualify for our list, as there has been chatter in the media about such an outcome. Indeed, our recent travels across Asia revealed that clients are taking a much greater interest in our longstanding view – since January 2016 – that Taiwan is the premier geopolitical Black Swan. We established this view well before President Trump won the election and received a congratulatory call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, breaking diplomatic practice since 1979. Now, at the beginning of 2019, the exchange of barbs between the Chinese and Taiwanese presidents has raised tensions anew (Chart 6).4 Chart 6Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk Likely To Rise From Here Nonetheless, Taiwan makes the cut here because we doubt that most of our global clients take the issue seriously. Furthermore, we are concerned that – with fair odds of a U.S.-China trade truce lasting through 2019 – cross-strait tensions could fall out of sight. The basis of our view is that there is a unique confluence of political developments in Beijing, Washington, and Taipei that is conducive toward a diplomatic or military incident that could escalate tensions: Taiwan’s pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in addition to taking the presidency in 2016, won control of the legislature for the first time ever (Chart 7). This means that domestic political constraints on President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration are lower than usual. Tsai has angered Beijing by seeking stronger relations with the U.S. and refusing to endorse the 1992 Consensus, which holds that there is only “One China” albeit two interpretations. China’s General Secretary Xi Jinping has removed term limits and placed greater emphasis on the reunification of Taiwan. Xi has consolidated power domestically and has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy throughout his term, including in the South China Sea, where greater naval control would enable China to threaten Taiwan’s supply security. Xi’s blueprint for his “New Era” includes the reunification of China, and some have argued that there is a fixed timetable for reunification with Taiwan by 2050 or even 2035.5 Some recent military drills can be seen as warnings to Taiwan. U.S. President Trump called the One China Policy into question at the outset of his term in office (only later reaffirming it), and has presided over an increase in U.S. strategic pressure against China, such as the trade war and freedom of navigation operations, including in the Taiwan Strait. Trump’s National Security Adviser John Bolton and Assistant Defense Secretary Randall Schriver are seen as Taiwan hawks, while the just-concluded Republican Congress passed the Taiwan Travel Act and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which imply an upgrade to the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s democracy and security.6 These three factors suggest that, cyclically, there is larger room than usual for incidents to occur that initiate a vicious cycle of tensions. The odds of a full-fledged war are still very low – the U.S. has reaffirmed the One China Policy in its recent negotiations with Beijing, which seem to be progressing, while China has not changed its official position on Taiwan. Beijing’s reunification timetable still has a comfortable 30 years to go. The Chinese economy has not collapsed, so there is no immediate need for Beijing to dive headlong into a nationalist foreign policy adventure that could bring on World War III. However, the odds of diplomatic incidents, or military saber rattling, that then trigger a dangerous escalation and a multi-month period of extremely elevated tensions are much higher than the market recognizes. This is because the U.S. and China may still see strategic tensions flare even if they make progress on a trade deal, while a failure on the trade front could spark a spillover into strategic areas. Any cross-strait incident would be relevant to global investors – and not just Taiwanese assets, which would suffer the brunt of economic sanctions – because the slightest increase in the odds of a full-scale war would be extremely negative for global risk appetite. Over the next 12 months, we would mostly expect Beijing to eschew high-profile provocations. The reason is that President Tsai is unpopular and the recent local elections in Taiwan saw her DPP lose seats to the more China-friendly Kuomintang (Chart 8). An aggressive posture could revive the DPP ahead of the January 2020 presidential election, the opposite of what Beijing wants.7 On the other hand, Beijing could decide to ignore the 1996 precedent and choose outright military intimidation. Or it could attempt to meddle in Taiwan’s domestic politics, as it has been accused of doing in the recent local elections.8 Meanwhile, the U.S. and Taiwan are the more likely instigators of an incident over these 12 months, knowingly or not. Washington and Taipei have a window of opportunity to achieve a few concrete objectives while Presidents Tsai and Trump are still in office – which cannot be guaranteed after 2020. A similar window of opportunity caused a market-relevant spike in China-South Korea tensions back in 2015-17, when the United States, seeing that the right-wing Park Geun-hye administration was falling out of power, attempted to rush through the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system in South Korea. As a result, China imposed economic sanctions on its neighbor (Chart 9). Chart 9China Hits South Korea Over THAAD Something similar could transpire over the next year if the U.S. sends a high-level official – say, Bolton, or Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, or even Vice President Mike Pence – to hold talks in Taiwan. Or if the U.S. stages a major show of force in the Taiwan Strait, as it threatened in October, or U.S. naval vessels call on Taiwanese ports. The U.S. could also announce bigger or better arms packages (Chart 10), such as submarine systems, which have been cleared by the Department of State. Given the elevated U.S.-China and China-Taiwan tensions overall, such an incident could cause a bigger escalation than the different participants expect – and even more so than the market currently expects. Chart 10U.S. Arms Sales To Taiwan Could Provoke Beijing Bottom Line: Cyclically, the period between now and the inauguration of the next Taiwanese president in May 2020 brings heightened risk of a geopolitical incident. Depending on what happens in 2020, tensions could rise or fall for a time. Yet structurally, as Sino-American strategic distrust continues to build, Taiwan will continually find itself at the center of the storm. Black Swan 2: Russia And Ukraine Agree To Go To War Tensions are mounting between Russia and Ukraine in the run-up to the March 31 Ukrainian presidential election. Incumbent President, Petro Poroshenko, has been trailing in the polls for a year. His rival is the populist Yulia Tymoshenko, who has been leading both first-round and second-round polling. Both Poroshenko and Tymoshenko have, at various points in their careers, been accused of being pro-Russian. Poroshenko’s business interests, as with most successful Ukrainian businesspeople, include considerable holdings in Russia. Tymoshenko, on the other hand, was imprisoned from 2011 to 2014 for negotiating a gas imports contract with Russia that allegedly hurt Ukrainian interests. With the most pro-Russian parts of Ukraine either cleaved off (Crimea) or in a state of lawlessness (Donetsk and Luhansk), the median voter in the country has become considerably more nationalist and anti-Russian. It therefore serves no purpose for any politician to campaign on a platform of normalizing relations with Moscow. In this context, the decision by the Patriarchate of Constantinople – the first-among-equals of the Christian Orthodox churches – to grant autocephaly (sovereignty) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in January is part of the ongoing evolution of Ukraine into an independent entity from Russia. This process could create tensions, particularly as parts of the country continue to be engaged in military conflict (Map 1). From Moscow’s perspective, the autocephaly grants Ukraine religious – and therefore some semblance of cultural – independence from Russia. This solidifies the loss of a 43-million person crown jewel from the Russian sphere of influence. Moscow is also not averse to stoking tensions. Although President Putin’s mandate will last until 2024, his popularity is nearly at the lowest level this decade. Orthodox monetary and fiscal policy, along with pension reforms, have sapped his political capital at home. In 2014, tensions over Ukraine spurred nationalist sentiment in Russia, rapidly increased popular support for both Putin and his government (Chart 11). Putin may calculate that another such recapitalization may be needed. Chart 11Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression The danger is therefore that domestic politics in both Ukraine and Russia may create a window of opportunity for a skirmish this quarter. Perhaps something akin to the naval tensions around the Kerch Strait that ultimately cost President Putin a summit with President Trump at the G20 meeting in December. While these incidents may benefit both sides domestically, and may even appear carefully orchestrated, they could also get out of hand in unpredictable ways. Bottom Line: While both Kiev and Russia may see a short-termed conflict as domestically beneficial, such an outcome could have unforeseen consequences. At the very least, it could sap already poor business confidence in neighboring Europe, as it did in 2014-2015. Black Swan 3: Saudi Arabia With A Blank Cheque One of the greatest geopolitical blunders of the twentieth century was Berlin’s decision to give its ally Austro-Hungary a “blank cheque.” Austro-Hungary was an anachronism at the turn of the century – a multiethnic empire held together by allegiance to a royal family. As such, the ideology of nationalism represented an existential threat, particularly given that 60% of the empire’s population was neither Austrian nor Hungarian. Following the assassination of its crown prince Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a pan-Slavist terrorist in Sarajevo, Vienna decided that a total destruction of Serbia was necessary for geopolitical and domestic political reasons. Today, Saudi Arabia is in many ways an anachronism itself. It is the world’s last feudal monarchy. Its leaders understand the risks and have begun an ambitious and multifaceted reform effort. Unlike Austro-Hungary, Saudi Arabia has learned to embrace nationalism. Riyadh is using the war in Yemen, as well as targeted actions against its own royal family and the religious establishment, to build a modern nation-state. The problem is that, much as nationalism was an ideological kryptonite for Vienna, democratic Islamism is an existential problem for Riyadh and its peers among the Gulf monarchies. Neighboring Qatar, a tiny peninsular kingdom enjoying an oversized geopolitical influence due to its natural gas wealth, has supported various groups across the Middle East that believe that democracy and conservative Islam are compatible. Turkey and Qatar have often cooperated in this effort, as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey has served as a model for many such Islamist parties in the region. Why Qatar hitched its geopolitical wagon to democratic Islamism is not clear. Perhaps its leaders felt that it was the only option unclaimed by an energy-rich sponsor. Regardless, Qatar’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood and other such groups has clearly irked Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies, enough for them to kick Qatar out of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In 2017, with the pro-Saudi Trump administration ascendant in the White House, Riyadh felt emboldened enough to break off all diplomatic relations with Qatar and impose an economic blockade. Since 2014, another dynamic has emerged in the region that raises further concerns: a scramble for material resources brought on by the end of +$100 per barrel oil prices. Saudi public expenditures have been steadily rising since 2008, both due to population growth, social welfare spending in the wake of Arab Spring rebellions, and astronomical defense spending to counter the rising influence of Iran. And yet, 2014 saw oil prices plunge to decade lows in a matter of months. Saudi Arabia’s fiscal breakeven oil price has doubled, in a decade, from under $40 per barrel to $83 per barrel in 2018 (Chart 12). Meanwhile, Qatar’s GDP is a quarter of that of Saudi Arabia, even though its population is less than 2% of Saudi Arabia’s. Chart 12Saudi Arabia Has A Fiscal Problem Rumors that the U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis prevented a Saudi invasion of Qatar in 2018 have largely been dismissed by the mainstream media. But should they be? If allegedly “rogue elements” of the Saudi intelligence establishment can dismember a journalist in a consulate, why couldn’t “rogue elements” of its military stage a coup – or an outright invasion – in neighboring Qatar? Such an outcome would truly be extraordinary, but so was the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Meanwhile, President Trump offered an extraordinary level of support for Riyadh by issuing what we can only refer to as a “blank cheque” following Khashoggi’s murder. In the November 20 statement, President Trump essentially created a new policy doctrine of standing with Saudi Arabia “no matter what.”9 Two weeks later, Riyadh “thanked” the U.S. President by slashing the OPEC oil output by 1.2 million barrels per day. From this dynamic, it appears that Washington has made a similar strategic blunder in 2018 that Berlin did in 1914. A weakened, stressed, and threatened ally has been given a “blank cheque” by its stronger ally. Such a sweeping offer of support may lead to unintended consequences as the weaker ally feels that its material and geopolitical constraints can be overcome. In Saudi Arabia’s case, that could mean a more aggressive policy towards Qatar, or perhaps Iran. Particularly now that the White House has seen several realist members of the Trump cabinet – such as Mattis and former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson – replaced by Iran hawks and Trump loyalists. Bottom Line: A combination of less independent-minded cabinet members in the White House and a clear “blank cheque” from President Trump to Saudi Arabia could cause geopolitical risk to re-emerge in the Middle East. In the near term, this could increase the geopolitical risk premium on oil prices – as measured by the residual in Chart 13. Black Swan 4: The Balkans Become A Powder Keg … Again Bismarck famously said in 1888 – 26 years before the outbreak of the Great War, that “one day the great European War will come out of some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.” The Balkans are far less geopolitically relevant today than in the early twentieth century. They are also exhausted following a decade-long Yugoslav rigor mortis in the 1990s which yielded at least three regional wars and now six (or seven, depending who is counting) independent states. The problem is that tensions have not disappeared. Two frozen conflicts remain. First, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a sovereign country made up of two political entities, with the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska agitating for independence and aligning with Russia. Second, tensions between Serbia and Kosovo took a turn for the worse late last year as Kosovo imposed an economic embargo on trade with Serbia and called for the creation of a military. Has anything really changed over the course of the decade? We think there are three causes for alarm: Tensions between Russia and the West have become serious, with both camps looking to score tactical and strategic wins across the globe. With the Syrian Civil War all but over, a new battleground may emerge. While Republika Srpska is essentially an outright ally of Russia, Serbia continues to try to straddle the fine line between an EU enlargement candidate and geopolitical neutrality. However, this high-wire act is becoming untenable as… Enlargement fatigue sets in the EU. There is no doubt that the EU enlargement process froze Balkan conflicts. Countries like Serbia and Kosovo have an incentive to be on their best behavior so long as the prospect of eventual EU membership remains. But in the current environment of introspection, the EU may not have enough of a coherent geopolitical vision to deal with the Balkans without a crisis. The global economic cycle may be ending, leading to a global recession in the next 12-to-24 months. While our BCA House View remains that the next recession will be a mild one in the U.S., we think that EM and, by extension, frontier markets could be the eye of the storm in the next downturn. As investors abandon their “search for yield” in riskier geographies, they could exacerbate poor governance, political tensions, and geopolitical cleavages that have been frozen in place by the last economic cycle. Finally, U.S. policy towards the Balkans is unclear. In the past, the U.S. asked all countries in the region to accept the status quo and prepare for EU integration. But with the U.S. now adopting an antagonistic view towards the EU bloc, it is unclear what Washington’s message to the Balkans will be. After all, Trump has personally encouraged all other world leaders to don their own version of the “America First” slogan. The only problem in a place like the Balkans is that “Serbia first” – or Croatia and Kosovo first – is unlikely to go down smoothly in the neighborhood, given the last twenty – or even hundred – years. Bottom Line: The powder keg that is the Balkans has not been dried for decades. However, several tailwinds of stability are gone, replaced with macro headwinds. A renewed conflict on Europe’s doorstep could be the next great geopolitical crisis. If this were to occur, we would bank on greater European integration, especially in terms of military and foreign policy. However, it could also mark the first break in U.S.-EU foreign policy if the two decide to pick opposing sides in the region. Black Swan 5: Lame Duck Trump For our final Black Swan, we are sticking with one of our 2018 choices: a “Lame duck” presidency. “Lame duck” presidents – leaders whose popularity late in their terms have sunk so low that they can no longer affect policy – are said to be particularly adventurous in the foreign arena. While this adage has a spotty empirical record, there are several notable examples in recent memory.10 American presidents have few constitutional constraints when it comes to foreign policy. Therefore, when domestic constraints rise, U.S. presidents can seek relevance abroad. President Trump may become the earliest, and lamest, lame duck president in recent U.S. history. While his Republican support remains strong (Chart 14), his overall popularity is well below the average presidential approval rating at this point in the political cycle (Chart 15). Now there is also a Democrat-led House of Representatives to stymie his domestic policy and launch independent investigations into both his administration’s conduct and his personal finances and dealings. We would also add the Senate to the list of problems for President Trump. The electoral math was friendly towards the Republicans in 2018, with Democrats defending 10 Senate seats in states that President Trump won in 2016. In 2020, however, two-thirds of the races will be for Republican-held seats. As such, many Republican senators may begin campaigning early by moving away from President Trump. What kind of adventures would we expect to see President Trump embark on in 2019? Last year, we identified “China-U.S. trade war,” “Iran jingoism,” and “North Korea” as potentials. In many ways, 2018 was the year when all three mattered. Going forward, however, we think that trade war and the Middle East might take a backseat. First, the bear market in equities has raised the odds of a recession. As such, the potential cost of pursuing the trade war further has been increased. So has an aggressive policy towards Iran that dramatically boosts oil prices. Furthermore, President Trump has signaled that he is willing to withdraw from the Middle East, calling for a full withdrawal from Syria and telegraphing one from Afghanistan. Instead, we see President Trump potentially following in the footsteps of previous U.S. administrations and finding relevance in Latin America. A military intervention in Venezuela, to ostensibly support a coup against the current regime, would find little opposition domestically. First, there is no doubt that Venezuela has become a genuine humanitarian disaster. Second, its oil output is on a downward spiral already, with only 1 million b/d of production at risk due to a potential military conflict (Chart 16). Third, the new Bolsonaro administration in Brazil may even support an intervention, as well as neighboring Colombia. This is a change from the last twenty years, in which Latin American countries largely stuck together, despite ideological differences, in opposition to U.S. interference in the continent’s domestic affairs. Chart 16On A Downward Spiral Finally, even the anti-Trump U.S. foreign policy establishment may support an intervention. Not only is there the issue of human suffering, but Russia and China have used Venezuela as an anchor to build out influence in America’s sphere of influence. Furthermore, the potential promise of Venezuela’s eventual energy production is another reason to consider an American intervention (Chart 17). Bottom Line: American presidents rarely decide to go softly into that good night. It is very difficult to see President Trump become irrelevant. With tensions with China carrying a high economic cost and military interventions in the Middle East remaining politically toxic in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan wars, perhaps President Trump will decide to go “retro,” in the sense of a throwback Latin America intervention.   Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see, Blackstone, “Byron Wien Announces Ten Surprises For 2018,” dated January 2, 2018, available at blackstone.com. 2 A shoutout to another doyen of the financial industry, Alastair Newton! 3 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “Deciphering Global Trade Linkages,” dated September 27, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see “Highlights of Xi’s speech at Taiwan message anniversary event,” China Daily, January 2, 2019, available at www.chinadaily.com.cn; and “President Tsai Issues Statement On China’s President Xi’s ‘Message To Compatriots In Taiwan,’” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), January 2, 2019, available at english.president.gov.tw. 5 Please see Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” section 3.12, October 18, 2017, available at www.xinhuanet.com; and Deng Yuwen, “Is China Planning To Take Taiwan By Force In 2020?” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2018, available at beta.scmp.com. 6 Please see United States, H.R. 535, Taiwan Travel Act, 115th Congress (2017-18), available at www.congress.gov and S. 2736, Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, 115th Congress (2017-18), available at www.congress.gov. 7 This is precisely what occurred when China chose missile tests in 1995-96 and drove voters toward the very candidate, Lee Teng-hui, that Beijing least desired. The popular Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je may run for president in 2020, and Beijing may see him as preferable to President Tsai. He has spoken of China and Taiwan as being part of the same family and he has held city-to-city talks between Shanghai and Taipei despite the shutdown in direct talks between Beijing and Taipei. 8 Please see Andrew Sharp, “Beijing likely meddled in Taiwan elections, US cybersecurity firm says,” Nikkei Asian Review, November 28, 2018, available at asia.nikkei.com. 9 Please see “Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Standing with Saudi Arabia,” The White House, dated November 20, 2018, available at whitehouse.org. 10 President Clinton launched the largest NATO military operation against Yugoslavia amidst impeachment proceedings against him, while President George H. W. Bush ordered U.S. troops to Somalia a month after losing the 1992 election. Ironically, President George H. W. Bush intervened in Somalia in order to lock in the supposedly isolationist Bill Clinton, who had defeated him three weeks earlier, into an internationalist foreign policy. President George W. Bush ordered the “surge” of troops into Iraq in 2007 after losing both houses of Congress in 2006; President Obama arranged the Iranian nuclear deal after losing the Senate (and hence Congress) to the Republicans in 2014.   Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Global Corporates: The Fed is now clearly signaling a near-term capitulation to tightening financial conditions alongside slowing global growth and inflation. A pause in the U.S. rate hiking cycle, after credit spread valuations have cheapened up, opens up a window of opportunity for global corporate bond market outperformance versus government debt over the next 3-6 months. Country Allocation: Move to overweight (4 of 5) on both U.S. investment grade and high-yield corporates, while downgrading U.S. Treasuries to underweight (2 of 5). Upgrade euro area investment grade and high-yield corporates to neutral (3 of 5), while downgrading euro area governments to underweight (2 of 5). Upgrade emerging market U.S. dollar denominated debt (both sovereign and corporate) from maximum underweight to underweight (2 of 5). Feature We downgraded our overall recommended investment stance on global corporate debt to neutral on June 26 of last year.1 That decision reflected our concern at the time that less accommodative central banks, a rising U.S. dollar, weakening global growth momentum and intensifying U.S.-China trade tensions had all significantly worsened the near-term risk/reward tradeoff for owning corporate bonds. This accompanied a firm-wide call at BCA to pare back our recommended exposure to global equities for the same reasons. We now see an opportunity, driven by better value and diminished market volatility after the Fed has clearly signaled a pause on U.S. rate hikes (Chart of the Week), to go back to an overweight stance on corporate credit on a tactical basis (3-6 months). Chart of the WeekTime For A Pause In Corporate Spread Widening To be clear, we still see medium-term risks for corporate credit once global growth stabilizes and a resilient U.S. economy forces the Fed to restart the rate hikes in the latter half of 2019. A move to a restrictive stance by the Fed toward year-end, signaled by an inversion of the U.S. Treasury yield curve, will raise recession risks and be the eventual death knell for this credit cycle. In the meantime, corporate debt is likely to outperform government bonds, justifying a tactical overweight position. This mirrors the recent change in the BCA House View, returning to a tactical overweight stance on global equities. On a regional basis, we prefer taking more of our upgraded credit risk in U.S. corporates over European and emerging market (EM) equivalents. The outlook for growth remains more favorable on a relative basis to Europe or China, the latter being most critical for the outperformance of EM assets. Why The Spread Widening Will Pause: A Patient Fed Is Taking A Break Global corporate bond spreads have widened since we did our downgrade in June, across all countries and credit tiers (Chart 2). Typically, some underperformance of corporate credit should occur when global growth momentum slows, as was the case throughout 2018. Yet the most violent period of spread widening only began once the Fed began signaling that it would continue with its interest hikes and balance sheet runoff, despite softening global growth. This set off yet another clash between policy and the markets – one of BCA’s key investment themes for 2018 that still applies in 2019 – resulting in a sharp selloff in global risk assets, including corporate debt. The result was a tightening of U.S. financial conditions, first through a stronger U.S. dollar (supported by rate hike expectations) and later through lower equity prices and wider corporate spreads. This echoed the 2014/15 period when the Fed was trying to lift rates off the zero bound after ending its quantitative easing program. The Fed was only able to deliver a single rate hike in December 2015 before pausing because of severely slumping global growth (most notably in China) and a sharp tightening in financial conditions, both of which knocked the wind out of the U.S. economy. Turning to 2019, the downturn in cyclical growth indicators like manufacturing purchasing managers indices (PMI) and the global leading economic indicator (LEI) has reached levels last seen after that 2014/15 episode (Chart 3). Importantly, our global LEI diffusion index, which measures the number of countries with rising LEIs compared to falling LEIs and is itself a reliable leading indicator of the global LEI, is bottoming out at the same level that preceded the 2016 LEI revival (middle panel). This suggests that a stabilization of the global LEI could unfold in the next few months, which would also signal a potential rebound in corporate credit returns (bottom panel). Chart 3Credit Returns Already Reflect Slowing Growth Given the many similarities between today and the 2014/15 backdrop, it is sensible to look for other indicators that accurately heralded the end of that period of spread widening to help time a potential increase in recommended exposure to corporates. Over the past several weeks, our colleagues at our sister BCA service, U.S. Bond Strategy, have been following a checklist of market-based signals to determine the timing of a potential peak in U.S. credit spreads.2 These are grouped into two categories: signals of rebounding global growth and signals of Fed capitulation on rate hikes. For global growth, the indicators monitored are shown in Chart 4: Chart 4Checklist For Peak U.S. Spreads: Global Growth the CRB raw industrials index of commodity prices (a broader measure that excludes highly volatile oil prices) the BCA Market-Based China Growth Indicator (created by our China Investment Strategy team as a proxy of investor expectations of Chinese growth3) the Global Industrial Mining equity price index For Fed capitulation, the indicators monitored are shown in Chart 5: Chart 5Checklist For Peak U.S. Spreads: Fed Capitulation our 12-month fed funds discounter, which measures the amount of expected Fed rate hikes over the next year discounted in the U.S. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve the price of gold in dollars (a higher price correlating with perceptions of easier U.S. monetary policy and vice versa) the nominal trade-weighted U.S. dollar index Among the growth-focused elements of the checklist, only the China Growth Indicator is in a clear uptrend. Non-oil commodity prices had been stabilizing at the end of 2018 but appear to be rolling over, while it is not yet clear if the downturn in Mining stocks has ended. With momentum in global PMIs and LEIs still having not yet bottomed out, it may be too early to expect a cyclical rebound in non-oil commodities and related equities. At a minimum, that will require even greater signs that China’s economy is regaining some vigor. However, as we discussed last week, Chinese policymakers’ options to stimulate growth are far more limited now than they were in 2015 and 2016 when a rebounding China boosted commodity demand and EM asset performance.4 Within the Fed-focused components of the “Peak Spreads Checklist”, the near-term bullish signal for credit is much stronger. Our fed funds discounter has rapidly priced out all rate hikes for 2019. Since November, gold is up nearly 8% and the nominal trade-weighted U.S. dollar is down 2%. The shift in recent Fed messaging from signaling a “gradual pace” of tightening to exhibiting “patience” on any future policy moves was a highly dovish signal for investors. This alone has been enough to stabilize equity and credit markets, which had been discounting that Fed tightening in 2019 would drive the U.S. into a possible recession. In the constant battle between financial conditions and the Fed, the former has won this latest round. How long will this Fed pause last? Continuing with the comparison to the 2014/15 episode, a critical difference is that underlying trends in U.S. economic growth and inflation are firmer today. This is evident in the BCA Fed Monitor, which is comprised of economic and financial data that indicate pressure on the Fed to tighten or ease monetary policy. Chart 6 shows a “cycle-on-cycle” comparison of the Fed Monitor (and its subcomponents) today versus 2014/15. The Fed Monitor is still signaling a need for the Fed to continue tightening because the Economic Growth and Inflation Components remain elevated. Yet the Monitor has declined from its recent peak thanks entirely to the plunge in the Financial Conditions Component, which has fallen even faster than it did in 2014/15. Chart 6BCA Fed Monitor: Today Vs 2014/15 The implication from our Fed Monitor is that there needs to be more evidence of slowing U.S. economic growth and reduced inflation pressures for the Fed to stay on hold for longer. If the data stay firm, but financial conditions ease because investors expect a prolonged pause from the Fed, then the Fed could quickly return to a hawkish bias later this year. This is now our base case scenario for how 2019 will play out. This is also why we are only upgrading corporate debt on a tactical basis. We do not expect U.S. growth or inflation to slow enough to prevent more Fed tightening later this year – an outcome that will weigh on credit returns as the Fed moves to a restrictive policy stance. Yet even if we are wrong and the U.S. economy decelerates more sharply, that is also a bad outcome for credit because it means weaker corporate profits and rising downgrades and defaults. For bond investors with longer-time horizons than 3-6 months, the credit rally that we are anticipating can actually provide an opportunity to reduce credit exposure for the final leg of the Fed’s monetary policy cycle and the multi-year corporate credit cycle. In other words, selling into the rally rather than chasing it. For now, we are choosing to play for the shorter-term move by upgrading our recommended global credit allocations. Yet we do not envision this turning into a long-term position. The medium-term outlook for corporates is far more challenging given the advanced age of the monetary, business and credit cycles. Bottom Line: The Fed is now clearly signaling a near-term capitulation to tightening global financial conditions alongside slowing global growth and inflation. A pause in the U.S. rate hiking cycle, after credit spread valuations have cheapened up, opens up a window of opportunity for global corporate bond market outperformance versus government debt over the next 3-6 months. The Specific Changes To Our Recommended Asset Allocation As part of our tactical upgrade of global corporate debt, we are making the following changes to our recommended portfolio allocation tables (see Page 13): Upgrade overall global credit exposure to overweight (4 out of 5) Upgrade both U.S. investment grade and high-yield corporate exposure to overweight (4 out of 5), while downgrading U.S. Treasury exposure to underweight (2 out of 5) Upgrade euro area investment grade and high-yield corporate exposure to neutral (3 out of 5) and downgrade euro area government bond exposure to underweight (2 out of 5) Upgrade EM U.S. dollar denominated debt from maximum underweight to underweight (2 out of 5), both for sovereign and corporate debt. The changes all represent a one-notch upgrade from our previous allocations, based on our more positive tactical view on overall global credit risk, while still maintaining our relative preference for U.S. corporates over non-U.S. equivalents. We prefer U.S. credit not only because we expect better relative economic growth momentum in the U.S., but also because our preferred valuation metrics indicate that U.S. corporate bond spreads now look relatively attractive. Our estimate of the default-adjusted spread on U.S. high-yield corporates, which is simply the current spread minus losses from defaults, has risen to 302bps, well above the long-run average of 268bps (Chart 7). That is a function of the high-yield spread now discounting a 2019 default rate of nearly 6%, well above our forecasted default rate of 2.5%.5 Chart 7Too Much Default Risk Priced Into U.S. Junk Corporate credit spreads in the U.S. also look attractive on a volatility-adjusted basis. Our estimates of Breakeven Spreads – the amount of spread widening required for corporate returns to break-even with duration-matched U.S. Treasuries on a one-year horizon – shows that credit spreads have cheapened to levels that are in the upper end of the historical range for both investment grade and high-yield debt (Charts 8 & 9). Chart 8Vol-Adjusted IG Spreads Have Cheapened   Chart 9Vol-Adjusted HY Spreads Are Cheap Credit spreads have also cheapened up in Europe and EM, and a “risk-on” rally from a Fed pause will likely benefit spread product in those regions. However, the performance of U.S. credit versus non-U.S. credit remains largely determined by relative growth trends (Charts 10 & 11). Given our more positive view on U.S. growth on a relative basis, we are maintaining a higher recommended allocation to U.S. corporates versus euro area and EM equivalents, even as we upgrade overall global corporate exposure. This is also a way to provide a partial hedge to the specific risks in the latter regions coming from: Chart 10Global Corporates: Continue Favoring U.S. Over Europe   Chart 11Global Corporates: Continue Favoring U.S. Over EM a) an end of the ECB’s corporate bond buying as part of its Asset Purchase Program, which takes a major buyer out of the euro area corporate market b) a more persistent slowing of Chinese growth momentum and softer non-oil commodity prices, both of which would be negatives for EM assets On a final note, we are also changing the specific weighting in our Model Bond Portfolio on Page 12 to reflect all of the above changes. The allocations to all U.S., euro area and EM corporates are increased – with bigger allocation changes in the U.S. – funded out of reduced weightings in U.S., German and French government bonds. Note that we are not making any changes to our relative U.K. exposures this week, given the unique risk for U.K. financial markets from the Brexit uncertainty. Thus, we are maintaining an overweight stance on U.K. Gilts in the government bond portion of the model portfolio, while remaining underweight U.K. corporates on the credit side.   Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Time To Take Some Chips Off The Table: Downgrade Global Corporate Bond Exposure To Neutral”, dated June 26th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Checklist For Peak Credit Spreads”, dated November 27th 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Trade Is Not China’s Only Problem”, dated November 21st 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Three Big Questions To Start Off 2019”, dated January 8th 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 That forecasted default rate is taken from Moody’s, who have a similarly positive outlook on 2019 U.S. growth as BCA. Therefore, we see no reason to use a different default rate assumption in our high-yield valuation estimate. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns