Financial Markets
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Macro headwinds, deficient demand along with rising chemicals stockpiles that have dealt a blow to industry pricing power warn that chemicals stocks are on the verge of a breakdown. Downgrade to a below benchmark allocation. At the margin deteriorating domestic conditions, along with a sustained softness in global growth indicators that are prone to an additional setback given the rising trade policy uncertainty suggest that it is prudent to move to the sidelines on the long materials/short utilities pair trade. Recent Changes Downgrade the S&P chemicals index to underweight, today. This also pushes the S&P materials sector’s weight back down to neutral. Close the long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade, today. Table 1 Feature The SPX suffered its first 5% pullback for the year early last week, and now that President Trump has opened Pandora’s Box, there are high odds that equities will continue to seesaw, at least, until the late-June G20 meeting when the heads of states meet again. Since early-March we have been, and remain, cautious on the short-term equity market outlook as a slew of our tactical indicators have soured. Chart 1 shows three additional non-confirming equity market breakout indicators that are exerting downward pull on the SPX. Stock correlations have increased (shown inverted, top panel, Chart 1), junk spreads have widened (shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 1) and the NYSE’s FANG+ Index has run out of steam (bottom panel, Chart 1). Now the risk is, as we first highlighted in the middle of last week, that the back half of the year global growth reacceleration phase goes on hiatus as this trade policy uncertainty further shatters CEO confidence and global exports remain downbeat (Chart 2). Chart 1Non-Confirming Indicators Chart 2Stalled Export Engine Worrisomely, a number of our cyclical indicators are also firing warning shots. Not only did the ISM’s manufacturing new orders-to-inventories ratio breach parity, but also BCA’s boom/bust indicator took a turn for the worse (Chart 3). Importantly, while a lot of ink is spent on how the U.S. economy is beyond full employment, labor markets are tight and the output gap has closed, resource utilization has petered out – interestingly at a lower high compared with the previous two peaks. This backdrop points to more stock market turmoil in the coming months, similar to the mid-2015 message (Chart 4). Chart 3Cyclical Trouble Brewing Chart 4No Tightness Here Tack on China’s cresting credit impulse and factors are falling into place for a tumultuous back half of the year (bottom panel, Chart 3). Keep in mind that the two ultimate “risk off” indicators we track remain tame and underscore that investor complacency remains elevated: the TED spread is at 16bps and the Japanese yen has barely budged of late. This is worrying and suggests that investors expect a positive U.S./China trade resolution (USD/JPY shown inverted, Chart 5). Chart 5No Real Risk Off Phase Yet Were the equity markets to spin out of control however, the “Fed put” remains in place and would save the day. While the Fed has taken down the median dots and projects no hikes for the rest of the year and a single hike next year, the message from the bond market is diametrically opposite. Thus, we are de-risking our portfolio and this week we are downgrading a deep cyclical sector to neutral and also closing an explicit cyclical/defensive pair trade. Chart 6 shows that over 40bps of cuts are priced in by May 2020, according to the OIS curve. Historically, this has been an excellent leading indicator of the annual delta in the fed funds rate. Our takeaway is that the Fed remains the only game in town and were another mini-riot point to occur, then the Fed would not hesitate to step in and put a floor under the equity market. Chart 6The Bond Market Has The Stock Market’s Back In sum, the risks are rising for a prolonged consolidation phase in equities on the back of a trade war escalation that pushes out the global growth recovery to early-2020. Thus, we are de-risking our portfolio and this week we are downgrading a deep cyclical sector to neutral and also closing an explicit cyclical/defensive pair trade. Chemical Reaction We have been on the sidelines on the heavyweight S&P chemicals index of late (it comprises 74% of the S&P materials sector), but factors have now fallen into place and warrant a below benchmark allocation. First, global macro headwinds will continue to weigh on this deep cyclical index as the risk of a full blown trade war will likely take a bite out of final demand. Chemical producers garner 60% of their revenues from abroad (a full 20 percentage points higher than the SPX) and thus are extremely sensitive to the ebbs and flows of emerging markets economic growth in general and China in particular. Adding it all up, macro headwinds, deficient demand along with rising chemicals stockpiles that have dealt a blow to industry pricing power warn that chemicals stocks are on the verge of a breakdown. Chart 7 shows that U.S. chemical products exports are contracting and if the greenback sustains its recent upward trajectory given heightened global trade policy uncertainty, further global market share losses are likely at a time when the overall chemicals market will be shrinking. With regard to China specifically, the recent drop in the credit impulse is far from reassuring (bottom panel, Chart 3) and, assuming that the Chinese authorities will await a riot point prior to really opening up the credit spigots, more pain lies ahead for U.S. chemical exports. Second, the picture is not brighter on the domestic front. Importantly, the American Chemical Council’s Chemical Activity Barometer is nil, warning that domestic end-demand is also ailing (Chart 8). Chart 7Hazard Warning Chart 8Toxic Profit Prospects Tack on a surprisingly persistent jump in industry headcount (bottom panel, Chart 9), and the implication is that waning productivity will slash chemicals profits (bottom panel, Chart 8). Finally, a number of other operating metrics are languishing. Chemicals railcar loads are outright contracting and the softening ISM manufacturing survey points to further downside in the coming months (middle panel, Chart 9). The chemicals shipments-to-inventories ratio is also in contraction territory as this downbeat demand has been met with a buildup in inventories both at the wholesale and manufacturing levels. As a result, a liquidation phase has ensued and chemicals selling prices have sunk into the deflation zone (middle & bottom panels, Chart 10). Chart 9Deficient Demand Chart 10Liquidation Phase Adding it all up, macro headwinds, deficient demand along with rising chemicals stockpiles that have dealt a blow to industry pricing power warn that chemicals stocks are on the verge of a breakdown. Bottom Line: Trim the S&P chemicals index to underweight. Given the 74% weight chemicals stock have in the S&P materials sector, this move also pushes the S&P materials sector’s (Chart 11) weight to neutral from overweight, and we crystalize modest losses of 5.2% in this niche deep cyclical sector. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P chemicals index are: BLBG: S5CHEM – DWDP, ECL, SHW, PPG, IFF, CE, ALB, LIN, APD, DOW, LYB, FMC, CF, MOS, EMN. Chart 11Trim Materials Back Down To Neutral Materials/Utilities: Move To The Sidelines While we were early in identifying a reflationary impulse from the Chinese authorities and put on an explicit cyclicals/defensives pair trade to capitalize on this opportunity at the end of January, the long materials/short utilities pair trade has failed to live up to its expectations, and today we recommend moving to the sidelines. Such a move is part of our de-risking of the portfolio given the rising global macro headwinds on the horizon we identified earlier. More specifically on the domestic front, our Economic Impulse Indicator (EII) suggests that beneath the surface some cracks are appearing in the U.S. economy. The EII encapsulates six parts of the U.S. economy and on a second derivative basis, softness is apparent (top panel, Chart 12). The ISM manufacturing survey corroborates this message and is also flirting with the boom/bust 50 line, signaling that it is prudent to take some risk off the table (bottom panel, Chart 12). The bond market is sniffing out this deteriorating domestic backdrop and the recent 25bs drop in the 10-year Treasury yield has breathed life into utilities and sucked the oxygen out of materials. Fixed income proxies are also benefiting from the drubbing in Citi’s Economic Surprise Index to the detriment of growth-sensitive deep cyclicals. The melting stock-to-bond ratio reflects all these domestic forces and warns against preferring materials to utilities stocks (Chart 13). Chart 12Move To The Sidelines Chart 13Mushrooming Domestic… The specter of a re-escalation in the trade war will not only continue to weigh on some domestic indicators, but gauges monitoring the health of the global economy will also suffer a setback. Already, our Global Activity Indicator has lost its spark, underscoring that global export volumes will continue to contract. King Dollar is also flexing its muscles, especially versus vulnerable twin deficit emerging market countries which saps economic growth. Tack on the derivative deflationary effect the appreciating greenback has on the commodity complex and materials stocks are at a great disadvantage versus domestic focused utilities (Chart 14). A number of additional global growth indicators are waning and signal that relative profitability will move in favor of utilities and at the expense of materials in the coming months. BCA’s global synchronicity indicator, which gauges the number of countries with a PMI above versus below 50 is sinking like a stone. In fact, the overall global manufacturing PMI is just barely above the expansion/contraction line and global industrial production is decelerating. All of this is a net negative for the deep cyclical materials sector, but a net positive for defensive utilities stocks that sport nil foreign sales exposure (Chart 15). Chart 14…And Global Growth… Chart 15…Worries But before getting outright bearish on this pair, there is a powerful offset. Likely, most of the bad news is reflected in bombed out relative valuations and oversold technicals. This actually also prevents us from fully reversing the trade and buying utilities at the expense of materials. A move to the sidelines is more appropriate (Chart 16). At the margin deteriorating domestic conditions, along with a sustained softness in global growth indicators that are prone to an additional setback given the rising trade policy uncertainty suggest that it is prudent to move to the sidelines on the long materials/short utilities pair trade. Bottom Line: Book losses of 5.3% in the long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade and move to the sidelines. Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Chart 16Saving Grace Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Highlights We’ve searched in vain for imminent domestic weakness in the U.S. economy, … : Much of our work this spring has focused on trying to poke holes in our view that the equilibrium fed funds rate remains above the target fed funds rate, but we haven’t found any evidence of overheating in the real economy, or worrisome excesses in financial markets. … but an exogenous shock could well precipitate a recession if it were serious enough: The U.S. is a comparatively closed economy, but there’s no such thing as full-on decoupling. The U.S. may react more slowly than other major economies to what’s going on in the rest of the world, but it’s not immune to it. A trade war would threaten global growth, … : U.S.-China trade negotiations have taken center stage over the last couple weeks, and escalating tension between the world’s two largest standalone economies will surely cast a pall over the global outlook. … but there are other potential threats that bear monitoring: Tensions with Iran could be the catalyst for an oil price shock, while a significant rollback of globalization could crimp corporate profit margins. Either would hasten the end of the equity bull market and the expansion. Feature Tight monetary policy is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for a recession. We deem policy to be tight if the fed funds rate exceeds our estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, and easy if it is below our estimate of equilibrium. Over the six decades for which we compute an estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, the U.S. has only ever experienced recessions when the fed funds rate has exceeded our estimate of equilibrium (Chart 1). Tight policy isn’t always tantamount to a recession – nothing came of tight settings in 1984 or 1995 – but recessions don’t occur without it. Chart 1Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Conditions Are Tight We currently estimate that the equilibrium fed funds rate, a.k.a. the neutral rate, is about 3⅛%, and we continue to project that it will be around 3⅜% by the end of the year. Those estimates leave the Fed with plenty of headroom before it materially slows the economy. If our estimate is on the money, it will take four more rate hikes to induce an inflection in the business cycle. We have not seen anything in the ongoing flow of macro data, or evidence of excesses in the financial markets, that would suggest a recession is already under way or is lurking around the corner. Internal dynamics should continue to support the expansion, but threats from outside the U.S. are growing. We therefore conclude that the next recession may well not arrive for another two years, in the absence of a significantly adverse exogenous event. This week, we extend our focus beyond the U.S. to try to uncover the external threats that could stop the U.S. economy, and the bull markets in risk assets, in their tracks. Beyond the tariff fireworks, we also contemplate the possibility that conflict with Iran could lead to an oil price shock, and the impact of a significant rollback of globalization. It is not our base case that any of the various external threats will tip the U.S. into a recession, but investors should keep tabs on the biggest ones. Tariffs The U.S.-China trade saga has unfolded in three pairs of moves and counter-moves (Diagram 1). While the aggregate $50bn worth of Chinese goods tariffed in the first two salvos mostly targeted industrial equipment and machinery, the third installment, covering $200bn worth of imports, extended the tariffs’ reach to consumer products. Major categories included not only commodities such as base metals, chemical products and mineral fuels and oils, but also a broad swath of foods, textiles, electronics, vehicles and spare parts. After a three-month cease-fire, the developments of the last two weeks arguably marked the most significant escalation of tensions on both sides. The U.S. is now threatening to levy tariffs on the remaining $325bn of Chinese goods that have so far been spared. Diagram 1Anything You Can Do Our colleagues at BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy service suggest that recent foreign policy initiatives indicate that the White House does not feel any particular pressure to minimize economic risk this far ahead of the election. The risk of market-disruptive measures has therefore increased, and they see a 50-50 chance that the U.S. and China will fail to reach an accord (Table 1). Although the administration has delayed any action on autos and auto parts for now, Europe could be the next trade partner in its cross hairs. The odds that Section 232 (national-security-threat) tariffs will be levied on European auto imports is rising (Chart 2). Table 1U.S.-China Trade War: Probabilities Of A Deal By End Of June 2019 These heightened trade tensions may delay the global growth recovery that we were expecting to bloom in the summer, and they may also allow the dollar to keep advancing. The greenback is a countercyclical currency, moving inversely with global activity (Chart 3), and a bump in the road for global growth would likely extend its upward run. Chart 3The Countercyclical Dollar Although a strong dollar would be a headwind for exporters, the U.S. economy is comparatively closed. Tariffs are likely to exert the greatest pressure on the economy via softer consumption and investment. So far, the available evidence suggests that U.S. consumers and corporations have borne the brunt of higher tariffs in the form of higher retail prices and lower profit margins.1 Iran Our geopolitical strategists contend that investors have underrated conflict with Iran as a market risk for a while. Now that the contentiousness of U.S.-Iran relations has ratcheted higher upon the administration’s decision not to extend the import waivers on Iranian oil, the issue is back in the spotlight. Our strategists caution that managing the dispute may require more delicacy than the more hawkish elements of the administration realize. In their view, the potential for a misstep increases the odds of a recession and poses a significant risk to the equity bull market. In a joint Special Report by our Commodity and Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy services at the beginning of the month, our in-house experts stressed that there are multiple moving parts driving the supply-demand balance in the global oil market.2 Investors should realize that the world faces the prospect of the loss of Venezuelan production (approximately 600,000 barrels per day (b/d)) and significant outages in Libya (~600,000 to 800,000 b/d), in addition to our strategists’ base-case estimate of 700,000 b/d from Iran’s current 1.3 million b/d output. BCA does not expect that all of that output will be lost, but the key point is that Iran is not the only potential source of a supply shortfall. Our energy strategists believe that OPEC 2.0 – the producer coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, and supported by Saudi Arabia’s OPEC allies – has the capacity to make up for even their larger shortfall scenarios (Chart 4). The problem is that OPEC 2.0 may not have the will to do so in a timely fashion. Saudi Arabia and the rest of the OPEC 2.0 coalition were caught completely off guard by the administration’s issuance of import waivers in November, after they had ramped up production at its request to limit the market disruptions that would have ensued when Iran’s output was taken off the market. The last-minute waiver decision caused oil prices to crater in the wake of a supply glut that OPEC 2.0 has been working to sop up ever since (Chart 5). Chart 5... But The Oil Market Is Pretty Tight OPEC 2.0’s members may feel that they were badly used last fall, and may not be inclined to move proactively now. Russia is managing its own low-grade conflict with the U.S., and all of the coalition should bear in mind that the U.S. could release over a million b/d from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) for a solid six to nine months, according to our energy team’s estimates. If rising oil prices are often viewed as a tax on American consumers, a late summer/early fall release of holdings could be viewed as an election rebate, courtesy of the skilled economic managers in the White House. Our team expects that OPEC 2.0 will likely guard against an oversupply-driven swoon in oil prices by managing its production on something akin to a just-in-time inventory strategy. Our energy and geopolitical strategists caution that there are two other ways the administration may overplay its hand. First, it might overestimate U.S. shale drillers’ ability to export their production. While new pipeline construction will relieve the transportation bottleneck limiting the Permian Basin output that reaches the Gulf of Mexico, oil exports from the Gulf are limited by a shortage of deep-water harbor facilities. If global trade tensions do worsen, both the dollar and U.S. equities may attract safe-haven flows. There is also the possibility that Iran might strike at Iraq, putting some of its 3.5 million b/d output at risk. It could also make good on its repeated threat to close the Straits of Hormuz, through which nearly a fifth of global oil supplies travel daily. Either of these options would dramatically escalate the conflict, but a desperate Iran might pursue them if it felt cornered. The bottom line is that the probability of an oil price shock is not negligible. Brinkmanship with Iran could upset a delicate supply-demand balance in global oil markets, and a delicate geopolitical balance in the Middle East. If the Volcker double-dip is treated as a single event, a surge in oil prices has preceded every recession in the last 45 years, except for the 2001 recession precipitated by the bursting of the dot-com bubble (Chart 6). Chart 6Oil Price Spikes Often Precede Recessions Significant Rollback Of Globalization Our Geopolitical Strategy and Global Asset Allocation services have cited peak globalization as an important long-term investment theme for the last several years. The tariff tensions between the U.S. and its trading partners would seem to have borne out their predictions, especially if one views them as having been inspired by unskilled workers’ losses from globalization. Taking on foreign exporters is likely to play well in the electorally decisive Rust Belt states, where manufacturing job losses have hit especially hard. We fully subscribe to the theory of comparative advantage as formulated by David Ricardo in the early 19th century. By allowing individual countries to specialize in what they do best, free trade increases the size of the global economic pie. Empirical evidence suggests that globalization also re-slices the pie, however. In the developed world, outsourcing manufacturing has operated to the benefit of investors and the detriment of less-skilled workers. For U.S.-based multinationals, tariffs are a minor irritant compared to the prospect of having to reroute supply chains around China. The modest headwinds to globalization observed before the U.S. began engaging in serial bilateral trade conflicts did not undermine corporate profit margins in any material way. A bigger anti-globalization push that forced global supply chains to be rerouted or partially unwound would have much more negative effects. The U.S. is a comparatively closed economy, but the multinationals that dominate equity market capitalization rely heavily on interactions with the rest of the world. Unwinding the global supply chains that have been carefully constructed over the last 30 years would be disruptive and costly. The worst-case scenario envisioned by our geopolitical strategists, in which U.S.-China relations dramatically worsen and the tariff back-and-forth escalates in a major way, would hit equities hard, especially if supply chains had to be rebuilt. As a proxy for what globalization has meant for investors’ and blue-collar workers’ share of the pie, we consider the path of real wages relative to productivity over the last 50 years. From 1970 through 2001, U.S. wages generally kept pace with productivity gains, observing a fairly narrow, well-defined range (Chart 7). Once China entered the WTO (as denoted by the vertical line on the chart), productivity-adjusted wages fell precipitously, and even their periodic bounces have fallen well short of the level that marked the lower end of the previous range. Chart 7The Pie Has Grown, But Unskilled Labor's Slice Has Shrunk Bottom Line: Temporary barriers to free trade, implemented as a negotiating tactic, are not a big deal for equities. A significant rollback of globalization would be, however, and a need to divert global supply chains away from China could stop the bull market in its tracks. Investment Implications Along with our Global Investment Strategy colleagues, we are somewhat more sanguine than our Geopolitical Strategy service that a worst-case outcome between the U.S. and China can be averted. We therefore continue to believe that the U.S. expansion, and the bull markets in risk assets, will persist until the Fed tightens monetary conditions enough to spark the next recession. We reiterate our recommendations that investors should maintain at least an equal weight position in equities and spread product. Enough is at stake in the conflicts with China and Iran, however, that a worsening of either could cause us to change our view, and we will be watching developments on each front closely. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Jennifer Lacombe Senior Analyst, Global ETF Strategy jenniferl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, “The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare,” NBER Working Paper No. 25672, (March 2019). 2 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy/Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “U.S.-Iran: This Means War?,”dated May 3, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The rising spectre of global market volatility has reignited interest in the Swiss franc. In the current geopolitical game of brinksmanship between the U.S. and China, the risk of miscalculation is high, suggesting it pays to have insurance in place. The large net short positioning in the Swiss franc and cheap valuation make it attractive from a contrarian standpoint. That said, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) is unlikely to sit and watch the CHF catapult to new highs. We expect currency intervention will be actively and aggressively used as a policy tool. Over the longer term, high domestic savings, rising productivity and a chronic current account surplus are underlying sources of support for the Swiss franc. Hold on to CHF/NZD positions recommended on April 26. We expect the unofficial floor of EUR/CHF 1.08-1.12 to hold in the near term but will respect our stop-loss at 1.11 if it is breached. Feature For most of the past decade, the Swiss franc has tended to be a dormant currency, interspersed by short bouts of intense volatility. For example, the USD/CHF is sitting today exactly where it was in early 2008, yet during this period the franc has seen wild gyrations that have lasted anywhere from just a few days to a few months. Outside of these swings, both USD/CHF and EUR/CHF have been mostly stable (Chart I-1). Chart I-1On The Verge Of A Big Move? The first bout of volatility occurred during the Great Financial Crisis, when the franc appreciated by 13% versus the euro, from July to October 2008. The second adjustment was marked by the European debt crisis, with the drop in the euro putting tremendous upward pressure on the franc. From the beginning of 2010 until September 2011 (when the SNB eventually put a currency floor in place), the euro plummeted by almost 35% versus the franc. More importantly, two-thirds of this adjustment occurred in the short few months before the SNB took action. The most recent adjustment in the franc has been the most interesting, because it was the central bank itself – not market forces – that triggered volatility in the exchange rate. In January 2015, the SNB decided to abandon the EUR/CHF 1.20 floor. The euro instantaneously cratered by about 30% versus the franc before retracing half of those losses a few days after. Since then, the EUR/CHF has been slowly creeping back towards the levels that prevailed before the floor was abandoned. The unifying theme across all three episodes is that the franc has tended to stage big moves near market riot points. Over the past week, the Swiss franc has emerged as one of the best-performing currencies amid the rising spectre of global market volatility (Chart I-2). This brings forward a few interesting questions. Will the SNB abandon the unofficial floor of EUR/CHF 1.08-1.12, or does it have an incentive to vigorously defend the currency? Should market volatility intensify from current levels, what trading opportunities are available to investors? Finally, what is the medium- and long-term outlook for the Swiss franc? Chart I-2The Franc Loves Volatility The Case For An Unofficial Cap The irony of the Swiss currency cap is that both its inception in 2011 and eventual demise in 2015 were rooted in deep external deflationary shocks, but the rationale behind the SNB’s moves in both episodes was vastly different. Back in 2011, Switzerland was rapidly stepping back into deflation, having just barely escaped it a year earlier. More importantly, this was driven by tradeable goods prices, given the franc’s rampant appreciation. At its nadir in 2011, goods prices were deflating by 3%, and rapidly dragging down inflation expectations with them. The SNB quickly realized that for a small, open economy like Switzerland, the exchange rate becomes incrementally important if deflation is entrenched (Chart I-3). Ergo, sitting and watching the trade-weighted Swiss franc continue to appreciate, especially given the euro was in a cascading downdraft, appeared to be a recipe for disaster. The stakes were especially high, given recent memory of the Great Recession. The cap worked like a charm, and the authorities could not have hoped for a better result. Inflation expectations staged a V-shaped recovery, along with headline inflation. The economy entered into a meaningful economic rebound, with the PMI swiftly rising above 50 and real GDP growth accelerating from near standstill to a 2.5% pace by 2014. This set the stage for a stock market rally that more than doubled the SMI index, nudging it back to its pre-crisis highs. The SNB quickly realized that for a small, open economy like Switzerland, the exchange rate often dictates the trend in domestic inflation. Since then, the inflation dynamics have improved even further, reinforcing the view that the SNB continues to manage the currency, even though the EUR/CHF floor was abandoned over four years ago. Inflation has risen almost uninterruptedly since it bottomed in 2015 (Chart I-4) – a feat that has not been replicated in major economies like the U.S. or euro area. During the same period, the EUR/CHF has trended higher, stabilizing during bouts of EUR/USD weakness but strengthening alongside gains in the euro. This has cheapened the trade-weighted franc, buffeting consumer prices. Chart I-3Exchange Rates Affect Tradeable Goods' Prices Chart I-4The SNB Has Done A Good ##br##Job So Far Our bias is that the whisper floor of 1.08-1.12 for EUR/CHF will continue to persist until the Swiss economy decisively exits deflation. In its latest monetary policy report, the SNB lowered its inflation target for 2019 and 2020 from 0.5% to 0.3% and 1% to 0.6% respectively. Meanwhile, three key factors suggest the inflation rate will continue to be anchored at low levels in the near term: Global trade has slowed meaningfully since the onset of 2018 and continues to drift downward. Given the complex nature of Swiss exports and their high-ranking in the value chain, they have been largely insulated from the slowdown (Chart I-5). It also helps that exporters have been able to cut prices to maintain volume sales. However, there is a natural limit as to how much exporters can cut prices to maintain demand, or how long exports can be insulated from a global slowdown, let alone a trade war. Falling exports will be a renewed powerful deflationary pulse for the domestic economy. While the franc has cheapened, our models suggest it still remains 5% overvalued versus the euro (Chart I-6). This explains in part why import prices remain under downward pressure, since it is just the mirror image of an expensive currency. In a world of still-low inflation, any adjustment in the real exchange rate can only occur very slowly. Swiss prices are rising at a 0.7% annual rate, while eurozone prices are rising at a 1.7% clip. This suggests it will take about five years just for the franc to close its overvaluation gap versus the euro. This suggests the SNB will be loath to tolerate any knee-jerk appreciation in the franc. Chart I-5Swiss Exports At Risk From A Trade War Chart I-6EUR/CHF Is Still 5% Cheap While the output gap has closed, it remains well below levels that have previously begun to generate meaningful inflationary pressures in the domestic economy. Domestic retail sales remain weak on the back of tepid wage growth. While the unemployment rate is at 2.4%, it usually takes the unemployment rate falling below 1% before it begins to generate any significant inflationary pressures. This is unlikely to happen over the next six to nine months. The Swiss labor market is extremely flexible and fluid, allowing for tremendous efficiency. Part-time employment continues to dominate job gains, meaning the need for precautionary savings will continue to restrain spending. Chart I-7Money Supply Growth Has Converged To GDP Growth Interestingly, the SNB has not had to ramp up its balance sheet significantly in recent years. Part of the reason is that the slowdown in global trade eased natural demand for francs, which meant the SNB was no longer accumulating foreign exchange reserves at a rampant pace. More importantly, the SNB has used the global slowdown to drain excess liquidity from the system and somewhat renormalize policy. Back in 2011 when the SNB put the cap in place, there was an explosion in domestic liquidity, with broad money supply rising at a 10% pace. As panicked investors were fleeing the European periphery, there were large inflows into the Swiss economy and into the haven of government bonds, driving up the franc in the process. The same pattern was repeated again in 2016 after the U.K. referendum to leave the EU. This time around, a lack of significant EU tail risks on the near-term horizon have curtailed safe-haven flows into the franc. This has allowed Swiss money supply growth to converge towards nominal GDP growth, effectively sterilizing excess liquidity (Chart I-7). The message from SNB Central Bank Chair Thomas Jordan has been very clear: Interest rates could be lowered further, along with powerful intervention in the foreign exchange market if necessary. This suggests that in the near term the preference for the SNB is for a stable exchange rate. The issue is that market forces have occasionally dictated otherwise, especially during riot points. With the S&P 500 off its highs, corporate spreads both in the U.S. and euro area inching higher, the VIX in an uptrend and government bond yields falling, we may be approaching such a point. Lessons From The 1990s And 2015 The natural questions that follow are that if the cap worked so perfectly, then why was it scrapped in the first place? And why not explicitly put it back on, given the rising specter of global asset volatility and Swiss franc strength? After all, if the risk for Switzerland is that it could abruptly step back into deflation, then the SNB can use the franc as a potent weapon to ease domestic financial conditions. Capping the franc at a cheap level to the euro, say back at 1.20, could be exactly what the doctor prescribed. The reality is that there are both political and economic constraints to such a commitment. While the decision to scrap the EUR/CHF floor was a puzzle to most investors back in 2015, a post-mortem analysis suggests the reasoning in hindsight was rather obvious. Back in 2015, the world economy was entering into a manufacturing recession as China closed off the credit spigots. This was particular acute in the Eurozone, which had just exited a double-dip recession but was facing credit growth falling at a 7% pace. Enter quantitative easing. The deflationary backdrop back then had already led to an explosion of high-powered money as foreigners flocked into Swiss assets. Foreign exchange reserves were rapidly outpacing the monetary base and quickly closing in on nominal GDP (Chart I-8). The risk of course is that if surging money and credit growth cannot fuel consumer price inflation, it can only stimulate an asset price boom. A floor to a currency about to ride a wave of large-scale monetary stimulus was disconcerting to even the most Keynesian of Swiss central bankers. A floor to a currency about to ride a wave of large-scale monetary stimulus was disconcerting to even the most Keynesian of Swiss central bankers. Meanwhile, there had already been a rising chorus of discontent among right-wing politicians in 2014, specifically those within the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) who wanted the central bank to stop buying foreign currencies and significantly lift its gold holdings instead. As early as October of 2014, opinion polls suggested that support for the proposal was at 44%, with only 39% of Swiss citizens against.1 Memories from the 1990s asset burst in Switzerland were front and center among SVP members. The Plaza Accord had led to the proliferation of carry trades into Switzerland as the U.S. dollar fell. This was supercharged by strong migration into Switzerland ahead of the fall of the Berlin Wall. All of this lit a fire under the real estate market. The SNB was eventually forced to raise interest rates from 3.5% in 1998 to 9% in 1992, transforming a real estate bull market into a 20-year bust (Chart I-9). With the SVP currently ahead in opinion polls ahead of the October 2019 elections, this is likely to remain a constraint Chart I-8Still Lots Of High-Powered Money In Switzerland Chart I-9Macro-Prudential Measures Have Stymied A Housing Bubble Economically, the SNB has to walk a fine line between a predominantly deflationary backdrop in Switzerland but a rising debt-to-GDP ratio that pins it among the highest in the G10 (Chart I-10). Too little stimulus, and the economy runs the risk of entering a debt-deflation spiral, as inflation expectations continue to be anchored strongly to the downside. Too much stimulus, and the result will be a build up of imbalances, leading to an eventual bust. This dilemma was the “raison d’ être” of the Swiss currency cap in 2011, but let to its eventual demise in 2015. Chart I-10The Swiss Have Lots Of Debt A final thought about the cap: It is different from a peg in that the former allows the franc to depreciate versus the euro, while the latter does not. This makes the cap an asymmetric mechanism: Only when the CHF is under upward pressure will the cap act as a QE mechanism, because the SNB has to buy euros while selling Swiss francs. Should the franc weaken against the euro, the SNB does not have to intervene, hence its balance sheet stops expanding and QE ends. The key risk is that the euro drops substantially, inviting speculation back into the Swiss economy. This risk is clearly unpalatable for both Swiss politicians and the SNB, which is why two-way asymmetry was reintroduced into the system. Trading Dynamics As A Safe Haven Switzerland ticks off all the characteristics of a safe-haven currency. Its large net international investment position of 125% of GDP generates huge income inflows. Meanwhile, rising productivity over the years has led to a structural surplus in its trading balance and a rising fair value for the currency. Consequently, the franc has tended to have an upward bias over the years, supercharged during periods of risk aversion (Chart I-11). Switzerland ticks off all the characteristics of a safe-haven currency. During bull markets, countries that have negative interest rates are subject to powerful outflows from carry trades. The impact of these are difficult to measure, but it is fair to assume that periods of low hedging costs (which tend to correspond with periods of lower volatility) can be powerful catalysts. As markets get volatile and these trades get unwound, unhedged positions become victim to short-covering flows. Given the negative yield from hedging trades funded in Swiss francs (Chart I-12), it is fair to assume a pronounced flight-to-safety will cause a knee-jerk appreciation in the franc, like in past episodes. Chart I-11The "Curse" Of The##br## SNB Chart I-12Hedging Against Franc Strength Is Expensive This is especially true, since the U.S. tax reforms have already driven foreign affiliates in Switzerland to liquidate investments (mostly real estate) and repatriate those funds back into Treasurys. Foreign direct investment in Switzerland is falling at a rate of 15% of GDP, causing the basic balance to hit -4% of GDP. These FDI outflows are unlikely to remain a headwind for the franc going forward, assuming the tax benefit was a one-time deal. Instead, a favorable balance-of-payments backdrop will continue to be a key underpinning behind the strong franc (Chart I-13). Chart I-13A One-Time Adjustment In The Basic Balance The message is that during rising periods of risk aversion, like now, speculators should accumulate francs as a portfolio hedge. We continue to favour the CHF/NZD, recommended on April 26. Aggressive investors can also sell the USD/CHF. Investment Conclusions Our long-term fair value models suggest the Swiss franc is currently cheap (Chart I-14). This makes it attractive both on a short- and longer-term basis versus a basket of currencies. The exception is versus the euro, given the EUR/CHF is still undervalued by 5%. Froth in the housing market has been eliminated. Stricter policies toward immigration, along with macro-prudential measures, such as a cap on second homes and stricter lending standards, have helped (Chart I-15). Meanwhile, the surprise move by the SNB to abandon the EUR/CHF floor has rebalanced the market. Back then, Swiss real estate became more expensive for investors in the euro area who used the SNB put to speculate on properties in Zurich and Geneva. Demand for Swiss real estate has largely decreased since then, eliminating this key source of risk for the SNB (Chart I-16) Chart I-14The Swiss Franc Is Cheap By Some Measures Chart I-15The Swiss People's Party ##br##Had Its Way Our bias is that over the next few years, the Swiss franc will be more of a dormant currency, gently appreciating towards its fair value but periodically interspersed by bouts of intense volatility. Interestingly, we may be entering such a riot point. German bund yields fell below Japanese levels this week. Historically, a falling bund yield has been a bad omen for EUR/CHF. We will respect our 1.11 stop loss on long EUR/CHF if breached (Chart I-17). Chart I-16The SNB Had Its Way Chart I-17Where Next For Bund Yields? Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see www.reuters.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data from the U.S. have been positive: Headline inflation and core inflation increased to 2% and 2.1% year-on-year respectively in April. NFIB business optimism index increased to 103.5 in April. NY Empire State Manufacturing index increased to 17.8 in May. Retail sales fell by 0.2% month-on-month in April, but the Redbook retail sales clocked in a solid 5.4% growth year-on-year. Industrial production decreased by 0.5% month-on-month in April, but is still growing at 0.9% year-on-year. On the housing market front, MBA mortgage applications contracted by 0.6% in May. NAHB housing market index increased to 66 in May. Housing starts increased by 5.7% to 1.24 million month-on-month in April. Building permits increased by 0.6% to 1.3 million in April. DXY index increased by 0.4% this week. U.S. and Chinese negotiators failed to reach an agreement regarding tariffs. The increased tariffs on Chinese goods was followed by the inevitable retaliation by China this Monday. As the market gauges the net impact of the tariff from both sides, volatility will prevail. Report Links: President Trump And The Dollar - May 9, 2019 Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been weaker-than-expected: Industrial production in the euro area fell by 0.6% year-on-year in March. The euro area ZEW economic sentiment fell to -1.6 in May. The German ZEW economic sentiment fell to -2.1 in May, while current situation improved to 8.2. Euro area GDP growth came in line at 1.2% year-on-year in Q1. German GDP growth increased to 0.4% quarter-on-quarter in Q1, while on a year-on-year measure, the growth rate fell from 0.9% to 0.6%. Trade balance in the euro area fell to 17.9 billion euros in March. German harmonized consumer price inflation was unchanged at 2.1% year-on-year in April. French industrial output contracted by 0.9% month-on-month in March, while non-farm payrolls increased to 0.3% quarter-on-quarter in Q1. EUR/USD fell by 0.4% this week. While signs are still pointing to a tentative recovery in the euro area, global trade war rhetoric and volatile incoming data continue to weigh on investor sentiment. Trump is poised to delay a decision to impose auto tariffs on EU and Japanese exports by up to six months, which suggests he might ramp up the trade war with China. Report Links: Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Reading The Tea Leaves From China - April 12, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mixed: Leading economic index and coincident index fell to 96.3 and 99.6 respectively in March. Trade balance by the balance-of-payment measure increased to 700 billion yen in March. Adjusted current account balance fell to 1.27 trillion yen in March. On the housing market front, the construction orders increased by 66.1% year-on-year in March. Housing starts grew by 10% year-on-year in March. Reconstruction efforts following last year’s disasters appear well underway. Machine tool orders contracted by 33.4% year-on-year in April. Japanese producer price inflation decreased to 1.2% year-on-year in April, while still higher than expected. USD/JPY fell by 0.7% initially, then gradually recovered, returning flat this week. The ongoing trade disputes largely increased short-term volatility in the yen. We continue to recommend the yen as a portfolio hedge. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Tug OF War, With Gold As Umpire - March 29, 2019 A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. have been solid, despite softer employment data: Nominal GDP growth increased to 1.8% year-on-year in Q1. Manufacturing production increased by 2.6% year-on-year in March. Industrial production increased by 1.3% year-on-year. Total trade balance came in at a deficit of 5.4 billion pounds in March. This was an improvement from the last reading of a 6.2 billion deficit in February. ILO unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in March, while the average earnings growth fell from 3.5% to 3.2%. Moreover, claimant count increased by 24.7K in April. GBP/USD fell by 1.6% this week. The pound remains one of our favorite currencies for the time being from a valuation perspective. Moreover, U.K. data continue to surprise positively. The catalyst for pound weakness this week was Theresa May’s announcement she will set out a timetable for her resignation next month, once the fourth iteration of Brexit is submitted for a vote. Report Links: Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been negative: Home loans contracted by 2.5% in March. Crucially, this was driven by both owner-occupied and investor lending. National Australia Bank’s business conditions and business confidence indices both fell in April. Business conditions fell to 3, and business confidence decreased to 0. Westpac consumer confidence fell to 0.6% in May. Consumer inflation expectations fell to 3.3% in May. On the labor market front, the wage price index was unchanged at 2.3% year-on-year in Q1. Unemployment rate increased to 5.2%, while participation rate increased to 65.8%. 28.4 thousand new jobs were created in April. However, this is due to the creation of 34.7 thousand part-time jobs, while 6.3 thousand full-time jobs were lost. AUD/USD fell by 1% this week. We remain overweight the Australian dollar as it will be one of the first pro-cyclical currencies to benefit from Chinese stimulus. But we will respect our AUD/USD 0.68 stop loss if it is breached. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been negative: Food price index fell by 0.1% month-on-month in April. Visitor arrivals contracted by 2.6% year-on-year in March. REINZ house sales continue to contract by 11.5% year-on-year in April. Net migration fell to 59 thousand in Q1. Migration has been an important source of demand for New Zealand. NZD/USD fell by 0.4% this week. The New Zealand dollar remains very vulnerable to external shocks, especially from the trade front. Meanwhile, terms of trade dynamics continue to favor AUD vis-à-vis NZD. The domestic environment, including reduced immigration also remains a headwind for the economy. Report Links: Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada have been promising: Building permits increased by 2.1% month-on-month in March. On the labor market front, the unemployment rate fell to 5.7% in April, and 106.5 thousand new jobs were created. Participation rate increased to 65.9%, and average hourly earnings increased by 2.6% year-on-year in April. This was a blockbuster jobs report. Headline inflation increased to 2% year-on-year in April, while core inflation decreased to 1.5%. Manufacturing sales increased by 2.1% month-on-month in March. USD/CAD decreased by 0.1% this week. The good news from the Canadian housing sector and labor market has supported the loonie. On Wednesday, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland called again for the U.S. to lift steel and aluminum tariffs in order to create “true free trade” on the continent. On the U.S. side, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said that Washington was close to resolving its differences with Mexico and Canada over steel and aluminum tariffs. Report Links: Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 There is little data from Switzerland this week: Producer and import prices fell by 0.6% in April. USD/CHF fell by 0.1% this week. The Swiss franc remains a safe-haven currency, and growing political uncertainty will increase demand for the franc. We discuss the outlook for the franc at length in the front section of this report. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been mixed: Core inflation fell to 2.6% year-on-year in April, while still higher than the expected 2.5%. Headline inflation was unchanged at 2.9% year-on-year in April. Real GDP growth did slow down to a 0.3% quarter-on-quarter pace in Q1. However, seasonal factors were at play. Strong agricultural output in Q4 2018 was not repeated in Q1 following last year’s summer drought. There was also low power production in the months of February and March. The trade balance increased to 17.6 billion NOK in April. USD/NOK has been volatile but returned flat this week. Two Saudi oil-pumping stations were targeted in a drone attack this Tuesday. The tensions in the Middle East increased the risk of oil supply shortages, which is bullish for oil price, thus beneficial for the Norwegian krone. Report Links: Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been positive: Swedish Public Employment Service (PES) unemployment rate fell to 3.5% in April. Headline consumer price inflation climbed to 2.1% year-on-year in April. Core consumer price inflation increased to 1.6% year-on-year in April. USD/SEK has been flat this week. As a pro-cyclical currency, the Swedish krona will soon benefit from a global growth recovery once political uncertainties and external shocks play out. We remain positive on the krona. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Feature In what has become a tradition, I met with Ms. Mea following client meetings in Europe last week. Ms. Mea is a long-term BCA client who has been following our Emerging Markets Strategy very closely over the years. It was our fourth meet-up in the past 18 months. Ms. Mea keeps our meetings interesting by always challenging our views and questioning the nuances of our analysis. The timing of our most recent meeting was particularly notable, as we had just received news that the latest U.S.-China trade talks had not produced an agreement. In light of this, Ms. Mea started our conversation with a question on the link between geopolitics and financial markets: Ms. Mea: Why have the U.S. and China failed to reach a trade accord when it is clear that without one, both global financial markets and business sentiment will be hurt? Answer: The U.S. and China are intertwined in a geopolitical confrontation that will endure for decades. Their strategic national interests are not aligned at all. Therefore, any accord on trade and other geopolitical disputes will not be lasting. It is impossible to accurately forecast and time all turns of the negotiation process and the associated event risks. Therefore, an investment process should be informed and guided by a thematic approach. The U.S. and China are intertwined in a geopolitical confrontation that will endure for decades. Our theme has been, and remains, that China and the U.S. are in a long-term geopolitical confrontation that epitomizes a rivalry between an existing and a rising superpower. This suggests that the demands of one side will be unacceptable to the other. That makes any agreement unsustainable over the long run. In brief, there was a structural regime shift in the U.S.-China relationship last year. Yet global equity markets rallied this year on rising expectations of a major trade deal. Notably, most of the gains in EM equities since late December occurred on days when there was positive news on the progress of trade talks. Hence, the EM rally can largely be attributed to expectations of a trade deal. Not surprisingly, the failure to conclude a trade accord has quickly pushed EM share prices back down to their mid-January levels (Chart I-1). As such, the majority of investors who have bought the EM equity index since early this year lost a substantial part of their gains in the recent selloff. Chart I-1EM Equity Index: Between Support And Resistance Given that these two nations are embroiled in a long-term geopolitical rivalry, it will be difficult to find solutions on trade and geopolitical disputes that can simultaneously satisfy both sides. Even so, this does not imply that global risk assets will be in freefall forever. Financial markets currently need to price in both (1) a geopolitical risk premium on a structural basis; and (2) the impact of trade tariffs on global business activity on a cyclical basis. Once these two components have been priced in, markets will become less sensitive to the ebbs and flows of tensions between the U.S. and China. Finally, China’s exports to the U.S. constitute only 3.5% of mainland GDP (Chart I-2). This is considerably smaller than capital spending, which makes up 42% of China’s GDP. Further, most of the investment outlays over the past 10 years have not been in productive capacity to supply goods to the American market. On the contrary, the overwhelming share of capital expenditures since 2008 have occurred in domestic segments of the economy rather than export industries. Certainly, the trade confrontation will weigh on consumer and business sentiment in China as well as reduce the flow of U.S. dollars to the Middle Kingdom, warranting RMB depreciation. Still, there are other predicaments unrelated to the U.S. import tariffs that Chinese policymakers are facing. These include the credit, money and property bubbles that we have written about extensively. China’s exports to the U.S. constitute only 3.5% of mainland GDP. Ms. Mea: With no trade deal, the odds appear to be rising that the Chinese authorities will ramp up both credit and fiscal stimulus. Should investors not be looking through the near-term volatility and be buying EM risk assets and China-plays – because this stimulus will produce a cyclical recovery in the mainland economy? Answer: It is a safe bet that the Chinese authorities will encourage more credit creation and ramp up fiscal spending. The difficulty for investors is in gauging two unknowns: What is the lead time between the stimulus and economic growth, and what will be the multiplier effect of these stimuli. Lead time: Chart I-3 portends our aggregate credit and fiscal spending impulse. Based on the past relationship between turning points in this indicator and the business cycle in China, the latter is likely to bottom around August. Chart I-2Structure Of Chinese Economy Chart I-3China: Stimulus Works With A Time Lag Chart I-4China's Stimulus And Financial Markets: 2012 Versus 2016 Multiplier effect: The impact of stimulus on the economy also depends on the multiplier effect. The latter is contingent on households’ and companies’ willingness to spend. If households and companies hasten the pace of spending, the economy can recover with little stimulus. If they reduce their expenditure growth, the economy may require much more stimulus. The majority of investors and commentators are comparing China’s current stimulus efforts with what occurred in 2016. However, our hunch is that the current Chinese business cycle might actually resemble the 2012-‘13 episode due to similarities in the multiplier effect. The size of credit and fiscal stimulus in 2012 was as large as in 2016. Nevertheless, the business cycle recovery in 2012-‘13 was very muted, as illustrated in Chart I-3 on page 3. Consistently, EM share prices and commodities did not stage a cyclical rally in 2012 as they did in 2016-‘17 (Chart I-4). Ms. Mea: It seems you are implying that differences between the 2012 and 2016 economic and financial markets outcomes are due to the multiplier. How does one appraise the multiplier effect? Answer: In a word, yes. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to forecast consumers’ and businesses’ willingness to spend – particularly in the midst of a clash between the positive effects of stimulus and the negative sentiment stemming from the ongoing U.S.-China confrontation. We have constructed indicators that measure the willingness to spend among households and companies in China. Our proxies for their marginal propensity to spend (MPS) are currently in decline (Chart I-5A and I-5B). Chart I-5AChina: Households' Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart I-5BChina: Enterprises’ Marginal Propensity To Spend MPS does not affect day-to-day expenditures, but rather captures consumer spending on large-ticket items such as housing, cars and durable goods, as well as investment expenditures by companies. Consistently, mainland companies’ MPS leads industrial metal prices by several months (Chart I-5B). Chart I-6 illustrates the critical difference between 2012 and 2016 in terms of the impact of credit and fiscal stimulus. In both episodes, the size of the stimulus was roughly the same, but the manufacturing PMI did not really recover in 2012-’13, gyrating in the 49-51 range. In contrast, it did stage a cyclical recovery in 2016-‘17 (Chart I-6, second panel). In brief, the difference between the 2012 and 2016 episodes was the MPS by companies and households (Chart I-6, third and fourth panels). There are other predicaments unrelated to the U.S. import tariffs that Chinese policymakers are facing. These include the credit, money and property bubbles that we have written about extensively. Provided the not-so-upbeat sentiment among Chinese households and businesses due to their high debt levels and the ongoing trade conflict, the odds are that their MPS will remain weak for now. As a result, the impact of credit and fiscal stimulus on China’s business cycle will be muted for now. As such, more stimulus and longer lead time may be required to engineer a cyclical recovery. Interestingly, the current profiles of both EM and developed equity markets closely resemble their 2012 trajectories – both in terms of direction and magnitude (Chart I-7). Chart I-6China's Stimulus In 2012 And 2016: Beware Of Multiplier Effect Chart I-7Is 2018-2019 Akin ##br##2011-2012? Ms. Mea: So, you are suggesting risks to China-related plays and EM financial markets are skewed to the downside. How should one assess how much downside there is, and what should investors look for to gauge turnings points in financial markets? Answer: We continuously assess the investment landscape, not only based on our fundamental analysis of the global/EM/China business cycles but also on various financial market valuations, positioning and technicals. Let’s review where we stand with respect to these metrics. Equity Valuations: EM stocks are not cheap. Our favored measure of equity valuations is the composite indicator-based 20% trimmed means of the following multiples: trailing and forward P/E, price-to-cash earnings, price-to-book value and price-to-dividend ratios (Chart I-8). On these metrics, EM stocks appear fairly valued. Nevertheless, these valuations should be viewed in the context of structural decline in EM corporate profitability. The measures of return on equity and assets for non-financial companies in EM are on par with their 2008 lows (Chart I-8, middle and bottom panels). When valuations are neutral, the equity market’s direction is dictated by the profit outlook. The latter currently remains negative for EM and Chinese companies (Chart I-9). Chart I-8EM Equities Are Not Cheap Chart I-9Downside Profit Surprises In EM And China Currency Valuations: The U.S. dollar is only moderately (one standard deviation) expensive, according to the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs (Chart I-10). The latter is our most favored currency valuation measure. The greenback has been in a major structural bull market since 2011. Secular bull/bear markets do not typically end before valuations reach 1.5-2 standard deviations. We reckon that the cyclical and structural backdrop remains favorable for the dollar, and odds are it will overshoot before a major top sets in. Going forward, most of the dollar’s additional gains will not occur versus the euro or the Japanese yen – which are already modestly undervalued (Chart I-10, middle and bottom panels) – but against other currencies. In particular, commodity currencies of developed economies have not yet cheapened enough (Chart I-11). Typically, a structural bear market in commodities does not end until these commodity currencies become cheap. Hence, the current valuation profile of these commodity currencies is consistent with the notion that the secular bear markets in commodities prices and EM are not yet over. Chart I-10The Euro Is Fairly Valued, The Yen Is Cheap G3 Currency Valuations Chart I-11Commodities Currencies ##br##Are Not Cheap Yet Unfortunately, there are no data for unit labor cost-based real effective exchange rates for the majority of EMs. However, it is a safe bet to infer that long- and medium-term cycles in EM currencies coincide with those of DM commodity currencies because they are all pro-cyclical. If DM commodity currencies have not yet bottomed, EM currencies remain vulnerable. Relative to the global equity benchmark, global materials have broken down to new cyclical lows. This could be a harbinger of EM relative equity performance making new lows. Ms. Mea: But the positioning in the U.S. dollar is long. How consistent is this with your view of further dollar strength? Positioning: While investors are long the U.S. dollar versus several DM currencies, they are short the greenback versus EM currencies. Chart I-12 illustrates the aggregate net long positions of both leveraged funds and asset managers in the BRL, MXN, RUB and ZAR. As of May 10 (the last datapoint available), investors were as long these EM high-beta currencies as they were at their cyclical peak in early 2018. As to emerging Asian currencies, ongoing RMB depreciation will drag emerging Asian currencies down. Notably, the Korean won has already broken down from its tapering wedge pattern. Concerning EM equities, investor positioning and sentiment was still very elevated before last week’s market turmoil. Chart I-13 demonstrates the number of net long positions in EM ETFs (EEM) by leveraged funds and asset managers. The last datapoint is also as of May 10. Chart I-12Investors Have Been Long EM Currencies Chart I-13Investors Have Been Bullish On EM Stocks In short, investor sentiment on EM was bullish and long positions in EM were extended before the U.S.-China trade confrontation escalated again. Tell-tale signs and technicals: Market profiles can sometimes help us gauge whether an asset class is in a bull or bear market, and what the next move is likely to be. We have the following observations: U.S. dollar volatility is close to its record lows (Chart I-14). Following the previous three low-volatility episodes, EM shares prices in dollar terms dropped substantially over the ensuing 18 months – 60% in 1997-1998, 65% in 2007-2008 and 30% in 2014-2015. The rationale is that very low global currency volatility indicates that investors do not foresee a major tectonic macro shift. When this does inevitably occur, currency markets move violently. The RMB depreciation could be a tectonic macro shift that global markets are not prepared for. The absolute and relative performances of EM stocks resemble that of global materials stocks. Global materials are breaking below their long-term moving averages (technical support lines) in absolute terms, raising the odds that the EM equity index will do the same. Relative to the global equity benchmark, global materials have broken down to new cyclical lows. This could be a harbinger of EM relative equity performance making new lows (Chart I-15). Chart I-14U.S. Dollar Volatility And ##br##EM Equity Returns Chart I-15EM And Global Materials: Relative To Global Index Consistently, industrial metals prices as well as our Risk-on/Safe-Haven Currency Index have potentially formed a head-and-shoulders pattern and may be entering a major down leg (Chart I-16). Further weakness in these variables would be consistent with a risk-off phase in EM financial markets. Finally, the relative performance of the MSCI China All-Share Index – which includes all onshore- and offshore-listed stocks – has relapsed relative to the global equity benchmark, failing to break above its long-term moving average (Chart I-17). This is a negative tell-tale sign, and often warrants considerable downside. Chart I-16A Head-And-Shoulder Pattern In Global Cyclical Markets? Chart I-17China All-Share Index: Absolute And Relative Performance Ms. Mea: It seems to me that the RMB holds the key. What are your thoughts on the Chinese currency? Answer: There are several reasons why the RMB will likely depreciate. First, yuan depreciation is needed to mitigate the impact of U.S. import tariffs on Chinese exporters’ profitability. Authorities could use the RMB depreciation to fight back against U.S. import tariffs – a response that U.S. President Donald Trump will certainly not like. Second, the ongoing cyclical downturn in China and rising deflationary pressures also warrant a cheaper currency. Third, there is a vast overhang of money supply in China: The broad money supply is equivalent to US$30 trillion. More stimulus will only make this oversupply of yuans larger. This, along with the desire of mainland households and businesses to diversify their deposits into foreign currencies/assets, is like “the sword of Damocles” on the yuan’s exchange rate. Finally, the sources of foreign currency that previously offset capital outflows in China are no longer available. The current account surplus has largely evaporated. In addition, the central bank seems to be reluctant to reduce its foreign exchange reserves to fund capital outflows. In fact, at US$3 trillion, its foreign currency reserves are equivalent to only 10% of local currency broad money supply. All in all, we are structurally short the RMB versus the dollar. Chart I-18China, Commodities, & EM: Identical Cycles Ms. Mea: What are the investment implications? Where are we in the EM/China investment cycle? Answer: Our investment themes since early this decade have been that EM share prices and currencies are in a bear market, the U.S. dollar is in a structural bull market, and commodities are in a structural downtrend (Chart I-18). With the exception of 2016-‘17, these themes have played out quite well. These structural moves have not yet been exhausted. At the moment, we do not foresee a 2016-’17-type cyclical rally either. The failure of EM equities to outperform DM stocks and the resilience of the U.S. dollar during the risk-on period since early this year, give us comfort in maintaining a negative stance on EM risk assets. Importantly, a decade-long poor EM performance is likely to end with a bang rather than a whimper, especially when investors by and large remain bullish on EM. On the whole, we recommend trading EM stocks on the short side and underweighting EM equities in a global equity portfolio. Within the EM equity universe, our overweights are Russia, central Europe, Thailand, non-tech Korean stocks, Mexico, Chile, the UAE and Vietnam. Our underweights are Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Peru, Indonesia, India, and the Philippines. Fixed-income investors should also position for higher volatility and weaker EM currencies, favoring low-beta versus high-beta markets. Russian and Mexican markets are our favored local currency and U.S. dollar bonds. Finally, we continue to recommend shorting a basket of the following EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. Our currency overweights are MXN, RUB, SGD and the THB as well as central European currencies. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
While we remain bullish on global equities and other risk assets over 12 months, we went tactically short the S&P 500 last Friday following the market’s complacent reaction to the Trump Administration’s further tariffs increases on Chinese imports. While a moderate trade war would still produce more economic damage than standard economic models imply, this would be greatly mitigated by significant Chinese economic stimulus and a Fed that is in no hurry to raise rates and could even cut rates. Barring any further major developments, we recommend investors start increasing risk exposure if the S&P 500 falls to 2711. A dip in global bourses would also create an opportunity to go overweight EM/European equities. Favor gold over government bonds as a low-cost hedge against trade war risks for now.
Highlights We were on the road last week, discussing our economic and market outlooks: We met with a range of Midwestern clients who focus primarily on the U.S. A majority of our meetings were with fixed-income teams. The Fed will ultimately decide the fate of the expansion, … : Nearly everyone wanted to get a read on how much longer the expansion will last. We offered the view that the Fed will induce the next recession, provided that an exogenous event doesn’t beat it to the punch. … and inflation will be the catalyst that prompts the Fed to act: Inflation was typically far from investors’ minds, and several of our meetings centered on what will drive it, and where and when we expect it will show up. Feature We traveled throughout the Midwest last week, discussing our outlook for financial markets and the economy with a range of investors. We got the sense that our clients are constructive about the economy and are generally open to tilting portfolios in a risk-friendly direction, albeit somewhat grudgingly. They recognized the challenge that worsening U.S.-China trade relations would pose to a constructive call, but were content to wait for more information before adjusting their views or their portfolios. Our views continue to follow the outline we’ve laid out in our written reports. In the absence of economic or financial market excesses, or an exogenous shock that induces a material slowdown, we expect the expansion to roll on until the Fed begins to fear that it’s gone too far and imposes restrictive monetary policy settings to rein it in. Until it does, we expect that the equity bull market will continue and spread product will deliver positive excess returns over Treasuries. The investment strategy takeaway is that it is too early to de-risk portfolios. De-risking will become the order of the day once the Fed resumes tightening monetary conditions via rate hikes. There is currently no sign that the Fed is contemplating a meaningfully hawkish shift, but we expect that inflation pressures will eventually force its hand. Ten years of subdued inflation have made a mockery of recurring post-crisis inflation warnings, and clients have developed a robust immunity to them. What, they wanted to know, has changed enough to resuscitate inflation? Steroid-Fueled Demand Aggregate demand crashed during the crisis and was far short of the economy’s capacity when it bottomed in mid-2009. In economics lingo, that meant that the U.S. economy faced a sizable negative output gap when it embarked on the recovery/expansion. Although the economy grew at a tepid 2% rate over the ensuing decade, capacity grew even more slowly, held back by consistently weak capital expenditures, and the output gap finally closed around the beginning of 2018 (Chart 1), removing a stout inflation-absorbing buffer. Chart 1The Excess Capacity Cushion Is Gone The United States then poured fuel on the fire by injecting a significant quantity of stimulus into an economy that was already operating at capacity. Corporations and other businesses that viewed the pickup in aggregate demand as a one-off event refrained from expanding capacity to meet that demand, as it appeared as if it would be a poor use of capital. Imported goods from economies that still have excess capacity can relieve some of the pressure of inadequate domestic supply, but they’re unlikely to absorb all of the pressure from excess demand, even in the absence of new tariff barriers. The aggregate 2018-19 stimulus shapes up as a catalyst for higher prices. Capacity vastly exceeded demand when the economy began to turn around ten years ago, but the stimulus package has made it look a little thin. The trouble is that no one can pinpoint exactly when upward price pressures will reveal themselves. Inflation is the mother of all lagging indicators, peaking and bottoming well after business cycle transitions suggest it should (Chart 2). All we can say is that the steroid injection from the stimulus planted the seeds of inflation. Just when they’ll begin to sprout is uncertain, but we believe the Fed’s pause will give them a chance to take root. Wage Inflation The labor market is so tight that it squeaks. The unemployment rate has fallen to a 49-year low; baby boomer retirements will cap the labor force participation rate around its current level (Chart 3, top panel); and discouraged workers (Chart 3, middle panel) and involuntary part-time workers are few and far between (Chart 3, bottom panel). Now that it has been absorbed, the glut of idled workers will no longer serve as a buffer neutralizing upward wage pressures. The labor market is tight as a drum. The pool of discouraged workers and involuntary part-timers is smaller than it was at the last two cyclical peaks, while employer demand is more robust. Employees are starting to gain bargaining power. The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) indicates that demand for new workers is intense. As a share of total filled positions, job openings are at an all-time high in the 18-year history of the series (Chart 4, middle panel). No one quits a job unless s/he has another one lined up, and it almost always requires higher pay to induce an employee to jump from Employer A to Employer B. The elevated quit rate thus reveals that employers are poaching workers from each other to meet that demand (Chart 4, bottom panel). After Employer B lures an employee away from Employer A, Employer A hires a worker from Employer C or Employer D, which now has an opening it needs to fill. The employment merry-go-round creates a self-reinforcing cycle pushing wages higher and endowing employees with newfound bargaining power. Chart 3With Fewer Workers On The Sidelines … Chart 4… Employers Have Turned To Poaching Self-sustaining wage gains could produce price-level increases via a demand-pull or a cost-push mechanism. In a demand-pull framework, businesses observing steady payroll expansions and increased household income may well attempt to push through selling price increases. Under cost-push, corporations raise prices in an attempt to offset increased labor costs. Then again, the pass-through from wage inflation to price inflation might not occur at all, as the dynamics of inflation are not fully understood. What The Fed Believes Investors may be frustrated by the lack of a clear connection between wages and prices, but they should not be put off by a little ambiguity – there would be no alpha without uncertainty. An absence of realized inflation does not eliminate the prospect of rate hikes. Our Inflation → Rate Hikes → Restrictive Monetary Policy → Recession → Bear Market roadmap may still come to pass. The first step in the chain would simply have to be perceived inflation as opposed to realized inflation, and it’s the Fed’s perception that drives monetary policy, not the public’s. As we stressed in our Special Report on the Phillips curve,1 there is no alternative explanation in mainstream economics connecting the dots between the elements of the Fed’s dual mandate. Every mainstream economic model posits an inverse relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate. Every economist learned about the expectations-augmented Phillips curve multiple times in the course of his or her undergraduate and graduate studies. Until the profession settles on an alternative narrative, the Fed and other major central banks will be beholden to the Phillips curve. The connection between wages and prices is a mystery, but the Phillips curve’s place in mainstream economics remains secure. It’s easy to talk of patience when inflation has been hibernating for ten years, even with the unemployment rate at 49-year lows, but once wage gains begin to exceed 3.5% and 4%, we expect the Fed will change its tune. Wages do not respond to changes in the unemployment rate when there’s ample slack in the labor market, but they do once it becomes difficult to find employees. The varying sensitivity of changes in wages at different levels of unemployment explains the kink in the Phillips curve, but we found the NAIRU-based unemployment gap2 to be a reliable proxy for identifying the point at which the labor market meaningfully tightens (Chart 5). Chart 5NAIRU, … The natural rate of unemployment is only a concept, however, and the CBO series we use to calculate the unemployment gap is subject to retroactive adjustments intended to better match the CBO’s estimates with real-world observations. We therefore incorporated two alternative measures of labor market slack to test the robustness of the unemployment-gap framework. The first is the Jobs Plentiful/Jobs Hard To Get responses from the Conference Board’s consumer confidence survey. The top panel of Chart 6 calculates the difference between Jobs Hard To Get and Jobs Plentiful; when it’s positive (negative), survey respondents are indicating that the labor market is soft (tight). The disparity in wage growth between the soft and the tight states, as estimated by the hoi polloi, is a little larger than under the CBO’s revised NAIRU estimates, suggesting Main Street may be better positioned to evaluate labor-market dynamics than D Street (the CBO’s address). Chart 6… The Consumer Confidence Survey, … To get away from the arbitrariness of the unemployment rate and the uncertainty of NAIRU estimates, we considered the employment gap from the perspective of the prime-age (non-)employment-to-population ratio (Chart 7). It also supports the conclusion that wage gains are a function of the degree of labor market slack, but the outlier results from the crisis render the mean non-employment ratio since 1985 a less-than-perfect boundary between tightness and slack. The prime-age (non-)employment-to-population ratio better fits the standard Phillips curve framework, producing a solidly linear relationship (Chart 8). It points to further wage gains as prime-age employment increases. Chart 7… And Prime-Age (Non-)Employment All Point To Faster Wage Gains If productivity continues to grow by leaps and bounds – the fourth-quarter gain was impressive, the first-quarter’s was eye-popping – the Fed won’t feel much pressure to hike rates. Productivity is a function of capital expenditures; workers are able to increase output when they’re provided with more and better tools. Capex has been extremely weak ever since the crisis in the U.S. and the rest of the world, however, and we do not think that investors should count on productivity remaining much above its low 1%-plus trend level of the last several years. Investment Implications The ultimate effect of the Fed’s pause will be to extend the duration of the expansion, assuming that an exogenous shock does not pull the plug on it. Extending the expansion will have the effect of extending the equity bull market, and the period in which spread product generates positive excess returns over Treasuries. There is no free lunch, and dovishness now will be offset by hawkishness later. Larger bull-market gains will ultimately be countered by larger bear-market losses. That is a concern for another day, however, and we continue to recommend that investors remain at least equal weight equities and spread product in balanced portfolios. We do not see a recession until the second half of 2020 at the earliest. Our best guess is that it will begin around the middle of 2021, so it is too early to de-risk portfolios or shift to a more defensive asset allocation profile. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Phillips Curve: Science Or Superstition?”, published February 26, 2019. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The unemployment gap in the top panel of Chart 5 is calculated by subtracting the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of NAIRU from the official unemployment rate. NAIRU, or the natural rate of unemployment (u*), is the minimum unemployment rate that would exist even in a full-employment economy. It results from structural factors like skill and geographic mismatches. The CBO currently estimates that NAIRU is 4.7%; the Fed’s dots suggest that it estimates u* is around 4.6%.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Firming relative demand and input cost dynamics, the Medicare For All (MFA)-induced panic selling in HMOs coupled with 5G euphoria buying in semis have set the stage for an exploitable pair trade opportunity: long S&P managed health care/short S&P semiconductors. Relative supply/demand dynamics, crumbling lumber prices, lower interest rates and compelling valuations and technicals all suggest that the long homebuilding/short home improvement retail pair trade is in the early innings. Recent Changes Initiate a long S&P managed health care/short S&P semiconductors trade today, with a tight stop loss at -7%. Table 1 Feature Equities hit a speed bump last week, as President Trump’s trade related tweets instilled some fear back into the markets. Investor complacency reigned supreme and, given the liquidity crunch, risk premia exploded higher with the VIX more than doubling from the recent lows. Historically, a parabolic rise in policy uncertainty is synonymous with an equity market selloff and a widening in risk premia; last week was no different (economic policy uncertainty shown inverted, second panel, Chart 1). Adding insult to injury, given that the forward P/E multiple expansion explained all of the equity market’s advance year-to-date as we highlighted three weeks ago, the trade-related melt up in policy uncertainty caused a mini meltdown in the forward multiple as financial conditions tightened (financial conditions shown inverted, third panel, Chart 1). The implication is that short-term equity market caution is still warranted as we have been writing over the past few weeks, at least until the U.S./China trade dispute dust settles. Chart 1Caution Still Warranted Chart 2Tenuous Trio The recent simultaneous rise of three asset classes, that we call “the tenuous trio”, warned that something had to give: stocks, bond prices and the trade-weighted U.S. dollar cannot all go up in tandem for an extended period of time. When this happens it is typically a forewarning of an equity market snap (Chart 2). One simple explanation is that a rising greenback comes back and haunts equities via a negative P&L hit, albeit with a lagged effect. Irrespective of where the U.S. dollar will move in the coming months, it will continue to weigh on EPS as the surge in the greenback took root from April to November last year. Thus, with a six-to-nine month lag it will continue to infiltrate EPS and Q2 – which the sell-side already expects to barely breach year ago levels – will also feel the U.S. dollar’s wrath. Were the dollar to continue its ascent from current levels, it would put in jeopardy the back half of this year’s EPS growth numbers, especially Q4/2019 that sell-side analysts forecast to jump to 8%, according to I/B/E/S data. This week we recommend putting on a new pair trade involving an unloved health care subgroup and a mighty tech sector subindex but with a tight stop, and also update an intra-consumer discretionary market-neutral housing-levered pair trade. Importantly, the 12-month forward EPS number is artificially rising. Chart 3 shows that calendar 2019 and 2020 EPS estimates continue to build a base, but the 12-month forward number has been rising since early-February. What explains the increase in the 12-month forward estimate is arithmetic. In other words, despite a multi-month downgrading of calendar 2019 and 2020 EPS, the first two quarters of next year are forecast to come in significantly higher than 2019’s first six months. As the latter roll off and the former get added to the 12-month forward EPS number, a deceiving jump occurs. For next year, we continue to expect $181 EPS, and we would lean against the double-digit EPS growth in 2020 that the sell-side currently forecasts. Our top down macro S&P 500 EPS model softened anew recently, warning that mid-single digit growth, at best, is more likely than low double-digit growth (Chart 4). Chart 3Artificial EPS Rise Chart 4SPX Macro EPS Model Forecasts Softness Finally, one of the tech sector’s invincible subgroups is cracking with the S&P semis relative performance hitting a wall both versus the broad market ex-TMT and versus the NASDAQ 100. This is significant not only from a sentiment perspective, but also because semis have high international sales exposure in general and China in particular (Chart 5). Chart 5Vertigo Warning This week we recommend putting on a new pair trade involving an unloved health care subgroup and a mighty tech sector subindex but with a tight stop, and also update an intra-consumer discretionary market-neutral housing-levered pair trade. New High-Octane Pair Trade Idea While health care and tech stocks started the year on a similar footing, a wide gulf has opened that is likely to, at least partially, reverse in the back half of the year. This dichotomy is most evident at the subsector level where managed health care stocks are still down in absolute terms for the year, whereas chip stocks are up roughly 20% year-to-date (Chart 6). This is an exploitable gap and today we suggest a new pair trade: long S&P managed health care/short S&P semiconductors. Chart 6Exploitable Reversal Looms Bernie Sanders’ revamped MFA bill sent the managed health care group to the ER. While there is heightened uncertainty surrounding MFA and we are working on a joint Special Report with our sister Geopolitical Strategy service due on June 3rd, this is likely a 2022 story. Not only will Sanders have to win the Democratic candidacy and subsequently the Presidential election, but also the GOP would have to lose the Senate. This is an extremely low probability event that has dealt a massive blow to HMO stocks. On the flip side, semis are priced for perfection. The recent catalyst for this group’s stratospheric rise was Apple’s patent settlement with Qualcomm that set in motion a 5G-related euphoria. Again 5G is a late-2021 story and a lot of good news is already priced in to semis stocks. Moreover, historically, semi cycles last four-to-five quarters and investors’ neglect of the semi downcycle is puzzling as we have recently concluded just two down quarters. Explicitly, what is truly baffling is that 12-month forward EPS are slated to contract in absolute terms and forward sales are hovering near the zero line, yet the Philly SOX index recently vaulted to all-time highs. Taken together, we would lean toward health care insurers at the expense of semiconductor stocks. Netting it all out, relative demand and input cost dynamics, the MFA-induced panic selling in HMOs coupled with 5G euphoria buying in semis have set the stage for an exploitable pair trade opportunity: long S&P managed health care/short S&P semiconductors. With regard to relative macro drivers, managed health care has the upper hand. Chart 7 shows that relative demand dynamics clearly favor HMOs and are working against chip stocks. Non-farm payroll growth is trouncing global semi billings. The message from the small business sector is similar with the labor market upbeat compared with declining global semi revenues. Finally, on the relative pricing power gauge front, overall wage inflation is outpacing DRAM prices. On all three fronts, the message is to expect a mean reversion higher in the relative share price ratio. Chart 7Buy Managed Health Care… Chart 8…At The Expense… Input cost/inventory dynamics suggest that HMOs also have the advantage. The health care insurance employment cost index is growing on a par with inflation, but semi industry employment is climbing at a rate over 5%/annum (bottom panel, Chart 8). Taking stock of medical cost inflation, costs are still melting, however global semi inventories are expanding. The upshot is that relative share prices have ample upside (middle panel, Chart 8). Finally, the previous relative valuation overshoot has returned to the neutral zone and, encouragingly, relative technicals are probing multi-year lows near one standard deviation below the historical mean. Importantly, over the past two decades every time our Technical Indicator has hit such a depressed level, a playable rebound in relative share prices has ensued (bottom panel, Chart 9). Chart 9…Of… Chart 10…Semis Nevertheless, this highly volatile market-neutral trade faces one big risk we previously alluded to: relative profit expectations are extended. In other words, the bombed out S&P semiconductor forward EPS and revenue projections are masking the relative profit and revenue backdrop (Chart 10). Netting it all out, relative demand and input cost dynamics, the MFA-induced panic selling in HMOs coupled with 5G euphoria buying in semis have set the stage for an exploitable pair trade opportunity: long S&P managed health care/short S&P semiconductors. Bottom Line: Initiate a long S&P managed health care/short S&P semis pair trade today with a stop loss at the -7% mark. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P managed health care and S&P semi indexes are: BLBG: S5MANH – UNH, ANTM, HUM, CNC, WCG and BLBG: S5SECO – INTC, AVGO, TXN, NVDA, QCOM, MU, ADI, XLNX, AMD, MCHP, MXIM, SWKS, QRVO, respectively. Homebuilding/Home Improvement Retail Pair Trade Update In late-January we put on a market, sector and subindustry neutral trade preferring homebuilders to home improvement retailers (HIR) as a way to benefit from the increase in residential construction at the expense of residential investment. This trade moved in the black from the get-go and is now generating alpha to the tune of 7% since inception, but more gains are in store in the coming months. President Trump’s hawkish tariff rhetoric should keep interest rates at bay, at least for a short while, and bond market nervousness is more of a boon to homebuilders than to HIR (top panel, Chart 11). The drop in the price of mortgage credit along with minor price concessions from homebuilders are causing sales of new homes to take off versus existing home sales (middle panel, Chart 11). Granted, bankers remain willing extenders of residential loans and the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey revealed that demand for residential credit is making a comeback following a near yearlong decline (not shown). As a result, relative loan growth metrics also underpin the relative share price ratio (bottom panel, Chart 11). Chart 11Still In Early Innings In sum, relative supply/demand dynamics, crumbling lumber prices, lower interest rates and compelling valuations and technicals all suggest that the long homebuilding/short HIR pair trade is in its early innings. Importantly, the new/existing home sales–to-inventory ratio is an excellent leading indicator of relative share prices and is currently emitting an unambiguously bullish signal for homebuilders at the expense of HIR (Chart 12). Chart 12Supply/Demand Backdrop Says Stick With This Pair Trade Chart 13Relative Sales ##br##Expectations… Examining the relative demand backdrop reveals that homebuilders will continue to outshine HIR. Current readings in the NAHB home sales survey versus the remodeling survey and future expectations both point to more gains in the relative share price ratio (Chart 13). The felling in lumber prices also represents a benefit to homebuilders to the detriment of HIR. Lumber is a key building input cost in new home construction so any price liquidation is a boon for homebuilding margins. In contrast, HIR makes a set margin on lumber sales, therefore deflating lumber prices cut HIR profits (Chart 14). Chart 14…Felling Lumber Prices And … Chart 15…Bombed Out Valuations Signal More Relative Share Price Gains Finally, on the relative valuation and technical fronts, there is anything but froth. In fact, the relative price to book ratio is perched near an all-time low and relative momentum has only recently troughed and has yet to reach the neutral zone (Chart 15). In sum, relative supply/demand dynamics, crumbling lumber prices, lower interest rates and compelling valuations and technicals all suggest that the long homebuilding/short HIR pair trade is in its early innings. Bottom Line: Stick with a long S&P homebuilders/short S&P HIR pair trade. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P homebuilding and S&P HIR indexes are: BLBG: S5HOME – PHM, DHI, LEN and BLBG: S5HOMI – HD, LOW, respectively. Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Highlights Coming up on the deadline for President Trump’s China – U.S. tariff ultimatum, tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese imports could go to 25% from 10% on Friday – the outlook for base metals remains complicated, particularly for aluminum and copper.1 Of course, the U.S. and China could have a meeting of the minds and agree to resolve the outstanding issues in the trade negotiations. This would be supportive of continued global supply-chain expansion, EM income growth and base metals prices generally. On the downside, an escalation of the Sino – U.S. trade war could retard investment in global supply chains, as firms hunker down for an extended and contentious contraction in global trade.2 This would be bearish for EM income growth, which would translate directly into lower base metals demand and, all else equal, depress prices. Still, a breakdown in trade talks could be bullish for base metals, as China likely would increase its fiscal, monetary and credit stimulus, in an attempt to offset the income-suppressing effects of reduced global trade and investment. As we said, it’s complicated. Two of the three outcomes above are supportive of base metals prices – i.e., a deal is agreed, and increased Chinese stimulus in the event of a breakdown in negotiations. Against this backdrop, we are closing our long tactical trading recommendations in copper and aluminum at tonight’s close, and replacing them with a call spread on July CME COMEX copper, in which we will get long $3.00/lb calls vs. short $3.30/lb calls. The call spreads are a low-risk way of positioning in a volatile market for a likely price-supportive outcome in these talks – the max loss on this position is the net premium paid to get long the spread. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Supply-side fundamentals continue to dominate oil price formation. An unplanned outage in Russia that took ~ 1mm b/d of oil off the market this week, following the contamination of exports with organic chloride left in shipments via Transneft’s European pipeline system. Russia’s Energy Ministry is guiding markets to expect the contamination will be cleared up toward the end of this month.3 Base Metals: Neutral. We are closing our tactical aluminum and copper trade recommendations at tonight’s close. We do see the potential for higher base metals prices – particularly copper – if China expands fiscal and monetary stimulus in the wake of a breakdown in trade talks with the U.S., or both sides can resolve their differences. We expect copper will benefit most from such outcomes. However, we believe a call spread – long July $3.00/lb CME COMEX calls vs. short $3.30/lb calls expiring in July – is a lower-risk way of expressing this view. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold could rally in the wake of an expanded trade war, if the Fed and the PBOC – along with other systemically important central banks – adopt more accommodative monetary policies in anticipation of a widening trade conflict. Greater fiscal, credit and monetary stimulus by China in response to a breakdown in trade talks also could boost safe-haven demand for gold. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The risk of a wider Sino – U.S. trade war – particularly the likely retaliation by China if U.S. tariffs are raised to 25% on already-targeted exports of $200 billion – would be especially bearish for soybeans and grain exports from the U.S. We remain underweight. Feature In the wake of President Donald Trump’s ultimatum to China to resolve trade talks by tomorrow, BCA Research’s geopolitical strategists give 50% odds to a successful trade deal being concluded by end-June. The odds of an extension of trade talks are 10%; and the odds of no deal on trade, 40% (Table 1). Table 1Updated Trade War Probabilities (May 2019) Of these possible outcomes, the no-deal scenario – i.e., an escalation in the trade war including raising tariffs on imports from China to 25% on the $200 billion of goods now carrying a 10% duty – would be the most volatile, and likely would push base metals’ prices lower in the short-term. A trade deal would set markets to estimating the extent of supply-chain investment and trade-flow revival, as the drawn-out uncertainty around the outcome of the Sino – U.S. trade war fades. Given the slim wedge our geopolitical strategists see between the deal and no-deal outcomes to these trade talks, we believe the implications of the latter need to be sorted. An agreement to extend trade talks likely would be welcomed with the same aplomb shown by markets prior to this current level of high drama. In this scenario, markets likely would price in an economically rational outcome to the U.S. – China trade negotiations, which resolves the uncertainty around tariffs and other investment-retarding policies. Given the slim wedge our geopolitical strategists see between the deal and no-deal outcomes to these trade talks, we believe the implications of the latter need to be sorted. In the short term – i.e., following a breakdown in the talks – market sentiment likely would become more negative, as traders priced in the implications for reduced global supply-chain investment and trade flows, particularly re China and EM exporters. In addition, base metals markets would discount the income hit to EM these effects would feed into, raising the likelihood commodity demand growth would slow. News flow would then dictate price action for the metals over the short term. As markets discount these expectations, we believe Chinese policymakers would act to increase the levels of fiscal, credit and monetary stimulus domestically, to counter the hit to domestic income. The lagged effects of this stimulus will have a strong influence on base metals’ price formation, and, depending on the level of stimulus, could be bullish for metals prices. China’s Influence on Base Metals Higher Post-GFC In previous research, we found copper, and to lesser extent aluminum and the LMEX index, which is heavily weighted to both, benefit most from monetary, credit and fiscal stimulus in China.4 Other metals also experience a lift when the level of these Chinese policy variables rises; however, their relationship with EM and China’s industrial production cycle is weaker and time varying (Chart of the Week). In Table 2, we show how different policy and macro factors affect various base metal prices and the LMEX; these models generate the output for the curves in the Chart of the Week. The table show the coefficients of determination for single-variable regressions for each metal on the EM- or China-focused factor shown in the columns for the period 2000 to now, and 2010 to now. Within the base metals complex, copper, the LMEX index and aluminum exhibit the strongest and most reliable relationships with the explanatory variables shown at the top of each column. Table 2Coefficients Of Determination: Base Metals Prices (yoy) Vs. Key Factors The biggest takeaway from this analysis is that, for each individual metal, Chinese economic activity in particular, and EM income dynamics generally dominate price determination. The importance of these factors increased considerably post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC). As was the case with our correlation analysis, this is best captured by our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index (Chart 2, panel 1). This is clearly seen in the co-movement of our GIA index and copper prices (Chart 2, panel 2), and EM GDP.5 Chart 3 shows the GIA index disaggregated in its four main components. Chart 2BCA's GIA Index Vs. EM GDP, Copper Prices Chart 3BCA GIA Index Components' Performance Our analytical framework for base metals in China holds the nonferrous “pillar industries” behave as vertically integrated conglomerates. The influence of China’s economy on base metals prices is not unexpected: As China’s relative share of base metals supply and demand versus the rest of the world has grown, the marginal impact of its fiscal, credit, monetary and trade policies increased (Chart 4). The principal effect would be visible in China’s demand-side effects, to which the supply side would respond. That is to say, China’s monetary, credit and fiscal policies post-GFC lifted domestic incomes, which lifted demand domestically. In addition, aggressive export-oriented trade policy contributed to income growth, as well. This prompted increased base metals and bulk (e.g., steel) output on the supply side. A large part of this dynamic likely is explained by the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the base-metals markets in China. It is important to note these SOEs are strategic government holdings, responding to and directing government policy, as was recently noted in a University of Alberta study on SOEs: … the government maintains control over a number of economically significant industries, such as the automobile, equipment manufacturing, information technology, construction, iron and steel, and nonferrous metals sectors, which are all considered to be ‘pillar industries’ of the Chinese economy. The government, as a matter of official policy, intends to maintain sole ownership or apply absolute control over only what it considers to be strategic industries, but also maintains relatively strong control over the pillar industries.6 Our analytical framework for base metals in China holds the nonferrous “pillar industries” behave as vertically integrated conglomerates – ranging from firms refining of raw ore to those producing finished products used in infrastructure, construction, etc. In this framework, nonferrous metals in China are not commodity markets per se, but vertically integrated policy-driven industries responding to directives from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Politburo through to the State Council and the various ministries directing production and consumption.7 At the heart of this is the CCP’s efforts to direct economic growth. Investment Implications The implication of our policy-focused research is investors should focus on metals for which a large share of the variance in y/y prices can be explained by movements in Chinese economic activity. The no-deal outcome could be positive for base metals prices. To get a handle on this, we looked at the variance decomposition of each metal’s price in response to exogenous shocks originating from (1) Chinese economic activity, (2) EM (ex-China) and Complex Economies industrial activity, (3) U.S. industrial activity, and (4) the U.S. trade weighted dollar (Table 3).8 Using this approach, we found that: Copper, aluminum and the LMEX’s variances are mostly explained by China’s economic activity (~ 25%); specifically, shocks to the state’s industrial activity and credit cycle. This corroborates our earlier research, in which we focused on correlations between base metals and these factors. Idiosyncratic factors seem to account for a large part of nickel, lead and zinc’s price formation. This is seen by the large proportion of their variances that is unexplained by our selected explanatory variables. Given the opacity of fundamental data in these markets, we tend to avoid positioning in them. On average, EM ex-China and U.S. industrial activity account for a similar proportion of the variance in metal’s prices (~ 8%). While the U.S. dollar appears to be the second most important variable (~ 14%). Table 3China’s Economic Activity Drives Metals’ Return Variability Our analysis indicates that, as a group, base metals will be supported by the ongoing credit stimulus in China. Each metal is positively correlated with China’s credit cycle and industrial activity. Nonetheless, from our correlation, regression and variance-decomposition analysis, we believe copper and aluminum provide a better and more reliable exposure, as does exposure to the LMEX index, because of its high aluminum and copper weightings. Bottom Line: Approaching the ultimatum set by U.S. President Trump for a resolution to the Sino – U.S. trade war, markets are understandably taut. The odds of a deal vs. no-deal outcome by end-June are close, while the odds trade talks are extended account for the difference. In our estimation, the no-deal outcome could be positive for base metals prices, given our expectation Chinese policymakers will lift the amount of stimulus to the domestic economy to offset the negative effects of an expanded trade war. A deal would remove a lot of the uncertainty currently holding back global supply-chain capex and trade flows, which also would be bullish for base metals. Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For further discussion, please see “U.S. And China Get Cold Feet,” a Special Alert published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy May 6, 2019. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Our geopolitical strategists give the odds of a successful trade deal being concluded by end-June 50%; that trade talks continue, 10%; and the odds of no deal on trade, 40%. 2 Please see “Global market structures and the high price of protectionism,” delivered at the Jackson Hole central bank conference August 25, 2018, by Agustín Carstens, General Manager, Bank for International Settlements. 3 Please see “Russia sees oil quality normalizing in late May after contamination, output drops,” published May 7, 2019, by reuters.com. 4 Please see our Weekly Report of April 25, 2019, entitled “Copper Will Benefit Most From Chinese Stimulus.” It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 BCA’s GIA index is heavily weighted toward EM industrial-commodity demand. Please see “Oil, Copper Demand Worries Are Overdone,” where we introduce and discuss the GIA index, published February 14, 2019, in BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see “State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy Today: Role, Reform, and Evolution,” China Institute, University of Alberta, May 2018. 7 Something approximating a pure commodity market is crude oil – the supply and demand curves of many globally distributed sellers and buyers meet and clear the market. As such, a reasonable explanatory model for the evolution of prices can be generated using fundamental inputs (i.e., supply, demand and inventories). Fitting such models to base metals has proved difficult. We have better success explaining base metals prices using macro economic policy variables we believe are important to CCP policymakers – trade, credit, domestic GDP, etc. This is a new avenue of research, which we hope to use to hone in on a good explanatory model to account for ~ 50% of global base metal demand, and, in some instances (e.g., copper and steel, respectively) close to 40% - 50% of supply, as seen in Chart 4. Our current base metals research is focused on trying to disprove the hypothesis these are policy-directed markets within China. This aligns with Karl Popper’s falsifiability condition, which states a theory must be subject to independent, disinterested testing capable of refuting it, to be considered scientific. Please see “Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery,” (reprinted 2008), Routledge Classics, particularly Chapter 4. 8 Complex economies are countries ranking at the top of MIT’s Economic Complexity Index (ECI), and which export industrial goods to EM and China. The EM (ex-China) and Complex Economies variable is the first principal component extracted from a group of ~60 series related to industrial production in these countries. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades