Financial Markets

Highlights Historically, the dollar exhibits positive seasonality in October and November. Technical and valuation indicators suggest that this year will be no exception. Continuing divergence between U.S. and global growth, rising interest rates, and Italian risks point in this direction as well. However, long positioning in the dollar along with the rebound in the China Play Index are creating non-negligible risks to this bullish dollar view. As a result, investors should overweight dollar exposure in their portfolio, but hedge the above risks by buying NZD/USD and selling EUR/JPY. Feature Through most of September, the dollar traded on the heavy side. However, in the last two trading days of the month, the greenback managed to regain some composure. As October and November have historically been strong months for the DXY (Chart I-1), this week we review if this seasonal pattern will once again hold. The balance of evidence suggests that the historical norm is likely to repeat itself, and that the dollar will continue to rally for the next six months or so, though there are a few risks that should be hedged against. Chart I-1Entering A Seasonally Strong Period For The Dollar Technicals: No Obstacle For A Strong Dollar An argument rooted in seasonality is a reasoning based on technical factors. Currently, technical indicators continue to paint a supportive backdrop for the greenback. First, by the beginning of the summer, based on its 13-week rate-of-change measure, the dollar index had reached overbought levels. Faced with this hurdle, the dollar's rally essentially took a pause, with the DXY rising only 0.5% since June 28, compared to its 6.4% rally between April 10 and June 28. However, through this side-move, the dollar's overbought conditions resolved themselves, and now the greenback's 13-week rate of change is back in neutral territory (Chart I-2, top two panels). Normally, a sideways correction tends to be a sign that a currency's underlying support remains strong. On the other hand, the euro's oversold correction is also now complete, but the euro has remained on a slightly more pronounced downward path over the same period (Chart I-2, bottom two panels). Chart I-2Short-Term Overbought Conditions Have Been Cleared Second, the fractal dimension measure for the trade-weighted dollar shows that despite the recent phase of dollar strength that began in September, the dollar's uptrend is not yet ready to exhaust itself (Chart I-3). The fractal dimension is a measure of groupthink promoted by Dhaval Joshi, head of BCA's European Investment Strategy. It compares the short-term and long-term variance of any asset to gauge if long-term and short-term investors are holding the same positions. If they do, risks are high that a paucity of buyers (or sellers in bear markets) may develop, resulting in a trend reversal as all investors are already similarly positioned. This fractal dimension flagged a yellow card for the dollar in June, but it was only followed by the sideways move described above. Now that the dollar is gaining some vigor, the recent pickup in this indicator suggests that this rally can run further. Chart I-3No Groupthink In The Dollar Third, while the dollar needed to digest some short-term overbought conditions, cyclical indicators like the Coppock Oscillator are still nowhere near overbought (Chart I-4, top two panels). By the spring of 2018, the dollar had reached massively oversold territory on a cyclical basis, and it is now in the midst of a powerful rebound. If history is any guide, once the Coppock Oscillator turns, it is likely to move much more than it has so far, indicating that the dollar rally has legs. However, the euro's Coppock Oscillator looks like it still possesses ample downside, as downdrafts never end at the current level of readings (Chart I-4, bottom two panels). Chart I-4Cyclical Oscillators Still Favor The USD Bottom Line: Technical indicators are currently not arguing against the normal seasonal strength in the USD. The short-term overbought conditions present at the beginning of the summer have evaporated, the dollar's trading action does not show meaningful evidences of groupthink, and a key cyclical momentum measure has further upside. Short-Term Valuations: No Obstacle Here Either An additional factor that might prevent the dollar's normal seasonal strength from realizing itself is the current valuation picture. Here again, there is little to worry about. As Chart I-5 illustrates, our Fundamental Intermediate Term Model and our Intermediate-Term Timing Model do not show any mispricing in the USD. The dollar is trading in line with our two augmented interest rate parity valuation metrics - two indicators that have historically been useful in spotting potential periods of USD risk. Chart I-5No Evident Mispricing In The Dollar Economic And Financial Market Developments Still Support The Dollar With no danger for the dollar from a technical and valuation standpoint, economic and financial market developments will likely hold the key to the dollar's outlook. First, economic divergences remains fully at play. As Chart I-6 illustrates, the U.S. economy is handily outperforming the rest of the world as the ISM Manufacturing Index has not been dragged down by the weakness observed outside the U.S. Historically, the gap between the ISM and the world's PMI leads the dollar's gyrations as the greenback is ultimately the factor forcing U.S. and global growth to converge. This time around, the growth gap suggests that the dollar has a few more months of strength ahead of itself. Moreover, Arthur Budaghyan writes in BCA's Emerging Market Strategy service that China's deleveraging campaign will continue to hinder global export growth (Chart I-7) - a sector of the economy with little weight in the U.S. This means that the growth gap between the U.S. and the rest of the world may widen further. Chart I-6Economic Divergences Support The Dollar Chart I-7China Deleveraging Points To Weaker Trade Second, the U.S.'s economic strength may be a problem for a large swath of the global economy. It is often assumed that strong U.S. growth lifts global demand through exports, undoing some of China's negative impact in the process. However, this does not take into account that U.S. rates determine the global cost of capital. The U.S. economy is currently much stronger than the rest of the world, and the U.S. private sector is not as burdened by debt as is the case outside the U.S. (Chart I-8). This makes the U.S. more capable of handling higher interest rates than the rest of the world. As a result, this year, the rise in both 10-year Treasury yields and TIPS yields has been met with pain in assets levered to global growth, like the German DAX and EM stock prices, as well as EM and commodity currencies (Chart I-9). Chart I-8The U.S. Has A More Robust Balance Sheet Chart I-9Higher U.S. Yields Hurt Assets Levered To Global Growth This is in sharp contrast with the U.S. The market and the Federal Reserve are coming to grips with the reality that the U.S. neutral rate is increasing, courtesy of robust household balance sheets, strong capex intentions, rising inflationary pressures and a large dose of fiscal stimulus. Thus, despite the rise in interest rates, the U.S. yield curve has started to steepen anew, even as global asset markets have been suffering (Chart I-10). Fed Chairman Jerome Powell has even given his subtle acquiescence to this move. Indeed, last week he argued that the Fed's policy might still be quite accommodative as the neutral rate may be sitting well above the current level of the fed funds rate. Chart I-10The U.S. Yield Curve Is Steepening Anew Third is the question of Italy. Italian yields continue to rise both in absolute terms and relative to German bunds. Some of this reflects the stress created by higher global real yields, which hurt the outlook for Italian growth and hence point toward a worsening debt load, which requires a higher risk premium in BTPs. But there is more to the widening in Italian spreads. Italy is setting its budget for next year, and is engaging in a war of words with Brussels. The Five Star Movement / Lega Nord Coalition wants to set a 2.4% of GDP deficit for 2019, much more than the previously agreed 0.8% penciled by the previous government this past spring. This is still within the 3% limit of the EU's Growth and Stability pact, but the European Commission and investors are concerned as Italy's public debt-to-GDP is already 133% - and this 2.4% deficit rests on extremely rosy growth assumptions. As a result, markets are punishing Italian bonds. This is a problem because when Italian yields rise, Italian banks suffer. Dhaval Joshi has argued in BCA's European Investment Strategy that a move in BTP yields to 4% could render the whole Italian banking system insolvent, as it would wipe out excess capital of EUR30 billion.1 Since the entire German, French, Spanish, Dutch, Austrian, Belgian, Greek, Irish and Portuguese banking systems still have low capital reserves, their combined EUR 479 billion exposure to Italy is fast becoming a Sword of Damocles. As a result, a war of words between Rome and Brussels - one that could last until December - could cause further tumult in European bank shares, and force the European Central Bank to stay on the defensive longer than it wishes to. This would hurt the euro and by symmetry, help the dollar. Bottom Line: Economic and financial market developments still support the dollar. The outperformance of U.S. growth relative to the rest of the world is likely to continue to be felt in the form of a stronger dollar in the coming months, especially as global exports remains negatively affected by China's deleveraging. Moreover, rising U.S. borrowing costs are so far having a limited impact on U.S. growth, but generating potent headwinds for activity outside the U.S. Finally, Italy is likely to remain a sore spot for Europe over the next two to three months, one that may weigh on the ECB's ability to provide any hawkish guidance this year. Risks To The View The view that the dollar can continue to rally is not without impediments. The first and most obvious one is that speculators have already aggressively bought the dollar (Chart I-11, top panel). This makes the greenback vulnerable to any unexpected improvement in global growth. Chart I-11Risks For The Dollar The second impediment is that a temporary reprieve in the global growth slowdown could well be materializing as we speak. G10 economic surprises have regain some vigor, and the diffusion index of BCA's Global Leading Economic Indicator has been rebounding (Chart I-11, bottom two panels). The third risk is that the China Play Index we introduced 10 weeks ago is rebounding (Chart I-12). This indicator, based on AUD/JPY, Swedish industrial stocks denominated in dollars, iron ore prices, Brazilian stocks and EM high-yield bonds, is very sensitive to Chinese reflation, or at the very least to how investors expect Chinese reflation to evolve going forward. This may reflect the fact that the People's Bank of China has injected liquidity into the banking system by cutting the Reserve Requirement Ratio four times this year, or that local government borrowings have increased. Chart I-12Investors May Be Betting On Chinese Reflation However, these three factors remain risks, not our base case. After all, net speculative positions in the dollar can stay elevated for extended periods, and the Chinese stimulus that is helping the China Play Index and maybe even the G10 surprise index still pales in comparison to the size of the aggregate deleveraging that is causing total social financing to weaken. Another risk to monitor is Fed Chairman Powell. The likelihood that he dials down his hawkish rhetoric on the elevated neutral fed funds rate in the coming weeks is significant. This could cause a temporary setback in Treasury yields and global rates - one that is likely to be welcomed by global risk assets but that may cause temporary indigestion for the dollar. Bottom Line: Three key risks could invalidate our thesis that the dollar strengthens this fall. They are: the large overhang of speculative longs in the greenback, a potential temporary stabilization in global growth, and markets pricing in Chinese stimulus. Additionally, Fed Chairman Powell may walk back some of his hawkish comments from last week, which would impact global bond yields and help global risk assets, but weigh on the dollar. Investment Implications Faced with this outlook, what should investors do? We continue to recommend holding a cyclically bullish dollar stance. Long DXY makes sense at this juncture, with upside toward 102 by Q1 2019, Implying a fall in EUR/USD below 1.10. However, the risks highlighted above are also non-negligible. This means that holding some hedges makes perfect sense. This summer, we recommended selling USD/CAD. As Chart I-13 illustrates, the loonie has been the best performing G10 currency - the only one that managed to eke out a gain against the greenback this summer (top panel of Chart I-13). This means that mean-reversion is not likely to be the CAD's friend going forward. It may thus not be the best instrument anymore to hedge against USD weakness. Instead, Chart I-13 proposes that the three currencies best placed to benefit from any mean reversion if the USD weakens are the SEK, the AUD, and especially the NZD. The NZD is extremely oversold now, which suggests that it could benefit greatly if the dollar were to experience any period of weakness. Moreover, the NZD has traditionally been highly levered to EM asset prices and Asian growth conditions. As a result, if the rebound in the China Play Index ends up hurting the USD, the NZD is likely to be the prime beneficiary. Chart I-13G10 Currency Returns Moreover, the kiwi money markets are currently pricing in a 12% probability of interest rate cuts by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand over the coming four months. While a lack of inflation means that the environment is not propitious for the RBNZ to increase rates, a rate cuts seems farfetched: the Official Cash Rate remains well below the average level of growth experienced over the past three years, whether in nominal or real terms. In other words, monetary policy remains extremely accommodative, despite the fact that the output gap is closed and the unemployment rate stands below full employment (Chart I-14). Chart I-14The RBNZ Will Not Cut Rates Finally, shorting EUR/JPY may well prove to be the best protection if the Fed's leadership guides bond yields lower. As Chart I-15 shows, EUR/JPY performs well when bond yield rise, which explains why this cross has managed to strengthen despite the recent weakness in EM asset prices this year. Hence, if a dollar correction is not driven by global growth converging upward toward the U.S., but instead is driven by the Fed backtracking from its recent hawkish rhetoric, then EUR/JPY will suffer considerably. Chart I-15Short EUR/JPY: A Hedge Against Falling Bond Yields As a result, we recommend investors with long USD exposure hedge their bets by taking on a bit of long NZD/USD exposure and some short EUR/JPY exposure as well. Bottom Line: Since the seasonal and cyclical outlook is favorable to the greenback, it makes sense for investors to maintain a dollar-bullish bias in their portfolio. However, the tactical risks to the dollar created by a potential rebound in non-U.S. growth or a potentially dovish Fed are meaningful. As a result, some hedges should be maintained to mitigate net positive exposure to the dollar. We recommend buying NZD/USD and selling EUR/JPY in order to achieve optimal protection from these risk factors. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Italy, Bond Vigilantes, And Bubbles", dated October 4, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: The unemployment rate surprised positively, coming in at 3.7%. Moreover, initial jobless claims also surprised positively, coming in at 207 thousand. However, while nonfarm payrolls underperformed expectations, coming in at 134 thousand, this miss was compensated by important positive revisions to 270 thousand for August. DXY has risen by roughly 1.4% this week. Overall, we continue to be positive on the dollar, given that inflationary pressures in the U.S. will continue to put upward pressure on interest rates. Moreover, China is tightening monetary conditions, which will continue to act as a drag on global growth. This environment will benefit the green back until at least the beginning of 2019. Report Links: Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 The Dollar And Risk Assets Are Beholden To China's Stimulus - August 3, 2018 Rhetoric Is Not Always Policy - July 27, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area has been mixed: Retail sales yearly growth surprised to the upside, coming in at 1.8%. However, core inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.9%. Finally, both the composite and manufacturing Markit PMI, also surprised negatively, coming in at 54.1 and 53.2 respectively. Rising U.S. yields as well as renewed concerns about Italy have lowered EUR/USD by roughly 2% this past couple of weeks. We are negative on the euro on a cyclical basis, given that euro area inflationary dynamics are tightly linked to global economic activity, which will likely be armed by China's monetary tightening. Thus, inflation, and consequently rates, will stay low in the euro area for the time being. Report Links: Will Rising Wages Cause An Imminent Change In Policy Direction In Europe And Japan? - October 5, 2018 Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 Time To Pause And Breathe - July 6, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been positive: Machinery orders yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 12.6%. Moreover, the leading economic Index also surprised to the upside, coming in at 104.4. Finally, overall household spending yearly growth also surprised to the upside, coming in at 2.8%. USD/JPY has been falling for the past week and a half. We are negative on the yen on a cyclical basis, given that YCC is likely to stay in place for the foreseeable. After all, Japanese inflation expectations remain moribund. Moreover, the expected negative fiscal shock next year will also weigh on aggregate demand. All of these factors, combined with slowing global growth will continue to widen rate differentials, which will create upside in USD/JPY. Report Links: Will Rising Wages Cause An Imminent Change In Policy Direction In Europe And Japan? - October 5, 2018 Rhetoric Is Not Always Policy - July 27, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Manufacturing production yearly growth surprised to the upside, coming in at 1.3%. However, Halifax house prices yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.5%. Finally, Markit Services PMI underperformed expectations, coming in at 53.9. GBP/USD has been flat since the middle of September. The European Union has been much more conciliatory than anticipated, causing the pound to rally. However, we will continue to watch the negotiations closely, given that very little geopolitical risk is currently priced into the pound at the moment, which means it will continue to be whipshawed with inevitable setbacks in the negotiations. We remain long GBP vol. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD/USD has fallen by roughly 2.5% over the past couple of weeks, mostly due to the spike in U.S. real yields and the fall in emerging market assets. We continue to be bearish on the Australian dollar, as the Australian economy is the most sensitive G10 currency to policy tightening in China. Moreover, the Australian economy has a very indebted household sectors, which makes it difficult for the RBA to hike rates in the current environment. Investors who wish to express this bearish view on the AUD can do so by shorting AUD/CAD, as the CAD will likely benefit from rising oil prices. Report Links: Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD/USD has fallen by nearly 3%. Overall, we are bearish the kiwi, as continued tightening by both the fed and Chinese authorities will keep putting pressure on risk assets like the NZD. Moreover, the momentum in volatility continues to be a negative sign for high yield currencies like NZD. That being said, once volatility momentum becomes negative high carry trades like NZD/CHF will prove to be attractive. Moreover, investors looking to hedge their long dollar positions should look to buy the NZD, as rate expectations in New Zealand have likely hit a bottom. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada has been mixed: While the net change in employment outperformed expectations significantly, coming in at 63.3 thousand, the devil was in the detail; full time employment contracted by 17 thousand jobs. On the other hand, the participation rate also surprised to the upside, coming in at 65.4%. However, housing starts surprised negatively, coming in at 189 thousand. USD/CAD has gone up by roughly 1.2% the past 2 weeks. We are closing our short USD/CAD trade this week, as we think the tactical upside for the CAD is now limited. Investors looking to hedge their long dollar exposure should instead look to buy the kiwi. That being said we continue to be positive on the Canadian dollar against the Australian dollar, as oil will further outperform base metals. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been negative: Headline inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 1%. Moreover, the SVMW Purchasing manager's Index also surprised negatively, coming in at 59.7. Finally, real retail sales yearly growth also underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.3%. EUR/CHF has risen by roughly 1.7% this past two weeks. Overall, we are bearish on the franc on a long-term basis, as inflationary forces are too tepid in Switzerland for the SNB to move away from its ultra-dovish monetary policy. Moreover, the strength in the franc over the past few months will likely drive prices down, adding further fuel to the SNB's easy money campaign. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been mixed: Headline and core inflation both outperformed expectations, coming in at 3.4% and 1.9% respectively. Moreover, manufacturing output growth also surprised to the upside, coming in at -0.1%. However, register unemployment surprised negatively, ticking up to 2.3%. USD/NOK has risen by roughly 1% the past couple of weeks, in spite of rising oil prices. We have long argued that USD/NOK is more sensitive to real rate differentials than to oil prices. Given that we expect real U.S. rates to have additional upside, we continue to be bullish on this cross. That being said, the NOK could outperform other commodity currencies like the AUD and the NZD, as the relative performance of oil in the commodity space will provide a cyclical lift to the NOK against these currencies. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden has been mixed: Retail sales yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 2%. Moreover, consumer confidence also surprised to the upside, coming in at 103.6. However, manufacturing PMI underperformed expectations, coming in at 55.2. USD/SEK has risen by roughly 2.7% the past couple of weeks. Overall, we are bullish on the krona on a long term basis, as monetary policy is too easy in Sweden given Sweden's current inflationary backdrop, which means that the path of least resistance for rates is up. Nevertheless, the policy tightening by Chinese authorities could continue to weigh on global growth. This means that the SEK could have some downside on a 3 to 6 month horizon. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Please note that a Special Alert titled "Brazil: A Regime Shift?" discussing investment implications of the weekend elections was published on Tuesday. Highlights The combination of rising U.S. bond yields and slumping growth in EM/China heralds further downside in EM risk assets and currencies. Watch for a breakdown in Asian risk assets and currencies. As a market-neutral trade for the next several months, we recommend going long Latin American and short emerging Asian stocks in common currency terms. We are downgrading Hong Kong stocks from neutral to underweight within an Asian or EM equity portfolio. Feature U.S. bond prices have broken down, and yields have broken out (Chart I-1). The bond selloff will continue as U.S. growth is very strong and inflationary pressures are accumulating. Chart I-1U.S. Bond Yields Have Broken Out, More Upside How will EM financial markets react to a further rise in U.S. bond yields? If EM growth were robust and fundamentals healthy, financial markets in developing countries would have no problem digesting higher U.S. interest rates. However, the fact is that EM fundamentals are poor and growth is weakening. Consequently, financial markets in the developing world are very vulnerable to higher U.S. bond yields. For now, U.S. bond yields will continue to rise, the U.S. dollar will strengthen further, and the EM bear market will endure. Stay short/underweight EM risk assets. Understanding The Nexus Between EM Assets And U.S. Bonds Rising U.S. bond yields pose a threat to EM risk assets if the former leads to a stronger U.S. dollar and by extension weaker EM currencies. Notably, risks to EM share prices will magnify if dollar borrowing costs for EM (corporate and sovereign bond yields) increase further (Chart I-2). In short, if rising U.S. bond yields are not offset by narrowing EM credit spreads, EM dollar bond yields will climb. This in turn will weigh on EM share prices. Chart I-2Rising Dollar Borrowing Costs: A Bad Omen For EM Stocks Chart I-3 highlights that the divergence between U.S. and EM share prices this year can be attributed to the decoupling in their credit spreads. Chart I-3Diverging Credit Spreads Between EM & U.S Credit spreads, meanwhile, are steered by EM exchange rates (Chart I-4). When EM currencies depreciate, debtors' ability to service U.S. dollar debt worsens, and credit spreads widen to reflect higher risk. The opposite also holds true. Chart I-4EM Credit Spreads Are A Function Of EM Currencies Overall, getting EM exchange rates right is of paramount importance. Hence, a vital question: Do EM currencies always depreciate when U.S. bond yields are rising or the Federal Reserve is tightening? Chart I-5 suggests not. Before 2013, EM currencies appreciated with rising U.S. bond yields. Since 2013, the correlation has been mixed. Chart I-5No Stable Relationship Between U.S. Bond Yields & EM Currencies The key difference between these periods is the performance of EM/Chinese economies. When EM/China growth is robust or accelerating, financial markets in developing economies have no trouble digesting higher U.S. interest rates and their currencies tend to appreciate. By contrast, when EM/China growth is weak or slumping, EM asset prices and currencies tumble regardless of the trajectory of U.S. interest rates. A pertinent question at the moment is why robust U.S. growth is not helping EM weather higher U.S. interest rates. The caveat is that EM as a whole is more exposed to the Chinese economy than the American one. Hence, barring a meaningful improvement in Chinese growth, higher U.S. bond yields will be overwhelming for EM financial markets. This is why we have been focusing on China's growth dynamics. Bottom Line: Desynchronization between the U.S. and Chinese economies will persist. The resulting combination of rising U.S. bond yields, a stronger greenback and depreciating EM currencies foreshadows further downside in EM risk assets. Emerging Asia: Do Not Catch A Falling Knife The latest export data from Korea and Taiwan point to a continued slowdown in their exports (Chart I-6). Corroborating the deepening slump in Asian growth and global trade, emerging Asian equity and credit markets are plunging. In particular: Chart I-6Global Trade Is Slowing The relative performance of emerging Asian stocks versus the global equity benchmark failed to break above important technical long-term resistance lines earlier this year, and will likely breach below their early 2016 lows (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Emerging Asian Equities Vs. Global: Further Underperformance Ahead Both high-yield and investment-grade emerging Asian corporate dollar-denominated bond yields continue to climb - a worrisome development for emerging Asian share prices (high-yield corporate bond yields are shown inverted in Chart I-8). Chart I-8Rising Corporate Bond Yields In Emerging Asia = Lower Stock Prices The equity selloff in emerging Asia is broad-based. Chart I-9 shows that the emerging Asian small-cap equity index is in freefall. Chart I-9Emerging Asian Small Caps Are In Freefall Net earnings revisions in China, Korea and Taiwan have dropped into negative territory (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Net Earnings Revisions Are Negative In China, Korea And Taiwan The Chinese MSCI All-Share Index - all stocks listed on the mainland and offshore (worldwide) - has plunged close to its early 2016 lows (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Chinese Broad Equity Index Is Back To Its 2016 Lows In China, the property market and construction remain at substantial risk. The budding slump in the real estate market will likely offset the government spending stimulus on infrastructure investment. Plunging share prices of property developers listed in both onshore and in Hong Kong point to a looming major downtrend in real estate market (Chart I-12). Chart I-12An Imminent Slump In Chinese Real Estate? For Asian equity portfolio managers whose mandate is to make a decision on Hong Kong and Singapore stocks, we recommend downgrading Hong Kong equities from neutral to underweight while maintaining Singapore at neutral within an Asian and overall EM equity portfolio. Our basis is that rising interest rates in the U.S. will translate into higher borrowing costs in Hong Kong due to the currency peg (Chart I-13). Simultaneously, Hong Kong's economy will suffer from a slowdown in China. Hence, a combination of weaker growth and rising borrowing costs will spell trouble for this interest rate-sensitive bourse. Chart I-13Higher U.S. Rates = Higher Hong Kong Rates Bottom Line: Equity and credit markets in emerging Asia are trading extremely poorly, and further downside is very likely. This week, we are downgrading allocations to Hong Kong stocks from neutral to underweight within an Asian or EM equity portfolio. A Relative Equity Trade: Short Asia / Long Latin America Common currency relative performance of emerging Asian versus Latin American stocks has broken down (Chart I-14). We reckon emerging Asian equities are set to underperform their Latin American peers for the next several months. Chart I-14Long Latin American / Short Emerging Asian Stocks The main culprit will likely be further depreciation in the RMB and an intensifying economic downturn in Asia, which will propel emerging Asian currencies and share prices lower. In regard to Latin America, elections in Mexico and Colombia have produced governments that will on the margin be positive for their respective economies. In Brazil too, first round election results are pointing to a market friendly result. We have been shifting our country equity allocation in favor of Latin America at the expense of Asia since late last year. In particular, we downgraded Chinese stocks in December 2017, Indonesian equities this past May and the Indian bourse last week. At the same time, we have been raising our equity allocation to Latin America by upgrading Mexico to overweight in April 2018, Colombia last week and Brazil earlier this week.1 Given we are also overweight Chilean stocks, our fully invested EM equity model portfolio noticeably overweights Latin America versus Asia. Notwithstanding our broad underweight in emerging Asia, we are still overweight Korea, Taiwan and Thailand within an EM equity portfolio. However, these overweights are paltry relative to both the size of the Asian equity universe and our overweights in Latin America. Bottom Line: Go long Latin American and short emerging Asian stocks in common currency terms as a trade for the next several months. Our Fully-Invested Equity Model Portfolio Chart I-15 demonstrates the performance of our fully invested EM equity portfolio versus the EM MSCI benchmark. This portfolio is constructed based on our country recommendations. Hence, it is a measure of alpha that clients could derive from our country calls and geographical equity allocations. Chart I-15EMS's Fully-Invested Model Equity Portfolio Performance We make explicit country equity recommendations (overweight, underweight and neutral) based on qualitative assessments of all relevant variables - the business cycle, liquidity, currency risks, policy, politics, valuations, and the structural backdrop among other things - for each country. This model portfolio is not a quantitative black box, but rather a combination of several factors: macro themes on the overall EM space, in-depth research on each individual country and various quantitative indicators. The table with our recommended country equity allocation is published at the end of our weekly reports (please refer to page 11). This fully invested equity model portfolio has outperformed the MSCI EM equity benchmark by about 65% with very low volatility since its initiation in May 2008. This translates into 500-basis-points of compounded outperformance per year. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "EM: Staring At A Grey Swan?" dated October 4, 2018 and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Alert "Brazil: A Regime Shift?" dated October 9, 2018; links are available on page 11. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights So What? More downside to CNY/USD ahead. Why? The trade war is spilling into political and military arenas, making it harder to de-escalate and negotiate a trade deal. Official U.S. and Chinese rhetoric is increasingly antagonistic, reflecting once-in-a-generation policy shifts toward a new Cold War. Tensions will not subside after the U.S. midterm election - neither the U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement nor any quick deals with Japan and the EU will speed up U.S.-China negotiations. Feature Clients know that BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has been alarmist on U.S.-China relations since we started as a service in 2012.1 This structural view is based on the long-term decline of U.S. power relative to China and the emergence of global multipolarity.2 However, the rise of General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2012 and President Donald Trump in 2016 have reinforced our view that "Sino-American conflict is more likely than you think."3 This includes military as well as economic conflict. Setting aside the risk of war, a geopolitical "incident" of some kind is becoming increasingly likely. As the two sides engage in brinkmanship, the probability of a miscalculation or provocation rises, and the probability of a grand new compromise falls. For investors, the takeaway is supportive of Geopolitical Strategy's current stance: long U.S. dollar, long U.S. stocks relative to DM, and long DM stocks relative to EM. We expect CNY/USD to fall further as markets question the ability to discount trade uncertainties via tariff rates alone (Chart 1). We continue to recommend a "safe haven" hedge of Swiss bonds and gold. Chart 1CNY/USD Has More Downside The risk is that China could respond to U.S. pressure by stimulating its economy aggressively. So far, the "China Play Index," devised by our Foreign Exchange Strategy, does not signal reflation. Nor do Chinese domestic infrastructure stocks relative to global, which our China Investment Strategy watches closely (Chart 2). Chart 2Small Stimulus Thus Far Trade Tensions Are Spilling Over A corollary of our view that U.S.-China tensions are secular and strategic in nature - i.e., not limited to the U.S. trade deficit - is the view that trade tensions will spill over into strategic areas, exacerbating those tensions and generating negative outcomes for investors exposed to the U.S.-China economic partnership.4 This strategic spillover is now taking shape. Since President Trump went forward with the second round of tariffs - 10% on $200 billion worth of imports, to ratchet up to 25% on January 1, 2019 - a series of negative events have taken place in U.S.-China relations (Table 1), culminating in the USS Decatur incident on September 30. Table 1Trade War Spills Into Strategic Areas The Decatur, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, was conducting operations in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea when it sailed within 12 nautical miles of Gaven and Johnson Reefs, which China claims as sovereign islands. At around 8:30am that Sunday morning, a Luyang-class destroyer from China's People's Liberation Army Navy "approached within 45 yards of Decatur's bow, after which Decatur maneuvered to prevent a collision," according to the U.S. Pacific Fleet spokesman. This was not an unprecedented incident in itself, but it came very close to a collision that could easily have resulted in a shipwreck, a full-blown U.S.-China crisis, and a global risk-off event in financial markets. The Decatur sailed close to the Chinese-claimed reefs because it was conducting a "Freedom of Navigation Operation" (FONOP) to assert the international right of free passage. A major point of contention between China and the U.S. (and between China and most of its neighbors and the western world) is that China claims outright sovereignty over about 80% of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands. In July 2016, the International Court of Arbitration ruled that none of the contested rocks and reefs in the sea qualify as islands and hence that they are not entitled to 12 nautical miles of "territorial" sea. China rejects this ruling and asserts sovereignty over the maritime features and much of the sea itself.5 In Diagram 1 we illustrate how a FONOP works based on a similar operation last year. The U.S. has conducted these operations for decades, but in late 2015 it began a series of FONOPs focusing on countering China's excessive claims in the South China Sea.6 This was also a way of opposing China's construction, reclamation, and "militarization" of the reefs under its possession. Diagram 1What Is A 'Freedom Of Navigation Operation'? It is not remotely a surprise that this year's trade tensions came close to exploding in the South China Sea. It is the premier geographic location of U.S.-China strategic friction: a hub for international trade; a vital supply route for all major Asian economies; and the primary focus of China's attempt to rewrite global rules (Diagram 2).7 The Appendix updates our list of clashes in this area. Diagram 2South China Sea As Traffic Roundabout The takeaway is that, far from capitulating to the Trump administration's trade demands, China is taking a more aggressive stance - and it is doing so outside the trade context. The U.S., for its part, has not diminished the significance of this incident, as it has often done on similar occasions.8 Instead, Vice President Mike Pence gave a remarkable speech at the Hudson Institute on October 4 in which he highlighted the Decatur, among a range of other "predatory" Chinese state-backed actions, to make a comprehensive case that China is a geopolitical rival seeking to undermine the United States and specifically the Trump administration.9 Pence's comments reflect a decision to "go public" with a shift in national strategy that has been developing in recent years, beginning - albeit tepidly - even in the Obama administration. A similar shift is underway in China - and has accelerated with the U.S.'s implementation of tariffs. Official Communist Party rhetoric increasingly characterizes the U.S. as an enemy whose real intention is to "contain" China's rise and has recently called for Chinese "self-reliance" in the face of U.S. sanctions.10 The two sides are bracing for conflict and are now seeking to mold public opinion more actively. Bottom Line: Investors should take note: markets were 45 yards away from a significant correction! The U.S.-China trade tensions are spilling outside of economic relations into political and military domains, as we expected. The South China Sea remains a hot zone that could be the setting of a geopolitical incident as tensions mount. What Is A Show Of Force? Notably, the U.S. military is said to be considering a "global show of force" during an unspecified week in November in order to deter China from its current policy trajectory. If this occurs, it will be market-relevant as it will be seen as a provocation by China and other U.S. rivals. A "show of force" is a formal military operation conducted by a nation with the purpose of demonstrating that it has both the will and the ability to use force in defense of its interests. It is fundamentally a political action, even though it utilizes military resources. The declared intention is to demonstrate resolve and prevent or deter an undesirable course of action by a rival state.11 Nevertheless, it is the equivalent of a dog baring its teeth and should not be taken lightly, especially when conducted by one major power against another. The U.S. holds shows of force fairly frequently. Over recent decades it has been the third most common type of operation for U.S. forces.12 However, for most of the past several decades, the U.S. conducted very few operations in the Asia Pacific not pertaining to the Vietnam War, and these were usually of limited length and intensity. They were often shows of force to deter North Korea from various acts of terrorism and sabotage. China was rarely involved - there was, for example, no U.S. deployment during the Tiananmen crisis. Nevertheless there are a few highly relevant precedents: By far the most important exception is the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996. This was a major show of force - and one whose shadow still hangs over the Taiwan Strait. In July 1995, Beijing launched a series of missile tests and military exercises, hoping to discourage pro-independence sentiment and dissuade the Taiwanese people from voting for President Lee Teng-hui - who was rightly suspected of favoring independence - ahead of the 1996 elections. The United States responded on March 1, 1996 by deploying two aircraft carriers, USS Nimitz and USS Independence, and various warships to the area. The Nimitz even sailed through the strait. Tensions peaked ahead of the Taiwanese election on March 23, 1996 - in which voters went against China's wishes - and the show of force concluded after 48 days on April 17. Of course, tensions simmered for years afterwards. The Taiwan incident was the only operation involving China in the 1990s, and the first to do so since a minor contingency operation upon the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. It is generally deemed successful in demonstrating U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security - but it also spurred a revolution in Chinese military affairs, such that China is today in a far better position to attack Taiwan than ever before.13 The market effects were pronounced: Chinese and Taiwanese equities sold off. American stocks were unaffected (Chart 3). Chart 3Naval Shows Of Force Can Rattle Markets The second major exception was the Hainan Island Incident, or EP-3 Incident. On April 1, 2001 a Chinese jet struck a U.S. EP-3 ARIES II signals reconnaissance plane in the skies over the South China Sea. The U.S. plane landed on China's island province of Hainan, where its crew was detained and interrogated for 10 days while their aircraft was meticulously disassembled. Ultimately the U.S. issued a half-hearted apology and the crew was released. This was a much smaller show of force than the third Taiwan crisis. The U.S. Navy positioned three destroyers in the area for two days. Chart 4A South China Sea Incident Helped Kill The Bull Market This incident marked the peak of the cycle in U.S. equities ex-tech (Chart 4). In China, both A-shares and H-shares experienced volatility before selling off in subsequent months (Chart 5, top panel). Chart 5Volatility And Selloffs Amid Asian Shows Of Force The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents occasioned a show of force. On March 26, 2010 a North Korean miniature submarine conducted a surprise torpedo attack against the Cheonan, a South Korean Corvette, sinking it and killing 46 sailors. The U.S. intended to respond by positioning the USS George Washington in the Yellow Sea, but was intimidated from doing so by China's fiercely negative diplomatic reaction. Instead it deployed the carrier to the Sea of Japan. Later that year, however, after North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island and killed four South Koreans, the U.S. responded with a beefed up version of regular military drills, including the George Washington, for four days in the Yellow Sea. This incident is significant in showing how aggressively China will oppose demonstrations of American naval power in its near abroad. Unlike in 1996, China is today much better positioned to react to U.S. naval action in its neighborhood. If Beijing was so resistant to a U.S. show of force against North Korea in the wake of a North Korean attack, it will be even more resistant to a U.S. display of might in China's nearby waters aimed at China in response to what China views as a defense of maritime-territorial sovereignty. Chinese A-shares sold off, while H-shares were somewhat more resilient, during this episode (Chart 5, second panel). Fire and Fury: The United States' latest significant show of force occurred in 2017 when the navy positioned three aircraft carrier strike groups in the region to deter North Korean nuclear and missile tests and belligerent rhetoric against the United States. This action ultimately led to Chinese enforcement of sanctions and North Korean capitulation to U.S. demands. Chinese stocks only briefly sold off during this episode (Chart 5, third panel). However, the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield fell during the peak of tensions in the summer. So what about the global show of force that the U.S. is considering in November? Details on the specific operation under consideration are scant because they fall under a "classified proposal," written by members of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Command and only partially leaked to the press (apparently to coincide with Vice President Pence's speech).14 The proposal is still being discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Intelligence Community, so nothing is final. From the information that is publicly available, it is highly significant that the proposed show of force is supposed to be "global" in range. It would reportedly involve a "series" of military missions on "several fronts," including the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, an unspecified area near Russia, and the west coast of South America. It would also involve multiple military services - the navy, the air force, the marines, and potentially cyber and space capabilities. While the various missions would reportedly be "concentrated" and "focused," implying that the U.S. wants to manage the escalation of tensions carefully, the locations that have been named are extremely sensitive. A show of force in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea would be provocative enough. A simultaneous show of force against both China and Russia in today's context would be truly extraordinary.15 In short, if the report is accurate, the U.S. is contemplating a rare and provocative display of its global power projection capabilities. Why would the U.S. stage such a grand demonstration merely because of a taunt by a Chinese ship? The Decatur incident is only the proximate cause. Washington is in the midst of attempting a very dangerous "two-front war" against China and Iran, the latter of whom faces oil sanctions from November 4.16 Moreover, this is a "three-front war" if today's historically bad relations with Russia are taken into account. Indeed, the U.S. may well be responding to the joint show of force by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi in their own large-scale military exercises in September, in which Chinese soldiers participated in a Russian drill outside the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for the first time.17 As such, we would not put any stock in the idea that a sudden drop-off in geopolitical tensions, with China or anyone else, will occur after the U.S. midterm election on November 6. Rather, investors should expect an increase in geopolitical risk. There is no combination of midterm election results in which Trump will be forced to pull back on his "Maximum Pressure" doctrine. The proposal is not final, and the idea alone is a low-level threat that could be used in negotiations. But under the circumstances, we think it more likely than not that the U.S. will go forward with it. Ultimately, the U.S. proposal epitomizes our mega-theme of multipolarity. The U.S. is in relative decline and is reasserting itself with a muscular national security policy, particularly against China and Iran but also against Russia. However, its actions are highly unlikely to cause a change in China's behavior now that Beijing has determined that the U.S. is seeking Cold War-style strategic containment. Instead, China will hasten its efforts to become self-reliant and to deter U.S. aggression in its near abroad. Global economic policy uncertainty, and trade policy uncertainty, are likely to increase, not decrease, in such an environment. Saber-rattling and supply-chain risk will weigh on EM Asia in particular. Bottom Line: The U.S. government is contemplating an extraordinary "global show of force" that could involve a series of joint military operations across the globe. The chief focus is China, but the unknown array of operations could also target Russia or Iran. We think such operations are plausible and will increase global economic uncertainty. We would expect them to create volatility in global markets, adding to jitters over China tariffs (supply-chain risks) and Iranian sanctions (oil prices). How Will China Retaliate? China does not have the ability to respond proportionately to the U.S. - it cannot hold a global show of force of its own. Because its own shows of force will appear diminutive next to American fireworks, it may not react immediately. Beijing is more likely to respond by changing its policies to address the underlying increase in antagonism with the United States and improve its national security. We would classify its potential responses into two main groups: the low road and the high road. The low road consists of policies meant to confront the U.S. directly and forcefully. In our view, these policies bring significant costs that will make China reluctant to embrace them fully: Raise the stakes in the South China Sea: China could go for broke and deploy the full range of military assets in the islands that it has repurposed. This would provoke an even larger international naval response from the U.S. and its allies.18 Remove sanctions on North Korea: China could reverse sanctions enforcement on North Korea (Chart 6) and undermine President Trump's signature foreign policy overture. The problem is that China would then provide the U.S. with a pretext for an even greater military presence in Northeast Asia. Chart 6China Could Reverse Sanctions Enforcement Flout sanctions on Iran: China could subsidize Iran (Chart 7) in the hopes of helping to create a huge American distraction comparable to the second Iraq war. But this confrontation would threaten China with an oil shock and economic dislocation, an even greater conflict with the U.S., and the risk of regime change in Iran.19 Chart 7China Could Flout Iran Sanctions Punish U.S. companies: China could raise the pressure on U.S. companies doing business on its territory. The problem is that the U.S. has already demonstrated, through the ZTE affair this year, that it can inflict devastating reprisals against the tech champions on whom China's economic future depends (Chart 8). Chart 8U.S. Could Punish Chinese Tech Firms Thus China is most likely to take the "high road," i.e. seeking alternatives to the United States throughout the rest of the world: Chart 9China's Market Is Its Biggest Advantage Import more goods: China's greatest strength in winning friends is that its domestic demand remains relatively robust (Chart 9). China can substitute away from the U.S. by shifting to other developed markets. Emerging markets are becoming more connected with China and less so with the U.S. (Chart 10). Chart 10China's Trade Ties Grow, Ex-U.S. Maintain outward investment: China's outward investment profile is expanding rapidly (Chart 11), but there is potential for a negative political backlash - as has occurred in Malaysia.20 China will need to focus on improving relations with those countries where it expands investment, including in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).21 Chart 11China's Outward Investment Strategy: Priorities Over The Past Decade Court U.S. regional allies: Relations with South Korea have already improved; Shinzo Abe of Japan is soon to make a rare state visit to China; and trilateral trade talks between these three have revived for the first time since 2015 (Chart 12). Both the Philippines and Thailand currently have governments that are friendly to China. Beijing will need to ensure that its growing trade surpluses do not get out of whack. Chart 12Can China Court U.S. Allies? Sign multilateral trade pacts: China is trying to position itself as a leader of free trade. This is a tough sell, but a successful completion of negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) will generate some momentum. This Asia Pacific trade grouping is far larger in terms of total imports than its more sophisticated rival, the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the latter being shorn of U.S. participation (Chart 13). Chart 13RCEP Is Bigger Than CPTPP Play nice in the South China Sea: Now that the U.S. is proposing to push back against Chinese militarization of the islands, it makes sense for China to take a conciliatory approach. It is proposing joint energy exploration with the Philippines and others at least as long as offshore activity is depressed (Chart 14). China might also try to settle a diplomatic "Code of Conduct" for the sea with its neighbors. Chart 14A Reason For China To Play Nice The most important consequence is an alliance with Russia, whether formal or not. The security agenda of these two powers is increasingly aligned with their robust economic partnership (Chart 15).22 The differences and distrust between them cannot override their need to guard themselves against a more assertive United States. Chart 15Embrace Of Dragon And Bear Bottom Line: China's "high road" strategies are its best options when more aggressive options have higher risks of undermining China's own long-term interests. But an alliance with Russia is quickly becoming inevitable. Investment Implications A global show of force targeting China's "core interests" in Taiwan and the South China Sea will make trade negotiations even more difficult. China is not going to offer concessions when facing U.S. military intimidation in addition to tariffs.23 Investors should watch closely for any signs that nationalist protests and boycotts of U.S. goods are developing in China. Such a movement would not be allowed to continue for long without the Communist Party condoning it. A boycott would mark a form of retaliation that is much more impactful than tariffs. A deterioration in cultural ties is also in the cards. The United States is reported to be considering restrictions on Chinese student visas after intelligence assessments of non-traditional technological and intellectual property theft via graduate students in advanced programs such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing.24 U.S. markets remain insulated today, as in the last big rupture in U.S.-China relations in 1989, so we continue to expect U.S. equities to outperform Chinese (and global) stocks amid trade tensions and saber-rattling. Chart 16Last U.S.-China Crisis Prompted Stimulus... However, an important takeaway from the 1989 episode is that China stimulated the economy (Chart 16). This time we think stimulus will remain lackluster, reflecting Xi's need to keep overall leverage contained (Chart 17). But conflict escalation with the U.S. is clearly the biggest risk to this view. Chart 17...But Stimulus Muted Thus Far One oft-discussed retaliatory option is that China could sell off its vast $1.17 trillion holdings of U.S. treasuries. Rapidly dumping them is not effective, but slowly tapering is precisely what China has been doing since 2011 (Chart 18). This will accelerate its need to invest in real assets abroad and to purchase alternative reserve currencies, such as the euro, pound, and yen. Chart 18China Weans Itself Off Treasuries Ultimately, the significance of Vice President Pence's speech is that the U.S. now views China as both a great power and a threat to U.S. supremacy. This raises the potential for a large share of the $33 billion in cumulative U.S. direct investment in China since 2006 to become, effectively, stranded capital (Chart 19). If that is indeed the case, it would mean that investors in S&P 500 China-exposed companies would have to take note and re-rate their investments. Companies with significant investment in China may have to make capital investments in alternative supply-chain options, leading to a significant hit to their profit margin. Chart 19Stranded Capital In China? Other countries in Europe and the rest of Asia stand to benefit from the U.S. getting squeezed out of China's market, unless and until the new Cold War forces them to choose sides. Their choice is by no means a foregone conclusion, underscoring that China's policy response will be to seek better bonds with its neighbors and non-U.S. partners. Over the longer term, we think that our mega-theme of multipolarity will produce the bifurcation of capitalism. Within each sphere of influence globalization will continue to operate, but between spheres, or in the border areas, it will become a much less tidy affair. In addition to our recommendations above on page 2, we are reinitiating our short U.S. S&P 500 China-exposed stocks relative to the broad market. These companies have sold off heavily in recent months but the negative backdrop suggests that there is farther to go. Housekeeping On a separate note, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy is closing our long U.S. high-tax rate basket relative to S&P 500 trade for a gain of 8.26%. This was a play on the Trump tax cuts that we initiated in April 2017. Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin," dated January 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Throwing The Baby (Globalization) Out With The Bath Water (Deflation)," dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Underestimating Sino-American Tensions," dated November 6, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?" dated March 28, 2017, and "The Looming Conflict In The South China Sea," May 29, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Comparable incidents in December 2013, August 2014, May 2016, December 2016, August 2017, and March 2018 did not receive such a high-level response from U.S. leaders, reflecting both the seriousness of the Decatur incident and the administration's sense of political expediency amidst the trade conflict and midterm election cycle. 9 Pence criticized Chinese President Xi by name for allegedly breaking his word on the militarization of the Spratly Islands. He suggested that China's outward investment should be understood in strategic rather than economic terms, implying that the Belt and Road Initiative is a Soviet-style plan to organize a "bloc" of nations under Chinese hegemony. And he hinted at a new defense of the Monroe Doctrine in his criticism of China's recent assistance to the collapsing socialist regime in Venezuela. Please see the White House, "Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China," dated October 4, 2018, available at www.whitehouse.gov. 10 The Trump administration's key document is Secretary of Defense James Mattis, "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America," Department of Defense, 2018, available at dod.defense.gov. For the Xi administration, see Orange Wang and Zhou Xin, "Xi Jinping says trade war pushes China to rely on itself and 'that's not a bad thing,'" South China Morning Post, dated September 26, 2018, available at www.scmp.com; and the Information Office of the State Council, "The Facts and China's Position on China-US Trade Friction," September 2018, available at www.chinadaily.com. 11 For this discussion of shows of force please see W. Eugene Cobble, H. H. Gaffney, and Dmitry Gorenburg, "For the Record: All U.S. Forces' Responses to Situations, 1970-2000 (with additions covering 2000-2003)," Center for Strategic Studies, May 2005, available at www.dtic.mil. 12 See footnote 11 above. 13 Please see William S. Murray, "Asymmetric Options for Taiwan's Defense," Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 5, 2014, available at www.uscc.gov. 14 Please see Barbara Starr, "US Navy proposing major show of force to warn China," dated October 4, 2018, available at www.cnn.com. 15 Even the South American location implies that Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence on that continent is now deemed meaningful enough to require a reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine. Over the past decade, the U.S. has tended to regard these activities as limited, but now that may be changing. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "2019: The Geopolitical Recession?" dated October 3, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see "Russia Holds Massive War Games, As Putin And Xi Tout Ties," Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, September 11, 2018, available at www.rferl.org. 18 Australia, Japan, and the U.K. have already begun enforcing freedom of navigation alongside the U.S. 19 The U.S. could also impose secondary sanctions on China for non-compliance. State-owned energy firm Sinopec, for instance, was said to be reducing imports of crude from Iran by half in the month of September. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy notes that Chinese refiners, like other Asian refiners, are preparing to run more light-sweet crude from the U.S. in the future, which gives a good yield in high-value-added products like gasoline. So far China has not imposed retaliatory tariffs on these imports from the U.S. Please see Chen Aizhu and Florence Tan, "China's Sinopec halves Iran oil loadings under U.S. pressure: sources," Reuters, dated September 28, 2018, available at uk.reuters.com. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Are You Ready For 'Maximum Pressure?'," dated May 16, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown?" dated September 13, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Can Russia Import Productivity From China?" dated June 29, 2016, and "The Embrace Of The Dragon And The Bear," dated April 11, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Xi Jinping's refusal to meet with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo over the past weekend, and decision to visit North Korea for the first time in his term, underscores this point. 24 Please see Demetri Sevastopulo and Tom Mitchell, "US considered ban on student visas for Chinese nationals," Financial Times, dated October 2, 2018, available at www.ft.com. Appendix Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) (Continued) Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) (Continued)

Highlights Portfolio Strategy A playable sector rotation opportunity has emerged, as we first argued at the recent BCA investment conference: Financials, industrials and select tech subgroups will lead the next phase of the market advance, a result of the bond market selloff gaining steam into year-end and beyond. In contrast, rising interest rates, a vibrant U.S. economy, softening operating metrics and high indebtedness signal that it is time to shed utility stocks. Recent Changes Trim the S&P Utilities sector to underweight today. Table 1 Feature On the eve of earnings season, the SPX remains close to an all-time high. The most recent spate of investor optimism was driven by President Trump cementing another deal last week, this time with Canada. While the renaming of NAFTA to USMCA is a step in the right direction (i.e. a deal was struck), a deal with China remains the elephant in the room. On that front, U.S. hawkish trade rhetoric should remain in vogue and any deal will have to wait until at least after the election, if not until Q1/2019. Up to now Trump's trade hawkishness has not infiltrated U.S. profits, but we continue to closely monitor IBES reported profit growth expectations. Following up from last week, the rest of the world is bearing the brunt of the U.S. trade-related rhetoric according to our profit growth models, a message sell-side analysts' forecasts also corroborate (we use forward EBITDA in order to gauge trend profit growth and filter out the tax-induced jump in U.S. EPS, Chart 1). Meanwhile, at the margin, seasonality can prop up stocks. While September - a historically negative return month, but not this year - is behind us, stock market crash-prone October is upon us, and thus a pick-up in volatility would not come as a surprise. Beyond October's dreaded crash history, the Presidential cycle has piqued our interest, especially years two and three. Building on our sister Geopolitical Strategy publication's research,1 and given the upcoming midterm elections, we created a cycle-on-cycle profile of SPX returns during these two middle Presidential cycle years (Chart 2). Chart 1U.S. Has The Upper Hand Chart 2Seasonality Boost Until Midyear 2019? In more detail, we analyzed 17 cycles starting in 1950 using S&P 500 daily data (reconstructed S&P 500 prior to 1957). During these iterations, only two two-year periods ended in the red, 1974/75 and 2002/03. The first coincided with a recession and the second took place in the aftermath of the dotcom bust. In addition, two other cycles produced roughly 5% two-year returns, 1962/63 and 1966/67. Finally, 1954/55 was the outlier when the SPX went parabolic and nearly doubled. While every cycle is different, it is clear from Chart 2 that the Presidential cycle should continue to underpin the SPX, if history is an accurate guide, especially given our forecast of no recession in the coming 9-to-12 months. In fact, the S&P could rise another 10%, in line with our 2019 expectation, predicated upon a 10% increase in profits and a lateral multiple move. Interestingly, according to the median Presidential cycle-on-cycle roadmap, while the back half of 2019 is likely to prove more challenging, the first half of next year should enjoy most of the returns (Chart 2). An assessment of recent data releases in the U.S. and abroad is also revealing. Chart 3 shows that the domestic economy is firing on all cylinders. Consumer confidence and sentiment hit multi-decade highs recently. Similarly, the job market remains vibrant and small business euphoria reigns supreme. Not only are small business owners optimistic on all employment-related subcomponents of the NFIB survey, but SME capex intentions are also as good as they get. The ISM manufacturing survey ticked down from the August peak, but remains close to 60. Its close sibling, the ISM services survey, vaulted into uncharted territory. All of this is reflected in the still-growing U.S. leading economic indicator and signals that the U.S. equity market remains on a solid footing. Outside U.S. shores, the bearish narrative is well established with EMs, especially the U.S. dollar debt-saddled fragile five that have to contend with twin deficits, sinking in a bear market. China's debt load is also coming under intense scrutiny as U.S. tariffs are all but certain to weigh on Chinese output growth. Nonetheless, there is a chance that the EMs have depreciated their currencies by enough to engineer a modest rebound (bottom panel, Chart 4). In other words, absent the currency peg straightjacket that dominated the region in the late-1990s, free-floating FX devaluations may serve as a relief valve in order to boost exports. The latest Korean MARKIT manufacturing PMI spiked above the boom/bust line to a multi-year high signaling that already humming Korean factories (industrial production is accelerating) will likely remain busy in the coming months. Other hard economic data also confirm these greenshoots: Korean manufacturing exports are expanding smartly. In particular, exports to China are soaring. Reaccelerating manufacturing selling prices also corroborate this budding Korean recovery (third panel, Chart 4). Chart 3U.S. Is On Fire Chart 4Reflationary Impulse? While it is premature to call an end to the EM carnage, most of the bad news on global export volumes and prices may be nearing an end and the EMs may even export some of their inflation to the U.S. Play The Sector Rotation Into Financials And Industrials... In recent research, we have been highlighting that inflation is slowly rearing its ugly head and there are high odds that the selloff in the bond market gains steam into year-end and beyond2 (as a reminder BCA's fixed income publications continue to recommend below-benchmark portfolio duration). Against such a backdrop, sectors that benefit from rising interest rates and that serve as inflation hedges should outperform in the coming quarters. The "FIT" market refers to financials, industrials and select technology stocks. In more detail, we expect a sector rotation, especially into financials and industrials that have been laggards and remain compellingly valued (Chart 5). With regard to financials, Chart 6 shows that this early cyclical sector enjoys a positive correlation with interest rates and inflation expectations, and a catch up phase in relative share prices looms in the coming quarters. Chart 5Rotate Into Financials... Chart 6...And Industrials Industrials stocks also benefit from rising inflation and interest rates as large parts of this deep cyclical sector are levered to the commodity cycle (Chart 7). In other words, industrials stocks are an indirect inflation hedge and trouble surfaces only when capital goods producers cannot pass rising input costs down the supply chain or to the consumer. But, we are not there yet. Keep in mind that during the last cycle, relative (and absolute) industrials performance peaked prior to relative energy stock prices. Similarly, the relative industrials stock price ratio troughed in early 2009 before their deep cyclical brethren put in a (temporary) bottom a year later (Chart 8). Chart 7Industrials Lead Chart 8Undervalued True, energy stocks are also going to perform well if our thesis of higher interest rates/inflation pans out in the coming quarters and especially if BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service's view of a looming oil price spike materializes (Chart 9). Thus, we sustain the high-conviction overweight stance in the broad sector and reaffirm our recent upgrade to an above benchmark allocation in the S&P oil & gas exploration & production (E&P) subgroup.3 We also reiterate our recent market-neutral and intra-commodity pair trade: long S&P oil & gas E&P / short global gold miners.4 This trade is off to a great start up 10.3% since inception and will benefit further from an inflationary impulse. Chart 9Energy Remains A High-Conviction Overweight While tech stocks have really delivered and led the market advance year-to-date, a bifurcated tech market should remain in place with capex levered S&P software and S&P tech hardware, storage & peripherals indexes (both are high-conviction overweights) outperforming early cyclical tech groups, semi and semi equipment stocks (we remain underweight both semi subindexes). Bottom Line: A playable rotation into financials and industrials is in the offing especially if the selloff in the bond market accelerates on the back of an inflationary whim. We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to both the S&P financials and S&P industrials sectors. ...But Lights Are Out For Utilities Utilities stocks are the ultimate loser from a backup in interest rates as they serve as premier fixed income proxies in the equity space and we are compelled to trim exposure to below benchmark. The niche S&P utilities sector yields 3.5% and when the competing risk free asset is near 3.2% and rising, investors prefer to shed, at the margin, riskier high-yielding equities and park the proceeds in U.S. Treasurys (Chart 10). While arguably most of the bad news is already reflected in washed out technicals and bombed out short and even long-term profit expectations (Chart 11), the selling will only accelerate into yearend and 2019. Chart 10Higher Yields Bite Chart 11Oversold And Unloved... Apart from the tight inverse correlation utilities have with interest rates, they are also a defensive sector that outperforms the broad market when the economy is in retreat. Currently a plethora of recent economic releases are signaling that the U.S. economy is overheating. Chart 12 illustrates the safe haven status of utility stocks (ISM surveys shown inverted). On the operating front, despite the upbeat economic data, electricity capacity utilization remains anemic. Capacity growth is likely responsible for this weak resource utilization signal as utilities construction continues unabated (private construction shown inverted, top panel, Chart 13). Adding insult to injury, inventory accumulation is also weighing on the sector (turbine inventories shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 13). Chart 12...But More Pain Looms Chart 13Weak Operating Metrics Worrisomely, all these expansion plans have been financed with debt. While this is not typically an issue for stable cash flow generating utilities, the sector's net debt-to-EBITDA profile has gone parabolic, nearly doubling since the GFC and even overtaking the early 2000s when a California deregulation wave first led to exuberance and then an electricity crisis (Chart 14). Any letdown in cash flow growth will be disruptive, especially given that the sector has no valuation cushion (bottom panel, Chart 14). Nevertheless, there are some risks that could put our underweight position offside. Natural gas prices have spiked of late and given that they are the marginal price setter for the sector they could boost utility pricing power and thus profits (top & middle panels, Chart 15). As the U.S. economy is firing on all cylinders, electricity demand should remain brisk and provide an offset to the otherwise weakening utility operating backdrop (bottom panel, Chart 15). Chart 14Heavily Indebted And Pricey Chart 15Risks To Underweight View Netting it all out, rising interest rates, a vibrant U.S. economy, softening operating metrics and high indebtedness signal that the time is ripe to sell utility stocks. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P utilities sector to underweight. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit," dated September 12, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Deflation - Reflation - Inflation," dated August 20, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Soldiering On," dated July 16, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Deflation - Reflation - Inflation," dated August 20, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Jair Bolsonaro, an ex-army captain and a right-leaning, law-and-order candidate has won a surprising victory in the first round of the Brazilian presidential election (Chart I-1). Bolsonaro came within striking distance of 50%, but did not cross that threshold, which means that the second round will go ahead on October 28. Given that he only needs another 4% to gain a majority of votes, his victory in the second round is now the most likely outcome by far. Importantly, the results of the congressional election similarly saw a swing to the right in both legislative houses. Chart I-1Bolsonaro Outperformed In The First Round What are the prospects for pro-market structural reforms amid this apparent regime shift in Brazilian politics? How should investors be positioned over the coming months? In the short term, a Bolsonaro presidency will boost business and market sentiment. This is mainly due to the right-leaning balance of parties in Congress and hence Bolsonaro's ability to form a majority coalition. This should lead to an outperformance of Brazilian assets relative to EM on expectations of reforms being passed and implemented. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service recommends upgrading Brazil to an overweight within EM equity, credit, and local fixed-income portfolios. However, in the longer term, we expect that Bolsonaro's presidency will still be constrained on social security reforms. It is still not clear if Brazil's median voter is demanding the kind of policies touted by Bolsonaro's economic advisors. Given Bolsonaro's populism, he may not be willing to expend his political capital on painful and unpopular reforms. In light of this, investors with a 2-5 year horizon should be wary of increasing their absolute exposure to Brazilian assets. Private investors looking for long-term exposure to Brazil should be especially concerned about Bolsonaro's anti-democratic, pro-military inclinations. A New Political Regime... Bolsonaro outperformed expectations in the first round by winning 46% of the popular vote, soundly beating his main rival Fernando Haddad of the left-wing Worker's Party. Polls over the past few weeks had seen him pegged at around 30%. Yet, Sunday night's results showed Bolsonaro beating all pollsters' expectations and nearly gaining the victory in the first round. Table I-1First Round Turnout Was Low In Contrast To Pass Elections Notably, and in contrast to previous elections, overall turnout for the first round was low, standing at just 79% (Table I-1). This played into Bolsonaro's hands. Even though there will be strategic voting in the second round - and our expectation is that most left-leaning voters will switch to Haddad, the remaining left-wing candidate - Haddad's chances look slim. He needs a mass wave of Lula supporters to turn out for the vote. The fact that they did not in the first round bodes ill for him. Thus, Bolsonaro stands at strong odds of becoming Brazil's next president. Attention will turn to the mandate that Bolsonaro will receive over the next four years. In our view, the factors below will be key: Short-term constraints have fallen off: The surprising surge in right-leaning parties at the congressional level suggests that President Bolsonaro will have no immediate legislative constraints to his agenda. He will be free to pursue his policy preferences relatively unimpeded. Chart I-2Chamber Of Deputies Results This is due to both legislative houses shifting towards the right, giving Bolsonaro a mandate to form a majority right-wing government for the first time since 1998 (Chart I-2). So far, 63% of seats in the lower house have gone to center-right and right-wing parties (according to our back-of-the-envelope calculation). If all of these parties joined into a coalition it would represent a historically strong mandate. Markets will surely interpret this as a positive development. However, not all of these parties will necessarily join Bolsonaro. Moreover, reforms requiring a constitutional amendment, such as the all-important reform of Brazil's unsustainable pension system, would require a supermajority of 308 out of 513 seats (60%) in the lower house. Historically, this has proven difficult, and it will be especially tricky for a president with no executive experience, little legislative record, and who denounces the use of pork-barrel spending.1 Otherwise, Congress can ultimately be cajoled into following Bolsonaro. As such, for the first time since Lula's first election (2002 to 2006), the Brazilian president is well-positioned to pursue his agenda. Bolsonaro will likely initiate some easy supply-side policies like cutting corporate taxes and red tape for businesses. Besides, business sentiment could surge due to the emergence of a business-friendly government. Hence, Bolsonaro has some short-term, easy "boosters" before the long-term challenges resurface. Long-term constraints uncertain: Despite the above, the pace of reforms will be slow given that Bolsonaro is, in the end, a populist who will want to maintain power above all. We continue to doubt Bolsonaro's willingness and ability to pursue social security reforms. We suspect that the vast majority of his voters chose to cast their ballot due to his law-and-order agenda that included a focus on battling crime and corruption. His economic advisor, Paulo Guedes, spent more time touting his reformist credentials in foreign financial publications than on the campaign trail. As such, it is difficult to conclude that Bolsonaro actually has a strong mandate for painful pension reforms. Polls ahead of the election suggest that only 4% of the public wants pension reforms (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Brazil's Population Is Not Open To Fiscal Austerity Chart I-4The J-Curve Of Structural Reform That said, we are open-minded and willing to be proved wrong. If Bolsonaro supports very dramatic reforms in his first 12 months in office, when his political capital is strongest, he could pull through despite the likely opposition from the median voter. As our J-Curve Of Structural Reform suggests, Bolsonaro can survive the "danger zone" if he pushes ahead with painful reforms right away (Chart I-4). He will start with sufficient political capital to do so. For long-term investors, the chief question is this: Is Bolsonaro a Brazilian Ronald Reagan or merely a Brazilian Rodrigo Duterte? Judging from everything he himself - not his advisors - has said in the past and on the campaign trail, we would bet on the latter. ...But The Same Economic Problems Brazil is getting a new government, but the macro economic challenges remain the same. Namely, ballooning public debt, still high interest rates and an unsustainable pension system (Chart I-5). As discussed above, it is not evident that Bolsonaro will strive to enact major cuts in the social security system that would be very unpopular. Apart from pensions and privatization, other choices to tackle the unsustainable public debt dynamics include reducing interest rates and boosting nominal growth (Chart I-6). Bolsonaro's economic team has repeatedly discussed the need to reduce high interest rates. Chart I-5Much Needed Pension Reform! Chart I-6Brazil's Macro Distortions   Chart I-7The Real Is Still At Risk Of Depreciation Rapid and large interest rate cuts by the central bank will help to service the public debt given that 96% of public debt is in local currency. Yet, lower interest rates could put pressure on the currency to depreciate - the interest rate differential between Brazil and the U.S. is at all-time lows (Chart I-7). Meanwhile, a weaker currency is needed to increase nominal growth. Notably, extremely low inflation and weak nominal growth have worsened the nation's public debt dynamics in recent years. Overall, lower policy rates and currency devaluation are required to reflate Brazil out of a public debt trap. If the exchange rate stabilizes in the short run as foreign investors come back to Brazil, the central bank will reduce interest rates considerably. Lower borrowing costs in combination with a sharp rise in business confidence and existing pent-up investment demand will propel capital spending, employment and overall growth. In short, these are necessary conditions for Brazilian markets to outperform their EM peers, i.e., for relative outperformance. As to absolute performance, it also depends on the outlook for global markets. In a complete global risk-off mode (the odds of which are considerable at the moment) - in which EM currencies and risk assets continue rioting and U.S. share prices drop - it will be difficult for Brazilian risk assets to rally meaningfully. That said, they will still outperform their EM peers. In the long run, pursuing policies of lower-than-needed interest rates and, hence, of chronic currency depreciation appears to be more palatable to Bolsonaro's populist credentials than difficult structural reforms. Therefore, investors who look to commit long-term capital to Brazil should mind the exchange rate. Populist policies favoring nominal growth in the long run lead to chronic currency depreciation. Bottom Line: Bolsonaro's election and his initial policies will be cheered by markets and will help Brazilian markets to outperform their EM peers for now. However, Bolsonaro is a populist and in the long term will choose economic policies that favor high nominal growth and, thereby, warrant chronic currency depreciation. Investment Recommendations Chart I-8Overweight Brazilian Assets Relative To EM In terms of market recommendations, we have the following: For EM dedicated portfolios, we recommend upgrading Brazil to overweight within the equity, credit, and local currency bonds universes (Chart I-8). BCA's Emerging Market Strategy service is taking a 14% profit on its structural short BRL versus USD position. Also, we are closing the short BRLMXN and short BRLARS trades with a 12% gain and a 5.7% loss, respectively. We also recommend closing the short Brazilian bank stocks trade initiated on May 16, 2018, as its return is now flat due to the recent rebound over the past few days. Absolute performance of Brazilian risk assets is contingent on global financial markets sentiment and at the moment odds of global risk off are considerable. This could cap the rally in Brazilian risk assets for now. Long-term investors should realize that timing Brazilian markets in general, and the exchange rate in particular, will be critical to protect gains. We believe that the path of least resistance for Bolsonaro and his team will be to depreciate the currency and engender nominal GDP growth in order to inflate away the country's public debt. This is a smart strategy for which they have a political mandate. But it will be a death-knell for foreign investors with major positions in the country.   Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In late 1998, for instance, even President Cardoso's own PSDB party deprived him of the votes needed to seal a painstakingly negotiated deal with the IMF, which led to a loss of confidence among creditors and a sharp devaluation of the real in January 1999.  

Highlights Duration: Last week's bond market rout was driven by strong U.S. data. Global growth (ex. U.S.) continues to weaken. Weak foreign growth that migrates stateside via a stronger dollar remains the biggest risk to our below-benchmark duration stance. For now, we prefer to hedge that risk by owning curve steepeners and maintaining only a neutral allocation to spread product. High-Yield: A supply shock in the oil market would most likely lead to steep backwardation in the oil futures curve and an increase in implied oil volatility. An increase in implied oil volatility will translate into a higher risk premium embedded in junk spreads. Emerging Market Sovereigns: All of the recent widening in USD-denominated EM sovereign spreads has been concentrated in Turkey and Argentina, two nations that remain highly exposed to global growth divergences and a stronger U.S. dollar. Most other EM countries offer less attractive spreads than comparable U.S. corporate debt. Remain underweight USD-denominated EM sovereign bonds. Feature Bond Breakout Chart 1The Long End Breaks Out Bond markets sold off sharply last week and long-dated Treasury yields took out some noteworthy technical levels in the process. The 10-year Treasury yield broke above its May 2018 peak of 3.11% and settled at 3.23% as of last Friday. The next big test for the 10-year's cyclical uptrend is the 2011 peak of 3.75% (Chart 1). The 30-year yield similarly broke above its May 2018 peak of 3.25%, settling at 3.39% as of last Friday. The next resistance for the 30-year occurs at the early-2014 peak of 3.96%. Removing our, admittedly uncomfortable, technical analysis hat, it is instructive to note which macro factors were responsible for last week's large bear-steepening of the Treasury curve and which weren't. Strong U.S. economic data - the non-manufacturing ISM survey hit its highest level since 1997 (Chart 2) - and Fed Chairman Powell commenting that the fed funds rate is "a long way from neutral at this point, probably" were the key drivers of the move.1 Taken together, these two developments suggest that the Fed is further behind the curve than was previously thought. This is consistent with an upward revision to the market's assessment of the neutral fed funds rate, which explains why the yield curve steepened and the price of gold edged higher.2 But it's equally important to note the factors that didn't drive the increase in yields. In this case, yields weren't driven by a rebound in growth outside of the U.S., which continues to flag (Chart 2, panel 2). The Global Manufacturing PMI fell for the fifth consecutive month in September. While our diffusion index based on the number of countries with PMIs above versus below the 50 boom/bust line ticked higher (Chart 2, panel 3), our diffusion index based on the number of countries with rising versus falling PMIs remained deeply negative (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2Growth Divergences Deepen Chart 3Global PMIs Taken together, our diffusion indexes are consistent with an environment where most countries are experiencing decelerating growth from high levels. This message is confirmed by looking at the PMIs from the five largest economic blocs (Chart 3). The Eurozone PMI continues to fall rapidly, though it remains well above 50. The Emerging Markets (ex. China) PMI is also trending lower from a relatively high level, while the Chinese PMI is threatening to break below 50. Only the U.S. and Japan have healthy looking PMIs. The precariousness of non-U.S. growth leads us to reiterate the biggest risk to our below-benchmark duration view. The risk is that weak foreign growth eventually migrates to the U.S. via a stronger dollar and forces the Fed to pause its +25 bps per quarter rate hike cycle. If current trends continue, it is highly likely that U.S. growth will slow in the first half of next year, though it is unclear whether such a slowdown would be severe enough for the Fed to pause rate hikes.3 In any event, the bond market is only priced for the Fed to maintain its quarterly rate hike pace until June of next year (3 more hikes) before going on hold (Chart 4). Essentially, the market already discounts a rate hike pause, even after last week's large increase in yields. Chart 4Market's Rate Expectations Still Too Low For this reason, we prefer to maintain our below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, and to hedge the risk of weakening foreign growth by owning curve steepeners,4 and maintaining only a neutral allocation to spread product. Bottom Line: Last week's bond market rout was driven by strong U.S. data. Global growth (ex. U.S.) continues to weaken. Weak foreign growth that migrates stateside via a stronger dollar remains the biggest risk to our below-benchmark duration stance. For now, we prefer to hedge that risk by owning curve steepeners and maintaining only a neutral allocation to spread product. In Case You Needed Another Reason To Be Nervous About Junk As Treasury yields broke higher last week, the average high-yield index option-adjusted spread tightened to a fresh cyclical low of 303 bps. It has since rebounded to 316 bps (Chart 5). Our measure of the excess spread available in the high-yield index after adjusting for expected default losses is now at 196 bps, well below its historical average of 247 bps (Chart 5, panel 2). We have previously pointed out that even this below-average excess spread embeds a very low 12-month default loss expectation of 1.07%.5 Rarely have default losses been below that level. With job cut announcements forming a tentative bottom (Chart 5, bottom panel), we see high odds that default losses surprise to the upside during the next 12 months. In the absence of further spread tightening, that would translate to 12-month excess junk returns of 196 bps or less. But this week we want to highlight an additional risk to junk spreads. That risk being our Commodity & Energy Strategy service's view that crude oil prices could experience a positive supply shock in the first quarter of next year. At present, our strategists see high odds of $100 per barrel Brent crude oil in the first quarter of next year, and are forecasting an average price of $95 per barrel for 2019. At publication time, the Brent crude oil price was $85.6 At first blush it isn't obvious why high oil prices would pose a risk to junk spreads, and in fact there is no consistent correlation between the level of oil prices and junk spreads. However, there is a correlation between implied volatility in the crude oil market and junk spreads, with higher implied vol coinciding with wider spreads and vice-versa (Chart 6). Chart 5Default Loss Expectations Too Low Chart 6Higher Oil Vol = Wider Junk Spreads Would higher oil prices necessarily induce a spike in implied volatility? Not necessarily. It turns out that what matters for implied oil volatility is the slope of the futures curve.7 A contangoed futures curve where long-dated futures trade at a higher price than short-dated futures tends to be associated with high implied volatility. A steeply backwardated futures curve where long-dated futures trade well below short-dated futures is equally associated with elevated implied vol (Chart 7). Implied volatility tends to be lowest when the futures curve is in mild backwardation. A mild backwardation is typical when crude prices are in a gradual uptrend, as is the case at present. All in all, the following features provide a reasonable description of the current environment: Gradual uptrend in crude oil price Mild oil futures curve backwardation Low implied crude volatility Tight junk spreads However, as we head into next year, our commodity strategists anticipate that supply constraints will bite in the oil market. The U.S. is poised to implement an oil embargo against Iran in November, and Venezuela - another important oil exporter - remains on the brink of collapse. With global oil inventories already tight, and the loss of further production from Venezuela and Iran looming, our strategists anticipate that the number of days of demand covered by crude oil inventories will decline sharply. This decline will lead to a steep backwardation of the futures curve (Chart 8). Chart 7Brent Crude Oil Volatility Vs. Forward Slope Chart 8Supply Shock Will Lead To Steep Backwardation The bottom line for junk investors is that a supply shock in the oil market would most likely lead to a steep backwardation in the futures curve and an increase in implied oil volatility. An increase in implied oil volatility will translate into a higher risk premium embedded in junk spreads. We continue to recommend only a neutral allocation to high-yield in U.S. bond portfolios. We will await a signal that profit growth is set to deteriorate before advocating for a further reduction in exposure. Still No Buying Opportunity In EM Sovereigns Chart 9EM Index Spread Looks Cheap As growth divergences between the U.S. and the rest of the world increase, we are on high alert for an opportunity to shift some allocation out of U.S. corporate credit and into USD-denominated emerging market (EM) sovereign debt. However, so far EM spreads are simply not wide enough to merit attention from U.S. bond investors. This is not apparent from the average index spreads. In fact, a quick glance at the indexes shows that EM sovereign spreads have widened a lot relative to duration- and quality-matched U.S. corporates, and actually offer a healthy spread pick-up (Chart 9). However, a more detailed look at the spreads from individual countries shows that the spread advantage in EM is only available in a select few markets (Charts 10A & 10B). At the lower-end of the credit spectrum: Turkey, Argentina, Ukraine and Lebanon all offer higher breakeven spreads than comparable U.S. corporates. In the upper credit tiers: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE) look attractive. All other EM countries off lower breakeven spreads than comparable U.S. corporates. Chart 10ABreakeven Spreads: USD EM Sovereigns Vs. U.S. Corporates Chart 10BBreakeven Spreads: USD EM Sovereigns Vs. U.S. Corporates We would be very reluctant to shift any allocation out of U.S. corporates and into either Turkey or Argentina. Both of those countries are highly exposed to the tightening in global liquidity conditions that occurs alongside a strengthening U.S. dollar. Our Foreign Exchange and Global Investment Strategy teams created a Vulnerability Heat Map to identify which EM countries are likely to struggle as the U.S. dollar appreciates (Chart 11).8 These tend to be countries with large current account deficits and high external debt balances, though several other factors are also considered. The results show that Argentina and Turkey are the two most exposed nations. Chart 11Vulnerability Heat Map For Key EM Markets At the upper-end of the credit spectrum, the USD bonds from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE are more interesting. Our geopolitical strategists anticipate an escalation of tensions between the U.S. and Iran following the U.S. midterm elections, and such tensions could increase the political risk premium embedded in all Middle Eastern debt. But for longer-term U.S. fixed income investors, it is worth noting that extra spread is available in the hard currency sovereign debt of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE compared to A-rated U.S. corporates. Bottom Line: All of the recent widening in USD-denominated EM sovereign spreads has been concentrated in Turkey and Argentina, two nations that remain highly exposed to global growth divergences and a stronger U.S. dollar. Most other EM countries offer less attractive spreads than comparable U.S. corporate debt. Remain underweight USD-denominated EM sovereign bonds. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Powell's full interview can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CqaBSSl6ok 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "A Signal From Gold?", dated May 1, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "An Oasis Of Prosperity?", dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com, where we note that every time the Global (ex. US) LEI has dipped below zero since 1993, the U.S. LEI has eventually followed. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "More Than One Reason To Own Steepeners", dated September 25, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Out Of Sync", dated July 3, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl", dated September 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets", dated August 2, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy/Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Bear And The Two Travelers", dated August 17, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

We have long argued that the U.S. economy can withstand a tightening of up to 100-125bps (using the 10-year UST yield) in a short time span. Empirical evidence supports our view, and with regard to stocks, what is most important is the correlation between the bond yield year-over-year change and momentum in the SPX (middle panel). In early March, we compared cyclical momentum in the S&P 500 with the annual change in the 10-year UST yield and documented the correlation shifts going back to the 1960s. We also filtered for a minimum of 100bps change in the 10-year UST yield and a concurrent negative correlation between the two variables. In other words, we searched for tightness in monetary conditions that caused equity market consternation, excluding recessions. Our analysis revealed that there have been five iterations when rising bond yields proved restrictive for equities: once in each of the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s and twice in the 1980s. On average, the SPX drawdown from peak-to-trough during these five iterations was 19% and lasted 6.5 months. While the correlation currently has clearly made a turn toward the zero line (bottom panel), it is not in negative territory yet. Using this simple rule of thumb suggests that it would take a selloff in the bond market that pushed yields above 3.70% to cause a significant hiccup in stocks (as a reminder this year’s trough in the 10-year UST yield is 2.72%). With regard to portfolio positioning and given BCA’s interest rate view of a continuation of a selloff in the bond market, we would shy away from interest rate-sensitive sectors (please see the next Insights).