Financial Markets
Highlights U.S. domestic demand will remain robust for the foreseeable future thanks to fiscal stimulus, stronger credit growth, a falling savings rate, and plentiful sources of pent-up demand. Economic and financial imbalances in the U.S. are also muted, while the financial system is fairly resilient. All this implies that the Fed can raise rates quite a bit more - certainly above the 3% level that the market regards as the threshold at which the economy will go off the rails. Since both monetary and fiscal policy will remain accommodative for the foreseeable future, a recession is unlikely before 2020, with risks tilted to an even later onset date. The combination of a stronger dollar, slowing global trade, high EM debt levels, and the Chinese government's reluctance to pursue a massive fiscal/credit stimulus program due to concerns about financial stability and debt sustainability, all spell trouble for emerging markets. Investors should favor developed market equities over their EM counterparts. Within the developed market universe, remain overweight the U.S. over both Europe and Japan in common-currency terms. As we predicted two years ago, bonds have entered a secular bear market. However, a temporary countertrend rally is a growing risk in the near term, especially in light of extremely stretched short positioning and technically oversold conditions. Feature A New Record Will Be Set Next Year The current U.S. economic expansion will become the longest on record if it makes it to July 2019, at which point it will surpass the 1990s expansion (Chart 1). Will it last that long? We think so. In fact, the risk to our 2020 recession call is tilted towards a later downturn rather than an earlier one. Chart 1The Current Economic Expansion Will Likely Be The Longest On Record To understand why, it is useful to consider the forces that generate recessions. In one sense, business cycles are very simple things: Recessions occur when spending begins to decline in relation to the economy's productive capacity. This often sets in motion a vicious circle where rising unemployment reduces both income and confidence, leading to less spending and even higher unemployment. Conversely, recoveries occur when spending rises relative to the economy's productive capacity. This may happen because fiscal and/or monetary policy turn stimulative. It can also happen because the excesses that were built up in the lead-up to the recession are purged, allowing the economy to grow from a clean slate. Lessons From The Great Recession The Great Recession offers a vivid demonstration of these processes. The run-up in home prices starting in the early 2000s pushed up consumption. Rising housing demand also lifted residential investment. Once the housing bubble burst, everything went into reverse: Home prices and construction collapsed. Household debt, which had grown rapidly over the preceding 25 years, began to contract. The importance of shifts in aggregate demand in explaining business-cycle fluctuations may seem simple if not obvious, but it is remarkable how many people fail to understand them. One of the more strangely controversial reports I wrote while working in the global markets group at Goldman Sachs in September 2009 was a piece predicting that the Fed would need to keep rates low for "many years" to come.1 It is easy to forget now, but the U.S. 10-year yield rose as high as 3.92% in December 2009 on the expectation that the Fed would start "normalizing" monetary policy in the near future (Chart 2). Chart 2Rate Expectations Were Too Hawkish Shortly After The Great Recession, But Are Now Too Dovish Those who understood the mechanics of recessions and recoveries should have realized that the Fed would not be able to abandon its ultra-loose monetary stance so quickly. Yes, the financial crisis had ended in the sense that credit spreads were falling, equity prices were recovering, and fears of a massive bank run were receding. But the sources of demand that propped up spending prior to the Great Recession were not coming back anytime soon. The U.S. needs about 3.5% of GDP in residential investment to keep up with population growth. After the recession ended, it probably required something closer to 2% of GDP in residential investment in order to work off the excess inventory of homes that was created during the bubble years. Residential investment averaged nearly 6% of GDP between 2002 and 2006. Where exactly was that 4% of GDP in lost demand going to come from? Certainly not from the Obama stimulus package, which was too small and too transient. Likewise, while one could have reasonably debated in 2009 the extent to which debt levels would ultimately fall, it should have been pretty obvious that they would not start rising at least for the next few years. Conceptually, the level of demand is determined by the rate of growth of debt.2 Rising debt added to aggregate demand in the years leading to the Great Recession. If debt levels had simply stabilized in the aftermath of the recession, this would have still left the economy with less spending power than it had before the downturn. It took a long time, but by 2016 investors had finally internalized the lessons discussed above. The U.S. 10-year yield hit a record closing low of 1.37% on July 5, 2016. As luck would have it, this was also the day that we published a note declaring "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market." Our decision to turn more cautious on bonds was motivated by both valuation considerations and the fact that many of the forces that had dragged down bond yields were starting to drive them back up: The output gap had shrunk; fiscal policy had become more stimulative; and credit was growing anew. In addition, eight years of frugal living created plenty of pent-up demand for fixed capital and consumer durable goods. Chart 3 shows that the average age of the residential capital stock shot up from 25.8 years in 2007 to 30.1 years in 2016. The average age of the nonresidential capital stock also continued to drift up, rising to the highest level since 1963. The average age of consumer goods also increased (Chart 4). Chart 3The U.S. Capital Stock Has Aged (Part I) Chart 4The U.S. Capital Stock Has Aged (Part II) Where Things Stand Today This brings us to the present. Today, the output gap is fully closed, private-sector credit growth has returned to its long-term trend, and fiscal policy is even looser than it was two years ago (Chart 5). The replacement cycle for business investment still has further to run. Both capex intention surveys and the recent easing in lending standards for commercial and industrial loans suggest that capital expenditures will remain strong for the foreseeable future (Chart 6). Meanwhile, household spending will be supported by accelerating wage growth and a savings rate that has plenty of scope to fall from current levels (Chart 7). Chart 5The Need For Ultra-Low Rates Has Passed Chart 6Business Investment Still Going Strong Chart 7Stronger Wage Growth And A Falling Savings Rate Will Lift Spending Perhaps most importantly, the sort of financial imbalances that have triggered recessions in the past are largely absent today. Unlike a decade ago, the mortgage market is in good shape. The Urban Institute's Housing Credit Availability Index, which measures the percentage of housing loans that are likely to default over the next 90 days, remains near all-time lows (Chart 8). The corporate debt market is more problematic, and we continue to see it as the "weakest link" in the financial system. The ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP has climbed to a record high, while so-called "covenant-light loans" have proliferated. The situation is particularly bad among companies with publicly-traded bonds, who have generally been the worst offenders. Nevertheless, the situation is far from dire. The ratio of corporate net debt-to-EBITD is still reasonably low. The interest coverage ratio is fairly elevated, as is the "quick ratio," which takes the difference between current corporate assets and inventories and divides it by short-term liabilities. Corporate assets have also risen quite briskly over the past few years, which has kept the corporate debt-to-asset ratio broadly stable (Chart 9). Chart 8U.S. Mortgage Market Is In Good Shape Chart 9Corporate Debt: Problematic, But Far From Dire Looking out, rising interest rates will lift debt-servicing costs while faster wage growth will put downward pressure on profit margins. This is likely to strain corporate balance sheets, causing spreads to widen from today's ultra-low levels. However, a major wave of defaults is unlikely to occur unless earnings collapse, which rarely happens outside of recessions. The Financial System Is More Resilient Is it possible that rising defaults will force firms to lay off workers, leading to less spending throughout the economy, higher corporate defaults, and even more layoffs? Such a vicious circle cannot be dismissed, but its likelihood is mitigated by the fact that most corporate debt is held by unleveraged investors. Defaults are most economically pernicious when they lead to "leveraged losses," a term coined by my former Goldman Sachs colleague, Jan Hatzius. If a leveraged institution wishes to hold ten times as much assets as capital, a $1 loss on a bad loan will force it to reduce its assets by $10. This could result in a downward spiral in asset prices - one where fire sales lead to big haircuts to asset holders, generating even more forced sales. A credit crunch is almost inevitable in such a scenario. Unlike mortgages, which are often held by leveraged institutions, most corporate debt is held by unleveraged players such as pension funds, insurance companies, and ETFs. Bank loans account for only 18% of nonfinancial corporate-sector debt, down from 40% in 1980 (Chart 10). The share of leveraged loans held by banks has declined from about 25% a decade ago to less than 10% today. Moreover, banks today hold much more high-quality capital than in the past (Chart 11). Chart 10Banks Have Reduced Their Exposure To The Corporate Sector Chart 11U.S. Banks Are Well Capitalized Tellingly, we already had a dress rehearsal for what a corporate debt scare might look like. Credit spreads spiked in 2015. Default rates rose, but the knock-on effects to the financial system were minimal (Chart 12). This suggests that corporate America could withstand quite a bit of monetary tightening without buckling under the pressure. Chart 12Corporate Debt Scare: 2015 Was A Preview No Recession On The Horizon The discussion above suggests that U.S. aggregate demand growth will remain robust for the foreseeable future thanks to fiscal stimulus, stronger credit growth, a falling savings rate, and still-abundant sources of pent-up demand. Economic and financial imbalances are also muted, while the financial system is fairly resilient. All this implies that the Fed can raise rates quite a bit more - certainly above the 3% level that the market regards as the threshold at which the economy will go off the rails (Chart 13). Comments this week from key Fed officials, including Chair Powell, suggest that the FOMC is finally starting to see things our way. Since it will take a while for the Fed to lift interest rates into restrictive territory, it follows that the next recession is nowhere on the horizon. This observation is supported by a variety of leading economic indicators, including the ISM index, initial unemployment claims, and core durable goods orders (Chart 14). Only the yield curve is sending a modestly worrying signal, although as we discussed in a prior report,3 the danger posed from a flatter yield curve is lower today than in the past. Chart 13Markets Expect No Fed Hikes Beyond Next Year Chart 14No Imminent Risk Of A U.S. Recession It will not be until 2020, and perhaps even later, that monetary policy turns restrictive. By that time, imbalances will have grown, which implies that debt levels and asset prices will probably be higher. The unemployment rate could be in the low 3% range and core PCE inflation will likely have moved squarely above the Fed's target. Risks To The View While our baseline scenario foresees a recession happening later rather than sooner, it would be unwise to ignore the risks to that sanguine view. Four things could hasten an economic downturn: A full-blown trade war with China: Trump's procyclical fiscal policy will drain domestic savings, causing the current account deficit to widen. Since Trump is unlikely to blame his own macro policies for a rising trade deficit, he will try to find a scapegoat. He cannot blame Canada or Mexico anymore since he just negotiated a "tremendous" new USMCA agreement with them, which allegedly redresses all the injustices of the prior trade deal. Japan and the EU will also get a break, if for no other reason than they are still needed as geopolitical allies. This just leaves China as the fall guy. The risk is that the Chinese government not only raises tariffs on U.S. exports, but also retaliates against U.S. firms with operations in China. Even more dangerously, a trade war with China could escalate into an outright military conflict. The underreported story of the near collision between a Chinese warship and a U.S. destroyer this week highlights the risk of such an outcome.4 An oil superspike: Our energy strategists have argued that extremely tight supply conditions, exacerbated by sanctions against Iranian oil exports, could cause the price of crude to shoot up to $100 dollars per barrel by early next year. Every U.S. recession over the past 40 years has been preceded by a rapid increase in oil prices (Chart 15). While there are reasons to think that an oil shock would be less damaging than in the past - the U.S. is now a net energy exporter; the volume of oil consumption as a share of real GDP has fallen by a third since 1995, and by half since 1980; inflation expectations are much better anchored - a big enough oil spike, if combined with other adverse shocks, could create the conditions for another recession. An Italian sovereign debt crisis: Italy is caught between a rock and a hard place. The Italian private sector saves too much and spends too little. A shrinking population has reduced the need for firms to invest in new capacity. The prior government's pension cuts have also incentivized people to save more for their retirement. The result is a private sector savings-investment surplus that stood at 5% of GDP in 2017 compared to close to breakeven a decade ago (Chart 16). Unlike Germany, Italy cannot export its savings to the rest of the world through a large trade surplus because it does not have a hypercompetitive economy. Nor can the Italian government risk running afoul of the bond vigilantes by emulating Japan's strategy of absorbing private-sector savings with large budget deficits. It is unlikely that these tensions will come to a head before the next global recession. Nevertheless, Italy's fiscal woes certainly make global financial markets more vulnerable to a risk-off event. Emerging market meltdown: As our EM strategists have highlighted, the combination of a stronger dollar, slowing global trade, high EM debt levels, and the Chinese government's reluctance to pursue a massive fiscal/credit stimulus program due to concerns about financial stability, all spell trouble for emerging markets. It is doubtful that an EM crisis would bring down the U.S. economy - even the 1990s crises did not do that - but it could exacerbate a preexisting slowdown, especially if the spillovers from EM lead to a tightening in U.S. financial conditions via a sharp appreciation of the dollar, wider credit spreads, and a selloff in U.S. stocks. Chart 15Rapid Increases In Oil Prices Tend To Precede Recessions Chart 16Italy: Private Sector Saves Too Much And Spends Too Little Investment Conclusions In many respects, the economic and financial landscape today resembles that of late-1997 and early-1998. Back then, the U.S. stock market was rallying while emerging market assets were selling off. The decoupling between U.S. and global stocks came to a thunderous end in the summer of 1998. Popular lore attributes the 22% plunge in the S&P 500 from July 20 to October 8 to the implosion of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), but in fact almost all of the decline in the index occurred before the problems at LTCM surfaced. It was more the steady drip of bad news over the course of 1998 - the spread of the crisis from Thailand to Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea; the collapse of Hong Kong-based Peregrine Investments Holdings, Asia's largest private investment bank; growing fears that China would devalue its currency; and finally, the Russian sovereign debt default - which caused market sentiment among U.S. investors to turn from euphoric ambivalence to bearish hysteria (Chart 17). Chart 17Key Events During The Asian Crisis It is impossible to know if such a phase-transition will occur again, but prudent investors should consider scaling back risk if they are currently overweight risk assets. We moved to neutral from overweight on global equities in June, while maintaining our preference for developed over emerging markets. Within the developed market universe, we continue to favor the U.S. over both Europe and Japan in common-currency terms, given our expectation of further dollar strength. If global stocks do suffer a correction during the next few months, this will present a buying opportunity. U.S. equities, which account for over half of global stock market capitalization, tend not to peak until six months or so before the start of a recession (Table 1). Keep in mind that the S&P 500 rallied by 68% between its October 1998 lows and April 2000. Emerging market stocks bottomed in September 1998, before doubling over the subsequent 18 months. Following this script, we expect to flip our recommendation from being underweight to overweight EM equities at some point in 2019, probably in the first half of the year. The 1998 template is also helpful for thinking about the outlook for bond yields. The 10-year Treasury yield rose from 4.16% in October 1998 to 6.79% in January 2000, but not before falling from nearly 7% in April 1997. We do not expect a similar decline in yields this time around, but a modest dip from current levels would not be surprising, particularly because bond sentiment is highly bearish at the moment (Chart 18). As with stocks, any decline in bond yields would be temporary. Bonds are now in a secular bear market that could last a decade, if not longer. Our baseline views for global equities, bonds, currencies, and commodities are illustrated in Appendix A. Table 1Stocks And Recessions: Case-By-Case Chart 18Bond Sentiment Is Very Bearish Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 "Goldman Says Deleveraging May Keep Fed Rate Low for 'Years,' " Bloomberg, September 10, 2009. 2 Recall that GDP is a flow variable (how much production takes place every period), whereas credit is a stock variable (how much debt there is outstanding). Thus, credit growth affects GDP and, by extension, the change in credit growth (the so-called credit impulse) affects GDP growth. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve," dated December 22, 2017. 4 Steven Lee Myers, "American and Chinese Warships Narrowly Avoid High-Seas Collision," The New York Times, October 2, 2018. Appendix A Appendix Chart IMarket Outlook: Equities Appendix Chart IIMarket Outlook: Bonds Appendix Chart IIIMarket Outlook: Currencies Appendix Chart IVMarket Outlook: Commodities Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Corporates remain expensive with 12-month breakeven spreads for both A and Baa-rated bonds standing below the 25th percentiles of their distribution that has prevailed since 1989. Furthermore, with inflation now at the Fed's target, monetary policy will…
The above chart presents the alphas and betas of 23 industry groups within the MSCI China index from mid-June to the end of September. Several points are worth mentioning: The relative performance of Chinese industry groups since mid-June has been…
Highlights Chart of the WeekIncreasing Gas-On-Gas Pricing Will Disrupt Global LNG Markets Growth in the global Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) market will be fuelled by surging U.S. natural gas production, which will allow consumers in Asian and European markets to diversify away from oil-indexed pricing - with its attendant geopolitical risks - and falling European gas production. As a result, markets will move toward short- and long-term contracts priced in USD/MMBtu (Chart of the Week). This will favor gas producers and LNG merchants with access to U.S. shale-gas supplies, where production is growing at double-digit p.a. rates (Chart 2). Well-developed trading and risk-management markets in the U.S. - centered on Henry Hub, LA - will incentivize consumers to shorten the tenor of oil-indexed contracts, replacing them with hedgeable futures-based contracts. These markets allow producers and merchants to offer short- and long-term contracts that meet consumer preferences. As the global LNG market grows, shipping companies, along with producers and merchants with worldwide trading and transport capabilities - or access to such capabilities - will grow market share at the expense of exporters tied to the more rigid oil-indexing regime (Chart 3). Energy: Overweight. We remain long call spreads along the Brent forward curve over February - August; these positions are up an average 88.4% since inception, basis Tuesday's close. The long S&P GSCI position we recommended in December is up 21.8%, on the back of higher oil prices and backwardated crude-oil forward curves. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper is holding on to recent gains - up ~ 11% from its mid-August trough, following oil higher. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold hovers around $1,200/oz, following the Fed's meeting last week, which resulted in a 25bp increase in fed funds to 2.25%. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The trade agreement to be signed by U.S. officials at the end of November with their counterparts in Mexico and Canada removes some of the uncertainty weighing on ag markets. Upward revisions to 2017 carry-out estimates by the USDA continue to pressure corn and beans. Chart 2Surging Production, Market Depth Favor U.S. Gas Producers And Merchants Chart 3Growing LNG Imports Will Favor Shippers, Producers And Merchants Feature Surging U.S. natural gas production will continue to find its way to global LNG markets over the next decade. The persistence of oil-indexing in Asian LNG contracts will fuel the growth of U.S. exports, given the arbitrage between cheaper natural gas - priced basis supply-demand fundamentals for gas - and more expensive oil-indexed contracts.1 Added to this cost advantage, U.S. exports can be linked to hedgeable futures prices, using NYMEX Henry Hub, LA, contracts. These stability-of-supply and pricing advantages also allow LNG buyers in Asia and Europe to diversify away from oil-production disruption risks, which can send prices sharply higher, and being overly reliant on Russian imports. Chart 4U.S. LNG Exports Will Surge This will give global consumers an incentive to continue shortening the tenor of more rigid oil-indexed LNG contracts, and to replace them with hedgeable contracts referencing Henry Hub, LA, futures contracts priced in USD/MMBtu. While a fairly stout increase of U.S. LNG exports already is expected by the EIA and IEA, we believe this dynamic likely results in export volumes that are higher than the ~ 10 Bcf/d expected by 2023, and close to 15 Bcf/d toward the end of the 2020s (Chart 4).2 Increasing volumes of associated natural gas production in the Permian Basin in west Texas, which will have to be transported from the basin so that it does not curtail oil production, will drive a large part of this growth. We expect a significant LNG export center to be developed in South Texas in Corpus Christi over the next five years or so, just as the U.S. surpasses 10 Bcf/d of exports in the middle of the next decade.3 Flexible pricing of LNG contracts basis Henry Hub already is supporting the buildout of Gulf Coast exports via take-or-cancel contracts. These contracts are replacing the more restrictive take-or-pay contracts still used in Asia.4 This will continue to evolve, allowing supply development to be hedged via Henry Hub natgas futures. Consumers ultimately benefit from cheaper supplies and hedgeable risks. This is not to say other benchmarks will fall away. There is always room for regional benchmarks - even oil-based benchmarks such as the Japan Crude Cocktail (JCC), or the spot- and swaps-market reference Japan/Korea Marker (JKM).5 The global crude oil market accommodates such regional benchmarks: WTI crude oil futures are the benchmark for oil markets in the Americas, while Brent crude oil futures serve as the benchmark for global markets. Crude oils with different chemical properties can be priced relative to these benchmarks for delivery anywhere in the world. The global LNG market could retain an Asian benchmark, but a lot of work needs to be done in terms of building the supporting infrastructure - pipelines, regasification facilities, deep futures markets, etc. - to make that happen.6 We are inclined to believe the build-out of U.S. LNG export capacity will occur before these pieces fall into place: Scale has never been an issue in the U.S. oil and gas patch. Global Supply - Demand Overview Chart 5Global LNG Demand Growth Likely Outpaces Current Expectations Global LNG demand is expected to rise at an impressive 1.7% p.a. out to 2040 (Chart 5). However, local supply and demand levels are increasingly unbalanced, implying that cross-border pipeline and LNG imports will need to increase as gas demand rises.7 A few key markets lead this trend, as seen in Chart 6, which illustrates the supply-gap in major consuming countries. Supply gaps are poised to grow in Emerging Asia and Europe, due to elevated demand growth in the former and lack of supply growth in the latter. World LNG demand grew by 10% last year, with Europe and Emerging Asia accounting for more than 95% of this increase. However, last year's stellar growth numbers should not be considered as the baseline growth forecast.8 The latest projections show demand increasing by 21 Bcf/d by 2025 - taking LNG imports from 38 Bcf/d at present to 58 Bcf/d by then. This implies a lower annualized growth rate of 5.5%. Chart 6Supply - Demand Imbalances Will Fuel LNG Demand Globally LNG Supply On Growth Trajectory World LNG export capacity is expected to go from 48 Bcf/d in 2017 to 61 Bcf/d by 2022 (Chart 7), with 53% of the additional capacity coming from the U.S., 18% from Australia, and 15% from Russia.9 Chart 7LNG Export Capacity Growth Our baseline forecast for the LNG market foresees a short-term supply surplus in 2020 (Chart 8), followed by a catch-up in demand and new waves of projects between 2024 and 2030. Among the supply-side developments we are following: Chart 8New LNG Projects In The Pipeline The Australian LNG market has undergone massive change in the last five years. While being a relatively small natural gas producer (8th largest producer, accounting for ~ 3% of world output), in 2015, the country became the second largest LNG exporting country in the world with now over 7.5 Bcf/d of exports. The bulk of new liquefaction facilities will be operational in 2019 with the completion of new trains at the Wheatstone, Prelude Floating and Ichthys LNG facilities.10 This will bring Australian total LNG export capacity to over 10 Bcf/d. Importantly, most of Australia's LNG trade is with Emerging Asian countries. This region still relies mostly on oil-linked, long-term, and fixed-destination contracts. Absent the OPEC market-share war of 2014 - 2016, when oil prices collapsed, Australia's LNG prices are subject to oil price risks and volatility (Chart 9). Chart 9Asian Oil-Indexed Contracts Trade Above Spot LNG The U.S. currently has ~ 3 Bcf/d liquefaction capacity and is increasingly exporting to Asian countries (Table 1). The present wave of projects under-construction will push capacity to ~ 9 Bcf/d in 2020. Following a two year pause in project Final Investment Decisions (FIDs) from 2016 to 2017, potential FIDs in 2018 and 2019 could increase the U.S. capacity to ~ 14 Bcf/d by 2025. This will make the U.S. the second-largest exporter of LNG in the world, surpassing Australia. This new wave of investment is yet to be finalized; therefore, final investment decisions in 2H18 and 2019 will be crucial to determine the medium-term potential of U.S. LNG. If a majority of these projects goes through, U.S. capacity risks being overbuilt for the next decade (Chart 10). Table 1U.S. LNG Exports By Country Chart 10U.S. LNG Capacity Risks Becoming Overbuilt Importantly, U.S. LNG exports already have had a massive impact on the global LNG market. The totality of U.S. export prices are determined by gas-on-gas pricing - i.e., gas priced in USD/MMBtu as a function of gas supply-demand fundamentals. Just as importantly, these contracts are without destination restrictions found in many oil-indexed contacts. In the U.S., the presence of a deep futures market allows flexible long-term contracting.11 According to Royal Dutch Shell, the spot LNG market doubled from 2010 to 2017, accounting for ~ 25% of all transactions, most of it due to the prodigious increase in U.S. LNG supply.12 An overbuilt U.S. market would increase spot LNG trading. Our own calculations based on EIA data indicate the U.S. could have too much capacity relative to demand in 2018 - 19, but goes into balance in 2020 - 2022.13 Russia's natural gas production is projected to increase from 66.7 Bcf/d in 2017 to 70.1 Bcf/d in 2023. However, the bulk of this increase will cover new pipeline exports. The country's LNG capacity is expected to grow by ~ 2.5 Bcf/d with the completion of trains at the Yamal, Vysotsk and Portovaya export facilities. Despite its low LNG capacity, Russia remains a key player in the LNG market. Its rising pipeline capacity connected to China - the fastest growing market in the world - competes directly with global LNG supplies. For Russia, the rise of natural gas availability on a global basis - in the form of LNG - shakes its foreign relationships and policies to the core. In loosening the once-tight relationship between buyers and sellers, the rise of spot LNG supplies will favor consumers and energy security, and foster the development of longer-term contracting.14 Global LNG Demand Could Outpace Supply By our reckoning, some 62% of additional global gas demand of 160 Bcf/d will be covered by rising domestic production, 12% by rising trans-national pipeline capacity, and the remaining 26% by LNG imports.15 Longer-term, we expect LNG and natural gas demand to keep rising as industry demand expands and major coal consumers build up their natural gas and renewables usage. As a result, LNG consumption will increase at a rate of ~ 3% p.a. until 2040, as overall gas demand grows ~ 1.7%.16 Key demand-side developments: Table 2Natgas Emits Less CO2 China's environmental reforms, supply-side industrial policies and continued economic growth will be the engine of global natural gas and LNG growth in the next decade. The Middle Kingdom's natural gas demand grew 15% to 23 Bcf/d in 2017, of which 54% came from additional LNG. This short-term growth surge required spot and short-term LNG imports, which pushed up North Asian LNG spot prices. Despite our expectation that China will continue leading global LNG growth, we believe 2017 to be an outlier. Two factors contributed to the rise in spot prices: To tackle its massive pollution without significantly altering economic development and growth, China's environmental policies favor natural gas as a bridge to a low-carbon economy, since natgas contains half the carbon content of coal (Table 2). China's supply-side reforms and winter capacity cut led to a spike in spot LNG demand, which had to be covered in global LNG markets. China has an extremely low level of storage to deal with seasonal natgas consumption fluctuations; this forces the country to rely on spot LNG to meet short-term peaks in gas demand (Chart 11). Chart 11China's Minimal Natgas Storage Forces It To Rely On Spot Markets While these factors still dominate Chinese markets, new Russian pipeline capacity is expected to start delivering gas in 2019, the ~ 247 bcf of additional domestic storage capacity and the rise in spot LNG supply will mitigate the effect. In addition, China is limited in its regasification capacity. Data re projects under construction and demand forecasts indicate the average utilization would rise to ~ 90% in 2020. Winter usage would push this to ~ 100% rapidly, constraining its ability to meet winter demand with spot LNG. As a result, we expect Asian spot LNG prices to rise above contracted oil-indexed prices next winter, but less so in 2020 and 2021. Longer term, China's gas consumption is expected to grow 4.6% p.a., outpacing the 4.0% p.a. domestic production growth. Some 23% of the gap will come from Russian and Turkmenistan pipeline imports. Europe's supply-gap rose in the past 3 years, and is expected to continue to widen. Unlike the rest of the world, this gap is growing because of supply depletion instead of strong demand growth. In fact, demand is expected to remain flat, based on the IEA's forecast of Europe's long-term growth. On the other hand, total European gas supply has decreased by 16% since 2010, and is expected to continue decreasing at a similar pace, reaching 21 Bcf/d in 2023 from 25 Bcf/d in 2017. These declines in European natgas supply are due to: The phase-out by 2030 of Netherlands' Groningen field. Continued concerns about the impact of natural gas production on earthquakes in nearby communities pushed the Dutch government to adopt, in March 2018, a plan to gradually stop gas extraction at the Groningen field. Production has been decreasing since 2013 and is expected to decrease by around three quarters between now and end-2023. U.K. natural gas production will decrease by 5% p.a. due to the lack of capex and the large number of fields reaching a mature state. Stagnation in Norway's gas production following its record production level in 2017. Europe's regasification capacity has considerable slack, which will allow it to expand its import volumes. Europe currently has 23 Bcf/d regas capacity, with a very low 27% utilization in 2017. This means it has ~16 Bcf/d capacity available. With the U.S. is expected to raise its exports by ~ 6 - 7 Bcf/d in the next couple of years, Europe could potentially absorb the entire U.S. LNG exports if it desires to diversify its source of energy supply. Pressure Builds For Competitive LNG Markets Chart 12Expect More LNG Spot Trading The movement toward an integrated global market - similar in structure to current oil markets - will be driven by sharply increased U.S. LNG exports, and more competitive pricing of LNG as a function of gas supply-demand fundamentals. This latter effort likely will find support from Japanese and EU regulators. In addition, U.S. exporters already are using futures-based pricing - using Henry Hub contracts - which provide greater flexibility for producers, consumers and merchants to hedge their risk. Either Asian markets will develop viable regional benchmarks, or the global market will increasingly adopt Henry Hub indexing. Again, this is a typical commodity-market evolution: wheat can be priced for delivery anywhere on the planet using Chicago Board of Trade indexing. Asia lacks an integrated pipeline network. Market-based pricing of gas as gas - i.e., based on regional supply-demand gas fundamentals - also has not fully developed. LNG-on-LNG competition is considered a way to promote market-based pricing. Thus, the rise in spot and short-term contracts priced on the basis of natural gas fundamentals in the region already visible in the data likely will continue (Chart 12). In addition, if we see the oil price spike we expect in 1Q19 - driven by the loss of Iranian exports due to U.S. sanctions, continuing losses in Venezuelan exports due to economic collapse, and still-strong global oil demand - LNG priced on gas fundamentals will become even more attractive.17 LNG consumers' exposure to oil prices - via oil-indexed supply contracts - is a disadvantage to consumers with super-abundant natural gas supplies (Chart 13).18 That said, the U.S. export capacity remains limited, thus it cannot completely substitute for the global trade being done basis oil-indexed LNG contracts. Still, higher oil prices will incentivize a shift to contracts with prices determined by natgas fundamentals, which favors continued growth in U.S. exports. If anything, it will push for a faster-than-expected expansion of U.S. LNG export capacity. Chart 13LNG Buyers Will Resist Oil-Indexed Exposure Bottom Line: Growth in global LNG markets likely will be faster than expected, as the U.S. develops its export capacity and continues to offer futures-based pricing. This will further reduce the attractiveness of rigid oil-indexed contracts. Gas producers and LNG merchants with access to U.S. shale-gas supplies, possessing trading and risk-management capabilities that allow them to offer flexible contracts globally, are favored in this quickly evolving market. Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Associate pavelb@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 The LNG cost structure is complex. A recent paper from the Oxford Institute For Energy Studies estimates U.S. breakeven costs for new LNG projects are roughly $7/MMBtu delivered, or ~ $4/MMBtu over current Henry Hub, LA, spot prices. This includes liquefaction costs, and transportation costs from the U.S. Gulf to Asia of ~ $1.50/MMBtu, and ~ $0.70/MMBtu from the U.S. Gulf to northwest Europe. Regasification charges and entry fees likely add ~ $0.70 to $1/MMBtu. Please see "The LNG Shipping Forecast: costs rebounding, outlook uncertain," published by the Oxford Institute For Energy Studies, March 2018. Transport costs are variable, and are only one part of the LNG pricing equation. The benefits of diversifying supplies cannot be overlooked, nor can the benefit of gas-on-gas pricing in a high-priced crude oil market. See also see "US powerhouse in the making," published June 14, 2018, by petroleum-economist.com. 2 Please see the International Energy Agency's Gas 2018 report published in March, particularly the discussion of supply beginning on p. 67. 3 Please see "The Price of Permian gas Pipeline Limits," by Stephen Rassenfoss, in the Journal of Petroleum Technology, published July 19, 2018. 4 Take-or-cancel contracts employ option-like features - e.g., cancelation payments that function as an option premium - that give buyer and seller flexibility in cancelling a contract or delivery in a manner that allows the seller to cover fixed costs, not unlike a tolling contact. This is possible because of the hedging latitude provided by the NYMEX natural gas futures market, which has Henry Hub, LA, as its delivery point. Please see "The Shift Away from Take-or-Pay Contracts in LNG," published by the Atlanta-based law firm King & Spalding on its Energy Law Exchange blog September 13, 2017. 5 Platts' JKM spot assessment for November was $11.35/MMBtu, which was down 6% from October assessments. Please see "Platts JKM: Asia November LNG spot prices fall on thin demand," published by S&P Global Platts September 21, 2018. The NYMEX JKM forward curve peaks at $13.50/MMBtu for January 2019 deliveries, and backwardates thereafter. 6 Big LNG consumers' antitrust regulators are increasing pressure on overly restrictive contracts, which could open these markets to further competition over the next three years. Japan's Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) in 2017 concluded a review of term LNG contracts, which raised the possibility heretofore standard term contract features - e.g., limits on destinations and diversions, and take-or-pay provisions - could run counter to its antimonopoly laws. Japan is the largest importer of LNG in the world, taking ~ 11 Bcf/d. Meanwhile, in June of this year, the European Commission opened an investigation into long-term LNG contracts between its member states and Qatar Petroleum. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, the Washington, D.C., law firm, expects a ruling on destination and profit-sharing clauses that severely limit re-trading of LNG by purchasers. Akin Gump expects a ruling in the course of the next 3 years. While Japan's FTC did not specify remedies, it is possible buyers gain rights to re-sell and re-direct cargoes, following these reviews. This would make markets more competitive, although indexing the price of LNG to oil-based formulas likely will hinder this process. Please see "Revisiting LNG Resale Restrictions - Implications of Recent EU Decisions," published on the firm's website August 2, 2018. 7 Natural gas demand grew by 16% since 2010, according to the BP 2018 Statistical Review of World Energy, and is expected to grow by a cumulative 47% (1.6% p.a.) by 2040. 8 Many idiosyncratic factors helped Chinese LNG imports reach such an exceptional growth rate, mostly weather-related: China's environmental policy is resulting in widespread substitution of coal for natural gas for space-heating purposes, which, in colder-than-expected winters, results in surging demand. We do not believe this will be a long-term seasonal influence: Physical facilities are being built out to accommodate higher supply and demand. 9 World liquefaction capacity will rise to ~ 61 Bcf/d in 2022, based on our calculations of projects under construction. The bulk of additional capacity will come from the U.S., Australia and Russia. 10 Capacity of 0.6, 0.5 and 1.2 Bcf/d, respectively. 11 Please see U.S. Department of Energy, office of Oil & Natural Gas, LNG Monthly. 12 Like most globally traded commodities, LNG can be traded in USD/MMBtu. The global financial and clearing system already is set up to accommodate commodity transactions denominated in USD, therefore we do not see any impediments to extending it further into the LNG market. 13 Please see Chart 10 footnote for details. 14 We will be exploring the geopolitical dimension of LNG next week in a Special Report written with our colleagues in BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy. Please see Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Windfall: How the new energy abundance upends global politics and Strengthens America's Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012). 15 From 2017 to 2040, based on BP projections. The bulk of additional pipeline capacity will come from Russia with 12 Bcf/d destined to China and Europe expected to come on line in 2019. 16 Please see the International Energy Agency's GAS 2018 report published in March, BP's BP Statistical Review Of World Energy 2018 report published in June, Shell's Shell LNG Outlook 2018 report published in February, and U.S. the Energy Information Administration's International Energy Outlook 2017 report published in September. 17 Please see our most recent assessment of global oil fundamentals, published September 27, 2018, entitled "Risks From Unplanned Oil-Outage Rising; OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Is Suspect," and our updated forecast, "Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1h19 rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl," published September 20, 2018. 18 Asia LNG prices are usually linked to the JCC according to predetermined formulae. However, the exact formula remains opaque and varies with each contract. Based on our calculations, we concluded that since 2010, the average formula uses a slope of ~14% on JCC prices lagged 4 months, with very low s-curve components and a constant. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights Set your overall investment strategy with two 'rules of 4' based on 10-year bond yields: If either the Italian BTP or the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB stays above 4 percent, then sell equities and buy bonds. If both the Italian BTP and the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB are in the 3-4 percent range, then remain broadly neutral. If both the Italian BTP and the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB fall below 3 percent, then buy equities and sell bonds. Stay neutral to Italy's MIB and Italian banks for the time being. Among the mainstream European equity markets our top pick remains France's CAC. Feature Many people believe that Italy has one of the world's most indebted economies, but this widely-held belief is wrong. Although Italy's public indebtedness is high, Italy's private indebtedness is one of the lowest in the world (Chart of the Week). This means that Italy's total indebtedness is less than that of France and the U.K., and broadly similar to that of the U.S. (Chart I-2 - Chart 1-5).1 Chart of the WeekItaly's Private Sector Indebtedness Is One Of The Lowest In The World Chart I-2Italy: Total Indebtedness = 260% Of GDP Chart I-3France: Total Indebtedness = 305% Of GDP Chart I-4U.K.: Total Indebtedness = 280% Of GDP Chart I-5U.S.: Total Indebtedness = 250% Of GDP The Myth Of Italian Indebtedness An economy's debt sustainability depends on its total indebtedness, and not on its public indebtedness or its private indebtedness in isolation. Debt becomes unsustainable when the marginal extra euro of debt results in misallocation of resources and mal-investment. At this point, the extra debt adds nothing to growth or, worse, it subtracts from growth. Therefore, debt reaches its sustainable limit when the economy has exhausted all productive uses for it. But it does not matter whether these productive uses are funded with private debt or with public debt. For example, successful economies require investment in high-quality healthcare and education. Some economies fund this with private debt, while others fund it with public debt. This means that if productive private indebtedness is low, there is more scope for productive public indebtedness. The crucial point is that Italy has extremely low private indebtedness, which means that it can afford relatively high public indebtedness before reaching the limit of debt sustainability. Right now, this is especially true because the Italian banking system remains dysfunctional, preventing the private sector from borrowing (Chart I-6). Under these circumstances, the Italian government can borrow the private sector's excess savings and debt repayments and put them to highly productive use - which will paradoxically reduce the deficit in the long term. Chart I-6Italy's Private Sector Is Not Borrowing Hence, the M5S/Lega government is following excellent economic policy in proposing a modest increase in the fiscal deficit in 2019. An appropriately sized and targeted fiscal stimulus is exactly what Italy needs right now. But this excellent economic policy will take time to bear fruit and show up in Italy's growth and deficit data. Italy's big problem is that bond vigilantes do not wait, they shoot first and ask questions later. Italy Is Especially Vulnerable To Bond Vigilantes Italy is also a world leader in running primary surpluses (Chart I-7 and Table I-1). In plain English, this means that the Italian government spends considerably less than it receives, if interest payments are excluded. Chart I-7Italy Is A World Leader In Running Primary Surpluses Table I-1Italy Has Consistently Run Primary Surpluses Put differently, Italy's government deficit results not from its operational spending relative to its income, but from the interest payments on its debt. This makes Italy especially vulnerable to the bond vigilantes. If the bond vigilantes distort Italy's interest rate, they can tip the Italian government into financial distress, even if that distress is not justified by the economic fundamentals. Is this a real risk? Sadly, yes. The euro debt crisis was essentially a liquidity crisis which resulted from bond vigilantes running amok. When irrational markets refuse to lend to sovereigns at a fair interest rate, maturing debt has to be refinanced at a penalising interest rate, causing an undeserved deterioration in the government's finances. Thereby, the irrational fear of insolvency becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Italy has an additional problem. When Italian bond prices decline, it erodes the value of the banking system's euro 350 billion portfolio of BTPs and weakens the banks' fragile balance sheets. If a bank's equity capital no longer covers its net non-performing loans (NPLs), investors get nervous. In this regard, the largest Italian banks now have euro 160 billion of equity capital against euro 130 billion of net NPLs, implying a cushion of euro 30 billion (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Italian Banks' Equity Capital Exceeds ##br##Net NPLs By Euro 30 Bn... So the markets would start to worry about Italian banks' mark-to-market solvency if their bond portfolios sustained a loss of €30 billion. We estimate this equates to the 10-year BTP yield breaching and remaining above 4 percent (Chart I-9).2 Chart I-9...The Excess Would Disappear If The 10-Year BTP Yield Stayed Above 4% The ECB solved the euro debt crisis at a stroke by committing to act as lender of last resort to distressed sovereigns at an 'undistorted' interest rate. Indeed, the commitment alone was enough to defeat the bond vigilantes without the ECB spending a single cent from its Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program.3 But recall that the ECB only threatened its firepower when the 2-year Spanish Bono yield had breached 6.5 percent and the 10-year yield had breached 7.5 percent. It follows that if the 10-year Italian BTP yield breached 4 percent, the yield would be high enough to hurt the Italian banks, but not nearly high enough for any powerful intervention from the ECB. Hence, the 10-year BTP yield at 4 percent is the level at which we would return to a pro-defensive strategy. Conversely, a level below 3 percent would create some margin of safety providing one precondition for a more pro-cyclical investment stance. In the meantime, the current level at 3.3 percent justifies a neutral cyclical stance to Italy's MIB and Italian banks. Among the mainstream European equity markets our top pick remains France's CAC. The Connection Between Bubbles And Liquidity Crises Bubble formation may seem to have no connection with a liquidity crisis but the two phenomena are closely related. Bubble formation is simply a brewing liquidity crisis resulting from irrational euphoria rather than irrational fear. A bubble forms when value investors stop investing on the basis of a valuation framework. Instead, they get lured into the momentum herd that is participating in a strong rally, and the additional buy orders fuel the euphoria. However, once all of the value investors have joined the momentum herd, and a value investor then suddenly reverts to type and puts in a sell order, the market will suffer a liquidity crisis. There are no buyers left! And finding one might require a substantial reversal in the price to attract an ultra-long-term deep value investor. As regular readers know, fractal analysis measures whether the herding behaviour in any financial instrument is becoming excessive. The analysis suggests that developed market equities are not yet at the tipping point of excessive euphoria that signalled the last two trend exhaustions in May 2017 and January 2018 (Chart I-10). But this does not mean that there are clear blue skies ahead. Chart I-10Developed Market Equities Are Not Yet At A Trend Exhaustion The danger is not that the rich valuation is irrationally excessive, but that it is hyper-sensitive to bond yields. At low bond yields, bonds offer no price upside but substantial price downside. Confronted with this increased riskiness of bonds, equity returns justifiably collapse to the feeble returns offered by bonds with no additional 'risk premium', giving equity valuations an exponential uplift. But if bond yields normalise, the process goes into vicious reverse - the rich valuation of equities must decline as exponentially as it rose. We have defined the danger point as when the sum of the 10-year yields on the U.S. T-bond, German bund, and JGB breaches and stays above 4 percent. In summary, set your overall investment strategy with two 'rules of 4' based on 10-year bond yields: If either the Italian BTP or the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB stays above 4 percent, then sell equities and buy bonds. If both the Italian BTP and the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB are in the 3-4 percent range, then remain broadly neutral. If both the Italian BTP and the sum of the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB fall below 3 percent, then buy equities and sell bonds. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Indebtedness defined as a share of GDP. 2 Assuming that the average maturity of Italian banks' BTPs is around 5 years. 3 The ECB's Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program was created in 2012 in response to the euro debt crisis and facilitates the ECB's lender of last resort function to solvent but illiquid sovereign borrowers. Fractal Trading Model* We are pleased to report that our long China/short India trade achieved its 9% profit target and is now closed. This week, we note that the underperformance of the Eurostoxx50 versus the Nikkei225 is technically stretched, with a 65-day fractal dimension approaching the limit which signaled a very recent trend reversal. Hence, this week's recommended trade is long Eurostoxx50 versus Nikkei225. The profit target is 3.5% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Chart 1Second Half Rebound The leveling-off of bullish sentiment toward the dollar and the perception of fading political risk have caused spread product to rally hard since the end of June. Indeed, corporate bonds are almost back into the black versus Treasuries for the year (Chart 1). We caution against buying into either of these trends. We have demonstrated that divergences between the U.S. and the rest of the world usually end with weaker U.S. growth,1 and our geopolitical strategists warn that American tensions with both Iran and China are poised to ramp up after the November midterms.2 Add in persistent monetary tightening and corporate profit growth that is barely keeping pace with debt growth, and it becomes clear that the corporate spread environment is turning more negative. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and only a neutral allocation to spread product versus Treasuries. Evidence of deteriorating profit growth is required before turning more negative on spread product. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 78 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -16 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 8 bps on the month, and currently sits at 114 bps. Corporate bonds remain expensive with 12-month breakeven spreads for both A and Baa-rated credit tiers below their 25th percentiles since 1989 (Chart 2). Further, with inflation now at the Fed's target, monetary policy will provide less and less support for corporate bond returns going forward. These are the two main reasons we downgraded our cyclical corporate bond exposure to neutral in June.3 Gross leverage for the nonfinancial corporate sector declined in Q2, for the third consecutive quarter (panel 4), though the declines have been quite modest. Dollar strength and accelerating wage growth will weigh on corporate profits in the second half of the year, and with corporate profit growth just barely keeping pace with debt growth (bottom panel), odds are that leverage will start to rise. Midstream and Independent Energy companies remain attractively valued after adjusting for duration and credit rating (Table 3). These two sectors stand to benefit from rising oil prices into next year, as is expected by our commodity strategists.4 Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 104 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +326 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 22 bps on the month, and currently sits at 316 bps. Our measure of the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for default losses is currently 209 bps, below the long-run mean of 247 bps (Chart 3). This tells us that if default losses are in line with our expectations during the next 12 months, we should expect high-yield returns of 209 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries, assuming also no capital gains/losses from spread tightening/widening. But the default loss expectations embedded in our calculation are also extremely low relative to history (panel 4). Our assumption, derived from the Moody's baseline default rate forecast and our own forecast of the recovery rate, calls for default losses of 1.07% during the next 12 months. Default losses have rarely come in below that level. While most indicators suggest that default losses will remain low for the next 12 months, historical context clearly demonstrates that the risks are to the upside. Meanwhile, with gross corporate leverage likely to rise in the second half of the year,5 and job cut announcements already trending higher (bottom panel), current default loss forecasts appear overly optimistic. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -7 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread tightened 5 bps on the month, driven by a 4 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and a 1 bp tightening in the option-adjusted spread. The excess return Bond Map on page 15 shows that MBS offer a relatively poor risk/reward trade-off, particularly compared to Aaa-rated non-Agency CMBS, High-Yield and Sovereigns. However, our Bond Map does not account for the macro environment, which remains favorable for the sector. Refi activity is tepid, and continued Fed rate hikes will ensure that it stays that way (Chart 4). Meanwhile, lending standards have been slowly easing since 2014 (bottom panel). Despite the steady easing, the Fed's most recent Senior Loan Officer Survey reports that mortgage lending standards remain at the tighter end of the range since 2005. This suggests that further easing is likely going forward. In a recent report we noted that residential investment has decelerated in recent months, with the weakness mostly stemming from multi-family construction.6 Demand for single-family housing remains robust, and we see no potential negative impact on MBS spreads during the next 6-12 months. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 48 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +38 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 151 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +67 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed by 70 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +34 bps. Local Authorities outperformed by 50 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +91 bps. Supranationals outperformed Treasuries by 4 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +16 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 6 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +10 bps. After adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration, the average spread available from the USD-denominated Sovereign index is unattractive compared to the U.S. corporate bond space (Chart 5). Dollar strength should also cause Sovereign debt to underperform U.S. corporates in the coming months (panel 3). But the outlook could be worse for the Sovereign index. Mexico, Colombia and the Philippines make up approximately 50% of the index's market cap, and our Emerging Markets Strategy team has found that none of those countries are particularly vulnerable to a slowdown in Chinese aggregate demand.7 Mexico and Columbia are particularly insulated. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 36 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +153 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio rose 2% in September, and currently sits at 87% (Chart 6). This is about one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean and only slightly above the average of 81% that was observed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. In a recent report we demonstrated that while M/T yield ratios are low, municipal bonds offer attractive yields compared to corporate bonds.8 For example, we observe that a 5-year Aa-rated municipal bond carries a yield of 2.40% versus a yield of 3.42% for a comparable corporate bond index. This implies that an investor with an effective tax rate of 30% should be indifferent between the two bonds. Moving further out the curve, the breakeven tax rate falls to 23% at the 10-year maturity point and is even lower at the 20-year maturity point. The greater attractiveness of long-maturity munis is consistent across credit tiers, and investors should favor long-dated over short-dated municipal debt (bottom panel). Treasury Curve: Favor The 7-Year Bullet Over The 1/20 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve underwent a roughly parallel upward shift in September. While the 10-year Treasury yield rose 19 bps, the 2/10 slope was unchanged at 24 bps and the 5/30 slope flattened 3 bps to reach 25 bps. The yield curve is already quite flat, and our models suggest that a lot more flattening is discounted. For example, our 1/7/20 butterfly spread model shows that 32 bps of 1/20 flattening is priced into the 1/7/20 butterfly spread for the next six months (Chart 7).9 With the U.S. economy growing strongly and the Fed moving at a gradual +25 bps per quarter pace, the curve is likely to flatten by less than is currently discounted on a cyclical (6-12 month) horizon. This argues for positioning in curve steepeners. In a recent report we also made the case for owning steepeners as a hedge against the risk that weak foreign growth infiltrates the U.S. via a stronger dollar.10 We found that the yield pick-up is similar for the different steepener trades we considered, and also that the 7-year yield has the most downside in the event of a pause in the Fed's tightening cycle. This argues for maintaining our position long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell, a position that has earned +37 bps since it was initiated in May. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8Inflation Compensation TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 16 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +138 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 6 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.14%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 7 bps and currently sits at 2.25%. Both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain below the 2.3% to 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed's 2% target. TIPS breakeven rates have held firm in recent months, despite the sharp drop in commodity prices (Chart 8). This suggests that investors' inflation expectations are increasingly being swayed by U.S. core inflation, which is now more or less consistent with the Fed's target (bottom panel). In recent reports we showed that year-over-year core inflation (both CPI and PCE) is likely to flatten-off during the next six months.11 But continued inflation prints near the Fed's target should be sufficient to drive long-dated breakevens higher, into our target range. This will occur as persistent prints near target cause investors' fears of deflation to gradually ebb. ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +29 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS narrowed 4 bps on the month and now stands at 33 bps, just below its pre-crisis minimum. The excess return Bond Map on page 15 shows that consumer ABS offer attractive return potential compared to other high-rated spread products - such as Agency CMBS and Domestic Agencies - but also carry a greater risk of losses. The Bond Map also reveals that Aaa-rated credit card ABS offer a more attractive risk/reward trade-off than Aaa-rated auto loan ABS. We continue to recommend favoring the former over the latter. Credit quality trends have been slowly moving against the ABS sector and we think caution is warranted. The consumer credit delinquency rate bottomed in 2015, albeit from a very low level, and it should continue to head higher based on the trend in household interest coverage (Chart 9). Average consumer credit bank lending standards have also been tightening for nine consecutive quarters (bottom panel). Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 41 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +167 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 6 bps on the month and currently sits at 83 bps (Chart 10). In a recent report we showed that the macro picture for CMBS is decidedly mixed.12 A typical negative environment for CMBS is characterized by tightening bank lending standards for commercial real estate loans and falling demand. At present, both lending standards and demand for nonresidential real estate loans are close to unchanged (bottom two panels). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 13 basis points in September, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +54 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 44 bps. The Bond Maps on page 15 show that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this defensive sector continues to make sense. The BCA Bond Maps The following page presents excess return and total return Bond Maps that we use to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Maps employ volatility-adjusted breakeven spread/yield analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Maps do not impose any macroeconomic view. The Excess Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the excess return Bond Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps in excess of Treasuries. The Total Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the total return Bond Map shows the number of days of average yield increase required for each sector to lose 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of yield increases and are therefore less likely to lose 5%. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average yield decline required for each sector to earn 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of yield decline and are therefore more likely to earn 5%. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of September 28, 2018) Chart 12Total Return Bond Map (As Of September 28, 2018) Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation (As Of September 28, 2018) Table 5Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "An Oasis Of Prosperity?", dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "A Story Told Through Charts: The U.S. Midterm Election", dated September 19, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Go To Neutral On Spread Product", dated June 26, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl", dated September 20, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "More Than One Reason To Own Steepeners", dated September 25, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "More Than One Reason To Own Steepeners", dated September 25, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Deciphering Global Trade Linkages", dated September 27, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "An Oasis Of Prosperity?", dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 For further details on our yield curve models please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "More Than One Reason To Own Steepeners", dated September 25, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "No Excuses", dated September 18, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 12 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Balance Sheet Problem", dated July 17, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
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