Fixed Income

Highlights Stock markets begin 2020 with fragile short-term fractal structures, which means there is a two in three chance of a tactical reversal. The bond yield impulse is now a strong headwind, which reliably predicts that bond yields are not far from a near-term peak. The oil price tailwind impulse is fading. German and European growth will lose some momentum in the first and/or second quarters of 2020. Tactically underweight equities versus bonds. But on a longer-term horizon, the low level of bond yields justifies and underpins exponentially elevated equity market valuations. Markets Are Fractally Fragile Stock markets begin 2020 with fragile short-term fractal structures. In plain English, this means that usually cautious value investors have become momentum traders, and their buy orders have fuelled a strong short-term trend. But the danger is that when everybody becomes a momentum trader, liquidity evaporates and the market loses its stability. After all, when everybody agrees, who will take the other side of the trade without destabilising the price? When everybody becomes a momentum trader, liquidity evaporates and the market loses its stability.  When a fractal structure is fragile the tiniest of straws can break the camel’s back. But the straw is simply the catalyst for a potential market reversal. The straw could be, say, US/Iran geopolitical tensions escalating, or it could be something else, or there might be no straw needed at all. The underlying cause of the potential reversal is the market’s fragile fractal structure and its associated illiquidity and instability (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekStock Markets Are Fractally Fragile Investment presents no certainties, only probabilities. Successful investing is about identifying and playing those probabilities right. When the market’s fractal structure is at its limit of fragility, the probability that the short-term trend reverses by a third rises to two in three, while the probability that the short-term trend continues uninterrupted drops to one in three. Hence, a fractal warning of a reversal will be right two times out of three, but it will be wrong one time out of three. Still, we can accept being wrong one time out of three if it means we are right the other two times! For further details please revisit our recent Special Report ‘Fractals: The Competitive Advantage In Investing’.1 Translating all of this into current index levels, there is a two in three probability that over the next three months the Euro Stoxx 600 sees 405 before it sees 435. Across the Atlantic, there is a two in three probability that the S&P500 sees 3150 before it sees 3400 (Chart I-2). Nevertheless, a better tactical trade might be to play a short-term reversal in stocks in relative terms versus bonds. Chart I-2Stock Markets Are Fractally Fragile The Bond Yield Impulse Is Now A Strong Headwind A commonly held belief is that a decline in bond yields causes economic growth to accelerate. For example, we frequently hear bold claims such as: financial conditions have eased, so economic growth is likely to pick up. Unfortunately, the commonly held belief is wrong. What causes growth to accelerate or decelerate is not the change in financial conditions but rather the change in the change – the impulse. If the decline in the bond yield is the same in two successive periods, growth will not accelerate. For example, a 0.5 percent decline in the bond yield will trigger new borrowing through an increase in credit demand. The new borrowing will add to spending, meaning it will generate growth. But in the following period, all else being equal, a further 0.5 percent decline in the bond yield will generate the same additional new borrowing and thereby exactly the same growth rate. Therefore, what matters for a growth acceleration or deceleration is whether the bond yield change in the second period is greater or less than that in the first period. In other words, what matters is the bond yield impulse. A bond yield impulse at +1 percent constitutes a strong headwind to short-term growth.  Now look at the actual numbers. The euro area 10-year bond yield stands at a lowly 0.45 percent and the 6-month change is a seemingly benign +0.2 percent. Nothing to worry about, right? Wrong. The crucial 6-month impulse equals a severe +1 percent, because the +0.2 percent rise in yields followed a sharp -0.8 percent drop in the preceding period (Chart I-3). A similar story holds in the US, where the bond yield 6-month impulse now equals +0.5 percent, the highest level in two years (Chart I-4). Chart I-3The Euro Area Bond Yield Impulse Is Now A Strong Headwind Chart I-4The US Bond Yield Impulse Is A Headwind Too A bond yield impulse at +1 percent constitutes a strong headwind to short-term growth. Hence, through the past decade, this impulse level has reliably predicted that bond yields are not far from a near-term peak (Chart I-5). Combined with fractally fragile stock markets, there is a two in three chance that equities underperform bonds by about 4 percent on a three month tactical horizon. Chart I-5When The Bond Yield Impulse Is A Strong Headwind, Bond Yields Are Near A Local Peak Yet on a longer horizon, the low level of bond yields also provides comfort to equity investors by underpinning elevated valuations. At ultra-low yields, bonds become a risky ‘lose-lose’ proposition: prices can no longer rise much, but they can fall a lot. As bonds become riskier, the much higher return required on formerly riskier assets – such as equities – collapses to the feeble return offered on equally-risky bonds (Chart I-6). Meaning that the valuation of equities resets at an exponentially higher level. Chart I-6Ultra-Low Bond Yields Justify Ultra-Low Returns From Equities As long as bond yields stay near current levels, long-term investors should prefer equities over bonds. The Oil Price Tailwind Impulse Is Fading The preceding discussion on the bond yield impulse applies equally to how the oil price can catalyse growth accelerations and decelerations. For the impact on inflation, what matters is the oil price change. But for the impact on growth accelerations and decelerations what matters is the oil price impulse. The German economy is especially sensitive to the oil price impulse. The German economy is especially sensitive to the oil price impulse. This is because its decentralized ‘hub and spoke’ structure requires a lot of criss-crossing of road traffic that relies on imported oil. Hence, when the oil price falls it subtracts from imports and thereby adds to Germany’s net exports, and vice versa (Chart I-7). But just as for the bond yield, what matters for a growth acceleration or deceleration is whether the oil price change in a given 6-month period is greater or less than that in the preceding 6-month period. In other words, the evolution of the oil price 6-month impulse. Chart I-7The Oil Price Explains Swings In Germany's Net Exports Oscillations in the oil price 6-month impulse have explained the oscillations in Germany’s 6-month economic growth with an uncanny precision. The first half of 2019 constituted a severe headwind impulse, because a 30 percent increase in the oil price followed a 40 percent decline in the previous period, equating to a severe headwind impulse of 70 percent.2 But as the oil price stabilized in the second half of 2019, this flipped into a tailwind impulse of 30 percent (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Oil Price Tailwind Impulse Is Fading Allowing for typical lags of a few months, this severe headwind impulse followed by a tailwind impulse explains why Germany experienced a sharp slowdown in the middle of 2019 followed by a healthy rebound which continued through the fourth quarter (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Oil Price Impulse Explains Oscillations In German Growth However, even without any escalation of US/Iran tensions, the oil price 6-month impulse is now fading. Combined with the headwind from the bond yield 6-month impulse it is highly likely that German and European growth will lose some momentum in the first and/or second quarters of 2020. Next week, we will explain what all of this means for sector, country, and regional equity allocation in the first half of 2020. Stay tuned. Fractal Trading System* To repeat the main theme of the week, all of the major stock markets are fractally fragile. Play this by going tactically short stocks versus bonds. Our preferred expression of this is short the S&P500 versus the 10-year T-bond. Set the profit target at 5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. Chart I-10EUROSTOXX 600 In other trades, short GBP/NOK achieved its 2.5 percent profit target at which it was closed. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 62 percent comprising 19.7 wins and 12.0 losses. When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated   December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report ‘Fractals: The Competitive Advantage In Investing’, October 10, 2019 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The 6-month steps in the WTI crude oil price were $74.15, $45.21, and $58.24. The first change equated to a 40 percent decrease and the second change equated to a 30 percent increase. So the 6-month impulse was 70 percent. Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields   Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights 2020 Model Bond Portfolio Positioning: Translating our 2020 global fixed income Key Views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio comes up with the following conclusions: target a moderately aggressive level of overall portfolio risk, with below-benchmark duration exposure alongside meaningful overweight allocations to global corporate credit. Country Allocations: The cyclical improvement in global growth heralded by leading indicators should put upward pressure on overall global bond yields in 2020. With central banks likely to maintain accommodative policy settings to try and boost depressed inflation expectations, government bond allocations should reflect each country’s “beta” to global yield changes. That means favoring lower-beta countries (Japan, Germany, Spain, Australia, the UK) over higher-beta countries (the US, Canada, Italy). Spread Product: Better global growth, combined with stimulative monetary conditions, will provide an ideal backdrop for growth-sensitive spread product like corporate bonds to outperform government debt this year. We are maintaining an overweight stance on US high-yield credit, while increasing overweights to euro area corporates (both investment grade and high-yield). With the US dollar likely to soften as 2020 evolves, emerging market hard currency debt, both sovereign and corporate, is poised to outperform – we are upgrading both to overweight. Feature Welcome to our first report of the New Year. Just before our holiday break last month, we published our 2020 “Key Views” report, outlining the thematic implications of the BCA 2020 Outlook for global bond markets.1 In this follow-up report, we turn those themes into specific investment recommendations for the next twelve months. We will also make any necessary changes to the allocations in the Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio to reflect our themes. The main takeaway is that 2020 will be a much different year than 2019, when virtually all global fixed income classes delivered solid absolute returns. The unusual combination of rapidly falling government bond yields and stable-to-narrowing spreads on the majority of credit products – especially in developed market corporate debt – will not be repeated in 2020. Absolute returns from fixed income will be far lower than in 2019, forcing bond investors to focus on relative returns across maturities, countries and credit sectors to generate outperformance. With global monetary policy to remain stimulative, alongside improved global growth, market volatility should remain subdued over the next 6-12 months. Being more aggressive on overall levels of portfolio risk, particularly through higher allocations to markets like high-yield corporates and emerging market (EM) credit, is a solid strategy in a world of low risk-free interest rates and tame volatility. Top-Down Bond Market Implications Of Our Key Views As a reminder, the main fixed income investment themes from our 2020 Key Views report were the following: Global growth will rebound in 2020, led by the US and China, putting upward pressure on global bond yields. Central banks will stay dovish until policy reflation has clearly turned into inflation, limiting how high bond yields can climb in 2020 but sowing the seeds for a far more bond-bearish backdrop in 2021. Accommodative monetary policy and faster growth will delay the peak in the aging global credit cycle. Returns on global fixed income will be far lower in 2020 than in 2019, given rich valuation starting points. Country and sector selection will be more important in driving fixed income outperformance. We now present the specific fixed income investment recommendations that derive from those themes, described along the following lines: overall portfolio risk, overall duration exposure, country allocations within government bonds, yield curve allocations within countries, and corporate credit allocations by country and credit rating. Overall Portfolio Risk: MODERATELY AGGRESSIVE Global growth is in the process of bottoming out after the sharp manufacturing-driven slowdown in 2019. The cumulative lagged impact of monetary easing by central banks last year, led by the US Federal Reserve cutting rates and the European Central Bank (ECB) restarting its Asset Purchase Program, is a main reason why growth is set to rebound. Reduced trade uncertainty between the US and China should augment the impact of easier monetary policy through improved business confidence. Our global leading economic indicator (LEI), which has increased for nine consecutive months, is already heralding this improvement in the global economy. Our global LEI diffusion index – which measures the number of countries with a rising LEI and is itself a leading indicator of the LEI – suggests more gains ahead as 2020 progresses. The LEI diffusion index is also a reliable leading indicator of bond market volatility, with the former signaling that the latter will remain quiescent in 2020 (Chart 1). At the same time, cross-asset correlations across fixed income sectors should drift a bit higher alongside a more broad-based upturn in global economic growth and expanding monetary liquidity via central bank asset purchases (Chart 2). This pickup in correlations suggests that there is scope for markets that lagged the 2019 global credit rally, like EM USD-denominated sovereign debt, to make up for that underperformance in 2020. Chart 1Improving Global Growth Will Keep Volatility Subdued Chart 2Cross-Asset Correlations Should Increase In 2020 The combination of better growth, stable volatility – but with only a mild rise in correlations – is a good backdrop to take a somewhat more aggressive investment stance in fixed income portfolios in 2020.  The combination of better growth, stable volatility – but with only a mild rise in correlations – is a good backdrop to take a somewhat more aggressive investment stance in fixed income portfolios in 2020. We prefer to take that additional risk by adding to our recommended overweight to global credit, rather than further reducing our below-benchmark overall duration exposure. Overall Portfolio Duration Exposure: BELOW BENCHMARK Chart 3Global Bond Yields Poised To Move Higher The improvement in global growth that we are anticipating in 2020 would normally be expected to put upward pressure on the real component of global government bond yields (Chart 3, top panel). This would initially manifest itself through asset allocation shifts out of bonds into equities and, later, through expectations of rate hikes and tighter monetary policy. However, with all major developed market central banks now expressing a desire to keep policy as easy as possible to try and boost inflation expectations, the cyclical move higher in real yields is likely to be more muted in 2020. However, given our expectation that the US dollar is likely to see a moderate decline, as global capital flows move into more growth-sensitive markets in EM and Europe, there is scope for global bond yields to rise via higher inflation expectations – especially with global oil prices likely to move a bit higher, as our commodity strategists expect (bottom two panels). We recommend only a moderate below-benchmark overall duration exposure in global fixed income portfolios in 2020, given that real yields will likely stay relatively muted. Investors should maintain core allocations to inflation-linked bonds, however, to benefit from the pickup in inflation expectations that is likely to occur this year. We recommend only a moderate below-benchmark overall duration exposure in global fixed income portfolios in 2020, given that real yields will likely stay relatively muted. Investors should maintain core allocations to inflation-linked bonds, however, to benefit from the pickup in inflation expectations that is likely to occur this year. Government Bond Country Allocation: UNDERWEIGHT HIGHER-BETA MARKETS, OVERWEIGHT LOWER-BETA MARKETS At the country level, we would typically let our expectations of monetary policy changes guide our recommended allocations. Yet in 2020, we see very little potential for any change in monetary policy outside of Australia (where rate cuts can happen early in the year) and Canada (where a rate hike may be possible later in the year). Thus, we think that a more useful framework for making fixed income country allocation decisions in 2020 is to rely on the “yield betas” of each country to changes in the overall level of global bond yields. Chart 4 shows the three-year trailing yield betas for 10-year government bonds of the major developed markets. Changes in the 10-year yields are compared to the yield of the 7-10 year maturity bucket of the Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury Index (as a proxy for the unobservable “global bond yield”). On that basis, the higher-beta markets are the US, Canada and Italy, while the lower-beta markets are Japan, Germany, France, Spain, Australia and the UK. Thus, we want to maintain underweight positions in the former group and overweight positions in the latter group. At the moment, we already have most of those tilts within our model bond portfolio, with two exceptions: we are currently neutral (benchmark index weight) in the UK and Canada. For the UK, Brexit uncertainty has made it difficult to take a strong view on the direction of Gilt yields - a problem now compounded further with Andrew Bailey set to take over from Mark Carney as the new Governor of the Bank of England. Staying neutral, for now, still seems like the best strategy until all the policy uncertainties are fully resolved. Canadian bond yields are more likely to maintain their “higher-beta” status as global yields rise, as we discussed in a recent report.2 Thus, this week, we move our recommended allocation for Canadian government bonds to underweight from neutral. For Canada, the growth and inflation data continue to print strong enough to keep the Bank of Canada on a relatively more hawkish path than the other developed market central banks. This suggests that Canadian bond yields are more likely to maintain their “higher-beta” status as global yields rise, as we discussed in a recent report.2 Thus, this week, we move our recommended allocation for Canadian government bonds to underweight from neutral. Applying Our Global Golden Rule To Government Bond Allocations In September 2018, we published a Special Report introducing a government bond return forecasting methodology called the “Global Golden Rule.”3 This is an extension of a framework introduced by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, that links US Treasury returns (versus cash) to changes in the fed funds rate not already discounted in the US Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve. That relationship also holds in other developed market countries, where there is a clear correlation between the level of bond yields and our 12-month discounters, which measure the change in policy rates over the next year priced into OIS curves (Chart 5). Chart 4Favor Lower-Beta Government Bond Markets In 2020 In Table 1, we show the expected returns generated by the Global Golden Rule (shown hedged into US dollars) for the countries in our model bond portfolio universe, based on monetary policy scenarios that we deem to be most plausible for 2020. Chart 5Monetary Policy Expectations Will Remain Critical For Bond Yields In Table 2, we show the returns on a duration-adjusted basis (expected total return divided by duration). We then rank the return scenarios for overall country indices, aggregating the returns of the individual yield curve maturity buckets shown in those two tables, in Table 3. Table 1Global Golden Rule Forecasts For 2020 The results in Table 1 show that expected returns are still expected to be positive across most countries, although this is largely due to the gains from hedging into higher-yielding US dollars. The duration-adjusted returns shown in Table 2 look most attractive at the front-end of yield curves across all the countries. This is somewhat consistent with our view, discussed in the 2020 Key Views report, that investors should expect some “bear-steepening” of global yield curves over the course of this year as inflation expectations drift higher (Chart 6). Table 2Global Golden Rule Duration-Adjusted Forecasts For 2020   Chart 6Expect A Mild Reflationary Bear Steepening Of Global Yield Curves Table 3Ranking The 2020 Return Scenarios The results in Table 3 show that the best expected returns would come in rate cutting scenarios – an unsurprising outcome given that there is very little change in policy rates currently discounted in OIS curves in all countries in our model bond portfolio universe. We see rates more likely to remain stable across all countries, however, making the “rates flat” scenarios in the middle of Table 3 more likely in 2020. After our downgrade of Canada this week, our recommended country allocations now reflect both yield betas and the results of our Global Golden Rule. Spread Product Allocation: OVERWEIGHT GLOBAL CORPORATES VERSUS GOVERNMENT BONDS, IN THE US, EURO AREA AND EM Chart 7Stay Overweight US High-Yield Turning to credit markets, the shift of global central banks to a more accommodative stance – with global growth improving – has opened a window for another year of outperformance versus sovereign bonds in 2020. With market volatility likely to remain low, as discussed earlier, there is a strong case to increase credit allocations relative to government debt as 2020 begins. Turning to credit markets, the shift of global central banks to a more accommodative stance – with global growth improving – has opened a window for another year of outperformance versus sovereign bonds in 2020. We already have a recommended overweight allocation to US high-yield corporate debt within our model bond portfolio. As we discussed in a recent report, the conditions that would lead us to become more cautious on US junk bonds – deteriorating corporate health, restrictive Fed policy and tightening bank lending standards – are currently not in place (Chart 7).4 If US economic growth starts to rebound in the first half of 2020, as we expect, then the case for US junk bond outperformance is even stronger. We are maintaining only a neutral allocation to US investment grade corporates, however, but this is part of a relative value view versus US Agency mortgage backed securities, which look more attractive on a volatility-adjusted basis.5 We are comfortable with our US credit views, but we are making the following changes this week to raise the credit allocation in our model bond portfolio: Upgrade EM USD-denominated sovereign and corporate debt to overweight. The two conditions that typically must be in place before EM hard currency debt can outperform – a softer US dollar and improving global growth – are now both in place. The two conditions that typically must be in place before EM hard currency debt can outperform – a softer US dollar and improving global growth – are now both in place (Chart 8). The momentum in the US dollar has clearly rolled over and even in level terms, the trade-weighted dollar is peaking. Add in the improvement in both our global LEI and the global manufacturing PMI (and the China PMI, most importantly) and the case for upgrading EM hard currency debt for 2020 is a strong one. Increase the size of overweights to euro area investment grade and high-yield corporate debt. We already have a modest overweight stance on euro area corporate bonds in our model bond portfolio, based on our expectations that the ECB will maintain a highly-accommodative stance – which could include buying more corporate debt in its Asset Purchase Program. Yet with an increasing body of evidence highlighting that the sharp downturn in European growth seen in 2019 is bottoming out, the argument for raising euro area corporate bond allocations for this year is compelling. This is especially true for euro area high-yield, where the backdrop looks even more constructive (Chart 9) compared to US junk bonds using the same metrics described above – corporate health (not deteriorating), monetary policy (not restrictive) and lending standards (not tightening). Chart 8Upgrade EM Credit To Overweight Chart 9Increase Overweights To European Credit Summing It All Up: Our Model Bond Portfolio Adjustments To Begin 2019 The outlook described in our 2020 Key Views report, and in this week’s report, lead us to make several adjustments to our model bond portfolio weightings seen in the table on Pages 15 and 16. The results of those changes are the following: Duration: We are maintaining an overall portfolio duration of 6.5 years, which is 0.5 years below that of our custom benchmark portfolio index (Chart 10). Credit Allocation: We are increasing the allocation to EM USD-denominated debt, funded by reducing exposure to US Treasuries. We are also increasing the size of the overweight positions in euro area investment grade and high-yield corporate debt, funded by cutting allocations to German and French government bonds. The net effect of these changes is to increase our total spread product weighting to 57% of the portfolio (Chart 11), which represents an overweight tilt versus the benchmark of +15% (versus a +8% overweight prior to this week’s changes). Chart 10Stay Below-Benchmark On Duration Exposure Chart 11A Larger Recommended Allocation To Spread Product For 2020 Country Allocation: We are cutting the Canadian government bond allocation to underweight, while making additional modest adjustments to yield curve positioning in the US, Japan, and the UK to reflect the output from our Global Golden Rule. The net result of these changes, combined with the increased allocation to corporate bonds, is to boost the overall portfolio yield to 3%, which represents a positive carry of +43bps versus our benchmark index (Chart 12). Chart 12Greater Portfolio Yield To Begin 2020 Chart 13Move To A Moderately Aggressive Level Of Portfolio Risk Overall Portfolio Risk: All of the above changes represent an increase in the usage of the “risk budget” of our model bond portfolio, which is now running a tracking error (or excess volatility versus that of the benchmark) of 73bps (Chart 13). This is higher than the 58bps prior to this week’s changes, but is still below the maximum allowable tracking error of 100bps that we have imposed on the model portfolio since its inception. This is consistent with our view that investors should maintain a “moderately aggressive” level of risk in fixed income portfolios in 2020.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “2020 Key Views: Delay Of Reckoning”, dated December 12th 2019, available at gfis.bcarsearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “How Sweet It Is”, dated November 6, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated September 25th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “The Lowdown On Low-Rated High-Yield”, dated November 27, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Big Mo(mentum) Is Turning Positive”, dated October 29, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Chart 1Softer PMIs In December A bond bear market looked to be underway in December, with the 10-year Treasury yield reaching as high as 1.93% just before Christmas. But two developments during the past week drove it back down to 1.80%, and could prevent yields from rising during the next month or two. Five macro factors are important for US bond yields (global growth, the output gap, the US dollar, policy uncertainty and sentiment). Two of those factors flipped from sending bond-bearish to bond-bullish signals during the past week. First, policy uncertainty had been ebbing due to the US/China phase 1 trade deal, but it ramped up again due to US military conflict with Iran. Second, our preferred global growth indicators had been showing tentative signs of bottoming, but reversed course in December. The Global Manufacturing PMI fell from 50.3 to 50.1 in December, and the US ISM Manufacturing PMI fell from 48.1 to 47.2 (Chart 1). We continue to forecast higher bond yields in 2020, but recent events have likely postponed any significant sell-off. Stay tuned. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 119 basis points in December and by 619 bps in 2019. In our 2020 Key Views report, we argued that the credit cycle will remain supportive for corporate bonds this year, but that we prefer to take credit risk in the high-yield space where valuation is more attractive.1 With inflation expectations still depressed, the Fed can maintain its “easy money” policy for some time yet. This accommodative stance will encourage banks to keep the credit taps running, leading to tight spreads. The third quarter’s tightening of C&I lending standards is a risk to our view (Chart 2), especially if this month’s survey reveals that the tightening continued into Q4. We don’t think that will be the case, given that the yield curve – another indicator of monetary conditions – steepened sharply in the fourth quarter. As stated above, valuation is the main hurdle for investment grade corporates. Spreads for all credit tiers are below our targets (panels 2 & 3).2 As a result, we advise only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporate bonds. We also recommend increasing exposure to Agency MBS in place of corporate bonds rated A or higher.  Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 202 basis points in December, and by 886 bps in 2019. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 34 bps on the month and currently sits at 335 bps, 102 bps above our target (Chart 3). With attractive valuation, accommodative monetary conditions and a looming recovery in global economic growth, we expect junk spreads to tighten during the next 6-12 months. One notable development from last year is that the Ba and B credit tiers outperformed the Caa credit tier. This is unusual in an environment of positive excess junk returns. We analyzed the divergence between Caa and the rest of the junk index in a recent report and came to two conclusions.3 First, the historical data show that 12-month periods of overall junk bond outperformance are more likely to be followed by underperformance if Caa is the worst performing credit tier. Second, we can identify several reasons for 2019’s Caa spread widening that make us inclined to downplay any negative signal. Specifically, we note that the Caa credit tier’s exposure to the shale oil sector is responsible for the bulk of 2019’s underperformance (bottom panel). The conflict between the US and Iran should boost oil prices during the next few months, benefiting the US shale sector and causing some of this divergence to unwind. MBS: Overweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 34 basis points in December, and by 56 basis points in 2019. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread tightened 10 bps on the month, driven by an 8 bps tightening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS) and a 2 bps decline in expected prepayment losses (aka option cost). We recommend an overweight allocation to Agency MBS, particularly relative to corporate bonds rated A or higher, for three reasons.4 First, expected compensation is competitive. The conventional 30-year MBS OAS is 45 bps (Chart 4). This is only 7 bps below the spread offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds (panel 4). Also, spreads for all investment grade corporate bond credit tiers are below our targets. Second, risk-adjusted compensation heavily favors MBS. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency MBS plot well to the right of investment grade corporates. This means that the sector is less likely to see losses versus Treasuries on a 12-month horizon. Finally, the macro environment for MBS remains supportive. Mortgage lending standards have barely eased since the financial crisis (bottom panel), and most homeowners have already had at least one opportunity to refinance. This burnout will keep refi activity low, and MBS spreads tight. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 54 basis points in December, and by 252 bps in 2019. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 175 bps on the month, and by 697 bps in 2019. Local Authority and Foreign Agency bonds outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 41 bps and 73 bps, respectively, in December, and by 287 bps and 341 bps, respectively, in 2019. Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals both performed in line with Treasuries in December, but outperformed by 51 bps and 36 bps, respectively, in 2019. We continue to recommend an underweight allocation to USD-denominated sovereign bonds, given that spreads remain expensive compared to US corporate credit (Chart 5). However, we noted in a recent report that Mexican and Saudi Arabian sovereigns look attractive on a risk/reward basis.5 This is also true for Local Authorities and Foreign Agencies, as shown in the Bond Map in Appendix C. Our Emerging Markets Strategy service also thinks that worries about Mexico’s fiscal position are overblown, and that bond yields embed too high of a risk premium (bottom panel).6 Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 51 basis points in December, and by 57 bps in 2019 (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio fell 6% in December, and currently sits at 78% (Chart 6). We upgraded municipal bonds in early October, as yield ratios had become significantly more attractive, especially at the long-end of the Aaa curve (panel 2).7 Yield ratios have tightened a lot since then, but value remains at long maturities. Specifically, 2-year, 5-year and 10-year M/T yield ratios are all below average pre-crisis levels at 66%, 68% and 78%, respectively. But 20-year and 30-year yield ratios stand at 87% and 91%, respectively, above average pre-crisis levels. Fundamentally, state and local government balance sheets remain solid. Our Municipal Health Monitor remains in “improving health” territory and state & local government interest coverage has improved considerably in recent quarters (bottom panel). Both of these trends are consistent with muni ratings upgrades continuing to outpace downgrades going forward. Treasury Curve: Maintain A Barbell Curve Positioning Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Long-dated Treasury yields rose in December, while the Fed’s forward guidance kept short-maturity yields low. The result is that the 2/10 slope steepened 17 bps in December and the 5/30 slope steepened 11 bps (Chart 7). Looking back on 2019 we find that, despite August’s curve inversion scare, the 2/10 slope steepened 13 bps on the year and the 5/30 slope steepened 19 bps. In our 2020 Key Views report, we argued that the 2/10 Treasury slope will stay positive in 2020, in a range between 0 bps and 50 bps.8 We also expect further modest steepening during the next few months as the Fed continues to hold down the front-end of the curve in an effort to re-anchor inflation expectations, even as improving global growth pushes long-dated yields higher. Despite our outlook for modest curve steepening, we continue to recommend holding a barbelled Treasury portfolio. Specifically, we favor holding a 2/30 barbell versus the 5-year bullet, in duration-matched terms. This position offers positive carry (bottom panel), due to the extreme overvaluation of the 5-year note. It also looks attractive on our yield curve models (see Appendix B). TIPS: Overweight Chart 8Inflation Compensation TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 112 basis points in December, and by 42 bps in 2019. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 16 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.78%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 14 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.86%. Both rates remain well below the 2.3%-2.5% range consistent with the Fed’s target. The divergence between the actual inflation data and inflation expectations remains stark. Trimmed mean PCE inflation has been fluctuating around the Fed’s target since mid-2018 (Chart 8). However, long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain stubbornly low. It takes time for expectations to adapt to a changing macro environment, but even accounting for those long lags, our Adaptive Expectations Model pegs the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate as 16 bps too low (panel 4).9 It is highly likely that the Fed will have to tolerate some overshoot of its 2% inflation target in order to re-anchor long-term inflation expectations. As a result, the actual inflation data will lead expectations higher, causing the TIPS breakeven inflation curve to flatten.10 Any politically-driven increase in oil prices will only exacerbate TIPS breakeven curve flattening. ABS: Underweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in December, but outperformed the benchmark by 69 bps in 2019. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 6 bps on the month. It currently sits at 37 bps, 3 bps above its minimum pre-crisis level (Chart 9). Our Excess Return Bond Map (see Appendix C) shows that Aaa-rated consumer ABS ranks among the most defensive US spread products, and also offers more expected return than other low-risk sectors such as Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals. However, we remain wary of allocating too much to consumer ABS because credit trends continue to shift in the wrong direction. The consumer credit delinquency rate remains low, but has put in a clear bottom. This is also true for the household interest expense ratio (panel 3). Senior Loan Officers also continue to tighten lending standards for both credit cards and auto loans. Tighter lending standards usually coincide with rising delinquencies (bottom panel). All in all, our favorable outlook for global growth causes us to shy away from defensive spread products, and deteriorating credit metrics make consumer ABS even less appealing. Stay underweight. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in December, and by 233 bps in 2019. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 1 bp on the month. It currently sits at 71 bps, below its average pre-crisis level but somewhat above levels seen during the past two years (Chart 10). The macro outlook for commercial real estate (CRE) is somewhat unfavorable, with lenders tightening loan standards (panel 4) in an environment of tepid demand. The Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey shows that banks saw slightly stronger demand for nonfarm nonresidential CRE loans in Q3, after four consecutive quarters of falling demand (bottom panel). Despite the poor fundamental picture, our Excess Return Bond Map shows that CMBS offer a reasonably attractive risk/reward trade-off compared to other bond sectors (see Appendix C). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 16 basis points in December, but outperformed the benchmark by 91 bps in 2019. The index option-adjusted spread widened 4 bps on the month, and currently sits at 57 bps. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer a compelling risk/reward trade-off. An overweight allocation to this high-rated sector remains appropriate. Appendix A: The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record At present, the market is priced for 22 basis points of cuts during the next 12 months. We anticipate a flat fed funds rate over that time horizon, and therefore anticipate that below-benchmark portfolio duration positions will profit. We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of January 3, 2020) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of January 3, 2020) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 33 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 33 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 12Excess Return Bond Map (As Of January 3, 2020) Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 10, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For details on how we arrive at our spread targets please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Sign Or Buying Opportunity?”, dated November 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Perspective On Risk And Reward”, dated October 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Country Insights: Malaysia, Mexico & Central Europe”, dated October 31, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 10, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 For further details on our Adaptive Expectations Model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 10, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Feature Recommended Allocation Since BCA published its 2020 Outlook,1 and the December GAA Monthly Portfolio Update,2 nothing has happened to make us fundamentally change our views. We see the global manufacturing cycle rebounding over the coming quarters, but major central banks remaining dovish. This combination of accelerating growth and easy monetary policy should be positive for risk assets. We accordingly continue to recommend an overweight on equities versus bonds, prefer the more cyclical euro zone and EM equity markets over the US, and selectively like credit (particularly the riskier end of the US junk bond universe). In the 2020 Outlook, we laid out a series of milestones that would indicate how our scenario is playing out: whether we need to reconsider it, or whether we should be adding further to risk (Table 1). Here is how those milestones are progressing. Table 1Milestones For The 2020 Outlook Chinese growth. Total Social Financing picked up in November (CNY1.75 trillion versus CNY619 billion the previous month) and the most recent hard data (notably retail sales and industrial production) showed improvement. But the momentum of credit creation and activity generally remain weak (Chart 1). We expect that Chinese growth will begin to accelerate in early 2020, due to the lagged effect of monetary stimulus in the first half of last year, and easier fiscal policy. Moreover, December’s annual Central Economic Work Conference pointed to greater government emphasis on growth stability.3 The clampdown on shadow banking also seems to be easing (Chart 2). However, we need to see further signs of Chinese growth accelerating before, for example, we become more bullish on Emerging Markets and commodities. Chart 1Chinese Credit And Activity Remain Weak Chart 2Clampdown On Shadow Banking Easing? Trade war. The last-minute agreement to cancel the December 15 rise in US tariffs on Chinese imports represents the “ceasefire” we expected, rather than “phase one” of a more profound agreement. It is still unclear whether previous tariffs will be rolled back (Chart 3). China’s supposed promise to increase imports of US agricultural products from $10 billion a year to $40 billion-$50 billion seems unrealistic. Progress on more fundamental topics such as China’s subsidies for state-owned companies seems far off. For now, President Trump has done enough to minimize the negative impact on the US economy in an election year. But there remains a possibility that trade war reemerges as a risk during 2020. Chart 3How Far The Rollback? Progress against these milestones suggests that our current asset allocation recommendation structure – moderately risk-on, but with hedges against downside risk – is appropriate for now. Global growth. Data confirming the rebound in the manufacturing cycle remain mixed. Economic surprises have generally been positive in the euro zone, but have slipped in the US and Japan, and remain soft in the Emerging Markets (Chart 4). In Germany, the manufacturing PMI slipped back to 43.7 in December, but the Ifo and ZEW surveys both rebounded (Chart 5). There is, however, still little sign that the weakness in manufacturing is spilling over into consumption and services. In Germany, unemployment remains at a record low and wages are strong. In the US, wage growth continues to trend up, and there is no indication in the weekly initial claims data that companies are starting to lay off workers at more than the seasonally normal pace (Chart 6). Market indicators of the cycle are also showing some positive signs. Among commodities, the price of copper – the most cyclical metal – has begun to rise. Chinese cyclical stocks are outperforming defensives. But the US dollar has not yet showed any significant depreciation (Chart 7). Chart 4Economic Surprises Mixed Chart 5Germany Showing Signs Of Bottoming   Chart 6No Problems In The Labor Market Chart 7Some Positive Signs From The Markets     US politics. President Trump’s approval rating has picked up slightly – we warned that its slipping might cause him to get aggressive on trade or foreign policy (Chart 8). Markets might worry at the possibility of “President Warren” given her focus on increased regulation of industries such as finance, energy, and technology. But she has fallen a little in the polls. Even in liberal California (where the primary will be unusually early next year – March 3), she is only level with Biden and Sanders in opinion polls. Our geopolitical strategists see US politics as one of the key geopolitical risks this year,4 but the risk seems subdued for now. Chart 8Trump’s Approval Rating Stable To Rising Fed tightening. Expansions usually end when inflation rises, either causing the Fed to raise rates to choke it off, or with the Fed ignoring the inflation and allowing debt and asset bubbles to form. Any signs, therefore, that inflation, or inflation expectations, are rising would signal that we are truly in the “end game”. For now, there are no such signs. US inflation is likely to soften over the next six months, as a result of the economic slowdown and strong dollar. And TIPS breakevens imply the market believes the Fed will miss its inflation target by an average of 80-90 BPs a year over the next decade (Chart 9). The Fed is likely to sound very dovish over the coming year. The review of its monetary policy framework, probably to be announced in July, may result in some sort of “catch-up” policy: under this, if inflation undershoots the Fed’s target, the target automatically rises the following year.5 Its efforts to support the repo market, including short-term Treasury securities purchases of $60 billion a month, will increase the Fed’s balance-sheet, and represent a “mini-QE” (Chart 10). The Fed is likely to be reluctant to turn more hawkish ahead of the presidential election. These dovish moves – and continued accommodative policies from the ECB and Bank of Japan – mean that monetary policy will be supportive for risk assets throughout 2020. Chart 9Inflation Remains Subdued These milestones suggest, therefore, that our current asset allocation recommendation structure – moderately risk-on, but with hedges (long cash and gold) against downside risk – is appropriate for now. Chart 10A "Mini-QE"? Equities: We shifted last month to an underweight on US equities, with an overweight on the euro zone, and neutral on Emerging Markets. The US tends to underperform during upswings in the global manufacturing cycle (Chart 11). Europe looks attractive because of its heavy weighting in sectors we like such as Financials, Autos and Capital Goods. Europe’s returns will also be boosted by the appreciation in the euro and pound that we expect (our equity recommendations assume no currency hedging). For EM, we would turn more positive if we saw a clear pickup in Chinese credit and economic growth. Chart 11US Underperforms When Growth Picks Up Chart 12Fed Won't Cut As The Market Expects   Fixed Income: Our positive view on global growth implies that long-term rates will rise. We see the US Treasury 10-year yield reaching 2.5% by mid-2020. The market still expects the Fed to cut rates once over the next 12 months. If it stays on hold, as we expect, that slight hawkish surprise would be compatible with a moderate rise in rates (Chart 12). Core euro zone rates might rise by a little less, perhaps by 30-40 BPs, and Japanese government bond yields by 10-15 BPs. We, therefore, continue to recommend a small underweight on duration and an overweight on TIPS which look particularly cheaply valued. Within credit, our preferences are for European investment grade (not as expensive as in the US, and with the ECB buying corporate debt again) and the lower end of the US junk-bond universe (since CCC-rated bonds missed out on 2019’s rally). In a rebounding global economy, the US dollar should depreciate, particularly since it looks somewhat over-valued, and with speculative positions long the dollar. Currencies: In a rebounding global economy, the US dollar should depreciate, particularly since it looks somewhat over-valued (Chart 13), and with speculative positions long the dollar (Chart 14). But its performance is likely to vary depending on the currency pair. Our FX strategists expect the dollar to weaken to 1.18 against the euro and 1.40 against the pound over the next 12 months, and even more against currencies such as the NOK, SEK, and AUD.6 But the dollar is likely to strengthen against the yen (an even more counter-cyclical currency) and against currencies in EM, where central banks will continue to cut rates and inject liquidity aggressively to support their economies. Chart 13Dollar Looks Expensive... Chart 14...And Speculators Are Long     Commodities: Supply in the oil market remains tight, with OPEC deepening its production cuts to 1.7 million barrels/day. The crude oil price was held down in 2019 by weakening demand, which should recover along with the cycle in 2020 (Chart 15). Our energy strategists expect Brent to average $67 a barrel in 2020 (compared to $66 now), with WTI $4 lower. Metal prices could rise in 2020 as Chinese growth recovers and the US dollar depreciates – the two most important factors that drive them (Chart 16). Given the uncertainty over both, we remain neutral for now, but would turn more positive (including on commodity-related assets, such as Australian or EM equities) if we see clear signs of their moving in the right direction. We see gold as a good downside hedge in a world of ultra-low interest rates, especially since central banks may allow inflation to overshoot over the coming years. Chart 15Supply/Demand Balance Points To Higher Oil Price Chart 16Metals Are Driven By The Dollar And China   Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see "Outlook 2020: Heading Into The End Game," dated 22 November 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "GAA Monthly Portfolio Update: How To Position For The End Game," dated 2 December 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Year-End Tactical Upgrade," dated 18 December 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy "Strategic Outlook: 2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society," dated 6 December 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 5 For example, if the Fed's inflation target is 2% but inflation is only 1.7% one year, the target would automatically rise to 2.3% the following year. 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy, "2020 Key Views: Top Trade Ideas," dated December 13, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation  

As 2019 draws to a close, we thank you for your ongoing readership and support. We wish you and your loved ones a happy holiday season and all the best for a healthy and prosperous 2020. Highlights We explore the principal risks to our optimistic 2020 outlook. Trade and the 2020 US Presidential election remain potential landmines. A stronger dollar would tighten global financial conditions and be deflationary. Credit market tremors would end buybacks. Stronger-than-expected inflation would force a cycle-ending Federal Reserve tightening. Weaker-than-expected inflation would first allow for larger bubbles to form at the expense of a more painful recession and deeper a bear market down the road. Hedging against those risks warrants overweighting cash, TIPs and gold. Feature Chart I-1Timing is Ripe For A Recovery As always, this year’s visit from Ms. and Mr. X was thought-provoking and generated diverse investment ideas.1 While we did not share Mr. X’s fears, his caution may be justified because an aging business cycle, elevated equity multiples and extremely expensive government bonds do not mesh with pro-risk portfolio positioning. With this in mind, we will explore the greatest risks to our positive market outlook, which include politics, the US dollar, problems in the credit market, a quicker resumption of inflation and lower inflation. The Central Scenario To understand how these five risks affect our central thesis, let’s review the key views and themes that underpin our bullish outlook. BCA expects global economic activity to recover in 2020. First, the global inventory contraction is advanced, which increases the chance that the manufacturing cycle will track its usual pattern of an 18-month decline followed by an 18-month acceleration (Chart I-1). Secondly, Chinese policymakers are putting a floor under domestic economic activity and the stabilization in credit growth and the climbing fiscal impulse already augur well for global growth (Chart I-2). Thirdly, global liquidity is in a major upswing, thanks to easing by central banks around the world (Chart I-3). Finally, the trade détente between the US and China agreed last week reduces the odds of a destructive trade war. Chart I-2China's Policy Turnaround Chart I-3Easing Abound!   US monetary policy will remain accommodative next year. US inflation will remain subdued in the first half of 2020 in response to both the global growth slowdown underway since mid-2018 and the lagged effect of a stronger dollar. Moreover, Fed policy will remain sensitive to inflation expectations. According to BCA’s US Bond Strategy’s model, it could take an extended overshoot in realized inflation before inflation expectations move back to the 2.3% to 2.5% range consistent with achieving a 2% inflation target (Chart I-4). Thus, the Fed will remain on pause for all of 2020. BCA’s positive outlook depends on both China and the US respecting their trade truce. In this context, the dollar will depreciate. The USD is a countercyclical currency and typically suffers when global economic activity rebounds, especially if inflation remains tame (Chart I-5). This behavior is due to the low share of the US economy dedicated to manufacturing and exports, which makes the US less sensitive to global trade and industrial activity. Moreover, when the world economy strengthens, safe-haven flows that boost the dollar in times of duress reverse, which accentuates the selling pressure on the USD. Chart I-4Realized Inflation Will Guide Expectations Chart I-5The Dollar Won't Respond Well To Stronger Global Growth   Global bond prices will be another victim of an improving economic outlook. Global safe-haven securities are extremely expensive and investors are too bullish toward this asset class (Chart I-6). This puts government bonds at risk in the face of positive economic surprises. However, the upside in Treasury yields will be capped between 2.25 and 2.5% because the Fed will be cautious about lifting rates. This move will likely be led by inflation expectations. As a result, we favor TIPs over nominal Treasurys. Chart I-6Safe-Haven Yields Have Upside Chart I-7Investors Aren't Feeling Exuberant About Earnings Growth   Equities will outperform bonds. The S&P 500 is trading at 18-times forward earnings and 2.3-times sales. However, those elevated multiples are due to depressed risk-free rates. Long-term growth expectations embedded in stock prices are only 1%, toward the bottom of this series’ historical distribution (Chart I-7). Therefore, investors are not particularly optimistic on the long-term prospects of per-share earnings. This lack of euphoria implies that stocks are not as expensive as bonds, and that if yields climb because of improving global economic activity, then equities will outperform bonds. Moreover, with a backdrop of easy money and no recession forecast until 2022, the timing still favors positive returns for equities in the coming 12 to 18 months (Table I-1).   Table I-1The End Game Can Be Rewarding Finally, we favor European equities over US stocks. This regional slant is as much a reflection of the better value offered by European stocks as it is of their sector composition. European stocks are trading at a forward PE of 14, implying an equity risk premium of 846 basis points versus 546 basis points in the US. Moreover, our preference for industrials, energy and financials favors European equities (Table I-2). Additionally, European banks are our favorite equity bet worldwide because they trade at a price-to-book ratio of only 0.6 and the drivers of their return on tangible equity are perking up (Chart I-8). Table I-2Europe: Overweight In The Right Sectors Chart I-8Brightening Prospects For Euro Area Banks     Risk 1: Politics BCA’s positive outlook depends on both China and the US respecting their trade truce. However, the two countries are long-term rivals and the rising geopolitical power of China relative to the US will cause tensions to escalate in the coming decades (Chart I-9). This also suggests that China and the US are highly unlikely to ever have an agreement that fully covers intellectual property transfers. Chart I-9China/US Tensions Are Structural The US could still renege on the “Phase One” deal. President Trump faces an election in 2020 and the majority of Democratic hopefuls are also hawkish on China. If Trump’s low approval rating does not improve soon (Chart I-10), he could become a more war-like president, in the hope that electors will rally around the flag. A renewed trade war would hurt business sentiment and undermine consumer spending (Chart I-11). A bellicose approach to international relations, especially on trade, would spark another spike in global policy uncertainty that will hurt global capex intentions. Meanwhile, companies could cut employment, which would weigh on household incomes. A rising unemployment rate could also hurt household confidence, reinforcing the slowdown in consumer spending. This would guarantee an earlier recession. Stocks would decline along with global government bond yields. Chart I-10President Trump Can Still Make It Chart I-11Households On The Edge   The US election creates an additional political risk. Democratic candidates are touting higher corporate taxes, a wealth tax, a greater regulatory burden, antitrust actions, and so on. These policies are worrisome to corporate leaders and business owners. For the time being, our Geopolitical Strategy team favors a Trump victory in 2020 (Chart I-12).2 However, if his odds deteriorate significantly, then business executives would likely curtail capex and hiring. This could also result in a US recession that would invalidate our central scenario for 2020. Chart I-12Our Model Still Favors President Trump Risk 2: A Strong Dollar A strong US dollar would hurt growth. A continued dollar rally would counteract a large proportion of the easing in liquidity conditions created by accommodative central banks around the world. The dollar affects the global cost of capital. Both advanced economies and emerging markets have USD-denominated foreign currency debt totaling around $6 trillion each. A strong USD raises the cost of servicing this large debt load, which could force borrowers to curtail their spending. A continued dollar rally would counteract a large proportion of the easing in liquidity conditions created by accommodative central banks around the world. Despite our conviction that the US dollar will depreciate in 2020, the following factors may invalidate our thesis: The USD still possesses the highest carry in the G10. When the dollar is supported by some of the highest interest rates in the G10, it often continues to rally (Chart I-13). Chart I-13The Dollar Offers An Elevated Carry The global growth rebound may be led by the US. If the US leads the rest of the world higher, then rates of return in the US would climb quicker than in the rest of the world. The resulting capital inflows would bid up the dollar. The shortage of USDs in offshore markets may flare up again. The September seize-up in the repo market was a reminder that because of the Basel III rules, global banks have a strong appetite for high-quality collateral and reserves. This generates substantial demand for the USD, which could put upward pressure on its exchange rate. The US dollar is a momentum currency. Among the G10 currencies, the USD responds most strongly to the momentum factor (Chart I-14).3 The dollar’s strength in the past 18 months could initiate another wave of appreciation. The dollar may not be as expensive as suggested by purchasing power parity (PPP) models. According to PPP estimates, the trade-weighted dollar is 24.2% overvalued. However, according to behavioral effective exchange rate models (BEER), the dollar may be trading closer to its fair value (Chart I-15). Chart I-14The Dollar Is A Momentum Currency Chart I-15Is The Dollar Expensive?   Why are the five items listed above risks for the dollar, but not our central scenario? Regarding the dollar’s carry, in 1985, 1999, and 2006, the US still offered some of the highest short-term interest rates among advanced economies, nevertheless the dollar began to depreciate. In those three instances, an acceleration in foreign economic activity relative to the US was the key culprit behind the USD’s weakness. In 2020, we expect foreign economies to lead the US higher. Since mid-2018, the manufacturing sector has been at the center of the global slowdown. But now, inventory and monetary dynamics point towards a re-acceleration in manufacturing activity. The US was the last nation to be hit by the growth slowdown; it will also be the last to reap a dividend from the recovery. The marginal buyers of US equities have been US firms. On the danger created by the dollar and the collateral shortage, the Fed is tackling the lack of excess reserves head-on by injecting $60 billion per month of reserves via its asset purchases. Moreover, the US fiscal deficit, which is tabulated to reach $1.1 trillion in 2020, will add a similar amount of dollars to the pool of high-quality collateral around the world, especially as the US current account deficit is widening anew. On the momentum tendency of the USD, the dollar’s momentum seems to be petering off. A move in the Dollar Index below 96 would indicate a major change in the trend for the DXY. Finally, estimates of a currency’s fair value based on BEER fluctuate much more than those based on PPP. If the global growth pick-up allows foreign neutral rates to increase relative to the US over the coming 12 to 24 months, then the dollar’s BEER equilibrium will likely converge toward PPP, putting downward pressure on the USD. Risk 3: Credit Market Tremors A credit market selloff is not our base case, but it would be damaging to risk assets. A deterioration in credit quality would be the main culprit behind a widening in credit spreads. Our Corporate Health Monitor already shows that the credit quality of US firms is worsening (Chart I-16). Moreover, the return on capital of the US corporate sector is rapidly deteriorating. Accentuating these risks, US profit margins have begun to decline because a tight labor market is exerting an upward pull on real unit labor costs (Chart I-17). Furthermore, the near-total disappearance of covenants in new corporate bond issuance increases the risks to lenders and will likely depress recovery rates when a default wave emerges. Chart I-16Deteriorating Fundamentals For US Corporates Chart I-17A Tight Labor Market Is Biting Into Margins     Widening credit spreads would signal a darkening economic outlook. Historically, wider spreads have been an excellent leading indicator of recessions (Chart I-18). Wider spreads have a reflexive relationship with the economy: they reflect anticipation of rising defaults by investors, but they also represent a price-based measure of lenders’ willingness to extend credit. Therefore, wider spreads force open the underlying cracks in the economy by depriving funds to weak borrowers. The resulting deterioration in capex and hiring would prompt a decline in consumer confidence and spending, ultimately leading to a recession. Chart I-18Widening Spreads Foreshadow Recessions Chart I-19Who Is Buying Stocks? Businesses! US equities may prove to be even more sensitive to the health of the credit market than in previous cycles. The marginal buyers of US equities have been US firms, which have engaged in equity retirements totaling $16.5 trillion since 2010. Since that date, pension plans, foreigners and households have sold a total of $7.7 trillion in US equities (Chart I-19). Both internally generated cash flows and borrowings have allowed for a decline in the equity portion of funding among US firms. Therefore, a weak credit market would hurt equities because a recession would depress firms’ free cash flows and hamper the capacity of firms to buy back their shares. Finally, the tendency of US firms to borrow to buy back their shares means that newly issued debt has not been matched by as much asset growth as in previous cycles. Therefore, borrowing is not backed by the same degree of collateral as in past cycles. If the credit market seizes up, then default and recovery rates will suffer even more than suggested by our corporate health monitor. The VIX will blow up and equities could suffer. Higher US inflation is potentially the most important downside risk for next year. While a widening in credit spreads would have a profound impact on stocks, it is unlikely to materialize when the Fed conducts a very accommodative monetary policy and global growth recovers. Risk 4: Higher Inflation Chart I-20The US Labor Market Is Tight Higher US inflation is potentially the most important downside risk for next year as it would catalyze the aforementioned dangers. Inflation could surprise to the upside because the labor market is tight. At 3.5%, the unemployment rate is well below equilibrium estimates that range between 4.1% and 4.6%. Small firms are increasingly citing their inability to find qualified labor as the biggest constraint to expand production. In the Conference Board Consumer Confidence survey, the number of households reporting that jobs are easily procured is near a record high relative to those preoccupied by poor job prospects. Finally, the voluntary quit rate is at 2.3%, a near record high (Chart I-20). Core PCE remains at only 1.6% year-on-year, but investors should recall the experience of the late 1960s. Through the 1960s, the labor market was tight, yet core inflation remained between 1% and 2%. However, in 1966, inflation suddenly accelerated to 4% before peaking near 7% in 1970. Some inflation dynamics warrant close monitoring. The three-month annualized rate of service inflation excluding rent of shelter has already surged to 4.5% and the same metric for medical care inflation stands at 5.9%. A continued tightening in the labor market could solidify a broadening of these trends because a rising employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers points toward stronger salaries and ultimately higher domestic demand (Chart I-21). A very weak dollar would also allow this scenario to develop. Chart I-21Household Income Growth Will Accelerate A sudden flare in inflation would prompt an abrupt tightening in liquidity conditions that would be lethal for the economy. An out of the blue surge in CPI would likely cause a swift reassessment of inflation expectations by households and investors. Under these circumstances, the Fed could tighten monetary policy much faster than we currently envision. If interest rate markets are forced to price in a prompt removal of monetary accommodation, Treasury yields could easily spike above 3.5% by year end, which would hurt both the economy and the expensive equity market. If realized inflation turns out weaker than we expect in 2020, then central banks will maintain accommodative policies beyond next year. For now, this scenario remains a tail risk because the recent economic slowdown will probably continue to act as a dampener on US inflation in the first half of the year. Additionally, we do not expect the USD to collapse by 40% and fan inflation and inflation expectations, as occurred from 1985 to 1987. Instead, inflation expectations are much better anchored than they were in either the 1960s or 1980s, decreasing the risk that the Fed will suddenly have to tighten policy. Risk 5: Weaker-Than-Expected Inflation Chart I-22An Aggressive BoJ Did Not Achieve Inflation The last risk is paradoxical, but it is the one with the highest probability. It is paradoxical because it involves greater upside for stocks next year than we currently anticipate, but at the expense of a much deeper bear market in the future. The labor market may be tight, but Japan’s experience cautions us against extrapolating that inflation is necessarily around the corner. In Japan, the unemployment rate has been below 3.5% since 2014 and minimal domestically generated inflation has emerged. Inflation excluding food and energy remains at a paltry 0.7% year-on-year, even as the Bank of Japan has kept the policy rate at -0.1% and expanded its balance sheet from 20% of GDP in 2008 to 102% today (Chart I-22). If realized inflation turns out weaker than we expect in 2020, then central banks will maintain accommodative policies beyond next year. Central banks are currently toying with their inflation targets, discussing allowing inflation overshoots and displaying deep paranoia in the face of deflation. By weighing on inflation expectations, low realized inflation would nail policy rates around the world at currently depressed levels or even lower. Chart I-23Bubbles Destroy Long-Term Return On Capital In this context, bond yields would have even more limited upside than we envision and risk assets could experience higher multiples than today. In other words, we would have a perfect scenario for another stock market bubble. Vulnerability would escalate as valuations balloon and the perceived risk of monetary tightening dissipates from both investors’ and economic agents’ minds. Elevated asset valuations portend lower long-term expected returns (Chart I-23) and a larger share of the capital stock would become misallocated. Ultimately, the stimulative impact of such a bubble would create its own inflationary pressures. Consumers and companies would accumulate more debt and cyclical spending would rise (Chart I-24). In the end, the Fed would raise rates more aggressively, but the economy would be more vulnerable to those higher rates. Chart I-24Higher Cyclical Spending Creates Vulnerabilities Therefore, we would see a larger recession and, because assets are more expensive, a greater decline in prices. This would be extremely destabilizing for the global economy, potentially much more so than if a recession were to emerge today. Moreover, since the resulting slump would be yet another balance-sheet recession, it would likely entail a lack of capacity by central banks to reflate their economies. Conclusion The scenarios above are all risks to our benign view for 2020. The first four represent downside threats for assets next year, but the last one (weaker-than-expected inflation) entails upside potential to our forecast next year with significantly more painful results down the line. These risks are important to consider when protecting our portfolio, which has a pro-cyclical bias. It is overweight stocks, underweight bonds, and favors cyclical equities as well as foreign bourses at the expense of the US. BCA’s Global Asset Allocation service recently published an article on safe havens, which studied the profile of risk assets under various circumstances.4 Treasurys normally are the best safe haven, however, at current levels of yields, this benefit will be small compared with previous cycles. Instead, we favor an overweight position in cash, TIPs and gold. The best defense against short-term gyrations is to think about long-term strategic asset allocation. In this regard, this month’s Special Report – co-authored with BCA’s Equity, Geopolitical and Foreign Exchange Strategists, and Marko Papic, Chief Strategist at Clocktower Group – discusses our top sector calls for the upcoming decade. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst December 20, 2019 Next Report: January 30, 2020   II. Top US Sector Investment Ideas For The Next Decade Every decade a dominant theme captures investors’ imaginations and morphs into a bubble. Massive speculation typically propels the relevant asset class into the stratosphere as investors extrapolate the good times far into the future and go on a buying frenzy. Chart II-1 shows previous manic markets starting with the Nifty Fifty, gold bullion, the Nikkei 225, the NASDAQ 100, crude oil and most recently the FAANGs. Chart II-1Manias: An Historical Roadmap What will be the dominant themes of the next decade? How should investors capitalize on some of these big trends? The purpose of this Special Report is to identify and provoke a healthy debate on the prevailing investment themes for the 2020s and to speculate on what the key US sector beneficiaries and likely losers may be. Theme #1: De-Globalization Picks Up Steam The first investment theme for the upcoming decade is the “apex of globalization” or “de-globalization”. We have written about this theme extensively at BCA Research and it is the mega-theme of our sister Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) service. Odds are high that countries will continue looking inward as the US adopts a more aggressive trade policy, China’s trend growth slows, and US-China strategic tensions intensify. The small cap preference is a secular view with a time horizon that spans the next decade. Chart II-2 shows that we are at the conclusion of a period of tranquility. Pax Americana underpinned globalization as much as Pax Britannica before it. The US is in a relative decline after decades of geopolitical stability allowed countries like China to rise to “great power” status and rivals like Russia to recover from the chaos of the 1990s. Chart II-2De-globalization Has Commenced De-globalization has become the consensus since the election of Donald Trump. But Trump is not the prophet of de-globalization; he is its acolyte. Globalization is ending because of structural factors, not cyclical ones. Three factors stand at the center of this assessment, outlined in our 2014 Special Report, “The Apex Of Globalization – All Downhill From Here”: multipolarity, populism and protectionism. Events have since confirmed this view. One final long-term playable investment idea from the apex of globalization is a structural bull market in defense stocks. The three pillars of globalization are the free movement of goods, capital, and people across national borders. We expect to see marginally less of each in the future. Investment Implication #1: Profit Margin Peak The most profound and provocative investment implication from de-globalization is that SPX profit margins have peaked and will likely come under intense pressure, especially for US conglomerates that – on a relative basis to international peers – most enthusiastically embraced globalization. Chart II-3 shows reconstructed S&P 500 profits and sales data back to the late-1920s. Historically, corporate profit margins and globalization (depicted as global trade as a percentage of GDP) have been positively correlated. Chart II-3Profit Margin Trouble As countries are more outward looking, trade flourishes and openness to trade allows the free flow of capital to take advantage of profit-maximizing projects. Following the Great Recession and similar to the Great Depression, trade has suffered and trade barriers have risen. The Sino-American trade war has accelerated the inward movement of countries, including Korea and Japan, and has had negative knock-on effects on trade as evidenced by the now two-year old global growth deceleration. China’s response to President Trump’s election was to redouble its pursuit of economic self-sufficiency, which meant a crackdown on corporate debt and a fiscal boost to household consumption. Trump’s tariffs then damaged sentiment and trade between the two countries. Any deal reached prior to the 2020 US election will remain in doubt among global investors. The longer the trade war remains unresolved, the deeper the cracks will be in the foundations of the global trading system. We are especially worried for the S&P interactive media & services index that includes GOOGL and FB. Such a backdrop is negative for profit margins, as inward looking countries prevent capital from being allocated most efficiently. Moreover, the uprooting of supply chains due to the trade war hurts margins and the redeployment of equipment in different jurisdictions will do the same at a time when final demand is suffering a setback. In addition, rising profit margins are synonymous with wealth accruing to the top 1% of US families and vice versa. This relationship dates back to the late-1920s, as far back as our dataset goes. Using Piketty and Saez data, which exclude capital gains, it is clear that profit margin expansion exacerbates income inequality (top panel, Chart II-4). Chart II-4Heightened Risk Of Wealth Re-distribution Expanding margins lead to higher profits. Because families at the top of the income distribution are often business owners, income disparities are the widest when margins are in overshoot territory. Eventually this income chasm comes to a head and generates political discontent. Populism has emerged on both the right and left wings of the US political spectrum – and since the rise of Trump, even Republicans complain about inequality and the excesses of “corporate welfare” and laissez-faire capitalism. Because inequality is extreme – relative to America’s developed peers – and political forces are mobilizing against it, the probability of wealth re-distribution is rising in the coming decades (middle panel, Chart II-4). Labor’s share of national income has nowhere to go but higher in coming years and that is negative for profit margins, ceteris paribus (bottom panel, Chart II-4). Buy or add software stock exposure on any weakness with a 10-year investment time horizon. Drilling beneath the surface, the three secular US equity sector/factor implications of the apex of globalization paradigm shift are: prefer small caps over large caps prefer value over growth overweight the pure-play BCA Defense Index Investment Implication #2: Small Is Beautiful Chart II-5It's A Small World After All While a small cap bias is contrary to the cyclical US Equity Strategy view of preferring large caps to small caps, the issue is timing: the small cap preference is a secular view with a time horizon that spans the next decade. The small versus large cap share price ratio’s ebbs and flows persist over long cycles. Small caps outshined large caps uninterruptedly from 1999 to 2010. Since then large caps have had the upper hand (Chart II-5). Were the apex of globalization theme to gain traction in the 2020s, small caps should reclaim the lead from large caps, especially in the wake of the next US recession. Similar to the death of the global banking model, companies with global footprints will suffer the most, especially compared with domestically focused outfits. One way to explore this theme is via domestic versus global sector preference. But a more investable way to position for this sea change, is to buy small caps (or microcaps) at the expense of large caps (or mega caps). Small caps are traditionally domestically geared compared with large caps that have significantly more foreign sales exposure. The closest ETF ticker symbols resembling this trade is long IWM:US/short SPY:US. Investment Implication #3: Buy Value At The Expense Of Growth Similar to the size bias, the style bias also moves in secular ways. Value outperformed growth from the dot com bust until the GFC. Since then growth has crushed value, even temporarily breaking below the year 2000 relative trough. This breakneck pace of appreciation for growth stocks is clearly unsustainable and offers long-term oriented investors a compelling entry point near two standard deviations below the historical mean (Chart II-6). Chart II-6Value Has The Upper Hand Versus Growth Financials populate value indexes, a similarity with small cap outfits. Traditionally, financials are a domestically focused sector with export exposure registering at half of the S&P’s average 40% level of internationally sourced revenues. On the flip side, tech stocks sit atop the growth table and they garner 60% of their revenue from abroad. This value over growth style preference will pay handsome dividends if the de-globalization theme becomes more mainstream as countries become more hawkish on trade and the Sino-American war continues to erect barriers to trade that took decades to lift. We have created a basket of ten stocks that we think will be driven over the long term by the demographic rise of the Millennial. The caveat? President Trump's recent short-term deal with China could set back the de-globalization theme. But our geopolitical strategists do not anticipate it to be a durable deal, and they also expect the trade war to resume in some way, shape or form in 2021-22, regardless of the outcome of the US election. The closest ETF ticker symbols resembling this trade is long IVE:US/short IVW:US. Investment Implication #4: Defense Fortress Chart II-7Stick With Pure-play Defense Stocks One final long-term playable investment idea from the apex of globalization is a structural bull market in defense stocks (Chart II-7). The US Equity Sector service's October 2016 “Brothers In Arms” Special Report drew parallels with the late nineteenth century period of European rearmament, and the American and Soviet arms race of the 1960s.5 These movements were greatly beneficial to the aerospace and defense industry. Currently, the move by several countries to adopt more independent foreign policies, i.e. to move away from collaboration and cooperation toward isolationism and self-sufficiency, entails an accompanying arms race. Table II-1 China’s challenge to the regional political status quo motivates a boost to defense spending globally. In fact, SIPRI data on global military spending by 2030 (Table II-1) increases our conviction that this trade will succeed on a five-to-ten year horizon. Beyond the global arms race, two additional forces are at work underpinning pure-play defense contractors. A global space race with China, India and the US wanting to have manned missions to the moon, and the rise of global cybersecurity breaches. Defense companies are levered to both of these secular forces and should be prime sales and profit beneficiaries of rising space budgets and increasing cybersecurity combat budgets. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the pure-play BCA defense index are: LMT, RTN, NOC, GD, HII, AJRD, BWXT, CW, MRCY. Theme #2: Tech Sector Regulation, US Enacts Privacy Laws The second long-term geopolitical theme that we are exploring is the regulatory or “stroke of pen” risk that is rising on FAANG stocks – Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Google. These companies were this decade’s undisputed stock market winners. The US anti-trust regulatory framework was designed to curb broad anti-competitive actions of trusts. As Lina Khan discusses in her seminal article, these actions “include not only cost but also product quality, variety, and innovation.” However, through subsequent regulatory evolution, the Chicago School has focused the US anti-trust process on consumer welfare and prices. If President Reagan and the courts could change how anti-trust laws were administered in the 1980s, so too can future administrations and courts. Today the US Congress, on both sides of the aisle, is looking into regulatory tightening, while the judicial system will take longer to change its approach. Moreover, the impetus for tougher anti-trust policy is here. It comes from a long period of slow growth, income inequality, and economic volatility – such as in the 1870s-80s. This was certainly the case for Standard Oil in 1911, which became a nation-wide boogeyman despite most of its transgressions occurring in the farm belt states. Today, income inequality is a prominent political theme and source of consumer discontent. A narrative is emerging – which will be super-charged during the next recession – that growth has been unequally distributed between the old economy and the twenty-first century technology leaders. While there are a few ESG related ETFs, we would rather explore this theme’s investment implications of sectors to avoid in the coming decade. With regard to privacy, the news is equally grim for large tech outfits. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force on May 2018, imposes compliance burdens on any company handling user data. In the US, California has signed its own version of the law – the Consumer Privacy Act – which will go into effect in January 2020. These laws give consumers the right to know what information companies are collecting about them and who that data is shared with. They also allow consumers to ask technology companies to delete their data or not to sell it. While tech companies are likely to fight the new California law, and the US court system is a source of uncertainty, we believe the writing is on the wall. The EU is by some measures the largest consumer market on the planet. California is certainly the largest US market. It is unlikely that the momentum behind consumer protection will change, especially with the EU and California taking the lead. The odds of a federal privacy law, following in the footsteps of the Consumer Privacy Act, are also rising. Investment Implication #5: Shun Interactive Media & Services Stocks These risks introduce a severe overhang for FAANG stocks. We are especially worried for the S&P interactive media & services index that includes GOOGL and FB. Chart II-8Regulation Will Squeeze Tech Margins Tack on the threat of federal regulation and this represents another major headwind for profits and margins that are extremely elevated for these near monopolies. Given that advertising revenue is crucial to the business model of social media companies (GOOGL and FB included), a significant uptick in privacy regulation will likely hurt their bottom line. With regard to profit margins, tech stocks in general command a profit margin twice as high as the SPX. Specifically, FB and GOOGL enjoy margins that are 500 basis points higher than the broad tech sector (Chart II-8)! This is unsustainable and they will likely serve as easy prey for policymakers. Our view does not necessarily call for breaking up these monopolies. The US will have to weigh the economic consequences of anti-trust policy in a context of multipolarity in which China’s national tech champions are emerging to compete with American companies for global market share. Nevertheless, increased regulation is inevitable and some forced sales of crown jewel assets may take place. Moreover, the threat of a breakup will lurk in the background, creating uncertainty until key legislative and judicial battles have already been fought. That will take years. Finally, we doubt the tech sector will be left alone to “self-regulate” its incumbents and negotiate a price on consumers’ privacy. More likely, a new privacy law will loom, serving as a negative catalyst for profit growth. Uncertainty will weigh on the S&P interactive media & services relative performance. The ticker symbols to short/underweight the S&P interactive media & services index are an equally weighted basket of GOOGL and FB (they command a 98% market cap weight in the index). Theme #3: SaaS, Artificial Intelligence, Augmented Reality And Autonomous Driving Are Not Fads The third big theme that will even outlive the upcoming decade is the proliferation of software as a service (SaaS). The move to cloud computing and SaaS, the wider adoption of artificial intelligence, machine learning, autonomous driving and augmented reality are not fads, but enjoy a secular growth profile. In the grander scheme of things today’s world is surrounded by software. Millions of lines of code go even into gasoline powered automobiles, let alone electric vehicles. Autonomous driving is synonymous with software, the Internet of Things (IoT) needs software, the space race depends on software, modern manufacturing and software are closely intertwined, phone calls for quite some time have been a software solution, and the list goes on and on. This tidal effect is hard to reverse and is already embedded in workflows across industries. Opportunities to penetrate health care and financial services more deeply remain unexplored and it is difficult to envision another competing industry unseating “king software”. These secular trends are not only productivity enhancing, but will also most likely prove recession-proof. When growth is scarce investors flock to any source of growth they can come by and we are foreseeing that when the next recession arrives, investors will likely seek shelter in pure play SaaS firms. Investment Implication #6: Software Is Eating The World Chart II-9Software Is Eating The World Buying software stocks for the long haul seems like a bulletproof investment idea. But the recent stellar performance of software stocks has moved valuations to overshoot territory. Our recommended strategy is to buy or add software stock exposure on any weakness with a 10-year investment time horizon. All of these secular trends have pushed capital outlays on software into a structural uptrend. Software related capex is not only garnering a larger slice of the tech spending budgets but also of the overall capex pie. If it were not for software capex, the contraction in non-residential investment in recent quarters would have been more severe (Chart II-9). Private sector software capex is near all-time highs as a share of total outlays. Government investment in software is also reaccelerating at the fastest pace since the tech bubble. When productivity gains are anemic, both the business and government sectors resort to software upgrades in order to boost productivity. Cyber security is another more recent source of software related demand as governments around the globe are taking such risks extremely seriously (bottom panel, Chart II-9). Given this upbeat demand backdrop and ongoing equity retirement, software stocks are primed to grow into their pricey valuations. Finally, this long-term trade will also serve as a hedge to the short/underweight position we recommend in the S&P interactive media & services index. The closest ETF ticker symbol resembling the S&P software index is IGV:US. Theme #4: Millennials Already Are The Largest Cohort And Will Dominate Spending The fourth long-term theme we anticipate to gain traction in the 2020s is the demographic rise of the Millennial generation. Much has been made of preparing for the arrival of the Millennial generation, accompanied by well-worn stereotypes of general "failure to launch" as they reach adulthood. However, "arrival" is a misnomer as this age cohort is already the largest and "failure" is simply untrue. According to the US Census Bureau, Millennials are the US’s largest living generation. Millennials (or Echo Boomers) defined as people aged 18 to 37 (born 1982 to 2000), now number more than 80mn and represent more than one quarter of the US’s population. Baby Boomers (born 1946 to 1964) number about 75mn. Stealthily becoming the largest age group in the US over the last few years, Millennials per-year-birth-rate peaked at 4.3mn in 1990. Surprisingly, the pace matched that of the post-war Baby Boom peak-per-year-birth-rate in 1957 - the per-year average over the period was higher for the Baby Boomers (Chart II-10). Chart II-10Millennials Are The Largest Cohort This gap is now set to grow rapidly as the death rate of Baby Boomers accelerates. What is more, the largest one-year age cohort is only 25 years old, thus, Millennials will be the dominant generation for many years. It is unclear how these “kids” will impact the market as they become the most important consumers, borrowers and investors, but make no mistake: this is a seismic shift in economic power and it is here to stay. The Echo Boom is a big, generational demographic wave. A difficult and painful delay has not tempered its looming importance. Finally, this wave of echo-boomers is educated, relatively unburdened by debt (please see BOX in the June 11, 2018 Special Report on demystifying the student debt load as it pertains to Millennials), and as they inevitably “grow up”, form new households and have kids. They will borrow, spend, earn, but not necessarily save and invest to the same extent as the Boomers. And this will be an important long-term theme going forward. Near term, we might already be seeing signs of their arrival and firms have begun to pivot accordingly. Investment Implication #7: Buy The BCA Millennials Equity Basket Millennials will boost consumption spending in a number of different ways. The relatively unburdened Millennial cohort will be entering prime home acquisition age soon and this should underpin the long-term prospects of the US housing market and related industries. Furthermore, Millennials consume differently from their parents; social media, online shopping and smart phones are not the consumption categories of the Baby Boomers. With this in mind, we have created a basket of ten stocks that we think will be driven over the long term by the demographic rise of the Millennial. We note that these stocks are heavily weighted to the technology and consumer discretionary sectors, which is logical as Millennial consumption habits tend to be discretionary focused and technology-based. Beginning with consumer discretionary, we are highlighting AMZN, NFLX and SPOT as core holdings in our Millennials basket. AMZN’s heft dwarfs consumer discretionary indexes but it could fall in several categories; the acquisition of Whole Foods makes it a Millennials-focused consumer staples retailer and its cloud computing web services segment is a tech leader. NFLX and SPOT represent the means by which Millennials consume media, by streaming movies and music over the internet. The idea of owning physical media is rapidly becoming an anachronism. The home ownership theme noted in this report leads us to add HD and LEN to the basket. Millennials are “doers” and are set to be the dominant DIYers in the next few years, making HD a logical choice. LEN, as the nation’s largest home builder, should benefit from the Millennials coming of age into home buyers. We are also adding TSLA to our basket as a lone clean tech-oriented equity. TSLA capitalizes on the increasing shift to clean energy of Millennials (the key reason why no traditional energy companies have a spot in our basket). Chart II-11Buy BCA's Millennial Equity Basket The technology stocks in our Millennials basket are AAPL, UBER (which replaces FB as of today) and MSFT, together representing more than 9% of the total value of the S&P 500. AAPL’s inclusion in the list is predictable as the leading domestic purveyor of devices on which Millennials consume media content. FB is a predictable holding, with more than half of all Americans being monthly active users, dominated by the Millennial cohort. It has served our basket well since inception, but today we are compelled to remove it and replace it with UBER. UBER is a Millennial favorite and the epitome of the sharing economy. In reality UBER is a logistics company and while it is losing money, it is eerily reminiscent of AMZN in its early days. Maybe UBER will dominate all means of transportation and its ease of use will propel it to a mega cap in the coming decade. Our inclusion of MSFT is based on its leadership in cloud computing, a rapidly growing industry. We expect the connectivity and mobile computing demands of Millennials will accelerate. The last stock we are adding to our basket is also the only financial services equity. Though avid consumers, Millennials have shown an aversion to cash, preferring card payment systems, including both debit and credit-based. Accordingly, we are adding the leader in both of these, V, to our Millennials basket (Chart II-11). Investors seeking long-term exposure to stocks lifted by the supremacy of the Millennial generation should own our Millennial basket (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). We would not hesitate to add other sharing economy stocks, including Airbnb, to this basket should they become investable in the near future. Theme #5: ESG Becomes Mainstream Investors are increasingly looking at allocating assets based on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations, and this mini-theme has the potential to become a big trend in the 2020s. There are a number of factors that underpin ESG investing. First, Millennials are climate conscious and given that they already are the largest cohort in the US they will not only dominate spending, but also influence election results. Moreover, via social media Millennials can sway public opinion and participate in the ESG conversation. Second, ECB President Christine Lagarde recent speech to the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament is a must read.6 If the ECB were to explicitly focus on climate change policy as part of its monetary policy operations then this is a game changer. Green investment financing including “green bonds” could become mainstream. Keep in mind that as reported in the FT, “the European Parliament has declared a climate emergency; the new European Commission (EC) has taken office on a promise of an imminent “green new deal”, and Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has vowed to accelerate emissions cuts.” Last week, the EC released “The European Green Deal” with a pretty aggressive time table. The EC president said “The green deal is Europe’s man on the moon moment” and presented 50 policies slated to get rolled by 2022 to meet revamped climate goals. The implication is that once ESG takes center stage at a number of these institutions, it will be easier to become mainstream and propagate the world over. Third, large institutional investors are starting to adopt an ESG mindset, especially pension plans. These investors with trillions of dollars at their disposal can not only disfavor fossil fuel investment, but also undertake investments in “green projects” via private and public equity markets. Banks are also moving in the “greening of finance” direction and given that they are the pipelines of the global plumbing system, swift adoption will go a long way in taking ESG mainstream. Finally, the electric vehicle (EV) proliferation is another key driver on how the ESG theme will play out in the 2020s. As a reminder, in the US 50% of all energy consumption is gasoline related linked to automobiles. While battery technology still has limitations, EV is no longer a fad as the German and Japanese automakers are starting to make inroads on TSLA. These car manufacturers do not want to be left out, especially if this shift toward EV becomes mainstream in the 2020s. The Chinese are not far behind on the EV manufacturing front, however government policy can really become a game changer. If a number of countries and/or California mandate a large share of all new vehicles sold be EV, then the investment implications will be massive. Investment Implication #8: Avoid Fossil Fuels, Gambling, Alcohol And Tobacco… While there are a few ESG related ETFs, we would rather explore this theme’s investment implications of sectors to avoid in the coming decade. We are believers that ESG criteria will continue to gain in importance in institutional investment management decisions. Accordingly, we would tend to avoid ‘sin stocks’, including gambling, tobacco and alcohol; demand for their services is unlikely to decline but investment weightings should mean that share prices will underperform. Further, we think a clean energy shift will mean energy stocks will likely continue to be long-term underperformers (Chart II-12). Final Thoughts On The US Dollar In this report, we tried to focus on the upcoming decade’s big themes that we expect to play out, and centered our recommendations on US equities/sectors. We do not want to neglect some macroeconomic variables that tend to mean revert over time. Specifically, the US dollar, interest rates and most importantly US indebtedness, will also be key drivers of investment theses in the 2020s. Currently, debt is rising faster than nominal GDP growth with the government and non-financial business debt-to-GDP profiles on an unsustainable path (second panel, Chart II-13). Chart II-12Areas To Avoid As ESG Becomes Mainstream Chart II-13Unsustainable Debt Profiles   Granted, the saving grace has been generationally low interest rates as the debt service ratios have fallen (top panel, Chart II-13). However, if the four decade bull market in Treasurys is over, or may end definitively with the next US recession sometime in the early 2020s, then rising interest rates are the only mechanism to concentrate CEOs’ and politicians’ minds. On the dollar front, Chart II-14 highlights the ebbs and flows of the trade-weighted US dollar since it floated in the early-1970s. The DXY index has moved in six-to-ten year bull and bear markets. The most recent trough was during the depths of the Great Recession, while the (tentative?) peak was in late-2016. If history repeats, eventually the dollar will mean revert lower in the 2020s, especially given the fiscal profligacy of the current administration that may continue into 2024, assuming President Trump gets re-elected next November. Chart II-14Greenback's Historical Ebbs And Flows The US dollar remains the reserve currency of the world today, but that exorbitant privilege is clearly fraying on the edges as the balance-of-payments dynamics are heading in the wrong direction. Over the next five years, the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the US budget deficit will swell to 4.8% of GDP. Assuming the current account deficit widens a bit then stabilizes (usually happens when global growth improves), this will pin the twin deficits at 8% of GDP. This assumes no recession, which would have the potential to swell the deficit even further. The US saw its twin deficits swell to almost 13% of GDP following the financial crisis, but the difference then was that in the wake of the commodity boom the dollar was cheap (and commodity currencies overvalued). The subsequent shale revolution also greatly cushioned the US trade deficit. Shale productivity remains robust and US output will continue to rise, but the low-hanging fruit has already been plucked. Chart II-15Twin Deficits Will Weigh On The US Dollar For one reason or another, foreign central banks are diversifying out of dollars. If due to the changing landscape in trade, this is set to continue. If it is an excuse to shy away from the rapidly rising US twin deficits, this will continue as well. In a nutshell, there has been hardly a time in recent history when the twin deficits in the US were rising and the dollar was in a secular uptrend (Chart II-15). Another dollar-negative force is its expensiveness. By rising 35% since its trough, the USD has sapped the competitiveness of the US manufacturing sector, which is accentuating the American trade deficit outside of the commodity sector. If the ESG trend ends up hurting oil prices, the US current account will follow the widening deficit in manufactured products. Moreover, the US is lagging Europe on the green revolution. Either the US will have to import green technologies, or the US government will have to provide more subsidies to the private sector. Either way, both of these dynamics will hurt the US current account deficit further. Historically, the currency market is the main vehicle to correct such imbalances. The apex of globalization will also hurt the greenback. In a world where all the markets are integrated, borrowers in EM nations often use the reserve currency to issue liabilities at a lower cost. This boosts the demand by EM central banks for US dollar reserves to protect domestic banking systems funded in USD. Moreover, some countries like China implement pegs (both official and unofficial) to the US dollar in order to maintain their competitiveness and export their production surpluses to the US. To do so they buy US assets. If the global economy becomes more fragmented and the Sino-US relationship continues to deteriorate structurally as we expect, then these sources of demand for the dollar will recede. Overlay the widening US current account deficit, and you have the perfect recipe for a depreciating trade-weighted US dollar. Finally, the US is likely to experience more inflation than the rest of the world following the next recession. The US economy has a smaller capital stock as a share of GDP than Europe or Japan, and American demographics are much more robust. This means that the neutral rate of interest is higher in the US than in other advanced economies. As a result, the Fed will have an easier time generating inflation by cutting real rates than both the ECB and the BoJ. Higher inflation will ultimately erode the purchasing power of the dollar and prove to be a structurally negative force for the USD.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist Marko Papic Chief Strategist, Clocktower Group Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   III. Indicators And Reference Charts With a breakthrough in trade talks and Fed officials changing their language to suggest that policy will remain accommodative until inflation meaningfully overshoots 2%, the S&P 500 decisively broke out. Because it eases global financial conditions and boosts the profit outlook, the recent breakdown in the dollar should fuel the equity rally. Tactically, the S&P 500 may have overshot the mark, but on a cyclical basis, stronger growth and an easy Fed will propel US and global stocks higher. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) remains cautious towards equities. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. However, our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the US and Japan continues to improve. In Europe, this indicator has finally hooked up. The WTP indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. This broad-based improvement therefore bodes well for equities. Moreover, the pickup in Europe suggests that European stocks are increasingly ripe to outperform their US counterparts. Global yields have turned higher but they remain at exceptionally stimulating levels. Moreover, money and liquidity growth remains very strong as global central banks have adopted strongly dovish slants. Additionally, a Fed that will allow inflation to overshoot before tightening policy is adding to this supportive monetary backdrop. As a result, our Monetary Indicator remains at extremely elevated levels. Furthermore, our Composite Technical Indicator is still flashing a buy signal. Finally, our BCA Composite Valuation index is suggesting that stocks are expensive, but not so much as to cancel out the supportive monetary and technical backdrop. As a result, our Speculation Indicator remains in the neutral zone. 10-year Treasurys yields are becoming slightly less expensive, however, they are no bargain. Moreover, our Composite Technical Indicator is quickly moving away from overbought territory but has yet to flash oversold conditions, indicating that yields are roughly half way through their move. The strengthening of the Commodity Index Advance/Decline line and higher natural resource prices further confirm the upside for yields. Therefore, the current setup argues for a below-benchmark duration in fixed-income portfolios. Small signs that global growth is bottoming, such as the stabilization in the global PMIs, the pick-up in the German ZEW and IFO surveys, or the acceleration in Singapore’s container throughput growth, point to a worsening outlook for the counter-cyclical US dollar. Moreover, the dollar trades at a large premium of 24% relative to its purchasing-power parity equilibrium. Additionally, our Composite Technical Indicator is quickly deteriorating after having formed a negative divergence with the Greenback’s level. Since the dollar is a momentum currency, this represents a dark omen for the USD. In fact, we continue to believe that a breakdown in the dollar will be the clearest signal that global growth is rebounding for good. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart II-16US Dollar And PPP Chart II-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart II-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart II-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart II-20Euro Technicals Chart II-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart II-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart II-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart II-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game," dated November 22, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "US Election 2020: Civil War Lite," dated November 22, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report "Riding The Wave: Momentum Strategies In Foreign Exchange Markets," dated December 8, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report "Safe Haven Review: A Guide To Portfolio Protection In The 2020s," dated October 29, 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see US Equity Strategy Special Report "Brothers In Arms," dated October 31, 2016, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 6 https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/09/04/sp090419-Opening-Statement-by-Christine-Lagarde-to-ECON-Committee-of-European-Parliament

Special Report

This is the final report of the year from BCA’s Global Fixed Income and US Bond Strategies. Our regular publication schedule will resume on January 7, 2020. We wish you a happy, healthy and prosperous new year.   Highlights Interest Rate Policy: The Fed’s next interest rate move will be a hike, but it probably won’t occur until 2021. It will not occur until either long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach our target band of 2.3%-2.5% or financial asset valuations reach extreme levels. We provide several indicators to monitor to assess the timing of the next Fed hike. Balance Sheet Policy: The era of balance sheet shrinkage is over. The Fed will continue to grow its balance sheet in 2020, and will also tweak regulations to make banks more indifferent between holding Treasury securities and reserves. Strategic Review: The exact form of any new policy strategy is uncertain, but we expect the Fed to make an announcement in mid-2020 that makes it clear that it will explicitly target above-2% inflation for some unspecified period of time in order to re-anchor inflation expectations and make up for past inflation misses. Feature Last week, both our Global Fixed Income Strategy and US Bond Strategy services published their key fixed income views for 2020.1  Those reports presented investment ideas that we think will be profitable next year, but only discussed Fed policy to the extent that it informs those views. This Special Report delves into exactly what we expect to see from the US Federal Reserve in 2020. Specifically, we consider what the Fed will do with its interest rate and balance sheet policies in 2020, and also what might result from the Fed’s ongoing strategic review. Interest Rate Policy The final FOMC meeting of 2019 took place last week, and we learned that the Fed’s reaction function underwent a significant dovish shift between the September and December meetings. Currently, only 4 FOMC participants expect to lift rates in 2020 while the remaining 13 expect the funds rate to stay in its present range between 1.5% and 1.75% (Chart 1). Back in September, 9 participants thought the fed funds rate would be above 1.75% by the end of 2020. Chart 1Fed Will Stay On Hold In 2020, Market Still Priced For Cuts The yield curve is still discounting a slight decline in the funds rate next year, and the Fed will of course deliver more rate cuts if economic growth deteriorates. However, given our positive global growth outlook for 2020, we think rate cuts are unlikely.2 Rather, we expect a flat fed funds rate next year followed by rate hikes in 2021. The Fed’s reaction function underwent a significant dovish shift between the September and December meetings.  If our economic view pans out, then getting a sense of what will be required for the Fed to lift rates is the most pressing monetary policy issue. On that front, we continue to believe that inflation expectations and financial conditions are the two most important factors to monitor.3  Recent remarks from Fed officials have only strengthened our conviction in that view. Inflation Expectations & The Fed’s Phillips Curve Model Last week, when Chair Powell was asked what it will take to lift rates again, he said that he wants to see “a significant move up in inflation that’s also persistent”. This scripted response reveals a lot about the Fed’s reaction function in 2020, and about the importance of inflation expectations. To see why, let’s consider the Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve, the typical model that the Fed uses to assess trends in inflation. An example of this sort of model, taken from a 2015 Janet Yellen speech, is presented in Box 1.4 Box 1The Fed's Inflation Model According to the Fed’s model, core inflation is determined by: (i) inflation expectations, (ii) resource utilization and (iii) relative import prices. But inflation expectations are especially important because they determine inflation’s long-run trend. As explained by former Chair Yellen: Chart 2The Importance Of Inflation Expectations … economic slack, changes in imported goods prices, and idiosyncratic shocks all cause core inflation to deviate from its longer-term trend that is ultimately determined by long-run inflation expectations. This is what Chair Powell means when he says he wants to see a “persistent” move up in inflation. He wants to make sure that inflation expectations return to levels that are consistent with the Fed’s target in order to re-anchor inflation’s long-run trend. The widespread consensus that the “Phillips Curve is flat” makes inflation expectations even more important in the minds of Fed policymakers. When people say that the “Phillips Curve is flat”, they mean that there is very little relationship between resource utilization and inflation. In other words, the coefficient b4 in Box 1 is very small. Logically, if the relationship between resource utilization and inflation is weak, then expectations become an even more important driver of core inflation. As Fed Vice Chair Richard Clarida recently said:5 A flatter Phillips Curve makes it all the more important that inflation expectations remain anchored at levels consistent with our 2 percent inflation objective. Simply put, the Fed needs to see a re-anchoring of inflation expectations before it lifts rates. Our sense is that this will be achieved when both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach a range between 2.3% and 2.5%. We are not yet close to those levels. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rates currently sit at 1.71% and 1.79%, respectively (Chart 2). Meanwhile, household survey measures from the University of Michigan and the New York Fed also show very low inflation expectations (Chart 2, bottom 2 panels). With all this in mind, the big question for monetary policy is how long will it take for inflation expectations to rise back to “well anchored” levels? Will it occur next year, or not until 2021? How Long Until Inflation (And Inflation Expectations) Return To Target? Chart 3High Inflation No Longer A Worry We have long held the view that inflation expectations adapt only slowly to changes in the actual inflation data.6 In other words, inflation expectations are low today because actual inflation has been consistently below the Fed’s target for much of the past decade. This makes it very difficult for people to believe that inflation will be high in the future. In fact, when asked what CPI inflation is likely to average over the next 10 years, most forecasters think it will be in a range between 2% and 2.5%, consistent with the Fed’s target.7 This is similar to what forecasters thought in 2004 when TIPS breakeven rates were well-anchored within our target band (Chart 3). The main difference between 2004 and today is that in 2004 a sizeable minority thought inflation might average above 2.5% over the next 10 years. Now, almost nobody expects a significant overshoot of the Fed’s inflation target, and a sizeable minority think inflation will undershoot. The lesson we take from these survey responses is that in order for TIPS breakeven inflation rates to reach our 2.3%-2.5% target, more people need to expect a significant overshoot of the Fed’s 2% inflation target. This will only happen if actual inflation rises to the Fed’s target, or above, and stays there for a significant period of time. Long enough to bring the fear of high inflation back to the forefront of investors’ minds. To further quantify this notion, our Adaptive Expectations Model of the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate pegs current fair value for the 10-year breakeven at 1.94% (Chart 4). The model’s fair value is primarily determined by the 10-year rate of change in core CPI, meaning that a prolonged period of year-over-year core inflation near (or above) the Fed’s target will be required before our model’s fair value pushes above 2.3%. So how long will it take before core inflation is sustainably running at, or above, the Fed’s target? While we expect core inflation to continue along its slow upward trend. It probably won’t be high enough to push long-maturity TIPS breakevens into our target range until 2021, or late-2020 at the earliest. Chart 4Adaptive Expectations Model Chart 5Trimmed Means Are Rising... At present, core PCE inflation is running at a year-over-year rate of 1.59%, considerably below the Fed’s 2% target. One point in favor of rising core inflation is that trimmed mean price measures are accelerating more quickly than core measures (Chart 5). This will tend to drag core inflation higher over time. However, there is still a long way to go before core inflation reaches the Fed’s target and many leading inflation indicators have moderated this year (Chart 6):   Chart 6...But Many Headwinds Remain Unit labor cost growth rebounded in the past few quarters, but has yet to break out of its post-crisis range (Chart 6, top panel). The New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge rolled over sharply in 2019 (Chart 6, panel 2). NFIB surveys of planned and reported price increases have also turned down (Chart 6, bottom 2 panels). Considering the main components of core inflation, we find that the strong month-over-month core inflation prints of June, July and August were driven mostly by accelerating goods prices (Chart 7). Goods inflation has reversed course since then, and should continue to be a drag on core inflation going forward. This is because core goods inflation follows import price inflation with a long lag, and some import price deflation is already baked in (Chart 8). Chart 7CPI Components Chart 8Expect Some Import Price Deflation On the flipside, we have also seen core services inflation (excluding shelter and medical care) inflect higher during the past six months (Chart 7, panel 4). Continued strength in this component is essential if overall core inflation is going to move up. Shelter is the largest component of core inflation and we expect it to trend sideways as we head into 2020. The rental vacancy rate has flattened off at a low level, and the Apartment Market Tightness Index is just barely in net tightening territory (Chart 9). Neither indicator is sending a strong signal in either direction. Chart 9Shelter Inflation Trending Sideways All in all, we see core inflation and TIPS breakeven rates moving slowly higher in 2020. But it will take some time before inflation is strong enough to push long-maturity breakeven rates into our target range of 2.3%-2.5%. Given the importance placed on re-anchoring inflation expectations, the Fed won’t hike rates again until our TIPS breakeven target is met. We don’t expect this to occur until 2021, or late-2020 at the earliest. The Financial Conditions Wildcard Chart 10The Importance Of Financial Conditions We mentioned above that the Fed’s interest rate policy will be determined by two factors: inflation expectations and financial conditions. In a perfect world, financial market valuations will stay at reasonable levels and inflation expectations will determine the timing of the next Fed rate hike. However, we must also consider what is likely to happen if it takes a very long time for inflation expectations to reach our target. The longer it takes, the longer that monetary conditions will be accommodative, and any extended period of easy money could lead to an asset bubble. Eventually, if valuations look bubbly enough, there may be a case for the Fed to sacrifice a bit on its inflation target and attempt to deflate a potentially de-stabilizing bubble in financial markets. This is not just a hypothetical situation. As Governor Lael Brainard remarked last December:8 The last several times resource utilization approached levels similar to today, signs of overheating showed up in financial-sector imbalances rather than in accelerating inflation. With greater focus on financial stability than in the past, it is conceivable that we could eventually see Fed tightening to head off an asset bubble. But we are not close to such bubbly conditions yet (Chart 10). The Financial Conditions component of our Fed Monitor is close to neutral, and while corporate bond spreads are tighter than average, they are well above the lows seen in the mid-2000s. Meanwhile, the S&P 500’s forward multiple is not yet back to its early-2018 level, let alone the highs of the late 1990s (Chart 10, bottom panel). Bottom Line: The Fed’s next interest rate move will be a hike, but it probably won’t occur until 2021. It will not occur until either long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach our target band of 2.3%-2.5% or financial asset valuations reach extreme levels. Balance Sheet Policy 2019 was a tumultuous year for the Fed’s balance sheet policy. At the start of the year, the Fed was continuing the process of balance sheet shrinkage that started in October 2017. The goal was never to return the Fed’s balance sheet to its pre-crisis size. Policymakers had already decided that they would shift permanently to a floor system of monetary policy implementation. A floor system is one where the central bank supplies more reserves to the banking system than are demanded, pushing interest rates down toward a floor that is set by the Fed. In this case, the floor is the Fed’s overnight reverse repo facility (ON RRP). Using this facility, the Fed agrees to borrow any excess cash at the ON RRP rate in return for a security from the Fed’s balance sheet as collateral. To implement this policy correctly, the Fed’s balance sheet must remain large so that bank reserves are plentiful. The Fed thought that it was supplying more reserves than the banking system demanded, but banks found themselves hoarding liquidity for a few days in September. Everything was going smoothly until September when this strategy hit a snag. The Fed thought that it was supplying more reserves than the banking system demanded, but banks found themselves hoarding liquidity for a few days in September. The result was that the fed funds rate shot higher, and actually printed outside the Fed’s target band for one day (Chart 11).9 Chart 11The Fed Briefly Lost Control Of Rates In September Clearly, the Fed had actually not been supplying the banking system with more reserves than it wanted, otherwise overnight liquidity would have remained plentiful throughout September. Even more vexing is that surveys of primary dealers and market participants all showed that reserve supply was comfortably above demand (Chart 12), even though this turned out not to be the case. Chart 12The Fed Was Blindsided Though there are many questions that still need to be answered, the Fed quickly took action and intervened in the repo market to increase the daily reserve supply. It also re-started T-bill purchases at a rate of $60 billion per month, ending the period of balance sheet shrinkage. Then just last week, the Fed announced a program of term repo agreements that will increase overnight liquidity heading into the volatile year-end period. After all that, the Fed’s balance sheet is once again growing as we head into 2020. But there is much uncertainty about how the balance sheet will evolve during the next 12 months.  A Two-Pronged Strategy In 2020 the Fed will attack its balance sheet problems on two fronts. 1) Increase Reserve Supply First, it will purchase T-bills in order to increase the supply of reserves. Chart 13 shows how the Fed’s securities holdings and bank reserves will evolve in the first half of 2020, assuming that the Fed buys $60 billion of T-bills per month. We also assume that maturing MBS roll over into Treasury securities and that currency in circulation grows at a rate of 5% per year. Table 1 gives a breakdown of what the Fed’s balance sheet looks like today and what it will look like at the end of June, according to our assumptions. Chart 13The Fed's Balance Sheet Over Time But increasing the reserve supply will be a bit more difficult than that. For one thing, Table 1 shows that the Treasury Department’s General Account at the Fed is expected to grow by another $106 billion. All else equal, this will drain $106 billion of reserve supply. The Treasury depleted its cash holdings down to $130 billion in August, as it took extraordinary measures to stay under the debt ceiling. But now that the debt ceiling has been suspended until July 2021, the Treasury has been re-building its cash stores, targeting a level of $410 billion. Table 1Fed’s Balance Sheet: Projections Second, Table 1 assumes that Fed repos stay flat at $213 billion. But if the Fed decides to extricate itself from the repo market in the first half of 2020 then, all else equal, reserve supply will shrink by $213 billion. So far the Fed has provided very little guidance about its future presence in the repo market, but we expect it to err on the side of caution. That is, the Fed will not completely unwind its repo operations until it is confident that reserve supply is comfortably above demand. What we can say for certain is that the Fed will try to increase the reserve supply in early-2020. Then, at some point during the year, it will decide that the reserve supply is high enough and it will shift to purchasing only enough securities to keep pace with growth in non-reserve liabilities, holding reserve supply flat. It is unknown when that shift will occur, but whenever it does, the Fed’s balance sheet will still be growing, just more slowly. We can say decisively that the era of balance sheet shrinkage is over. At some point in 2020 the Fed will probably also introduce a standing repo facility. This will act as the mirror image of the current ON RRP, providing a ceiling on interest rates. The facility will promise to supply overnight cash at a stated rate in return for Treasury collateral. If reserve supply is sufficiently high, then the standing repo facility is irrelevant. It would merely be a safety measure in case of periods like last September when reserve demand spiked. 2) Decrease Reserve Demand Other than increasing reserve supply, the Fed will also take steps in 2020 to reduce the amount of reserves demanded by the banking sector. It will do this by tweaking some banking regulations that possibly encouraged banks to hoard reserves in September. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio is the regulation that requires banks to hold enough high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to cover 30 days of cash outflows in a stressed scenario. Bank reserves and Treasury securities both count as HQLAs, as do other fixed income securities with a haircut. In theory, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio shouldn’t prevent banks from swapping reserves for Treasuries in the repo market. But banks also undergo frequent internal stress testing, in preparation for the Fed’s periodic stress tests, and those internal tests may place a premium on reserves over Treasuries. It is very likely that, in 2020, the Fed will take steps to make banks increasingly indifferent between holding reserves and Treasury securities. This should reduce overall reserve demand and make cash more freely available in the overnight repo market. Investment Implications With all that said, we place very little importance on the Fed’s balance sheet policy in terms of what it means for asset returns. Our longstanding view is that asset purchases were only an effective policy tool because they reinforced the Fed’s forward guidance about changes in the funds rate. In fact, any perceived correlation between changes in the size of the Fed’s balance sheet and financial asset prices is only because balance sheet policy was moving in the same direction as interest rate policy. That is, during the past few years, periods of Fed asset purchases have always coincided with easier interest rate policy and periods of balance sheet shrinkage have always coincided with tighter interest rate policy. It is the interest rate policy that determines movements in asset prices, not the balance sheet. Finally, in 2019, we witnessed a period when balance sheet policy diverged from interest rate policy and we were able to test our thesis. Between December 2018 and July 2019, the Fed was shrinking its balance sheet but also easing its forward rate guidance and preparing for rate cuts. Outstanding bank reserves fell by $124 billion, but the expected 12-month change in the fed funds rate fell from +11 bps to -88 bps. It is very likely that, in 2020, the Fed will take steps to make banks increasingly indifferent between holding reserves and Treasury securities. What happened during this period? Bond yields declined and the dollar depreciated (Chart 14). Meanwhile, risk asset prices shot higher (Chart 15). In other words, markets behaved as you would expect if the Fed were easing policy, clearly taking their cues from interest rate policy not the balance sheet. Chart 14Rates Policy Trumps Balance Sheet Part I Chart 15Rates Policy Trumps Balance Sheet Part II Bottom Line: The era of balance sheet shrinkage is over. The Fed will continue to grow its balance sheet in 2020, and will also tweak regulations to make banks more indifferent between holding Treasury securities and reserves. But more importantly, the Fed’s balance sheet policy is now completely de-linked from its interest rate policy. That being the case, investors should largely ignore trends in the Fed’s balance sheet and focus on interest rate policy as the main driver of asset returns. The Fed’s Strategic Review The Fed is currently undertaking a strategic review of its monetary policy strategy, tools and communications practices. Chair Powell has said that he expects the review to be completed by the middle of 2020, and it is likely that some important changes will be announced. According to the Fed, the review is taking place because “the US economy appears to have changed in ways that matter for the conduct of monetary policy.” Specifically, the Fed believes that the neutral fed funds rate – the rate consistent with stable inflation – is structurally lower. The Fed is concerned that this increases the risk of the fed funds rate being pinned at its effective lower bound (ELB), making it more difficult to consistently hit its inflation target. The review is about considering different strategies and tools that the Fed could use to more consistently hit its 2% inflation target in the future, but the 2% target itself is not up for discussion. The Fed has already decided that 2% inflation is most consistent with its price stability mandate. Policy Strategy Chart 16A Big Miss One thing that’s clear is that most Fed participants agree that some changes to policy strategy are necessary. There is widespread concern about the fact that the Fed has not hit its inflation target during the past decade. The Fed officially adopted a 2% target for PCE inflation in January 2012, but inflation has not come close to those levels since. Headline and core PCE have increased at average annual rates of only 1.3% and 1.6%, respectively, since 2012 (Chart 16). At the July and September FOMC meetings, the Fed discussed several different strategies that could make it easier to hit its inflation target. Most of the proposals fall into the category of “makeup strategies”, strategies where the Fed tries to make up for a period of below-2% inflation by targeting above-2% inflation for a stretch of time. In theory, most Fed members agree that such strategies make sense. From the September FOMC minutes:10 Because of the downside risk to inflation and employment associated with the ELB, most participants were open to the possibility that the dual-mandate objectives of maximum employment and stable prices could be best served by strategies that deliver inflation rates that over time are, on average, equal to the Committee’s longer-run objective of 2 percent. Promoting such outcomes may require aiming for inflation somewhat above 2 percent when the policy rate was away from the ELB, recognizing that inflation would tend to be lower than 2 percent when the policy rate was constrained by the ELB. The main problem with these sorts of makeup strategies is what Fed Governor Lael Brainard calls the time-inconsistency problem.11 For example, if inflation has been running well below – or above – target for a sustained period, when the time arrives to maintain inflation commensurately above – or below – 2 percent for the same amount of time, economic conditions will typically be inconsistent with implementing the promised action. In other words, when it comes time to deliver on its past promises, the Fed may not want to. But if it fails to deliver, it makes any future promises less impactful. Governor Brainard thinks that this problem can be mitigated by adopting a more flexible approach. That is, rather than following a strict rule that says that the Fed must aim for average inflation of 2 percent over a specific timeframe, it could simply opportunistically change its target inflation range based on the circumstances. She gives the following example: For instance, following five years when the public has observed inflation outcomes in the range of 1-1/2 to 2 percent, to avoid a decline in expectations, the Committee would target inflation outcomes in a range of, say, 2 to 2-1/2 percent for the subsequent five years to achieve inflation outcomes of 2 percent on average overall. We think it is very likely that something similar to Brainard’s plan will be announced when the review is completed in 2020. There is widespread consensus that the Fed should temporarily target an overshoot of its 2 percent inflation target to ensure that inflation expectations stay anchored near target levels. Opportunistically shifting the inflation target to 2%-2.5% on a temporary basis seems like the easiest way to communicate that goal. ELB Tools In addition to potential changes to policy strategy, the Fed has also been talking about potential policy tools that could be deployed the next time that interest rates reach the ELB. Policymakers took up this question in detail at the October FOMC meeting and generally agreed that the combination of forward guidance and asset purchases had been effective at delivering policy accommodation at the lower bound. Now that the committee is comfortable with these tools, we would expect them to be deployed very quickly the next time that the fed funds rate reaches zero. In all likelihood, if the funds rate reaches zero again, the Fed will quickly announce a round of asset purchases and pledge to keep rates on hold until some economic outcome – likely related to inflation – is met. The Fed also discussed the possibility of cutting rates into negative territory, but there is very little appetite for negative rates policy in the US. From the October FOMC minutes:12 All participants judged that negative interest rates currently did not appear to be an attractive monetary policy tool in the United States. Participants commented that there was limited scope to bring the policy rate into negative territory, that the evidence on the beneficial effects of negative interest rates abroad was mixed, and that it was unclear what effects negative rates might have on the willingness of financial intermediaries to lend and on the spending plans of households and businesses. If, during the next ELB phase, the combination of forward rate guidance and asset purchases does not appear to be working quickly enough, we think it’s most likely that the Fed will follow the Bank of Japan and simply extend these policies further out the yield curve. For example, the Fed would set a cap on some intermediate-maturity Treasury yield (say the 2-year yield), and pledge to buy as many securities as necessary to keep the yield below that cap. This potential tool was discussed at the October FOMC meeting, and it received a more favorable response than the negative rates policy. Results Of The Strategic Review The exact form of any new policy strategy is uncertain, but we expect the Fed to make an announcement in mid-2020 that makes it clear that it will explicitly target above-2% inflation for some unspecified period of time in order to re-anchor inflation expectations and make up for past inflation misses. This will make it even more important to use inflation expectations as our guide for detecting shifts in Fed policy, rather than the actual inflation data. In many ways, the Fed’s reaction function has already moved toward targeting expectations. The results of the 2020 strategic review will make that even more explicit. There is less urgency to announce any potential new tools for conducting policy at the ELB, and we do not expect much in that regard. Other than some ideas for further study.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: Delay Of Reckoning”, dated December 10, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com and US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 10, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For details on BCA’s economic outlook for 2020 please see The Bank Credit Analyst, “Outlook 2020: Heading Into The End Game”, dated November 22, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The New Battleground For Monetary Policy”, dated March 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4  https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 5  https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/clarida20190926a.htm 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 CPI inflation runs about 0.4%-0.5% above PCE inflation, so the Fed’s 2% PCE target translates to a 2.4%-2.5% target for CPI. 8  https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20181207a.htm 9 This September episode is discussed in detail in the US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “What’s Up In US Money Markets?”, dated September 24, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190918.htm 11 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20191126a.htm 12 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20191030.pdf