Singapore

While 2024 will see various election risks, global geopolitical uncertainty is driven by the US election and its struggle with Russia, China, and Iran. The stock market can manage local domestic political risk. But it will correct upon a major outbreak of geopolitical uncertainty.

With easing inflation, Singapore’s domestic liquidity is set to improve meaningfully. Put this bourse on an upgrade watch list. A new trade: go overweight Singapore domestic bonds relative to EM.

Executive Summary Singapore stocks are at risk as an impending contraction in global trade will hurt this very open economy and its markets. The country’s foreign reserves are already shrinking as the balance of payments has slid into deficit. The Monetary Authority of Singapore’s (MAS) attempts to rein in inflation by pushing up the currency is also causing foreign reserves to contract, and local money supply to decelerate sharply. Inflationary pressures in Singapore are not entrenched and will soon subside. Wage growth is under control, and unit labor cost increases are subdued. Singapore’s export competitiveness remains robust; yet that does not preclude it from a period of shrinking exports over the next 6-12 months. Falling exports, shrinking foreign reserves, decelerating money supply and peaking inflation will dissuade MAS from pushing up the Singapore dollar much higher from current levels. Manufacturing Cycles Dictate The Performance Of Singapore Stocks Recommendation Inception Date RETURN Downgrade Singapore stocks from overweight to neutral May 10, 2021 2.3% Bottom Line: Equity investors should reduce their exposure to Singapore stocks in EM and Asian portfolios by downgrading their allocation from overweight to neutral. Absolute return investors should wait for a better entry point. Feature Chart 1Singapore Stocks' Outperformance Is Set To Take A Breather Like most global markets, Singapore stocks have sold off materially since early this year. Relative to EM and Asian counterparts, however, they have fared well – in line with our call back in May 2021 when we upgraded this bourse to overweight (Chart 1). The question is, given the changing macro backdrop − where a whiff of stagflation has permeated global investment landscapes – what should investors now do about this market? We believe that higher inflation in Singapore is a temporary phenomenon and will subside sooner rather than later. Contracting global trade, on the other hand, is a much more vital risk for this very open economy and its equity markets; and is a reason to downgrade this bourse. Indeed, Singapore stocks in absolute US dollar terms face more downside over the next several months. Relative to its EM and Asian counterparts also, this bourse’s outperformance is likely to take a breather.  Asian and EM equity portfolios would therefore do well to downgrade this market by a notch from overweight to neutral in EM and Asian equity baskets. Absolute return investors should stay on the sidelines for now. Unfavorable Settings Contracting global trade and tightening liquidity will weigh on Singapore stocks in the months ahead. Global trade volumes will fall as developed countries’ demand for goods (ex-auto) shrinks following the pandemic-era binge. Chinese growth will also likely be struggling to recover. What this means is that both global manufacturing and exports are heading towards a contraction. As a very open economy where goods exports make up 115% of GDP (and services exports another 55%), manufacturing and exports of goods drive income for the entire Singaporean economy and influence its stock market cycles. Chart 2 shows how ebbs and flows in manufacturing new orders dictate Singapore’s equity market performances. Chart 2Manufacturing Cycles Dictate The Performance Of Singapore Stocks The performances of financial and real estate stocks, which make up two-thirds of the MSCI Singapore index, are also highly dependent on business cycles − which in turn, are driven by swings in manufacturing and exports (Chart 3). One reason for that is, at 23% of GDP, manufacturing is the single largest sector in the economy. By comparison, finance and insurance make up 14% of the nation’s output, and real estate 3%. Any acceleration or deceleration in manufacturing activity therefore has a strong impact on the performance of tertiary sectors, including those of banking and real estate. In addition, MAS’ tightening is causing local money supply to decelerate (discussed in more detail later). Slower money growth is never bullish for stock prices (Chart 4). Chart 3Banks And Real Estate Stocks Also Move With Manufacturing And Exports Chart 4Decelerating Money Supply Is A Bad Omen For Share Prices   In sum, given the changing global macro backdrop of slowing manufacturing and trade, and elevated US inflation, Singapore stocks have not yet found a sustainable bottom in absolute terms. Relative to their EM counterparts, Singapore’s outperformance could also take a breather. During periods of weakening global trade and manufacturing, Singapore stocks usually do poorly relative to their EM peers. The top panel of Chart 5 shows US manufacturing PMI new orders as decelerating rapidly. Periods of falling and/or sub-50 PMI prints usually herald Singapore stocks’ underperformance relative to EM, with a few months lag. Singapore’s own new export orders are also about to slip into contraction territory. If history is any guide, this too entails a period of underperformance of this bourse versus EM going forward (Chart 5, bottom panel). Is Inflation Genuine In Singapore? The short answer is no; there is little genuine inflation in Singapore. The country is not witnessing any wage-price spiral either, unlike in the US. What we see there instead is just a one-off surge in inflation. Average monthly wages in Singapore have accelerated in the past year but are not out of line when compared to the past 20 years (Chart 6, top panel). Chart 5Weakening Manufacturing Orders Foreshadow Singapore Equities' Underperformance Chart 6Limited Wage Growth And Subdued Unit Labor Costs Will Rein In Inflationary Pressures   A controlled rise in wages has helped keep Singaporean firms’ unit labor costs (ULCs) in check. The middle panel of Chart 6 shows ULCs for the overall economy vis-à-vis the consumer price index. ULCs are much below pre-pandemic levels. This happens to be the case even in the service sector of the economy where productivity gains are much harder to achieve. In the goods producing sector, where productivity gains are relatively easier to achieve, ULCs have remained particularly low (Chart 6, bottom two panels). What this means is that firms are facing little wage-related cost pressures. They are, therefore, less likely to pass it on to customers via higher selling prices. That, in turn, will help cap inflationary pressures in the economy. Chart 7Sharply Slowing Money Growth Points To Peaking Inflation In fact, much of the recent rise in headline and core consumer inflation in Singapore has had to do with the explosive money growth seen during the pandemic. Both narrow (M1) and broad money (M3) growth rates in Singapore accelerated in 2020 to levels not seen since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Inflation usually follows money growth with several months lag, and this time was no different. That said, both measures of money have since decelerated markedly this year. This will rein in inflationary pressures going forward (Chart 7).  Looking forward, money supply itself will likely decelerate further in the months ahead. A critical reason for that is the manner in which the central bank (MAS) uses the currency to achieve its monetary policy objectives (i.e., to maintain price stability).   When inflation rises, MAS typically guides the trade-weighted Singapore dollar to appreciate, in an attempt to rein in inflation. In so doing, MAS buys local currency and sells foreign currency. This reduces local liquidity and money supply. Chart 8 shows that MAS is indeed guiding the Singapore dollar up: the trade weighted currency has risen by over 3% in the past six months tracking inflation. Not surprisingly, money growth in Singapore has decelerated meaningfully. In time, that will help pull inflation lower. There was an external factor too. In the past couple of years, the country had witnessed a massive improvement in its balance of payments (BoP). It skyrocketed from a minus 3% of GDP in 2019 to a plus 27% in 2021. To prevent the currency from surging, the central bank had resorted to a rapid accumulation of foreign reserves. As MAS pumped local currency into the system while purchasing foreign currencies, local money supply boomed (Chart 9). Chart 8In Order To Check Inflation, The MAS Has Pushed The Singapore Dollar Up... Chart 9...Causing Foreign Reserves To Drop, And Money Supply To Decelerate Materially Chart 10The Trade Surplus Will Narrow, Putting More Pressure On The Balance Of Payments But the tide has turned this year. The trade surplus has rolled over and will continue to shrink as global trade is set to weaken further this year as explained above. As such, Singapore’s current account surplus will also likely roll over. The capital account has already slipped back into massive deficits; so has the BoP (Chart 10). The upshot is that foreign reserves have begun to contract. This means MAS is now selling foreign reserves to buy back local currency. This is causing a deceleration in local money supply (Chart 9, above). In sum, the absence of meaningful wage pressures, a decelerating money supply, and a strengthening currency will help Singapore see its inflation ease sooner than in the US. Can Singapore Withstand A Stronger Currency? As discussed above, Singapore’s monetary policy entails tackling higher inflation by letting the Singapore dollar appreciate in nominal terms. But given the high inflation prints, an appreciating currency would mean that it gets even stronger in real terms (i.e., in inflation-adjusted terms). An expensive currency in real terms could erode competitiveness. So, the question is, can the Singapore economy withstand a stronger currency? The short answer is yes. Chart 11 shows that while the Singapore dollar has appreciated to new highs in nominal trade weighted terms, in real terms (ULC-based) it remains at around 15-year lows. As such, currency competitiveness should not be an issue anytime soon. Notably, real exchange rates calculated using ULCs are more representative of currency competitiveness than the use of consumer prices allows. The reason is that employee compensation is a major component of any company’s overall cost structure; and therefore, ULCs matter for a company much more directly than do consumer prices. The very low levels of the ULC-based real exchange rate indicates that the Singapore dollar is still very competitive. Indeed, Singapore’s export volumes have been on an upward trend relative to global exports (Chart 12). Chart 11The Singapore Dollar Remains A Highly Competitive Currency Chart 12Singapore Is Grabbing Export Market Share From The Rest Of The World Notably, Singapore continues to attract a very high amount of FDI. This will help raise productivity going forward, thereby keeping ULCs in check down the line. All that said, strong competitiveness (i.e., the ability to maintain global market share) does not preclude Singapore from experiencing a drop in its export revenues over the next 6-to-12 months. The reason is faltering goods demand in the US and Europe after a pandemic-era overconsumption. Falling exports, in turn, will lead to shrinking foreign reserves, decelerating money supply, and finally slowing growth and inflation. This will discourage MAS from pushing the Singapore dollar much higher from current levels. As Chart 11 showed, the Singaporean currency is already at an all-time high in trade-weighted terms. The rally in the trade-weighted Singapore dollar is therefore in late stages. Investment Recommendations Chart 13The Singapore Dollar's Outperformance Vesus Other Asian Currencies Is Late Singapore stocks, with a P/E ratio of 21.5, have become relatively expensive vis-à-vis their EM (13.1) and Asian (14.1) counterparts. In terms of the price-to-book value ratio however, they are not expensive. Considering all, we recommend that investors reduce their exposure to Singapore stocks in EM and Asian equity portfolios by downgrading their allocation from overweight to neutral. Our overweight stance since May 10, 2021, has yielded a gain of 2.3% so far. Absolute return investors should wait for a better entry point. The depreciation of the Singapore dollar vis-à-vis the US dollar likely has some more room given the impending deterioration in global trade. But the latter will also soon check the appreciation of the Singapore dollar versus other Asian currencies − as MAS will be dissuaded from guiding the currency up in view of peaking domestic inflation and shrinking trade (Chart 13). Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com

Special Report

Executive Summary Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Southeast Asia is suffering from fading macro and geopolitical tailwinds but there are still investment opportunities on a relative basis. The peace dividend, globalization dividend, and demographic dividend are all eroding and will continue to erode, though there are relative winners and losers. The Philippines and Thailand are most secure; the Philippines and Indonesia are least dependent on trade; and the Philippines and Vietnam have the highest potential GDP growth. Geopolitical risk premiums have risen for Russia, Eastern Europe, China, and will rise for the Middle East. This leaves ASEAN states as relatively attractive emerging markets. Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG PHILIPPINES / EM EQUITIES 2022-05-12   LONG ASEAN / ACW EQUITIES 2022-05-12   Bottom Line: ASEAN’s geopolitical outlook is less ugly than many other emerging markets. Cyclically, go long ASEAN versus global equities and long Philippine equities versus EM. Feature Chart 1Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States The Philippines elected its second “strongman” leader in a row on May 9, provoking the usual round of editorials about the death of liberalism. Investors know well by now that such political narratives do as much to occlude economic reality as to clarify it. Still, there is a fundamental need to understand the changing global political order since it will ultimately impact the investment landscape. If the global order stabilizes – e.g. US-Russia and US-China relations normalize – then trade and investment may recover from recent shocks. A new era of “Re-Globalization” could ensue. Asia Pacific would be a prime beneficiary as it is full of trading economies (Chart 1). Related Report  Geopolitical StrategySecond Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours By contrast, if Great Power Rivalry escalates further, then trade and investment will suffer, the current paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will continue, and East Asia’s frozen conflicts from 1945-52 will thaw and heat up. Asian states will have to shift focus from trade to security and their economies will suffer relative to previous expectations. How will Southeast Asia fare in this context? Will it fall victim to great power conflict, like Eastern Europe? Or will it keep a balance between the great powers and extract maximum benefits? Three Dividends Three dividends have underpinned Southeast Asia’s growth and prosperity in recent decades: 1.  Peace Dividend – A relative lack of war and inter-state conflict. 2.  Globalization Dividend – Advantageous maritime geography and access to major economies. 3.  Demographic Dividend – Young demographics and strong potential GDP growth. All three of these dividends are eroding, so the macro and geopolitical investment case for ASEAN has weakened relative to twenty years ago. Nevertheless in a world where Russia, China, and the Gulf Arab markets face a higher and persistent geopolitical risk premium, ASEAN still offers attractive investment opportunities, particularly if the most geopolitically insecure countries are avoided. Peace Dividend Favors The Philippines And Thailand Since the end of the US and Chinese wars with Vietnam, military conflicts in Southeast Asia have been low intensity. Lack of inter-state conflict encouraged economic prosperity and security complacency. The five major Southeast Asian nations saw military spending decline since the 1990s and only Vietnam spends more than 2% of GDP (Chart 2). Chart 2Peace Brought Prosperity Unfortunately that is about to change. China has large import dependencies, an insufficient tradition of sea power, and feels hemmed in by its geography and the US alliance system. Beijing’s solution is to build and modernize its navy and prepare for potential conflict with the US, particularly over Taiwan. The result is rising tension across East Asia, including in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. The ASEAN states fear China will walk over them, China fears they will league with the US against China, and the US tries to get them to do exactly that. Hence ASEAN’s defense spending has not kept up with its geopolitical importance and will have to rise going forward. Consider the following: Vietnam risks conflict with China. Vietnam has the most capable and experienced naval force within ASEAN due to its sporadic conflicts with China. Its equipment is supplied mainly by Russia, pitting it squarely against China’s Soviet or Soviet-inspired equipment. But Russia-China ties are tightening, especially after Russia’s divorce with Europe. While Vietnam will not reject Russia, it is increasingly partnering with the United States. The pandemic added to the Vietnamese public’s distrust of China, which is ancient but has ramped up in recent years due to clashes in the South China Sea. While Vietnam officially maintains that it will never host the US military, it is tacitly bonding with the US as a hedge against China. Yet Vietnam does not have a mutual defense treaty with the US, so it is vulnerable to Chinese military aggression over time. Indonesia distances itself from China. Rising security tensions are also forcing Indonesia to change its strategy toward China. Indonesia lacks experience in naval warfare and is not a claimant in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It is reluctant to take sides due to its traditionally non-aligned diplomatic status, its military culture of prioritizing internal stability (which is hard to maintain across thousands of islands), and China’s investment in its economy. However, China is encroaching on Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and Indonesia has signaled its displeasure through diplomatic snubs and high-profile infrastructure contracts. Indonesia is trying to bulk up its naval and air capabilities, including via arms purchases from the West. Malaysia distances itself from China. Malaysia and the Philippines have the weakest naval forces and both face pressure from China’s navy and coast guard due to maritime-territorial disputes. But while the Philippines gets help from the US and its allies and partners, Malaysia has no such allies. Traditionally it was non-aligned. Instead it utilizes economic statecraft, as it has often done against more powerful countries. It recently paused Chinese economic projects in the country to conduct reviews and chose Ericsson over Huawei to build the 5G network. Ongoing maritime and energy disputes will motivate defense spending. The Philippines preserves alliance with United States. Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte tried but failed to strengthen ties with China and Russia. Beijing continued to swarm the Philippines’ economic zone with ships and threaten its control of neighboring rocks and reefs. Ultimately Duterte renewed his country’s Visiting Forces Agreement with the US in July 2021. The newly elected President “Bong Bong” Marcos is even less likely to try to pivot away from the US. Instead the Philippines will work with the US to try to deter China. Thailand preserves alliance with United States. Thailand is the most insulated from the South China Sea disputes and often acts as mediator between China and other ASEAN states. However, Thailand is also a formal US defense ally and assisted with logistics during the Korean and Vietnamese wars. While US military aid was suspended after the 2014 military coup, non-military aid from the US continued. The State Department certified Thailand’s return to democracy in 2019, relations were normalized, and the annual Cobra Gold exercise resumed in 2020. The US’s hasty normalization shows Thailand’s importance to its regional strategy. On their own, the ASEAN states cannot counter China – they are simply outgunned (Chart 3). Hence their grand strategy of balancing Chinese trade relations with American security relations. Chart 3Outgunned By China Chart 4Opinion Shifts Against China In recent decades, with the US divided and distracted, they sought to entice China through commercial deals, in hopes that it would reduce its encroachments on the high seas. This strategy failed, as China’s expansion of economic and military influence in the region is driven by China’s own imperatives. Beijing’s lack of transparency about Covid-19 also sowed distrust. As a result, public opinion became more critical of China and defensive of national sovereignty (Chart 4). Southeast Asia will continue trading with China but changing public opinion, the US-China clash, and tensions in the South China Sea will inject greater geopolitical risk into this once peaceful and prosperous region. Military weakness will also lead the ASEAN states to welcome the US, EU, Japan, and Australia into the region as economic and security hedges against China. This trend risks inflaming regional tensions in the short run – and China may not be deterred over the long run, since its encroachments in the region are driven by its own needs and insecurities. Decades of under-investment in defense will result in ASEAN rearmament, which will weigh on fiscal balances and potentially economic competitiveness. Investors should not take the past three decades of peace for granted. Bottom Line: Vietnam (like Taiwan) is in a geopolitical predicament where it could provoke China’s wrath and yet lacks an American security guarantee. The Philippines and Thailand benefit from American security guarantees. Indonesia and Malaysia benefit from distance from China. All of these states will attempt to balance US and China relations – but in the future that means devoting more resources to national security, which will weigh on fiscal budgets and take away funds from human capital development. Waning Globalization Dividend Favors Indonesia And The Philippines All the ASEAN states rely heavily on both the US and China for export markets. This reliance grew as trade recovered in the wake of the global pandemic (Chart 5). Now global trade is slowing down cyclically, while US-China power struggle will weigh on the structural globalization process, penalizing the most trade-dependent ASEAN states relative to their less trade-dependent neighbors. So far US-China economic divorce is redistributing US-China trade in a way that is positive for Southeast Asia. China is rerouting exports through Vietnam, for example, while the US is shifting supply chains to other Asian states (Chart 6). The US will accelerate down this path because it cannot afford substantively to reengage with China’s economy for fear of strengthening the Russo-Chinese bloc. Chart 5Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance​​​​​ Chart 6ASEAN’s Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China’s Hence the US will become more reliant on Southeast Asian exporters. Whatever the US stops buying from China will have to be sourced from other countries, so countries that export a similar basket of goods will benefit from the switch. Comparing the types of goods that China and ASEAN export to the US, Thailand is the closest substitute for China, whereas Malaysia is the farthest (Chart 7). That is not to say that Malaysia will suffer from US-China divorce. It is already ahead of China in exporting high-tech goods to the US, which is the very reason its export profile is so different. In 2020, 58% of Malaysia’s exports to the US are high-tech versus 35% for China’s. At the same time, Southeast Asian exports to China may not grow as fast as expected – cyclically China’s economy may accelerate on the back of current stimulus efforts, but structurally China is pursuing self-sufficiency and import substitution via a range of industrial policies (“Made in China 2025,” “dual circulation,” etc). These policies aim to make Chinese industrials competitive with European, US, Japanese, and Korean industrials. But they will also make China more competitive with medium-tech and fledging high-tech exports from Southeast Asia. Thus while China will keep importing low value products and commodities, such as unrefined ores, from Southeast Asia, imports of high-tech products will be limited due to China’s preference for indigenous producers. US export controls will also interfere with ASEAN’s ability to export high-tech goods to China. (In order to retain their US trade, in the face of Chinese import substitution, ASEAN states will have to comply with US export controls at least partially.) Even the low-to-medium tech goods that China currently imports from Southeast Asia may not grow as fast in the coming years as they have in the past. The ten provinces in China with the lowest GDP per capita exported a total of $129 billion to the world in 2020, whereas China’s imports from the top five ASEAN states amounted to $154 billion USD in 2020 (Chart 8). If Beijing insists on creating a domestic market for its poor provinces’ exports, then Southeast Asian exports to China will suffer. China might do this not only for strategic sufficiency but also to avoid US and western sanctions, which could be imposed for labor, environmental, human rights, or strategic reasons. Chart 7The US Sees Thailand And Vietnam As Substitutes For China​​​​​​ Chart 8China Threatens ASEAN With Import Substitution​​​​​​ Chart 9Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China China, unlike the US during the 1990s and 2000s, cannot afford to open up its doors and become a ravenous consumer and importer of all Asia’s goods. This would be a way to buy influence in the region, as the US has done in Latin America. But China still has significant domestic development left to do. This development must be done for the sake of jobs and income – otherwise the Communist Party will face sociopolitical upheaval. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand are the most vulnerable to China’s dual circulation strategy because of their sizeable exports to China, which stand at 12%, 15% and 7.6% of GDP respectively (Chart 9). Even though the Southeast Asian states have formed into a common market, and have joined major new trade blocs such as the CPTPP and RCEP, they will not see unfettered liberalization within these agreements – and they will not be drawn exclusively into China’s orbit. Instead they will face a China that wishes to expand export market share while substituting away from imports. The US and India, which are not part of these new trade blocs, will still increase their trade with ASEAN, as they will seek to substitute ASEAN for China, and ASEAN will be forced to substitute them for China. Thus globalization will weaken into regionalization and will not provide as positive of a force for Southeast Asia as it did over the 1980s-2000s. Going forward, the new paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will weigh on trade-dependent countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand relative to their neighbors. Within this cohort, Malaysia and the Philippines will benefit from selling high-tech goods to the US, while Thailand and Vietnam will benefit from selling low- and mid-tech goods. China will remain a huge and critical market for ASEAN states but its autarkic policies will drive them to pursue other markets. Those with large and growing domestic markets, like Indonesia and the Philippines, will weather hypo-globalization better than their neighbors. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand are all extremely dependent on foreign trade and hence vulnerable if international trade linkages weaken. Bottom Line: Global trade is likely to slow on a cyclical basis. Structurally, Hypo-Globalization is the new paradigm and will remove a tailwind that super-charged Southeast Asian development over the past several decades. Indonesia and the Philippines stand to suffer least and benefit most. Potential Growth Dividend Favors The Philippines And Vietnam Countries that can generate endogenous growth will perform the best under hypo-globalization. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have the largest populations within ASEAN. But we must also take into account population growth, which contributes directly to potential GDP growth. A domestic market grows through population growth and/or income growth. For example, China benefitted from its growing population but now must switch to income generation as its population growth is stagnating. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have the highest population growth, while Thailand has the lowest. Thai population growth is even weak compared to China. The total fertility rate reinforces this trend – it is highest in Philippines but lowest in Thailand (Chart 10). A population that is too young or too old needs significant support that diverts resources away from the most productive age group. Philippines and Indonesia have the lowest median age, while Thailand has the highest. The youth of Indonesia and Philippines will come of age in the next decade, augmenting labor force and potential GDP growth. By contrast, Vietnam and especially Thailand, like China, will be weighed down by a shrinking labor force in the coming decade (Chart 11). Chart 10Fertility Rates Robust In ASEAN ​​​​​​ Chart 11Falling Support Ratio Weighs On Thailand, Vietnam​​​​​​ Hence Indonesia and Philippines will prosper while Thailand, and to some extent Vietnam, lack the ability to diversify away from trade through domestic market growth. Malaysia sits in the middle: it is trade dependent and has the smallest population, but it has a young and growing population, and its labor force is still growing. Yet falling population growth is not a disaster if productivity and income growth are high. Productivity trends often contrast with population trends: Indonesia had the weakest productivity growth despite having a large, young, and growing population, while Vietnam had the strongest growth, despite a population slowdown. In fact Vietnam has the strongest productivity growth in Southeast Asia, at a 5-year, pre-pandemic average of 6.3%, followed by the Philippines (Chart 12A). By comparison China’s productivity growth averaged between 3%-6.6%, depending on the data source. Chart 12AProductivity And Potential GDP​​​​​​ Chart 12BProductivity And Potential GDP​​​​​​ Chart 13Capital Formation Favors Philippines Productivity growth adds to labor force growth to form potential GDP. In 2019, Philippines had the highest potential GDP growth at 6.9%, followed by the Vietnam at 6.8%, Indonesia at 5.6%, Malaysia at 3.9% and Thailand at 2.3%. In comparison China’s potential GDP growth was 3.6%-5.9%, again depending on data. Thailand is undoubtedly the weakest from both a population and productivity standpoint, while the Philippines has strength in both (Chart 12B). Countries invest in their economies to increase productivity. In 2019, Vietnam recorded the highest growth in grossed fixed capital formation at around 10.6%, followed by Indonesia at 6.9%, Philippines at 6.3%, and Thailand at 2.2%. Gross fixed capital formation has rebounded from the contractions countries suffered during the pandemic lockdowns in 2020 (Chart 13). Bottom Line: The Philippines has strong potential GDP growth, but Indonesia is not far behind as it invests in its economy. Vietnam has the highest investment and productivity growth, but its demographic dividend is waning. Malaysia is slightly better than Thailand because it has a growing population, but it has stopped investing and it is as trade dependent as Thailand. Thailand is weak on all accounts: it is trade dependent, has a shrinking population, and has a low potential GDP growth. Investment Takeaways Bringing it all together, ASEAN is witnessing the erosion of key dividends (peace, globalization, and demographics). Yet it offers attractive investment opportunities on a relative basis, given the permanent step up in geopolitical risk premiums for other major emerging markets like Russia, eastern Europe, China, and (soon) the Gulf Arab states (Charts 14A & 14B). Indeed the long under-performance of ASEAN stocks as a bloc, relative to global stocks, has recently reversed. As investors recognize China’s historic confluence of internal and external risks, they increasingly turn to ASEAN despite its flaws. Chart 14AASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China The US and China will use rewards and punishments to try to win over ASEAN states as strategic and economic partners. Those that have a US security guarantee, or are most distant from potential conflict, will see a lower geopolitical risk premium. Chart 14BASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China​​​​​​ Chart 15Favor The Philippines The Philippines is the most attractive Southeast Asian market based on our criteria: it has an American security guarantee, domestic-oriented growth, and high productivity. Populism in the Philippines has come with productivity improvements and yet has not overthrown the US alliance. Philippine equities can outperform their emerging market peers (Chart 15). Indonesia is the second most attractive – it does not have direct territorial disputes with China, maintains defense ties with the West, is not excessively trade reliant, and keeps up decent productivity growth. It is vulnerable to nationalism and populism but its democracy is effective overall and the regime has maintained general political stability after near-dissolution in 1998. Thailand is geopolitically secure but lacking in potential growth. Vietnam has high potential growth but is geopolitically insecure over the long run. Investors should only pursue tactical investments in these markets. We maintain our long-term favorable view of Malaysia, although it is trade dependent and productivity has weakened. In future reports we will examine ASEAN markets in greater depth and with closer consideration of their domestic political risks.   Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix