Asia

Special Report

Highlights Theoretically the US could employ a “Reverse Kissinger” strategy – befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  But Trump has made no headway in relations with Russia. Meanwhile Democrats now see engagement with Putin as a failure and will pursue a more aggressive policy. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader Russo-American geopolitical confrontation. Russia will likely succeed in preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but not in the long run. We remain overweight Russian equities and bonds relative to EM benchmarks, but will downgrade if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion. Feature Investors do not need to wait for the US election verdict to assess the general trajectory of US-Russia relations. Some points are clear regardless of whether President Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden prevails: US-Russia engagement had mostly but not entirely failed between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and President Trump’s election in 2016.   President Trump could not break free of the constraints of office and his administration has remained adversarial toward Russia despite his preference for deeper engagement. Whether Democrats or Republicans take the White House in 2021, the result will be confrontation with Russia over the four-year term and likely beyond. The geopolitical risk premium in the Russian ruble will rise relative to its current level. A Trump victory would reduce this risk, but only temporarily.   The Failure Of Engagement Russia’s rise from the ashes of the Soviet Union can be illustrated by our Geopolitical Power Index – it shows Russia’s rise relative to the US in terms of demographic, economic, technological, commercial, and military variables that make a nation strong (Chart 1). Chart 1Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia is a shadow of its Soviet self and lags far behind the US in raw capability. But its recovery from the chaos of the 1998 financial crisis, fueled by a global commodity bull market, has consisted of a systematic removal of domestic political constraints. It is politically unified under the personal rule of Putin, has reformed its economy and modernized its military, and has successfully pushed back against the US and the West in its sphere of influence. Russia punches above its economic weight in the world by means of its military, which it has wielded opportunistically in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya (Chart 2). Neither the US nor any other power was willing to fill the power vacuum in these locations. A Trump victory only temporarily reduces the rise in Russian geopolitical risk. The US and Russia have a fundamentally antagonistic relationship over influence in Europe and occasionally the Far East. They have little need to trade with each other. They are both large, independent commodity exporters and advanced weapon-makers separated by vast distances. Russia is threatened by the US’s military and technological superiority, its economic strength and newfound status as an energy exporter (see energy section), and its ability to undermine Russian legitimacy in the former Soviet sphere by promoting democracy.  Russia’s advantage is that the US is internally divided by political factions. Putin’s popular approval has benefited from his restoration of domestic order and Russia’s standing as a great power. Successive American presidents have floundered under domestic partisanship and polarization (Chart 3).   Chart 2Russia’s Military Punches Above Its Economic Weight Chart 3Russia Is Politically Unified, The US is Internally Divided   Attempts to “reset” relations have failed.1 The Barack Obama administration’s 2009-11 Reset, announced by Biden, saw several concrete compromises, including the New START treaty and Russia’s joining the WTO. But the Bolotnaya Square protests in 2011-12, at the height of the Arab Spring, rekindled Moscow’s fear that the US aimed to foment “color revolutions” not only in Russia’s periphery but even in Russia itself. Faced with losing its control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, Russia invaded parts of Ukraine and seized Crimea, the first military annexation of territory in Europe since World War II. The US and Europe applied extensive sanctions that last to this day and drag on Russian growth.2  True, Moscow cooperated on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Russia does not want Iran to get nuclear weapons. Yet this is not imminent. And Russia gained global oil market share when the US walked away from the deal and restarted sanctions (Chart 4). Either way, Iran survives as a Russian ally capable of exerting influence across the Middle East.   President Trump launched another attempt at engagement with Russia. If there is a strategic basis for this policy – i.e. if it is not just based in Trump’s personal proclivities – then it is the idea of a “Reverse Kissinger” maneuver. During the Cold War, the US befriended Maoist China in order to isolate the Soviet Union. Today, with China posing the clear threat to US hegemony, the US could try to befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  The difference is that in 1972, American and Chinese interests were complementary. China wished to stabilize its borders and the US offered geopolitical relief as well as technology and knowhow. Today American and Russian interests are not complementary other than the political convenience of demonizing each other (Chart 5). The US offers Russia limited investment capital; Russia does not offer cheap labor or a vast consumer market. Chart 4Russia’s Oil Market Share Benefitted From Iran Sanctions Chart 5US-Russo Interests Are Not Complementary   The Trump administration’s attempt to engage Putin has failed. Putin’s declaration of a global oil market share war this year drove American shale oil companies into bankruptcy during an election year. Barring an “October surprise” engineered by Putin to get Trump reelected, their “alliance” is at best rhetorical and at worst a mirage. Putin might favor Trump because he sharpens US internal divisions, or because he has an isolationist foreign policy preference, but Putin’s actions so far in 2020 suggest a deeper strategic reality: Russia seeks to foment political turmoil in the US, not solidify either of the parties in power, as the latter could backfire against Russia. What Comes After Engagement? Russia lacks the power to create a new world order, but it will continue to leverage its relative power to exercise a veto over affairs in the current global order, in which US influence is weakening. It can hasten the West’s decline by sowing divisions within the West. Chart 6COVID-19 Dented Support For Trump And Putin What happens when US polarization falls and a new political consensus takes shape? This would pose a major threat to Putin’s strategic options. Thus it is relevant if Joe Biden wins the 2020 election with a strong majority and a full Democratic sweep of government. Presidents Trump and Putin, and their political parties, are among the worst performers amid the COVID-19 pandemic and recession (Chart 6). The implication is that Trump will lose the election and Putin will resort to time-tried techniques of confrontation with the West to restore his domestic support. Democrats will pursue a more aggressive policy toward Russia. The Democrats harbor a deep vendetta against Russia over its interference in the 2016 election and will go on the offensive to prevent Russia from trying to undermine their grip on power again. They will also seek to deter Russia from further undermining American strategic interests. Biden will try to revive NATO, expand US troop presence in eastern Europe, and promote democracy and human rights in Russia’s periphery, using the Internet to launch a disinformation campaign against Putin’s regime. Cyber warfare will escalate.  A “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China. The silver lining for Russia is economic: Biden’s policies will help to weaken the dollar and cultivate a global growth recovery. Biden will be less inclined to start disruptive Trump-style trade war with China that could permanently damage China’s potential growth or global growth. Chinese imports are essential to propping up Russia’s sluggish economy. In enabling commodity prices to recover, and reducing global policy uncertainty, Biden would inadvertently aid Russian recovery (Chart 7). Chart 7The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar Ultimately Russia is insecure because the US threatens to undermine its economy and political legitimacy both at home and in its strategic buffers. Putin has re-centralized control while shutting out foreign influence. This approach is not changing anytime soon given the recent constitutional changes to prolong Putin’s rule till 2036. Preliminary reports claim that, with 65% of the public voting, these changes were ratified by 76% of the population.3  What changed is that the US is no longer as optimistic about engaging Russia. If anything, its internal divisions will encourage it to go on the offensive. Sanctions may well be expanded before they are eased, the Ukraine conflict could revive rather than simmer down, and new fronts in the conflict could widen, particularly in cyberspace. This is particularly the case if Biden wins the White House in November. The structural, geopolitical risk premium of US-Russia conflict is priced into Russian assets, but there is room for a cyclical increase if Biden is elected. Our market-based Russian geopolitical risk indicators – which define geopolitical risk as excessive ruble weakness relative to its macro context – show that Russian risk is elevated because of COVID-19, but dropping. The US election should reverse this trend, unless Trump wins (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Alternative measures of political risk that utilize non-market variables support our qualitative assessment, such as the indicator provided by GeoQuant. The implication is that Russian political risk is higher than the market is pricing (Chart 9). Chart 9Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Kissinger Reversed? Not Yet. If Trump wins, could he not engineer a major détente with Russia? In 2018 the US shifted its national defense strategy to emphasize that “the central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition,” arguing specifically that “it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.4”  Yet US geopolitical power has declined such that taking an offensive approach to Russia and China simultaneously is not practicable.  If the US pursues the Reverse Kissinger strategy, then it will have to make major concessions to Putin’s Russia. It would need to provide substantial sanctions relief, accept the Crimean annexation, allow a high degree of Russian influence in Donbass (Ukraine), abandon hopes of retribution for the 2016 election interference, ask for a return to the 2015 nuclear deal on Iran at best, and settle for arms control agreements that do not cover new technologies. It is not clear that President Trump would concede this much in a second term, though in most cases he would have the power to do so. Yet Moscow cannot downgrade its cooperation with Beijing by much, since US-Russia détente never lasts long and China weighs more heavily in its economic calculus than the West’s sanctions. Chart 10US-Russo Struggle Is Subordinate To US-Sino Conflict The Democrats, by contrast, are not prepared to make these concessions, particularly on 2016. They are more willing to pursue a gradualist approach in dealing with China, which they believe is less urgent due to shared economic interests.5  If the US confronts Russia, then Russia will draw closer to China. The informal alliance between these two powers is well advanced. A closer association provides China with a better position in waging its long-term geopolitical competition with the United States.  Ultimately US grand strategy and public opinion will drive American presidents to take a harder line on China because it rivals the US in economic resilience and technology over the long run (Chart 10). The conflict with Moscow will eventually be subordinate to the US-China struggle. But a “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China, either through its own weakness or Chinese strength. A much stronger trans-Atlantic alliance, or much greater Chinese influence over East Asia and/or the Middle East, could trigger a shift in Russian strategy. We are not there yet. Russia’s cooperation with China will deepen, strengthening China’s hand and making it all the more imperative for the United States to solidify the trans-Atlantic alliance with Europe. Otherwise the risk of a precipitous decline in American power will threaten global stability.  Bottom Line: US-Russian antagonism will continue for the foreseeable future. Russian geopolitical risk is underpriced, particularly if Biden wins the election. A Trump victory would offer only a temporary reprieve.  Direct Competition In Energy Russia can offer low cost natural gas alongside an existing and projected (under construction) network of pipelines into Europe. This capability will help it to sustain and marginally increase its market share in Europe relative to the US in the medium term. In turn, this will help Russia secure vital revenues for its macro stability.  Natural gas exports to Europe represent 2.5% of GDP or 9% of total exports. A Biden presidency is negative for Russian assets, but Russia has room to ease policy. In the long run, however, US LNG will challenge Russia’s share in the European natural gas market. On the whole, the US sees Russia as an economic competitor in the European natural gas market and it will continue to disrupt Russian natural gas exports to Europe through sanctions and/or by other means. A resulting market share war between the US and Russia will lead to low natural gas prices benefitting the consumer, Europe. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader geopolitical confrontation between the US and Russia. The following factors will shape heightened competition: Escalating Competition For European Natural Gas Market Europe will remain a major market for natural gas. The combination of falling domestic production, steady consumption growth and the ongoing structural shift to cleaner sources of energy will require greater imports of natural gas (Chart 11). Critically, Europe’s natural gas consumption might rise faster than its GDP making this market attractive to energy producers. According to the IEA, Europe’s consumption of natural gas will continue to grow at a steady rate over the next 5 years. In a nutshell, European policymakers are promoting cleaner energy such as natural gas over coal and nuclear energy. This push will facilitate rising demand for natural gas.  Yet, European natural gas production is expected to drop by 40%, driven by field closures in the Netherlands and the UK.  As such, the diverging gap between falling production and steady consumption opens up a space for both Russian and US natural gas exports into the continent. Russia Natural Gas Strategy: Russia and its largest natural gas producer, Gazprom, are aiming to increase their share in the European market from their current 36% to 40% (Chart 12). Chart 11Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Chart 12...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share   Table 1Russia’s Pipeline Export Capacity More specifically, Russia’s latest 2035 strategy (known as ES-2035) reaffirms its two-pronged strategy: (i) continue to provide low-cost natural gas to Europe and Asia through pipelines and (ii) developing LNG export capacity for exports to the Far East. Pipelines: Russia’s export capacity to Europe is set to increase to 190 Bcm/y by 2022 excluding existing transit routes passing through Ukraine (Table 1). Two new sources of pipeline routes will be the Nord Stream2, coming online by the end of this year, and Turk Stream, expected to come online by 2022. These pipelines will have an export capacity of 55 Bcm/y and 31.5/y Bcm, respectively (Map 1).   Map 1Russia’s Latest Pipelines Bypass Ukraine Chart 13Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Meanwhile, pipeline capacity through Ukraine will remain 140 Bcm/y. Ultimately, Russia has been determined to diversify its natural gas transit routes despite pressures from the US.6 In addition, Gazprom natural gas production for transport via pipeline is expected to increase by 35% to 983 Bcm in the next 15 years. The European market is essential to Russia’s export revenues, as it currently represents 56% of Russia’s total gas export volumes compared with 83% total export to non-CIS countries (Chart 13). Lastly, regarding natural gas pricing, Gazprom will continue to move away from oil-indexed long-term contracts to shorter-term spot market contracts. This change of tack will cause deflation in Gazprom’s export prices to Europe but will preserve Russia’s market share in its strategic European market.   LNG: Russia will continue to be one the top four LNG producers alongside Qatar, Australia and the US. According to the latest estimates by the IEA, Russian exports of LNG, currently at 39 Bcm, are set to expand by 20% by 2025. The development of the Yamal peninsula into a major natural gas and LNG hub will allow Russia to produce close to 110 Bcm of LNG by 2035, which will constitute 16% of its overall current gas production. This will lead to continued LNG exports to various markets, particularly Europe, which consumes 50% of Russia’s LNG exports. Imported technology from Europe and external financing from China have allowed Novatek, Russia’s second largest natural gas producer, to become the leader in production and exports of LNG. Russia is also investing heavily in liquefaction. It is now fifth globally in liquefaction capacity. There are currently $21 billion in pre-final investment decision (FID) from the LNG Artic 2 in the Yamal that will increase its liquefaction capacity by over 200% by 2026.  Lastly, it is estimated that 70-80% of total commodity exporters’ costs are sourced locally and are in rubles due to the import substitution policy adopted by Moscow in 2015. This will alleviate cost pressures arising from a potentially weaker ruble in exploiting the Yamal reserves. US Needs To Find A Market For Its LNG: US produces 920 bcm/y of natural gas but consumes only 830 bcm/y. The rest is available for export. The need to export rising excess of natural gas output puts the US in direct competition with other natural gas exporters such as Russia. Chart 14US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise In the medium term, an oversupplied market alongside the COVID-19-induced demand shock in Europe will reduce European natural gas demand, hurting both the US and Russia. US LNG might lose market share in the European market to Russia due to falling production arising from capex cuts and bankruptcies in the US natural gas sector.7 Yet, in the long run, Europe’s geopolitical ties with the US and strategic interest in diversifying away from Russia make US LNG an obvious area of cooperation. The Trump-Juncker agreement in July 2018 led to a 300% increase in US LNG exports to Europe before the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 14). Since coming into effect, the agreement also resulted in a doubling of EU utilization of LNG regasification capacity, from 30% to close to 60% in early 2020 and is expected to continue expanding in the years to come. Bottom Line: Russia will likely succeed in at least preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but will be challenged by US LNG in the long run. Macro And Financial Market Implications For Russia Chart 15Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Heightened confrontation with the US and new sanctions on Russia will materialize if Biden wins the presidency. All else constant, this is unfavourable for Russian asset prices. It should be noted, however, that years of fiscal conservativism, tight monetary policy, a prudent and pro-active bank regulatory stance as well as some success in import substitution have given Russia the capacity to offset negative external shocks by easing macro policy: Russia has one of the lowest public debt-to-GDP ratios among the largest countries in the world. Its total public debt stands at 13.5% of GDP (Chart 15). Its external public debt is at a mere 4% of GDP. As in many other countries, Russia’s fiscal deficit is widening sharply due to the pandemic and low oil prices. However, we expect the primary and overall fiscal deficits will be only 4.25% and 5% of GDP in 2020, respectively. So far, at 3.5% of GDP, the announced fiscal stimulus in response to the pandemic has been small by global standards. Russia has room to boost fiscal expenditure substantially this year and in the coming years to offset negative external shocks. The Central Bank still has room to reduce interest rates further. The real policy rate is 2.5% compared with 1% for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan (Chart 16, top panel). Russia’s local currency government bond yields offer value: their real yield is 2.5% compared with the EM GBI benchmark real yield of 1.5% (Chart 16, bottom panel). The Central Bank of the Russian Federation will refrain from QE-type policies (i.e., public debt monetization). This is a plus for the ruble relative to other EM currencies where central banks are engaged in QEs. Bank lending rates remain extremely elevated in Russia and local currency credit penetration is reasonably low (Chart 17). Companies and banks’ external indebtedness has declined from $1,200 bn in 2014 to $900 bn currently. Chart 16Russian Real Rates Offer Value Chart 17Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated!   Authorities have cleaned up the banking system. The number of banks has dropped from 1000 in 2010 to 430. Banks have written down and provisioned for a large amount of loans. All of these reduce Russia’s vulnerability to negative shocks. Finally, pressured by US and EU sanctions, Russia has been moderately successful in import substitution as we discussed in a previous report. The nation has expanded its productive capacity, especially in agriculture and some other industries. As a result, it now has more room to deploy fiscal and monetary stimulus to boost demand that will be satisfied by domestic rather than foreign output. In short, fiscal and monetary stimulus will not cause the currency to plunge. On the negative side, the outlook for productivity growth remains lukewarm. Russia’s long-term economic outlook will be characterized by relative stability but low growth, as has been the case in recent years. Combining our geopolitical and macro analysis, two conclusions stand out. First, we remain overweight Russian equities as well as both local currency and US dollar bonds relative to their EM benchmarks. If Trump stages a comeback over the next four months, which is not impossible, then the geopolitical risk premium will continue to fall. Trump would offer a reprieve in tensions for a year or two.  Second, the US election threatens this view because Joe Biden is currently heavily favoured to beat Trump and if he does, he is likely to impose fresh sanctions on Russia, possibly as early as 2021. Therefore, if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion, we will downgrade Russian assets. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist  mattg@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Michael McFaul, From Cold War To Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America (London: Penguin, 2018). 2  International Monetary Fund, “Russian Federation: 2019 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report 19/260 (August 2019). 3  Ann M. Simmons and Georgi Kantchev, “Russians Vote for Overhaul That Could Keep Putin in Power Until 2036,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2020.  4  “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening The American Military’s Competitive Edge,” Department of Defense, 2018. 5  Victoria Nuland, “Pinning Down Putin: How A Confident America Should Deal With Russia,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020. 6  The US has tried to stop Russia’s expansion of pipelines into Europe in the past. Evidenced from both Kennedy and Reagan administration policies directed towards the building of the Friendship oil pipeline in the 1960s and the Brotherhood gas pipeline in the 1980s, respectively. In response, Russia began developing its own technological capacity through import substitution, hurting western firms in the process. 7  "U.S. natural gas giant Chesapeake Energy goes bankrupt,” CBC, June 29, 2020.

Highlights We are moving our tactical call on Chinese stocks from neutral to overweight, bringing it inline with our cyclical stance on Chinese equities. Our cyclical overweight stance is supported by several factors: the rate of recovery in China’s economy and corporate profits should outpace the rest of the world in the next 9-12 months and valuations in Chinese stocks are relatively cheap. In the near term, compared with the tug-of-war in the US between resuming business activities and containing a second COVID-19 wave, China has a lower risk of a major second wave and re-lockdown of its economy. The recent request by China’s central government for banks to forgo a large portion of this year’s profits should have very limited effect on China’s overall stock performance.  Feature Chinese stocks have fewer downside risks compared to their global counterparts, which were buffeted this past week by escalating COVID-19 case counts in the US and a slower global economy recovery according to IMF estimates. Chart 1Overweight Chinese Stocks We have been tactically neutral on Chinese stocks since early April, due to heightened uncertainties about the path of the global pandemic and geopolitical tensions between the US and China.1 These uncertainties remain in place.  Nevertheless, against the backdrop of a bleak outlook in normalizing global economic activity, the pandemic containment in China has been relatively successful and the nation’s economic outlook is slightly more positive. This argues for overweighting Chinese stocks in a global equity portfolio, on both tactical (0-3 months) and cyclical (6-12 months) time horizons (Chart 1).  We are initiating two new trades: long Chinese stocks versus global benchmarks, in both onshore and offshore equity markets. At its June 17th State Council meeting, China’s central government asked that commercial banks give up 1.5 trillion yuan in profits and cap profit growth below 10% this year to support the real economy. While this rare government request may further depress the banking sector’s stock performance, we think its negative impact on China’s overall stock market will be minimal.  Furthermore, the request should help to lower corporate financing costs - including the private sector and small businesses – and, therefore, help bolster corporate marginal propensity to invest. The net result will be positive on both China’s economic recovery and overall stock performance in the medium term.  Better Than The Rest Compared to the rest of the world, Chinese stocks should be supported by a more positive economic outlook and relatively cheaper valuations in the next 9 to 12 months.  Chart 2China May Return To Its Trend Growth In 2021 The IMF has downgraded its 2020 global economic growth projection to -4.9% from April’s -3%. According to the IMF’s baseline scenario, China is the only major economy that will still register positive growth this year, albeit very modest. This contrasts with an 8% growth contraction in developed nations and a 4.6% retrenchment in emerging economies excluding China. The IMF estimate also suggests that China’s level of economic output in 2021 will rise above its 2019 level, whereas the US and European GDP levels will remain below their pre-COVID 19 levels (Chart 2). If the global economy recovers at a slower-than-expected rate in the second half of this year, then there will be spillover effects on China through reduced demand for its goods. The IMF projected that global trade will shrink by nearly 12% this year (Chart 3). However, compared with Europe and a majority of EM economies, China’s economy is dominated by domestic rather than external demands (Chart 4). Moreover, a weaker external environment means that Chinese authorities will have to press on the stimulus pedal to avoid an outright growth contraction this year. Chart 3Global Trade Will Remain Depressed This Year... Chart 4...But The Chinese Economy Has Become Less Reliant On External Demand   Industrial profit growth turned positive in May, the first year-over-year increase in 2020. On a year-to-date basis, industrial profits remain in deep contraction (Chart 5). As aggressive credit and fiscal stimulus works its way into the economy, however, we expect China’s industrial profits and GDP to turn modestly positive for the entire year of 2020. Positive annual expansion in China’s industrial profits, even if small, supports a recovery in corporate earnings and stock prices. Chart 5Industrial Profit Growth Should Pick Up Along With The Economy Valuations in Chinese stocks have also become less expensive. Similar to the US and elsewhere, Chinese stock prices have trended upwards ahead of a corporate earnings recovery. Nevertheless, compared with other major economies, Chinese stocks have not diverged from its economic fundamentals as drastically as other major economies (Chart 6). Moreover, Chinese stocks are not traded at extreme multiples as experienced in previous cycles (Chart 7). Chart 6China's Stock Market Rally Less Decoupled From Economic Fundamentals Chart 7Valuations in Chinese Stocks Are Not As Extended As In Previous Cycles Bottom Line: China’s economic outlook for this year and next is better than the rest of the world, while its stocks are currently less overbought. This supports our positive view on Chinese stocks on a cyclical time frame. Lower Near-Term Risks China has been relatively successful in controlling its domestic infection rate compared with the uncertain path of virus containment in the US and most EM economies (Chart 8). China’s steady return to normalcy in business activities warrants a change in our tactical investment call on Chinese stocks from neutral to overweight. Chart 8Mind The Gap China has seen a flare up in domestically transmitted cases since June 11, after successfully containing the virus and reporting only single-digit new cases for nearly two months. However, the new cases have not had any meaningful impact on China’s returning to normalcy in domestic business or consumer activities. This is in sharp contrast with the US where a resurgence in infection rates last week threatened a potential rollback in economic re-openings and the need to increase social distance measures (Chart 9). Indeed, several states in the US have responded to the second wave of virus spread by slowing or stalling reopening efforts. The ongoing tug-of-war between normalizing economic activities and containing the pandemic challenges the sustainability of the US stock rally that started in late March. China’s new COVID cases are concentrated in Beijing and the number of daily new infections has been limited to double digits (Chart 10). Instead of imposing a blanket lockdown as was done in late January and February, the Beijing government has only locked down a few high-risk districts. In the past two weeks the municipal government has also drastically expanded its testing to more than one-third of its 21 million residents, and promptly traced and isolated close contacts of infected people. Chart 9Running Ahead Of Itself? Chart 10Beijing Quickly Brought New Case Numbers Down To Low Double-Digits China’s authoritative style of containing the pandemic leaves little room for error.  The chance is slim that the Chinese government will allow the number of infections, if any were to pop up, to manifest into a major second wave and derail its economic recovery. However, the US will undoubtedly experience some hiccups in the near term as it struggles to contain the virus and reopen its economy. Bottom Line: The near-term risk to China’s economic recovery due to a second wave of infections is lower relative to the rest of the world. A Few Words On Chinese Banks The central government’s request that commercial banks “sacrifice” 1.5 trillion yuan in profits this year will likely further depress the banking sector’s stock performance. However, it should have a limited negative impact on the performance of aggregate Chinese equities for the following reasons: The banking sector currently accounts for around 10% of market caps in both China's onshore and offshore equity markets, limiting the downside risks to the broad market from the sector’s price declines. The tech sector2 has been driving the overall stock performance in both China’s onshore and offshore equity markets (Chart 11). Chinese banks’ market capitalization as a share of the total broad market caps has declined in recent years, while the share of the tech sector has risen substantially (Chart 12). Chart 11The Tech Sector Has Been Driving Chinese Stock Performance Since 2016 Chart 12Banking Sector's Share Of Broad Market Has Been Declining Unlikely its global peers, banking sector's relative performance in both China’s domestic and offshore equity markets are countercyclical; periods of outperformance in banking stocks have been negatively related to rising economic activity and broad market stock prices.3 In other words, China’s banking sector underperforms during an economic recovery. It has been underperforming the broad indexes in both the domestic and investable markets since mid-2018, regardless the sector’s profit growth (Chart 13A and 13B). Chart 13ARegardless Of Profit Growth... Chart 13B...The Banking Sector Underperformed During Economic Recoveries Banks will give up a large portion of this year's profits by offering lower lending rates, cutting fees, deferring loan repayments and granting more unsecured loans to small businesses. Based on our calculations, banks will achieve the 1.5 trillion yuan goal by either lowering their average lending rate by 20bps and/or by expanding loan growth by 15% in the 2nd half of 2020 from last year (Table 1). Both measures will benefit China’s real economy and corporate profits, as well as help to bolster corporate marginal propensity to invest. The net result will be positive on overall stock performance in the medium term.  Table 1Scenarios On How Banks Will Make Up For The 1.5 Trillion Profit “Sacrifice” Bottom Line:  China’s banking sector will continue to underperform, but the impact from a profit reduction this year should have a limited negative impact on Chinese equities. The benefit of a “wealth transfer” from banks to the real economy, however, should more than offset the banking sector’s drag on Chinese stocks. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Investing During A Global Pandemic," dated April 1, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2   Please see the footnote in Chart 12 for the tech-related sectors included in China's offshore market and the TMT Index in the A-share market. 3   Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance," dated November 27, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights Economic shocks in recent decades have led to surges in nationalism and the COVID-19 crisis is unlikely to be different. Nationalism adds to the structural challenges facing globalization, which is already in retreat. Investors face at least a 35% chance that President Trump will be reelected and energize a nationalist and protectionist agenda that is globally disruptive. China is also indulging in nationalism as trend growth slows, raising the probability of a clash with the US even if Trump does not win. US-China economic decoupling will present opportunities as well as risks – primarily for India and Southeast Asia. Feature Since the Great Recession, investors have watched the US dollar and US equities outperform their peers in the face of a destabilizing world order (Chart 1). Chart 1US Outperformance Amid Global Disorder Global and American economic policy uncertainty has surged to the highest levels on record. Investors face political and geopolitical power struggles, trade wars, a global pandemic and recession, and social unrest.  How will these risks shape up in the wake of COVID-19? First, massive monetary and fiscal stimulus ensure a global recovery but they also remove some of the economic limitations on countries that are witnessing a surge in nationalism.  Second, nationalism creates a precarious environment for globalization – namely the wave of “hyper-globalization” since 2000. Nationalism and de-globalization do not depend on the United States alone but rather have shifted to the East, which means that geopolitical risks will remain elevated even if the US presidential election sees a restoration of the more dovish Democratic Party.  Economic Shocks Fuel Nationalism’s Revival Nationalism is the idea that the political state should be made up of a single ethnic or cultural community. While many disasters have resulted from this idea, it is responsible for the modern nation-state and it has enabled democracies to take shape across Europe, the Americas, and beyond. Industrialization is also more feasible under nationalism because cultural conformity helps labor competitiveness.1  At the end of the Cold War, transnational communist ideology collapsed and democratic liberalism grew complacent. Each successive economic shock or major crisis has led to a surge in nationalism to fill the ideological gaps that were exposed. For instance, various nationalists and populists emerged from the financial crises of the late 1990s. Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to restore Russia to greatness in its own and other peoples’ eyes (Chart 2). Not every Russian adventure has mattered for investors, but taken together they have undermined the stability of the global system and raised barriers to exchange. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the interference in the US election in 2016 helped to fuel the rise in policy uncertainty, risk premiums in Russian assets, and safe havens over the past decade. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States created a surge in American nationalism (Chart 3). This surge has since collapsed, but while it lasted the US destabilized the Middle East and provided Russia and China with the opportunity to pursue a nationalist path of their own. Investors who went long oil and short the US dollar at this time could have done worse. Chart 2The Resurgence Of Russian Nationalism Chart 3USA: From Nationalism To Anti-Nationalism The 2008 crisis spawned new waves of nationalist feeling in countries such as China, Japan, the UK, and India (Chart 4). Conservatives of the majority cultural group rose to power, including in China, where provincial grassroots members of the elite reasserted the Communist Party’s centrality. Japan and India became excellent equity investment opportunities in their respective spheres, while the UK and China saw their currencies weaken.  The rising number of wars and conflicts across the world since 2008 reflects the shift toward nationalism, whether among minority groups seeking autonomy or nation-states seeking living space (Chart 5). Chart 4Nationalist Trends Since The Great Recession Chart 5World Conflicts Rise After Major Crises COVID-19 is the latest economic shock that will feed a new round of nationalism. At least 750 million people are extremely vulnerable across the world, mostly concentrated in the shatter belt from Libya to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and India.2 Instability will generate emigration and conflict. Once again the global oil supply will be at risk from Middle Eastern instability and the dollar will eventually fall due to gargantuan budget and trade deficits. Today’s shock will differ, however, in the way it knocks against globalization, a process that has already begun to slow. Specifically, this crisis threatens to generate instability in East Asia – the workshop of the world – due to the strategic conflict between the US and China. This conflict will play out in the form of “proxy battles” in Greater China and the East Asian periphery. The dollar’s recent weakness is a telling sign of the future to come. In the short run, however, political and geopolitical risks are acute and will support safe havens. Globalization In Retreat Nationalism is not necessarily at odds with globalization. Historically there are many cases in which nationalism undergirds a foreign policy that favors trade and eschews military intervention. This is the default setting of maritime powers such as the British and Dutch. Prior to WWII it was the American setting, and after WWII it was the Japanese. Over the past thirty years, however, the rise of nationalism has generally worked against global trade, peace, and order. That’s because after WWII most of the world accepted internationalist ideals and institutions promoted by the United States that encouraged free markets and free trade. Serious challenges to that US-led system are necessarily challenges to global trade. This is true even if they originate in the United States. Globalization has occurred in waves continuously since the sixteenth century. It is not a light matter to suggest that it is experiencing a reversal. Yet the best historical evidence suggests that global imports, as a share of global output, have hit a major top (Chart 6).3 The line in this chart will fall further in 2020. American household deleveraging, China’s secular slowdown, and the 2014 drop in oil and commodities have had a pervasive impact on the export contribution to global growth.   Chart 6Globalization Hits A Major Top The next upswing of the business cycle will prompt an increase in trade in 2021. Global fiscal stimulus this year amounts to 8% of GDP and counting. But will the import-to-GDP  ratio surpass previous highs? Probably not anytime soon. It is impossible to recreate America’s consumption boom and China’s production boom of the 1980s-2000s with public debt alone. Global trend growth is slowing. Isn’t globalization proceeding in services, if not goods? The world is more interconnected than ever, with nearly half of the population using the Internet – almost 30% in Sub-Saharan Africa. One in every two people uses a smartphone. Eventually the pandemic will be mitigated and global travel will resume. Nevertheless, the global services trade is also facing headwinds. And it requires even more political will to break down barriers for services than it does for goods (Chart 7). The desire of nations to control and patrol cyber space has resulted in separate Internets for authoritarian states like Russia and China. Even democracies are turning to censorship and content controls to protect their ideologies.  Chart 7Both Goods And Services Face Headwinds Political demands to protect workers and industries are gaining ground. Policymakers in China and Russia have already shifted back toward import substitution; now the US and EU are joining them, at least when it comes to strategic sectors (health, defense). Nationalists and populists across the emerging world will follow their lead. Regional and wealth inequalities are driving populations to be more skeptical of globalization. GDP per capita has not grown as fast as GDP itself, a simple indication of how globalization does not benefit everyone equally even though it increases growth overall (Chart 8). Inequality is a factor not only because of relatively well-off workers in the developed world who resent losing their job or earning less than their neighbors. Inequality is also rife in the developing world where opportunities to work, earn higher wages, borrow, enter markets, and innovate are lacking. Over the past decade, emerging countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa have seen growing skepticism about whether foreign openness creates jobs or lifts wages.4  Immigration is probably the clearest indication of the break from globalization. The United States and especially the European Union have faced an influx of refugees and immigrants across their southern borders and have resorted to hard-nosed tactics to put a stop to it (Chart 9). Chart 8Global Inequality Fuels Protectionism Chart 9US And EU Crack Down On Immigration There is zero chance that these tough tactics will come to an end anytime soon in Europe, where the political establishment has discovered a winning combination with voters by promoting European integration yet tightening control of borders. This combination has kept populists at bay in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany. A degree of nationalism has been co-opted by the transnational European project. In the US, extreme polarization could cause a major change in immigration policy, depending on the election later this year. But note that the Obama administration was relatively hawkish on the border and the next president will face sky-high unemployment, which discourages flinging open the gates.  Reduced immigration will weigh on potential GDP growth and drive up the wage bill for domestic corporations. If nationalism continues to rise and to hinder the movement of people, goods, capital, and ideas, then it will reduce the market’s expectations of future earnings. American Nationalism Still A Risk  The United States is experiencing a “Civil War Lite” that may take anywhere from one-to-five years to resolve. The November 3 presidential election will have a major impact on the direction of nationalism and globalization over the coming presidential term. If President Trump is reelected – which we peg at 35% odds – then American nationalism and protectionism will gain a new lease on life. Other nations will follow the US’s lead. If Trump fails, then nationalism will likely be driven by external forces, but protectionism will persist in some form. Chart 10Trump Is Not Yet Down For The Count Investors should not write Trump off. If the election were held today, Trump would lose, but the election is still four months away. His national approval rating has troughed at a higher level than previous troughs. His disapproval rating has spiked but has not yet cleared its early 2019 peak (Chart 10).5 This is despite an unprecedented deluge of bad news: universal condemnation from Democrats and the media, high-profile defections from fellow Republicans and cabinet members, stunning defeats at the Supreme Court, and scathing rebukes from top US army officers. If Trump’s odds are 35% then this translates to a 35% chance that the United States will continue pursuing globally disruptive “America First” foreign and trade policies in the 2020-24 period.    First Trump will attempt to pass a Reciprocal Trade Act to equalize tariffs with all trading partners. Assuming Democrats block it in the House of Representatives, he will still have sweeping executive authority to levy tariffs. He will launch the next round in the trade war with China to secure a “Phase Two” trade deal, which will be tougher because it will be focused on structural reforms. He could also open new fronts against the European Union, Mexico, and other trade surplus countries. By contrast, these risks will melt away if Biden is elected. Biden would restore the Obama administration’s approach of trade favoritism toward strategic allies and partners, such as Europe and the members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but only occasional use of tariffs. Biden would work with international organizations like the World Trade Organization. His foreign policy would also open up trade with pariah states like Iran, reducing the tail-risk of a war to almost zero.  Biden would be tougher on China than Presidents Obama or Bill Clinton, as the consensus in Washington is now hawkish and Biden would need to keep the blue-collar voters he won back from Trump. He may keep Trump’s tariffs in place as negotiating leverage. But he is less likely to expand these tariffs – and there is zero chance he will use them against Europe. At the same time, it will take a year or more to court the allies and put together a "coalition of the willing" to pressure China on structural reforms and liberalization. China would get a reprieve – and so would financial markets. Thus investors have a roughly 65% chance of seeing US policy “normalize” into an internationalist (not nationalist) approach that reduces the US contribution to trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk over the next few years at minimum. But there are still four months to go before the election; these odds can change, and equity market volatility will come first. Moreover a mellower US would still need to react to nationalism in Asia. European Nationalism Not A Risk (Yet) European nationalism has reemerged in recent years but has greatly disappointed the prophets of doom who expected it to lead to the breakup of the European Union. The southern European states suffered the most from COVID-19 but many of them have made their decision regarding nationalism and the supra-national EU. Greece underwent a depression yet remained in the union. Italians could easily elect the right-wing anti-establishment League to head a government in the not-too-distant future. But there is no appetite for an Italian exit. Brexit is the grand exception. If Trump wins, then the UK and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson will be seen as the vanguard of the revival of nationalism in the West. If Trump loses, English nationalism will appear an isolated case that is constrained by its own logic given the response of Scottish nationalism (Chart 11). The trend in the British Isles would become increasingly remote from the trends in continental Europe and the United States. The majority of Europeans identify both as Europeans and as their home nationality, including majorities in countries like Greece, Italy, France, and Austria where visions of life outside the union are the most robust (Chart 12). Even the Catalonians are focused on options other than independence, which has fallen to 36% support. Eastern European nationalists play a careful balancing game of posturing against Brussels yet never drifting so far as to let Russia devour them. Chart 11English Versus Scottish Nationalism Chart 12European Nationalism Is Limited (For Now) Europeans have embraced the EU as a multi-ethnic confederation that requires dual allegiances and prioritizes the European project. COVID-19 has so far reinforced this trend, showing solidarity as the predominant force, and much more promptly than during the 2011 crisis. It will take a different kind of crisis to reverse this trend of deeper integration. European nationalists would benefit from another economic crash, a new refugee wave from the Middle East, or conflict with Turkish nationalism. The latter is already burning brightly and will eventually flame out, but not before causing a regional crisis of some kind. European policymakers are containing nationalism by co-opting some of its demands. The EU is taking steps to guard against globalization, particularly on immigration and Chinese mercantilism. The lack of nationalist uprisings in Europe do not overthrow the contention that globalization is slowing down. Europe can become more integrated at home while maintaining the higher barriers against globalization that it has always maintained relative to the UK and United States. Chinese Nationalism The Biggest Risk The nationalist risk to globalization is most significant in East Asia and the Pacific, where Chinese nationalism continues the ascent that began with the Great Recession. China’s slowdown in growth rates has weakened the Communist Party’s confidence in the long-term viability of single-party rule. The result has been a shift in the party line to promote ideology and quality of life improvements to compensate for slower income gains. Xi Jinping’s governing philosophy consists of nationalist territorial gains, promoting “the China Dream” for the middle class, and projecting ambitious goals of global influence by 2035 and 2049. The result has been a clash between mainland Chinese and peripheral Chinese territories – especially Hong Kong and Taiwan (Chart 13). The turn away from Chinese identity in these areas runs up against their economic interest. It is largely a reaction to the surge in mainland nationalist sentiment, which cannot be observed directly due to the absence of reliable opinion polling. Chart 13Chinese Nationalism On The Mainland, Anti-Nationalism In Periphery The conflict over identity in Greater China is perhaps the world’s greatest geopolitical risk. While Hong Kong has no conceivable alternative to Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan does. The US is interested in reviving its technological and defense relationship with Taiwan now that it seeks to counterbalance China. Chart 14Taiwan: Epicenter Of US-China Cold War Beijing may be faced with a technology cordon imposed by the United States, and yet have the option of circumventing this cordon via Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” used to be its security guarantee. Now that the US is tightening export controls and sanctions on China, Beijing has a greater need to confiscate that shield. This makes Taiwan the epicenter of the US-China struggle, as we have highlighted since 2016. The risk of a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is as pertinent in the short run as it is over the long run, given that the US and China have already intensified their saber-rattling in the Strait (Chart 14), including in the wake of COVID-19 specifically. China’s secular slowdown is prompting it to encroach on the borders of all of its neighbors simultaneously, creating a nascent balance-of-power alliance ranging from India to Australia to Japan. If China fails to curb its nationalism, then eventually US political polarization will decline as the country unites in the face of a peer competitor. If American divisions persist, they could drive the US to instigate conflict with China. Thus a failure of either side to restrain itself is a major geopolitical risk. The US and China ultimately face mutually assured destruction in the event of conflict, but they can have a clash in the near term before they learn their limits. The Cold War provides many occasions of such a learning process – from the Berlin airlift to the Cuban missile crisis. Such crises typically present buying opportunities for financial markets, but the consequences could be more far reaching if the Asian manufacturing supply chain is permanently damaged or if the shifting of supply chains out of China is too rapid. Globalization will also suffer as a result of currency wars. The US has not been successful in driving the dollar down, a key demand of the US-China trade war. It is much harder to force China to reform its labor and wage policies than it is to force it to appreciate its currency. But unlike Japan in 1985, China will not commit to unilateral appreciation for fear of American economic sabotage.   Punitive measures will remain an American tool. Contrary to popular belief, the US is not attempting to eliminate its trade deficit. It is attempting to reduce overreliance on China. Status quo globalization is intolerable for US strategy. But autarky is intolerable for US corporations. The compromise is globalization-ex-China, i.e., economic decoupling. Investment Implications Chart 15Favor International Stocks As Growth Revives US stock market capitalization now makes up 58% of global capitalization (Chart 15), reflecting the strength and innovation of American companies as well as a worldwide flight to safety during a decade of rising policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk. The revival of global growth amid this year’s gargantuan stimulus will prompt a major rotation out of US equities and into international and emerging market equities over the long run. As mentioned, the US greenback would also trend downward. However, there will be little clarity on the pace of nationalism and the fate of globalization until the US election is decided. Moreover the fate of globalization does not depend entirely on the United States. It mostly depends on countries in the east – Russia, China, and India, all of which are increasingly nationalistic.  A miscalculation over Taiwan, North Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, trade, or technology could ignite into tariffs, sanctions, boycotts, embargoes, saber-rattling, proxy battles, and potentially even direct conflict. These risks are elevated in the short run but will persist in the long run. As the US decouples from China it will have to deepen relations with other trading partners. The trade deficit will not go away but will be redistributed to Asian allies. Southeast Asian nations and India – whose own nationalism has created a shift in favor of economic development – will be the long-run beneficiaries.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). 2  Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, and Ying Han, “750 Million Struggling To Meet Basic Needs With No Safety Net,” Gallup News, June 16, 2020. 3 Christopher Chase-Dunn et al, “The Development of World-Systems,” Sociology of Development 1 (2015), pp. 149-172; and Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, Benjamin Brewer, “Trade globalization since 1795: waves of integration in the world-system,” American Sociological Review 65 (2000), pp. 77-95. 4 Bruce Stokes, “Americans, Like Many In Other Advanced Economies, Not Convinced Of Trade’s Benefits,” September 26, 2018. 5 In other words, the mishandling of COVID-19 and the historic George Floyd protests of June 2020 have not taken as great of a toll on Trump’s national approval, thus far, as the Ukraine scandal last October, the government shutdown in January-February 2019, the near-failure to pass tax cuts in December 2017, or the Charlottesville incident in August 2017. This is surprising and points once more to Trump’s very solid political base, which could serve as a springboard for a comeback over the next four months.

Special Report

Dear Client, This week, we are publishing a Special Report on the geopolitical implications of COVID-19 from Matt Gertken, BCA Research’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist. Matt discusses the rise of nationalism with each successive global crisis and the negative implications for globalization. I hope you find his report insightful. Next week, we will publish our quarterly Strategy Outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Economic shocks in recent decades have led to surges in nationalism and the COVID-19 crisis is unlikely to be different. Nationalism adds to the structural challenges facing globalization, which is already in retreat. Investors face at least a 35% chance that President Trump will be reelected and energize a nationalist and protectionist agenda that is globally disruptive. China is also indulging in nationalism as trend growth slows, raising the probability of a clash with the US even if Trump does not win. US-China economic decoupling will present opportunities as well as risks – primarily for India and Southeast Asia. Feature Since the Great Recession, investors have watched the US dollar and US equities outperform their peers in the face of a destabilizing world order (Chart 1). Chart 1US Outperformance Amid Global Disorder Global and American economic policy uncertainty has surged to the highest levels on record. Investors face political and geopolitical power struggles, trade wars, a global pandemic and recession, and social unrest.  How will these risks shape up in the wake of COVID-19? First, massive monetary and fiscal stimulus ensure a global recovery but they also remove some of the economic limitations on countries that are witnessing a surge in nationalism.  Second, nationalism creates a precarious environment for globalization – namely the wave of “hyper-globalization” since 2000. Nationalism and de-globalization do not depend on the United States alone but rather have shifted to the East, which means that geopolitical risks will remain elevated even if the US presidential election sees a restoration of the more dovish Democratic Party.  Economic Shocks Fuel Nationalism’s Revival Nationalism is the idea that the political state should be made up of a single ethnic or cultural community. While many disasters have resulted from this idea, it is responsible for the modern nation-state and it has enabled democracies to take shape across Europe, the Americas, and beyond. Industrialization is also more feasible under nationalism because cultural conformity helps labor competitiveness.1  At the end of the Cold War, transnational communist ideology collapsed and democratic liberalism grew complacent. Each successive economic shock or major crisis has led to a surge in nationalism to fill the ideological gaps that were exposed. For instance, various nationalists and populists emerged from the financial crises of the late 1990s. Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to restore Russia to greatness in its own and other peoples’ eyes (Chart 2). Not every Russian adventure has mattered for investors, but taken together they have undermined the stability of the global system and raised barriers to exchange. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the interference in the US election in 2016 helped to fuel the rise in policy uncertainty, risk premiums in Russian assets, and safe havens over the past decade. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States created a surge in American nationalism (Chart 3). This surge has since collapsed, but while it lasted the US destabilized the Middle East and provided Russia and China with the opportunity to pursue a nationalist path of their own. Investors who went long oil and short the US dollar at this time could have done worse. Chart 2The Resurgence Of Russian Nationalism Chart 3USA: From Nationalism To Anti-Nationalism The 2008 crisis spawned new waves of nationalist feeling in countries such as China, Japan, the UK, and India (Chart 4). Conservatives of the majority cultural group rose to power, including in China, where provincial grassroots members of the elite reasserted the Communist Party’s centrality. Japan and India became excellent equity investment opportunities in their respective spheres, while the UK and China saw their currencies weaken.  The rising number of wars and conflicts across the world since 2008 reflects the shift toward nationalism, whether among minority groups seeking autonomy or nation-states seeking living space (Chart 5). Chart 4Nationalist Trends Since The Great Recession Chart 5World Conflicts Rise After Major Crises COVID-19 is the latest economic shock that will feed a new round of nationalism. At least 750 million people are extremely vulnerable across the world, mostly concentrated in the shatter belt from Libya to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and India.2 Instability will generate emigration and conflict. Once again the global oil supply will be at risk from Middle Eastern instability and the dollar will eventually fall due to gargantuan budget and trade deficits. Today’s shock will differ, however, in the way it knocks against globalization, a process that has already begun to slow. Specifically, this crisis threatens to generate instability in East Asia – the workshop of the world – due to the strategic conflict between the US and China. This conflict will play out in the form of “proxy battles” in Greater China and the East Asian periphery. The dollar’s recent weakness is a telling sign of the future to come. In the short run, however, political and geopolitical risks are acute and will support safe havens. Globalization In Retreat Nationalism is not necessarily at odds with globalization. Historically there are many cases in which nationalism undergirds a foreign policy that favors trade and eschews military intervention. This is the default setting of maritime powers such as the British and Dutch. Prior to WWII it was the American setting, and after WWII it was the Japanese. Over the past thirty years, however, the rise of nationalism has generally worked against global trade, peace, and order. That’s because after WWII most of the world accepted internationalist ideals and institutions promoted by the United States that encouraged free markets and free trade. Serious challenges to that US-led system are necessarily challenges to global trade. This is true even if they originate in the United States. Globalization has occurred in waves continuously since the sixteenth century. It is not a light matter to suggest that it is experiencing a reversal. Yet the best historical evidence suggests that global imports, as a share of global output, have hit a major top (Chart 6).3 The line in this chart will fall further in 2020. American household deleveraging, China’s secular slowdown, and the 2014 drop in oil and commodities have had a pervasive impact on the export contribution to global growth.   Chart 6Globalization Hits A Major Top The next upswing of the business cycle will prompt an increase in trade in 2021. Global fiscal stimulus this year amounts to 8% of GDP and counting. But will the import-to-GDP  ratio surpass previous highs? Probably not anytime soon. It is impossible to recreate America’s consumption boom and China’s production boom of the 1980s-2000s with public debt alone. Global trend growth is slowing. Isn’t globalization proceeding in services, if not goods? The world is more interconnected than ever, with nearly half of the population using the Internet – almost 30% in Sub-Saharan Africa. One in every two people uses a smartphone. Eventually the pandemic will be mitigated and global travel will resume. Nevertheless, the global services trade is also facing headwinds. And it requires even more political will to break down barriers for services than it does for goods (Chart 7). The desire of nations to control and patrol cyber space has resulted in separate Internets for authoritarian states like Russia and China. Even democracies are turning to censorship and content controls to protect their ideologies.  Chart 7Both Goods And Services Face Headwinds Political demands to protect workers and industries are gaining ground. Policymakers in China and Russia have already shifted back toward import substitution; now the US and EU are joining them, at least when it comes to strategic sectors (health, defense). Nationalists and populists across the emerging world will follow their lead. Regional and wealth inequalities are driving populations to be more skeptical of globalization. GDP per capita has not grown as fast as GDP itself, a simple indication of how globalization does not benefit everyone equally even though it increases growth overall (Chart 8). Inequality is a factor not only because of relatively well-off workers in the developed world who resent losing their job or earning less than their neighbors. Inequality is also rife in the developing world where opportunities to work, earn higher wages, borrow, enter markets, and innovate are lacking. Over the past decade, emerging countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa have seen growing skepticism about whether foreign openness creates jobs or lifts wages.4  Immigration is probably the clearest indication of the break from globalization. The United States and especially the European Union have faced an influx of refugees and immigrants across their southern borders and have resorted to hard-nosed tactics to put a stop to it (Chart 9). Chart 8Global Inequality Fuels Protectionism Chart 9US And EU Crack Down On Immigration There is zero chance that these tough tactics will come to an end anytime soon in Europe, where the political establishment has discovered a winning combination with voters by promoting European integration yet tightening control of borders. This combination has kept populists at bay in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany. A degree of nationalism has been co-opted by the transnational European project. In the US, extreme polarization could cause a major change in immigration policy, depending on the election later this year. But note that the Obama administration was relatively hawkish on the border and the next president will face sky-high unemployment, which discourages flinging open the gates.  Reduced immigration will weigh on potential GDP growth and drive up the wage bill for domestic corporations. If nationalism continues to rise and to hinder the movement of people, goods, capital, and ideas, then it will reduce the market’s expectations of future earnings. American Nationalism Still A Risk  The United States is experiencing a “Civil War Lite” that may take anywhere from one-to-five years to resolve. The November 3 presidential election will have a major impact on the direction of nationalism and globalization over the coming presidential term. If President Trump is reelected – which we peg at 35% odds – then American nationalism and protectionism will gain a new lease on life. Other nations will follow the US’s lead. If Trump fails, then nationalism will likely be driven by external forces, but protectionism will persist in some form. Chart 10Trump Is Not Yet Down For The Count Investors should not write Trump off. If the election were held today, Trump would lose, but the election is still four months away. His national approval rating has troughed at a higher level than previous troughs. His disapproval rating has spiked but has not yet cleared its early 2019 peak (Chart 10).5 This is despite an unprecedented deluge of bad news: universal condemnation from Democrats and the media, high-profile defections from fellow Republicans and cabinet members, stunning defeats at the Supreme Court, and scathing rebukes from top US army officers. If Trump’s odds are 35% then this translates to a 35% chance that the United States will continue pursuing globally disruptive “America First” foreign and trade policies in the 2020-24 period.    First Trump will attempt to pass a Reciprocal Trade Act to equalize tariffs with all trading partners. Assuming Democrats block it in the House of Representatives, he will still have sweeping executive authority to levy tariffs. He will launch the next round in the trade war with China to secure a “Phase Two” trade deal, which will be tougher because it will be focused on structural reforms. He could also open new fronts against the European Union, Mexico, and other trade surplus countries. By contrast, these risks will melt away if Biden is elected. Biden would restore the Obama administration’s approach of trade favoritism toward strategic allies and partners, such as Europe and the members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but only occasional use of tariffs. Biden would work with international organizations like the World Trade Organization. His foreign policy would also open up trade with pariah states like Iran, reducing the tail-risk of a war to almost zero.  Biden would be tougher on China than Presidents Obama or Bill Clinton, as the consensus in Washington is now hawkish and Biden would need to keep the blue-collar voters he won back from Trump. He may keep Trump’s tariffs in place as negotiating leverage. But he is less likely to expand these tariffs – and there is zero chance he will use them against Europe. At the same time, it will take a year or more to court the allies and put together a "coalition of the willing" to pressure China on structural reforms and liberalization. China would get a reprieve – and so would financial markets. Thus investors have a roughly 65% chance of seeing US policy “normalize” into an internationalist (not nationalist) approach that reduces the US contribution to trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk over the next few years at minimum. But there are still four months to go before the election; these odds can change, and equity market volatility will come first. Moreover a mellower US would still need to react to nationalism in Asia. European Nationalism Not A Risk (Yet) European nationalism has reemerged in recent years but has greatly disappointed the prophets of doom who expected it to lead to the breakup of the European Union. The southern European states suffered the most from COVID-19 but many of them have made their decision regarding nationalism and the supra-national EU. Greece underwent a depression yet remained in the union. Italians could easily elect the right-wing anti-establishment League to head a government in the not-too-distant future. But there is no appetite for an Italian exit. Brexit is the grand exception. If Trump wins, then the UK and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson will be seen as the vanguard of the revival of nationalism in the West. If Trump loses, English nationalism will appear an isolated case that is constrained by its own logic given the response of Scottish nationalism (Chart 11). The trend in the British Isles would become increasingly remote from the trends in continental Europe and the United States. The majority of Europeans identify both as Europeans and as their home nationality, including majorities in countries like Greece, Italy, France, and Austria where visions of life outside the union are the most robust (Chart 12). Even the Catalonians are focused on options other than independence, which has fallen to 36% support. Eastern European nationalists play a careful balancing game of posturing against Brussels yet never drifting so far as to let Russia devour them. Chart 11English Versus Scottish Nationalism Chart 12European Nationalism Is Limited (For Now) Europeans have embraced the EU as a multi-ethnic confederation that requires dual allegiances and prioritizes the European project. COVID-19 has so far reinforced this trend, showing solidarity as the predominant force, and much more promptly than during the 2011 crisis. It will take a different kind of crisis to reverse this trend of deeper integration. European nationalists would benefit from another economic crash, a new refugee wave from the Middle East, or conflict with Turkish nationalism. The latter is already burning brightly and will eventually flame out, but not before causing a regional crisis of some kind. European policymakers are containing nationalism by co-opting some of its demands. The EU is taking steps to guard against globalization, particularly on immigration and Chinese mercantilism. The lack of nationalist uprisings in Europe do not overthrow the contention that globalization is slowing down. Europe can become more integrated at home while maintaining the higher barriers against globalization that it has always maintained relative to the UK and United States. Chinese Nationalism The Biggest Risk The nationalist risk to globalization is most significant in East Asia and the Pacific, where Chinese nationalism continues the ascent that began with the Great Recession. China’s slowdown in growth rates has weakened the Communist Party’s confidence in the long-term viability of single-party rule. The result has been a shift in the party line to promote ideology and quality of life improvements to compensate for slower income gains. Xi Jinping’s governing philosophy consists of nationalist territorial gains, promoting “the China Dream” for the middle class, and projecting ambitious goals of global influence by 2035 and 2049. The result has been a clash between mainland Chinese and peripheral Chinese territories – especially Hong Kong and Taiwan (Chart 13). The turn away from Chinese identity in these areas runs up against their economic interest. It is largely a reaction to the surge in mainland nationalist sentiment, which cannot be observed directly due to the absence of reliable opinion polling. Chart 13Chinese Nationalism On The Mainland, Anti-Nationalism In Periphery The conflict over identity in Greater China is perhaps the world’s greatest geopolitical risk. While Hong Kong has no conceivable alternative to Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan does. The US is interested in reviving its technological and defense relationship with Taiwan now that it seeks to counterbalance China. Chart 14Taiwan: Epicenter Of US-China Cold War Beijing may be faced with a technology cordon imposed by the United States, and yet have the option of circumventing this cordon via Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” used to be its security guarantee. Now that the US is tightening export controls and sanctions on China, Beijing has a greater need to confiscate that shield. This makes Taiwan the epicenter of the US-China struggle, as we have highlighted since 2016. The risk of a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is as pertinent in the short run as it is over the long run, given that the US and China have already intensified their saber-rattling in the Strait (Chart 14), including in the wake of COVID-19 specifically. China’s secular slowdown is prompting it to encroach on the borders of all of its neighbors simultaneously, creating a nascent balance-of-power alliance ranging from India to Australia to Japan. If China fails to curb its nationalism, then eventually US political polarization will decline as the country unites in the face of a peer competitor. If American divisions persist, they could drive the US to instigate conflict with China. Thus a failure of either side to restrain itself is a major geopolitical risk. The US and China ultimately face mutually assured destruction in the event of conflict, but they can have a clash in the near term before they learn their limits. The Cold War provides many occasions of such a learning process – from the Berlin airlift to the Cuban missile crisis. Such crises typically present buying opportunities for financial markets, but the consequences could be more far reaching if the Asian manufacturing supply chain is permanently damaged or if the shifting of supply chains out of China is too rapid. Globalization will also suffer as a result of currency wars. The US has not been successful in driving the dollar down, a key demand of the US-China trade war. It is much harder to force China to reform its labor and wage policies than it is to force it to appreciate its currency. But unlike Japan in 1985, China will not commit to unilateral appreciation for fear of American economic sabotage.   Punitive measures will remain an American tool. Contrary to popular belief, the US is not attempting to eliminate its trade deficit. It is attempting to reduce overreliance on China. Status quo globalization is intolerable for US strategy. But autarky is intolerable for US corporations. The compromise is globalization-ex-China, i.e., economic decoupling. Investment Implications Chart 15Favor International Stocks As Growth Revives US stock market capitalization now makes up 58% of global capitalization (Chart 15), reflecting the strength and innovation of American companies as well as a worldwide flight to safety during a decade of rising policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk. The revival of global growth amid this year’s gargantuan stimulus will prompt a major rotation out of US equities and into international and emerging market equities over the long run. As mentioned, the US greenback would also trend downward. However, there will be little clarity on the pace of nationalism and the fate of globalization until the US election is decided. Moreover the fate of globalization does not depend entirely on the United States. It mostly depends on countries in the east – Russia, China, and India, all of which are increasingly nationalistic.  A miscalculation over Taiwan, North Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, trade, or technology could ignite into tariffs, sanctions, boycotts, embargoes, saber-rattling, proxy battles, and potentially even direct conflict. These risks are elevated in the short run but will persist in the long run. As the US decouples from China it will have to deepen relations with other trading partners. The trade deficit will not go away but will be redistributed to Asian allies. Southeast Asian nations and India – whose own nationalism has created a shift in favor of economic development – will be the long-run beneficiaries.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). 2  Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, and Ying Han, “750 Million Struggling To Meet Basic Needs With No Safety Net,” Gallup News, June 16, 2020. 3 Christopher Chase-Dunn et al, “The Development of World-Systems,” Sociology of Development 1 (2015), pp. 149-172; and Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, Benjamin Brewer, “Trade globalization since 1795: waves of integration in the world-system,” American Sociological Review 65 (2000), pp. 77-95. 4 Bruce Stokes, “Americans, Like Many In Other Advanced Economies, Not Convinced Of Trade’s Benefits,” September 26, 2018. 5 In other words, the mishandling of COVID-19 and the historic George Floyd protests of June 2020 have not taken as great of a toll on Trump’s national approval, thus far, as the Ukraine scandal last October, the government shutdown in January-February 2019, the near-failure to pass tax cuts in December 2017, or the Charlottesville incident in August 2017. This is surprising and points once more to Trump’s very solid political base, which could serve as a springboard for a comeback over the next four months.

  Highlights In the short run, extreme policy uncertainty is problematic for risk assets. In the long run, gargantuan fiscal and monetary stimulus continues to support cyclical trades. Equity volatility always increases in the lead-up to US presidential elections. Trump has a 35% chance of reelection. The US-China trade deal is intact for now but the risk of a strategic crisis or tariffs is about 40%. Our Turkish GeoRisk Indicator is lower than it should be based on Turkey’s regional escapades. Feature US equities fell back by 2.6% on June 24 as investors took notice of rising near-term risks to the rally. With gargantuan global monetary and fiscal stimulus, we expect the global stock-to-bond ratio to rise over the long run (Chart 1). However, we still see downside risks prevailing in the near term related to the pandemic, US politics, geopolitics, and the rollout of additional stimulus this summer. Chart 1Risk-On Phase Continues - But Risks Mounting Chart 2Policy Uncertainty Hitting Extremes Global economic policy uncertainty is skyrocketing – particularly due to the epic the November 3 US election showdown. Yet Chinese policy uncertainty remains elevated and will rise higher given that the pandemic epicenter now faces an unprecedented challenge to its economic and political order. China’s economic instability will increase emerging market policy uncertainty (Chart 2). Only Europe is seeing political risk fall, yet Trump’s threats of tariffs against Europe this week highlight that he will resort to protectionism if his approval rating does not benefit from stock market gains, which is currently the case. The COVID-19 outbreak is accelerating in the US in the wake of economic reopening and insufficient public adherence to health precautions and distancing measures. The divergence with Europe is stark (Chart 3). Authorities will struggle to institute sweeping lockdowns again, but some states are tightening restrictions on the margin and this will grow. Chart 3US COVID-19 Outbreak The divergence between daily new infection cases and new deaths in the US, as well as countries as disparate as Sweden and Iran, is not entirely reassuring. The US is effectively following Sweden’s “light touch” model. Ultimately COVID is not much of a risk if deaths are minimized – but tighter social restrictions will frighten the markets regardless (Chart 4). President Trump’s election chances have fallen under the weight of the pandemic – followed by social unrest and controversy over race relations. But net approval on handling the economy is holding up well enough (Chart 5). Chart 4Divergence In New Cases Versus New Deaths Chart 5Trump’s Lifeline Is The Economy Our subjective 35% odds of reelection still seem appropriate for now – but we will upgrade Trump if the financial and economic rebound is sustained while his polling improves. His approval should pick up in the face of a collapse of law and order, not to mention left-wing anarchists removing or vandalizing historical monuments to America’s Founding Fathers and some great public figures who had nothing to do with the Confederacy in the Civil War. Equity volatility will increase ahead of the US election. Chart 6Volatility Always Rises Before US Elections Equity volatility always increases in the lead up to modern American elections (Chart 6) and this year’s extreme polarization, high unemployment, and precarious geopolitical environment suggest that negative surprises could be worse than usual, notwithstanding the tsunami of stimulus. So far this year the S&P 500 is tracing along the lower end of its historical performance during presidential election years. This is consistent with a change of government in November, unless it continues to power upward over the next four months – typically a change of ruling party requires a technical correction on the year. Our US Equity Strategist, Anastasios Avgeriou, also expects the market to begin reacting to political risk – and he precisely timed the market’s peak and trough over the past year (Chart 7). We suspect that the positive correlation between the S&P and the Democratic Party’s odds of a full sweep of government is spurious. The reason the S&P has recovered is because of the economic snapback from the lockdowns and the global stimulus. The reason the odds of a Blue Wave election have surged is because the pandemic and recession decimated Trump and the Republicans. Going forward, the market needs to do more to discount a Democratic sweep. At 35%, this scenario is underrated in Chart 8, which considers all possible presidential and congressional combinations. Standalone bets put the odds of a Blue Wave at slightly above 50%. We have always argued that the party that wins the White House in 2020 is highly likely to take the Senate. Chart 7Market At Risk Of Election Cycle Chart 8Market Will Soon Worry About 'Blue Wave' True, the US is monetizing debt and this will push risk assets higher regardless over the long run. But if former Vice President Joe Biden wins the presidency, he will create a negative regulatory shock for American businesses, and if his party takes the Senate, then corporate taxes, capital gains taxes, federal minimum wages, liability insurance, and the cost of carbon (implicitly or explicitly) will all rise. The market must also reckon with the possibility that Trump is reelected or that he becomes firmly established as a “lame duck” and thus takes desperate measures prior to the election. His threat to impose tariffs on Europe this week underscores our point that if Trump’s approval rating stays low, despite a rising stock market, then the temptation to spend financial capital in pursuit of political capital will rise. This will involve a hard line on immigration and trade. Bottom Line: Tactically, there is more downside. Strategically, we remain pro-cyclical. Stimulus Hiccups This Summer One reason we have urged investors to buy insurance against downside risks this month is because of hurdles in rolling out the next round of fiscal stimulus. The four key drivers of the global growth rebound are liquidity, fiscal easing (Chart 9), an enthusiastic private sector response, and the large cushion of household wealth prior to the crisis. This is according to Mathieu Savary – author of our flagship Bank Credit Analyst report. Mathieu argues that it will be harder for investors to overlook policy uncertainty after the stimulus slows, i.e. the second derivative of liquidity turns negative. Chart 9Gargantuan Fiscal Stimulus The massive increase in budget deficits and the quick recovery in activity amid reopening have reduced politicians’ sense of urgency. We fear that the stock market will have to put more pressure on lawmakers to force them to provide more largesse. Ultimately they will do so – but if they delay, and if delay looks like it is turning into botching the job, then markets will temporarily panic. Why are we confident stimulus will prevail? In the United States, fiscal bills have flown through Congress despite record polarization. Democrats cannot afford to obstruct the stimulus just to hurt the economy and the president’s reelection chances. Instead they have gone hog wild – promoting massive spending across the board to demonstrate their fundamental proposition that government can play a larger and more positive role in Americans’ lives. Their latest proposal is worth $3 trillion, plus an infrastructure bill that nominally amounts to $500 billion over five years. President Trump, for his part, was always fiscally profligate and now wants $2 trillion in stimulus to fuel the economic recovery, thus increasing his chances of reelection as voters grow more optimistic in the second half of the year. He also wants $1 trillion in new infrastructure spending over five years. Yet Republican Senators are dragging their feet and offering only a $1 trillion package. In the end they will adopt Trump’s position because if they do not hang together, they will all hang separately in November. The debate will center on whether the extra $600 in monthly unemployment benefits will be continued (at a cost of $276bn in the previous Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act). Republicans want to tie benefits to returning to work, since this generous subsidy created perverse incentives and made it more economical for many to stay on the dole. There will also be a debate over whether to issue another round of direct cash checks to citizens ($290bn in the CARES Act). Republicans want to prioritize payroll tax cuts, again focusing on reducing unemployment (Chart 10). Chart 10US Fiscal Stimulus Breakdown Our US bond strategist, Ryan Swift, has shown that the cash handouts present a substantial fiscal “cliff.” Without the original one-time stimulus checks, real personal income would have fallen 5% since February, instead of rising 9% (Chart 11). If Republicans refuse to issue a new round of checks, yet the extra unemployment benefits stay, then over $1 trillion in income will be needed to fill the gap so that overall personal income will end up flat since February. In other words, an ~8% increase in income less transfers from current levels is necessary to prevent overall personal income from falling below its February level. China and the EU will eventually provide more largesse. Republican Senators will capitulate, but the process could be rocky and the market should see volatility this summer. China may also be forced to provide more stimulus in late July at its mid-year Politburo meeting – any lack of dovishness at that meeting will disappoint investors. European talks on the Next Generation recovery fund could also see delays (though they are progressing well so far). Brexit trade deal negotiations pose a near-term risk. There is also a non-negligible chance that the German Constitutional Court will raise further obstructions with the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programs on August 5. European risks are manageable on the whole, but the market is not discounting much (Chart 12). Chart 11Will Congress Takeaway The Money Tree? Bottom Line: We expect the S&P 500 to trade in a range between 2800 and 3200 points during this period of limbo in which risks over pandemic response and political risks will come to the fore while the market awaits new stimulus measures, which may not be perfectly timely. Chart 12European Risks Are Getting Priced Has The Phase One China Deal Failed Yet? President Trump’s threat this week to slap Europe with tariffs, if it imposes travel restrictions on the US over the coronavirus, points to the dynamic we have highlighted on the more consequential issue of whether Trump hikes broad-based tariffs on China, and/or nullifies the “Phase One” trade deal. Our sense is that if Trump is doing extremely poorly, or extremely well, in terms of opinion polls and the stock market, then the roughly 40% odds of sweeping punitive measures of some kind will go up (Diagram 1). Cumulatively we see the chance of a major tariff hike at 40%. Diagram 1Decision Tree: Risk Of Significant Trump Punitive Measures On China In 2020 White House trade czar Peter Navarro’s comments earlier this week, suggesting that the Phase One trade deal was already over, prompted Trump to tweet that he still fully supports the deal. Negotiations between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Chinese Politburo member Yang Jiechi also nominally kept the lid on tensions. However, China may need to depreciate the renminbi to ease deflationary pressures on its economy – and this would provoke Trump to retaliate (Chart 13). Chart 13Chinese Depreciation Would Provoke Trump We have always argued against the durability of the Phase One trade deal. Investors should plan for it to fall apart. Judging by our China GeoRisk Indicator, investors are putting in a higher risk premium into Chinese equities (Chart 14). They are also doing so with Korean equities, which are ultimately connected with US-China tensions. Only Taiwan is pricing zero political risk, which is undeserved and explains why we are short Taiwanese equities. After China’s imposition of a controversial national security law in Hong Kong and America’s decision to prepare retaliatory sanctions, reports emerged that Chinese authorities ordered state-owned agricultural traders to halt imports of soybean and pork – and potentially corn and cotton. These reports were swiftly followed by others that highlighted that state-owned Chinese firms purchased at least three cargoes of US soybeans on June 1, in spite of China’s decision to stop imports.1 Thus this aspect of the deal has not yet collapsed. But we would emphasize that the constraints against a failure of the deal are not prohibitive this year. The $200 billion worth of additional Chinese imports over 2020-2021 promised in the deal included $32 billion worth of additional US farm purchases – with at least $12.5 billion in 2020 and $19.5 billion in 2021 over 2017 imports of $24 billion. However, to date, US agricultural exports to China suggest that China may not even meet 2017 levels (Chart 15). Chart 14GeoRisk Indicators Show Rising Risk Chart 15Trade Deal Durability Still Shaky Soybeans account for roughly 60% of US agricultural exports to China. While Chinese imports are up so far this year relative to 2019, they remain well below pre-trade war levels. Although lower hog herds on the back of the African Swine Flu and disruptions caused by COVID-19 may be blamed, they are not the only cause of subdued purchases. The share of Chinese soybean imports coming from the US is also still below pre-trade war levels (Chart 16). Chart 16China Still Substituting Away From US New Chinese regulation requiring documents assuring food shipments to China are COVID-19 free adds another hurdle – China already banned poultry imports from Tyson Foods Inc. plants. Although the US’s share of China’s pork imports has picked up significantly, it will not go far toward meeting the trade deal requirements. China’s pork purchases from the US were valued at $0.3 billion in 2017, while soybean imports came in at $14 billion. Bottom Line: Trump’s only lifeline at the moment is the economy which pushes against canceling the US-China deal. But if he becomes a lame duck – or if exogenous factors humiliate him – then all bets are off. The passage of massive stimulus in the US and China removes economic constraints to conflict. Will Erdogan Overstep In Libya? We have long been bearish on Turkey relative to other emerging markets due to President Tayyip Erdogan’s populist policies, which erode monetary and fiscal responsibility and governance. Turkey’s intervention in Libya has marked a turning point in the Libyan civil war. The offensive to seize Tripoli on the part of General Khalifa Haftar of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA) has been met with defeat (Map 1). Map 1Libya’s Battlefront Is Closing In On The Oil Crescent Foreign backing has enabled the conflict. Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Russia are the Libyan National Army’s main supporters, while Turkey and Qatar support Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj of the UN recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA’s successes this year can be credited to Turkey, which ramped up its intervention in Libya, even as oil prices collapsed, hurting Haftar and his supporters. Now the battlefront has shifted to Sirte and the al-Jufra airbase – the largest in Libya – and is closing in on the eastern oil-producing crescent, which contains over 60% of Libya’s oil. The victor in Sirte will also have control over the oil ports of Sidra, Ras Lanuf, Marsa al-Brega, and Zuwetina. With all parties eying the prize, the conflict is intensifying. Tripoli faces greater resistance as its forces move east. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s June 6 ceasefire proposal, dubbed the Cairo Initiative, was rejected by al-Sarraj and Turkey. Instead, the Tripoli-based government wants to capture Sirte and al-Jufra before coming to the table. The recapturing of oil infrastructure would bring back some of Libya's lost output (Chart 17). Nevertheless, OPEC 2.0 is committed to keeping oil markets on track to rebalance, reducing the net effect of a Libyan production increase on global supplies. However, the GNA’s swift successes in the West may not be replicable as it moves further East, where support for Haftar is deeper and where the stakes are higher for both sides. This is demonstrated by the GNA’s failed attempt to capture Sirte on June 6. The battlefront is now at Egypt’s red line – GNA control of al-Jufra would pose a direct threat to Egypt and is thus considered a border in Egypt’s national security strategy. A push eastward risks escalating the conflict further by drawing in Egypt militarily. In a televised speech on June 20, al-Sisi threatened to deploy Egypt’s military if the red line is crossed. The statement was interpreted by Ankara as a declaration of war, raising the possibility that Egypt will go to war with Turkey in Libya. On paper, Egypt’s military is up to the task. Its recent upgrades have pulled up its ranking to ninth globally according to the Global Fire Power Index, surpassing Turkey’s strength in land and naval forces (Chart 18). However, while Turkey’s military has been active in other foreign conflicts such as in Syria, Egypt’s army is untested on foreign soil. Its most recent military encounter was the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Even after years of fighting, it has yet to declare victory against terrorist cells in the Sinai Peninsula. Thus Egypt’s rusty forces could face a protracted conflict in Libya rather than a swift victory. Chart 17GNA/Turkish Success Would Revive Libyan Oil Production Chart 18Egypt Is Militarily Capable … On Paper Other constraints may also deter al-Sisi from following through on his threat: Other Arab backers of the Libyan National Army – the UAE and Saudi Arabia – are unlikely to provide much support as their economies have been hammered by low oil prices. Egypt’s own economy is in poor shape to withstand a protracted war, with public debt on an unsustainable path. Not coincidentally, Egypt faces another potential military escalation to its south where it has been clashing with Ethiopia over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. The dam will control Egypt’s water supply. The latest round of negotiations failed last week. While Cairo is hoping to obtain a bilateral agreement over the schedule for filling the dam, Addis Ababa has indicated that it will begin filling the dam in July regardless of whether an agreement is reached. Al-Sisi’s response to the deadlocked situation has been to request an intervention by the UN Security Council. However, as the July filling date nears, the Egypt-Ethiopia standoff risks escalating into war. For Egypt, there is an urgency to secure its future water supplies now before Ethiopia begins filling the dam. And while resolving the Libyan conflict is also a matter of national security – Egypt sees the Libyan National Army as a buffer between its porous western border and the extremist elements of the GNA – the risks are not as pressing. Thus a military intervention in Libya would distract Egypt from the Ethiopian conflict and risk drawing it into a war on two fronts. Moreover, Egypt generally, and al-Sisi in particular, risk losing credibility in case of a defeat. That said, Egypt has high stakes in Libya. A GNA defeat could annul the recent Libya-Turkey maritime demarcation agreement – a positive for Egypt’s gas ambitions – and eliminate the presence of unfriendly militias on its Western border. Thus, if the GNA or GNA-allied forces kill Egyptian citizens, or look as if they are capable of utterly defeating Haftar on his own turf, then it would be a prompt for intervention. Meanwhile Turkey’s regional influence and foreign policy assertiveness is growing – and at risk of over-extension. Erdogan’s interests in Libya stem from both economic and strategic objectives. In addition to benefitting from oil and gas rights and rebuilding contracts, Ankara’s strategy is in line with its pursuit of greater regional influence as set out in the Mavi Vatan, its current strategic doctrine.2 There are already rumors of Turkish plans to establish bases in the recently captured al-Watiya air base and Misrata naval base. This would be in addition to Ankara’s bases in Somalia and in norther Iraq. Erdogan is partly driven into these foreign policy adventures to distract from his domestic challenges and keep his support level elevated ahead of the 2023 general election (Chart 19). However, his growing assertiveness threatens to alienate European neighbors and NATO allies, which have so far played a minimal role in the Libyan conflict yet have important interests there. For now, the western powers seem focused on countering Russian intervention in Libya and the broader Mediterranean. Prime Minister al-Sarraj and General Stephen Townsend, head of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), met earlier this week and reiterated the need to return to the negotiating table and respect Libyan sovereignty and the UN arms embargo, with a focus on stemming Russian interference. However, Turkish relations with the West may take a turn for the worse if Erdogan oversteps. Turkey continues to threaten Europe with floods of refugees and immigrants if its demands are not met. This pressure will grow due to the COVID-19 crisis, which will ripple across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Ankara also continues to press territorial claims in the Mediterranean Sea, ostensibly for energy development.3 Turkey has recently clashed with Greece and France on the seas. In sum, the Libyan conflict is intensifying as it moves into the oil crescent. The Turkey-backed GNA will face greater resistance in Sirte and al-Jufra, even assuming that Egypt does not follow through on its threat of intervening militarily. Erdogan’s foreign adventurism will provoke greater opposition in Libya and elsewhere among key western powers, Russia, and the Gulf Arab states. Bottom Line: The implication is that a deterioration in Turkey’s relationship with the West, military overextension, and continued domestic economic mismanagement will push up our Turkey GeoRisk Indicator, which is a way of saying that it will weigh on the currency (Chart 20). Chart 19Erdogan’s Fear Of Opposition Drives Bold Policy Chart 20Foreign And Domestic Factors Will Push Up Turkish Risk Stay short our “Strongman Basket” of emerging market currencies, including the Turkish lira. Investment Takeaways We entered the year by going strategically long EUR-USD, but closed the trade upon the COVID-19 lockdowns. We have resisted reinitiating it despite the 5% rally over the past three months due to extreme political risks this year, namely the US election and trade risks. Trump’s threat of tariffs on Europe this week highlights our concern. We will wait until the election outcome before reinstituting this trade, which should benefit over time as global and Chinese growth recover and the US dollar drops on yawning twin deficits. Throughout this year’s crisis we have periodically added cyclical and value plays to our strategic portfolio. We favor stocks over bonds and recommend going long global equities relative to the US 30-year treasuries. We are particularly interested in commodities that will benefit from ultra-reflationary policy and supply constraints due to insufficient capital spending. This month we recommend investors go long our BCA Rare Earth Basket, which features producers of rare earth elements and metals that can substitute for Chinese production (Chart 21). This trade reflects our macro outlook as well as our sense that the secular US-China strategic conflict will heat up before it cools down. Chart 21Position For An Escalation In The US-China Conflict   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Karl Plume et al, "China buys U.S. soybeans after halt to U.S. purchases ordered: sources," Reuters, June 1, 2020. 2 The Mavi Vatan or “Blue Homeland Doctrine” was announced by Turkish Admiral Cem Gurdeniz in 2006 and sets targets to Turkish control in two main regions. The first region is the three seas surrounding it – the Mediterranean Sea, Aegean Sea, and Black Sea with the goal of securing energy supplies and supporting Turkey’s economic growth. The second region encompasses the Red Sea, Caspian Sea and Arabian Sea where Ankara has strategic objectives. 3 Ankara’s gas drilling activities off Cyprus have been a form of frequent provocation for Greece and Cyprus. Ankara has also stated that it may begin oil exploration under a controversial maritime deal with Libya as early as August. Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Special Report

Highlights Economic shocks in recent decades have led to surges in nationalism and the COVID-19 crisis is unlikely to be different. Nationalism adds to the structural challenges facing globalization, which is already in retreat. Investors face at least a 35% chance that President Trump will be reelected and energize a nationalist and protectionist agenda that is globally disruptive. China is also indulging in nationalism as trend growth slows, raising the probability of a clash with the US even if Trump does not win. US-China economic decoupling will present opportunities as well as risks – primarily for India and Southeast Asia. Feature Since the Great Recession, investors have watched the US dollar and US equities outperform their peers in the face of a destabilizing world order (Chart II-1). Chart II-1US Outperformance Amid Global Disorder Global and American economic policy uncertainty has surged to the highest levels on record. Investors face political and geopolitical power struggles, trade wars, a global pandemic and recession, and social unrest.  How will these risks shape up in the wake of COVID-19? First, massive monetary and fiscal stimulus ensure a global recovery but they also remove some of the economic limitations on countries that are witnessing a surge in nationalism.  Second, nationalism creates a precarious environment for globalization – namely the wave of “hyper-globalization” since 2000. Nationalism and de-globalization do not depend on the United States alone but rather have shifted to the East, which means that geopolitical risks will remain elevated even if the US presidential election sees a restoration of the more dovish Democratic Party.  Economic Shocks Fuel Nationalism’s Revival Nationalism is the idea that the political state should be made up of a single ethnic or cultural community. While many disasters have resulted from this idea, it is responsible for the modern nation-state and it has enabled democracies to take shape across Europe, the Americas, and beyond. Industrialization is also more feasible under nationalism because cultural conformity helps labor competitiveness.1  At the end of the Cold War, transnational communist ideology collapsed and democratic liberalism grew complacent. Each successive economic shock or major crisis has led to a surge in nationalism to fill the ideological gaps that were exposed. Chart II-2The Resurgence Of Russian Nationalism Chart II-3USA: From Nationalism To Anti-Nationalism   For instance, various nationalists and populists emerged from the financial crises of the late 1990s. Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to restore Russia to greatness in its own and other peoples’ eyes (Chart II-2). Not every Russian adventure has mattered for investors, but taken together they have undermined the stability of the global system and raised barriers to exchange. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the interference in the US election in 2016 helped to fuel the rise in policy uncertainty, risk premiums in Russian assets, and safe havens over the past decade. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States created a surge in American nationalism (Chart II-3). This surge has since collapsed, but while it lasted the US destabilized the Middle East and provided Russia and China with the opportunity to pursue a nationalist path of their own. Investors who went long oil and short the US dollar at this time could have done worse. The 2008 crisis spawned new waves of nationalist feeling in countries such as China, Japan, the UK, and India (Chart II-4). Conservatives of the majority cultural group rose to power, including in China, where provincial grassroots members of the elite reasserted the Communist Party’s centrality. Japan and India became excellent equity investment opportunities in their respective spheres, while the UK and China saw their currencies weaken.  The rising number of wars and conflicts across the world since 2008 reflects the shift toward nationalism, whether among minority groups seeking autonomy or nation-states seeking living space (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Nationalist Trends Since The Great Recession Chart II-5World Conflicts Rise After Major Crises   COVID-19 is the latest economic shock that will feed a new round of nationalism. At least 750 million people are extremely vulnerable across the world, mostly concentrated in the shatter belt from Libya to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and India.2 Instability will generate emigration and conflict. Once again the global oil supply will be at risk from Middle Eastern instability and the dollar will eventually fall due to gargantuan budget and trade deficits. Today’s shock will differ, however, in the way it knocks against globalization, a process that has already begun to slow. Specifically, this crisis threatens to generate instability in East Asia – the workshop of the world – due to the strategic conflict between the US and China. This conflict will play out in the form of “proxy battles” in Greater China and the East Asian periphery. The dollar’s recent weakness is a telling sign of the future to come. In the short run, however, political and geopolitical risks are acute and will support safe havens. Globalization In Retreat Nationalism is not necessarily at odds with globalization. Historically there are many cases in which nationalism undergirds a foreign policy that favors trade and eschews military intervention. This is the default setting of maritime powers such as the British and Dutch. Prior to WWII it was the American setting, and after WWII it was the Japanese. Over the past thirty years, however, the rise of nationalism has generally worked against global trade, peace, and order. That’s because after WWII most of the world accepted internationalist ideals and institutions promoted by the United States that encouraged free markets and free trade. Serious challenges to that US-led system are necessarily challenges to global trade. This is true even if they originate in the United States. Globalization has occurred in waves continuously since the sixteenth century. It is not a light matter to suggest that it is experiencing a reversal. Yet the best historical evidence suggests that global imports, as a share of global output, have hit a major top (Chart II-6).3 The line in this chart will fall further in 2020. American household deleveraging, China’s secular slowdown, and the 2014 drop in oil and commodities have had a pervasive impact on the export contribution to global growth.   Chart II-6Globalization Hits A Major Top Chart II-7Both Goods And Services Face Headwinds The next upswing of the business cycle will prompt an increase in trade in 2021. Global fiscal stimulus this year amounts to 8% of GDP and counting. But will the import-to-GDP ratio surpass previous highs? Probably not anytime soon. It is impossible to recreate America’s consumption boom and China’s production boom of the 1980s-2000s with public debt alone. Global trend growth is slowing. Isn’t globalization proceeding in services, if not goods? The world is more interconnected than ever, with nearly half of the population using the Internet – almost 30% in Sub-Saharan Africa. One in every two people uses a smartphone. Eventually the pandemic will be mitigated and global travel will resume. Nevertheless, the global services trade is also facing headwinds. And it requires even more political will to break down barriers for services than it does for goods (Chart II-7). The desire of nations to control and patrol cyberspace has resulted in separate Internets for authoritarian states like Russia and China. Even democracies are turning to censorship and content controls to protect their ideologies.  Political demands to protect workers and industries are gaining ground. Policymakers in China and Russia have already shifted back toward import substitution; now the US and EU are joining them, at least when it comes to strategic sectors (health, defense). Nationalists and populists across the emerging world will follow their lead. Regional and wealth inequalities are driving populations to be more skeptical of globalization. GDP per capita has not grown as fast as GDP itself, a simple indication of how globalization does not benefit everyone equally even though it increases growth overall (Chart II-8). Inequality is a factor not only because of relatively well-off workers in the developed world who resent losing their job or earning less than their neighbors. Inequality is also rife in the developing world where opportunities to work, earn higher wages, borrow, enter markets, and innovate are lacking. Over the past decade, emerging countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa have seen growing skepticism about whether foreign openness creates jobs or lifts wages.4  Immigration is probably the clearest indication of the break from globalization. The United States and especially the European Union have faced an influx of refugees and immigrants across their southern borders and have resorted to hard-nosed tactics to put a stop to it (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Global Inequality Fuels Protectionism Chart II-9US And EU Crack Down On Immigration   There is zero chance that these tough tactics will come to an end anytime soon in Europe, where the political establishment has discovered a winning combination with voters by promoting European integration yet tightening control of borders. This combination has kept populists at bay in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany. A degree of nationalism has been co-opted by the transnational European project. In the US, extreme polarization could cause a major change in immigration policy, depending on the election later this year. But note that the Obama administration was relatively hawkish on the border and the next president will face sky-high unemployment, which discourages flinging open the gates.  Reduced immigration will weigh on potential GDP growth and drive up the wage bill for domestic corporations. If nationalism continues to rise and to hinder the movement of people, goods, capital, and ideas, then it will reduce the market’s expectations of future earnings. American Nationalism Still A Risk  The United States is experiencing a “Civil War Lite” that may take anywhere from one-to-five years to resolve. The November 3 presidential election will have a major impact on the direction of nationalism and globalization over the coming presidential term. If President Trump is reelected – which we peg at 35% odds – then American nationalism and protectionism will gain a new lease on life. Other nations will follow the US’s lead. If Trump fails, then nationalism will likely be driven by external forces, but protectionism will persist in some form. Chart II-10Trump Is Not Yet Down For The Count Investors should not write Trump off. If the election were held today, Trump would lose, but the election is still four months away. His national approval rating has troughed at a higher level than previous troughs. His disapproval rating has spiked but has not yet cleared its early 2019 peak (Chart II-10).5 This is despite an unprecedented deluge of bad news: universal condemnation from Democrats and the media, high-profile defections from fellow Republicans and cabinet members, stunning defeats at the Supreme Court, and scathing rebukes from top US army officers. If Trump’s odds are 35% then this translates to a 35% chance that the United States will continue pursuing globally disruptive “America First” foreign and trade policies in the 2020-24 period.    First Trump will attempt to pass a Reciprocal Trade Act to equalize tariffs with all trading partners. Assuming Democrats block it in the House of Representatives, he will still have sweeping executive authority to levy tariffs. He will launch the next round in the trade war with China to secure a “Phase Two” trade deal, which will be tougher because it will be focused on structural reforms. He could also open new fronts against the European Union, Mexico, and other trade surplus countries. By contrast, these risks will melt away if Biden is elected. Biden would restore the Obama administration’s approach of trade favoritism toward strategic allies and partners, such as Europe and the members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but only occasional use of tariffs. Biden would work with international organizations like the World Trade Organization. His foreign policy would also open up trade with pariah states like Iran, reducing the tail-risk of a war to almost zero.  Biden would be tougher on China than Presidents Obama or Bill Clinton, as the consensus in Washington is now hawkish and Biden would need to keep the blue-collar voters he won back from Trump. He may keep Trump’s tariffs in place as negotiating leverage. But he is less likely to expand these tariffs – and there is zero chance he will use them against Europe. At the same time, it will take a year or more to court the allies and put together a “coalition of the willing” to pressure China on structural reforms and liberalization. China would get a reprieve – and so would financial markets. Thus investors have a roughly 65% chance of seeing US policy “normalize” into an internationalist (not nationalist) approach that reduces the US contribution to trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk over the next few years at minimum. But there are still four months to go before the election; these odds can change, and equity market volatility will come first. Moreover a mellower US would still need to react to nationalism in Asia. European Nationalism Not A Risk (Yet) Chart II-11English Versus Scottish Nationalism European nationalism has reemerged in recent years but has greatly disappointed the prophets of doom who expected it to lead to the breakup of the European Union. The southern European states suffered the most from COVID-19 but many of them have made their decision regarding nationalism and the supra-national EU. Greece underwent a depression yet remained in the union. Italians could easily elect the right-wing anti-establishment League to head a government in the not-too-distant future. But there is no appetite for an Italian exit. Brexit is the grand exception. If Trump wins, then the UK and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson will be seen as the vanguard of the revival of nationalism in the West. If Trump loses, English nationalism will appear an isolated case that is constrained by its own logic given the response of Scottish nationalism (Chart II-11). The trend in the British Isles would become increasingly remote from the trends in continental Europe and the United States. The majority of Europeans identify both as Europeans and as their home nationality, including majorities in countries like Greece, Italy, France, and Austria where visions of life outside the union are the most robust (Chart II-12). Even the Catalonians are focused on options other than independence, which has fallen to 36% support. Eastern European nationalists play a careful balancing game of posturing against Brussels yet never drifting so far as to let Russia devour them. Chart II-12European Nationalism Is Limited (For Now) Europeans have embraced the EU as a multi-ethnic confederation that requires dual allegiances and prioritizes the European project. COVID-19 has so far reinforced this trend, showing solidarity as the predominant force, and much more promptly than during the 2011 crisis. It will take a different kind of crisis to reverse this trend of deeper integration. European nationalists would benefit from another economic crash, a new refugee wave from the Middle East, or conflict with Turkish nationalism. The latter is already burning brightly and will eventually flame out, but not before causing a regional crisis of some kind. European policymakers are containing nationalism by co-opting some of its demands. The EU is taking steps to guard against globalization, particularly on immigration and Chinese mercantilism. The lack of nationalist uprisings in Europe do not overthrow the contention that globalization is slowing down. Europe can become more integrated at home while maintaining the higher barriers against globalization that it has always maintained relative to the UK and United States. Chinese Nationalism The Biggest Risk The nationalist risk to globalization is most significant in East Asia and the Pacific, where Chinese nationalism continues the ascent that began with the Great Recession. China’s slowdown in growth rates has weakened the Communist Party’s confidence in the long-term viability of single-party rule. The result has been a shift in the party line to promote ideology and quality of life improvements to compensate for slower income gains. Xi Jinping’s governing philosophy consists of nationalist territorial gains, promoting “the China Dream” for the middle class, and projecting ambitious goals of global influence by 2035 and 2049. The result has been a clash between mainland Chinese and peripheral Chinese territories – especially Hong Kong and Taiwan (Chart II-13). The turn away from Chinese identity in these areas runs up against their economic interest. It is largely a reaction to the surge in mainland nationalist sentiment, which cannot be observed directly due to the absence of reliable opinion polling. Chart II-13AChinese Nationalism On The Mainland, Anti-Nationalism In Periphery Chart II-13BChinese Nationalism On The Mainland, Anti-Nationalism In Periphery   The conflict over identity in Greater China is perhaps the world’s greatest geopolitical risk. While Hong Kong has no conceivable alternative to Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan does. The US is interested in reviving its technological and defense relationship with Taiwan now that it seeks to counterbalance China. Chart II-14Taiwan: Epicenter Of US-China Cold War Beijing may be faced with a technology cordon imposed by the United States, and yet have the option of circumventing this cordon via Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” used to be its security guarantee. Now that the US is tightening export controls and sanctions on China, Beijing has a greater need to confiscate that shield. This makes Taiwan the epicenter of the US-China struggle, as we have highlighted since 2016. The risk of a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is as pertinent in the short run as it is over the long run, given that the US and China have already intensified their saber-rattling in the Strait (Chart II-14), including in the wake of COVID-19 specifically. China’s secular slowdown is prompting it to encroach on the borders of all of its neighbors simultaneously, creating a nascent balance-of-power alliance ranging from India to Australia to Japan. If China fails to curb its nationalism, then eventually US political polarization will decline as the country unites in the face of a peer competitor. If American divisions persist, they could drive the US to instigate conflict with China. Thus a failure of either side to restrain itself is a major geopolitical risk. The US and China ultimately face mutually assured destruction in the event of conflict, but they can have a clash in the near term before they learn their limits. The Cold War provides many occasions of such a learning process – from the Berlin airlift to the Cuban missile crisis. Such crises typically present buying opportunities for financial markets, but the consequences could be more far reaching if the Asian manufacturing supply chain is permanently damaged or if the shifting of supply chains out of China is too rapid. Globalization will also suffer as a result of currency wars. The US has not been successful in driving the dollar down, a key demand of the US-China trade war. It is much harder to force China to reform its labor and wage policies than it is to force it to appreciate its currency. But unlike Japan in 1985, China will not commit to unilateral appreciation for fear of American economic sabotage.   Punitive measures will remain an American tool. Contrary to popular belief, the US is not attempting to eliminate its trade deficit. It is attempting to reduce overreliance on China. Status quo globalization is intolerable for US strategy. But autarky is intolerable for US corporations. The compromise is globalization-ex-China, i.e., economic decoupling. Investment Implications Chart II-15Favor International Stocks As Growth Revives US stock market’s capitalization now makes up 58% of global capitalization (Chart II-15), reflecting the strength and innovation of American companies as well as a worldwide flight to safety during a decade of rising policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk. The revival of global growth amid this year’s gargantuan stimulus will prompt a major rotation out of US equities and into international and emerging market equities over the long run. As mentioned, the US greenback would also trend downward. However, there will be little clarity on the pace of nationalism and the fate of globalization until the US election is decided. Moreover the fate of globalization does not depend entirely on the United States. It mostly depends on countries in the east – Russia, China, and India, all of which are increasingly nationalistic.  A miscalculation over Taiwan, North Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, trade, or technology could ignite into tariffs, sanctions, boycotts, embargoes, saber-rattling, proxy battles, and potentially even direct conflict. These risks are elevated in the short run but will persist in the long run. As the US decouples from China it will have to deepen relations with other trading partners. The trade deficit will not go away but will be redistributed to Asian allies. Southeast Asian nations and India – whose own nationalism has created a shift in favor of economic development – will be the long-run beneficiaries. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist   Footnotes 1  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). 2  Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, and Ying Han, “750 Million Struggling To Meet Basic Needs With No Safety Net,” Gallup News, June 16, 2020.  3  Christopher Chase-Dunn et al, “The Development of World-Systems,” Sociology of Development 1 (2015), pp. 149-172; and Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, Benjamin Brewer, “Trade globalization since 1795: waves of integration in the world-system,” American Sociological Review 65 (2000), pp. 77-95.  4  Bruce Stokes, “Americans, Like Many In Other Advanced Economies, Not Convinced Of Trade’s Benefits,” September 26, 2018. 5  In other words, the mishandling of COVID-19 and the historic George Floyd protests of June 2020 have not taken as great of a toll on Trump’s national approval, thus far, as the Ukraine scandal last October, the government shutdown in January-February 2019, the near-failure to pass tax cuts in December 2017, or the Charlottesville incident in August 2017. This is surprising and points once more to Trump’s very solid political base, which could serve as a springboard for a comeback over the next four months.