Trade / BOP

Highlights Global Inflation has upside on a cyclical basis, but this narrative is well known and investors have already placed their bets accordingly, buying inflation protection in a wide swath of markets. However, global growth has not yet found its footing, suggesting a mini-deflation scare, at least relative to expectations, is likely this summer. The U.S. dollar will benefit in such a scenario, and NOK/SEK will depreciate. While GBP/USD has downside, the pound should rally versus the euro. Weakness in EUR/CAD has not yet fully played out; the recent bout of strength was only a countertrend move. Feature Inflation is coming back, and this will obviously have major consequences for both asset and currency markets. However, macro investing is not just about forecasting fundamentals correctly; often, just as importantly, it is about understanding how other investors have priced in these expected economic developments. Therein lies the problem. While we understand why inflation could pick up, so too have most investors, and they have positioned themselves accordingly. With global growth currently looking shaky, we believe a better entry point for long-inflation plays will emerge in the coming months. In the meanwhile, a defensive, pro-U.S. dollar posture still makes sense. Investors Are Long Inflation Bets We have long argued that inflation was likely to make a cyclical comeback, a return that would begin in the U.S. before spreading to the rest of the globe. This story is currently playing out. However, in response these developments, investors have placed their bets accordingly, and the story currently seems well baked in. Prices of assets traditionally levered to inflation have already moved to discount a significant pick-up in inflation. The most evident dynamics can be observed in the U.S. inflation breakevens. Both the 10-year breakevens as well as the 5-year/5-year forward breakevens just experienced some of their sharpest two-year changes of the past 20 years, notwithstanding the pricing out of a post-Lehman, depression-like outcome (Chart I-1). Breakevens are not alone. Other assets have displayed similar behavior. In the U.S., investors have aggressively sold their holdings of utilities stocks, which have been greatly outperformed by industrial stocks. Traditionally, investors lift the price of XLI relative to that of XLU when they anticipate global inflation to pick up (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Markets Are Positioning Themselves##br## For Higher Inflation Chart I-2U.S. Sectoral Performance Suggests Investors ##br##Have Already Bet On Higher Inflation... It is not just intra-equity market dynamics that support this assertion. The behavior of the U.S. stock market relative to Treasurys further buttresses the idea that investors have already aggressively discounted an upturn in global consumer prices (Chart I-3). Potentially, the best illustration of investors' preference for inflation protection is currently visible in EM assets. A seemingly paradoxical phenomenon has been puzzling us: How have EM equities managed to avoid the gravitational pull that has caused EM bonds to nearly flirt with the nadir of early 2016? After all, EM equities, EM currencies and EM bonds are normally closely correlated, driven by investors' wagers on the direction of global growth. A simple variable can explain this strange dichotomy: anticipated inflation. As Chart I-4 illustrates, the performance of a volatility adjusted long EM stocks / short EM bonds portfolio tends to anticipate fluctuations in global inflation. The current price action in this basket indicates that investors have made their bets, and they think inflation is going up. Chart I-3...So Does The Stock-To-Bond Ratio Chart I-4Inflation Bets Explain Why EM Stocks And EM Bond Prices Have Diverged Anecdotal evidence suggests that in recent quarters, pension plans have been aggressive buyers of commodities - a move that normally coincides with these long-term investors putting in place some inflation hedges. Moreover, positioning in the futures markets corroborates these stories: speculators are still very long commodities like copper and oil - commodities traditionally perceived as efficient protectors against inflation spikes (Chart I-5). Finally, despite the potentially deflationary risks created by Italy three weeks ago, speculators remain short U.S. Treasury futures, bond investors are underweight duration, and sentiment toward the bond market remains near its lowest levels of the past eight years (Chart I-6). Again, this behavior is consistent with investors being positioned for an inflationary environment. Chart I-5Money Has Flown Into Resources Chart I-6Bond Market Positioning Is Still Very Short Bottom Line: There is a well-defined case to be made that a global economy that was not so long ago defined by the presence of deflationary risks is now morphing into a world where inflation is on the upswing. However, based on inflation breakevens, sectoral relative performance, equities relative to bonds in both DM and EM as well as on the positioning of investors in commodity and bond markets, this changing state has been quickly discounted by investors. The Decks Are Stacked, But Where Does The Economic Risk Lie? The problem facing investors already long inflation protection every which way they can be is that the global economy is slowing, which normally elicits deflationary fears, not inflationary ones. This seems a recipe for disappointment, albeit one that is likely to help the dollar. Our global economic and financial A/D line, which tallies the proportion of key variables around the world moving in a growth-friendly fashion, has fallen precipitously. This normally heralds a slowdown in global economic activity (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Global Growth Is Losing Traction In similar vein, global leading economic indicators have also begun to roll over - a trend that could gain further vigor if the diffusion index of OECD economies experiencing rising versus contracting LEIs is to be believed (Chart I-8). The global liquidity picture has also deteriorated enough to warrant caution. Currency carry strategies - as approximated by the performance of EM carry trades funded in yen - have sagged violently. This tells us that funds are flowing out of EM economies and moving back to countries already replete with excess savings like Japan or Switzerland (Chart I-9). Historically, these kinds of negative developments for global liquidity have preceded industrial slowdowns, as EM now accounts for the lion's share of global IP growth. Finally, China doesn't yet look set to bail out the world's industrial sector. This month's money and credit numbers were weaker than anticipated, and our leading indicator for the Li-Keqiang index - our preferred gauge of industrial activity in the Middle Kingdom - points to further weakness (Chart I-10). This makes it unlikely that China's imports will rise, lifting global growth. Additionally, China has re-stocked in various commodities, suggesting it is front-running its own domestic demand, highlighting the risk that its commodities intake could become even weaker than what domestic growth implies. Chart I-8More Weakness In LEIs Chart I-9Global Liquidity Tightening Chart I-10China Not Yet Set To Bail Out The World With this kind of backdrop, we expect the current slowdown in global growth to run further before ebbing, probably in response to what will be a policy move out some kind from China to put a floor under growth. As a result, the current infatuation with inflation hedges among investors may wane for a bit as slower growth could shock inflation expectations downward, especially in a global context that has been defined by excess capacity since the late 1990s. An environment where global inflation expectations could be downgraded in response to slower growth is likely to be an environment where the dollar performs well, particularly as U.S. growth continues to outperform global growth (Chart I-11). This also confirms our analysis from two weeks ago that showed that when bonds rally the dollar tends to outperform most currencies, with the exception of the yen.1 Moreover, with the Federal Open Market Committee upgrading its path for interest rates by one additional hike in 2018, this reinforces the message from our previous work noting that once the fed funds rate moves in the vicinity of r-star, the dollar performs well, nearly eradicating the losses it incurred when the fed funds rate rises but is well below the neutral rate (Table I-1). This is especially true if vulnerability to higher rates rests outside - not inside - the U.S., as is currently the case.2 Chart I-11The Dollar Likes Lower Global Inflation Table I-1Fed And The Dollar: Where We Stand Matters As Much As The Direction Beyond the dollar, one particular currency cross has historically been a good correlate to investors betting on higher inflation: NOK/SEK. As Chart I-12 illustrates, when investors buy inflation hedges such as going long EM equities relative to EM bonds, this generates a rally in NOK/SEK. These dynamics played in our favor when we were long this cross earlier this year. However, not only are EM equities extended relative to EM bonds, the current economic environment portends a growing risk of investors curtailing these kinds of bets. The implication is bearish for NOK/SEK, and we recommend investors sell this cross at current levels. Chart I-12NOK/SEK Suffers If Inflation Bets Are Unwound Bottom Line: Investors have quickly and aggressively positioned themselves to protect their portfolios against upside inflation risks. However, the global economy is still slowing - a development that has further to run. As a result, this current anticipation of inflation could easily morph into a temporary fear of deflation, at least relative to lofty expectations. This would undo the dynamics previously seen in the market. This is historically an environment in which the dollar performs well, suggesting the greenback rally is not over. Moreover, NOK/SEK could suffer in this environment. The Bad News Is Baked Into The Pound There is no denying that the data flow out of the U.K. has been poor of late. In fact, despite what was already a low bar for expectations, the U.K. economy has managed to generate large negative surprises (Chart I-13). One of the direct drivers of this poor performance has been the complete meltdown in the British credit impulse (Chart I-14). Additionally, the slowdown in British manufacturing can be easily understood in the context of slowing global growth (Chart I-15). Chart I-13Anarchy In The U.K. Chart I-14The Credit Impulse Has Bitten Chart I-15U.K. Exports Are Slowing Because Of Global Growth But, the bad new seems well priced into the pound, especially when compared to the euro. Not only is the GBP trading at a discount to the EUR on our fundamental and Intermediate-term timing models, speculators have accumulated near-record short bets on the pound versus the euro (Chart I-16). This begs the question: Could any positive factor come in and surprise investors, resulting in a fall in EUR/GBP? We think the answer to this question is yes. First, despite the negatives already priced in, incremental bad news have had little traction in dragging the pound lower versus the euro in recent weeks, suggesting that EUR/GBP buying has become exhausted. Second, a falling EUR/USD tends to weigh on EUR/GBP, as the pound tends to act as a low-beta version of the euro (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Investors Are Well Aware Of Britain's Problems Chart I-17EUR/GBP Sags When EUR/USD Weakens Third, the economic outlook for the U.K. is improving. It is true that in the context of slowing global growth, the manufacturing and export sectors are unlikely to be a source of positive surprises for Great Britain. However, the domestic economy could well be. As Chart I-14 highlights, the credit impulse has collapsed, but the good news is that outside of the Great Financial Crisis it has never fallen much below current levels, suggesting that a reversion to the mean may be in offing. Additionally, U.K. inflation is peaking, which is lifting British real wages (Chart I-18). In response, depressed consumer confidence is picking up. This is crucial as consumer spending, which represents roughly 70% of the U.K.'s GDP, has been the key drag on growth since 2016. Any improvement on this front will lift the whole British economy, even if the manufacturing sector remains soft. Fourth, Brexit is progressing. This week's vote in the House of Commons was confusing, but it is important to note than an amendment that gives Westminster the right to force a renegotiation between the U.K. and the EU if no deal is reached in 2019 has been passed. This also decreases the risk of a completely economically catastrophic Brexit down the road, but increases the risk that PM Theresa May could be ousted over the next 12 months. Our positive view on the pound versus the euro (or negative EUR/GBP bias) is not mimicked in cable itself. Ultimately, despite the GBP/USD's beta to EUR/GBP being below one, it is nonetheless greater than zero. As such, it is unlikely that GBP/USD will be able to rally if the DXY rallies and the EUR/USD weakens (Chart I-19). Therefore, while we recommend selling EUR/GBP, we are not willing buyers of GBP/USD. Chart I-18A Crucial Support To Growth Chart I-19Cable Will Not Avoid The Downward Pull Of A Strong Dollar Bottom Line: The British economy has undergone a period of weakness, which is already reflected in the very negative positioning of investors in the GBP versus the EUR. However, the bad data points are losing their capacity to push EUR/GBP higher, and the British economy may begin to heal as consumer confidence is rebounding thanks to improving real wages. The low beta of GBP/USD to the euro also implies that a falling EUR/USD will weigh on EUR/GBP. However, while the pound has upside against the euro, it will continue to suffer against the dollar if EUR/USD experiences further downside. What To Do With EUR/CAD? One weeks ago, we were stopped out of our short EUR/CAD trade. Has EUR/CAD finished its fall, or was the recent rally a pause within a downward channel? We are inclined to think the latter. Heated rhetoric on trade has hit the CAD harder than the EUR, as exports to the U.S. represent a much larger share of Canada's GDP than of the euro area, forcing the pricing of a risk premium in the loonie. However, even after a rather explosive G7 meeting, we do believe that a compromise is still feasible and that NAFTA is not dead on arrival. A deal is still likely because, as Chart I-20 demonstrates, Canadian tariffs on U.S. imports are not only marginally in excess of U.S. tariffs on Canadian imports, they are also in line with international comparisons. This suggests only a small push is needed to arrive to a deal that salvages NAFTA, which ultimately is much more important to Canada than the dairy industry. Chart I-20Canada And The U.S. Can Find A Compromise Despite this reality, we cannot be too complacent, U.S. President Donald Trump is likely to be playing internal politics ahead of the upcoming mid-term elections. U.S. citizens are distrustful of free trade (Chart I-21), a trend especially pronounced among his base. However, a good result for the GOP in November is contingent on the Republican base showing up at the polls. Firing this base up with inflammatory trade rhetoric is a sure way to do so. This means that risks around NAFTA are still not nil. Chart I-21America Belongs To The Anti-Globalization Bloc However, EUR/CAD continues to trade at a substantial premium to fair-value on an intermediate-term horizon (Chart I-22). Moreover, as the last panel of the chart illustrates, speculators remain massively short the CAD against the EUR. This creates a cushion for the CAD versus the EUR if global growth slows. Moreover, technicals are still favorable of shorting EUR/CAD. Not only is EUR/CAD still overbought on a 52-week rate-of-change basis, it seems to be in the process of forming a five-wave downward pattern, with the fourth one - a countertrend wave - potentially ending (Chart I-23). Chart I-22EUR/CAD Is Still Vulnerable Chart I-23Wave Pattern Not Completed Finally, EUR/CAD tends to perform poorly when the USD strengthens, which fits with our current thematic for the remainder of 2018. Bottom Line: The headline risk surrounding NAFTA has weighed on the loonie against the euro, stopping us out of our short EUR/CAD trade with a small profit. However, the valuation, positioning and technical dynamics suggest the timing is ripe to short this cross once again. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Rome Is Burning: Is It The End?", dated June 1, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "This Time Is NOT Different", dated May 25, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was stellar: NFIB Business Optimism Index climbed to 107.8, outperforming expectations; the price changes and good times to expand components are also very strong; Headline and core PPI both outperformed expectations, auguring well for future consumer inflation; Headline and core retail sales grew by 0.8% and 0.9% in monthly terms, beating expectations; Both initial and continuing jobless claims also came out below expectations, highlighting that the labor market is still tightening, and wage growth could pick up further. The Fed raised interest rates this week to 2%, and added one additional rate hike to its guidance for 2018. FOMC members once again highlighted the "symmetric" target, suggesting that the Fed expects the economy to overheat slightly. An outperforming U.S. economy relative to the rest of the world is likely to propel the greenback this year. Report Links: This Time Is NOT Different - May 25, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Economic data was largely disappointing: Italian industrial output contracted by 1.2% on a monthly basis, and grew only by 1.9% on a yearly basis; The German ZEW Survey declined substantially across all metrics; European industrial production increased by 1.7% annually, less than the expected 2.8% increase; However, Spanish headline inflation spiked up from 1.1% to 2.1%. Yesterday, ECB President Mario Draghi announced the ECB's plan to taper asset purchases to EUR 15 bn a month in September, and phase them out completely by year-end. Moreover, Draghi highlighted that the ECB was not anticipating to implement its first hike until after the summer of 2019. Furthermore, the ECB President highlighted the current slowdown in global growth, as well as the rising protectionist risk from the U.S. potentially negatively impacting the European economy and the ECB's decisions going forward, suggesting that the plans are not set in stone. 2018 is likely to remain a volatile year for the euro. Report Links: Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 This Time Is NOT Different - May 25, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Japanese data has been strong this week: Machine orders increased on a 9.6% annual basis, and a 10.1% monthly basis, in April, outperforming expectations by a large margin; The Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index also increased by 2.7% annually, higher than the expected 2.2% increase. As political and economic risks in Europe and South America having subsided for now, the yen has lost some of its glitter. However, with ongoing uncertainty on trade and populism across the globe, we maintain our tactically bullish stance on the yen, especially against commodity currencies and the euro. However, beyond the short-term horizon, the BoJ will remain determined to cap any excess appreciation in the yen, as a strong JPY tightens Japanese financial conditions, weighing on the BoJ's ability to hit its inflation target. This will ultimately limit the yen's upside on a cyclical basis. Report Links: Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Data from the U.K. was somewhat disappointing: Manufacturing and industrial production both increased less than expected, at 1.4% and 1.8%, respectively; The goods trade deficit widened to GBP 14.03bn from GBP 12bn, and the overall trade deficit widened to GBP 5.28bn from GBP 3.22bn; Average earnings grew by 2.8%, less than the expected 2.9%; However, headline inflation came in at 2.4%, less than the expected 2.5%, while retail price inflation also underperformed expectations. This means that the uptrend in real wages continues. Given the limited movement in the pound, it seems that a lot of the bad news was already priced in by last month's depreciation. However, Theresa May's ongoing blunders in parliament represent a continued source of risk for the pound. While the GBP has downside against the EUR, it is unlikely to see much upside against the greenback. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Do Not Get Flat-Footed By Politics - March 30, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Australian data was weak: NAB Business Confidence and Conditions surveys both declined, also underperforming expectations; Australian employment grew by 12,000, less than expected. Moreover, full-time employment contracted. While the unemployment rate dropped as a result, this was largely due to a fall in the participation rate. RBA's Governor Lowe, in a speech on Wednesday, announced that any increase in interest rates "still looks some time away" as the slack in the labor market does not seem to be diminishing. Annual wage growth has been constant at 2.1% for the past three quarters, and did not pick up despite an improvement in full-time employment earlier this year. We remain bearish on the AUD. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The NZD is likely to face significant downside against the greenback along with the other commodity currencies as global growth slows down. However, due to its weaker linkages to Chinese industrial demand, the kiwi is likely to see less downside than the AUD. Nevertheless, it is likely to weaken against the CAD and the NOK as the NZD is expensive against these oil currencies, and oil's is likely to continue to outperform other commodities will support this view. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 USD/CAD has been on an uptrend given the greenback generally strong performance since February year, a force magnified by the volatile rhetoric surrounding NAFTA negotiations. However, the Canadian economy has been accelerating this year, thanks to robust growth in the U.S., to a strong Quebecer economy, and to a pickup in Alberta. In addition, the Canadian labor market is tightening further and wage growth is above 3%. Furthermore, risks surrounding NAFTA seem already reflected in the CAD's behavior and valuation. There is more clarity on the CAD versus its crosses than on the CAD versus the USD. Outperforming U.S. and Canadian growth relative to the rest of the world mean that the CAD should outperform most other G10 currencies. Report Links: Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data out of Switzerland was decent: Industrial production increased by 9% in annual terms, albeit less than the previous 19.6% growth; Producer and import prices increased by 3.2% year on year, in line with expectations, however the monthly increase underperformed markets anticipations. With global trade tensions rising, and Germany having entered President Trump's line of sight, the CHF could experience additional upside against the euro in the coming months. However, the SNB is unlikely to deviate from its ultra-accommodative stance, which means that any downside in EUR/CHF will proved to be short lived. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 The SNB Doesn't Want Switzerland To Become Japan - March 23, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Both headline and core inflation underperformed, coming in at 2.3% and 1.2%, respectively. However, the Regional Network Survey hinted at a pickup in capacity utilization as expectations for industrial output remained robust, as well as at an additional strength in employment. This led to a forecast of a resurgence in inflationary pressures. We expect the NOK to outperform the EUR. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Swedish inflation rose from 1.7% to 1.9%, coming in line with expectations. Additionally, Prospera 1-year inflation expectations survey rose to 1.9% from 1.8% in the March survey. This is likely to provide the Riksbank with reasons to turn gradually more hawkish, which should support the very cheap krona. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights The chaotic conclusion to last weekend's G7 summit in Charlevoix is a reminder that the specter of trade wars will not fade quietly into the night. A trade war would hurt the U.S., but would punish the rest of the world even more. The U.S. dollar typically strengthens when global trade slows. Despite President Trump's antics, the dollar is at little risk of losing its status as the world's premier reserve currency. Fiscal stimulus should keep U.S. growth above trend well into next year, allowing the Fed to maintain its once-per-quarter pace of rate hikes. We are currently overweight global equities, but we expect to shift to neutral before the end of the year. Feature Hit First, Ask Questions Later Donald's Trump's negotiating style - hit as hard as you can and then compromise - has worked well in dealing with tin-pot dictators, at least judging by the apparent outcome of this week's Singapore summit with Kim Jong-Un. It has also worked well throughout Trump's career as a real estate developer. However, as the breakdown of last weekend's G7 summit demonstrates, it is not clear if it is a winning strategy in the realm of international trade. Down-on-their-luck creditors may be willing to settle for twenty cents on the dollar when they had been promised one hundred, but governments have their citizens to answer to, and national pride often trumps (ahem) narrow financial interests in such matters. How Not To Fight A Trade War The U.S. is a fairly closed economy and hence a trade war probably would not have severe effects on growth. However, the way Trump is waging his war ensures that whatever impact it has on the domestic economy will be negative. This is not only because Trump's tariffs are certain to invite retaliation; it is also because Trump is targeting intermediate goods - goods that are used as inputs into production of final goods - for tariffs. Chart 1Rising Productivity In The Steel Sector ##br##Caused Employment To Decline Consider the case of steel. Today, the U.S. steel industry employs just 145,000 workers, down from 203,000 workers in 2000. In contrast, there are about two million workers employed in steel-consuming sectors of the economy.1 A reasonable rule-of-thumb from the international trade literature is that a one-percent increase in foreign prices causes domestic prices to rise by about half a percent. This is mainly because domestic producers end up capturing some of the gains from tariffs through higher profit margins. A 25% increase in steel tariffs would thus raise steel prices by around 12.5%. Higher steel prices will lead to higher prices for many American goods such as automobiles, some of which are exported abroad. It is actually quite conceivable that steel tariffs would reduce exports more than they would depress imports, leading to a wider trade deficit. Ironically, foreign competition probably explains only a small fraction of the decline in U.S. steel employment. The U.S. produces roughly as much steel now as it did in 2000 (Chart 1). What has changed is that output-per-worker in the steel industry has increased by a total of 43% since then. Blame technological progress, not trade. Trade Wars, The Fed, And The Dollar Chart 2The Dollar Tends To Strengthen ##br##When Global Trade Deteriorates Even if higher tariffs did produce a one-off increase in consumer and producer prices, slower GDP growth would likely prompt the Fed to moderate the pace of rate hikes. If the stock market declined in sympathy with slower growth and rising protectionist sentiment, the resulting tightening in financial conditions would further justify a go-slow approach to monetary normalization. All things equal, a more dovish-than-expected Fed would likely translate into a weaker dollar. All things are not equal, however. A trade war would probably hurt the rest of the world more than the U.S. This is partly because the rest of the world is more open to trade, but it is also because the rest of the world runs a trade surplus with the U.S., which makes it more vulnerable to a broad-based decline in trade volumes. Chart 2 shows that the dollar tends to strengthen when global trade is weakening. Reserve Currency Status In Jeopardy? An often-heard counterargument to the "protectionism is good for the dollar" view is that at some point, rising trade tensions could undermine the dollar's standing as the world's premier reserve currency. The U.S. has run a trade deficit almost continuously for 40 years, accumulating 40% of GDP in net liabilities to the rest of the world in the process (Chart 3). If foreign buyers decide to scale back their purchases of U.S. assets, the dollar could swoon. Chart 3U.S. External Deficit: 40 Years And Counting Trump's statement at the conclusion of the G7 summit that "We're like a piggy bank that everybody's robbing" seems to imply that he thinks that foreigners are living beyond their means by draining the U.S. of its wealth. The opposite is actually the case: The U.S. has been able to spend more than it earns for decades precisely because foreigners have been willing to deposit ever more money into the U.S. piggy bank. Fortunately for the greenback, America's status as the world's piggy bank of choice is unlikely to change any time soon. The euro area remains hopelessly divided. The Italian bond market - the biggest in Europe - has once again become the object of investor angst. Japan is drowning in a sea of government debt, with debt monetization probably the only viable solution. China would like to transform the renminbi into a global reserve currency, but opacity in government decision-making, and a still largely closed capital account, will limit any progress towards that goal for some time to come. China and other countries could try to "punish" the U.S. government by buying fewer Treasury bonds, but where would that get them? The average maturity of U.S. government debt is less than six years. The Fed, not China, largely sets rates at that portion of the yield curve. Granted, a decline in Treasury purchases would reduce the demand for dollars. However, that would just put upward pressure on the value of the renminbi. China does not want a stronger currency. For all the talk about how America's rivals are keen to reduce their dollar holdings, their share of global central bank reserves has actually climbed over the past two decades, largely because they have been gobbling up dollars to keep their own currencies from appreciating (Chart 4). Today, nearly two-thirds of global currency reserves are denominated in dollars, a higher proportion than when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 (Chart 5). Chart 4Geopolitics Is Not Driving Demand For Treasurys Chart 5The Dollar Remains The Preferred Reserve Currency A Not So Exorbitant Privilege Chart 6The U.S. Term Premium Is ##br##Higher Than Elsewhere In any case, it's not clear how much the U.S. benefits from having a reserve currency. There is little evidence that U.S. long-term bond yields are lower than they would otherwise be because of foreign reserve accumulation. Chart 6 shows that the term premium - the difference between the yield on a long-term bond and the market's expectation of the average level of short-term rates over the life of the bond - is higher in the U.S. than in the rest of the world. If foreign central bank purchases were pushing down U.S. bond yields, one would expect to see the reverse pattern. The only tangible benefit the United States gets from having a reserve currency is that the U.S. Treasury can issue currency to foreigners who hold it as a store of value rather than spending it. This amounts to an interest-free loan to the U.S. government. This so-called "seigniorage revenue" is not trivial: Last year, foreigners increased their holdings of U.S. currency by $60 billion.2 However, this is still less than one-third of one percent of U.S. GDP. What Really Explains Why The U.S. Has A Current Account Deficit? It is often argued that the dollar's reserve currency status has allowed the U.S. to run large current account deficits. However, Australia has run even bigger current account deficits than the U.S., and it does not have a reserve currency. What matters in the end is whether people trust you to pay back your debts, not whether you have a reserve currency. The rate of return that a country offers investors is also important. As we explained in our weekly report on April 6th, an often-overlooked reason for why the U.S. and Australia run current account deficits is that both countries enjoy faster trend growth than most of their peers.3 Faster growth tends to push up the neutral real rate of interest, otherwise known as r-star. A country with a relatively low neutral rate needs to have an "undervalued" currency that is expected to appreciate over time in order to compensate investors for the subpar yield that its bonds provide. As sketched out in Chart 7, this results in current account surpluses for countries with low neutral rates, and current account deficits for countries with high neutral rates. Chart 7Interest Rates And Current Account Balances Commentators who claim that the euro is cheap are barking up the wrong tree. The euro needs to be cheap to entice investors into holding low-yielding German bunds and other safe-haven euro area bond markets. Indeed, one could argue that the euro is not cheap enough. Thirty-year U.S. Treasurys currently yield 3.07% while 30-year German bunds yield 1.16%, a difference of 191 basis points. Even if one allows for the fact that investors expect euro area inflation to be lower than in the U.S. over the next 30 years, EUR/USD would need to trade at a measly 84 cents today in order to compensate German bund holders for the inferior yield they will receive.4 The euro got a good clobbering yesterday following the release of the ECB's post-meeting statement, which established a timeline for ending asset purchases by the end of this year but promised no rate hikes for at least another 12 months. We continue to expect EUR/USD to hit 1.15, with a high likelihood that it goes even lower. Lessons From The Nixon Shock We are skeptical of the argument that threatening to raise tariffs is an effective tool for talking down one's currency. It is true that the Nixon Administration imposed an across-the-board 10% tariff in August 1971, which succeeded in forcing America's trading partners to revalue their currencies within the quasi-fixed exchange-rate Bretton Woods system that prevailed at that time. Such an arrangement would be difficult to orchestrate today. For one thing, the U.S. does not have the geopolitical sway that it once did. Moreover, when exchange rates are pegged, one can often revalue a currency to the upside while cutting interest rates (if investors expect a series of revaluations, they would be willing to hold government bonds even if they yielded less than those abroad). In today's world of flexible exchange rates, a country would need to be willing to tighten monetary policy to drive up its currency. Thus, it would get hit on two fronts: From a stronger currency and from higher interest rates. This additional cost to the economy lowers the odds that any country would voluntarily undertake such measures in the hope (probably futile anyway) of placating Trump. In any case, most of the dollar's weakness in the 1970s occurred after the December 1971 Smithsonian Agreement reversed Nixon's tariff hike. What followed was a period of trade liberalization on the back of successive GATT negotiation rounds. U.S. tariffs actually fell more in the 1970s than in the prior two decades (Chart 8). The fact that the dollar weakened during that period had more to do with the Fed, which permitted inflation to get out of hand by allowing real rates to remain in chronically negative territory. The dollar also suffered from the surge in oil prices, which produced a 35% deterioration in the U.S. terms of trade over the course of the decade (Chart 9). Chart 8Two Centuries Of U.S. Tarriffs Chart 9Dollar Weakness In the 1970s: Blame Deteriorating Terms Of Trade And A Dovish Fed It is possible that the Fed will repeat the mistakes of the 1970s, but this is more of a risk for the 2020s than a near-term concern. U.S. real yields have actually risen substantially relative to those abroad since last September (Chart 10). Chart 10The Dollar Is Once Again Responding ##br##To Real Rate Differentials The outcome of this week's FOMC meeting was on the hawkish side. The median number of dots in the newly released Summary of Economic Projections now point to four rate hikes this year, up from three hikes in the March projections. In addition, the Fed increased estimates for both growth and core inflation for this year. The decision to hold press conferences following every FOMC meeting will also give the Fed greater scope to expedite the pace of rate hikes. Investment Conclusions After panicking over every Trump tweet promising more protectionism earlier this year, markets have taken the recent news of escalating trade tensions in stride. Investors presumably think that Trump will water down his rhetoric, as he has periodically done over the past few months. Such a benign outcome is entirely possible. Trump left a fig leaf at the G7 summit in the form of a challenge to other members to eliminate their tariffs in exchange for the U.S. doing the same. Reaching such a deal would not be easy, but incremental progress towards this goal could be achieved. The overall level of tariff barriers within developed countries is already quite low. The U.S. actually stands at the top end of the spectrum -- average U.S. tariffs of 1.6% are double that of Canada, for example -- so the rest of the G7 would be wise to call Trump's bluff and agree to talks to further scale back trade barriers (Chart 11). This could give risk assets some breathing space for the next year or so. Yet, such a rosy outcome is far from guaranteed. Protectionism is popular among American voters, especially among Trump's base (Chart 12). Trump's obsession with the level of the stock market was a constraint on his protectionist rhetoric, but now that investors are content to look the other way, that constraint has loosened. Chart 11Tariffs: Who Is Robbing The U.S.? Chart 12Free Trade Is Not In Vogue In The U.S., And Is ##br##Especially Disliked Among Trump Supporters The fact that Trump's macroeconomic policies are completely at odds with his trade agenda does not help matters. Fiscal stimulus will boost aggregate demand, which will suck in more imports. An overheated economy will prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would, leading to a stronger dollar. All this will result in a wider trade deficit. What will Trump tell voters two years from now when he is campaigning in Michigan and Ohio about why the trade deficit has widened rather than narrowed under his watch? Will he blame himself or America's trading partners? No trophy for getting that answer right. The effect of a trade war on the stock market would be grave. Multinational firms have large footprints abroad, the result of decades of investment in global supply chains. Equities represent a claim on the existing capital stock, not the capital stock that might emerge after a trade war has been fought. A trade war would result in a lot of stranded capital, forcing investors to mark down the value of the companies in their portfolios. In light of these risks, we expect to downgrade our recommendation on global equities from overweight to neutral before the end of the year. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Lydia Cox and Kadee Russ, "Will Steel Tariffs put U.S. Jobs at Risk?," EconoFact, February 26, 2018. Steel-consuming industries are defined as those that devote more than 5% of their total costs to steel. 2 Considering that 80% of U.S. currency in circulation consists of $100 bills, it is safe to say that much of this overseas stash of cash belongs to those who acquired it through ill-gotten means. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "U.S.-China Trade Spat: Is R-Star To Blame?," dated April 6, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 For this calculation, we assume that the fair value for EUR/USD is 1.32, which is close to the IMF's Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimate. The annual inflation differential of 0.4% is based on 30-year CPI swaps. This implies that the fair value for EUR/USD will rise to 1.49 after 30 years. If one assumes that the euro reaches that level by then, the common currency would need to trade at 1.49/(1.0191)^30=0.84 today. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights The following four investment themes are likely to play out over the next couple of years: The yield shortfall on German long-dated bunds versus the equivalent U.S. T-bonds and U.K. gilts will narrow, one way or the other. The 10% undervaluation of the trade-weighted euro - as assessed by the ECB itself - will eventually correct. As the euro area's structural over-competitiveness gradually adjusts, euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos. Swedish real estate and Swedish real estate equities, which are both very richly valued, will underperform. Feature What connects last Sunday's dysfunctional G7 Summit with this week's ECB policy meeting? The answer is the euro area's €450 billion export surplus. Specifically, the €300 billion export surplus in Germany which equals 8% of its GDP - an export surplus that is squarely in President Trump's cross-hairs (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekECB Policy Has Driven Up Germany's Export Surplus The interesting thing is that the euro area hasn't always run an export surplus. Before 2012, the euro area's trade with the rest of the world was more or less in balance. Even Germany's export surplus was half of its current size. To put it in Trumpian terms, fewer Mercedes were "rolling down New York's Fifth Avenue." What caused the imbalance to surge in recent years? Was it punitive tariffs or restrictive trade practices in Germany? No, the answer is much simpler than that. ECB Policy Has Driven Up Germany's Export Surplus The export surplus in the euro area and in Germany is just a mirror-image of the euro exchange rate (Chart I-2). As the euro became undervalued, it made euro area exports more competitive and foreign imports into the euro area less competitive. This assessment of euro area over-competitiveness comes straight from the horse's mouth. The ECB's own indicators show that the euro area remains over-competitive by around 10%, meaning the euro is still undervalued by about 10%.1 In turn, the euro's substantial undervaluation is a near perfect function of the yield shortfall on German long-dated bunds versus the equivalent U.S. T-bonds and U.K. gilts (Chart I-3). It follows that the ultimate cause of the euro area's glaring imbalance is ECB policy itself - specifically, the extreme experiment with bond buying and negative interest rates. Chart I-2ECB Policy Has Driven Up The ##br##Euro Area's Export Surplus Chart I-3The ECB's Expansive Monetary Policy Is ##br##Responsible For The Euro's Undervaluation As Germany's former Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, explained: "When ECB chief Mario Draghi embarked on the expansive monetary policy, I told him he would drive up Germany's export surplus... I promised then not to publicly criticise this policy. But then I don't want to be criticised for the consequences of this policy." The ECB counters that it targets neither the euro exchange rate nor the trade balance; it sets policy to achieve its mandate for price stability. It argues that it is further from its mandate for price stability compared with the Federal Reserve because, ostensibly, the euro area is at a different point in the economic cycle compared with the U.S. This requires the ECB to set an ultra-accommodative policy compared with other central banks. The undervalued euro and trade surplus are the unavoidable spill-overs of this relative monetary policy. ECB Spill-Overs Felt Far And Wide However, one important reason that euro area inflation is underperforming U.S. inflation has nothing to do with the economic cycle. Rather, it is because the official measures of inflation in the euro area and the U.S. are defined differently (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). The euro area's Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) omits the consumption costs of owner-occupied housing, whereas the U.S. consumer price basket includes them at a very substantial 25% weight. Homeowners will testify that the cost of maintaining their homes constitutes one of their largest expenses, and that these costs tend to rise faster than other prices. Using the U.S. as a guide, we estimate that a euro area inflation measure that correctly included home maintenance costs would be running higher than HICP inflation by an average of 0.5 percentage points a year (Chart I-6). Chart I-4Euro Area Inflation##br## Is Underperforming... Chart I-5...Because Euro Area Inflation Omits ##br##Owner-Occupied Housing Costs Chart I-6Including Owner-Occupied Housing ##br##Costs Adds 0.5% To Inflation Just because the statisticians do not measure owner-occupied housing costs in the euro area HICP, it doesn't mean that homeowners do not feel these costs. In Germany, measured inflation is now running at 2.3%, so the true inflation that households feel is running closer to 3%. Meanwhile, interest rates on savings accounts are stuck near zero, which means that German savers are seeing the real value of their savings erode by 3% every year. As Der Spiegel magazine put it to ECB Chief Economist, Peter Praet: "Can you understand why so many Germans regard the ECB as the greatest threat to their personal wealth?" Spill-overs from the ECB's ultra-accommodative policy have also been felt across the Baltic Sea. The Riksbank and the Norges Bank have had to shadow the ECB to prevent a sharp appreciation of their currencies versus the euro. The trouble is that ultra-low and negative interest rates have been absurdly inappropriate for the booming Scandinavian economies. So ECB policy may have generated spill-over housing bubbles in Sweden and Norway (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7ECB Spill-Overs Felt In Scandinavia Chart I-8Scandinavian Real Estate Appears Richly Valued Hence, a seemingly innocuous 'definitional' difference between the consumer price baskets in the euro area vis-à-vis the U.S. explains: the bulk of the shortfall in euro area inflation; the ECB's justification for ultra-accommodation; the undervalued euro; the euro area's €450 billion trade surplus; deeply negative real interest rates in Germany; and putative housing bubbles in Sweden and Norway. The main argument we hear in the ECB's defence is that the central bank is at the mercy of its treaty. If the treaty demands ultra-accommodation then the ECB must deliver it. But this argument is wrong. The ECB treaty only asks that the central bank delivers "price stability", leaving the ECB with substantial flexibility in how it precisely defines price stability. With this in mind, the ECB - and other central banks - should use this definitional flexibility to minimize differences with other central banks. Because in a world of integrated capital markets, the spill-overs from seemingly innocuous definitional differences are felt far and wide, resulting in political backlashes and economic imbalances. Imbalances Must Correct In The Long Run Ultimately though, economic imbalances must correct, and the corrective mechanism is economic, financial, or political feedback loops, or some combination of these. On this basis, we reiterate four investment themes that are likely to play out over the next couple of years: The yield shortfall on German long-dated bunds versus the equivalent U.S. T-bonds and U.K. gilts will narrow, one way or the other. The 10% undervaluation of the trade-weighted euro - as assessed by the ECB itself - will eventually correct. As the euro area's structural over-competitiveness gradually adjusts, euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos (Chart I-9). Chart I-9As The Euro's Undervaluation Corrects, It Will Help Euro Area Domestics And Hurt Exporters Swedish real estate and Swedish real estate equities, which are both very richly valued, will underperform. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/balance_of_payments_and_external/hci/html/index.en.html The ECB uses three metrics to assess the euro area's competitiveness versus its major trading partners: GDP deflators, CPIs, and unit labour costs. The average of the three metrics suggests that the euro is undervalued by around 10%.The assessment of euro undervaluation assumes that the major euro area economies entered the monetary union at a broadly correct level of competitiveness against each other and against their other major trading partners. This assumption seems valid, given that the net external position of these economies were all in equilibrium at the onset of monetary union. Fractal Trading Model We are pleased to report that our long SEK/GBP currency position hit its profit target of 3% and is now closed. This week we note that the relative performance of two classically cyclical sectors, oil and gas versus financials, is technically stretched and at a 65-day fractal dimension which has accurately predicted the last two major reversals. Hence, our recommended trade is short euro area oil and gas versus euro area financials. Set a profit target of 6% with a symmetric stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Neither the weakness in emerging market economies nor political turmoil in Europe are likely to significantly affect the U.S. economy. Although the U.S. economy is increasingly service-oriented, financial markets have become more bound to the manufacturing economy in the past 30 years. The U.S.'s large trade surplus in services fosters faster job creation and better pay than in the goods-producing area where the U.S. has a trade deficit. Our energy strategists believe that the risks for oil prices remain biased to the upside, although we are less bullish in view of OPEC 2.0's possible production increases in the near future. Feature U.S. risk assets are rebounding amid solid economic news and rising hopes that another Eurozone financial crisis has been averted. Still, investors remain concerned about rising rates, protectionist trade policies, and the health of emerging market economies. In addition, market participants continue to scan the U.S. economic data in both the manufacturing and service sectors looking for signs that the late-cycle phase of the expansion is ending and that a recession is nigh. The NASDAQ and small cap U.S. stocks rallied past their February peaks last week, but the S&P 500 remains 3.7% below its early 2018 heights. Moreover, BCA's stock-to-bond ratio continues in an uptrend and we expect stocks to beat bonds in the next year. However, neither U.S. high-yield spreads nor the VIX have returned to their January lows. 10-year Treasury yields are 53 bps higher and the dollar is up by 5%. West Texas Intermediate oil prices peaked at $72.26/bbl on May 21. We discuss BCA's latest view on oil later in this report. U.S. economic growth remains solid. May's reading (58.6) on the ISM non-manufacturing index released last week is consistent with 3.5% real GDP growth. Moreover, the May sounding (58.7) on manufacturing indicates that the U.S. economy is growing near 5%. We discuss the signal from both the ISM's manufacturing and non-manufacturing indicators in the next section. In any case, U.S. economic activity in 1H 2018 will easily surpass the FOMC's view of both potential GDP growth (1.8%) and its estimate for actual growth in 2018 (2.7%) (Chart 1). The Fed will provide a new set of dot plots and economic forecasts this week. BCA expects the Fed to bump up rates this week and then gradually during the next year. The Fed and the market's view of the path of rates in the next 12 months is aligned (Chart 2). However, BCA's stance is that inflation will accelerate in 2019, which would elicit a more aggressive response from the central bank starting in the second half of 2019. Our view is that the Fed will stick to its gradual path unless economic growth is much weaker than expected or inflation spikes higher. Moreover, because inflation is at the Fed's 2% target and the economy is at full employment, the price at which the Fed's "policy put" gets exercised is much lower than earlier in the cycle. The implication is that neither the weakness in emerging market economies nor political turmoil in Europe are likely to significantly affect the U.S. economy. Still, a wider trade war is a risk to U.S. and global growth, and we address this issue in the service sector below. Chart 11H GDP Tracking Well Above##BR##Potential & Fed's Forecast Chart 2Fed And Market Aligned##BR##On Rate Path In Next 12 Months On The Same Page The ISM surveys - manufacturing and non-manufacturing - are aligned. The top panel of Chart 3 shows that both metrics have climbed since their troughs in late 2015 (manufacturing) and early 2016 (non-manufacturing). These lows occurred amid EM-related economic and market turbulence. The 2015 nadir in the manufacturing series was more pronounced, thus the rise outpaced the non-manufacturing indicator (panel 2). U.S. financial markets, and the stock market more specifically, are sensitive to the performance of the manufacturing sector. The service sector accounts for 62% of U.S. economic activity and 86% of private-sector employment (Chart 4). Charts 5 and 6 show the relationship between the year-over-year change in BCA's stock-to-bond ratio and the level of manufacturing (Chart 5) versus non-manufacturing (Chart 6) composites. The relationship (r-squared 0.56) between our stock-to-bond ratio and the manufacturing sector is more robust that the r-squared (0.43) between the stock-to-bond ratio and the non-manufacturing sector. Chart 3Manufacturing And Non-Manufacturing ISM Are Aligned, But That's Not Always The Case Chart 4U.S. Economy Is 60% Services... Although the U.S. economy is increasingly service-oriented, Charts 7 and 8 show that the financial markets have become more bound to the manufacturing economy in the past 30 years. Between 1958 and 1988, the r-squared between our stock-to-bond ratio and manufacturing data was 0.19 (Chart 7). That increased to 0.34 from 1988 to 2018 (Chart 8). Chart 5Tighter Relationship Between##BR##Stock-To-Bond Ratio And Manufacturing ISM... Chart 6... Than With##BR##Non Manufacturing ISM Chart 7ISM Manufacturing Vs.##BR##Stock-To-Bond Ratio 1958-1988... Chart 8... And##BR##1988-2018 Chart 9 shows that there have been six other periods when the manufacturing index recovered more quickly than non-manufacturing. Five of the intervals were associated with EM stress.1 Moreover, as is currently the case, the economy was at or below full employment in four of the six occasions when manufacturing outpaced the service sector. Furthermore, the Fed initiated rate hikes in four of the seven episodes, including the current one (Appendix Chart 1). EM stocks tend to outpace U.S. equities as the non-manufacturing index rises faster than the manufacturing index. In addition, when the U.S. manufacturing sector is accelerating relative to the service sector, China's growth prospects (as measured by the LI Keqiang Index) improve. Chart 9Performance Of EM Assets When Manufacturing ISM Outpaces Service Sector ISM The peak in our Relative ISM composite index is consistent with BCA's view that the economic expansion that began in 2009 is nearing an end. Our Relative ISM Composite dipped prior to the 2001 recession, but began to rise as the 2007-2009 downturn commenced. Both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing indices collapsed at the same pace prior to the 2007-2009 recession, because the breakdown of the banking system related to the housing crisis weighed on the non-manufacturing data. Unfortunately, the ISM non-manufacturing data only begins in 1997. However, using the goods and service-sector GDP as proxies for the ISM metrics, we find that the manufacturing sector tends to underperform the service sector in the late stages of an expansion (Chart 10). Our earlier work2 details the performance of U.S. financial assets in a late-cycle environment. Chart 10Manufacturing Sector Tends To Underperform The Service Sector In Late Cycle Environments Bottom Line: Last year's "global synchronized growth" story is showing signs of wear. While the U.S. economy will enjoy a strong rebound in the second quarter, leading economic indicators in most of the other major countries have rolled over. The advanced stage of the U.S. business cycle, heightened geopolitical risks and our bias for capital preservation keep us tactically cautious on risk assets again this month. Service Sector: An Update Even with the increasingly dominant role of the service sector (Chart 4 again), the majority of high frequency economic data measures activity in the manufacturing sector. However, the Quarterly Services Survey (QSS) initiated in 2003-2004 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), measures the service sector which includes small- and medium-sized companies3 and produces timely revenue figures on a quarterly basis. The dataset is used primarily by the BEA to paint a more accurate picture of national accounts, notably personal consumption and the intellectual property segment of private-fixed investment. The survey is also essential for FOMC policymakers because it is very useful to track economic performance. Moreover, the QSS is an important source of revisions to real GDP because over 40% of the quarterly estimates of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) for services is based on the QSS. The "key services statistics" include information services, health care services, professional, scientific and technical services, administrative and support, and waste management and remediation services. The QSS for Q1 2018 found that total revenues for selected services fell by 1.2% over the previous quarter but rose 5.2% over the last four quarters (in nominal terms and only non-seasonally adjusted data available). Nominal GDP climbed 4.7% year-over-year in Q1 (Chart 11). Several areas of the service economy saw sales growth in Q1 outpace nominal GDP. Sales were strongest in finance and insurance (+7.8%) followed by information (+7%). Real estate and rental leasing sales increased by 4.7% in the past year while revenue in health care & social assistance rose +3.4%. Together, sales in finance & insurance and health care & social assistance make up about 50% of total revenues. Chart 11Many Areas Of Service Sector##BR##Advancing Faster Than Nominal GDP Chart 12Sales Growth In The Service Sector##BR##Is Broad Based However, revenue growth in several categories decelerated in Q1 and grew more slowly than nominal GDP. Arts, entertainment and recreation, administration support and waste management, and other services are in this category. Bottom Line: Given that the majority of service industries from the QSS sample survey continue to show upward momentum, perhaps we will see a similar revision to real consumer spending for services for the third estimate of Q1 real GDP in late June (Chart 12). We continue to expect U.S. GDP growth to match or exceed the Fed's modest target for 2018. This above-trend growth will continue to put downward pressure on the unemployment rate and push inflation higher, setting the stage for a more aggressive Fed next year and a recession in 2020. The Wrong Trade War? The large trade surplus in the U.S. service sector is a hidden source of strength for the economy and labor market (Chart 13). President Trump campaigned on his ability to create high-paying manufacturing jobs and he has focused his attention on the goods side of the U.S. trade deficit. Nonetheless, his America First rhetoric threatens jobs in the high-paying service sector. Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. has imported more than it has exported, acting as a drag on GDP growth. The trade gap reflects a large and persistent goods deficit, which more than offsets a growing trade surplus on the service side (Chart 14). U.S. imported goods exceeded exports by $807 billion in 2017. Service exports reached an all-time high of $798 billion in 2017 - $255 billion more than imports - up from $249 billion in 2016. It is too soon to tell if the smaller surplus in services is related to Trump's protectionist trade rhetoric. Exports of services have increased by 6% a year on average since 2000, which is nearly twice as fast as nominal GDP. Service exports expanded by just 4% in 2017 versus 2016, which is below the pace of nominal GDP (4.7%) The trade surplus in services subtracted 0.08% from real GDP in Q1 2018, but added 0.05% in 2017. Moreover, the trade surplus in services has consistently added to GDP growth over the past few decades, although the trade surplus in services is swamped by the large drag on GDP due to the trade deficit on goods. Industries where the U.S. enjoys a trade surplus have experienced job growth that is faster than in industries where the U.S. runs a deficit. In addition, median wages ($30.07 as of April 2018) among surplus-producing industries are more than 20% higher than in industries in the goods sector ($24.94) where there is a trade deficit. Moreover, wages in the trade-oriented service sector have escalated quicker than in the goods-producing sector in the past year (Chart 15). Chart 13The U.S. Runs Trade##BR##Surplus In Services... Chart 14...But It's Not Large Enough To Offset##BR##The Big Trade Deficit In Goods Chart 15Wages In Export-Led Service Industries##BR##21% Higher Than In Goods Sector Furthermore, exports in the U.S. service sector tend to compete on quality (not on price) and, therefore, will not be as affected as U.S. goods exports if the dollar meets BCA's forecast for a modest increase this year (Chart 16). That said, the Trump administration's trade policies threaten to reduce the U.S.'s global dominance in services. Chart 16Services Exports Compete On Quality, Not Price Table 1 shows that the U.S. has the largest trade surplus in travel ($82 billion surplus in 2016), intellectual property ($80 billion), financial services ($73 billion) and other business services ($43 billion), which includes legal, accounting, consulting and architectural services. The U.S. also runs a surplus in maintenance and repair services. Table 1Key Components Of U.S. Trade Surplus In Services Trump's trade and immigration policies put this trade surplus at risk. In 2016, foreigners spent $82 billion more to vacation in, travel to, and be educated in the U.S. than what U.S. citizens spent on those services overseas. Moreover, a recent U.N. report4 noted that "Global flows of foreign direct investment fell by 23 per cent in 2017. Cross-border investment in developed and transition economies dropped sharply, while growth was near zero in developing economies." If foreign governments continue to react to Trump's directives on trade and immigration, then the U.S. trade advantage in financial services ($73 billion), software services ($29 billion), TV and film rights ($12 billion), architectural services ($5 billion) and advertising ($10 billion) will also be at risk. Bottom Line: The U.S.'s large trade surplus in services fosters faster job creation and better pay than in the goods-producing area where the U.S. has a trade deficit. The Trump administration's rhetoric and actions on trade and globalism potentially risks America's dominance in the service sector. In theory, U.S. trade restrictions could add to U.S. GDP growth via increased manufacturing output and a smaller goods trade deficit. However, many U.S. trading partners have already announced tariffs on U.S. goods which will put the brakes on growth. Even so, any gains on the manufacturing trade front could be largely offset by damage to the U.S. surplus in services trade. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service expects that trade-related uncertainty will persist at least until the midterm elections in November.5 On a related note, an increase in onshore oil production in the past 10 years reduced the U.S's large trade deficit in petroleum and petroleum products. BCA's energy strategists recently updated their oil price and production forecasts for this year and next. Still Bullish On Oil BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service remains bullish on oil, although two key elements of the outlook makes forecasting particularly difficult.6 Our base case forecast has been bullish for some time, based on our assumption that OPEC 2.0 would retain its previous output cuts, at least through the end of 2018. Venezuela's production has contracted sharply and we penciled in a further modest decline. Iranian exports will also shrink due to the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions. The only substantial growth on the production side is expected to come from U.S. shale producers. The supply/demand backdrop pointed toward higher prices with world demand projected to remain robust. We estimated that Brent could reach $90/bbl early next year. Chart 17Ensemble Forecast Accounts For##BR##Collapse In Venezuela's Exports However, some major oil consumers, including the U.S., are starting to complain. The U.S. has asked the OPEC 2.0 countries to increase output, which may remove further upward pressure on prices. OPEC 2.0's leadership has signaled that it will consider reversing the production cuts during the second half of this year. This could add an extra 870 b/d of production. The other major unknown is how much further Venezuelan production will slide. Our oil strategists have run alternative scenarios to gauge the risks to the base case. The optimistic case sees OPEC 2.0 retaining production cuts and Venezuelan production dipping by another 1m b/d. The pessimistic case sees OPEC 2.0 reversing the production cuts, while Venezuelan production erodes modestly compared with the base and optimistic cases. Chart 17 shows that Brent hits $100/bbl in 2019 in the optimistic case, but drops to $60 in the pessimistic scenario. The ensemble forecast, shown in red in Chart 17, is a weighted average of the three scenarios. It shows that the price of oil will be roughly flat over the next 18 months. Bottom Line: Our energy strategists believe that the risks for oil prices remain biased to the upside, although we are less bullish in view of OPEC 2.0's possible production increases in the near future. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Appendix Chart 1Fed Policy And Labor Market Slack When Manufacturing ISM Outpaces Service Sector ISM 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Cleanup On Aisle Two", published June 4, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Late Cycle View," published October 16, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 https://www.census.gov/services/qss/about_the_survey.html 4 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_overview_en.pdf 5 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump's Demands On China," April 4, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again", published May 31,2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The recent weakness in emerging markets (EM) has not yet altered the Fed's view of the U.S. economy. Capital spending in the U.S. remains upbeat despite a slowdown in economic momentum outside the country. May's Beige Book continued to highlight labor shortages, especially among skilled workers in key areas of the economy. Feature Chart 1The Labor Market Continues To Tighten U.S. risk assets dipped along with Treasury yields last week as investor worry about Italy, emerging markets and global trade mounted. BCA's stance is that despite the increase in financial market and economic stress overseas, the Federal Reserve will stick to its gradual pace of rate hikes for now. Policymakers at the central bank would need to see a direct and prolonged impact on U.S. financial conditions before adjusting the path of rate hikes. Data released last week on housing, capital spending and the labor market confirmed that the U.S. economy is growing well above its long-term potential in 1H 2018 and that inflation remains at the Fed's 2% target (see section below). The U.S. added 223,000 jobs in May. The 3-month average, at almost 180,000, is well above the expansion in the labor force. Thus, the unemployment rate ticked down to 3.8%, matching the low seen during the height of the tech bubble in 2000 (Chart 1). For the FOMC, the unemployment rate has already reached the level policymakers had projected for the end of the year (3.8%). Indeed, by later this year unemployment is likely to drop below the FOMC's projection for the end of 2019 (3.6%). The Fed has signaled that it is comfortable with an overshoot of the 2% inflation target, but it will likely be forced by early 2019 to transition from simply normalizing monetary policy at a "gradual" pace to targeting slower growth. This would set the stage for a recession in 2020. Julia Coronado, a panelist at BCA's upcoming 2018 Investment Conference in Toronto, noted recently that inflation may fall short of the Fed's target and cause the Fed to scale back its planned hikes.1 Italy remains a key source of concern for markets. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service notes that a new election is likely in Italy after August, prolonging the political uncertainty there. BCA's stance is that while Italian policymakers' fight with Brussels, Berlin, and the ECB will last throughout 2018, they are not looking to exit the euro area yet. Over the next ten years, however, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service expects Italy to test the markets with a euro area exit attempt. We are sticking to our view that such an event is far more likely to occur following a recession than it is today.2 The Trump Administration re-ignited the trade war last week. We discuss below, in the context of the Fed's Beige Book, which noted an uptick in uncertainty surrounding trade. Is EM Weakness A Risk? The recent weakness in emerging markets has not altered the Fed's view of the U.S. economy. Chart 2, Chart 3 and Chart 4 show the performance of key U.S and EM financial market earnings and economic metrics indexed to the peak of MSCI's Emerging Market Index in mid-1997, late 2014 and early 2018. Chart 2 (panel 1) shows that the dollar's strength since the EM markets peaked last year is modest compared with prior cycles. Moreover, oil prices are rising today; in 1997-98 and 2014-15 prices collapsed. The implication is that rising oil prices suggest that global economic activity is in an uptrend. Last week, BCA's Commodity and Energy Service team revised their forecasts for oil prices in 2018 and 2019 warning investors to expect more volatility in oil markets.3 U.S. financial conditions (panel 3) have eased since the EM peak in early 2018. This contrasts with 1997-98 and in 2014-2016 when financial conditions tightened considerably. S&P 500 forward EPS estimates (panel 4) have climbed since the top in EM equities, but the rise is related to the 2017 tax bill. Analysts' estimates for U.S. large cap earnings also rose during the EM crisis in the late 1990s, but then fell in 2014 and 2015 as oil prices dropped. U.S. real final demand climbed after EM equities peaked in 1997 and 2014. BCA's view is that the U.S. economy will accelerate in the final three quarters of 2018 and run well above its long-term potential of 1.8%. Chart 2U.S. Financial Conditions, ##br##Oil And EPS During EM Stress Chart 3EM Assets 1997-98, ##br##2014-15 And Today Chart 4U.S. Stocks, Treasuries, ##br##Spread Product And EM Stress The rise in the dollar and Fed rate hike expectations have pressured some EM currencies, financial markets and economies. That said, the response is muted relative to previous cycles. A Boston Fed paper4 found that during recent bouts of international financial market turmoil, EM economies with fewer economic vulnerabilities performed better than economies that were more exposed. However, the paper also noted that during crises in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was little differentiation in EM market performance. Chart 3 shows that in the late 1990s and between 2014 and 2016, EM currencies declined about 8.2% in the first few months after EM equity prices peaked. Today, EM currencies are down just 3.8% versus the dollar since the EM equity peak (panel 1). Panel 2 shows EM stocks relative to U.S. stocks since the EM summit and panel 3 shows the global LEI (ex the U.S.) is tracking the mid-1990s episode, but not the 2014-2016 experience. China's Li Keqiang Index (LKI) is also following the late 1990s episode. BCA's China Investment Strategy service states that China's economy will continue to weaken, but that the deceleration will not be as severe as the 2014-2016 slowdown (panel 4).5 U.S. Treasury yields are on the rise; in the late 1990s and 2014-2016 (Chart 4, panel 1) they headed downhill. That said, the yield on the 10-year Treasury note has dipped 3 bps in the past week as investor worry about EM, global trade and Italy more than offset a strong batch of U.S. economic data. Panels 2 and 3 show that the S&P 500 and the U.S. stock-to-bond ratio dipped after the peak in EM stocks this year and in the earlier episodes. We note that at this point in the previous two instances, both U.S. equity prices and the stock-to-bond ratio began to climb and soon surpassed their prior heights. BCA's view is that some caution is warranted on U.S. stocks in the next few months. However, in the next 12 months, the U.S. stock-to-bond ratio will move higher. Investment-grade (panel 4) and high-yield spreads (panel 5) climbed this year after the top in EM stock prices. Moreover, the escalation in high-yield spreads is muted relative to the increase in 2014 as oil prices peaked. We also note that current spread levels are well above those in the late 1990s. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service recommends investors overweight high-yield bonds relative to Treasuries.6 Previous periods of EM-related stress in the financial markets led to shifts in the relationship between the dollar and certain U.S. asset classes. The top panel of Chart 5 shows that the correlation between changes in U.S. stock prices and the dollar tends to increase during these episodes. The relationship is more consistent prior to 2000. Since that time, the dollar and U.S. equities have moved in opposite directions during intervals of EM stress. There is no clear pattern in the relationship between the stock-to-bond ratio and the dollar when EM stress intensifies (panel 2). There is a very choppy correlation between S&P operating earnings and the dollar (panel 3). Chart 5U.S. Financial Markets' Correlation With The Dollar During EM Stress Likewise, there is no consistent interconnection between bond yields and the dollar (Chart 5, panel 4) as EM stress increases. However, as the pressure mounts, we note that the correlation between the dollar and the 10-year begins to shift. Oil and gold prices and the dollar tend to move in opposite directions during times of EM stress (not shown). Moreover, since the early 2000s, there is a consistently negative relationship between the dollar, gold and oil. In recent years, an escalating dollar has been aligned with small cap stocks outperforming large caps. Larger companies have more exposure to overseas sales than small cap firms in the S&P 500.7 Bottom Line: Dollar strength and rising U.S. bond yields are a classic late-cycle combination that often spells trouble for emerging market assets. Escalating turmoil in EM financial markets could potentially lead the Federal Reserve to put the rate hike campaign on hold. However, that would require some signs of either domestic financial stress or slowing growth. Stay short duration over a 12 month horizon. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service is looking for a trough in economic surprise and a capitulation in speculative positioning in the Treasury market to signal the end to the recent pullback in yields.8 Dollar Impact Capital spending in the U.S. remains upbeat despite a slowdown in economic momentum outside the country. BCA's view is that global growth will cool for the next few months and then reaccelerate. Chart 6 shows that global capital goods imports have rolled over (panel 1), but that new capital goods orders in the G3 remain in an upward trend (panel 2). Nonetheless, most of the strength in the G3 is from the U.S. BCA's model for nominal and real business investment (panel 3) suggests that capex is poised to rocket in the coming quarters. Moreover, CEO confidence measured by Duke and the Business Roundtable remain at cycle highs (Chart 7, panel 1) while business spending plans in the regional Fed surveys are still elevated (panels 2 and 3). Higher oil prices are not the only story behind the boom in U.S. business spending. Chart 8 shows that energy capex troughed (panel 3) a few months after oil prices (panel 1) in early 2016. Business spending outside the oil patch never turned negative on a year-over-year basis (panel 2) and it is still on the upswing. The 2017 tax bill and corporations' search for labor-saving machinery as wage and compensation metrics rise are behind the surge in spending. Robust corporate earnings also provide a tailwind for capex (panel 4). Chart 6Global Growth Is Rolling Over... Chart 7..But U.S. Growth Is Poised To Lift Off Chart 8Oil Is A Tailwind For Capes, ##br##But Not The Whole Story Last week's report on corporate profits allows us to compare the trajectory of the S&P 500's profits and margins to the NIPA measures (Chart 9). Both metrics indicate that earnings jumped in recent quarters (panel 1) to record heights (panel 2). Any disconnect between the two indicators has disappeared.9 Chart 10 shows that S&P 500 revenues dipped in Q1 (panel 1), but NIPA-based sales measures continued to climb (panel 2). However, panel 2 shows a divergence in margins. The BEA sounding leaped ahead in Q1 while the S&P 500 version levelled off. BCA's view is that S&P 500 earnings growth on a trailing four-quarter basis will peak later this year (Chart 11). Moreover, we anticipate the secular mean reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning later in 2018. Chart 9S&P And NIPA Profit Measures Are Aligned Chart 10NIPA And S&P Sales And Profit Margins The dollar's recent strength is not yet a threat to U.S. corporate profits nor the U.S. equity market. BCA's view is that the dollar will advance by 5% in the next 12 months. The appreciation would trim EPS growth by roughly 1 to 2 percentage points, although most of this would occur in 2019 due to lagged effects. Indeed, the dollar would only climb in the context of robust U.S. economic growth and an expanding corporate top line. Nonetheless, the stronger greenback is not yet evident in forward EPS estimates for 2018 or 2019. (Chart 12). Chart 11Strong S&P 500 EPS Growth Ahead, ##br##Will Start To Slow Soon Chart 12Is the Stronger Dollar Starting To Impact 2019 EPS Estimates? Bottom Line: BCA's view is that the slowdown in growth outside the U.S. is not the start of a more significant downturn. Monetary policy is still accommodative worldwide, U.S. fiscal policy is loose and governments outside the U.S. are no longer tightening policy. The implication is that a big slide in global growth is not likely and that by the end of the summer, global growth will probably reaccelerate. Therefore, risks to the dollar are much more balanced and we do not foresee much more upside in the greenback. Stay long stocks versus bonds. However, investors with longer horizons should begin to prepare for lower real returns in the 2020s after a recession early in that decade. Beige Book Update The Beige Book released last week ahead of the FOMC's June 12-13 meeting suggested that uncertainty surrounding U.S. trade policy remained an important headwind in April and May. The Fed's business and banking contacts mentioned either tariffs or trade policy 34 times in the Beige Book. This was below 44 mentions in the April edition, but well above the 3 mentions in March. Moreover, uncertainty came up 13 times in May (Chart 13, panel 5); 10 were related to trade policy. There were nine mentions of trade in April and only two in March. Chart 13Rise Of Inflation Words ##br##And Uncertainty Stand Out BCA's view is that trade-related uncertainty will persist at least until the midterm elections in November.10 The Trump administration announced a new round of tariffs on Chinese products last week. Moreover, the U.S. plans to end the exemptions it provided to E.U. steelmakers on the tariffs that the U.S. imposed earlier this year. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service notes that the U.S.-China trade war is back on. The significance of the administration's about-face on trade is that it invalidates the conventional view that President Xi and Trump would promptly make a deal to ease tensions. President Trump's election, however, has revealed the preference of the median voter in the U.S. on trade. That preference is far less committed to free trade than previously assumed. Despite the headwind from trade, BCA's quantitative approach to the Beige Book's qualitative data continues to point to underlying strength in the U.S. economy, a tighter labor market and higher inflation. Moreover, references to a stronger dollar have disappeared from the Beige Book. Chart 13, panel 1 shows that at 67% in May, BCA's Beige Book Monitor ticked up from April's 55% reading, which was the lowest level since November 2017 when doubts over the tax bill weighed on business sentiment. The number of weak words in the Beige Book remained near four-year lows. On the other hand, the number of strong words climbed in May, but remains below last fall's post-hurricane highs. The tax bill was noted 3 times in the latest Beige Book, down from 12 in April and 15 in March. The legislation was cast in a positive light in two of the three mentions. BCA's stance is that the dollar will move modestly higher in 2018. The trade-weighted dollar is up 4.1% since mid-April, but the elevated value of the greenback is not yet a concern for Beige Book respondents. Furthermore, based on the minimal references to a robust dollar (only eight in the past eight Beige Books), the dollar should not be an issue for corporate profits in Q2 2018. The handful of recent references sharply contrasts with the surge in comments during 2015 and early 2016 (Chart 13, panel 4). The last time that eight consecutive Beige Books had so few remarks about a strong dollar was in late 2014. Table 1Labor 'Shortages' Identified In The Beige Book The disagreement on inflation between the Beige Book and the Fed's preferred price metric narrowed in May (Chart 13, panel 3). The number of inflation words rose to a fresh cycle zenith, surpassing the July 2017 peak. Core PCE also increased in early 2018. However, in the past year, inflation measured by the PCE deflator, failed to match the escalation in inflation references. In the past, increased remarks about inflation have led measured inflation by a few months, suggesting that the CPI and core PCE may still climb. May's Beige Book continued to highlight labor shortages, especially among skilled workers in key areas of the economy. Shortages of qualified workers were reported in various specialized trades and occupations, including truck drivers, sales personnel, carpenters, electricians, painters and information technology professionals. The Beige Book noted that many firms responded to the lack of qualified workers by increasing wages and compensation packages. Moreover, the word "widespread", which is part of BCA's inflation words count, was used 11 times in May, to describe both labor shortages and rising input costs. Table 1 shows industries with labor shortages. In the year ended April 2018, the gain in average hourly earnings in most of the industries was faster than average. Moreover, in nearly all these categories, labor market conditions are the tightest since before the onset of the 2007-2009 recession. More details can be found in a recent Fed study on labor shortages in the manufacturing sector.11 BCA's Beige Book Commercial Real Estate (CRE) Monitor12 remains in a downtrend (Chart 14). The Fed has highlighted valuation concerns in CRE and BCA's Global Investment Strategy service recently stated that the sector is increasingly vulnerable.13 Chart 14Beige Book Commercial Real Estate Monitor Bottom Line: May's Beige Book supports our stance that inflation will lead to at least three more Fed rate hikes by the end of the year. Moreover, labor shortages may be spreading from highly skilled to moderately skilled workers, and rising input costs are widespread. The nation's tax policy still gets high marks from the business community, but ongoing concerns over trade policy will restrain growth. The Fed may back off from this gradual path if stress in the emerging markets leads to tighter U.S. financial conditions. Still, it will take more than the recent spate of EM turmoil to deter the Fed. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.rutgersrealestate.com/blog-re/low-inflation-the-good-and-the-bad/ 2 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy "Italy, Spain, Trade Wars... Oh My!", published May 30, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's Commodity And Energy Strategy "OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again", published May 31,2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/rpa1702.pdf 5 Please see BCA Research's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "11 Charts to Watch", published May 30, 2018. Available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Coming To Grips With Gradualism", published May 8, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Too Good To Be True", published January 22, 2018. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Pulling Back And Looking Ahead", published May 22, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Summer Stress Out", July 3, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump's Demands On China," April 4, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/evaluating-labor-shortages-in-manufacturing-20180309.htm 12 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Summer Stress Out", dated July 3, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Tantalizing Trades - Four Months On", dated January 19, 2018. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The global trade slowdown will intensify, even if U.S. domestic demand remains robust. The large emerging Asian bourses will recouple to the downside with their EM peers. Market-neutral EM equity portfolios should consider going long consumer staples while shorting banks. In Chile, receive 3-year swap rates. Continue to overweight stocks relative to the EM benchmark. Short the Colombian peso versus the Russia ruble. Stay neutral on Colombian equities and local bonds but overweight sovereign credit within their respective EM universes. Feature Performance of large equity markets in north Asia - Korean, Taiwanese and Chinese investable stocks -- has been relatively resilient compared with other EM bourses. Specifically, the EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan equity index has already dropped 16% in U.S. dollar terms, while the market cap-weighted index of investable Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese stocks is down only 8% from its peak in late January.1 These three markets account for 60% of the MSCI EM stock index. A pertinent question is whether these North Asian markets will de-couple from or re-couple with the rest of EM. Our bias is that they will re-couple to the downside. Global equity portfolios should continue to underweight Asian stocks versus the DM bourses in general, and the S&P 500 in particular. That said, dedicated EM equity portfolios should overweight Korea and Taiwan and maintain a neutral stance on China and Hong Kong relative to the EM and Asian equity benchmarks. The Global Trade Slowdown Will Intensify Emerging Asian stock markets are very sensitive to global trade cycles. Slowing global trade is typically negative for them. There is growing evidence that the global trade deceleration will intensify: The German IFO index for business expectations in German manufacturing - a good leading indicator for global trade - is pointing to a further slowdown in global exports (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Global Trade Slowdown Will Persist Export volume growth has already slowed across manufacturing Asia (Chart I-2). The most recent data points for these series are as of April. Asia's booming tech/semiconductor industry is also slowing. Both Taiwan's export orders growth and Singapore's technology PMI new orders-to-inventory ratio have relapsed (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Asian Exports Growth: Heading Southward Chart I-3Asian Tech: Feeling The Pinch One of the causes of weakness in the global semiconductor cycle could be stagnating global auto sales (Chart I-4). The latter are being weighed down by weakness in auto sales in China and the U.S. Cars require a significant amount of semiconductors, and lack of improvement in global auto sales will suppress semiconductor demand. So far, China has not been at the epicenter of investors' concerns, but this will soon change as its growth slowdown intensifies. Credit conditions continue to tighten in China, which entails downside risks to mainland capital spending and consequently imports. China's imports are set to slump considerably, reinforcing the global trade downturn.2 First, China's bank loan approvals have dropped considerably in the past 18 months, suggesting a meaningful slowdown in bank financing and in turn the country's investment expenditures (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Global Auto And Semiconductor Sales Chart I-5China: Bank Loan Approval And Capex Second, not only are bank loan standards tightening but costs of financing are also rising. The share of loans extended above the prime lending rate has risen to a 15-year high (Chart I-6, top panel). This represents marginal tightening. Finally, onshore corporate bond yields as well as offshore U.S. dollar-denominated corporate bond yields have broken to new highs in this cycle (Chart I-6, bottom panels). Mounting borrowing costs and tighter credit standards in China point to further deceleration in credit-sensitive spending such as investment expenditures and property purchases. On the whole, rising interest rates and material currency depreciation in EM ex-China and credit tightening in China will prompt a considerable slump in imports, depressing world trade. EM including Chinese imports account for 30% of global imports, while the U.S. and EU together make up 24% of global imports values. Hence, global trade will disappoint if and as EM and Chinese imports stumble. A final word on the history of de-coupling among EM regions is in order. There have been a few episodes when emerging Asian and Latin American stocks de-coupled: In 1997-'98, the home-grown Asian crisis devastated regional markets, but Latin American stocks continued to rally until mid-1998 - when they plummeted (Chart I-7, top panel). Chart I-6China: Rising Borrowing Costs Chart I-7De-coupling Between Asia And Latin America In 2007-'08, emerging Asian equities tumbled along with the S&P 500, but Latin American bourses fared well until the middle of 2008 due to surging commodities/oil prices (Chart I-7, middle panel). Finally, the bottom panel of Chart I-7 illustrates that in early 2015, Asian stocks performed well, supported by the inflating Chinese equity bubble. Meanwhile, Latin American stocks plunged. In all of these episodes, the de-coupling between Asia and Latin America proved to be unsustainable, and the markets that showed initial resilience eventually re-coupled to the downside. Bottom Line: Global trade is set to head southward, even if U.S. demand remains robust. China's growth slump will be instrumental to this global trade slowdown. Consequently, Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese equities will be vulnerable. Heeding To Market Signals Financial markets often move ahead of economic data, and simply tracking data is not always helpful in gauging turning points in business cycles. By the time economic data change course, financial markets would typically have already partially adjusted. Besides, past economic and financial market performance is not a guarantee of future performance. This is why we rely on thematic fundamental analysis and monitor intermediate- and long-term trends in financial markets to navigate through markets. There are presently several important market signals that investors should be heeding to: EM corporate bond yields are surging, which typically foreshadows falling EM share prices (Chart I-8). Meanwhile, there is no robust correlation between EM equities and U.S. bond yields. Chart I-8EM Share Prices Always Decline When EM Corporate Bond Yields Rise The basis: So long as the rise in U.S. bond yields is offset by compressing EM credit spreads, EM corporate bond yields decline and EM share prices rally. But when EM corporate (or sovereign) yields rise, irrespective of whether this is due to rising U.S. Treasury yields or widening EM credit spreads, EM equity prices come under considerable selling pressure. Lately, both EM credit spreads have been widening, offsetting the drop in U.S. bond yields. Hence, a drop in U.S. bond yields is not in and of itself sufficient to halt a decline in EM share prices. So long as EM corporate and sovereign credit spreads are widening by more than the decline in U.S. Treasury yields, EM corporate and sovereign bond yields will rise, heralding lower EM share prices. The ratio of total return (including carry) of six commodities currencies relative to safe-haven currencies3 is breaking below its 200-day moving average after having bounced from this technical support line several times in the past 12 months (Chart I-9). This could be confirming that the bull market in EM risk assets is over, and a bear market is underway. Chinese property stocks listed onshore have broken down, and those trading in Hong Kong seem to be forming a head-and-shoulder pattern (Chart I-10). In the latter case, such a technical formation will likely be followed by a considerable down-leg. Chart I-9An Important Breakdown Chart I-10Chinese Property Stocks Look Very Vulnerable Further, China's onshore A-share index has already dropped by 15% from its cyclical peak in late January. Finally, both emerging Asia's relative equity performance against developed markets, as well as the emerging Asian currency index versus the U.S. dollar (ADXY) seem to be rolling over at their long-term moving averages (Chart I-11). The same technical pattern is presenting itself for global energy and mining stocks in absolute terms, and also in the overall Brazilian equity index (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Asian Equities And Currencies Are ##br##At Critical Juncture Chart I-12Commodity Equities And Brazil ##br##Are Facing Technical Resistance The failure of these markets to break above their long-term technical resistance levels may be signalling that their advance since early 2016 has been a cyclical - not structural - bull market, and is likely over. These technical chart profiles so far confirm our fundamental analysis that the EM and commodities rallies since early 2016 did not represent a multi-year secular bull market. If correct, the downside risks to EM including Asian markets are substantial, and selling/shorting them now is not too late. Bottom Line: EM including Asian stocks, currencies and credit markets are at risk of gapping down. Absolute-return investors should trade these markets on the short side. Asset allocators should underweight EM markets relative to DM in general and the U.S. in particular. A complete list of our currency, fixed-income and equity recommendations is available on pages 20-21. An EM Equity Sector Trade: Long Consumer Staples / Short Banks EM consumer staples have massively underperformed banks as well as the overall EM index since January 2016 (Chart I-13). The odds are that their relative performance is about to reverse. Equity investors should consider implementing the following equity pair trade: long consumer staples / short banks: Consumer staples are a low-beta sector because their revenues are less cyclical. As EM growth downshifts, share prices of companies with more stable revenue streams will likely outperform. Bank stocks are vulnerable as local interest rates in many EMs rise in response to the selloff in their respective currencies (Chart I-14). Consumer staples usually outperform banks when local borrowing costs are rising. Chart I-13Go Long EM Consumer Staples / ##br##Short EM Banks Chart I-14EM Banks Stocks Are Inversely Correlated With##br## EM Local Bond Yields We expect more currency depreciation in EM, which will exert further upward pressure on local rates, including interbank rates. Further, growth weakness in EM economies typically leads to rising non-performing loan (NPL) provisions. Chart I-15A and Chart I-15B demonstrates that weakening nominal GDP growth (shown inverted on the charts) leads to higher provisioning. Hence, a renewed EM growth slowdown will hurt bank profits. Chart I-15AWeaker Nominal GDP Growth Entails ##br##Higher NPL Provisions Chart I-15BWeaker Nominal GDP Growth Entails ##br##Higher NPL Provisions Our assessment is that banks in many EM countries have provisioned less than what is probably necessary following years of a credit boom. Indeed, in the last 12-18 months or so, many banks have even been reducing their NPL provisions to boost profits. Hence, a reversal of these dynamics will undermine banks' earnings. Bottom Line: Market-neutral EM equity portfolios should consider going long consumer staples while shorting banks. This is in addition to our long-term strategy of shorting EM banks versus U.S. banks as well as shorting banks in absolute terms in individual markets such as Brazil, Turkey, Malaysia and small-cap banks in China. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 These calculations are done using MSCI investible stock indexes in U.S. dollars terms. 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "The Dollar Rally And China's Imports", dated May 24, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 Average of cad, aud, nzd, brl, clp & zar total returns (including carry) relative to average of jpy & chf total returns (including carry). Chile: Stay Overweight Equities, Receive Rates 31 May 2018 Chart II-1Chilean Equities Relative Performance And Copper Prices It is often assumed that Chilean financial markets are a play on copper. While this largely holds true for the Chilean peso, it is not always correct regarding its stock market's relative performance to its EM peers. Chile has outperformed in the past amid declining copper prices (Chart II-1). Despite our negative view on copper prices, we are reiterating our overweight allocation to this bourse within an EM equity portfolio. There are convincing signs that growth in the Chilean economy is moving along fine for now (Chart II-2). While weakness in global trade will weigh on the economy, the critical variable that makes Chile stand out from other commodities producers in the EM universe is its ability to cut interest rates amid currency depreciation. Chart II-3 illustrates that interest rates in Chile can and do fall when the peso depreciates. This stands in stark contrast with many others economies in the EM universe. There are a number of factors that suggest inflationary pressures will remain dormant for some time. This will allow the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) to cut rates as and when required. Chart II-2Chile: Economic Conditions Chart II-3Interest Rates In Chile Can Fall When Peso Depreciates First, the output gap is negative and has been widening, which has historically led to falling core inflation (Chart II-4). Second, a wide range of consumer inflation measures - services and trimmed-mean inflation rates - are very low and remain in a downtrend (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Chile: Output Gap And Inflation Chart II-5Chile: Inflation Is Very Low And Falling Finally, there are no signs of wage inflation, which is the key driver of genuine inflation. In fact, wage growth is decelerating sharply (Chart II-6). Odds are that this disinflationary rout will go on for longer, given Chile's demographic and labor market dynamics. The country's labor force growth has accelerated and the economy does not seem able to absorb this excess labor supply (Chart II-7). Consistently, our labor surplus proxy - calculated as the number of unemployed looking for a job divided by the number of job vacancies - has surged to all-time highs (Chart II-8). Chart II-6Chile: Wage Growth Is Very Weak Chart II-7Chile: Rising Labor Force Chart II-8Chile: Excessive Labor Supply... Interestingly, this is not happening because of weak employment. Chart II-9 shows that the employment-to-working population ratio is at a record high, while employment growth is robust. This upholds that decent job growth is not sufficient to absorb the expanding supply of labor. All in all, a structural excess supply of labor as well as a cyclical slowdown in global trade and lower copper prices altogether will likely warrant a decline in interest rates in Chile. Consequently, we recommend a new fixed income trade: Receive 3-year swap rates. The recent rise provides a good entry point (Chart II-10). Chart II-9...Despite Robust Employment Growth Chart II-10Chile: Receive 3-Year Swap Rates The ability to cut interest rates will mitigate the effect of weaker exports on the economy. We recommend dedicated EM investors maintain an overweight allocation in Chile in their equity, local currency bond and corporate credit portfolios. For absolute return investors, the risk-reward profiles for Chilean stocks and the currency are not attractive. The peso will depreciate considerably, and shorting it versus the U.S. dollar will prove profitable. Consistent with our negative view on copper prices, we have been recommending a short position in copper with a long leg in the Chilean peso. This allows traders to earn some carry while waiting for copper prices to break down. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Colombia: The Currency Will Be A Release Valve The structural long-term outlook for Colombia is positive, as a combination of pro-market orthodox policies and reform initiatives amid positive tailwinds from demographic should ensure a reasonably high potential GDP growth rate. In the first round of presidential elections held last weekend, the gap between right wing candidate Ivan Duque and left-wing candidate Gustav Petro came out large enough to make a Duque victory highly likely in the second round to be held on June 17. His election would entail a positive backdrop for the reform agenda and business investment over the coming years. Yet despite the positive structural backdrop, Colombia is still facing a major imbalance - excessive reliance on oil in sustaining stable balance of payments (BoP) dynamics. The trade balance deficit - including oil - is $8 billion, while excluding oil it stands at $20 billion, or 7.5% of GDP (Chart III-1). Hence, if oil prices drop materially in the second half of this year - as we expect - Colombia's balance of payments will be strained. Consequently, the currency will come under depreciation pressure. The peso is presently fairly valued as the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs is at its historical mean (Chart III-2). Chart III-1Colombia's Achilles' Hill: Trade Balance Excluding Oil Chart III-2The Colombian Peso Is Fairly Valued The central bank has adopted a "hands-off" approach toward the exchange rate, and is likely to allow the peso to depreciate if the BoP deteriorates. Weak economic conditions will likely prevent it from hiking interest rates to bolster the peso: Even though the central bank has reduced its policy rate by 350 basis points since the end of 2016, lending rates remain restrictive when compared with the nominal GDP growth rate (Chart III-3, top panel). Fiscal policy has been tight, with government expenditures subdued and the primary deficit narrowing (Chart III-3, bottom panel). This is unlikely to change for now if conservative candidate, Ivan Duque, wins the election. Consumer and business demand has failed to pick up, and shows little sign of recovery (Chart III-4). Non-performing loans (NPL) continue to rise, forcing banks to raise their NPL provisioning (Chart III-5). Weak nominal GDP growth suggests provisions may rise further. Chart III-3Colombia: Little Sign Of Recovery Chart III-4Colombia: Little Sign Of Recovery Chart III-5Colombian Banks: NPL And NPL Provision Continue Rising Overall, banks' balance sheets remain impaired, hampering their ability to extend loans. Investment Recommendations Despite a favorable structural outlook, Colombia's cyclical growth and financial market outlooks remain poor. Chances are that the peso will come under selling pressure as the external environment deteriorates - i.e., the currency will act as a release valve. We recommend staying neutral on Colombian stocks and local bonds relative to their EM peers, and to overweight Colombian sovereign credit within an EM credit portfolio. The basis is that sound and tight fiscal policies and a continuation of supply side reforms will benefit this credit market. To capitalize on potential currency depreciation while hedging for the uncertainty of oil price decline, we recommend shorting the peso against the Russian ruble. Although Colombia's structural outlook is more promising than Russia's, the latter's BoP dynamics is healthier and its cyclical growth outlook is better than Colombia's. Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst AndrijaV@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights Trade war between China and U.S. is back on; President Trump is politically constrained from making a quick deal with China; Italian uncertainty will last through the summer and beyond; But bond market will eventually price profligacy over Euro Area exit, which favors bear steepening; A new election in Spain is market positive, there are no Euroskeptics in Iberia; Our tactical bearish view is playing out, stay long DXY and expect more summer volatility. Feature Geopolitical risks are rising across the board. This supports our tactically bearish view, elucidated in April.1 In this Client Note, we review our views on trade wars, Italy, and Spain. Is The U.S.-China Trade War Back On? Most relevant for global assets is that the first official salvo of the trade war between China and the U.S. has been fired: the White House announced, on May 29, tariffs on $50 billion worth of Chinese imports as well as yet-to-be-specified restrictions on Chinese investments in the U.S. and U.S. exports to China.2 We have long raised the alarm on U.S.-China relations, but President Trump threw us a curve-ball last week when Chinese and American negotiators issued a joint statement meant to soothe trade tensions. We responded that "we do not expect the truce to last long."3 Apparently it lasted merely eight days. The significance of the administration's about-face on trade is that it invalidates the conventional view that President Xi and Trump would promptly make a deal to ease tensions. Many of our clients have responded to our bearish view on Sino-American relations by suggesting that Beijing will simply offer to buy more "beef and Boeings," and that Trump will take the deal in order to declare a "quick win." The last ten days should put this view to rest. China did offer to buy more beef explicitly - with the offer of more Boeings also rumored - and yet President Trump rejected the deal. Why? Our suspicion is that President Trump was shocked by the backlash against the deal among Republicans in Congress and conservative commentators in the press. As we have argued since 2016, there is no political constraint to being tough on China on trade. This is a highly controversial view as many in the investment community agree with the narrative that the soybean lobby will prevent a trade war between the U.S. and China. President Trump's election, however, has revealed the preference of the median voter in the U.S. on trade. That preference is far less committed to free trade than previously assumed. Republicans in Congress, once staunch defenders of free trade, have therefore adjusted their policy preference, creating a political constraint to a quick deal with China. Bottom Line: Yes, the trade war is back on. We are re-opening our short China-exposed S&P 500 companies versus U.S. financials and telecoms. Is Italy Going To Leave The Euro Area? The Italian bond market is beginning to price severe geopolitical stress. The 10-year BTP spread versus German bunds has grown 98 basis points since the election (Chart 1), while the 2/10 BTP yield curve has nearly inverted (Chart 2). The latter suggests that investors are beginning to price in default risk, or rather Euro Area exit risk, over the next two years. Chart 1Probability Of Itexit Has Risen... Chart 2...But Two-Year Horizon Is Overstated We have long contended that Italy is the premier developed market political risk.4 Its level of Euroskepticism is empirically higher than that of the rest of Euro Area (Chart 3) and we have expected that Italy would eventually produce a global risk off. It is just not clear to us that this is the moment. Chart 3Italy: No Euro Support Rebound First, support for the Euro Area remains in the high 50% range and has largely bounced between 55-60% for several years. This is low relative to its Euro Area peers, prompting us to raise the alarm on Italy. But it is also still a majority, showing that Italians are not sold on leaving the Euro Area. Second, the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) has adjusted its policy towards the euro membership question in view of this polling. In other words, M5S is aware that the median Italian voter is not convinced that exiting the Euro Area is the right thing to do. We would argue that the anti-establishment parties performed well in this year's election precisely because of this strategic decision to abandon their Euroskeptic rhetoric on the currency union. Nonetheless, the deal that M5S signed to form a coalition with the far more Euroskeptic Lega was an aggressive deal that signals that Rome is preparing for a fight against Brussels, the ECB, and core Europe. The proposed tax cuts, unwinding of retirement reforms, and increases in social welfare spending would raise Italy's budget deficit from current 2.3% of GDP to above 7%. Given rules against such profligacy, and given Italy's high debt levels, the coalition might as well be proposing a Euro Area exit. There are three additional concerns aside from fiscal profligacy: New Election: President Sergio Mattarella's choice for interim prime minister - now that M5S and Lega have broken off their attempt to form a government - has no chance of gaining a majority in the current parliament. As such, the president is likely to call a new election. The leaders of M5S and the Lega, as well as the leaders of the center-left Democratic Party (DP), want the election to be held on July 29, ahead of the ferragosto holidays that shuts down the country in August.5 The market does not like the uncertainty of new election as the current M5S-Lega coalition looks likely to win again, only this time with even more seats. As such, the last thing investors want is a summer full of hyperbolic, populist, anti-establishment statements that will undoubtedly be part of the electoral campaigns. Polls: The two populist parties, M5S and the Lega, are gaining in the polls, particularly the latter, which is the more Euroskeptic (Chart 4). This suggests to investors that the more Euroskeptic approach is gaining support. Impeachment: The leader of M5S, Luigi Di Maio, has called for the impeachment of President Mattarella. Di Maio accused Mattarella of overstepping his constitutional responsibility when he denied the populist coalition's preferred candidate for economy minister, Paolo Savona. Impeachment would be a major concern for the markets as Mattarella's mandate is set to expire only in 2022, which means that he remains a considerable constraint on populism until then. Our reading is that Mattarella did not violate the constitution and that he is unlikely to be removed from power, even if the parliament does impeach him.6 Over the next month, investors will watch all three factors closely. In our view, it is positive that the election may take place over the summer - for the first time in Italy's history - as it would reduce the period of uncertainty. Second, it is understandable that investors will fret about Lega's rise in the polls. However, the closer Lega approaches M5S in the polls, the less likely the two parties will be to maintain their current coalition. At some point, it will not be in the interest of M5S to form a coalition with its chief opponent, especially if Lega gains support and therefore demands a greater share of power in the revised coalition deal. A much preferable coalition partner for M5S would be the center-left PD, which will be weaker, and hence more manageable, and would be a better ideological match. Therefore we believe that the market is getting ahead of itself. Italian policymakers are looking for a fight with Brussels, Berlin, and the ECB over fiscal room and profligacy. This is a fight that will take considerable time to resolve and should add a fiscal premium to the long-dated Italian bonds. In fact, May 29 had the biggest day-to-day selloff since 1993 (Chart 5). However, policymakers are not (yet) looking for exit from the Euro Area. As such, risk premium on the 10-year BTPs does make sense, but the sharp move on the 2-year notes is premature. Chart 4Italy's Populists Are Ascendant Chart 5Market's Reaction Is More Severe Than In 2011 Bottom Line: Italian policymakers are not looking to exit the Euro Area. Their fight with Brussels, Berlin, and the ECB will last throughout 2018 and makes it dangerous to try to "catch the falling knife" of the BTPs. However, expecting the yield curve to invert is premature as an Italian Euro Area exit over the next two years is unlikely. Over the next ten years, however, we would expect Italy to test the markets with a Euro Area exit attempt. We are sticking to our view that such an event is far more likely to occur following a recession than it is today. Is Spanish Election Threat The Same As Italy? Chart 6Spanish Election Is Market Positive Spain is having its own political crisis. The inconclusive June 2016 election produced a minority conservative government, with the center-right People's Party (PP) supported on critical matters by the center-left Socialist Party (PSOE). The leader of the PSOE, Pedro Sanchez, has decided to withdraw his support for the minority government due to alleged evidence of PP corruption, allegations that have dogged the conservatives for years. A vote of confidence on Friday could bring down the government. Why did the PSOE decide to challenge PP now? Because polls are showing that PP is in decline, as is, Podemos, the far-left party that nearly outperformed PSOE in the 2016 election (Chart 6). The greatest beneficiary of the political realignment in Spain, however, is Ciudadanos, a radically centrist and radically pro-European party that originated in Catalonia. Ciudadanos's official platform in the December 2017 regional elections in Catalonia was "Catalonia is my homeland, Spain is my country, and Europe is our future." New elections in Spain are likely to produce a highly pro-market outcome where the centrist and pro-EU Ciudadanos forms a coalition with PSOE. While such a coalition would lean towards more fiscal spending, it would not unravel the crucial structural reforms painfully implemented by Mariano Rajoy's conservative governments since 2012. It also is as far away from Euroskepticism as exists in Europe at the moment. Bottom Line: A new Spanish election would be a market-positive event. The country would have a more stable government, replacing the current minority PP government that has lost all its political capital after implementing painful structural reforms and being dogged by corruption allegations. There is no Euroskeptic political alternative in Spain at the moment. As such, we are recommending that clients go long 10-year Spanish government bonds against Italian.7 Any contagion from Italy to Spain is inappropriate politically and is a misapplied vestige of the early days of the Euro Area crisis when all peripheral bonds traded in concerto. As such, it should be faded. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Expect Volatility... Of Volatility," dated April 11, 2018, and "Are You Ready For 'Maximum Pressure?'" dated May 16, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 According to the White House statement, the specific list of covered imports subjected to tariffs will be announced on June 15. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Some Good News (Trade), Some Bad News (Italy)," dated May 23, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 2016 and "Europe's Divine Comedy Part II: Italy In Purgatorio," dated June 21, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Corriere Della Sera, "Governo: cresce l'ipotesi del voto il 29 luglio. Salvini: "Al voto con Savona candidato," dated May 29, 2018, available at www.corriere.it. 6 Like in the U.S., the threshold for impeachment in Italy is low. Both chambers of parliament merely have to impeach the president with a simple majority. However, in Italy, the trial is not held in the parliament, but rather by the Constitutional Court's 15 judges and an additional 16 specially appointed judges - selected randomly. It is highly unlikely that Mattarella, himself a previous member of the court, would be found guilty, particularly since he acted in accordance with presidential powers outlined in Article 87 of the constitution ("The President shall appoint State officials in the cases provided for by the law") and in accordance with precedent (in 1994, the president then refused to appoint Silvio Berlusconi's personal lawyer as the country's minister of justice). In addition, leader of Lega, Matteo Salvini, has stated that he would not want to see Mattarella impeached. This is likely because the process has a low probability of success. Furthermore, the president cannot disband the parliament and call new elections if impeachment proceedings begin against him. 7 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Hold, Close Or Switch: Reviewing Our Tactical Overlay Trades," dated May 29, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com.

Dear Clients, Please note that next week's report will be a joint effort with our geopolitical team, focused on North Korea. The report will be sent to you two days later than usual, on Friday June 8. Best regards, Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports Highlights Most episodes of negative relative Chinese equity performance this year have been driven by global stock market selloffs or related to the trade dispute with the U.S. Since Chinese ex-tech stocks have continued to outperform their global peers during this period, we recommend against downgrading China for now, barring hard evidence of a pernicious global slowdown or that severe protectionist action from the U.S. will indeed occur. Our list of charts to watch over the coming months highlights, among several other important points, that monetary conditions are not overly restrictive and that financial conditions are not tightening sharply. This is in spite of a recent clustering in corporate bond defaults that has concerned some investors. Besides broad-based stimulus in response to an impactful trade shock, a sustained pickup in housing construction remains the most plausible catalyst for an acceleration in domestic demand. For now tepid sales volume casts doubt on this scenario, but investors should continue to watch Chinese housing market dynamics closely. Feature There have been several developments affecting Chinese and global stock markets over the past two weeks. On the trade front, Secretary Mnuchin's statement on May 20 that the U.S. would be "putting the trade war" with China on hold was greeted by a material pushback from Congressional Republicans, particularly the administration's plan to ease previously announced sanctions on ZTE Group. The administration's trade rhetoric has since become more hawkish, as evidenced by yesterday's statement from the White House that referenced specific dates for the imposition of tariffs and the announcement of new restrictions on Chinese investment. This uptick in tough language sets the scene for Secretary Ross' Beijing visit this weekend to continue negotiations. More recently, a political crisis in Italy has caused euro area periphery bond yields to rise sharply, roiling global financial markets. The Italian President's rejection of Paolo Savona as proposed finance minister by the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) and Euroskeptic Lega has led to the installation of a caretaker government until the fall, when new elections are set to take place. The sharp tightening in financial conditions for Italy and Spain over the past week has exacerbated concerns about a potential growth slowdown in Europe, and has fed a relative selloff in emerging market equities that began in late-March. Despite the recent turmoil, our recommendation to investors is to avoid making any major changes to their allocation to Chinese ex-tech stocks within a global portfolio. Unless presented with hard evidence that the slowdown in the global economy is more than a simple deceleration from an above-trend pace, or that protectionist action from the U.S. will occur in a severe fashion, Table 1 suggests that investors should stay overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks (with a short leash). The table highlights that most episodes of negative relative Chinese ex-stock performance since the beginning of the year been driven by global stock market selloffs or related to the trade dispute with the U.S., despite the ongoing slowdown in China's industrial sector that we have repeatedly flagged. Since Chinese ex-tech stocks have continued to outperform their global peers during this period, our interpretation is that investors are well aware of the deceleration in China's economy, but do not yet regard it as a material threat to ex-tech equity prices. Table 1YTD Weakness In Chinese Stock Prices Has Been Driven By Global Events Clearly, however, this assessment on the part of global investors can change, underscoring that the situation in China merits continual re-assessment. With the goal of providing investors with a toolkit to continually monitor the state of the Chinese economy and the resulting implications for related financial asset prices, this week's report presents a list of 11 charts "to watch" across five categories of analysis. In our view these charts span key potential inflection points for the economic and profit outlook, and will serve as an important basis for us to update our view on China over the months ahead. Monetary & Fiscal Policy Chart 1: The Policy Rate Versus Borrowing Rates Chart 1Borrowing/Policy Rate Divergence Should Not Last,##br## But Is Worth Monitoring An interesting divergence has occurred lately between the 3-month interbank repo rate (currently the de-facto policy rate) and both corporate bond yields and the average lending rate. While the repo rate fell non-trivially after it became apparent in late-March that the PBOC would extend the deadline for the implementation of new regulatory standards for asset management products, corporate bond yields have recently risen sharply and China's weighted-average lending rate ticked higher in Q1. As we highlighted in last week's Special Report, the recent clustering of corporate bond defaults does not (for now) appear to be a source of systemic risk. First, by our estimation, the recent defaults cited above account for only 0.09% of outstanding corporate bonds. Second, the latest PBOC monetary report changed the tone from emphasizing "deleveraging" to "stabilizing leverage and restructuring", which shows that regulators are as concerned about the stability of the economy as they are about reducing excessive debts. But the possibility remains that the ongoing crackdown on China's shadow banking sector will cause some degree of persistence in the recent divergence between the interbank market and actual borrowing rates, implying that investors should continue to watch Chart 1 over the months for signs of materially tighter financial conditions. Chart 2: The Correlation Between Sovereign Risk And The Repo Rate We noted in a February Special Report that investors could use the rolling 1-year correlation between the 3-month interbank repo rate and the relative sovereign CDS spread between China and Germany as a gauge of whether Chinese monetary policy has become too restrictive for its economy.1 Despite the fact that actual sovereign credit risk in China is extremely low, Chart 2 shows that the relative CDS spread has acted as a good bellwether for growth conditions in the Chinese economy. It shows that the correlation between this spread and the 3-month interbank repo rate was initially positive in late-2016 (representing concern on the part of investors that monetary policy is restrictive), but has since come back down into negative territory. Interestingly, the correlation was consistently positive from mid-2011 to mid-2014, when average lending rates averaged 7% or higher and the benchmark lending rate exceeded the IMF's Taylor Rule estimate by about 1%.2 For now the correlation remains negative (as it was when we published our February report), meaning that it currently supports our earlier conclusion that monetary conditions are not overly restrictive and that financial conditions more generally are not tightening sharply (despite the recent rise in corporate bond yields). Chart 2No Sign Yet That Monetary Policy Is Overly Restrictive Chart 3Watch For Signs Of Fiscal Stimulus Chart 3: The Fiscal Spending Impulse Chart 3 presents the Chinese government's budgetary expenditure as an "impulse", calculated as expenditure over the past year as a percent of nominal GDP. Panel 2 shows the year-over-year change in the impulse. When compared with a similar measure for private sector credit, cyclical fluctuations in China's government spending impulse are relatively small. For this reason, BCA's China Investment Strategy service has not strongly emphasized fiscal spending as a major driver of China's business cycle. However, we also noted in a recent report that fiscal stimulus stands out as one of the "least bad" options available to policymakers to combat a negative export shock from U.S. protectionism, were one to occur.3 The potential for broader stimulus from Chinese authorities in response to an impactful trade shock raises the interesting possibility of another economic mini cycle in China, since the economy accelerated meaningfully in response to the last episode of material fiscal & monetary easing. As such, investors should closely watch over the coming months for signs that fiscal spending is accelerating, particularly if combined with potential signs of easing monetary policy. External Demand Chart 4: Global Demand And Chinese Export Growth Chart 4For Now, Resilient Exports ##br##Are Supporting China's Economy We have noted in several recent reports that a resilient export sector remains the most favorable pillar of Chinese growth. Besides the clear risk to Chinese trade from U.S. protectionism, two other factors have the potential to negatively impact the trend in export growth. The first (and most important) of these risks is a reduction in global demand, which some investors have recently been concerned about given the decline in global manufacturing PMIs. However, Chart 4 highlights that our global PMI diffusion indicator has done an excellent job of leading the global PMI over the past few years, and has barely registered a decline over the past few months. From our perspective, the odds are good that the recent deceleration in the PMI has been caused by sudden caution (even in developed countries) over the Trump administration's protectionist actions, and does not reflect a material or long-lasting slowdown in the global economy. But we will be closely watching the PMI releases over the coming months to rule out a more painful slowdown in global demand. Importantly, we have also highlighted that stronger exports may actually presage a further slowdown in China's industrial sector if it emboldens policymakers to intensify their reform efforts over the coming year. We argued in our May 2 Weekly Report that China's reform pain threshold is positively correlated with global growth momentum,4 meaning that the external sector of China's economy may have less potential to counter weakness in the industrial sector than many investors believe. In this regard, extreme export readings (to the up and downside) should be regarded by investors as a potentially problematic development. Chart 5: The Competitiveness Impact Of A Rising RMB Chart 5 highlights the second non-protectionist risk to Chinese export growth, namely the significant appreciation in the RMB that has occurred since mid-2017. The chart shows the percentile rank of three different trade-weighted RMB indexes since 2014, and highlights that all three are between their 70th & 80th percentiles (with our BCA Export-Weighted RMB index having risen the most). Importantly, the 2015-high shown in Chart 5 represents the strongest point for the currency in over two decades, suggesting that further currency strength may exacerbate the significant deceleration in export prices that has already occurred. Chart 5A Surging RMB Could Undercut Competitiveness Housing Chart 6: Housing Sales Versus Starts We have presented a variation of Chart 6 several times over the past few months, but it is important enough that it deserves to be continually monitored by investors over the coming year. Chart 6 tells the story of China's housing market from the perspective of an investor who is primarily interested in the sector because of its implications for growth. The chart highlights that residential floor space started, our best proxy for the real contribution to growth from residential investment, has fallen significantly relative to sales since 2012-2014. This appears to have occurred because of a significant build up in housing inventories, which has since reversed materially (even though the level remains elevated). To us, this suggests that the gap between housing sales and construction that has persisted for the past several years may finally be over, suggesting that the latter may pick up durably if sales trend higher. For now sales volume remains tepid, but this will be a key chart for investors to watch over the coming year given our view that housing is a core pillar of China's business cycle. The Industrial Sector Chart 7: The BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator And Its Components Chart 7 presents our leading indicator for the Li Keqiang index (LKI), which we developed in a November Special Report.5 There are six components of the indicator, all of which are related to changing monetary/financial conditions, and the growth in money and credit. Chart 6Housing Construction Could Accelerate##br## If Sales Pick Up Chart 7A Downtrend In Our LKI Leading Indicator, ##br##Within A Wide Component Range The indicator is at the core of our view, and we have been presenting monthly updates of the series in our regular reports since late last year. However, Chart 7 looks at the indicator from a different perspective, by showing it within a range that identifies the weakest and strongest components at any given point in time. Two points are noteworthy from the chart: While the overall LKI indicator has been trending down since early-2017, there is currently a wide range between the components. This gap is in stark contrast to the very narrow range that prevailed from 2014-2015, when the economy slowed considerably. This could mean that some of the components of the indicator are unduly weak, which in turn could imply that the severity of the slowdown in China's industrial sector will be less intense than the overall indicator would otherwise suggest. At least one component provided a lead on the subsequent direction of the overall indicator from late-2011 to late-2012, the last time that a significant gap existed between the components. This is in contrast to the situation today, in that all of the components are currently in a downtrend (albeit with differing paces as well as magnitudes). The key point for investors from Chart 7 is that all of the components of our indicator are moving in the same direction, which suggests with high conviction that China's economy is slowing. However, the wide range among the components suggests that indicator's message about the intensity of the slowdown is less uniform than it has been in the past, meaning that investors should be sensitive to a sustained pickup in the top end of the range. Equity Market Signals Chart 8: The Beta Of Our BCA China Sector Alpha Portfolio Chart 8 revisits a unique insight that we presented in our May 16 Weekly Report.6 The chart shows the rolling 1-year beta of our BCA China Investable Sector Alpha Portfolio versus the investable benchmark alongside China's performance versus global stocks, and suggests that the former may reliably lead the latter. While we noted in the report that drawing market-wide inferences from the beta characteristics of risk-adjusted performers is a not a conventional approach, finance theory is supportive of the idea. If investors are seeking to maximize their risk-adjusted returns and are engaging in tactical allocation across sectors, then it is entirely possible that beta-adjusted sector returns reflect the risk-on/risk-off expectations of market participants. For the purposes of China-related investment strategy over the coming year, our emphasis on Chart 8 will increase markedly if we see a sharp decline in the beta of our Sector Alpha Portfolio. As we noted in our May 16 report, the model is for now sending a curiously bullish signal, which we see as partial validation of our view that investors should have a high threshold to cut exposure to China within a global equity portfolio. Chart 8Watch For A Decline In The Beta Of ##br##Our Sector Alpha Portfolio Chart 9Decelerating Earnings Growth Could##br## Undermine Investor Sentiment Chart 9: Ex-Tech Earnings Versus The Li Keqiang Index We noted above that predicting the Li Keqiang index (LKI) is at the core of our view, and Chart 9 highlights why. The chart shows that a model based on the LKI closely fits the year-over-year growth rate of Chinese investable ex-tech earnings and, crucially, provides a lead. While the chart does not suggest that an outright contraction in ex-tech earnings is in the cards over the coming year, it does show that earnings growth is about to peak. This is potentially problematic, and warrants close attention, for two reasons: First, our leading indicator for the LKI suggests that it will decelerate further over the coming year, which could push our earnings growth estimate towards or below zero. Second, the peak in earnings growth could dampen investor sentiment towards Chinese ex-tech stocks, especially since bottom up analyst estimates for 12-months forward earnings growth have recently moved higher and are currently above what is predicted by our model. Chart 10: The Alpha Of Chinese Banks By now, the narrative surrounding Chinese banks is well known among global investors. The enormous leveraging of China's non-financial corporate sector is viewed by many as a clear sign of capital misallocation, meaning that a (potentially material) portion of the loan book of Chinese banks will have to be written off as bad debt. The ultimate scope of the bad debt problem in China is far from clear, but these longstanding concerns about loan quality suggest that Chinese bank stocks are likely to materially underperform their global peers if China's shadow banking crackdown begins to pose a significant threat to growth via restrictions on the provision of credit to the real economy. As such, we recommend that investors monitor Chart 10 over the coming year, which shows the rolling 1-year alpha significance for Chinese banks vs their global peers. While the rolling 1-year alpha of small banks has become less positive over the past few weeks, it remains in positive territory, similar to that of investable bank stocks. So, for now, this indicator supports our earlier conclusion that recent divergence between the interbank market and actual borrowing rates highlighted in Chart 1 is not heralding a material tightening in Chinese financial conditions. Chart 10Investors Should Monitor Chinese Bank Alpha ##br##For Significant Declines Chart 11No Technical Breakdown (Yet) In Ex-Tech Relative Performance Chart 11: The Technical Performance Of Ex-Tech Stocks BCA's approach to forecasting financial markets rests far more on top-down macroeconomic assessments than it does on technical analysis. However, technical indicators do contain important information, particularly when our top-down macro approach signals that a change in trend may be imminent. In this regard, technical indicators can provide valuable opportunities to enter or exit a position. To the extent that the technical profile of Chinese ex-tech stocks is informative in the current environment, Chart 11 shows that it is telling investors to stay invested despite the myriad risks to the economic outlook. This message is consistent with that of Table 1, namely that the negative performance of Chinese ex-tech stocks has been in response to global rather than idiosyncratic, China-specific risk. From our perspective, a technical breakdown in relative Chinese ex-tech stock performance in response to China-specific news would serve as a strong basis for a downgrade within a global equity portfolio, and we will be monitoring closely for such a development over the coming weeks and months. Stay tuned! Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Seven Questions About Chinese Monetary Policy", dated February 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Tightening In China: How Much Is Too Much?" dated January 18, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Question That Won't Go Away", dated April 18, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: A Low-Conviction Overweight", dated May 2, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Three Pillars Of China's Economy", dated May 16, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights China-U.S. trade détente goes against our alarmist forecast, prompting us to reassess the view; We do not expect the truce to last long, as China has not given the U.S. what we believe the Trump administration wants; Instead, we see the truce lasting until at least the completion of the North Korea - U.S. summit, at most early 2019; Market is correct to fret about Italy, as the populist agenda will be constrained by the bond market in due course; Stay long DXY, but close our recommendations to short China-exposed S&P 500 companies. Feature Our alarmist view on trade wars appears to be in retreat, or at least "on hold," following the conclusion of the latest trade talks between U.S. and Chinese officials. Global markets breathed a sigh of relief on Monday, after a weekend of extremely positive comments from President Trump's advisers and cabinet members. Particularly bullish were the comments from Trump's top economic adviser, Larry Kudlow, who claimed that China had agreed to reduce its massive trade surplus with the U.S. by $200 billion (Chart 1). Chart 1China, Not NAFTA, Is The Problem The official bilateral statement, subsequently published by the White House, was vague. It claimed that "there was a consensus" regarding a substantive - but unquantifiable - reduction in the U.S. trade deficit.1 The only sectors that were mentioned specifically were "United States agriculture and energy exports." China agreed to "meaningfully" increase the imports of those products, which are low value- added commodity goods. With regard to value-added exports, China merely agreed that it would encourage "expanding trade in manufactured goods and services." The two sides also agreed to "attach paramount importance to intellectual property protections," with China specifically agreeing to "advance relevant amendments to its laws and regulations in this area." Subsequent to the declaratory statement, China lowered tariffs on auto imports from 25% to 15%. It will also cut tariffs on imported car parts, to around 6%, from the current average of about 10%. Is that it? Was the consensus view - that China would merely write a check for some Boeings, beef, and crude oil - essentially right? The key bellwether for trade tensions has been the proposed tariffs on $50-$150 billion worth of goods, set to come in effect as early as May 21. According to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, this tariff action is now "on hold." Mnuchin was also supposed to announce investment restrictions by this date, another bellwether that is apparently on hold. This is objective evidence that trade tensions have probably peaked for this year.2 On the other hand, there are several reasons to remain cautious: Section 301 Investigation: Robert Lighthizer, the cantankerous U.S. Trade Representative who spearheaded the Section 301 investigation into China's trade practices that justified the abovementioned tariffs and investment restrictions, immediately issued a statement on Sunday dampening enthusiasm: "Real work still needs to be done to achieve changes in a Chinese system that facilitates forced technology transfers in order to do business in China." In the same statement, Lighthizer added that China facilitates "the theft of our companies' intellectual property and business know-how." In other words, Lighthizer does not appear to be excited by the prospect of trading IP and tech protection for additional exports of beef and crude oil. Political Reaction: The reaction from conservative circles was less than enthusiastic, with both congressional officials and various Trump supporters announcing their exasperation with the supposed deal over the weekend.3 The Wall Street Journal claimed that China refused to put a number - such as the aforementioned $200 billion - in the final statement.4 The implication is that Beijing won this round of negotiations. But President Trump will not want to appear weak. If a narrative emerges that he "lost," we would expect President Trump to pivot back to tariffs and confrontation. Support for free trade has recently rebounded among Republican voters but remains dramatically lower among them than among Democrats (Chart 2). As such, it is a salient issue for the president politically. Chart 2Support For Free Trade Recovering, ##br##But Republicans Still Trail Democrats Chart 3China Already ##br##Imports U.S. Commodities... Investment Restrictions: Senator Cornyn's (Texas, Republican) bill to strengthen the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process continues to move through the Senate.5 The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act Of 2017 (FIRRMA) is currently being considered by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and should be submitted to a vote ahead of the November election. Congress is also looking to pass a bipartisan bill that would prevent President Trump from taking it easy on Chinese telecommunication manufacturer ZTE. Chart 4U.S. Commodity Export Growth Is Solid Chart 5... But Impedes Market Access For Higher Value-Added Goods Beef And Oil Is Not Enough: The U.S. already has a growing market share in China's imports of commodities and crude materials, although it could significantly increase its exports in several categories (Chart 3). As the Chinese people develop middle-class consumption habits, the country was always going to import more agricultural products. And as their tastes matured, the U.S. was always going to benefit, given the higher quality and price point of its agricultural exports. In fact, China's imports of U.S. primary commodity exports have been increasing faster than imports of U.S. manufacturing goods (Chart 4). As such, the statement suggests that the U.S. and China have opted for the easiest compromises (commodities) to grant U.S. greater market access; the U.S. may have fallen short on market access for value-added manufacturing (Chart 5). In addition, there was little acknowledgment of the American demands that China cease forced tech transfers, cut subsidies for SOEs, reduce domestic content requirements under the "Made in China 2025" plan, and liberalize trade for U.S. software and high-tech exporters (Chart 6). Given these outstanding and unresolved issues, there are three ways to interpret the about-face in U.S. trade demands: Geopolitical Strategy is wrong: One scenario is that we are wrong, that the Trump administration is not focused on forced tech transfers and IP theft in any serious way.6 On the other hand, if that is true, the U.S. is also not serious about significantly reducing its trade deficit with China, since structurally, IP theft and non-tariff barriers to trade of high-value exports are a major reason why China has a massive surplus. Instead, the U.S. may only be focused on reducing the trade deficit through assurances of greater market access - a key demand as well, but one that could prove temporary or un-strategic, especially if access is only granted for commodities.7 If this is true, it suggests that President Trump's demands on China are transactional, not geopolitical, as we asserted in March.8 Midterms matter: Another scenario is that President Trump does not want to do anything that would hurt the momentum behind the GOP's polling ahead of the November midterms (Chart 7). The administration can always pick up the pressure on China following the election, given that 2019 is not an election year. Trump's political team may believe that Beijing concessions on agriculture, autos, and energy will be sufficient to satisfy the base until then. By mid-2019, the White House can also use twelve months of trade data to assess whether Beijing has actually made any attempt to deliver on its promises of increased imports from the U.S. Chart 6China's High-Tech Protectionism Chart 7Republicans Are Gaining... North Korea matters: Along the same vein as the midterms, there is wisdom in delaying trade action against China given the upcoming June 12 summit between President Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore. President Trump's approval ratings began their second surge this year following the announced talks (Chart 8), and it is clear that the administration has a lot of political capital invested in the summit's success. Recent North Korean statements, suggesting that they are willing to break off dialogue, may have been the result of the surprise May 8 meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Kim, the second in two months. As such, President Trump may have had to back off on the imposition of tariffs against China in order to ensure that his summit with Kim goes smoothly. At this point, it is difficult to gauge whether the decision to ease the pressure against China was due to strategic or tactical reasons. We expect that the market will price in both, easing geopolitical risk on equity markets. However, if the delay is tactical - and therefore temporary - then the risk premium would remain appropriate. We do not think that we are wrong when it comes to U.S. demands on China. These include greater market access for U.S. value-added exports and services (not just commodities), as well as a radical change in how China awards such access (i.e., ending the demand that technology transfers accompany FDI and market access). In addition, China still massively underpays for U.S. intellectual property (IP) rights and has been promising to do more on that front for decades (Chart 9). Given that China has launched some anti-piracy campaigns, and given its recent success in other top-down campaigns like shuttering excess industrial capacity, it is hard to believe that Beijing could not crack down on IP theft even more significantly. Chart 8...Thanks To Tax Cuts And Kim Jong-un Chart 9What Happened To ~$100 Billion IP Theft? Furthermore, U.S. demands on China are not merely about market access and IP. There is also the issue of aggressive geopolitical footprint in East Asia, particularly the South China Sea. The U.S. defense and intelligence establishment is growing uneasy over China's pace of economic and technological development, given its growing military aggressiveness. In fact, over the past two weeks, China has: Landed the Xian H-6K strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons on disputed "islands" in the South China Sea; Installed anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as surface-to-air missiles, on three of its outposts in disputed areas. Of course, if we are off the mark on our view of Sino-American tensions, it would mean that the Trump administration is willing to make transactional economic concessions for geopolitical maneuvering room. In other words, more crude oil and LNG exports in exchange for better Chinese positioning in vital sea and air routes in East Asia. We highly doubt that the Trump administration is making such a grand bargain, even if the rhetoric from the White House often suggests that the "America First" agenda would allow for such a strategic shift. Rather, we think the Trump administration, like the Obama administration, put the South China Sea low on the priority list, but will focus greater attention on it when is deemed necessary at some future date. Bottom Line: Trade tensions between China and the U.S. have almost assuredly peaked in a tactical, three-to-six month timeframe. While still not official, it appears that the implementation of tariffs on $50-$150 billion worth of imports from China, set for any time after May 21, is now on hold. As such, a trade war is on hold. We are closing our short China-exposed S&P 500 companies versus U.S. financials and telecoms, a trade that has returned 3.94% and long European / short U.S. industrials, which is down 2% since inception. This greatly reduces investment-relevant geopolitical risk this summer and makes us far less confident that investors should "sell in May and go away." Our tactical bearishness is therefore reduced, although several other geopolitical risks - such as Iran-U.S. tensions, Italian politics, and the U.S. midterm election- remain relevant.9 We do not think that Sino-American tensions have peaked cyclically or structurally (six months and beyond). The Trump Administration continues to lack constraints when it comes to acting tough on China. As such, investors should expect tensions to renew either right after the summit between Trump and Kim in early June or, more likely, following the November midterm elections. Italy: The Divine Comedy Continues Since 2016, we have noted that Italy remains the premier risk to European markets and politics.10 There are two reasons for the view. First, Italy has retained a higher baseline level of Euroskepticism relative to the rest of Europe (Chart 10). While support for the common currency has risen in other member states since 2013, it has remained between 55%-60% in Italy. This is unsurprising given the clearly disappointing economic performance in Italy relative to that of its Mediterranean peers (Chart 11). Chart 10Italy Remains A Relative Euroskeptic Chart 11Lagging Economy Explains Cyclical Euroskepticism Italy's Euroskepticism, however, is not merely a product of economic malaise. Chart 12 shows that a strong majority of Europeans are outright pessimistic about the future of their country outside of the EU. But when Italians are polled in that same survey, the population is increasingly growing optimistic about the option of exit (Chart 13). The only other EU member state whose citizens are as optimistic about a life outside the bloc is the U.K., where population obviously voted for Brexit. Chart 12Europeans Are Pessimists About EU Exit... Chart 13...But Italians Are More Like Brits Furthermore, Italian respondents have begun to self-identify as Italian only, not as "European" also, which breaks with another long-term trend in the rest of the continent (Chart 14) and is also reminiscent of the U.K. The second reason to worry about Italy is its economic performance. Real GDP is still 5.6% below its 2008 peak, while domestic demand continues to linger at 7.9% below its pre-GFC levels (Chart 15). As we posited at the end of 2017, the siren song of FX devaluation would become a powerful political elixir in the 2018 election, as populist policymakers blame Italy's Euro Area membership for the economic performance from Chart 15.11 Chart 14Italians Feel More Italian Chart 15Italian Demand Never Fully Recovered Is the Euro Area to blame for Italy's ills? No. The blame lies squarely at the feet of Italian policymakers, who flubbed efforts to boost collapsing productivity throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Chart 16). There was simply no pressure on politicians to enact reforms amidst the post-Maastricht Treaty convergence in borrowing costs. Italy punted reforms to its educational system, tax collection, and corporate governance. Twenty years of complacency have led to a massive loss in global market share (Chart 17). Chart 16Italy Has A Productivity Problem Chart 17Export Performance Is A Disaster While it is difficult to prove a counterfactual, we are not sure that even outright currency devaluation would have saved Italy from the onslaught of Asian manufacturing in the late 1990s. Euro Area imports from EM Asia have surged from less than 2% of total imports to nearly 10% in the last twenty years. Italy began losing market share to Asia well before the euro was introduced on January 1, 1999, as Chart 18 illustrates. The incoming populist government is unfortunately coming to power with growing global growth headwinds (Chart 19), with negative implications for Italy (Chart 20). These are likely to act as a constraint on plans by the Five Star Movement (M5S) and Lega coalition to blow out the budget deficit in pursuit of massive tax cuts, reversals of pension reforms, minimum wage hikes, and a proposal to increase spending on welfare. Our back-of-the-envelope calculation sees Italy's budget deficit growing to over 7% in 2019 if all the proposed reforms were enacted, well above the 3% limit imposed by the EU on its member states. Chart 18Italy Lost Market Share Amid Globalization Chart 19Tepid Global Growth... Chart 20...Is Bad News For Italy How would the EU Commission react to these proposals, given that Italy would break the rules of the EU Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)? We think the question is irrelevant. The process by which the EU Commission enforces the rules of the SGP is the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which would take over a year to put into place.12 First, the Commission would have to review the 2019 budget proposed by the new Italian government in September 2018. It would likely tell Rome that its plans would throw it into non-compliance with SGP rules, at which point the EU Commission would recommend the opening of a Significant Deviation Procedure (SDP). If Italy failed to follow the recommendations of the SDP, the Commission would then likely throw Italy into EDP at some point in the first quarter of 2019, or later that year.13 And what happens if Italy does not conform to the rules of the EDP? Italy would be sanctioned by the EU Commission by forcing Rome to make a non-interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% GDP.14 (Because it makes perfect sense to force a country with a large budget deficit to go into an even greater budget deficit.) Even if Rome complied with the sanctions, the punishment would only be feasible at the end of 2019, most likely at the end of Q1 2020. The point is that the above two paragraphs are academic. The Italian bond market would likely react much faster to Rome's budget proposals. The EU Commission operates on an annual and bi-annual timeline, whereas the bond market is on a minute-by-minute timeline. Given the bond market reaction thus far, it is difficult to see how Rome could be given the benefit of the doubt from investors (Chart 21). Investors have been demanding an ever-greater premium on Italian bonds, relative to their credit rating, ever since the election (Chart 22). Chart 21Uh Oh Spaghettio! Chart 22Bond Vigilantes Are Coming As such, the real question for investors is not whether the EU Commission can constrain Rome. It cannot. Rather, it is whether the bond market will. Rising borrowing costs would obviously impact the economy via several transmission channels, including overall business sentiment. But the real risk is Italy's banking sector. Domestic financial institutions hold 45% of Italian treasury bonds (BTPs) (Chart 23), which makes up 9.3% of all their assets, an amount equivalent to 77.8% of their capital and reserves (Chart 24). Foreign investors own 32%, less than they did before the Euro Area crisis, but still a significant amount. Chart 23Foreign Investors Still Hold A Third Of All Italian Debt Chart 24Italian Banks Also Hold Too Many BTPs In 2011, when the Euro Area crisis was raging, Italian 10-year yields hit 7%, or a spread of more than 500 basis points over German bunds. This was equivalent to an implied probability of a euro area breakup of 20% over the subsequent five years (Chart 25).15 What would happen if the populists in Rome followed through with their fiscal plans by September 2018 by including them in the 2019 budget? The bond market would likely begin re-pricing a similar probability of a Euro Area breakup, if not higher. In the process, Italian bonds could lose 20%-to-30% of their value - assuming that German bunds would rally on risk-aversion flows - which would result in a potential 15%-to-25% hit to Italian banks' capital and reserves. With the still large overhang of NPLs, Italian banks would be, for all intents and purposes, insolvent (Chart 26). Chart 25In 2011, Italian Spreads Signal Euro Break-Up Chart 26Italian Banks Still Carry Loads Of Bad Loans The populist government in Rome may not understand this dynamic today, but they will soon enough. This is perhaps why the leadership of both parties has decided to appoint a relatively unknown law professor, Guiseppe Conte, as prime minister. Conte is, according to the Italian press, a moderate and is not a Euroskeptic. It will fall to Conte to try to sell Europe first on as much of the M5S-Lega fiscal stimulus as he can, followed by the Italian public on why the coalition fell far short of its official promises. If the coalition pushes ahead with its promises, and ignores warnings from the bond market, we can see a re-run of the 2015 Greek crisis playing out in Italy. In that unlikely scenario, the ECB would announce publicly that it would no longer support Italian assets if Rome were determined to egregiously depart from the SGP. The populist government in Rome would try to play chicken with the ECB and its Euro Area peers, but the ATM's in the country would stop working, destroying its credibility with voters. In the end, the crisis will cause the populists to mutate into fiscally responsible Europhiles, just as the Euro Area crisis did to Greece's SYRIZA. For investors, this narrative is not a reassuring one. While our conviction level that Italy stays in the Euro Area is high, the scenario we are describing here would still lead to a significant financial crisis centered on the world's seventh-largest bond market. Bottom Line: Over the next several months, we would expect bond market jitters concerning Italy to continue, supporting our bearish view on EUR/USD, which we are currently articulating by being long the DXY (the EUR/USD cross makes up 57.6% of the DXY index). Given global growth headwinds, which are already apparent in the European economic data, and growing Italian risks, the ECB may also turn marginally more dovish for the rest of the year, which would be negative for the euro. Our baseline expectation calls for the new coalition government in Rome to back off from its most populist proposals. We expect that Italy will eventually flirt with overt Euroskepticism, but this would happen after the next recession and quite possibly only after the next election. If we are wrong, and the current populist government does not back off, then we could see a global risk-off due to Italy either later this summer, or in 2019. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Joint Statement of the United States and China Regarding Trade Consultations," dated May 19, 2018, available at whitehouse.gov. 2 President Trump later tweeted that the announced deal was substantive and "one of the best things to happen to our farmers in many years!" 3 The most illustrative comment may have come from Dan DiMicco, former steel industry CEO and staunch supporter of President Trump on tariffs, who tweeted "Did president just blink? China and friends appear to be carrying the day." 4 Please see Bob Davis and Lingling Wei, "China Rejects U.S. Target For Narrowing Trade Gap," The Wall Street Journal, dated May 19, 2018, available at wsj.com. 5 Please see "S. 2098 - 115th Congress: Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act Of 2017," dated May 21, 2018, available at www.govtrack.us. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Year Two: Let The Trade War Begin," dated March 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump's Demands On China," dated April 4, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Market Reprices Odds Of A Global Trade War," dated March 6, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Are You Ready For 'Maximum Pressure?'" dated May 16, 2018; and "Expect Volatility... Of Volatility," dated April 11, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy Part II: Italy In Purgatorio," dated June 21, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see, The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, "Excessive deficit procedure (EDP)," available at eur-lex.europa.eu. 13 Have you been missing the European alphabet soup over the past three years? 14 The EU Commission can also suspend financing from the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), but Italy has never participated in a bailout and thus could not be sanctioned that way. 15 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Threats And Opportunities In The Bond Market," dated April 7, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The Swan Diagram depicts four different "zones of economic unhappiness," each one corresponding to a case where unemployment and inflation is either too high or too low, and the current account position is either too large or too small. The global economy has made significant progress in moving towards both internal and external balance over the past few years, but shortfalls remain. A number of large economies, including Japan, China, and Italy, continue to need stimulative fiscal policy to prop up domestic demand. In Italy's case, investor unease about the country's fiscal outlook is likely to raise borrowing costs for the government, curb capital inflows into the euro area, and push the ECB in a more dovish direction. All this will weigh on the euro. The U.S. should be tightening fiscal policy at this stage in the cycle. Instead, President Trump has pushed through significant fiscal easing. This is the main reason the 10-year Treasury yield hit a seven-year high this week. An overheated U.S. economy will pave the way for further Fed hikes, which will likely result in a stronger dollar. Rising U.S. rates and a strengthening dollar will hurt emerging markets. Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, and Indonesia are among the most vulnerable. Feature The Dismal Science, Illustrated Last week's report discussed the market consequences of the tug-of-war that policymakers often face in trying to achieve a variety of economic objectives with a limited set of policy instruments.1 In passing, we mentioned that some of these trade-offs can be depicted using the so-called Swan Diagram, named after Australian economist Trevor Swan. This week's report delves further into this topic by estimating where various economies find themselves inside the Swan Diagram, and what this may mean for their currency, equity, and bond markets. True to the reputation of economics as the dismal science, the Swan Diagram depicts four "zones of economic unhappiness" (Chart 1). Each zone represents a different way in which an economy can deviate from "internal balance" (low and stable unemployment) and "external balance" (an optimal current account position). This amounts to saying that an economy can suffer from one of the following: 1) high unemployment and an excessively large current account deficit; 2) high inflation and an excessively large current account surplus; 3) high unemployment and an excessively large current account surplus; and 4) high inflation and an excessively large current account deficit. Box 1 describes the logic behind the diagram. Chart 1Four Zones Of Unhappiness BOX 1 The Logic Behind The Swan Diagram As noted in the main text, the Swan Diagram depicts four different "zones of economic unhappiness," each one corresponding to a case where unemployment and inflation are either too high or too low, and the current account balance is either too large or too small. A rightward movement along the horizontal axis can be construed as an easing of fiscal policy, whereas an upward movement along the vertical axis can be thought of as an easing in monetary policy. All things equal, easier monetary policy is assumed to result in a weaker currency. The internal balance schedule, which corresponds to the ideal state where the economy is at full employment and inflation is stable, is downward sloping because an easing in fiscal policy must be offset by a tightening in monetary policy in order to keep the economy from overheating. The external balance schedule is upward sloping because easier fiscal policy raises aggregate demand, which results in higher imports, and hence a deterioration in the trade balance. A depreciation of the currency via an easing in monetary policy is necessary to bring imports back down. Any point to the right of the internal balance schedule represents too much inflation; any point to the left represents too much unemployment. Likewise, any point to the right of the external balance schedule represents a larger-than-acceptable current account deficit, whereas any point to the left represents an excessively large current account surplus. Note that according to the Swan Diagram, an economy that suffers from high unemployment may still need a weaker currency even if it already has a current account surplus. Intuitively, this is because a depressed economy suppresses imports, leading to a "stronger" current account balance than would otherwise be the case. We use two variables to estimate the degree to which an economy has diverged from internal balance: core inflation and the output gap (Chart 2). If the output gap is negative, the economy is producing less output than it is capable of. If the output gap is positive, the economy is operating beyond full capacity. All things equal, high core inflation and a large and positive output gap is symptomatic of an economy that is showing signs of overheating. Chart 2The Two Dimensions Of Internal Balance When it comes to estimating the extent to which an economy is deviating from external balance, we include both the current account position and the net international investment position (NIIP) in our calculations (Chart 3). The NIIP is the difference between an economy's external assets and its liabilities. If one were to sum all current account balances into the distant past and adjust for valuation effects, one would end up with the net international investment position. If a country has a positive NIIP, it can run a current account deficit over time by running down its accumulated foreign wealth.2 Chart 3The Two Dimensions Of External Balance Policy And Market Outcomes Within The Swan Diagram Chart 4 shows our estimates of where the main developed and emerging markets fall into the Swan Diagram. The top right quadrant depicts economies that need to tighten both monetary and fiscal policy. The bottom left quadrant depicts economies that need to ease both monetary and fiscal policy. The other two quadrants denote cases where either tighter fiscal/looser monetary policy or looser fiscal/tighter monetary policy are appropriate. In order to gauge progress over time, we attach an arrow to each data point. The base of the arrow shows where the economy was five years ago and the tip shows where it is today. Chart 4Policy Prescription Arising From The Swan Diagram From a market perspective, an economy's currency is likely to weaken if it finds itself in one of the two quadrants requiring easier monetary policy. Among developed economies, the best combination for equities in local-currency terms is usually an easier monetary policy and a looser fiscal policy. That is also the configuration that results in the sharpest steepening of the yield curve. Conversely, the worst outcome for developed market stocks in local-currency terms is tighter monetary policy coupled with fiscal austerity. That is also the policy package that is most likely to result in a flatter yield curve. In dollar terms, a stronger local currency will typically boost returns. This is particularly the case in emerging markets, where stock markets are likely to suffer in situations where the home currency is under pressure. A few observations come to mind: The global economy has made significant progress in restoring internal balance over the past five years. That said, negative output gaps remain in nearly half of the countries in our sample. And even in several cases where output gaps have disappeared, a shortfall in inflation suggests the presence of latent slack that official estimates of excess capacity may be missing. External imbalances have also declined over time. Since earth does not trade with Mars, the global current account balance and net international investment position must always be equal to zero. Nevertheless, the absolute value of current account balances, expressed as a share of global GDP, has fallen by half since 2006 (Chart 5). Chart 5Shrinking Global Imbalances The decline in China's current account balance has played a key role in facilitating the rebalancing of demand across the global economy. The current account showed a deficit in Q1 for the first time in 17 years. While several technical factors exacerbated the decline, the current account will probably register a surplus of only 1% of GDP this year, down from a peak of nearly 10% of GDP in 2007. The Chinese economy also appears to be close to internal balance. However, maintaining full employment has come at the cost of rapid credit growth and a massive quasi-public sector deficit, which the IMF estimates currently stands at over 12% of GDP (Chart 6). Thus, one could argue that a somewhat weaker currency and less credit expansion would be in China's best interest. Similar to China, Japan has been able to reach internal balance only through lax fiscal policy (Chart 7). The lesson here is that economies such as China and Japan which have a surfeit of savings - partly reflecting a very low neutral real rate of interest - would probably be better off with cheaper currencies rather than having to rely on artificial means of propping up demand. Chart 6China's 'Secret' Budget Deficit Chart 7The Cost Of Propping Up Demand Germany has overtaken China as the biggest contributor to current account surpluses in the world. Germany's current account surplus now stands at over 8% of GDP, up from a small deficit in 1999, when the euro came into inception. In contrast to China and Japan, Germany is running a fiscal surplus. Solely from its perspective, Germany would benefit from more fiscal stimulus and a stronger euro. The problem, of course, is that a stronger euro would not be in the best interest of most other euro area economies. While external imbalances within the euro area have decreased markedly over the past decade, they have not gone away (Chart 8). Investors also remain wary of fiscal easing in Southern Europe. This week's spike in Italian bond yields - fueled by speculation that a Five-Star/League government will abandon plans for fiscal consolidation - is a timely reminder that the bond vigilantes are far from dead (Chart 9). The Italian government's borrowing costs are likely to rise over the coming months, which will curb capital inflows into the euro area and push the ECB in a more dovish direction. All this will weigh on the common currency. Chart 8The Euro Club: Imbalances Have Been Decreasing Chart 9Uh Oh Spaghettio! The U.S. is the opposite of Germany. Unlike Germany, it has a large fiscal deficit and a current account deficit. The Swan Diagram says that the U.S. would benefit from tighter fiscal policy and a weaker dollar. President Trump and the Republicans in Congress have other plans, however. They have pushed through large tax cuts and significant spending increases (Chart 10). This will likely prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than the market is currently discounting, leading to a stronger dollar. Chart 10The U.S. Budget Deficit Is Set To Widen Even If The Unemployment Rate Continues To Decline Rising U.S. rates and a strengthening dollar will hurt emerging markets, particularly those with current account deficits and negative net international investment positions. High levels of external debt could exacerbate any problems (Chart 11). On that basis, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, and Indonesia are among the most vulnerable. Chart 11External Debt And Debt Servicing Across EM Investment Conclusions Chart 12The U.S. Economy Is Doing ##br##Better Than Its Peers The global economy is approaching internal balance, but this may produce some unpleasant side effects. Productivity growth is anaemic and the retirement of baby boomers from the workforce will reduce the pace of labor force growth. In such a setting, potential GDP growth in many countries is likely to remain subpar. If demand growth continues to outstrip supply growth, inflation will rise. Heightened stock market volatility this year has partly been driven by the realization among investors that the Goldilocks environment of above-trend growth and low inflation may not last as long as they had hoped. The U.S. economy has now moved beyond full employment, and bountiful fiscal stimulus could lead to further overheating. This is the main reason the 10-year Treasury yield reached a seven-year high this week. Continued above-trend growth is likely to prompt the Fed to raise rates more than the market expects, which should result in a stronger dollar. The fact that the U.S. economy is outperforming the rest of the world based on economic surprise indices and our leading economic indicators could give the dollar a further lift (Chart 12). A resurgent dollar will help boost competitiveness in developed economies such as Japan and Europe. Emerging markets will also benefit in the long run from cheaper currencies, but if the adjustment happens rapidly, as is often the case, this could exact a short-term toll. For the time being, investors should overweight developed over emerging markets in equity portfolios. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Tinbergen's Ghost," dated May 11, 2018. 2 To keep things simple, we assume that a country's Net International Investment Position (NIIP) shrinks to zero over 50 years. Thus, if a country has a positive NIIP of 50% of GDP, we assume that it should target a current account deficit of 1% of GDP; whereas if it has a negative NIIP of 50% of GDP, it should target a current account surplus of 1% of GDP. 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