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Inflation/Deflation

Special Report Highlights The financial system / banks cannot and do not lend out or intermediate national or households "savings". In any economy, new money/new purchasing power is originated by commercial banks "out of thin air". The term "savings" in macroeconomics denotes an increase in the economy's capital stock, not deposits at the banks. The Chinese banking system has enormous amount of deposits because banks have created them "out of nothing" not because households save a lot. Hence, the narrative that justifies China's money, credit and property market excesses by high national and household "savings" is incorrect. The maneuvering room for China is diminishing as inflationary pressures are rising, productivity is slowing and speculative leverage is high. Feature The debate on China's macro outlook continues to linger both within and outside BCA. The focal point of the debate centers on the role of national "savings" in China in spurring credit origination and debt formation. Many of my colleagues at BCA and the majority of commentators outside BCA argue that China's high "savings" rate, or so-called "excess savings", has been an important contributor to its exponential credit and money growth. Contrary to this narrative, we within BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team maintain that the dramatic surge in credit and money in China has been the result of speculative behavior by banks and debtors. As such, the boom in money and credit growth has produced large imbalances and excesses, if not outright bubbles (Chart I-1). Chart I-1An Unprecedented Credit ##br##And Money Boom In China Every financial bubble in history has had its justifications. Last decade, the common narrative about U.S. real estate was that nationwide, U.S. house prices had historically never deflated in nominal terms. In the late 1990s, the tech bubble was vindicated by the "new productivity" era. In the meantime, in the 1980s in Japan and the mid-1990s in Hong Kong, sky high property prices were rationalized by limited amounts of land, given that these are islands. Despite these validations, all of these bubbles ultimately burst. We feel that vindicating China's enormous credit, money and property market excesses - which are all interrelated - by the nation's high "savings" is another attempt to endorse overextended and unsustainable macro imbalances. This report is a continuation of our series discussing these issues in great depth.1 The objective of this piece is to illuminate on the confusion between national "savings" and credit / deposits / money. Intuitively, many investors and commentators use the term "savings" to refer to bank deposits. Yet, in macroeconomics, national and household "savings" are not about deposits or money in the banking system at all. The term "savings" in macroeconomics denotes an increase in the economy's capital stock. Therefore, the financial system in general, and banks in particular, cannot and do not lend out or intermediate national or households "savings." The Chinese banking system has enormous amount of deposits because banks have created them "out of nothing" not because households save a lot. In an economy where banks exist, "savings" and financing are very different things. Commercial banks (hereafter referred to as banks) provide financing by expanding their balance sheets - creating deposits "out of thin air" as and when they originate loans. We previously elaborated on this money creation process,2 but given its importance to the topic of this report, we revisit it here. Banks Create New Purchasing Power "Out Of Thin Air" When a bank originates a loan, it simultaneously creates a deposit, or new money. Importantly, this does not represent a transfer of an existing deposit to the new borrower. This is a new deposit - new purchasing power - that did not previously exist (Figure 1). Figure I-1Credit / Money Creation Process The borrower can immediately use this new deposit to purchase goods and services or buy assets. At the same time, all owners of existing deposits at the bank still have their deposits too, and can use them as, when, and how they prefer. Thereby, the bank has created new purchasing power "out of nothing" when it originated a loan. Traditional macroeconomic theory presumes that for a person or company to invest in productive capacity, another person/unit must save. This assumption is true for a barter economy with no banks and money - where some entities produce but do not consume, so that others can acquire their output (goods) and in turn use them as investment. Nevertheless, in an economy with banks, one does not need to save in the form of a deposit in a bank in order for the latter to lend money to another entity. When a bank grants a loan or acquires an asset, it simultaneously creates new deposit/money - which is de facto new purchasing power originated by the bank "out of thin air." We use the terms deposit and money interchangeably because broad money supply is computed as the sum of all deposits in the commercial banks. Let's consider an example of how a bank loan leads to new income creation. A company borrows from a bank to build a bridge, it then pays its suppliers and contractors for their work. As a result, the suppliers and contractors, and consequently their employees and shareholders, earn income. Without this loan, the bridge would not have been built, and the suppliers, their employees and business owners would not have received income. In short, the loan comes first, then the investment - and only after the investment is carried out do employees and business owners earn income. Thereafter, they can consume, acquire assets and save in forms of bank deposits. Critically, this income is realized because the bank originated a loan / new purchasing power "out of nothing." Chart I-2 illustrates that the Chinese banking system has created RMB 140 trillion of broad money/deposits since January 2009. This is equivalent to US$21 trillion at today's exchange rate. This is twice as much as aggregate broad money - equivalent to $10.5 trillion - generated by commercial and central banks in the U.S., the euro area and Japan combined since early 2009 - even amid their respective QE programs. Chart I-2Helicopter Money In China The unprecedented new purchasing power of Chinese companies and households has been primarily due to this enormous balance sheet expansion by mainland commercial banks (Chart I-3). Chart I-3China: Commercial Banks ##br##Assets And Money Multiplier Bank Versus Financial Intermediaries Banks perform a unique function in the economy and financial system. There are considerable differences between a bank lending money or buying assets and a non-bank doing the same. This is unfortunately not reflected in mainstream economic theory and macro models. Unlike banks, non-banks - such as pension funds, insurance companies, households, businesses and all other non-bank entities - do not create new money/new purchasing power when they grant a loan or acquire an asset. The act of lending by non-banks simply constitutes a transfer of an existing deposit from a creditor to a borrower. Banks are not intermediaries of deposits into loans as the Loanable Funds Theory (LFT) alleges. They create deposits themselves by making loans and acquiring assets. The LFT, nonetheless, applies to non-bank lenders - the latter are indeed financial intermediaries, i.e., they channel existing deposits into loans or other assets. The institutional and legal differences that make commercial banks unique and allow them to create money are discussed in detail in "How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same?," Werner (2014b).3 The theory of fractional banking is not applicable to modern banking as well.4 It is the theory of money creation by banks that we subscribe to and present here that accurately describes the process of money creation. Bottom Line: Banks differ vastly from non-bank financial institutions, and are unique in their ability to create money/new purchasing power by originating loans or acquiring assets. Money Versus Credit Remarkably, there is also an important analytical distinction between credit/leverage and money. New money matters when one is attempting to gauge the (nominal) growth outlook because it represents new purchasing power. New money can only be originated by banks, including the central bank. Central banks can create broad money in circulation (i.e. beyond central bank reserves) when they buy financial assets from or lend to non-bank entities. Doing so creates a deposit in the commercial banking system. By contrast, the degree of credit/leverage is critical when evaluating the risk of financial distress in both the economy and the financial system. Credit can be extended not only by banks but also by non-banks. Hence, lending or buying corporate bonds by non-banks creates leverage/credit but not new money. The banking system is the only one capable of originating new money, and in turn, new purchasing power. In China, the outstanding stock of total non-financial debt (private plus public) is close to the amount of money supply (Chart I-4). Even though non-bank credit growth has risen in importance since 2010, it seems that without banks' money creation, non-bank credit would not have expanded. Chart I-4China: Money Versus Credit/Debt On another note, household propensity to save alters the velocity of money, not the amount of money in the banking system. A decision by a household to spend more rather than save does not change the amount of deposits in the banking system. As an example, a person who gets paid $1000 might spend $800 of her income and decide to save the remaining $200. The amount of deposits in the banking system does not change; $800 will be transferred to another bank account as she pays for her purchases, while the remaining $200 stays in her existing bank account. Hence, there is no change in the amount of deposits and money supply in the banking system in this scenario. On the whole, the amount of deposits, and hence, broad money supply, in any banking system is equal to the cumulative net money creation by banks and the central bank over the course of their history. This has nothing to do with household and national "savings." The Chinese banking system has enormous amount of deposits because banks have created them "out of nothing" not because households save a lot. Interestingly, changes in household propensity to save are reflected not in money supply but in the velocity of money. When households or companies decide to spend their deposits, the velocity of money rises. Conversely, when households and companies decide to save (retain) their deposits, the velocity of money drops. Bottom Line: Money is distinct from credit and leverage. Changes in the propensity to save alter the velocity of money, but not the amount of deposits/money supply in the banking system. True Meaning Of "Savings" In Macroeconomics What is the true meaning of "savings"5 in macroeconomics, given the amount of deposits in the banking system has no bearing on "savings?" The confusion between national "savings" and deposit/money creation is dealt with nicely by Fabian Lindner. Having modelled it, Lindner6 argues: "... the aggregate economy's saving is equal to the newly produced tangible assets and inventories. That total saving is equal to just the increase in tangible assets ... (because) all changes in net financial assets in the economy add up to zero... Thus, for every economic agent increasing her net financial assets, there is a corresponding decrease in net financial assets of all other economic agents in the economy. Put in more general terms: An economic agent can only save financially if other agents dis-save financially by the same amount... That is why in the entire economy (that is the world economy or a closed economy) only the increase in tangible assets, thus investment, is saving (emphasis is added). Thus, saving and investment are equivalent in the aggregate... The equivalence of investment and saving however does not mean - as claimed by LFT - that household saving (or the sum of household and government saving) is equal to total saving and thus to investment. No matter how high one group's financial saving is, the financial dis-saving of the rest of the economy has to be just as high. The only thing remaining is the creation of tangible assets." (Lindner 2015) In another paper,7 Lindner asserts: "Investment is the production of any non-financial asset in an economy and thus is always directly and unambiguously savings: it increases the economy's net worth... The economy as a whole cannot change its net financial wealth since it always equals zero. The aggregate economy can only save in the form of non-financial assets...The only way an economy can save is by increasing its non-financial wealth, i.e., its physical capital stock." (Lindner 2012) Bottom Line: For a country to raise its domestic "savings" rate, it needs to build its capital stock by using domestically produced investment goods and raw materials. Thereby, domestic "savings" have nothing to do with the absolute level or changes in amount of deposits/money in the banking system. China's Great Wall Of "Savings" China has been investing tremendous amounts for many years, and its capital stock has been mushrooming (Chart I-5, top panel). Yet, the incremental capital-to-output ratio (ICOR) has surged and, its inverse, the output-to-capital ratio has plunged since 2010 (Chart I-5, middle and bottom panels). These developments signify deteriorating efficiency in the Chinese economy and worsening capital allocation. They also entail that companies might have difficulties servicing their debt. When its export machine faltered in 2008 due to the Global Financial Crisis, China offset it by boosting its domestic investments. These investments - incremental additions to the nation's capital stock - defined by macroeconomics as domestic "savings"- offset the decline in external "savings." As such, the composition of national "savings" has changed dramatically since 2008: the share of external "savings" (net exports) have declined while the share of domestic "savings" has risen (Chart I-6). Chart I-5China: Capital Stocks Has Surged Chart I-6China: Domestic And External 'Savings' In China, the augmentation of its capital stock and, hence, its domestic "savings," have been largely financed by loans from Chinese banks. This may sound like nonsense, but only because we are using the term "savings" in a way used in macroeconomics. Yet, new purchasing power originated by the banking system is not in and of itself a sufficient condition to generate domestic "savings." The sufficient condition for having high domestic "savings" is the ability to produce domestic capital goods and raw materials that go into investment. If a country does not build its capacity to produce capital goods and raw materials, it would need to rely on imports - in other words it has to acquire foreign "savings" to invest. Encouraging domestic "savings" entails enhancing capacity to produce goods that are used in capital spending like raw materials, chemicals, steel, cement, machinery, and various equipment and instruments. This is what China has done exceptionally well over the past 20 years. The following points illustrate how China achieved very high "savings" and investment rates (Chart I-7): China devalued its currency in January 1994 by 32% and relied on a cheap currency to produce large trade surpluses (Chart I-8). It used the foreign currency proceeds to purchase foreign technologies and equipment to boost its capital stock. Chart I-7Savings And Investment Ratios Chart I-8China: The 1994 Currency ##br##Devaluation Started New Era It also attracted FDI to build its productive capacity both for consumer goods as well as capital goods. FDI inflows surged since China's acceptance into the WTO in 2001. Since 2009, however, China has been relying on new purchasing power created by banks to expand its industrial capacity to produce commodities, raw materials, industrial equipment and machinery. Meanwhile, mainland banks have been originating new loans, and hence deposits/money - new purchasing power - to finance real estate development and infrastructure construction, utilizing these domestically produced raw materials and machinery. This has allowed China to sustain high levels of domestic "savings." On the whole, China indeed has had "excess savings" as its economy has been suffering from excess industrial capacity. Initially, China invested to create such excess capacity. Then, its banking system originated enormous amount of money/new purchasing power to support and keep zombie companies alive in these industries with excess capacity. The banking system is still involved in this function up until today. While this is a reasonable economic policy in the short run, it is not a good growth strategy in the long term. The problem is that easy money and credit support inefficient enterprises and encourage unproductive investment. As a result, productivity growth will slow and potential growth will decelerate considerably. Bottom Line: The countries that produce a lot of goods and services for domestic investment are said to have high domestic "savings." By definition, the more excess industrial capacity a country has, the more "excess savings" that economy will carry. Yet, uncontrolled money/credit origination to support zombie enterprises in over-capacity sectors entails inefficient allocation of capital that necessarily slows productivity growth and hence economic growth potential in the long term. Limits On Money Creation A natural question that arise from all this is what are the limits on money creation? We list some of major ones here, but these issues have been addressed in our previous three reports,8 and we will address them again in forthcoming reports. Inflation and/or deprecation pressures on the currency that could lead to monetary tightening; Bank regulation and various regulatory ratios; Shareholders of banks - who are highly leveraged to non-performing assets/loans - might order reduced lending; Removing the implicit government "put" that encourage irresponsible borrowing and lending. Inflationary pressures are presently rising and more entrenched in China now than at any time in the past decade or so (Chart I-9). In the context of negative real interest rates (Chart I-10) and barring major growth slowdown, the authorities are unlikely to stimulate anytime soon. Chart I-9Beware Of Rising Inflation In China... Chart I-10...Making Interest Rates Negative Negative real local interest rates undermine Chinese households' willingness to hold the currency. China's foreign exchange reserves at $3 trillion, while high, are equal only to 10% broad money (M3) and 14% of official M2. This signifies how much money the banking system has created. At the moment, mainland banking regulations are being tightened. This as well as liquidity tightening by the People's Bank of China and the government's anti-corruption crackdown that is moving into the financial industry will further dampen money creation and leverage expansion. This triple tightening amid lingering money and credit excesses constitutes the main rationale behind our negative stance on China's growth and China-related plays in global financial markets. Policy tightening is especially dangerous amid the existing credit, money and property market imbalances and excesses. Downgrade Chinese Stocks From Overweight To Neutral The Chinese MSCI Investable equity index - which unlike H-shares includes mega-cap tech companies - has rallied massively and outperformed the EM benchmark (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Downgrade Chinese Investable Stocks ##br##From Overweight To Neutral Relative performance is overbought, and we recommend dedicated EM equity portfolios downgrade their allocation from overweight to neutral. Our overweight position was initiated on November 26, 2014, and has generated an 18.5% gain. The freed-up capital should be allocated proportionally to our remaining overweights, which are Taiwan, Thailand, Korean tech stocks, Russia and central Europe. We are contemplating upgrading Chile. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November 23, 2016 and January 18, 2017; available on ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 16, 2016, available on available on ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Werner, R. (2014b), "How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same?", International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 71-77. 4 Werner, R. (2014a), "Can banks individually create money out of nothing? -- The theories and the empirical evidence", International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 1-19. 5 We use "savings" in parenthesis because as this term does not really mean households' and companies' and governments' financial assets or deposits at the banks. "Savings" signifies the amount of goods and services produced but not consumed by an economy. 6 Lindner, F. (2015), "Did Scarce Global Savings Finance the US Real Estate Bubble? The Global Saving Glut thesis from a stock flow Consistent Perspective", Macroeconomic Policy Institute, Working Paper 155, July 2015. 7 Lindner, F. (2012), "Savings does not finance Investment: Accounting as an indispensable guide to economic theory", Macroeconomic Policy Institute, Working Paper 100, October 2012. 8 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November 23, 2016 and January 18, 2017; available on ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights BCA expects the 2/10 curve to steepen in 1H in 2018, then flatten in 2H. U.S. equities, the stock-to-bond ratio and oil thrive when the curve is flat. Small caps struggle. Record household net worth matters more for household saving than for consumption. Feature Wrangling over the GOP's tax plan and the Federal Open Market Committee's final meeting of 2017 provided the backdrop for financial markets last week. The dollar was the big loser, as investors doubted the ability of the Republican leadership in Congress to find the votes needed to pass the bill. BCA's view remains that Congress will pass a tax cut package by the end of Q1 2018. Even though inflation missed the Fed's forecast in 2017 (Chart 1), the FOMC left its inflation and interest projections unchanged for the next two years given its outlook for stronger growth and lower unemployment. Inflation will reach the 2% target by the end of 2019. As a consequence, the Fed expects to lift interest rates three more times in 2018 and another two times in 2019 (Chart 2). Chart 1Persistent Inflation Shortfall Chart 2The FOMC's Latest Forecasts The economy is now expected to grow 2.5% in 2018, up from the Fed's previous forecast of 2.1%. Growth is seen remaining above the 1.8% trend rate for three years. The Fed nudged its forecasts for the unemployment rate down by 0.2% for the next three years, based on the higher growth projections. The jobless rate is now expected to dip to 3.9% in 2018 and 2019, before ticking up to 4.0% in 2020. If anything, these forecasts look too conservative. Importantly, the Fed left its estimate for long-run unemployment unchanged at 4.6%. Therefore, the labor market is expected to tighten further beyond full employment. Consequently, wage gains should accelerate and allow inflation to return to the Fed's 2% target in 2019. We don't have any major disagreements with the Fed's interest rate forecasts for 2018, but inflation must turn higher. The Fed has raised rates five times over the last two years, but CPI inflation has made no progress toward the 2% objective. However, the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge continues to move steadily higher (Chart 1, panel 1). Nevertheless, the real Fed funds moved closer to its neutral level and the yield curve has continued to flatten (panel 3). Bottom Line: BCA expects the yield curve to steepen in the first half of 2018, driven either by rising inflation or a more dovish Fed. However, a flat curve is not the death knoll for risk assets. The yield curve will not invert until inflation has recovered to the Fed's target. This means that a period of modest curve steepening is likely, driven either by rising inflation or a more dovish Fed. Powell Versus The Market BCA's view is that the current paths of inflation and the yield curve are unsustainable. If the Fed continues to hike rates, but inflation fails to rise, then the yield curve will invert in the coming months. The inversion would signal that bond investors anticipate a recession and the Fed has not achieved its inflation target. Such an obvious policy error will not be permitted to occur, which leaves three possible outcomes for Fed policy and the Treasury curve during the next six months.1 1) The Fed Is Right In this scenario, inflation would rebound in the coming months, pushing up the compensation for inflation protection embedded in long-dated bond yields. This would cause an increase in long-maturity nominal yields and probably impart a steepening bias to the yield curve, depending on how quickly the Fed lifts rates. BCA's Outlook for 2018 makes a case why inflation will likely bottom in the coming months. Therefore, we view the "Fed is Right" scenario as the most probable outcome.2 2) The Fed Is Proactive In another scenario, the Fed recognizes there is a risk of tightening the yield curve into inversion - and the economy into recession - if inflation stays low. Therefore, the Fed may proactively adopt a more dovish policy stance to prevent the yield curve from inverting. The yield curve would also steepen, but this time it would be a bull-steepener where short-maturity yields fall more than long-maturity yields. This outcome would be the least likely of our three scenarios. The Fed will cling to its forecast that inflation will climb, given that economic growth is accelerating. If inflation fails to respond, then risky assets will eventually sell-off. 3) The Fed Is Reactive The Fed has a strong track record of reacting to tighter financial conditions and risk-off periods in equities and credit markets. If the yield curve continues to flatten, then we will soon see credit spreads widen and equities sell-off. At that stage, the Fed would almost certainly respond by signaling a slower pace of rate hikes. This would steepen the curve and ease pressures on risky assets. We view this development as more likely than the one where the Fed is proactive. Trouble With The Curve BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy team expects that the 2/10 yield curve will languish between 0 and 50 bps in 2018. The curve will steepen from 53 bps in mid-December 2017 through mid-year 2018, and then flatten into year-end. Which asset classes would benefit if BCA's curve call is accurate? Charts 3 through 7 show how several key financial markets have performed in previous yield curve environments. Chart 3A shows that the S&P 500 performs best when the curve is flat (between 0 and 50 bps), with average annualized returns of 22% and median annualized returns of 21%. Moreover, S&P 500 returns are negative less than 5% of the time when the curve is flat, but are negative 25% of the time when the curve is very steep (+100 to +150 bps) (Chart 3B). In general, Chart 3A demonstrates that returns diminish as the curve climbs. Chart 3AS&P 500 Total Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) Chart 3BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##S&P 500 Returns (1988- Present) A flat slope of the 2/10 curve is also the sweet spot for the stock-to-bond ratio (Chart 4A). Treasuries outperform stocks only in 5% of months when the 2/10 Treasury curve is flat (Chart 4B). As with stocks, the performance of the stock-to-bond ratio deteriorates as the curve steepens. The stock-to-bond ratio declines more than a third of the time when the curve is very steep. A 2/10 slope of +100 to +150 bps is the worst backdrop for the stock-to-bond ratio. Stocks underperform bonds 40% of the time in this situation. Chart 4AStock-To-Bond Total Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988 - Present) Chart 4BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##Stock-To-Bond Total Return (1988 - Present) However, a flat curve is a poor setting for small-cap excess performance (Chart 5A). Small caps underperform large caps nearly 80% of the time when the curve is flat (Chart 5B). The average underperformance is 600 bps. Moreover, a flat curve is the most unhealthy climate for small-cap excess returns, even poorer than when the curve inverts. A precipitous curve is the best environment for small caps, with small caps outperforming large by 400 bps on average. Small caps beat large caps 60% of the time when the curve is between 100 and 150 bps. Chart 5AS&P Small/Large TOTAL Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) Chart 5BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##S&P Small/Large Total Return (1988- Present) Our U.S. Bond Strategy colleagues note that the flatter the curve, the higher the risk of a sell-off in high-yields relative to Treasuries.3 Junk bonds underperform Treasuries 48% of the time when the curve is flat, which we expect in 2018 (not shown). The implication for investors is that the first half of 2018 will be the best period for junk bond returns. Investment-grade corporates have a similar return profile relative to the curve. Oil performs best when the 2/10 curve is inverted (Chart 6A). However, WTI oil returns an annualized 10-15% when the curve is between 0 and 100 bps. Plus, oil is higher 75% of the time when the curve is between 50 and 100 bps, which is the environment we expect in the first half of next year (Chart 6B). Chart 6AWTI Crude Oil Price Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) Chart 6BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##WTI Crude Oil Price Return (1988- Present) Forward earnings per share perform well with a flat curve, but earnings growth is optimal when the curve is inverted. The steeper the curve, the bigger the headwind for EPS. Since 1988, earnings growth has been positive when the curve inverts and is positive 95% of the time when the curve is flat. Chart 7 provides the historical context for a flat yield curve (0 to 50 bps) in terms of the performance of stocks, Treasury bonds, the stock-to-bond ratio, small caps and oil. The Appendix (see page 13) also includes three other charts that provide a perspective on asset class performance when the curve is moderately steep (50 to 100 bps), steep (100 to 150bps) and above 150 bps. Chart 7Stocks, Treasuries, Small Caps And Oil When The Curve Is Flat Bottom Line: BCA expects that the yield curve will first steepen in 2018, then become flatter, ultimately spending most of the year between 0 and 50 bps. A flat curve is the ideal environment for the S&P 500 and the stock-to-bond ratio. However, small cap stocks struggle when the curve is flat; BCA's view is that small caps will outperform large caps in 2018. A flat yield curve raises the risk of a sell-off in high yield, but provides a favorable grounding for oil, which is in line with BCA's fundamental view. BCA expects EPS growth will be positive next year; earnings growth is higher 75% of the time when the curve is flat. Household Net Worth Loses Influence Chart 8The Consumer Is In Good Shape U.S. consumer health has improved markedly since early this year, driving BCA's Consumer Health Indicator into positive territory (Chart 8). These elevated readings should bolster household consumption well into 2018. The improvement supports BCA's view of a stronger U.S. economy alongside a global synchronized recovery, at least over the next 12 months. Real consumer spending is underpinned by advances in real disposable income stemming from increasingly healthy labor market. Moreover, household net worth has continued to soar to an all-time high in 2017Q3 as equity markets remain frothy and house prices stable. However, net worth's direct influence on overall household consumption is not as significant as before the Great Recession. During the housing bubble in the early 2000s, U.S. households leveraged their spending through extensive mortgage refinancing and mortgage equity withdrawal. Real estate was the principal holding on most households' balance sheets. However, as the Great Recession unfolded, household net worth suffered with a collapse in both house prices and equity markets. By 2009, U.S. households were tapped out and grossly over-indebted. Deleveraging is now over, U.S. households have re-fortified their balance sheets and consumer spending is back in line with income growth. In the long term, inflation-adjusted disposable income is more highly correlated with inflation-adjusted consumer spending growth than real household net worth (Chart 9). Positive momentum should continue to support further real consumer spending over the next few quarters, given that unemployment is at a 17-year low and consumer confidence is at a 17-year high, and also given elevated consumers' expectations of real income gains over the next year or two. Chart 9Consumer Spending More Correlated With Income Than Net Worth Household net worth matters more for household saving than for consumption. Chart 10 shows the inverse relationship between net worth and the saving rate. Empirical research has demonstrated the risk that the structural decline (since the mid-1990s) in personal savings has on consumer spending and the overall economy. An often cited conclusion drawn by the investment community is that a lower savings rate raises the risk of consumer retrenchment.4 Chart 10Low Savings Rate, Record High Household Net Worth And Rising Income Expectations Even though the personal savings rate can be considered a contrarian measure for consumer spending, like many measures from the BEA national accounts (NIPA), it is subject to regular revisions. Over the long-term, according to the BEA, the level of the savings rate is often revised upwards but the trend over the last 45 years remains unchanged. There was a downtrend path to revisions in the mid-2000s housing bubble, but there has been a subtle uptrend since 2008 (Chart 11). Even so, in the long run, BCA views the low personal savings rate as a potential headwind for consumer spending as it cannot sustainably remain at its recovery low of 3.2%. However, rising income expectations and a sturdy labor market are offsets to depressed savings and will ensure that the economic expansion remains sustainable and, therefore, less vulnerable to volatile saving patterns. Does record high net worth alter the risks to the FOMC's goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth? In a recent research paper, the Federal Reserve of St-Louis looked at the most exuberant peaks in the ratio of household net worth to income in 1999 and 2006, which occurred before collapses in asset prices and recessions. Although caution is prescribed as household net worth keeps making new highs, the report noted that the composition of households' balance sheet is less alarming today than prior peaks, as equities and real estate relative to household income or total assets are more reasonable. Debt levels are also much more tame today than in 2006. With more immune balance sheets, households may be less vulnerable to unexpected shocks in the future (Chart 12).5 BCA's view is that financial vulnerabilities from the household sector are well contained. Outside of subprime auto loans, household borrowing is increasing modestly at an annual pace of 3.6%, in stark contrast with a 12.9% rate in the early-to-mid 2000s. Broad measures of household solvency, such as the household debt-to-income ratio, is within the range of the past few years and back to pre-recession levels. Furthermore, liquidity buffers (liquid assets to liabilities) are almost as high as the levels that preceded the equity market boom/bust in 1999-2000 (Chart 13). Chart 11Savings Rate Level Often Revised Upwards Chart 12Household Sector Balance Sheet Composition Chart 13Household Sector Buffers Are Solid BCA expects the Fed to remain vigilant about financial stability.6 Policymakers will take comfort that household liquidity and solvency ratios have improved dramatically in the past nine years, aided by the cumulative gains in housing and financial assets. Bottom Line: The outlook for the U.S. consumer is bright as incomes continue to improve amid tight labor market conditions. However, record household net worth is more relevant today for savings than for consumption. The Fed should remain committed to gradual rate hikes, but the central bank's quandary will be to determine the optimal pace to foster maximum employment and price stability. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?," published on December 12, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's "2018 Outlook Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course ," published December 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?," published on December 12, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 "Should The Decline In The Personal Savings Rate Be A Cause For Concern?", Alan C. Garner, The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2006Q2; and "The Decline in the U.S. Personal Savings Rate: Is It Real and Is It A Puzzle?", Massimo Guidolin and Elizabeth A. La Jeunesse, The Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis, November/December 2007. 5 "Household Wealth Is At A Post-WW II High: Should We Celebrate or Worry?", William R. Emmons and Lowell R. Ricketts, Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis, In the Balance, Perspectives on Household Balance Sheets, May 2017. 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Powell's In Power," published on November 6, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Chart 14U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 50 And 100 Bps Chart 15U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 100 And 150 Bps Chart 16U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Steeper Than 150 Bps
Highlights Global growth will remain strong in 2018, but the composition of that growth will shift in favour of the U.S. The surprise results of the Alabama Senate election are unlikely to scuttle the Republicans' tax plans. We expect a bill to be finalized by the end of the year. The Fed is poised to raise rates four times next year, two more hikes than the market is pricing in. The dollar should stage a modest rebound in 2018. China's economy will decelerate over the coming months, but merely from an above-trend pace. Near-term concerns about Chinese debt levels are overblown. Stay cyclically overweight global risk assets at least for the next six months. Feature Tax Cut Or Not, U.S. Growth Is Likely To Stay Strong In 2018 We expect global growth to remain strong in 2018. However, the composition of that growth is likely to shift back towards the United States. The weakening of the dollar this year should boost net exports, while dwindling spare capacity and faster wage growth should spur business investment and consumer spending. A looser fiscal policy will also help buoy the U.S. economy, but as we have discussed in recent reports, the contribution to growth from lower tax rates is likely to be fairly modest.1 We estimate that the final bill will lift real GDP growth by about 0.2%-0.3% in 2018 and 2019. The effects will diminish thereafter, eventually turning negative as larger budget deficits crowd out the savings that are necessary to finance private-sector investment. Democrat Doug Jones' surprise victory in the Alabama Senate election has thrown a wrench into the legislative process. Outgoing Senator Bob Corker voted against the original bill. If the reconciled House and Senate bill is not passed by the time Jones is seated in January, the Republicans may not have enough votes to get it through the chamber. Our geopolitical strategists expect the bill to pass by the end of the year, but this will likely require that Congressional Republicans acquiesce to Senator Collins' demand that Congress adopt legislation to help health insurers deal with the proposed abolition of the individual mandate. It may also require that Republican dealmakers ditch their last-minute effort to cut the marginal personal tax rate to 37% (the House version of the bill penciled in a top rate of 39.6%, while the Senate version envisioned a rate of 38.5%). The Fed Keeps On Hiking The Federal Reserve hiked rates again this week, taking the fed funds target range up to 1.25%-1.50%. The Fed's determination to tighten monetary policy at a time when inflation is still below target has many investors fretting. We are not particularly concerned. Inflation is a highly lagging indicator. The New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge, which includes various forward-looking inflation components such as producer prices and the ISM prices paid index, has accelerated to a cycle high of 3.0% (Chart 1). The unemployment rate is likely to fall to 3.5% by the end of next year. This would leave it more than one full point below NAIRU and 0.4 points below the median dot in the Summary Of Economic Projections released on Wednesday. Auxiliary measures of labor market slack, such as the U-6 rate and the share of the working-age population that is out of the labor force but wants a job, have also fallen back to pre-recession levels (Chart 2). Chart 1U.S. Inflationary Pressures Starting To Brew Chart 2Labor Market Slack Has Largely Vanished If U.S. growth surprises on the upside next year, as we expect, the Fed is likely to raise rates four times in 2018. This is roughly two more hikes than the market is currently pricing in. We recommended shorting the December 2018 fed funds futures contract on September 7th. The trade is up 48 basis points since then, but we think there is still scope for further gains. Modestly Slower Growth Elsewhere Outside the U.S., growth is likely to come down a notch in 2018. Japanese growth should cool somewhat from the heady pace of 2.7% seen over the past two quarters. Euro area growth is also likely to tick lower, as the impact of a stronger euro begins to bite. Financial conditions in the U.S. have loosened significantly relative to those in the euro area since the start of 2017. If history is any guide, this will cause euro area inflation to rise less than U.S. inflation over the coming year (Chart 3). This, in turn, will keep the ECB's forward guidance on the dovish side. This week's ECB meeting reinforced the message that the central bank is unlikely to raise rates at least until the summer of 2019. Chart 3Diverging Financial Conditions Will Have Inflationary Consequences Chart 4 shows that the euro has strengthened more against the dollar since the beginning of this year than can be accounted for by changes in interest rate expectations. We expect EUR/USD to fall back to 1.11 by the end of 2018. Chart 4AEUR/USD Has Strengthened More Than What One Would Have Expected Based On Changes In Interest Rate Differentials Chart 4BEUR/USD Has Strengthened More Than What One Would Have Expected Based On Changes In Interest Rate Differentials The Chinese Wildcard The biggest question mark over growth surrounds China. Real-time measures of industrial activity such as electricity generation, freight traffic, and excavator sales have slowed since the start of the year (Chart 5). The Caixin manufacturing PMI has also dipped, signaling weaker growth prospects among the country's small-to-medium sized private enterprises. Monetary conditions have tightened (Chart 6). How worried should investors be? So far, there is no reason to panic. Growth has weakened, but from an above-trend pace. Nominal GDP growth reached 11.2% year-over-year in Q3 2017, up from 6.4% in Q4 2015. Producer price inflation rose to 6.9% in October before backing off to 5.8% in November. Some cooling in the economy was both inevitable and desirable (Chart 7). Chart 5Growth Has Ticked Down ##br##Modestly In China Chart 6Monetary Conditions Have##br## Tightened In China Chart 7Chinese Growth Has Merely Weakened##br## From An Above-Trend Pace A more ominous slowdown cannot be ruled out, but that would require a substantial policy error. Such errors have occurred in the past. In 2015, the government undertook measures to reduce credit growth and cool the property market just as the global manufacturing sector was entering a recession on the heels of a sudden decline in energy sector capex. The Chinese authorities amplified the problem by trying to tippy-toe over the question of whether to devalue the currency, even as other EM currencies were sinking. This led to large capital outflows, thereby exacerbating the tightening in Chinese financial conditions. The circumstances today are quite different from 2015. While the authorities have clearly stepped up the pace of reforms following the Party Congress, the global and domestic backdrop is a lot more favorable. Global growth is much stronger. The yuan is also a lot cheaper - down 8.8% in real trade-weighted terms since its peak in 2015 (Chart 8). Chart 8The Yuan Has Cheapened Since 2015 Domestic demand remains on a firm footing. The service sector PMI ticked up further in November, an important development considering that China's service sector is now larger than its manufacturing sector (Chart 9). Alibaba reported sales of over U.S. $25 billion on its platform on "Singles Day" last month, up 39% from last year, and greater than U.S. online sales on Black Friday and Cyber Monday combined. The Chinese government is unlikely to take measures that allow growth to fall significantly below trend. Indeed, if anything, the recent evidence suggests that the authorities are tentatively easing their foot off the brake. Bond yields and credit spreads have come off their recent highs. New loans to the real economy clocked in at RMB 1.12 trillion in November, well above consensus estimates of RMB 800 billion. While the year-over-year change in M2 growth remains close to historic lows, the three-month change has hooked up (Chart 10). Chart 9It's Not All About Manufacturing In China Chart 10China: Money Growth Starting To Accelerate Higher core inflation has pushed real deposit rates into negative territory, making it increasingly painful for households to hold cash. This should cause the velocity of money to speed up, allowing nominal GDP growth to exceed money growth. Don't Bet On A Chinese Debt Crisis... Yet What about the longer-term debt issues haunting China? Here, there is both good and bad news. The bad news is that China's need to keep piling on debt may be an even more vexing problem than typically assumed. Pundits often claim that the government simply needs to bite the bullet and take the painful measures that are necessary to curb debt growth. The problem with this argument is that it sidesteps the question of what will offset the loss in spending from slower debt accumulation. Chinese households are massive net savers (Chart 11). As a matter of arithmetic, these savings must either be transformed into domestic investment or exported abroad via a current account surplus. China used to emphasize the latter. Its current account surplus reached 10% of GDP in 2007, mainly due to a widening trade surplus. It would be economically and politically impossible to pursue such a beggar-thy-neighbour strategy today. Economically, China is simply too big. Its economy has more than doubled relative to the rest of the world over the past decade (Chart 12). Politically, no major economy these days is prepared to tolerate a massive trade deficit with China - certainly not the U.S. Chart 11Mattresses Are ##br##Thicker In China Chart 12China's Size Limits Its Ability To Export Its ##br##Way Out Of Its Problems This means that China must now recycle excess savings internally. One way that Chinese households have done this is by purchasing real estate. In many respects, the Chinese property market has served as a piggy bank of sorts for much of the population. Large amounts of savings have also been placed into bank deposits and, increasingly, so-called wealth management products. These funds have then been used to satisfy the borrowing needs of local governments and business enterprises. It is no surprise that credit growth in China began to accelerate in 2009, just as the current account surplus was starting to narrow (Chart 13). In practice, the distinction between fiscal and corporate spending in China is rather blurry. Chart 14 shows China's official general government budget deficit as well as an augmented version constructed by the IMF which includes various off-balance sheet expenses. The former stands at a reasonably slim 3.7% of GDP, while the latter weighs in at a hefty 12.6% of GDP. Chart 13Credit Growth Took Off As ##br##Current Account Surplus Shrunk Chart 14China's "Secret" ##br##Budget Deficit A large chunk of these off-balance sheet items consist of losses incurred by China's state-owned enterprises. In many respects, these companies are the equivalent of Japan's fabled "bridges to nowhere": They exist to prop up demand in an economy where there is too much savings. Rather than making the economy more efficient, the risk is that structural reforms, if undertaken too rapidly, will simply depress growth. The most misallocated resource is a worker who wants a job but cannot find one. The troubling implication is that deleveraging may be difficult to achieve without causing significant economic distress. On The Bright Side... Fortunately, a number of factors mitigate the risks of a Chinese debt crisis. As Japan's experience shows, as long as a country has ample domestic savings and borrows primarily in its own currency, debt can increase to levels that many people might have thought impossible. Moreover, most of China's debt mountain consists of loans made by state-owned banks to SOEs and local governments. These loans often carry implicit guarantees from the central government. While this exacerbates the moral hazard problem, it does limit the potential of "leveraged losses" to lead to a massive credit crunch of the sort experienced during the Global Financial Crisis. China also has reasonably good long-term growth prospects. Output-per-worker is only a quarter of U.S. levels. Likewise, capital-per-worker is a fraction of what it is among advanced economies (Chart 15). Even with its bleak demographics, China would need to grow by around 6% per year over the coming decade if it were to remain on course to catch up to South Korea in output-per-worker by 2050 (Chart 16). Chart 15China Has More Catching Up To Do (1) Chart 16China Has More Catching Up To Do (2) Given China's well-educated labor force, it is likely that productivity levels will continue to converge with richer economies in the years ahead (Chart 17). Rapid growth, in turn, will allow China to outgrow some its debt and overcapacity problems more easily than would be the case for slower growing economies. Chart 17A Well-Educated Labor Force Bodes Well For China's Development Lastly, not all credit creation in China represents the intermediation of savings into productive investment. A lot of it is simply driven by speculative activities that contribute little to growth. Curbing the ability of individuals and companies to use extreme amounts of leverage to supercharge financial returns would enhance economic stability. To its credit, the government is actively addressing this issue. The bottom line is that Chinese growth is likely to slow modestly next year, but not by enough to imperil the global economy. Investors should remain cyclically overweight global equities and other risk assets at least for the next six months. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "When To Get Out," dated December 8, 2017; and Weekly Report, "Fiscal Follies," dated November 17, 2017. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Yield Curve & Fed: The yield curve will not invert until inflation has first recovered to the Fed's target. This means that a period of curve steepening is likely, driven either by rising inflation or a more dovish Fed. Corporate Sectors: Expect less extra compensation from increasing the riskiness of corporate bond portfolios in 2018. The Energy, Communications, Basic Industry, Financial and Technology sectors offer the best risk-adjusted value. Economy & Inflation: All signs are that economic growth has accelerated in recent months. Decelerating consumer credit growth and rising consumer delinquency rates do not yet pose a risk to future spending. Feature Long-term interest rates have trended lower in recent months even as the Federal Reserve has raised the level of the target federal funds rate by 150 basis points. This development contrasts with most experience, which suggests that, other things being equal, increasing short-term interest rates are normally accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields. [...] The broadly anticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a conundrum. - Alan Greenspan, February 20051 By the end of the week the Fed will have raised interest rates by 125 basis points since December 2015, yet the 10-year Treasury yield has risen only 7 bps (Chart 1). But unlike in 2005, there is no bond conundrum. On the contrary, the reason for low long-maturity Treasury yields is easily understood. Chart 1What Conundrum? Quite simply, the Federal Reserve has been lifting interest rates in-line with its projections for rising inflation, but markets are trading off the fact that this inflation has yet to materialize. The compensation for inflation protection embedded in 10-year yields is only 1.88%. Historically, when core inflation is close to the Fed's 2% target, compensation for inflation protection has traded in a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. Essentially, Fed rate hikes have lifted short-maturity yields but low inflation is keeping long-maturity yields depressed. The result is that the 2/10 Treasury slope has flattened all the way down to 58 bps from 128 bps in December 2015 (Chart 1, bottom panel). What should be clear is that the current paths of inflation and the yield curve are unsustainable. If the Fed continues to hike rates but inflation fails to rise, then the yield curve will invert in the coming months - a signal that bond investors anticipate a recession - and the Fed will have not achieved its inflation target. Such an obvious policy error will not be permitted to occur, which leaves us with three possible outcomes for Fed policy and the Treasury curve during the next six months. 1) The Fed Is Right In this scenario inflation starts to rebound in the coming months, pushing the compensation for inflation protection embedded in long-dated bond yields higher (Chart 2). This would certainly cause long-maturity nominal yields to increase and would probably impart a steepening bias to the yield curve, depending on how quickly the Fed lifts rates.2 BCA's Outlook for 2018 makes the case for why inflation is likely to bottom in the coming months, and we view the "Fed is Right" scenario as the most likely outcome.3 Chart 2Fed Expects Higher Inflation 2) The Fed Is Proactive In this scenario the Fed recognizes there is a risk of tightening the yield curve into inversion - and the economy into recession - if inflation stays low. It therefore proactively adopts a more dovish policy stance to prevent the yield curve from inverting. The likely first step would be signaling a slower pace of rate hikes in this week's Summary of Economic Projections. The yield curve would also steepen in this scenario, but this time a bull-steepening where short-maturity yields fall more than long-maturity yields. At least one FOMC member already seems worried enough to take this sort of action. St. Louis Fed President James Bullard said two weeks ago that: "Given below-target U.S. inflation, it is unnecessary to push normalization to such an extent that the yield curve inverts".4 But other policymakers are less concerned. Cleveland Fed President Loretta Mester downplayed the flat yield curve in a recent interview.5 We view this outcome as the least likely of our three scenarios. With economic growth accelerating (see Economy & Inflation section below), the Fed will likely cling to its forecast that inflation will move higher. If inflation fails to respond, then risky assets will eventually sell off. This brings us to the final scenario. 3) The Fed Is Reactive The Fed does not have a strong track record of proactively responding to low inflation readings, but it does have a strong track record of reacting to tighter financial conditions and risk off periods in equities and credit markets. What's more, if the yield curve continues to flatten, then we are very likely to see credit spreads widen and equities sell off quite soon. At that point the Fed would almost certainly respond by signaling a slower pace of rate hikes. That would steepen the curve and ease the pressure on risky assets. We view this third scenario as more likely than the one where the Fed is proactive. In fact, we observe that the yield curve is already flat enough that the chances of a sell-off in High-Yield corporate bonds relative to Treasuries are high. Using monthly data going back to 1988, we see that a flatter 2/10 Treasury slope is consistent with lower monthly excess returns from High-Yield (Chart 3). We also see that a flatter yield curve is consistent with more frequent risk-off periods (Chart 4). Chart 3Junk Monthly Excess Returns & ##br##Yield Curve (1988-Present) Chart 4% Of Months With Negative High-Yield ##br##Excess Returns (1988- Present) This makes sense intuitively. An inverted yield curve is a well-known recession indicator. This means that when the yield curve is very flat investors are obviously nervous that any new piece of bad news could tip the curve into inversion and signal an end to the economic recovery. In other words, a risk-off episode in junk bonds, like the one witnessed in early November, would be less likely to occur if the yield curve were steeper.6 We would recommend buying the dips on any near-term correction in junk bonds, because the Fed would then be forced to get more dovish and support the credit markets. But unless inflation returns and steepens the Treasury curve from current levels, the risk of just such an episode is high. Corporate Sector Year-In-Review With 2017 nearly in the books, this week we take a quick look back at the performance of the 10 main investment grade corporate bond sectors during the year. Chart 5 shows the excess return for each sector relative to its duration-times-spread (DTS) from the beginning of the year. DTS is a common measure of risk for corporate bonds, and can be thought of much like an equity's beta. When the overall corporate bond market is rallying, then high-DTS sectors tend to perform better. Conversely, when corporate bonds underperform Treasuries, then high-DTS sectors tend to lose more than the low-DTS alternatives. As can be seen in Chart 5, given that 2017 was a risk-on year, high-DTS sectors tended to outperform low-DTS sectors with a few exceptions. The Basic Industry sector and Financials performed much better than their DTS alone would have predicted, while the Communications sector performed much worse than its DTS would have predicted. Looking ahead into 2018, we make the following observations: Excess returns for investment grade corporate bonds are likely to be lower in 2018 than in 2017.7 In turn, this means that the Credit Risk Premium - the extra return earned for taking an additional unit of DTS risk - will also be lower. We calculated the Credit Risk Premium for each year since 2000 by performing a regression of annual excess returns for each of the 10 major sectors versus their beginning-of-year DTS. The beta from that regression represents the additional return earned that year from taking an extra unit of DTS risk. Chart 6 shows that this Credit Risk Premium is an increasing function of excess returns for the overall corporate sector. Logically, if the year ahead is likely to deliver lower excess returns for the overall index, then we should also expect less additional return from increasing the DTS risk of our corporate bond portfolios. Chart 52017 Corporate Sectors ##br##Excess Returns* Vs DTS** Chart 6Excess Returns* Vs ##br##Credit Risk Premium Second, we use our corporate sector model - a model that adjusts each sector's spread by its average credit rating and duration - to identify sectors that have the potential to outperform their DTS in the coming months. This model is updated each month in our Portfolio Allocation Summary.8 The most recent update shows that the high-DTS Energy, Basic Industry and Communications sectors are all attractively valued. The most attractive low-DTS sectors are Financials and Technology (Chart 7). Chart 7Risk-Adjusted Value In Corporate Sectors* Bottom Line: Expect less extra compensation from increasing the riskiness of corporate bond portfolios in 2018. The Energy, Communications, Basic Industry, Financial and Technology sectors offer the best risk-adjusted value. Economy & Inflation Does Consumer Credit Growth Put The Recovery At Risk? Last week's employment report showed a sharp increase in aggregate hours worked and suggests that U.S. economic growth has indeed shifted into a higher gear. We use a combination of year-over-year growth in aggregate hours worked and average quarterly productivity growth since 2012 to get a rough tracking estimate for U.S. real GDP growth. After last Friday's report this proxy is up to a healthy 3.1% (Chart 8). Last Friday's Consumer Sentiment data also suggest that consumer spending, the largest component of U.S. GDP, will stay firm in the coming months (Chart 9). While consumer credit growth has started to slow (Chart 9, panel 2) and consumer delinquencies are starting to rise (Chart 9, bottom panel), we are not yet inclined to view those trends as risks to the economic recovery. Chart 8Growth Tracking Well Above Trend Chart 9Credit Growth Falling & Delinquencies Rising First, notice that prior to the onset of recession, consumer spending growth tends to decline while consumer credit growth accelerates. It is only well after the recession begins that consumer credit growth follows spending growth lower. This chain of events is highly logical. In the late stages of the recovery households first start to see their incomes decline and then turn to credit to support their spending needs. Eventually, banks make consumer credit less available and consumer credit growth also decelerates, but we are already well into the recession by then. Chart 10Bank Lending Standards In fact, judging by the patterns observed in the lead up to the last two recessions, the warning sign for the economic recovery would be if consumer credit growth is rising while consumer spending growth is falling. So far this pattern has not been observed. Potentially more troubling is the increase in the consumer credit delinquency rate. Delinquencies do tend to rise prior to the onset of recession, although at the moment delinquencies are rising off an extremely low base. It is possible that after having kept lending standards very stringent for several years after the Great Recession, an uptick in delinquencies off historically low levels simply reflects a return to "business-as-usual" for banks. In fact, the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Survey showed a large tightening of consumer lending standards during the crisis, but then a moderate easing from 2010 until quite recently (Chart 10). Further, the most recent Senior Loan Officer Survey showed an increase in banks' willingness to extend consumer installment loans. Historically, this has been associated with falling consumer delinquency rates (Chart 10, bottom panel). Bottom Line: All signs are that economic growth has accelerated in recent months. Decelerating consumer credit growth and rising consumer delinquency rates do not yet pose a risk to future spending. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2005/february/testimony.htm 2 For a look at what different combinations of Fed rate hikes and long-maturity yields mean for the slope of the yield curve please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "2018 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income", dated November 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Special Report, "Outlook 2018: Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course", dated November 20, 2017, available at www.bcaresearch.com 4 https://www.stlouisfed.org/from-the-president/speeches-and-presentations/2017/assessing-yield-curve 5 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-01/fed-s-mester-shrugs-off-flattening-yield-curve-in-call-for-hikes 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Junk Bond Jitters", dated November 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "2018 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income", dated November 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 For the most recent update please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "A Higher Gear", dated December 5, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights We are putting the Indonesian stock market on an upgrade watch list. Indonesia's financial markets' beta relative to EM peers has been declining. As such, Indonesian markets will likely outperform the EM benchmark in a sell-off. Inflation in Mexico is peaking and will drift lower. The Mexican peso is particularly attractive relative to the South African rand and the Brazilian real. However, we still recommend that investors maintain a neutral stance on Mexican assets relative to EM peers until more clarity emerges from the NAFTA negotiations. Feature Indonesia: Putting On Upgrade Watch List Indonesian share prices have considerably underperformed the EM benchmark since February 2016 (Chart I-1). This has occurred despite exports growing at an annual rate of 18% in U.S. dollar terms in 2017. The surge in Indonesian exports has been largely driven by soaring prices for thermal coal, palm oil and copper. Export prices have soared by 24% for coal and copper and 11% for palm oil from their lows in early 2016. Nevertheless, their export volumes have been rather stagnant (Chart I-2). These commodities are large drivers of Indonesia's exports. Thermal coal and palm oil account for around 20% of total exports, while copper accounts for around 4%, in value terms. Chart I-1Indonesian Stock Prices: Relative & Absolute Chart I-2Indonesian Exports: Volume Vs. Prices We expect coal1 and base metals prices to drop considerably in 2018 due to China's meaningful growth slowdown. Having this backdrop in mind, we discuss the outlook for Indonesia's stock market in both absolute and relative terms. We continue recommending a neutral allocation to Indonesian stocks within an EM equity portfolio for now, but are putting this bourse on an upgrade watch list and will wait for the following triggers to go overweight: Chart I-3Chinese & Indonesian Equities: ##br##A Rotating Dance The first trigger is when Chinese H-shares and large-cap tech stocks begin underperforming the EM overall equity index. Interestingly, the relative performance of Indonesian equities and Chinese stocks has been negatively correlated (Chart I-3). Indonesia's stock market's underperformance relative to the EM benchmark can be also partially explained by the manic rise in a small number of EM large-cap tech stocks. Tech stocks are absent from Indonesia's stock exchange and when tech stocks' relative performance does turn south, it will be easier for the Indonesian bourse to outperform the EM benchmark. The second trigger for upgrading Indonesian stocks is when the initial phase of decline in commodities prices (10-15%) occurs. This phase could be the most painful for commodities plays like Indonesia, as nervous investors bail out. In short, we are waiting for the momentum of Indonesia's relative performance to turn up before overweighting the bourse. Domestic Demand And Exports: Parting Ways? The Indonesian economy and its financial markets have historically been highly correlated with commodities prices and exports: a positive external shock would trigger an export boom and foreign inflows would ensue. These inflows would in turn lead to currency appreciation and a subsequent fall in interest rates. The end result was the overheating of the economy and financial markets. Recently, however, Indonesia's economy and financial markets have been slowly disconnecting from exports in general and commodities prices in particular. The top panel of Chart I-4 shows that while exports used to be extremely correlated with the rupiah, these correlations have been breaking down since early 2016. Similarly, a disconnect is occurring between exports and other domestic macro variables like bank loans (Chart I-4, bottom panel). What is also noteworthy is the absence of a notable pickup in domestic demand growth amid the strong recovery in global trade. Chart I-5 shows that car and motorcycle sales are still anemic. Chart I-4Disconnect Between Indonesian ##br##Exports Vs. Rupiah & Bank Loans Chart I-5Indonesia's Domestic Sector Remains Sluggish Below are some of the reasons that help shed light as to why this divergence between exports and domestic demand has been taking place: First, the ratio of Indonesia's commodities' exports to total has fallen more sharply than in other commodities-producing EM nations (Chart I-6). Exports have also become generally less important for the overall Indonesian economy post the global financial crisis. Chart I-7 shows that private non-financial debt as a whole has risen, while exports have fallen as a share of GDP. Chart I-6Indonesia's Commodities ##br##Exports Ratio Has Plunged Chart I-7Private Debt Is A Bigger Driver Of ##br##Indonesia's Economy Than Exports The government has been following cautious and prudent policies. This is another reason why domestic demand growth has been mediocre amid robust exports. Chart I-8 signifies that growth in government expenditures has stalled in nominal terms and contracted in real terms. Indeed, the impulse in the banking system's net domestic assets (the combined aggregate of the central bank and commercial banks) remains negative, albeit improving on a rate of change basis (Chart I-9). Net domestic assets (NDA) measure the banking system's2 credit to the domestic sector - i.e. the government and the private sector. Chart I-8Indonesia's Government ##br##Has Been Prudent Chart I-9Banking System's Net Domestic ##br##Assets & Fiscal Deposit Drain The NDA impulse has been negative because the government has borrowed less from the banking system. In addition, the government has been shifting deposits from commercial banks to the central bank (Chart I-9, bottom panel). This has drained liquidity in the system and has slowed broad money growth and capped commercial banks' reserves at Bank Indonesia. As the potential negative term-of-trade shock transpires, the government will have enough of a buffer to spend by deploying its deposits from the central bank and by borrowing and spending more. That will in turn provide support for the economy when commodities prices fall and the external sector suffers. Chart I-10Central Bank Has Been Building FX Firepower As for the currency, the central bank has recently accumulated plenty of foreign exchange assets, creating commercial bank reserves in the process (Chart I-10). The central bank now has plenty of room to defend the currency by selling foreign assets when the rupiah comes under selling pressure. Bank Indonesia will also have more leeway managing a reasonable balance between a depreciating currency and rising local interbank rates. Bottom Line: Indonesia's domestic demand has been mediocre, despite the surge in exports and commodities prices. Meanwhile, the central bank and the government have used the positive global environment to accumulate firepower. This puts them in a position to act as shock absorbers when the external environment turns hostile. As a result, the Indonesian financial markets' beta to their EM peers will decline. We therefore recommend putting the Indonesian stock market on an upgrade watch list. Consistently, the potential downside in the currency and a sell-off in the domestic bond markets will be smaller than we previously anticipated. While still advocating a cautious/neutral stance on this market, we will be looking to upgrade it to overweight versus its EM peers after the first phase of a potential EM and commodities sell-off transpires. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Mexico: Waiting For A Better Entry Point In Mexico, inflation has very likely peaked and will drift lower as the central bank maintains a tight monetary policy stance: A large part of the rise in inflation in 2017 was caused by depreciation in the peso. The firmness in the peso this year entails that inflation will roll over soon (Chart II-1). Consumer spending and capital expenditure are set to contract as the impact of higher interest rates continue to filter through the economy (Chart II-2). In fact, domestic vehicles sales are shrinking sharply. Chart II-1Mexico: Peso & Inflation Chart II-2Higher Interest Rates Are ##br##Slowing Domestic Spending Furthermore, weak real wage growth will continue to weigh on consumer spending (Chart II-3). In addition, contracting fiscal non-interest expenditures will remain a headwind on economic growth (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Lower Real Wages = Lower Inflation Chart II-4Belt-Tightening By The Government Finally, one-off effects on inflation - such as the gasoline subsidy removal that took place at the end of last year - will subside as the base effect of these price increases abates. The inflation rate will in turn moderate. Despite all this, Banxico will continue to keep monetary policy tight due to lingering uncertainty related to NAFTA negotiations. Within the EM currency universe, the Mexican peso is particularly attractive relative to the South African rand and the Brazilian real. We will be looking to reinstate long positions in the MXN versus both the ZAR and the BRL for the following reasons: Relative trade balance dynamics will continue to favor Mexico relative to South Africa and Brazil. Mexican exports are likely to remain robust due to strong U.S. growth (Chart II-5), while South African and Brazilian exports will slow down as China's growth and imports falter (Chart II-6). Chart II-5Mexican Exports Will Remain ##br##Robust Due To Strong U.S. Growth Chart II-6South African & Brazilian Exports ##br##Will Take A Hit As China Slows Furthermore, metals prices will be affected more negatively than oil prices due to China's growth slump. China's share of world consumption in base and industrial metals at 50-55% is much larger than oil (12.5%). This will leave Mexican exports less negatively affected than those of Brazil and South Africa. Mexico does not suffer from rapidly rising public debt like Brazil and South Africa (Chart II-7). Large fiscal deficits and rising public debt burdens in Brazil and South Africa require a higher risk premium in their respective financial markets, leaving further room for the MXN to outperform both the BRL and the ZAR. While Mexico has already gone through some structural reforms, Brazil and South Africa have yet to deliver any substantial efforts on that front. This leaves Mexico in a much better position to attract long-term capital inflows compared to Brazil and South Africa. Finally, on a real effective exchange rate basis, the peso remains cheap relative to the rand and the real (Chart II-8). Chart II-7Public & Private Debt Is Lower In Mexico Chart II-8The Mexican Peso Is Still Cheap We closed our long MXN/BRL and long MXN/ZAR trades on October 25th because at present there is too much uncertainty with respect to NAFTA negotiations that could have a negative impact on the peso. However, with regards to the national general elections, uncertainty in South Africa and Brazil is even greater than in Mexico. In Mexico, the anti-establishment candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador is currently leading the polls, but his new party - National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) - is unlikely to gain a majority in Congress. Investment Conclusions We recommend that investors maintain a neutral stance across all asset classes in Mexico and wait for clarity on NAFTA3 negotiations before going overweight the country's currency and fixed-income markets relative to their EM peers. Mexican stocks have been selling off sharply in absolute terms and have substantially underperformed the EM benchmark. This poor performance is mainly attributed to financials and consumer discretionary stocks. While these two sectors only account for 20% of the total MSCI market cap, the retrenchment in their share price has been large enough to bring the whole market down. We have the following observations on these two equity sectors: The consumer discretionary sector has been underperforming due to disappointing earnings. Our bias is that it is still too early to call a bottom in the consumer cycle in Mexico. With regards to banks, we believe that tight monetary policy will continue to weigh on their share prices. More importantly, the yield curve remains inverted, and until we see it steepen, it will be hard for banks to rally. All in all, we continue recommending a neutral weighting in Mexican stocks within an EM equity portfolio. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017, the link is available on page 15. 2 Banking system is the sum of the central bank and commercial banks. 3 Please refer to the Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, titled "Nafta - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, the link is available at gps.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Special Report As we near the end of an impressive year for equities, the relationship between price growth and earnings growth and how to best position a portfolio for 2018 bears some reflection. The purpose of this report, rather than take a position on inflation or growth, is to create a roadmap such that investors can allocate according to their expectations for both and also avoid potential pitfalls and embrace likely winners. Diagram 1Four Quadrants Of Earnings And Inflation In framing our analysis, we will focus on the top half of a well-known growth/inflation matrix presented in Diagram 1 below (stay tuned for a follow-up Special Report when we examine the sector impacts of deflation). We have used S&P 500 earnings as our measure of growth for two reasons: first, they lead GDP and IP growth and second, they are most relevant in a discussion of S&P 500 sector allocations. While inflation and earnings growth tend to move together, this has not always been the case. We have identified six time periods in which inflation has been visibly rising (shaded in Chart 1) and compared it with S&P 500 EPS growth. The mean reverting nature of S&P 500 earnings growth makes discerning a pattern difficult but, more often than not, there is a positive correlation with rising inflation. Over the last 60 years S&P 500 earnings growth has averaged 7.6%, while core PCE prices increased on average by 3.3%. As shown in Table 1 below, S&P 500 earnings outpaced core inflation in four periods (indeed, they grew much faster) and fell behind in two periods. We thus place 1965-1971 and 1998-2002 in the top-left quadrant of our matrix (Stagflation) and 1973-1975, 1976-1981, 1987-1989 and 2003-2006 in the top-right (Boom Times). It is important to qualify that, for the purposes of this report, we are considering all periods in which inflation is increasing, not necessarily periods when it is elevated on an absolute basis. Chart 1Earnings And Inflation Usually Move Together... Table 1...But Not Always In our examination of inflation and sector winners last year1, we presented Table 2 below, now modified to tie sector earnings growth to relative share price performance. Breaking down sector performance in boom and bust periods is revealing. The first and most obvious observation is that stock performance tracks earnings growth in all periods, implying that fundamentals lead valuation, as they should. The second observation is that empirical evidence supports sector allocation theory in inflationary boom/bust periods. Table 2Sector Performance When Inflation Rises In theory, the best performing stocks in a stagflation environment would have low economic sensitivity but high pricing power. This is borne out with S&P health care being the top performing sector both from an earnings growth and, predictably, relative stock performance perspective. By contrast, the top performing boom time stocks should be the most economically sensitive yet still stores of value. In these periods, the top overall performer was energy which checks all the boxes. This year, we are expanding our analysis to the GICS2 sectors which have shared the same cyclical return profile as their GICS1 peers (Table 3). In the inflationary busts, defensive stocks including healthcare equipment and food & beverage outperformed. As expected, the inflationary booms saw traditional cyclical indices including energy and transportation outperform. Table 3GICS2 Sector Performance When Inflation Rises In the next section, we will take a deeper look at three of the GICS2 top and two bottom quartile performers when inflation is rising. Energy - (Currently Overweight) The S&P energy index has been a stellar performer in all six high inflation periods we have examined and has the highest average return of all GICS2 sectors. This is logical, considering the sector's revenue, profit and share price leverage to the underlying commodity. During periods of high inflation, all stores of value tend to increase and oil is no exception. An additional tailwind for energy prices with inflation is the associated elevated industrial production; the current synchronized global growth backdrop should sustain a healthy level of demand for energy. Keep in mind oil prices are an excellent gauge of global growth. In the context of a falling rig count and contracting oil stocks (Chart 2), energy prices and stocks seem likely to remain well bid, underpinning our overweight recommendation on the S&P energy index. Transportation - (Currently Overweight) Transportation can largely be summarized as S&P railroads (currently overweight) and S&P air freight & logistics (currently overweight) which together comprise 75% of the index. The index has been a very strong performer in periods of rising inflation, driven by coincident accelerating global trade volumes (Chart 3). Historically, global industrial production and both rail and air freight EPS have moved in tandem as relatively fixed supply drives pricing power firmly on the side of logistics providers (Chart 3). This pricing power allows the transportation to mitigate the usually coincidentally highly volatile energy price via oil surcharges, offsetting what is typically the largest input cost. Together, firming volumes and pricing gains support an outsized earnings outlook and our overweight recommendation in transportation. Chart 2Inflation, IP And Oil Prices Move Together Chart 3Rising Inflation Is A Boon To Global Trade Volume Health Care Equipment - (Currently Neutral) The S&P health care equipment index has consistently been an outperformer in each of the six high inflation impulse periods we analyzed. This is all the more interesting, considering it is the least cyclical of the top quartile relative performers. Health care equipment sales are largely driven by new facility construction which is, in turn, driven at least in part by consumer spending on health care. Consumer health care expenditure has a demonstrated propensity to follow (with significantly greater amplitude) overall inflation (Chart 4). Further, health care equipment is highly levered to global demand; the latter clearly rises hand in hand with inflation and should be EPS accretive to the former. Elevated relative valuations offsetting the positive operating environment keep us on the sidelines. Chart 4Health Care Spending Tracks Inflation Automotive - (Currently Underweight) Returns in the S&P automotive index are by far the most consistently negative when inflation is rising. Rising interest rates driving the costs of ownership higher, combined with the rational avoidance of a depreciating asset when stores of value are preferable, have historically impaired light vehicle sales as inflation climbs. In fact, the two have a tight negative correlation (Chart 5). In an industry where margins are razor thin at the best of times and fixed costs are relatively high, a shrinking top line implies significant profit contraction. Add on a highly geared balance sheet in a rising rate environment and the ingredients are all in place for underperformance. The current environment echoes this analysis; inventories are still elevated despite manufacturer incentives hitting their highest level in history and seven-year auto loans becoming the norm, something unheard of in previous cycles. Chart 5Inflation And Auto Sales Are Inversely Correlated Utilities - (Currently Underweight) Utilities, as the prototypical defensive sector, have unsurprisingly performed poorly as inflation is rising. Rising inflation expectations go hand in hand with rising bond yields (Chart 6); as a fixed-income proxy, utilities are likely to be subject to the same drubbing as the bond market when yields rise. Further, surging global trade is a notable boon to the three outperformers previously highlighted with their exceptional international exposure; utilities are a domestic-only investment and are bound to underperform. Overall, we recommend an underweight position in utilities. Chart 6Inflation Is A Headwind To Fixed Income Proxies Chris Bowes, Associate Editor U.S. Equity Strategy chrisb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Equity Sector Winners And Losers When Inflation Climbs," dated December 5, 2016, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights An extended period of synchronized global growth suggests above-potential U.S. growth will persist into 2018. BCA expects inflation to move back to the Fed's 2% target in 2018, allowing the Fed to raise rates four times. However, a new study by the SF Fed suggests that inflation could be stuck in low gear for a while longer. The U.S. consumer is poised to have a good year in 2018, aided by rising incomes, solid balance sheets and elevated confidence about future increases in employment and incomes. BCA expects a rebound in residential investment in 2018 despite higher mortgage rates. Feature BCA's Outlook for 2018 was published just recently.1 The report laid out the macroeconomic and policy themes that will impact financial markets during the next year. In this week's report we expand on those themes and discuss what they mean for the U.S. economy and financial markets specifically. A period of synchronized global growth will persist into 2018 and allow the U.S. economy to grow well above its long-term potential for a time. Overseas demand will lift U.S. profit growth in 2018, although both earnings and profit growth will peak next year. Widespread global growth and a positive output gap in the U.S. will lead to accelerating wages, higher inflation, a more aggressive Fed and higher bond yields. U.S. stocks will outperform bonds in 2018. Despite higher mortgage rates, the U.S. housing market will provide a lift to the U.S. economy in 2018 as residential investment rebounds after a challenging 2017. A peak in residential investment provides an early indication that a recession is on the horizon. Since the early 1960s, a crest in housing provided seven quarters of warning before a downturn commenced. In the long duration economic expansions in the 1980s and 1990s, residential construction provided an even earlier signal. The U.S. consumer will also add to growth in 2018, aided by solid balance sheets, near record confidence and elevated confidence about future increases in employment and incomes. Risks remain, however, and the biggest threat to our view of the U.S. economy and financial markets in 2018 is that inflation overshoots the Fed's 2.0% target. BCA's view is that inflation will return to 2% gradually. A faster pace of inflation may prompt a more aggressive Fed and catch markets off guard. If inflation fails to move back to 2%, the Fed may slow the pace of hikes, clearing the way for the current goldilocks scenario to persist even longer. Synchronized Global Growth For the first time in more than a decade, global economic activity is widespread. Led by a surge in capital spending, the economy is experiencing its strongest growth since the mid-2000s. The solid international expansion will bump U.S. industrial production and capital spending orders even higher and also support U.S. exports (Chart 1). The ebullient global backdrop may persist for a while. The OECD's global leading economic indicator is in a clear uptrend and suggests above-trend growth will persist through the end of 2018 (Chart 2). Global PMIs are also climbing (panel 2). The robust global growth has added to mounting inflationary pressures. In the U.S., the unemployment rate is below NAIRU; other OECD countries have followed suit. In all, almost 75% of member countries in the OECD are running at full employment (Chart 3). Chart 1Animal Spirits Are Stirring Chart 2Upbeat Global Growth Prospects Chart 3NAIRU Is A Global Phenomenon U.S. corporate profits will benefit from vigorous global economic activity. On average, 43% of S&P 500 sales are derived from overseas. Several sectors (Energy, Information Technology and Industrials) rely on international business for more than 50% of their sales and earnings. BCA's view that the U.S. dollar will move only modestly higher in 2018 implies that the currency will not have a major impact on EPS. When more than 90% of nations have positive GDP growth, stocks beat bonds, and the output gap narrows and closes, which leads to a lower unemployment rate and a more active Fed (Charts 4 and 5). The dollar's performance is mixed during intervals of strong global growth. The dollar climbed in the late 1990s, but sagged in the early- to mid-2000s. When global growth is strong, U.S. industrial production is generally higher. However, IP dipped in 2015 as oil prices fell at the start of the recent period of synchronized growth. Chart 4Widespread##BR##Global Growth ... Chart 5... Supports Risk Assets, Trade And##BR##A Narrower Output Gap Global growth could be derailed by any one of several threats. The risk of a prolonged flare-up in geopolitical risk in northeast Asia could curtail global trade. Furthermore, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team expects that relations between the U.S. and North Korea will follow the example of U.S. negotiations with Iran in the mid-2000s; periodic conflicts accompanied by back channel negotiations over several years.2 A policy mistake by the Fed or China may also disrupt the global bonhomie and, in turn, slow growth. Most measures of China's credit impulse are decelerating and the Chinese government's reforms may impact growth more than we expect. Moreover, weak poll numbers may lead President Trump to trigger trade disputes with important trading partners such as China, Mexico and Canada. Bottom Line: Synchronized global growth supports BCA's view that U.S. EPS growth will top out in 2018, but will remain positive. Margins should also top out in 2018. The positive backdrop will allow stocks to beat bonds next year, and credit to outperform Treasuries, even as the Fed raises rates. The environment for risk assets will stay supportive even if inflation does not accelerate. However, our forecast could be derailed by a sudden surge in inflation in 2018. Inflation At An Inflection Point? The Fed can rest a little easier following last week's rise in their preferred gauge of inflation, the core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, as the monthly rise was somewhat strong at 0.2% and the annual growth rate inched higher to 1.4% (year-over-year) in October, up from the previous month at 1.3% (year-over-year). In contrast, a diffusion index which includes the components of the PCE index, unlike the CPI, has moved back below zero, implying that inflation pressures are not yet widespread (Chart 6). Regardless of current sluggish inflation dynamics, BCA's view is that inflation will rise by enough to convince the Fed that continuing to boost rates next month is the right direction for monetary policy. However, patience will be required as it is too early to say if inflation has reached an inflection point as it is still below the Fed's 2 percent inflation target and remains persistently at a low level. Outgoing Chair Yellen's voiced this concern by saying at the September 19-20 FOMC meeting that the shortfall of inflation from 2 percent is a "mystery", which echoed Fed Chair nominee Powell's sentiment at Jackson Hole (August 2017). Furthermore, prior to the PCE release last week and in her last testimony, Yellen reiterated that "Even with a step-up in growth of economic activity and a stronger labor market, inflation has continued to run below the 2 percent rate. The recent lower readings on inflation likely reflect transitory factors. As these transitory factors fade, I anticipate that inflation will stabilize around 2 percent over the medium term. However, it is also possible that this year's low inflation could reflect something more persistent. Indeed, inflation has been below the Committee's 2 percent objective for most of the past five years." As we have discussed previously,3 though the Fed is unified on its gradual path for monetary policy, Chair Yellen's current dismay about the uncertainty for the path of inflation is not a widely held view among the members of the committee. The internal debate at the Fed about this "mystery" continues, and may heat up as four new board members join the FOMC. BCA's view is that inflation will move higher over the next year. However, a recent study4 by the FRB of San Francisco takes a different view. Economists at the San Francisco Fed concluded that the path for inflation (based on core PCE) has more downside. Their work suggests that health-care services inflation will remain a drag to core PCE due to recent changes in health care legislation. Health-care services represent about 35% of the PCE spending category identified as non-cyclical (58% of core PCE is non-cyclical or "acyclical" while 42% of core PCE is "procyclical"). Authors of the study estimated that health care services have subtracted about 0.3% from core PCE compared to the last recovery period in 2002-2007 (Chart 7). Accordingly, the unrelenting decline in health-care services inflation has prevented core PCE inflation from returning to its pre-recession average above 2 percent. Moreover, overall non-cyclical inflation is subtracting about 0.6% from core PCE inflation compared with the mid-2000s. Chart 6CPI And PCE Diffusion##BR##Indices Signals Diverge Chart 7Noncyclical Sources##BR##Driving Inflation Lower The Fed's rationale for higher rates of the previous 2004-2006 tightening cycle was quite different than today's. Just prior to the initial rate hike, the economy was "expanding at a rapid pace" and members of the FOMC had a high level of conviction that "robust growth would be sustained." More importantly, policymakers viewed the household sector as a "key driver in the expansion" as consumer spending was expected to continue to grow at a strong pace.5 Though inflation pressures were building, "most members saw low inflation (core PCE) as the most likely outcome" amid strong productivity growth. Even so, inflation persisted in an uptrend near the 2% threshold (and eventually crossed over in the following months) even as "considerable" labor market slack remained and wage growth moderated (though within the 3-4% range). That said, the bond market today is concerned about a policy mistake by the Fed. The 2/10 Treasury yield curve moved from 86 in October to 58 last week, reflecting the risk that the downward pressures on inflation remain elevated. If the i.e. transitory factors do not dissipate core inflation may get entrenched into a lower channel. The Fed may have to pause or cut short its tightening cycle if lower inflation persists and is accompanied by a decline in market-based measures of long-term inflation expectations. Bottom Line: BCA expects inflation to move back to the Fed's 2% target in 2018, allowing the Fed to raise rates four times. The market is only expecting one or two hikes next year. Our view is that the curve will steepen in 2018, as the market acknowledges the return of inflation. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service expects the 10-year Treasury yield to move above 2.8% next year, and may move as high as 3%. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds and underweight duration. U.S. Consumer Outlook Thanks to the consumer, the U.S. economy is operating very close to its long-term potential. Household balance sheets are in better shape than in the corporate sector. For example, total household liabilities are 11.3% below their long-term trend (since 1950) and have moved sharply lower since the early 1980s (17.2% in 1983Q1). Household net worth in 2017Q2 was at a record high, the result of stable house prices and frothy equity markets, according to the latest Flow of Funds data for 2017Q2 (Chart 8). House prices, based on the Case-Shiller National index, have increased steadily and have experienced their fastest yearly growth rate since June 2014 (6.15% year-over-year). Nationwide, housing prices are 46% above their 2012 trough and 6% above the pre-recession peak (July 2006). Moreover, given the equity market's recent new highs, households' financial position should continue to record further gains for at least the next two quarters (2017Q3 Flow of Funds data is due on December 7). Consumer confidence - although mostly a coincident indicator for consumer spending - continued to climb in November to a 17-year high. The increase was the result of elevated expectations for future gains in employment and income, though the latter decreased very slightly. These inflated readings may further support steady consumer expenditures at this late stage of the business cycle, especially heading into the holiday shopping season. Next week, we will examine previous spending cycles to better understand the implications for the 2017 holiday retail season. Consumers remain very optimistic about future labor market advances, making it easier ("jobs plentiful") rather than difficult to find a job ("jobs hard to get"). Furthermore, 46% of consumers expect stock market returns to strengthen in the next year in contrast to only 19% expecting stock prices to decrease over the same period. Nevertheless, there are risks that may dampen the pace of consumer spending. BCA expects employment growth to slow because the labor market cannot get much tighter. Plus, there is a shortage of skilled employees, according to the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) and the Fed's Beige Book. Moreover, the personal savings rate cannot sustainably remain at its recovery low of 3.2%. However, small businesses' upbeat plans for labor compensation still bode well for rising wages and salaries as they are at their highest level since March 2000. For consumer spending to flourish, overall labor income will need to improve. At 2.6%, annual wage compensation growth remains sluggish and far from the 3-4% per year that the Fed has stated would be consistent with an economy closer to a 2% inflation rate (Chart 9). Chart 8"Teflon" Household Balance Sheets Chart 9Consumer Spending Tailwinds Moreover, households are unlikely to binge on more debt to smooth out their expenditures as they did in the mid-2000s. A further acceleration in consumer spending would occur alongside steady improvement in the labor market and improving household confidence on future employment and income gains. As such, last week's income and spending report showed that while the consumer held back on real spending in October (+0.1% month-over-month), real personal income rose by 0.3% month-over-month. Real income growth troughed in December 2016 but has climbed by almost 2% in the past three months. Fed policymakers can take comfort that over the medium-term, consumer spending remains quite stable at around 2.5-3.0%. BCA still expects consumer spending to continue to grow by at least 2% pace in 2018 which should keep the expansion humming along. Bottom Line: The outlook for the U.S. consumer remains bright due to solid fundamental tailwinds such as strong employment growth, stable disposable incomes, frothy household net worth and buoyant confidence. This should continue to support the domestic economy and global growth, especially ahead of the holiday shopping season. Consumer headwinds to monitor are households' incentive to start saving more as wages remain stagnant and employment growth slows. However, as the fundamental tailwinds outweigh the headwinds for household spending, BCA still expects the U.S. consumer sector to remain steady over the near term. Residential Investment: More Than Just A Q4 Snapback Housing will boost GDP growth in 2018. BCA's view is that housing did not peak in early 2016 (Chart 10, panel 4). Investment in residential construction in Q2 was held down by higher rates and a mild 2016-17 winter that pulled construction ahead into Q1. Hurricanes Harvey and Irma made a major dent in Q3. A bounce in activity is underway in Q4, but we expect more than just a single quarter snapback. Instead, conditions are in place for an extended period of growth in residential investment. Low inventories, a rising homeownership rate, and a 12-year high in homebuilder sentiment, all support our bullish view (Chart 10). Inventories of unsold new and existing homes are near record lows (panel 2), and in many areas of the country, low inventories are limiting sales activity and pushing up prices. Homeownership rates are escalating again (panel 3), led by solid momentum in real disposable income, which in turn, and is a product of the booming labor market and rising wage inflation. Moreover, housing affordability will remain above average even if our forecast for a 2.8% 10-year Treasury yield is met (Chart 11). A 200 bps rise would push affordability below its long-term average for the first time in nine years. A more plausible path for rates would be a 100 bps increase in mortgage rates. Under this scenario, the affordability index would deteriorate, but remain a tailwind for the housing market. Chart 10Solid Housing##BR##Fundamentals In Place Chart 11Housing Affordability Under##BR##Various Rate Assumptions Housing investment is not only an important gauge of economic growth, but it also is the best leading indicator among all sectors. Construction of new homes and apartments, along with additions and alterations to existing stock, peaks as a share of GDP, on average seven quarters before the end of an expansion. Consumer spending on durable, nondurable and services reach a high five quarters before GDP hits a zenith, while business capital spending tops out six quarters ahead of the economy. There are risks for housing despite the upbeat fundamentals. Banks have been tightening their lending standards in recent quarters and an overtightening may impede the real estate market. A major change in the treatment of state and local real estate taxes and mortgage interest in the GOP tax plan may also negatively affect housing demand, particularly at the high end of the market. Additionally, rising foreign demand in certain U.S. markets may lead to mini-bubbles in coastal areas. The latest reading on the Case Shiller home price index showed housing prices up at the fastest rate in three years. A prolonged period of home price increases above income gains would challenge our sanguine view of housing affordability. However, the Fed and the banking system that it regulates are hyper-vigilant about excesses in the housing market, and it is unlikely that another housing bubble will be tolerated.6 Bottom Line: Housing is a reliable leading indicator of economic activity. Spending on new construction will add to growth in the coming year, allowing the economy to expand at a pace well above its long-term potential. Faster GDP growth will be accompanied by higher inflation and a more active Fed, especially relative to current market expectations. Moreover, a healthy housing market will continue to support solid consumer spending, the economy's largest and most important sector. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Outlook 2018, "Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course", November 20, 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?", August 16, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Managing The Risks", published October 2, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Mahedy, Tim and Shapiro, Adam, "What's Down With Inflation?", Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, November 27, 2017. http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2017/november/contribution-to-low-pce-inflation-from-healthcare/ 5 Minutes of The Federal Open Market Committee, May 4, 2004: https://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/20040504.htm 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Third Mandate," July 24, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Idea 1: Long Eurodollar, short Euribor - December 2022 interest rate futures contracts. Alternatively just go outright long the Eurodollar contract. Idea 2: Long EUR/USD Idea 3: Underweight Basic Materials equities versus market. Alternative expressions are to go short the LMEX index, or underweight Norway (OMX) versus Ireland (ISE). Idea 4: Long Norwegian 10-year bonds, short German 10-year bunds. Idea 5: Long U.K. 10-year gilts, short Irish 10-year bonds. Feature Question 1: Where Is The Worrying Imbalance? Last week, in the Quantum Theory Of Finance,1 we pointed out that when bond yields reach ultra-low levels, the payoff profile from bonds becomes highly asymmetric. When yields approach a lower bound, they cannot fall much further but they can rise a lot. Meaning that bond prices have very limited potential for gains, but have great potential for sudden and deep losses. Chart of the WeekThe Norway Versus Euro Area Bond Yield Spread Is Too Wide The unattractive asymmetric payoff profile - known as negative skew - applies to both nominal and real returns. This is because negative skew is concerned about deep nominal losses over a relatively short period. In which case, a deep nominal loss will be a deep real loss too.2 As equity returns always possess negative skew we can say that at ultra-low bond yields, bond risk becomes equity-like. Given this risk equalization, equities no longer justify a risk premium over bonds. And the lower prospective return required from equities means that today's equity valuations and prices become a lot richer. But the new delicate balance of valuations is conditional on bond yields remaining ultra-low. This is because the unattractive negative skew on a 10-year bond's returns disappears when its yield moves up into the 'high 2s' (Chart I-2). At this point, risk is no longer equalized and the equity risk premium must fully re-emerge - requiring today's equity market valuation and price to drop, perhaps substantially. However, the ensuing fight to havens would then once again pull bond yields back down from the 'high 2s'. It follows that the rise in expected interest rates is self-limiting. Any policy interest rate expectation already in the 'high 2s' - such as the Eurodollar December 2022 contract - cannot sustainably rise much further, whereas those that are still some way below - such as the Euribor December 2022 contract - can (Chart I-3). Which leads to our first investment idea. Chart I-2Bonds Become Much More ##br##Risky At Ultra-Low Yields Chart I-3The Euro Area/U.S. Interest Rate Expectation ##br##Spread Is Too Wide Investment idea 1: Long Eurodollar, short Euribor - December 2022 interest rate futures contracts. Alternatively just go outright long the Eurodollar contract. Question 2: Which Is The Safest Currency To Hold? Chart I-4Euro/Dollar Just Tracks ##br##The Bond Yield Spread To reiterate, at ultra-low bond yields, bond returns offer a highly unattractive payoff profile. Put simply, you can quickly lose a lot more money - in both nominal and real terms - than you can make! Now observe that the payoff profile for a foreign exchange rate just tracks the bond yield spread (Chart I-4). This means that when a central bank has already taken bond yields close to their lower bound, its currency possesses a highly attractive payoff profile called positive skew. In essence, as the ECB is at the realistic limit of ultra-loose policy, the direction of policy rate expectations cannot go significantly lower. Conversely, policy rate expectations for the Federal Reserve (for 2022) are not far from our upper bound of the 'high 2s'. So these expectations cannot go significantly higher without threatening a risk-asset selloff. On this basis, EUR/USD has more scope to gap up than to gap down. Investment idea 2: Long EUR/USD But be aware that investment ideas 1 and 2 are highly correlated with each other! Question 3: Where Are We In The Global Growth Mini-Cycle? Global growth experiences remarkably consistent - and therefore predictable - 'mini-cycles', with half-cycle lengths averaging 8 months. As the current mini-upswing started in May we can infer that it is likely to end in early 2018. So one surprise in 2018 could be that global growth slows in the first half rather than in the second half - contrary to what the consensus is expecting. That said, half-cycle lengths do have some degree of variation: the current upswing might be a few months longer or shorter than the average. So how can we avoid positioning too early or too late for the next turn? The answer is to focus on investments that have already fully priced the current upswing, so that timing becomes less of an issue. On this basis, we propose that the rally in industrial metals and Basic Materials equities is already extended. Our technical indicator which captures herding and groupthink correctly identified the trough at the end of 2015, the mini-peak at the end of 2016, and is now signalling that the latest rally is likely to fade (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-5Metals Have Fully Priced ##br##The Mini-Upswing... Chart I-6...And The Metal Rally Is Reaching##br## Its Technical Limit Investment idea 3: Underweight Basic Materials equities versus market. Alternative expressions are to go short the LMEX index, or underweight Norway (OMX) versus Ireland (ISE). Question 4: Will Inflation Lift Off? The ECB's continued indulgence with ultra-loose monetary policy would make you think that the euro area is on the edge of a deflationary abyss. In fact, inflation has been running comfortably within a 0-2% band for almost two years. Will inflation edge closer to the ECB's 2% point target? Given our view on the growth mini-cycle, not immediately. In the first half of 2018, inflation may even edge lower within the 0-2% band, but this global dynamic will affect inflation in all jurisdictions, not just in the euro area. There is nothing wrong with inflation running comfortably within a 0-2% band. Now that we know that nominal interest rates can go slightly negative, a 0-2% inflation band even permits negative real interest rates. The big mistake is to aim for an arbitrary point target, like 2%. This is because inflation is a non-linear phenomenon, and a defining characteristic of a non-linear phenomenon is that it cannot hit an arbitrary point target.3 It is our high conviction expectation that the major central banks will eventually change their point targets for inflation into target bands such as 0-2% or 1-3%. But afraid to lose credibility, they will not change tack abruptly. In the meantime, we notice that the Norges Bank is undershooting its 2.5% inflation target by considerably more than the ECB is undershooting its 2% target (Chart I-7). Yet the yield spread between Norwegian and euro area bonds has not caught up with this reality (Chart of the Week). Chart I-7The Norges Bank Is Undershooting Its Inflation Target By More Than The ECB Investment idea 4: Long Norwegian 10-year bonds, short German 10-year bunds. Question 5: Will Political Risk Re-emerge? Political events have had a hand in three of the sharpest recent moves in financial markets. The vote for Brexit catalysed a 15% decline in the pound; the vote for Trump triggered an 80 bps spike in the 10-year T-bond yield, and the vote for Macron unleashed a 10% rally in the euro. Political change disrupts markets if it dislocates the long-term expectations embedded in economic agents and financial prices. The vote for Brexit changed expectations about the U.K.'s long-term trading relationships; the election of Trump changed expectations about fiscal stimulus, the tax structure, and protectionism (perhaps unrealistically); and the election of Macron exorcised the potential chaos of a Le Pen presidency. Chart I-8The U.K. Versus Ireland Bond ##br##Yield Spread Is Too Wide In contrast, the recent (disputed) vote for independence in Catalonia, and the breakdown of coalition discussions in Germany barely moved the markets - because neither event changed expectations of long-term economic outcomes. As investors, this is the test we should apply to all political events. In 2018, the evolution of Brexit has the potential to move markets. This is because hard Brexiters and the EU27 are on a collision course. Specifically, the issue of the Irish border is insoluble. It is Brexit's Gordian knot. Theresa May has promised the hard Brexiters that the U.K. will leave the EU customs union and single market. She has also promised the Northern Ireland Unionists - who are propping up May's minority government - that there will be no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland or the rest of the U.K. But these promises are irreconcilable. The Republic of Ireland will veto a border that threatens the Good Friday peace agreement; the Northern Ireland Unionists will not tolerate the border moving to the Irish Sea, which would effectively take Northern Ireland into the EU customs union and single market; and the EU27 will block a Hong Kong type 'free port' status for Northern Ireland - as this would remove the integrity of harmonized standards across the EU. Eventually, the impenetrable Irish border problem is likely to be the roadblock to a hard Brexit. But first there needs to be a collision. And the collision could move markets. With the yield spread between U.K. 10-year gilts and Irish 10-year bonds near a 2-year wide (Chart I-8), this leads us to our fifth investment idea. Investment idea 5: Long U.K. 10-year gilts, short Irish 10-year bonds. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'The Quantum Theory Of Finance' November 23 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 For example if the nominal return over 3 months was a very painful -10%, and inflation was running at -10% per annum, the real return over 3 months would be a still very painful -7.5%. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'Three Mantras For Investors' August 17 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* Ahead of the OPEC meeting on November 30, the WTI crude oil price is vulnerable to any disappointment - because its rally is technically very extended. This week's trade recommendation is to expect a retracement of 7.5% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Chart I-9 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions.Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report Highlights Higher Treasury Yields: As core inflation returns to the Fed's target in 2018 the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will rise by at least 50 basis points and the nominal 10-year Treasury yield will move above 2.80%. This is substantially higher than the 1-year forward rate of 2.49%. Maintain a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. TIPS Over Nominal Treasuries: TIPS will outperform nominal Treasury securities in 2018 as long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates widen alongside rising core inflation. The passage of tax cuts in the first half of next year would speed up the adjustment in breakevens. Curve Steepeners, Then Flatteners: The slope of the yield curve is positively correlated with TIPS breakeven inflation rates. Look for mild curve steepening in the first half of 2018 as breakevens widen, transitioning to flattening once breakevens level-off around mid-year. The Cyclical Sweet Spot Comes To An End: The cyclical sweet spot of solid growth and low inflation that has been driving the outperformance of spread product will come to an end in 2018. The catalyst will be higher inflation. We will start paring exposure to spread product once long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates approach our target range of 2.4% to 2.5%, probably in the middle of next year. A Year Of Low Returns: Spreads are not that far from all-time expensive levels, meaning there is limited room for spread compression at this late stage of the credit cycle. Excess returns from spread product will be very similar to carry in 2018 - at least until inflation rises and it is time to prepare for a sustained period of spread widening. Feature BCA's Outlook for 2018 was published last week.1 That report laid out the macroeconomic themes that will impact markets during the next year. In this week's report we expand on those themes and discuss what they mean for U.S. fixed income markets specifically. We identify five key implications. Implication 1: Higher Yields One important theme for 2018 will be the resumption of the cyclical uptrend in inflation. As was stated in the Outlook: The historical evidence still suggests that once the labor market becomes tight, inflation eventually does accelerate. A broad range of data indicates that the U.S. labor market is indeed tight and the Atlanta Fed's wage tracker is in an uptrend, albeit modestly. Two other factors consistent with an end to disinflation are the lagged effects of dollar weakness and a firming in oil prices. Non-oil import prices have now moved decisively out of deflationary territory while oil prices in 2017 have averaged more than 20% above year-ago levels. Rising inflation mustn't necessarily translate into higher yields, but the Treasury market is not currently priced for the possibility that core inflation will ever re-gain the Fed's 2% target. Chart 1 shows the nominal 10-year Treasury yield split into its two main components: Chart 110-Year Treasury Yield Components The compensation for future inflation - proxied by the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate. The real 10-year Treasury yield - proxied by the 10-year TIPS yield. As has been stated repeatedly in this publication, in an environment where realized inflation is well-anchored around the Fed's 2% target the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has historically traded in a range between 2.4% and 2.5% (Chart 1, top panel). The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate currently sits at 1.84%. This means that by the time core inflation returns to the Fed's 2% target, a feat we think will be achieved in 2018, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will impart 56 to 66 basis points of upside to the nominal 10-year Treasury yield. It is possible that any increase in the compensation for inflation protection could be offset by falling real yields. However, it is highly unlikely that the 10-year real yield would decline while the Fed is hiking rates, unless there is a sharp downward adjustment in our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter2 (Chart 1, panel 2). On that front, the market is currently priced for between two and three rate hikes during the next 12 months. This expectation could be revised even higher in the near-term as inflation recovers, but that faster pace of rate hikes is unlikely to be sustained for any significant period of time. All in all, the discounter appears not that far from its fair value, meaning that the 10-year real yield should impart some modest additional upside to the 10-year nominal yield on a 6-12 month horizon. To summarize, if core inflation returns to the Fed's target in 2018, then the nominal 10-year Treasury yield will move into a range between 2.90% and 3.00% (Chart 1, bottom panel), conservatively assuming no additional upside or downside from real yields. This is substantially above the 1-year forward rate of 2.49%, and we therefore advocate a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. The Importance Of Synchronized Growth It was also observed in the Outlook that, according to the IMF, the median output gap for 20 advanced economies will shift from -0.1% in 2017 to +0.3% in 2018. If these forecasts pan out, then 2018 will also be the first year since the recession that more than 50% of those 20 economies have output gaps in positive territory. Meanwhile, the IMF estimates that the U.S. output gap has been essentially closed since 2015 (Chart 2). In other words, the U.S. has been leading the global economic recovery for the past few years but this is now starting to change. The rest of world is quickly catching up and the global economic recovery is now much more synchronized. This is critically important for U.S. bond yields because it lessens the impact of foreign inflows. For example, when U.S. growth was far outpacing growth in the rest of the world in 2014 and 2015, any increase in U.S. Treasury yields also widened the spread between U.S. yields and yields in the rest of the world. The wider gap encouraged foreign inflows to the U.S. bond market and limited how high U.S. yields could rise. Now, with the global economic recovery more synchronized, U.S. yields will have to increase by much more to have the same impact on the spread between U.S. yields and yields in the rest of the world. In our view this is an extremely bond-bearish development that often goes under-appreciated. Our 2-factor Treasury model attempts to quantify the impact of synchronized global growth on the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 3). The model uses Global Manufacturing PMI as its proxy for global growth, and bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar as a proxy for the synchronization of the global recovery - a less synchronized recovery should lead to increased bullishness toward the dollar and vice-versa. The model's current reading pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.69%. Chart 2Rest of World Playing Catch-Up Chart 32-Factor Treasury Model Bottom Line: As core inflation returns to the Fed's target in 2018 the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will rise by at least 50 basis points and the nominal 10-year Treasury yield will move above 2.80%. This is substantially higher than the 1-year forward rate of 2.49%. Maintain a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. Implication 2: TIPS Over Nominal Treasuries It should be obvious that if the forecasts in the prior section pan out then TIPS will substantially outperform nominal Treasury securities as breakeven inflation rates widen in 2018. In our opinion the low level of long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates represents the greatest source of medium-term value in U.S. bond markets. Chart 4Breakevens Biased Wider In addition, a wide range of indicators, such as our own Pipeline Inflation Indicator and the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge, already suggest that breakevens are biased wider (Chart 4). With the Fed engaged in a rate hike cycle, evidence of price pressures in the realized inflation data will be required before breakevens see significant upside. Our base case forecast is that the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate will reach our target range of 2.4% to 2.5% around the same time that core PCE inflation reaches 2%, probably in the middle of next year. However, there is one political risk that could speed up that adjustment. Namely, if Congress manages to pass tax cuts in the first half of 2018. From the Outlook: The U.S. tax system is desperately in need of reform [...]. However, the economy does not need stimulus from net tax giveaways given that it is operating close to potential. That would simply boost demand relative to supply, create overheating, and give the Fed more reason to get aggressive. The Republican's initial tax plan has some good elements of reform such as cutting back the personal mortgage interest deduction, eliminating some other deductions and making it less attractive for companies to shift operations overseas. However, many of these proposals are unlikely to survive the lobbying efforts of special interest groups. The net result probably will be tax giveaways without much actual reform. [...] There inevitably will be contentious negotiations in Congress but we assume that the Republicans will eventually come together to pass some tax cuts by early next year. Fiscal stimulus from tax cuts at this late stage of the cycle would be very inflationary, and judging by the sharp increase in TIPS breakevens that followed President Trump's election last November, the market has already figured this out. The passage of a tax bill early next year would no doubt speed up the return of long-maturity TIPS breakevens to our target range. Bottom Line: TIPS will outperform nominal Treasury securities in 2018 as long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates widen alongside rising core inflation. The passage of tax cuts in the first half of next year would speed up the adjustment in breakevens. Implication 3: Curve Steepeners, Then Flatteners Another recommendation that follows from rising inflation is that the yield curve will steepen as long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates rise. We have previously observed that changes in the slope of the 2/10 Treasury curve are positively correlated with changes in the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate. Crucially, this positive correlation remains intact even when the Fed is hiking rates.3 In the current rate hike cycle (which started in December 2015) we observe that monthly changes in the 2/10 nominal Treasury slope have been positively correlated with monthly changes in the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rate in 22 out of 24 months (Chart 5). It stands to reason that we should expect the yield curve to steepen as TIPS breakevens rise. Chart 52/10 Nominal Treasury Slope Vs. TIPS Breakeven Inflation Rate 5-Year/5-Year Forward ##br##(December 2015 - Present) However, we caution that curve steepening is probably only a story for the first half of 2018. Steepening will transition to flattening once long-dated TIPS breakevens reach our 2.4% to 2.5% target range, and in the meantime, there is a limit to how steep the yield curve can get. Let's assume that the Fed's median projection of a 3% terminal fed funds rate is reasonably accurate. It follows that the 10-year Treasury yield is unlikely to rise much above 3% before the end of the recovery. We can also calculate what the 2-year Treasury yield will be under different scenarios for the fed funds rate and the 2-year/fed funds slope. The latter can be thought of as simply the number of rate hikes the market expects during the subsequent two years. With these assumptions we can craft scenarios for where the 2/10 Treasury slope will be under different conditions, and these scenarios are presented in Table 1. The shaded cells in Table 1 are the scenarios that cause the 2/10 Treasury slope to steepen from its current level of 59 bps. Table 1Scenarios For The Number Of Fed Rate Hikes By ##br##The Time That Inflation Returns To Target For example, by the time that inflation recovers to the Fed's 2% target, the nominal 10-year Treasury yield will most likely be in a range between 2.8% and 3.25%. If the Fed only delivers two rate hikes between now and then it is very likely that the yield curve will steepen. This is shown in the section of Table 1 labelled "2 Rate Hikes". However, if the Fed lifts rates four times between now and the time that inflation returns to target, then it is much more likely that the 2/10 curve will flatten. These scenarios are shown in the top three rows of Table 1. The message is that the order of events matters. In our base case scenario, inflation starts to recover early next year and long-dated TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach our 2.4% to 2.5% target by mid-2018. At that point it is quite likely that the Fed will have only hiked rates a couple of times and the curve will have steepened. More rapid rate hikes, however, would severely limit the amount of potential steepening. We continue to advocate positioning for 2/10 steepening via a long position in the 5-year bullet versus a short position in the duration-matched 2/10 barbell. At present, the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is priced for 4 bps of 2/10 curve flattening during the next six months, so even mild curve steepening will lead to outperformance during that timeframe.4 We will shift from curve steepeners to flatteners once TIPS breakevens return to our target range. Bottom Line: The slope of the yield curve is positively correlated with TIPS breakeven inflation rates. Look for mild curve steepening in the first half of 2018 as breakevens recover, transitioning to flattening once breakevens re-normalize around mid-year. Implication 4: The Cyclical Sweet Spot Comes To An End From the Outlook: The perfect environment for markets has been moderate economic growth, low inflation and easy money. [...] We are assuming that growth is strong enough to encourage central banks to keep moving away from hyper-easy policies, setting up for a collision with markets. If growth slows enough that recession fears spike, then that also would be bad for risk assets. Sustaining the bull market requires a goldilocks growth outcome of not too hot and not too cold. Chart 6The "Fed Put" Is Still In Place This publication has named that goldilocks environment the "cyclical sweet spot" for risk assets. Essentially, as long as inflation is below the Fed's target, the Fed must respond to any economic weakness (or tightening of financial conditions) by adopting a more accommodative policy stance. The market knows that this "Fed put" is in place and that makes it very difficult to get a meaningful sell-off. In fact, the last major sell-off in corporate credit (in 2014/15) only occurred because the market assumed that the Fed would not deviate from its projected rate hike path even though commodity prices were plunging, causing defaults in certain exposed industry groups. Notice in Chart 6 that our 24-month Fed Funds Discounter stayed flat as spreads widened. Spreads only tightened in early 2016 after the Fed capitulated. So under what conditions will the "Fed put" disappear? Logically, if inflation were much higher the Fed would be less inclined to support markets at any sign of trouble. This is the reason that, while we remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries for now, we expect the cyclical sweet spot for spreads will come to an end next year. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates approaching our target range of 2.4% to 2.5% will be the first signal that it is time to pare exposure. The importance of supportive monetary policy for spread product performance is also evident when looking at our three favorite credit cycle indicators (Chart 7). Historically, three conditions must be met before a sustained period of spread widening can occur. Chart 7Credit Cycle Indicators Our Corporate Health Monitor must be in "deteriorating health" territory (Chart 7, panel 2). Fed policy must be restrictive. This can be proxied by an inverted yield curve, or a real fed funds rate above its estimated equilibrium level (Chart 7, panels 3 & 4). Bank Commerical & Industrial lending standards must be in "net tightening" territory (Chart 7, bottom panel). For the time being only corporate health is sending a negative signal, but once inflation recovers we will be at increasing risk of monetary conditions turning restrictive. Tighter lending standards tend to follow restrictive monetary policy with a short lag. Bottom Line: The cyclical sweet spot of solid growth and low inflation that has been driving the outperformance of spread product will come to an end in 2018. The catalyst will be higher inflation. We will start paring exposure to spread product once long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates approach our target range of 2.4% to 2.5%, probably in the middle of next year. Implication 5: A Year Of Low Returns From the Outlook: Our estimates indicate that a balanced portfolio will deliver average returns of only 3.3% a year over the coming decade, or 1.3% after inflation. That is down from the 4% and 1.9% nominal and real annual returns that we estimated a year ago, reflecting the current more adverse starting point for valuations. Heading into 2018 almost all U.S. spread product sectors are indeed faced with a more adverse starting point for valuations. Chart 8 compares today's option-adjusted spread (OAS) with the OAS at the end of 2016 for seven major spread products. With the exception of MBS, all sectors currently have lower spreads than at they did at the beginning of 2017. Chart 8Less Value In Spread Product Starting valuation is only one component of excess returns. Capital gains/losses from the change in spreads is the other. However, the deeper we move into the credit cycle the less room there is for further spread compression. In fact, we have previously calculated that the average spread for the investment grade Corporate bond index can only tighten another 35 bps before it reaches all-time expensive levels. This represents only 3 months of historical average spread tightening. The same calculation for the High-Yield index shows that the spread can only tighten another 145 bps, representing 4 months of average tightening.5 In other words, there is not much potential for spread compression at this late stage of the credit cycle and excess returns will be very similar to carry in 2018 - at least until inflation rises and it is time to prepare for a sustained period of spread widening. Chart 9 shows annualized 2017 year-to-date excess returns for each sector alongside projected excess returns for 2018 under two scenarios. The "flat spread" scenario assumes that spreads stay flat at current levels, while the "optimistic" scenario assumes that spreads tighten to all-time expensive valuation levels. Chart 92018 Excess Return Projections For investment grade corporate bonds even this extremely optimistic scenario would only provide excess returns of 363 bps, just 121 bps above this year's likely returns. For High-Yield, the optimistic scenario would provide excess returns of 637 bps, a mere 148 bps above this year's likely returns. For consumer ABS and domestic Agency bonds, the projections from our optimistic scenario do not even surpass this year's likely excess returns. Bottom Line: Spreads are not that far from all-time expensive levels, meaning there is limited room for spread compression at this late stage of the credit cycle. Excess returns from spread product will be very similar to carry in 2018 - at least until inflation rises and it is time to prepare for a sustained period of spread widening. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Outlook 2018, "Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course", dated November 20, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter measures the number of rate hikes priced into the overnight index swap curve for the next 12 months. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For further details on our yield curve models and how we calculate the amount of steepening/flattening priced into the butterfly spread please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 These numbers refer to the spread tightening necessary to reach all-time lows on the 12-month breakeven spread for each index. We calculate the 12-month breakeven spread as OAS divided by duration. Fixed Income Sector Performance