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Asset Allocation

Special Report Highlights Risk Budgeting: We are introducing a more formal risk measurement element to our model global bond portfolio. This is to identify if our individual views are potentially creating too much volatility, in aggregate, but also as a way to express the conviction of our individual recommendations through allocation of a "risk budget". Tracking Error Of Our Portfolio: We are setting our maximum allowable tracking error, or excess volatility of our portfolio versus our benchmark index, at 100 basis points. Our current tracking error is just under ½ of that limit. We estimate that our highest conviction views at the moment - staying below-benchmark on duration risk, overweighting U.S. corporates, underweighting both U.S. Treasuries and Italian government debt - contribute nearly 4/5ths of our overall portfolio tracking error. Feature Last September, we introduced a model portfolio framework to Global Fixed Income Strategy.1 This was done to better communicate our investment research into actionable ideas more in line with the day-to-day decisions and trade-offs made by professional bond managers. We followed that up with the addition of performance measurement tools to more accurately track the returns of our model bond portfolio versus a stated benchmark.2 We are now initiating the final piece of our model bond portfolio framework in this Special Report - introducing a risk management component to identify cumulative exposures and guide the relative sizes of our suggested tilts. Our goal is to translate our individual investment recommendations into the language of a "risk budget", i.e. how much of the desired volatility of the portfolio would we suggest placing into any single trade idea. This will allow our readers to apply our proposed tilts - based on how much conviction (i.e. "risk") we allocate to each position - to their own portfolios which may have different risk limits and return expectations. For example, our current recommendation to overweight U.S. corporate debt, both Investment Grade (IG) and High-Yield (HY) represents nearly 1/3 of our estimated total portfolio risk, by far our largest source of potential volatility both in absolute terms and versus our benchmark index (Table 1). Overweighting U.S. corporates, both versus U.S. Treasuries and Euro Area equivalents, is one of our highest conviction trades at the moment. A client who may choose to run a lower risk portfolio can still follow our recommendation by placing enough into U.S. corporates so that 33% of the desired portfolio volatility will come from those positions. Table 1Risk Allocation In Our Model Bond Portfolio In the rest of this Special Report, we will discuss some of the various ways to measure fixed income portfolio risk, apply them to our model portfolio, and introduce some measures to monitor our aggregate portfolio volatility. Going forward, we will closely watch our established metrics and position sizes to ensure that the combination of our individual investment recommendations that we discuss on a week-to-week basis does not create a portfolio that is potentially more volatile than desired. Risk Measurement In Fixed Income Portfolios While investors are typically focused on meeting return targets for their portfolios, the other side of the equation - managing portfolio volatility - is often less stressed. This is especially true during bull markets for any asset class. Investors may become complacent if returns meet or exceed their targets when, in fact, excess returns may have actually been earned through overly risky positions that could have easily not worked in the investors' favor. In the current macro environment, where many financial asset prices are at new highs with stretched valuations and with most of the major global central banks incrementally moving towards less accommodative monetary policy stances, risk management should be even more important for investors. Overly concentrated positioning could now lead to considerable portfolio losses, especially if measuring risk with a metric that is flawed or incomplete, which can lead to a false sense of security. With that in mind, we consider some typical risk measurement metrics used by fixed income investors: Duration: Duration is usually the most popular risk metric for fixed income portfolios as it measures interest rate sensitivity. Duration is defined as the percentage change in a portfolio or asset resulting from a one percentage point change in interest rates. While it provides a solid base understanding of interest rate risk, it does make a simplifying assumption that there is a linear relationship between interest rates and bond prices. Value-At-Risk: Value-At-Risk (VaR) is a statistical technique that measures the loss of an investment, or of an entire portfolio, over a certain period with a given level of confidence. However, there are two considerable flaws with this approach. First, the VaR output suggests a portfolio can lose at least X%, it does not actually indicate how big the potential loss could be. Instead, using a measure such as Historical VaR, if a portfolio has a long enough track record, can better quantify potential losses. Second, VaR is highly susceptible to estimation errors. Certain assumptions on correlations and the normality of return distributions can have a substantial impact on VaR readings. Table 2Value At Risk Of Our Benchmark In Table 2, we show the Historical VaR (HVAR) of our benchmark index, calculating the potential monthly loss using data going back to 2005. On that basis, the worst expected monthly loss for our benchmark is -1.6% (using a 95% confidence interval) and -2.1% (using a 99% confidence interval). Tracking Error: Tracking error measures the volatility of excess returns relative to a certain benchmark. It is a standard risk measure used by a typical "real money" bond manager with a benchmark performance index, like a mutual fund. Tracking error does not offer information on alpha generation (i.e. how much you can expect to beat your benchmark based on your current investments), it simply indicates how much more volatile a portfolio is expected to be versus its benchmark. As our model portfolio returns are measured on a relative basis to our stated bond benchmark index, tracking error is quite appropriate as our main risk metric. A Historical Examination Of Our Portfolio When we first created our model portfolio, we also introduced a benchmark index against which we could measure our performance. Our customized benchmark differs from typical multi-sector measures like the Barclays Global Aggregate Index in that it has a broader scope, including sectors that can have credit ratings below investment grade such as High Yield corporates. The benchmark does, however, exclude smaller regions that we only occasionally discuss such as Sweden, Portugal, Norway and New Zealand. These smaller markets offer comparatively poor liquidity and we want our benchmark to be as investible as possible. Nevertheless, our customized benchmark has been highly correlated to the Barclays Global Aggregate Index over the past decade. As our portfolio has not had a full year of return data, its history is quite limited. Still, in our first performance review conducted two months ago, we indicated that our portfolio had been very closely tracking our customized benchmark. We have since increased our positions in our highest conviction views and our tracking error has risen noticeably and now sits at just over 40bps (Chart 1). Within our model portfolio, we are setting an expected excess return target of 100bps per year. That means that we are setting a goal of beating our benchmark index returns by one full percentage point per year. Given that we are measuring our performance versus currency-hedged benchmarks that are primarily rated investment grade or better, 100bps of annual excess return is a reasonable target. We are also setting a limit where the excess return/tracking error ratio should aim to be equal to 1 each year. This is under the simple assumption that we want an equal amount of return over our benchmark for our expected excess volatility versus our benchmark. On that basis, we are setting our tracking error "limit" at 100bps per year. That suggests that our current tracking error is relatively low. However, correlations between the individual components of our benchmark index have been rising over the past couple of years (Chart 2). Therefore, running a relatively low overall level of risk at a time where diversification among the positions within our portfolio is now harder to achieve, and when the valuations on most government bond and credit markets look rich, is prudent. Chart 1Higher Tracking Error, But Still Well Below Our Target Chart 2Correlations Across Fixed Income Sectors Have Been Rising This is another way that we can control the overall riskiness of our model portfolio. Not only by how much of our risk budget (tracking error) that we want to allocate to each of our recommended positions, but also how big of a risk budget do we want to run at any given point in time. If we see more assets trading at cheap valuations, then we could choose to run a higher tracking error than when most assets look expensive. Bottom Line: We are introducing a more formal risk measurement element to our model global bond portfolio. This is to identify if our individual views are potentially creating too much volatility, in aggregate, but also as a way to express the conviction of our individual recommendations through allocation of a "risk budget". We are setting our maximum allowable tracking error, or excess volatility of our portfolio versus our benchmark index, at 100 basis points. Measuring The Contribution To Risk From Our Market Tilts In our model portfolio, we include a wide range of geographies and sectors from the global fixed income universe. Understanding the risk contribution of each position to the overall portfolio provides a clearer picture as to where our potential risks lie, and by how much. To measure the risk contribution of each of our individual recommendations to our overall portfolio volatility, we used the following formula: wA * E CovAB * wB Where W = the weight of any single asset in our portfolio and COV is the covariance between the asset and other assets in the portfolio. As such, an asset's contribution to risk is a function of its weight in the portfolio and its covariance with the other assets. Importantly, since we are measuring our model portfolio performance in terms of excess returns, we examined each position's contribution to risk relative to the benchmark. All calculations begin in late 2005, when return data is available for all of the assets in our portfolio. The results are summarized in Table 1 on Page 1. Our portfolio tilts are based off of our four highest conviction themes. They include: Stronger global growth led by the U.S. The U.S. economy should expand at a faster pace in the latter half of the year on the back of a rebound in consumption and strong capital spending, all supported by solid income growth and easy financial conditions. We have expressed this theme through our overweight allocation to U.S. corporate debt. While our U.S. Corporate Health Monitor is flashing that balance sheets are becoming increasingly strained, easy monetary conditions and an expansionary economic backdrop should continue to support excess returns for U.S. corporates. More Fed rate hikes than expected. We expect U.S. economic and corporate profit growth to remain robust due to accommodative monetary conditions, diminishing slack and resilient consumption. As such, the Fed will continue tightening policy by more than what markets are currently pricing in. This theme is expressed through an underweight position in U.S. Treasuries, which accounts for 17% of our volatility versus 24% for that of the benchmark. This wide spread relative to the benchmark is a substantial source of our tracking error, but one that we are comfortable running given our view that U.S. Treasury yields are too low. Chart 3Realized Bond Volatility Has Been Declining Rising tapering risks in Europe. Our expectation is that the European Central Bank (ECB) will be forced to announce a slower pace (tapering) of bond buying starting next year, given the current robust economic expansion in Europe that is rapidly absorbing spare capacity. An ECB taper announcement is expected to lead to rising longer-term global bond yields, mostly via rising term premia. We are expressing that view in our portfolio through our overall underweight interest rate duration stance. Our current portfolio duration is 5.6 years versus our benchmark duration of 7.0 years. That is a large tilt that represents a significant portion of our tracking error, but given our view that U.S. Treasuries also look overvalued, running a large overall duration underweight does correlate to our conviction level. Rising geopolitical risks and banking sector issues in Italy. Geopolitical risks remain elevated leading up to parliamentary elections in 2018, and Italian banks remain undercapitalized with non-performing loans still in an uptrend. Therefore, we are underweight Italian debt, though this is a smaller deviation of portfolio risk versus our benchmark (around 2%), given the smaller size of Italy in our benchmark. Purely looking at geography and sector selection, our four highest conviction views make up almost 80% of the active portfolio risk that we are "running" in our model portfolio. That number may seem high but, as described earlier, our realized portfolio volatility has been quite low (Chart 3). That suggests that there could be some degree of underlying diversification within our recommended portfolio given lower correlations of certain assets to the rest of the portfolio. This is a topic that we will investigate more deeply in future Weekly Reports. Bottom Line: We estimate that our highest conviction views at the moment - staying below-benchmark on duration risk, overweighting U.S. corporates, underweighting both U.S. Treasuries and Italian government debt - contribute nearly 4/5ths of our overall portfolio tracking error. Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Introducing Our Recommended Global Fixed Income Portfolio", dated September 20 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "An Initial Look At The Performance Of Our Model Bond Portfolio", dated April 18 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Table 4
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The rally in the S&P restaurants index has run its course and a profit recovery is fully discounted. Lock in profits and downgrade to neutral. Intensified inter-industry competition, the onslaught of online retailers and a rebounding U.S. economy are stiff headwinds for hypermarket stocks. Sell positions down to neutral. Recent Changes S&P Restaurants - Downgrade to neutral, booking profits of 11%. S&P Hypermarkets - Downgrade to neutral. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 remained resilient in the face of the fourth Fed interest rate hike and the drubbing in the tech sector. The latter is notable given that a select few stocks have contributed roughly one quarter of the overall market's gains this year, and signals that money is not leaving equities en masse, but is merely rotating into other sectors. This suggests that consolidation rather than correction is the main watchword. Our view remains that stocks are in a sweet spot: a lack of inflation pressures has kept long-term interest rates at bay, despite decent economic momentum and rising corporate profits. The latter have been driven by impressive corporate pricing power gains (see Chart 1 from last week's Weekly Report), creating an ideal equity market scenario whereby the business sector can grow profits without any corresponding consumer price inflation pressures. Investors are likely to extrapolate this goldilocks equity scenario for a while longer, given that our Reflation Gauge (RG), a combination of oil prices, Treasury yields and the U.S. dollar, has exploded to the highest level since 2010 and just shy of all-time highs. The RG leads both the U.S. economic surprise index and equity sentiment (Chart 1). If economic activity begins to reaccelerate, as we expect and irrespective of tax reform success, the window is open for additional equity market gains. Meanwhile, the mini sector rotation that commenced two weeks ago is a healthy development and may not be a precursor to a more vicious and widespread correction. In recent Weekly Reports, we have shown that our Equity Market Internal Dynamics Indicator was signaling that upward momentum in the broad market was well supported by the character of market participation (see Chart 2 from the May 15th Weekly Report). Chart 1Coiled Spring Chart 2Healthy Rotation Chart 2 shows that lately the small/large ratio has sprung back to life. Growth/value stalled near the previous all-time peak, and capital has flowed out of frothy tech stocks and into the cheaper and more economic-sensitive financials sector. Against a backdrop of a budding rebound in domestic economic data, this recent market rotation is likely to stay intact. That view is corroborated by the collapse in correlations among stocks and overall assets. The CBOE's implied correlation index has fallen to fresh cyclical lows, which suggests that investors have become increasingly discerning and that earnings fundamentals/valuations should become the primary drivers of stock market returns. Keep in mind that empirical evidence shows that receding stock correlations also underpin the broad equity market (top & bottom panels, Chart 2). All of these fluctuations signal that the broad equity market is more likely to build a base before it resumes its advance to new cyclical highs, rather than suffer an imminent and major correction. As such, we continue to slowly and deliberately recalibrate our portfolio away from its previously heavy bias toward defensives. This week we make two consumer-related shifts. Restaurants: Beware Of Heartburn One quarter ago we posited that the consolidation phase in the broad consumer discretionary sector restored value and created an attractive entry point. Washed out technicals and an upswing in industry earnings fundamentals supported our thesis (Chart 3). An upgrade in the S&P restaurants sub-index to overweight provided an attractive way to execute that thesis. This view has largely played out, as restaurant shares have bested the market by double digits since March 20th. Is there any more upside left to this impressive quarterly relative return? We doubt it. While we remain constructive on the overall consumer discretionary sector (Chart 4), we recommend crystalizing gains of 11% in the S&P restaurants index and downshifting to neutral. Chart 3Stay ##br##The Course... Chart 4...As Our Consumer Drag ##br## Indicator Is Flashing Green Q1 industry conference calls revealed that improved store traffic and better offerings boosted same-store sales, and relative share prices followed suit from a technically depressed level. That caused sell side analysts to modestly lift relative EPS forecasts, but a valuation re-rating still explains the bulk of the stock price surge (Chart 5). We are reluctant to pay a 40% premium to the broad market on a 12-month forward P/E basis. The National Restaurant Association's Restaurant Performance Index fell to the boom/bust 100 line and downside momentum has accelerated (second panel, Chart 5). Worrisomely, the Current Situation Index (not shown) of the same survey was in the contraction zone for "the sixth time in the last seven months". Similarly, the Expectations Index also decelerated, heralding an uncertain dining outlook. Indeed, demand for away from home dining is on the decline in absolute terms and compared with overall retail sales and consumption (middle panel, Chart 6). This suggests that the first quarter increase in store traffic may not be sustainable (top panel, Chart 6). The recent spike in restaurant construction expenditures will further dilute same-store sales growth opportunities (bottom panel, Chart 6). Chart 5Too Expensive Chart 6Do Not Overstay Your Welcome Leading indicators of profit margins have also eroded. An uptick in commodity input costs and 8% growth in the industry's wage bill, stand in marked contrast with anemic industry pricing power. Our restaurants profit margin gauge captures all of these forces and warns that a squeeze looms (Chart 7). Nevertheless, it is not all bad news. The improvement in consumer finances should counterbalance some of the casual dining industry's deficient demand hiccups. Rising household net worth makes consumers feel wealthier, and therefore increases their marginal propensity to spend. Importantly, the $15-$35K income cohort also expects a sizable boost to their take home pay, according to the latest Conference Board survey data (not shown). Importantly, the earnings headwind from foreign sales exposure has likely morphed into a profit tailwind. U.S. dollar softness is not only evident against G10 currencies, but also emerging market (EM) FX rates (Chart 8). In addition, healthy EM domestic demand is the mirror image of fickle U.S. final demand. EM central banks are easing monetary policy - whereas the Fed hiked for a fourth time this cycle last week - in order to rekindle EM consumer spending/growth. As a result, EM restaurant sales should improve (Chart 8). Chart 7Rising Input Costs ##br##Are Eating Into Margins Chart 8Export ##br## Relief Valve In sum, the playable rally in the S&P restaurants index has run its course and a profit recovery is fully priced in frothy valuations. The V-shaped rebound in share prices has outpaced fundamental improvements, and a consolidation/corrective phase is inevitable. Bottom Line: While we remain overweight the S&P consumer discretionary sector, we recommend booking profits of 11% in the S&P restaurants index (MCD, SBUX, YUM, DRI, CMG), and moving to a benchmark allocation. Time To Downgrade Hypermarkets While investors have shed anything retail related year-to-date (YTD), big box retailers have been a positive exception. In fact, the S&P hypermarkets index has been a stalwart performer YTD, outshining both the broad consumer staples universe and the overall market. Is this impressive run-up sustainable? The short answer is no. Three main headwinds suggest that some caution is warranted now that index outperformance has eliminated the previous valuation appeal: soft pricing power likely further aggravated by new German competitors expanding in/entering the U.S. market, the ongoing assault from online retailers and the improving U.S. economy, especially consumer spending. These factors imply that profit margins will remain under chronic pressure, but concerns could become more acute on a cyclical basis. Consumer goods import prices have surged in recent months (Chart 9), and the depreciating U.S. dollar is likely to sustain this uptrend. Cutthroat competition means that retailers will likely absorb these rising costs, to the detriment of profit margins. While food prices are making an effort to exit the deflation zone, ALDI and Lidl, two deep-pocketed German competitors are entering the U.S. retail scene, reportedly with massive expansion plans. Tesco, Sainsbury's and ASDA in the U.K., Carrefour in Europe and Woolworth's and Coles in Australia continue to feel the wrath of German retailers. Consequently, it would be dangerous to extrapolate the nascent improvement in retail food CPI. All of this is likely to sustain the profit margin squeeze (Chart 9). Further, the online retail onslaught will continue to escalate. The Amazon juggernaut appears unstoppable. The latest news that it will take over Whole Foods Market confirms that even grocery sales are now seriously on its radar screen. Chart 10 shows that non-store retail sales continue to grow at a much faster pace than traditional retailers. The greater the market share gains for online retailers, the larger the downward pressure on hypermarkets relative profitability (relative retail sales shown inverted, second panel, Chart 10). Chart 9Margin Pressures Chart 10Beware Online Retailers' Onslaught Under such a tough operating backdrop we are reluctant to pay a premium valuation for this safe haven sector. Worrisomely, soft revenue growth argues against a further a valuation re-rating (Chart 11). Finally, macro forces required to spur better revenue no longer exist. The U.S. economy has entered a self-reinforcing recovery. While personal consumption expenditures have underwhelmed of late, buoyant job certainty and a vibrant housing market are boosting consumer confidence. Before long, consumers should loosen their purse strings and indulge anew. Historically, a lively consumer spending backdrop has been inversely correlated with relative share prices (PCE is shown inverted, Chart 12). Similarly, Federal tax coffers have started to refill following a one year hiatus (bottom panel, Chart 12). The implication is that incomes and profits are expanding, boosting the incentive for consumers to "trade up" and shop at higher ticket stores. Nevertheless, some partial offsets exist. The lower income consumer is the industry's main clientele and low interest rates, low gasoline prices and soaring income confidence for this consumer cohort should cushion store traffic woes (third panel, Chart 13). Chart 11Derating ##br## Warning Chart 12Improving Economy = ##br## Bad Omen For Hypermarkets Chart 13Positive ##br##Offsets Meanwhile, the overall retail sales price deflator has tentatively troughed, albeit it continues to deflate. Given the high volume nature of the hypermarket industry, any small positive change in pricing power tends to have a meaningful impact on sales growth (second panel, Chart 13). Multi-year highs in overall income growth signals that on average consumers will have more disposable income. The bottom panel of Chart 13 shows that income growth has been a reliable indicator for hypermarket EPS. Adding it up, this is an opportune time to book modest profits and downgrade exposure in the S&P hypermarkets index to neutral. Intensified inter-industry competition, the onslaught of online retailers and a rebounding U.S. economy argue against extrapolating recent optimism far into the future. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P hypermarkets index to a benchmark allocation (WMT, COST). Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.
Highlights The Federal Reserve stuck to its guns, which lifted the U.S. dollar despite a disastrous CPI report. We agree with the Fed's assessment and expect U.S. inflation to pick up, clearing the way for higher interest rates and a stronger dollar. With three dissenters voting in favor of higher rates, the Bank of England meeting delivered a hawkish surprise. However, the inflation surge will continue to weigh on consumer spending, limiting the capacity of the BoE to increase rates. Stay short cable, but use any rally in EUR/GBP above 0.88 to short this cross. The Canadian economy is strong, and the CAD should perform well on its crosses. However, USD/CAD downside is limited. Go short EUR/SEK. Feature This week was replete with central bank meetings, most crucially the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, which provided much-needed color on the near-term future direction of global monetary policy. While the BoE does face a serious rise in inflation, it is still focused on the risks to U.K. growth. In contrast, the Fed mostly ignored the disastrous inflation report released the morning before its policy announcement and kept its focus on the underlying strength in the U.S. economy. We believe both institutions are pursuing the appropriate strategy for their respective economies. The Fed: Straight Ahead Fed Chair Janet Yellen and her gang increased the fed funds rate by 25 basis points to 1-1.25% and pre-announced the parameters around the reduction in the Fed's balance sheet size. On the balance sheet front, the Fed removed any doubt that it will begin reducing its asset holdings this year. Additionally, the Fed provided its new set of forecasts for growth, inflation, unemployment, and interest rates. While it increased its growth forecast for 2017 to 2.2% from 2.1%, it curtailed its core PCE deflator forecast for 2017 by 0.3 percentage points to 1.6%. However, in line with its conviction that the soft patch in inflation is temporary, it kept its 2018 and 2019 core PCE forecasts at 2%. The Fed did also acknowledge that the equilibrium unemployment rate was lower than it believed in March, decreasing its long-term estimate by 0.1% to 4.6%. However, despite recognizing that NAIRU has fallen, the Fed still thinks the labor market is tight. It proceeded to curtail its unemployment rate forecasts by 0.2% in 2017 to 4.3%, and by 0.3% in 2018 and 2019 to 4.2%. Congruent with these forecasts, the Fed did not adjust its intended path for interest rates. It still expects to hike rates once more in 2017, and three more times in both 2018 and 2019. As a result of these policy changes and the intentions associated with the new set of forecasts, the dollar recouped its CPI report-induced decline, and gold suffered. Most interestingly, the market seems to believe that the Fed is entering the realm of policy mistakes as the 2-10-year yield curve flattened considerably, and inflation expectations plunged to their lowest levels since November 4, 2016 (Chart I-1). But is the Fed really making a mistake? We do not think so. Simply put, we agree with the Fed that underlying economic momentum in the U.S. is real, and that both wage growth and inflation will turn the corner this summer. To begin with, our composite capacity utilization gauge, based on both industrial capacity and labor market utilization, is now fully into "no slack" territory. Historically, this has given the Fed the green light to increase interest rates. There is no mystery behind this relationship: when this indicator is above the zero line, inflation pressures emerge and wage growth accelerates (Chart I-2). This time is unlikely to prove different. Chart I-1A Policy ##br##Mistake? Chart I-2Conditions In Place For Higher##br## Inflation And Rates Supporting this assessment, many indicators show that the recent slowdown in wage growth will prove a temporary phenomenon. First, the spread between the Conference Board's "jobs plentiful" and "jobs hard to get" series still points to accelerating average hourly earnings (Chart I-3). Second, the labor market is likely to remain healthy. True, the fastest pace of job creation is behind us, a key symptom that labor market slack is vanishing, but some of our favorite employment indicators - such as Janet Yellen's labor market condition index and the NFIB job openings and hiring plans subcomponents - have picked up again (Chart I-4). In an environment of little slack, this might not translate into impressive nonfarm payroll numbers, but most likely faster wage growth. Chart I-3Wages Will Pick Up Chart I-4Yes, The Labor Market Is Healthy Third, capex intentions are still perky. Historically, capex intentions have tightly correlated with wages, and even the recent softness in wages was forecast by these intentions. This is simply because capex tends to require labor. When corporate investment materializes as worries about the durability of final demand hits cyclical lows, this is generally an environment that requires bidding up the price of labor - i.e. wages. This is precisely the current economic backdrop (Chart I-5). While the slowdown in bank credit to enterprises has caused many commentators to worry about the outlook for capex, we do not share these concerns. For one, although businesses may not have been tapping bank loans in Q1, they have been aggressively borrowing in the bond market (Chart I-6, top panel). Moreover, credit standards are now easing anew, and small firms are reporting little difficulty in accessing credit (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-5Good Outlook For Growth And Wages Chart I-6I Need Credit; No Problem! With respect to consumption, weren't retail sales on the soft side as well? Here again, we need to step back. Real retail sales continue to grow at a healthy 4.2% annual pace; meanwhile, the so-called control group - which affects GDP computations - was flat in May, but the April number was revised to 0.6% month-on-month, suggesting real consumption will be robust in Q2. In fact, federal income tax withholdings, a good proxy for household income growth, is also accelerating, further supporting consumption (Chart I-7). Overall, we agree with the Fed that the economy is on its way to escaping from its recent soft patch and that wage growth will accelerate. Ryan Swift, who writes our sister U.S. Bond Strategy service, has also recently argued that the U.S. Philips curve remains alive and well, and that wages and inflation will thus pick up again.1 Our own work does highlight the potential for not just wage growth but core CPI to also perk up. U.S. real business sales have been very strong of late, which historically has been a good leading indicator of core inflation (Chart I-8, top panel). Labor market dynamics tell a similar story. Our unemployment diffusion index is also a good leader of core CPI, and after a soft patch is now pointing to firming underlying inflation (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-7Real Consumption Will Trudge Along Chart I-8Inflation Soft Patch Will End Therefore, we expect the recent negative inflation surprise in the U.S. to reverse. Moreover, inflation surprises in the U.S. are also likely to beat those of the euro area. To a very large extent, Europe's positive inflation surprise, especially relative to the U.S., reflected the 2014 collapse in the euro. The recent stability in the euro since March 2015 further reinforces that the boost to European relative monetary conditions is dissipating, and that European inflation surprise will not outpace the U.S. going forward (Chart I-9). Chart I-9U.S. Inflation Surprises ##br##Will Pick Up Versus Europe's Chart I-10Diverging Policy ##br##Expectations This is very important, as these relative inflation surprise dynamics have been the key factor underpinning divergent expectations behind ECB policy and the Fed's path. While investors have increasingly brought forward the ECB's first hike, they have aggressively curtailed the number of hikes expected in the U.S. over the next two years (Chart I-10). If, as we expect, relative inflation surprises do once again move in favor of the U.S., this gap will disappear, supporting the dollar in the process. Bottom Line: The Fed is right to stay the course. The economy continues to display momentum, and the inflation soft patch should soon dissipate. Moreover, U.S. economic surprises are bottoming. As such, we expect market expectations for inflation and interest rates to move back toward the Fed's forecast, lifting the U.S. dollar in the process. BoE Dissenters Grab The Headlines, But... The poor BoE is in an infinitely more tenuous situation than the Fed. Core inflation continues to pick up, but economic uncertainty is also on the rise. This dichotomy is most pronounced when it comes to wages. At 2.6%, core inflation is now outpacing wage growth, thus real income levels are contracting (Chart I-11). This is problematic because at 65% of GDP, the U.K. is an economy fundamentally driven by consumer spending. As Chart I-12 illustrates, when inflation picks up and puts downward pressure on real wages, consumption sags. Therein lies the BoE's conundrum. Chart I-11U.K.: Inflation Everywhere, But Not In Wages Chart I-12The BOE's Dilemma Despite the three dissenters who voted in favor of a hike this week, we expect the BoE to continue to favor not lifting rates, leaving its accommodation in place.2 Household inflation expectations remain well moored, but a further relapse in growth could prompt a widening of the output gap and produce entrenched deflationary expectations down the line - something BoE Governor Mark Carney and his colleagues want to avoid at all costs. Chart I-13U.K. FDI At Risk Some investors have been wondering out loud about the likelihood of a "soft Brexit" coming back on the agenda, arguing that it would support the pound. Remaining in the common market is, after all, an unmitigated positive for the U.K. But to be part of the common market, the U.K. also has to adopt the sacrosanct freedom of movement of people. We remain unconvinced that the British will budge on this point. Brexit was first and foremost a rejection of neo-liberal ideals that have been perceived as detrimental to the British middle class. And no point has been and continues to be more contentious than immigration. With the EU absolutely unwilling to dilute freedom of movement, access to the common market for the U.K. remains a distant dream. Moreover, with the British median voter switching to the left, a topic discussed in last Friday's Geopolitical Strategy Service Special Report on the election, British politics are likely to become less business friendly.3 Compounding this issue, U.K. industrial production is flat on an annual basis, bucking the global improvement seen last year and implying that the falling pound has not boosted competitiveness in the U.K. manufacturing sector. Together these forces suggest that the recent upsurge in FDI inflows into the U.K. could reverse in coming quarters (Chart I-13), a big problem for a country with a current account deficit of more than 4% of GDP and deeply negative real rates. Ultimately, the pound is cheap, trading at a one-sigma discount to its fair value. This means the market is well aware of the negatives that are weighing on sterling. Thus, the risks to GBP are well balanced. As a result, we expect GBP/USD to finish the year toward 1.2 because of our expectation of USD strength. EUR/GBP has limited upside, and rises above 0.88 should be used to build short positions. Bottom Line: The BoE decision was in line with expectations, but the market was nonetheless surprised by the fact that three MPC members dissented and voted for a rate hike. Sure, British inflation is on the rise, but this is hurting household real incomes, and thus consumption. These dynamics limit the upside risk to policy rates. We think that GBP could weaken against the USD; we would use moves above 0.88 to short EUR/GBP. The Bank Of Canada Volte Face Despite a 5% fall in oil prices this week, the CAD has appreciated 1.2% against the USD. Behind this impressive move has been Monday's speech by Senior Deputy Governor Carolyn Wilkins, in which she hinted that the Bank of Canada's next move will be a hike, coming sooner than investors have been anticipating. The BoC assessed that the negative impact of the fall in oil prices in 2014-'15 has passed, and that domestic strength in the Canadian economy has become self-sustaining. With the output gap expected to close in Q2 2018, the logical path for policy is tighter. Do the indicators warrant such a view? Yes: Canadian employment is quite strong, growing at a 1.8% annual pace. Unemployment too has fallen substantially. Capacity utilization is elevated in the manufacturing sector, thanks to a decade of low corporate investment. If our assessment of the U.S. capex cycle is correct, Canadian goods exports should pick up, adding to capacity and inflationary pressures in the country (Chart I-14). Our Canadian economic diffusion index - based on retail trade, manufacturing sales, building permits, and employment data in the 10 provinces - has sharply accelerated, pointing to a continued rise in GDP growth. Canadian LEIs and PMIs are all strong. Canadian house prices continue to forge ahead, growing at a 14% annual rate, which will additionally support Canadian consumption. This picture highlights that the BoC does have room to adjust its forward guidance, especially if the Fed stays on its desired path. Today, not only are investors the most short CAD since early 2007, but the loonie is cheap relative to real rate differentials (Chart I-15). As a result of these distortions, CAD could respond very positively to continued reaffirmation by the BoC that policy may become tighter. Chart I-14O Canada Chart I-15CAD At A Discount To Rates Practically, due to our broad bullish outlook on the USD, we find the most interesting way to play CAD strength is through its various crosses. Thus, we remain short EUR/CAD, short AUD/CAD, and long CAD/NOK. Bottom Line: The Canadian economy has escaped its funk. True, the long-term risks associated with the housing bubble will ultimately come home to roost. However, in the short term, the BoC is finding room to lift its forward guidance. As a result, CAD is likely to move higher on non-USD crosses. EUR/SEK Is A Short EUR/SEK should weaken in the coming quarters. To begin with, EUR/SEK is trading at a 7% premium against its PPP fair value. Additionally, the real trade-weighted SEK stands at a one-sigma discount to its long-term fundamental fair value, which further highlights the SEK's upside potential versus the euro, the main trading counterparty of Sweden (Chart I-16). Valuations are not enough to motivate a position. Economics need to join the ball. Today, the Swedish output gap is positive while that of Europe remains negative. Unsurprisingly, Swedish core inflation has overtaken that of the euro area (Chart I-17). Moreover, while we have argued at length why euro area core inflation is likely to disappoint going forward,4 pressure on Swedish resources is such that Swedish core inflation is likely to display additional upside (Chart I-18). Chart I-16SEK Is Cheap Chart I-17Swedish Core Inflation Is Outpacing Europe's Chart I-18Swedish Core Inflation Will Rise Further This means there will be attractive relative policy dynamics between the Riksbank and the ECB in the coming months. If the ECB has to tighten policy, the Riksbank has an even better case to be hawkish. If, however, the global economic environment prevents the ECB from tightening and forces it toward an easing bias, these global deflationary pressures should prove more muted in Sweden. Thus, we expect that Swedish policy will tighten relative to the ECB's, despite the economic and inflation environment. Chart I-19CPI Expectations Differential Will Push ##br##Policy Toward A Lower EUR/SEK Additionally, inflation expectations are pointing toward a lower EUR/SEK. The recent Swedish Prospera inflation survey showed that economic agents are expecting a pickup in inflation. As a result, market-based inflation expectations in Sweden have outperformed those in Germany, pointing to a lower EUR/SEK (Chart I-19). Essentially, this reflects potential changes in the relative direction of policy between the two currencies. The big risk to this view is that Stefan Ingves, the Riksbank governor, continues to be one of the most dovish policy makers in the world. However, his term ends on January 1, 2018, and unless he is renewed for another six years, his words and desires will increasingly lose their ability to affect markets. Bottom Line: The Swedish economy is increasingly moving closer to an inflationary environment. This cannot yet be said about the euro area. With inflation expectations sharply moving up in Sweden versus the euro zone, investors should begin betting against EUR/SEK. Housekeeping We are closing our short USD/JPY trade this week at a 4.2% profit. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Low Inflation And Rising Debt", dated June 3, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Moreover, one of the dissenters was Kristin Forbes, who was attending her last meeting as a member of the MPC. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled, "U.K. Election: The Median Voter Has Spoken", dated June 9, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled, "ECB: All About China?", dated April 7, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Chairwoman Janet Yellen has halted the dollar selloff for now, with the DXY finally seeing some upside. Following the press conference, the greenback sits 1.2% above the lows seen prior to the Fed policy meeting. We share the view of the Fed and the expect markets to converge over time toward the Fed's forecasts. Additionally, Yellen confirmed that there is still one more hike on the table this year. We believe the market continues to underprice these factors, concentrating too much on what amounts to a temporary soft patch. As we have said in the past, these factors will continue to widen rate differentials between the U.S. and its G10 counterparts. Report Links: Look Ahead, Not Back - June 9, 2017 Capacity Explosion = Inflation Implosion - June 2, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR/USD dropped on the news of a weak trade balance figure of EUR 19.6 bn, below the expected EUR 27.2 bn. Generally, EUR/USD has remained reasonably static as euro weakness was muted by equal dollar weakness, but recent Fed hawkishness has broken this trend. Draghi's hawkishness is tepid at best and the Fed hiking rates this Wednesday, as well as Yellen reiterating that another hike will be seen later this year will continue to help U.S. policy anticipations relative to Europe. As a result, rate differentials are likely to widen, and the euro to soften. The little appreciation in the euro earlier this week, was a result the following positives: German ZEW Survey's Current Situation went up to 88, beating expectations of 85; Euro Area ZEW Survey's Current Situation also went up to 37.7 from 35.1. Report Links: Look Ahead, Not Back - June 9, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been negative: Domestic corporate goods prices grew by 2.1% YoY, against expectations of 2.2%. Machinery orders yearly growth came in at 2.7%, underperforming expectations by a wide margin. Industrial production yearly growth stayed flat at 5.7%. Ultimately, economic activity in Japan will largely depend on the currency. With the yen appreciating for most of 2017, it will be difficult for the Japanese economy to improve sustainably. At this point, we are closing our USD/JPY trade, as the correction in the U.S. dollar has run its course. Meanwhile, we remain bearish on NZD/JPY, as the rising dollar and the tightening in Chinese monetary conditions will deliver a formidable one-two punch to risk assets, and thus weigh on this cross. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Industrial Production contracted by 0.8% on a YoY basis, underperforming expectations. Manufacturing production yearly growth stayed flat, also underperforming. Meanwhile, both core and headline inflation came in above expectations, at 2.6% and 2.9% respectively. Yesterday the BoE came in more hawkish than expected, as Ian McCafferty and Michael Saunders joined Kristin Forbes voting and dissented in favor offor a hike. Meanwhile, in their monetary policy summary the BoE stated that inflation will stay above target for an "extended period". Following the report, EUR/GBP plunged by about 0.8%. We are now not positive on the pound, as core inflation is now outpacing wage growth, a development that should weigh on demand due to the decline in real income. This development could cause GBP/USD and EUR/GBP to reach 1.2 and 0.92 respectively to reach 1.2 by year end, but any move in EUR/GBP above 0.88 should be used to short this cross. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Data out of Australia was mixed this week: National Australia Bank's Business Confidence declined to 7 from 13; Westpac Consumer Confidence fell to -1.8% from -1.1%; However, the unemployment rate dropped to 5.5%, with full-time employment growing by 52,100, and part-time employment shrinking by 10,100. Most of the movement in the AUD was dominated by the employment data, seeing a broad-based increase versus other G10 currencies. While oil prices kept the CAD and NOK at bay, Chinese industrial production and retail sales increased at a 6.5% and 10.7% annual rate, respectively. Iron ore and copper, commodities important to Australia, however, saw little action, but coal saw a slight upside. The above dynamics resulted in the AUD outperforming other currencies versus the USD, and EUR/AUD weakened massively. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: Electronic card retail sales grew by 5.2% year-on-year, increasing from 4.2% the month before. However, the current account deficit came in at 3.1% of GDP against expectations of 2.7%. Meanwhile, yearly GDP growth came in at 2.5%, underperforming expectations. The kiwi rallied this week as expectations of a dovish fed weighed on the dollar, although most of these gains vanished following the FOMC press conference. We continue to be positive on the NZD relative to the AUD, given that the kiwi economy is in much better footing than the Australian one. However, upside for NZD/USD is limited, as this cross has reached highly overbought levels. Furthermore, the tightening in Chinese monetary conditions will become a headwind for a sustainable rally in the NZD. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The downside in oil continues as EIA crude oil stocks decreased by 1.661 million barrels, less than the expected 2.739 million. AUD/CAD and NZD/CAD rallied on the news, while CAD/NOK levelled off. In the commodity space, we remain most positive on the Canadian economy. While oil prices are a hurdle, business and consumer confidence, as well as PMIs remain robust, and the BoC expects the output gap to close in Q2 2018. Our Commodity and Energy Strategy team continues to believe that OPEC cuts and increased oil demand will eventually curtail inventories. We therefore expect our short AUD/CAD trade to prove profitable as markets begin to digest these developments. While the CAD looks good on its crosses, the resumption of the dollar bull market will limit the USD/CAD's downside. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Yesterday, in their monetary policy statement, the SNB reasserted its dovish bias, pledging to keep its extremely accommodative monetary policy in the years to come. Their inflation outlook changed little, upgrading the near term slightly while downgrading the longer term outlook. It is important to consider that when the SNB states that they expect that inflation will reach only 1.5% by the first quarter of 2020, they do so assuming the LIBOR rate stays at -0.75%. Meanwhile, they also signaled that they will stay active intervening in the currency market, with SNB president Thomas Jordan reiterating that the Franc “remains significantly overvalued”. We had previously stated that the implied floor put under EUR/CHF by the SNB could be removed by the end of this year. However, this scenario now seems unlikely, given the strong commitment by the SNB to remain accommodative. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Following a sell-off for most of the beginning of the week, USD/NOK has rebounded sharply, following the FOMC interest rate decision. Furthermore, the disappointing draw in oil inventories also contributed to the surge in USD/NOK. We continue to be bearish on the NOK, given that inflation is still receding in Norway. Recent data supports this, with core inflation and producer prices falling from anewApril. Furthermore, any surge in the U.S. dollar will provide a tailwind to USD/NOK given that this cross is highly sensitive to the dollar. Another cross where we are positioned towe use to take advantage of gain from Norway's economic weakness difficulties is CAD/NOK. The Canadian economy is on ain much stronger footing than the Norwegian one, and the rally in the dollar has historically been a tailwind for this cross. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Sweden's economy is developing as expected, with headline inflation reading at the expected level of 1.7%, with a 0.1% monthly increase. Although inflation decreased from the previous 1.9% reading, the Riksbank's Resource Utilization Indicator - historically, a reliable indicator for core inflation - continues to point up, indicating that core inflation will accelerate further. We are putting on a short EUR/SEK trade on the basis of long-term valuations being in the favor of the krona. With a closed output gap, Sweden's economy is more advanced in its business cycle than the euro area', which points to a further bifurcation in inflation rates between the two. These factors will also warrant a quicker removal of policy support from the Riksbank than the ECB. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Special Report Highlights Investors have soured on hedge funds, withdrawing US$ 70 billion net last year. This is unsurprising because hedge funds have greatly underperformed global equities since the Global Financial Crisis, and have struggled to achieve a return of even cash plus 4% because of low volatility and high cross-asset correlation. But hedge funds still have a place in a balanced multi-asset portfolio. They have a good track record of outperforming equities in recessions. We favor macro funds as a recession hedge. This strategy has outperformed even bonds in the past three recessions, and is the only hedge fund class with positive skew and low kurtosis. Outside of a recession, we favor event-driven funds for their lower-beta equity exposure and idiosyncratic return profile. Feature The hedge fund industry has received a considerable amount of bad press over the past couple of years due to its poor performance and high fees. Since 2010, the average annual return from hedge funds has been just 4%, while global equities have returned almost 9% a year. Fees have been trimmed back from the traditional 2/20, but still average 1.5% of assets and 17% of performance.1 As a result, investors last year withdrew a net US$ 70.1 billion from hedge funds, the first year ever of net withdrawals, apart from the Global Financial Crisis years of 2008-9 (Feature Chart). According to a survey by Preqin, 84%2 of investors cited unfavorable terms and conditions as the reason for withdrawing their money. But are investors right to have turned sour on hedge funds? Does the asset class no longer have a place in a diversified multi-asset portfolio? Can hedge funds still provide a useful hedge against the sharp drawdown in risk assets likely in the next recession? As so often, the general picture obscures the details. Hedge funds invest using wildly different strategies. In this report, we analyze the historical risk and return characteristics of different categories of hedge funds, and test their resilience during historical recessions and equity bear markets. We also examine the characteristics of each main hedge fund strategy individually, and asses its usefulness in asset allocation. Our conclusions are that, in general, hedge funds represent an expensive way to generate a return that in recent times has failed to beat a target of cash plus 4%. Hedge funds suffer from style drift (tending to take on increasing risk as an equity bull market continues), and therefore do not always provide acceptable returns in downturns. Moreover, manager selection is difficult, especially for smaller funds without the manpower or expertise to handle it well. However, we find that: Event-driven funds (for example, activist and M&A arbitrage strategies) do have a good long-term track record of generating alpha; Macro funds have historically provided attractive downside protection in recessions. Investors, therefore, should not abandon their allocations in hedge funds. In a world where valuations for most asset classes (equities, bonds, private equity, real estate etc.) are stretched, and where the probability of a global recession in the next two to three years is relatively high, a thoughtful and well-scaled investment in hedge funds still makes sense. A note on the data we used in this report. All the hedge fund returns are based on the equally-weighted monthly indices (HFRI)3 produced by Hedge Fund Research, Inc. Funds included in these indices must (1) report returns net of all fees, and (2) have at least $50 million under management or have been actively trading for at least 12 months. HFR makes significant efforts to avoid survivor bias. When a fund is removed from the index, the performance remains in the index until the point of liquidation or when the manager requests removal from the database. HFR makes stringent efforts to receive data of a fund's performance right up until the point of liquidation. Likewise, when a new fund is added to the index, its performance up to that date does not affect the historical performance of the index. Finally, if a non-liquidated fund does not report to the HFR database for three consecutive months, the fund is subject to removal from the HFRI, but its historical data remains. Analyzing Historical Returns Hedge funds have produced an impressive return of 10.1% a year since 1990, when reliable data starts. This compares to 6.9% for global equities and 6.2% for global bonds over the same period (Table 1). But all of this outperformance came before 2010. Over the past seven years, hedge funds have returned only 4% a year, compared to 8.5% for equities and 3.8% for bonds. Table 1Risk And Return Analysis There has clearly been a structural decline in hedge fund returns over time. Each five-year period since 1990 has seen a lower return than the previous five years, and the trend decline in returns is seen across all the major categories of hedge fund strategy (Table 2 and Chart 2). This is probably because the rapid growth in the hedge fund industry caused arbitrage opportunities to dry up and because, as individual funds got larger, they had less flexibility to invest. Table 2Risk And Return Analysis - By Period Chart 2Structural Or Cyclical? Hedge funds are supposed to be vehicles that "hedge" downside risk in periods of market stress and so can consequently generate a consistent return in excess of the risk-free rate. As one would expect, their performance, therefore, tends to be closer to that of bonds than of equities and, unsurprisingly, they have a close correlation with the performance of bonds over equities (Chart 3). But they have struggled in recent years to beat even their generally accepted benchmark of Libor + 4% (Chart 2 panel 1). Chart 3Are Hedge Funds Just 2/20 Bonds? From a risk perspective, all hedge fund strategies have a volatility somewhere between that of equities and bonds. Hedge fund return distribution is non-normal. Three of the four hedge fund strategies have exhibited negative skew, i.e. a higher-than-normal probability of negative returns. However, relative value is the only strategy with a large excess kurtosis, meaning that investors should expect extreme returns in periods of market stress. Macro has been the only strategy with a positive skew and a lower excess kurtosis than global equities. What Happened In Recessions? Hedge funds are, in theory, designed to give positive returns even during recessions and equity bear markets. Indeed they did so during the recessions of July 1990-March 1991 and March-November 2000. But, with the exception of global macro funds, they failed dismally to achieve a positive return in the December 2007-June 2009 recession (Table 3). Note, however, that all categories of hedge funds did outperform equities in the most recent recession. Table 3Recession Performance Global macro has clearly been the best hedge fund strategy at giving downside protection during recessions. It was the only category to outperform bonds during all three recessions in our analysis (Chart 4). The strategy's global cross-asset mandate and extensive use of derivatives enables it to achieve an option-like return distribution. Its nimbleness at switching exposures depending on the macro environment is clear from its sharp change of correlation with bonds and equities between recessions and expansions (Chart 5). This phenomenon is also seen to a lesser extent for event-driven and relative-value strategies. On the other hand, equity-hedge strategies have rising correlations with equities during recessions, mainly because of their net long bias. The cause of each equity bear market also has an impact on which hedge fund strategies perform the best (Chart 6). For example, relative-value strategies did well in the 1990-91 bear market, which was not accompanied by a deep economic recession. Conversely, event-driven funds severely underperformed during the 2007-2009 bear market because M&A deal activity dried up. Accordingly, investors looking to preserve capital in the next equity bear market need to pick a strategy after careful consideration of the likely cause of the next turndown. Hedge Fund Strategies Hedge funds encompass a wide range of investment styles, with managers using a myriad of different strategies to try to generate alpha. Below, we analyze the four main hedge fund strategies, explain the dynamics of their sub-categories and the relative attractions of their styles, and draw some conclusions about which are likely to be most appropriate in which environments. We also touch on whether using a fund of funds ever makes sense. Equity Hedge This strategy (Table 4) takes a long-short approach in equities, working under dedicated mandates with regard to capitalization, style and sector. The core strength of the group is superior bottom-up stock-picking coupled with long-short systematic risk hedging. Alpha generation is greater in less efficient, segmented markets with barriers to the free flow of information. Relative performance of this category (Chart 7) tends to be strongest when: There is significant dispersion of performance between sectors and stocks, giving hedge funds increasing opportunities for long-short trades; Value stocks outperform, since many long-short funds tend to be long cheap stocks and short expensive ones; Small caps outperform large caps. Many relative-value funds focus their long positions in smaller firms and their short positions in larger ones since small-cap stocks are less covered by sell-side analysts, resulting in more pricing inefficiencies. As a result of these biases and their generally net long positions, long-short equity hedge funds tend to have the strongest correlations with global equity markets and to perform worst in equity bear markets. Table 4Equity Hedge Strategies Chart 7Equity Hedge: High Beta Equity Exposure Event Driven This strategy (Table 5) pursues more opportunistic mandates and its returns are usually contingent on the successful completion of a specific corporate event. These funds tend to have a shorter investment horizon and use hedging techniques to isolate the event's impact on returns by reducing systematic risk. Alpha generation is dependent on the manager's ability to predict the outcome of corporate events. Activist and distressed funds focus more on value creation through operational turnarounds and hence have a longer investment period. The health of the M&A market (Chart 8) is the single biggest factor determining relative performance versus the hedge fund composite since it dictates exit valuations for most of the sub-strategies. We do not expect a recession until 2019 at the earliest, so deal volumes are likely to remain buoyant, which should help merger arbitrage funds generate good returns. Table 5Event Driven Strategies Chart 8Event Driven: Dependent On M&A Health The strategy also has a close correlation with credit spreads. This is partly because M&A deals tend to increase as the cost of funding the acquisition declines in an economic expansion. But it is also because distressed and restructuring funds have become more prominent over the years and their performance is linked to improving credit conditions. Macro This group (Table 6) utilizes a wide range of strategies taking exposure to movements in macroeconomic factors and their impact on asset classes. These funds tend to use leverage extensively and also dynamic risk-management techniques. Macro funds try to structure tactical positions to anticipate inflection points, and have a track record of generating significant outperformance in periods of stress. This means that this category has low kurtosis and skew, and has proved to be the best strategy for downside protection in recessions. Apart from in recessions, macro funds tend to outperform (Chart 9) only in times of credit-market stress (high-yield spread widening). But their recession-hedging properties are attractive, as seen by their negative correlation with equities and positive correlation with bonds during downturns. These tactical shifts in correlation led it to be the best strategy in three out of past four equity bear markets. Table 6Macro Strategies Chart 9Macro: Best Recession Hedge We generally prefer systematic rules-based funds over actively managed discretionary funds, as systematic funds offer better downside protection in recessions. However, systematic funds tend to underperform in trendless sideways-moving markets. Relative Value This group (Table 7) predominantly takes long/short positions in the rates and credit space. Most of the trades are arbitrage driven and depend on long-run mean reversion, thereby profiting from short-term deviations from fair value. Individual trades tend to have small profits, and so managers rely on leverage to magnify returns. With leverage comes the potential for extreme swings, as seen in this strategy's extremely high kurtosis. A famous example is the failure of Long Term Capital Management,4 which, at its peak, had an AUM of US$ 125 billion but just US$ 5 billion in equity capital. During 1995 and 1996 returns averaged 40% a year after fees. But, in the Asian financial crisis and the Russian default of 1997-1998, assets shrank to less than $1 billion in a matter of months. Relative-value funds have outperformed the hedge fund composite since the Global Financial Crisis largely as a result of low interest rates, which have reduced the cost of gearing up their positions (Chart 10). A rise in interest rates would represent a major headwind for this strategy. Table 7Relative Value Strategies Chart 10Relative Value: Rising Rates Are A Headwind Equity and interest rate volatility are also bad for relative-value fixed-income funds. Spikes in volatility render risk management models less effective. Additionally, relative value funds have exposures to the corporate credit space within their convertible arbitrage and corporate arbitrage sub-strategies. Hence, this group tends to underperform when high-yield spreads widen. Funds Of Funds Chart 11FOFs: Underperforming All The Way This group has seen a secular decline in AUM from USD$ 1.2 trillion to US$ 340 billion over the past 10 years.5 Returns have been poor relative to hedge funds as a whole (Chart 11), mainly because of their double layer of fees. However, funds of funds continue to have some attractions for smaller investors that are unable to meet minimum subscriptions for hedge funds or do not have the ability to handle their own manager selection. Funds of funds typically charge 1-1.5% on top of the underlying hedge funds' fees (and sometimes also a 10% performance fee). However they can often use their size to negotiate with hedge funds for a better deal on fees and innovative fee structures: for example, a larger proportion of the fee based on performance coupled with a high hurdle rate. This way they can partly reduce the aggregate fee burden (Chart 11, Panel 3). For larger investors such as pension plans and university endowments there is a choice between using a fund of funds and running their own in-house multi-strategy program. If we assume that the average fund of funds charges 1% in management fees, an investor looking to allocate $100 million should prefer to do this via a fund of funds if the cost of running an in-house program would be more than $1 million a year. Investment Implications In theory, given their focus on absolute return, hedge funds should underperform somewhat in an expansion and outperform significantly in a recession. They will tend to perform relatively poorly when volatility is low and cross-asset correlations high, as has been the case over the past eight years. However, as intervention by global central banks fades over the coming years - and with the risk of a recession on the horizon - volatility is likely to mean-revert closer to historical averages, which should create more opportunities for alpha. The hedge fund industry could come into its own again. But picking the right managers and strategy is crucial. There is a large dispersion between the performance of top and bottom decile hedge fund managers: in 2016, for example, top-decile funds made an average return of +32.7%, bottom-decile managers -15.5%.6 Intra-correlation between hedge fund strategies has recently fallen to a new low (Chart 12), so it is also important to choose the right strategy. Investors should have a preference for smaller hedge funds. These can be more nimble, allowing them to liquidate assets more readily in a downturn, and to have easier access to smaller, more inefficiently priced markets. They are likely to continue their recent outperformance (Chart 13) in an environment more dependent on security selection. We have two broad strategy recommendations contingent on the market environment (Chart 14): In a recession. Overweight macro funds, given their track record of impressive downside protection in recessions and equity bear markets. Now should be an attractive entry point given that the group has underperformed the hedge fund composite by 35% since the financial crisis. Over the cycle. Overweight event-driven funds, which have historically been an effective equity play with idiosyncratic exposures and lower beta risk. Deal activity is likely to remain strong thanks to companies' large cash balances and, for U.S. companies, prospective corporate tax reforms which will allow them to repatriate retained earnings held overseas. Chart 12Strategy Picking Is Crucial Chart 14Overweight Event Driven And Macro Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst Global Asset Allocation adityak@bcaresearch.com 1 Source: Hedge Fund Research. 2 Source: Preqin Investor Outlook: Alternative Assets H1 2017. 3 Source: HFRI Hedge Fund Indices, Defined Formulaic Methodology. 4 Source: http://www.investmentreview.com/print-archives/winter-1999/the-story-of-long-term-capital-management-752/ 5 Source: BarclayHedge. 6 Source: Hedge Fund Research.
Highlights The U.K. and EU may get a technical divorce, but the underlying economic and financial relationship may not end up changing dramatically - which is good news for the pound in the long term. Our 6-12 month preference for currencies is euro first, pound second, dollar third. The euro area economy will perform at least in line with the U.S. economy through 2017, so the T-bond/German bund yield spread will continue to compress. Long euro area retailers, short U.S. retailers has catch-up potential. The focussed stock pair-trade would be long Hornbach (Germany), short Home Depot (U.S.) Feature Brexit Will Become A Fake Divorce Theresa May's stinging reversal at the ballot box last Thursday has left some people wondering: will Brexit actually happen? The answer is very likely yes, but this is no longer the right question to ask. Jeremy Corbyn's resurgent Labour Party, the Scottish National Party, the Liberal Democrats and pro-European Conservatives now form a parliamentary majority which proposes that a non-EU U.K. negotiates tariff-free access to the single market and customs union.1 In such an arrangement, the U.K. and EU would be technically divorced. But economically and financially, the relationship would not be so different to being married. In effect, Brexit would become a fake divorce. Unfortunately, there is a flipside. The U.K. would be unable to reclaim swathes of sovereignty over its borders and its law. This is because the tariff-free movement of goods, services and capital is, in theory, indivisible from the free movement of people. Furthermore, EU law would transcend national law in the regulation and policing of the single market's so-called 'four freedoms'. Admittedly, the four freedoms are an unachieved - and arguably unachievable - ideal. But they are an aspiration which EU policymakers do not want Brexit to threaten. Angela Merkel recently put it in very strong terms: "Cherry-picking (from the four freedoms) would have disastrous consequences for the other 27 member countries... Tariff-free access to the single market can only be possible on the conditions of respecting the four basic freedoms. Otherwise one has to talk about limits to access" Hence, Brexit reduces to a trade-off between the extent of tariff-free access to the European single market that the U.K. wants to keep, and the extent of national sovereignty it is willing to concede (Chart of the Week). Economically and financially, it is largely irrelevant whether the U.K. gets tariff-free access to the single market via a bespoke free-trade arrangement or via membership of an off-the-shelf structure like EFTA or the EEA.2 The much bigger question is: in order to keep most of its tariff-free access to the single market, will the U.K. now downgrade its plans to "take back full control" of its borders and law? Following last Thursday's stunning election result - and its impact on parliamentary composition (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3) - the answer seems to be yes. The U.K. and EU may get a technical divorce, but the underlying economic and financial relationship might not end up changing dramatically. Euro First, Pound Second, Dollar Third Avoiding a dramatic change in the U.K./EU economic and financial relationship reduces the risk of a major disruption to the U.K. economy and the need for further emergency easing from the Bank of England. Thereby, it is good news for the pound in the long term. That said, our 6-12 month preference for currencies is euro first, pound second, dollar third. The crucial point is that currencies and bond market relative performance depends front and centre on the evolution of relative interest rate expectations. In turn, the evolution of relative interest rate expectations must ultimately follow relative economic performance, as evidenced in hard data such as GDP growth, inflation and job creation. Over a period of a few months, central banks can look through hard data on the basis that the data is noisy or "transient". But over periods of 6 months and longer, the noisy and transient excuse wears thin. Central banks' strong commitment to data-dependency means that their actions and/or words must follow the hard data. No ifs, buts or maybes. Hence, relative interest rate expectations ultimately follow relative economic performance (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). We are unashamedly republishing these two charts from last week because they prove the point so powerfully. Based on the latest PMIs which capture current economic sentiment, and on 6-month credit impulses which lead activity, euro area hard data will continue to perform at least in line with those in the U.S. (Chart I-6). In which case, relative interest rate expectations will continue to converge, the T-bond/German bund yield spread will continue to compress, and euro/dollar will ultimately drift higher. Chart I-4Relative Interest Rate Expectations Must Follow ##br##Relative Economic Performance Chart I-5Relative Bond Yields Must Follow Relative##br## Economic Performance Chart I-6Only A Modest Decline In The Euro Area ##br##6-Month Credit Impulse The Eurostoxx50 Is Not A Play On The Euro Area Economy. So What Is? Does it follow that the Eurostoxx50 equity index will outperform? Not necessarily. Unlike for currencies, interest rates and bond yields, the connection between relative economic performance and relative equity market performance is weak, or even non-existent. Note that the Eurostoxx50 has underperformed the S&P500 this year even though the euro area economy has outperformed. Chart I-7The Global Growth Pause ##br##Has Hurt Cyclicals The reason is that the over-arching driver of an equity market's relative performance is its skew to dominant international sectors and international stocks. The Eurostoxx50 has a higher exposure to the global growth cycle via its dominant weighting in Financials and Resources; conversely the S&P500 has a higher exposure to the less globally-sensitive Technology and Healthcare sectors. The defining sector skew has penalised the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500 because globally-sensitive cyclicals have strongly underperformed in a very clear global growth pause. Furthermore, the ever-reliable global 6-month credit impulse strongly suggests that the global growth pause will persist through the summer (Chart I-7). This begs the question: is there a way for equity investors to play the resilient performance of the euro area economy? The answer is yes. But before explaining how, a quick note of caution. An aggregate small cap equity index is not a good way to play a domestic economy. This is because the dominant characteristic of small cap stocks - in aggregate - is their very high beta. Hence, rather than a strong play on the domestic economy, investors are effectively buying highly leveraged exposure to market direction. Great when markets are rising, but painful when they are falling, irrespective of how the domestic economy is faring. Instead, a good equity play on relative economic performance is the relative performance of retailers (Chart I-8). Drilling down further, the relative performance of home improvement retailers is an even purer play (Chart I-9) - given that household spending on home improvement is closely tied to the domestic economic cycle. Chart I-8Retailers Are A Good Play On Relative ##br##Economic Performance Chart I-9Euro Area Home Improvement Retailers ##br##Can Now Ourperform Those In The U.S. On the expectation that the euro area economy will perform at least in line with the U.S. economy,3 the equity market play would be long euro area retailers, short U.S. retailers. In particular, long euro area home improvement retailers, short U.S. home improvement retailers has a lot of catch-up potential. And the focussed stock pair-trade would be long Hornbach (Germany), short Home Depot (U.S.) Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 In simple terms, the single market defines the zone of tariff-free trade for European countries with each other. Whereas the customs union defines the zone of a single set of rules and tariffs for European countries to trade with the rest of the world. Membership of the customs union allows goods and services that enter from the rest of the world to then move around Europe unhindered. 2 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is a free trade area consisting of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway participate in the EU single market through their membership of the European Economic Area (EEA). Whereas Switzerland participates through a set of bilateral agreements with the EU. 3 Based on growth in real GDP per head. Fractal Trading Model* Long nickel / short tin hit its 6.5% profit target and is now closed. This week's trade is to switch to long nickel / short palladium with a 10% profit target. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart I-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart I-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart I-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart I-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Global Growth: Global bond yields have fallen in a coordinated fashion among the major economies, even with only a modest cooling of growth momentum and realized inflation outcomes. With little sign of an imminent downturn in growth on the horizon, government bonds now look a bit expensive. Global Inflation: Inflation expectations in the major economies have fallen too far relative to underlying non-energy inflation pressures. With oil prices likely to begin rising again as the demand-supply balance in global energy markets tightens up, both realized inflation and expectations should move higher in the latter half of the year, especially in the U.S. Bond Market Strategy: Markets are pricing in too few rate hikes in the U.S., leaving U.S. Treasuries exposed to higher yields in the next 3-6 months. Yields should also rise in core Europe, although not by as much as in the U.S. with the ECB not yet ready to turn less dovish. Stay underweight U.S., neutral core Europe and overweight Japan in global government bond portfolios. Feature Have bond investors now become too pessimistic on global growth and inflation prospects? This is a question worth asking after the sharp decline in longer-dated government bond yields witnessed since the peak in mid-March. The benchmark 10-year yield has fallen during that period by -43bps in the U.S., -21bps in Germany, -24bps in the U.K., -45bps in Canada and -54bps in Australia. Granted, there has been a bit of softer news on both growth and, more importantly, inflation readings in several economies in the past couple of months. Those pullbacks, however, have been relatively modest compared to the severe bull-flattening bond rally seen in most developed economies (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekAn Overreaction From Bond Investors Global leading economic indicators are still pointing to faster growth over the latter half of the year, led by easing financial conditions given booming equity and credit markets. With most major economies either at full employment (U.S., U.K., Japan, Australia) or approaching full employment (Euro Area, Canada), accelerating growth will ensure that the recent downtick in global inflation will not persist for long - especially if oil prices begin to move higher again as our commodity strategists expect. This week brings several major central bank meetings with an opportunity to change the bullish tone in the bond markets. The Federal Reserve, the Bank of England (BoE) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) all meet, although only the Fed is expected to deliver another rate hike that is now heavily discounted in the markets. The BoE's hands are now effectively tied, even with high U.K. inflation, after last week's election outcome where the ruling Conservatives lost their majority government, thus ensuring even more uncertainty over the contours of the Brexit process. The BoJ is also stuck in a bind, with surprisingly strong Japanese economic growth but shockingly weak inflation. This is also the situation that the European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of Canada and Reserve Bank of Australia are facing, to a lesser extent: solid domestic growth but without enough inflation to force any immediate tightening of monetary policy. These sorts of mixed messages and conflicting signals also exist in the bond markets in the developed world, as we discuss in this Weekly Report. Our conclusion is that yields have now priced in too much pessimism and the balance of risks points to yields rising again in the months ahead, led by U.S. Treasuries. A Big Move In Yields For Such A Small Change In Growth... Looking at the change in government bond yields within the major developed markets since the peak on March 13th (Table 1) shows a few important facts: Table 1A Bull Flattening Of Global Yield Curves Since March The largest yield declines were in the U.S., Canada & Australia; The smallest declines were in the U.K., the Euro Area and Japan - unsurprisingly, the countries where central banks are engaged in large bond purchase programs; Lower market-based inflation expectations have played a role in the bond rally, coinciding with softer energy prices and declines in realized inflation outcomes; Real yields (i.e. nominal yields minus inflation expectations) have fallen sharply in the U.S., Canada & Australia; Yield curves have bull-flattened everywhere; Breaking the curve moves into real yield and inflation expectations components shows that both contributed to the flatter yield curves. The U.S. Treasury action stands out compared to the others. There has also been a 103bp flattening in the 2-year/10-year TIPS real yield curve, while the TIPS breakeven curve has steepened by 64bps. This is the result of the -89bp drop in 2yr breakevens, which now sit at 1.38% - well below the current U.S. headline CPI inflation rate of 2.2%. Even allowing for any potential liquidity issues that can distort the precise interpretation of shorter-dated TIPS breakevens, the market appears to be expecting a bigger drop in inflation in the next couple of years than both the Fed and the Bloomberg consensus of economic forecasters (Table 2).1 This U.S. move stands out relative to the other countries, where there has been very little change in 2-year inflation expectations (using CPI swaps instead of breakeven rates from inflation-linked bonds). With the headline U.S. unemployment rate now at a cyclical low of 4.3%, and with the broader U-6 measure, now down to a decade low of 8.4%, we anticipate a recovery in realized inflation, and TIPS breakevens, in the next few months. The source for the broader downturn in global inflation expectations is a bit of a mystery. While some cyclical global growth indicators like manufacturing PMIs have fallen a bit in some countries, most notably the U.S. and China, they are still at strong levels above 50 that point to faster economic growth (Chart 2). Leading economic indicators (LEIs) are also still pointing to some acceleration in the latter half of 2017 although, admittedly, the list of countries with rising LEIs has been diminishing in recent months. We see that as a potential sign of slower growth next year, but not for the rest of 2017. Table 2Consensus Growth & Inflation Forecasts Chart 2Global Economic Upturn Still Intact Bottom Line: Global bond yields have fallen in a coordinated fashion among the major economies, even with only a modest cooling of growth momentum and realized inflation outcomes. With little sign of an imminent downturn in growth on the horizon, government bonds now look a bit expensive. ...And Inflation Of course, some of the decline in inflation expectations can be attributed to softer readings on realized inflation over the past few months. Yet the markets seem to have overreacted a bit to that move, as well. The run of stronger-than-expected inflation outcomes has taken a breather in both the developed and emerging world, as evidenced by the rolling over of the Citigroup inflation surprise indices (Chart 3). Yet those indices remain at high levels and are not pointing to a meaningful, extended pullback in realized inflation. Chart 3Global Inflation Data Has Cooled A Bit The pullback in global energy prices since March has played a role in softer headline inflation in most countries. That decline has been part of a broader move lower in commodity prices that is likely related to less reflationary monetary and fiscal policies out of the world's biggest commodity consumer, China. However, our colleagues at BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy have noted that export and import volumes in the emerging economies accelerated sharply in the first quarter of 2017. Given that there is a strong correlation between trade volumes and oil demand in the emerging markets, this bodes well for a rebound in global oil demand. Combined with the "OPEC 2.0" production cuts, the demand-supply balance in world oil markets is likely to turn positive in the months ahead, which will allow oil prices to return to a range close to $60/bbl by year-end.2 A move in oil prices back to that level would help arrest the downturn in overall commodity price indices, and help stabilize goods CPI inflation in the developed economies in the latter half of 2017 (Chart 4). This should help boost global inflation expectations, and eventually bond yields, as the downturn in energy prices has shown very little pass-through into non-energy inflation in the developed world (Chart 5). Chart 4Disinflationary Impulse##BR##From Energy Will Soon Fade... Chart 5...Although The Impact On##BR##Inflation Has Been Modest Yet that stability of non-energy inflation visible in the charts masks many of the cross-currents seen across countries and within countries. Services CPI inflation remains strong in the U.S. at 3%, and has accelerated to 2% in both the U.K. and the Euro Area (Chart 6). Yet at the same time, both services and core inflation are falling rapidly towards 0% in Japan, despite a solid economic upturn and tight labor market. The situation is even more confusing in Canada, where wage inflation has fallen to below 1% but services inflation has picked up to 3%. Australia is in a similar boat, with services inflation above 3% but wages growing at only 2%. The divergence between the inflation outcomes across the countries can also be seen in our headline CPI diffusion indices, which measure the number of CPI sectors that are witnessing accelerating rates of inflation. The diffusion indices in the U.S., Japan and Canada are all at low levels, with the majority of CPI components seeing slowing rates of inflation, yet overall inflation seems to be holding up well despite the breadth of the "downturn", at least based on past correlations (Chart 7). The opposite is true in the Euro Area and Australia, where a majority of inflation components are growing faster, yet overall inflation is only moving slowly higher. Only in the U.K. is there a clear robust rise in the breadth of inflation (90% of CPI components accelerating) and overall inflation (headline CPI expanding at around 3%). Chart 6Underlying Inflation Has Not##BR##Slowed Much (Except In Japan) Chart 7Mixed Signals From The##BR##Global CPI Diffusion Indices Given all these diverging signals within the national inflation data, we are surprised that there has been such a uniform decline in inflation expectations across the major bond markets. That leads us to look to the oil price decline as the main cause of the lower expectations, rather than a more pernicious drop caused by expectations of slowing economic growth and cooling domestic inflation pressures. Given the BCA view that oil prices have likely reached bottom and will begin to move higher, the decline in global inflation expectations is likely to also end soon. Bottom Line: Inflation expectations in the major economies have fallen too far relative to underlying non-energy inflation pressures. With oil prices likely to begin rising again as the demand-supply balance in global energy markets tightens up, both realized inflation and expectations should move higher in the latter half of the year, especially in the U.S. Bond Market Strategy For The Second Half Of 2017 The outlook for government bond yields in the remaining months of the year will be driven by decent global growth and rising inflation expectations. Our Central Bank Monitors continue to point to the need for tighter monetary policy in every major developed market excluding Japan (Chart 8), leaving bond yield exposed to any unexpected moves from central bankers. This is especially problematic in the U.S., where fed funds futures now discount only a 25-30% probability of a Fed rate hike in September and December after the expected hike at this week's FOMC meeting (Chart 9). With the U.S. OIS curve pricing in only 48bps of hikes over the next 12 months, the Treasury market is exposed to a Fed moving more aggressively in meetings later in 2017. Chart 8Our Central Bank Monitors Still##BR##Calling For Tighter Policy (Ex Japan) Chart 9Markets Will Be Surprised##BR##By The Fed Later This Year In Europe, the ECB talked up a more positive economic growth story at last week's policy meeting, eliminating the language suggesting that rate cuts would be necessary because the growth recovery was still fragile. No signal was given about slowing the pace of ECB asset purchases, which was not a surprise given the still-low readings on core inflation in the Euro Area. The ECB did slightly downgrade its inflation projections for the next two years, with core inflation now expected to rise to 1.8% by 2019. Our Months-to-Hike measure for the Euro Area now out to 29 months, indicating that the first ECB rate hike is now expected in November of 2019 (Chart 10). Our view remains that the ECB will look to taper asset purchases before contemplating any rate hikes, and will likely signal a move to slow the pace of bond buying at the September policy meeting. While we agree that a rate hike is unlikely until 2019, the current market pricing does leave European bond markets exposed to any upside surprises in inflation over the next year. For now, we continue to recommend a neutral allocation to core European government bonds, with a curve steepening bias, while focusing Peripheral exposure on Spain relative to Italy. We envision moving to underweight Europe over the summer if the growth and inflation data continue to point to an eventual ECB taper, especially given the strong comparisons between Europe now and the pre-Taper Tantrum period in the U.S. in 2012-13 (Chart 11). Chart 10No ECB Hikes##BR##Expected Until 2019 Chart 11Bunds Still Following The U.S.##BR##Post-QE Experience In Japan, we expect the BoJ to continue to target a 0% 10yr JGB yield for some time, in order to ensure that there is enough currency weakness to keep headline inflation from decelerating (Chart 12). This will especially be true if our call for higher U.S. interest rates comes to fruition and USD/JPY begins moving higher again. We continue to recommend an overweight position on Japan with government bond portfolios, given the low yield beta of JGBs to the other bond markets (Chart 13). Chart 12The BoJ Will Do "Whatever It Takes"##BR##To Keep The Yen Soft Chart 13Stay Overweight##BR##Low-Beta JGBs Finally, we continue to recommend long CPI swaps positions in both the Euro Zone and Japan, and an overweight in U.S. TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, as a way to play for the rebound in global inflation expectations that we are expecting over the balance of 2017. However, given the disturbing downturn in core inflation readings in Japan, we are implementing a tight stop-loss level at 0.4% on our long 10yr Japan CPI swaps position (Chart 14). Chart 14Stay Long CPI Swaps##BR##In Europe & Japan (With A Stop) Bottom Line: Markets are pricing in too few rate hikes in the U.S., leaving U.S. Treasuries exposed to higher yields in the next 3-6 months. Yields should also rise in core Europe, although not by as much as in the U.S. with the ECB not yet ready to turn less dovish. Stay underweight U.S., neutral core Europe and overweight Japan in global government bond portfolios. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 The FOMC projections for growth in the headline Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) deflator from the latest set of forecasts released in March called for inflation of 1.9% in 2017 and 2.0% in 2018. The gap between the headline measures of CPI inflation and PCE deflator inflation has averaged about 50bps in recent years, so that implies that the Fed is expecting CPI inflation to be much higher than the 1.38% 2-year TIPS breakeven. 2 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil", dated June 8 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The latest wobble in the financials sector is a buying opportunity, with the exception of the defensive insurance index. Our tactical overweight in utilities has played out. Take profits and downgrade to neutral. Weak beverage operating metrics argue for a reduction in premium valuations. We recommend a full downgrade from overweight to underweight. Recent Changes S&P Utilities - Downgrade to neutral, locking in gains of 1% on this tactical position. S&P Soft Drinks - Downgrade to underweight. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 remained undaunted in the face of a geopolitical firestorm last week. Instead, vibrant global growth and easy monetary conditions continue to underpin investor confidence in the durability of the earnings upcycle. Our thesis remains intact: a recovery in top-line growth, powered by both volume and pricing power gains, will generate sufficient profit growth to sustain the equity market overshoot. While actual inflation has surprised to the downside, weighing on inflation expectations (bottom panel, Chart 1), this has not translated into a loss of business sector pricing power. Corporate selling prices have diverged markedly from the Fed's preferred measure of inflation (middle panel, Chart 1), reflecting a goldilocks scenario where more restrictive monetary conditions will not impede the path to improved profitability. In recent research we showed that operating leverage in S&P 500 constituents runs at 1.4x. In other words, a 5% increase in sales results in a 7% rise in operating EPS, based on our regression analysis. While every cycle is different, when revenues initially recover from a slump, as is currently the case, operating leverage can be even higher, with profits often outpacing sales by two or even three times. Since mid-December, both the U.S. dollar and 10-year Treasury yields have fallen in tandem. As a result monetary conditions have eased, reversing the tightening that occurred in the second half of 2016. Our U.S. Monetary Indicator (USMI) and momentum in corporate profit margins are perfectly inversely correlated. The recent downswing in the USMI is bullish for S&P 500 margins (USMI shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 2). True, a fall in bond yields can also be reflective of a deteriorating economy, such that investors should become worried about profitability. However, the stock-to-bond (S/B) ratio is not signaling any trouble ahead. History shows that the time to worry about the bond market's earnings message is when the S/B ratio contracts (see shaded areas, third panel, Chart 3). Chart 1Corporate Pricing Power Reigns Chart 2Easy Financial Conditions Boost Margins Chart 3Goldilocks Equity Scenario In addition, part of the decline in long-term interest rates also reflects a slower expected pace of fed funds rate increases. The bond market doubts the FOMC's 2.125% interest rate estimate for 2018, forecasting a fed funds rate roughly 63bps lower. If the bond market is accurate and the Fed recalibrates its 18-month rate outlook even modestly lower later this week, then the S/B ratio has more upside. This week we reiterate our recent financials sector upgrade to overweight, make two tweaks to our portfolio and downshift our defensive exposure another notch. Financials Are At A Critical Juncture Financials stocks have performed as if the U.S. economy is headed for a protracted slowdown, or even recession. Uncertainty with the U.S. Administration's ability to pass bills and enact reforms, a string of U.S. economic disappointments and related yield curve flattening, and sinking inflation expectations have all weighed on relative performance. Rather than extrapolate recent weakness, our inclination is to view the latest wobble as a buying opportunity. A number of forward looking loan growth indicators suggest that credit and capital formation are on an upward trajectory, which will support ongoing profit outperformance. Chart 4 shows that our U.S. capex indicator is an excellent leading indicator of loan growth, with a forty year track record. Soaring confidence implies a more expansionary mindset, and increased demand for external funds (third panel, Chart 4). Similarly, the ISM survey leads loan growth. Both the ISM manufacturing and services surveys are sending a positive signal (fourth panel, Chart 4). Specifically, our sister U.S. Bond Strategy's credit growth model captures all of these positive forces: the recent nascent recovery in bank credit growth should morph into a sustained recovery in the second half of 2017 (bottom panel, Chart 4). Meanwhile, financial conditions have continued to ease, aided by tightening credit spreads, a decline in oil prices, U.S. dollar softness and rise in equity prices (top panel, Chart 5). Easier monetary conditions should ensure that the recovery in overall corporate sector profits stays on track, thereby sustaining both consumer and corporate credit quality at high levels. It is notable that relative performance and the Bloomberg Financial Conditions Index are positively correlated (second panel, Chart 5). Credit quality is already showing signs of improvement: financials sector ratings migration has swung roughly 50 percentage points since last October (second panel, Chart 6). The implication is that reserve building should not become a profit drag over a cyclical investment horizon. Chart 4Credit Growth##br## Will Pivot Chart 5Easy Monetary Conditions ##br##Are A Boon For Financials Chart 6Financials Catch-Up##br## Phase Looms In sum, as long as the global economic expansion persists, as we expect, then the recent inflation expectations-related selloff in the sector should prove transitory. We continue to recommend above-benchmark exposure to areas with leverage to increased capital formation, with one notable exception in the sector's most defensive component: insurance. Continue To Avoid Insurers While financial companies levered to capital formation and credit creation are well positioned to thrive if the U.S. and global economies continue to improve, the same is not true for the broad S&P insurance index. This is a defensive group with a fairly stable recurring revenue stream that typically thrives when the economy is slowing, the yield curve is flattening and the U.S. dollar is on an upward trajectory. Relative performance has edged higher in concert with the recent yield curve flattening, but as detailed above, we don't expect the latter to continue. Ergo, the only external support for the group is likely to crumble, especially now that the U.S. dollar is softening (Chart 7). If the domestically-focused insurance index could not gain traction throughout the latest U.S. dollar bull market, what will happen if a mild currency depreciation occurs? Based on its own merits, the insurance industry likely heads toward a profit soft patch. The ebb and flow of overall business activity drives revenue growth, particularly in the interest rate-sensitive auto and housing sectors. Chart 8 combines sales growth for the latter two sectors into one series, which has recently slipped into negative territory, warning of a similar fate for insurance top-line growth. Consumer spending on insurance products is also contracting relative to total spending (Chart 8), corroborating the cautious message from housing and autos. There are also cracks forming in pricing power. The CPI for motor vehicle insurance remains robust, but that of household tenants insurance has sunk into the deflation zone. If the hard market turns soft, it will further undermine underwriting premium growth. To make matters worse, insurance companies have been on a hiring binge for the past several years. Headcount exploded higher beginning in 2014, and continues to make new highs. Rising cost structures coincided with the downturn in insurance book value growth (Chart 9). Book values have recently started to shrink, with little prospect for a reversal unless labor costs ease and/or underwriting activity revives. As a result, our preference is to focus exposure on non-insurance financials, as insurance remains a high-conviction underweight. Chart 7'Dollar ##br##Trouble' Chart 8Pricing ##br##Power Blues Chart 9Beware The Bull Market ##br## In Insurance Employment Book Profits In Utilities In early-April we upgraded the S&P utilities sector to a tactical (1-3 month) overweight courtesy of five key drivers that have now largely played out.1 As a result, we are booking profits of 1% and downgrading to a benchmark allocation. The U.S. economy is on the cusp of a capex revival. While Q1/2017 GDP growth was unduly weak, investment spending was a bright spot. Our U.S. Capex Indicator has accelerated sharply, signaling that investment should continue to gain traction. Historically, business spending and utilities relative performance have been inversely correlated (the Capex Indicator is shown inverted, top panel, Chart 10). Similarly, the composite ISM export index has recently catapulted to the highest level since the late-1990s. Should the U.S. dollar continue to depreciate, U.S. exporters will remain busy filling foreign orders. That is a relative performance drag for the domestically-exposed utilities sector (ISM exports shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 10). Meanwhile, electricity production growth has crested and natural gas price inflation has rolled over, suggesting that pricing power gains have peaked (Chart 11). The implication is that there will be no earnings follow through to support the recent breakout attempt (third panel, Chart 12). Chart 10Capex Revival Is Bearish For Utilities Chart 11Soft Demand With Weak Selling Prices Chart 12Why Pay Up For Lack Of EPS Follow Through? Importantly, the total return of the bond-to-stock ratio continues to contract. While both stocks and bond prices have risen in tandem of late, persistent stock market outperformance warns that flows into this fixed income proxy will soon peter out (Chart 12). Thus, in the absence of an earnings acceleration, it will be difficult to sustain premium valuations (bottom panel, Chart 12). In sum, utilities leading profit indicators have crested and all five of the driving forces behind our tactical overweight recommendation have largely transpired. Bottom Line: Execute the downgrade alert and book 1% profits since our tactical overweight of the S&P utilities sector, initiated in early-April. Time To Liquidate Beverage Stocks Consumer staples equities in general and beverage stocks in particular have been stellar outperformers this year. Nevertheless, this strength may prove fleeting in the absence of a revival in relative profit fortunes. Since the mid-1990s, relative performance has followed the ebb and flow of relative forward profit estimates. However, a gap has opened, as analyst estimates have continued to drift lower as share prices have climbed (top panel, Chart 13). The gravitational pull from fading earnings confidence may be too powerful to overcome over the next six months, given that our leading profit indicators have all taken a decisive turn for the worse. There is a rising risk that premium valuations will normalize (bottom panel, Chart 13). Instead, household products and packaged foods stocks offer a better risk/reward tradeoff. The biggest risk that we first identified in March centers around beverage shipments. The top panel of Chart 14 shows that industry shipments have plunged on the back of anemic end-demand. Shipment weakness is cause for concern given the correlation with relative performance. Chart 13Mind The Gap Chart 14Beverage Deflation... Our beverage industry activity proxy confirms this bearish message: relative profitability is under attack (middle panel, Chart 14). Worrisomely, soft drink manufacturers have tried hard to arrest the fall in shipments via steep price concessions (third panel, Chart 14). Even price deflation has been unable to reverse the contraction in industry volumes. If S&P soft drink sales continue to soften on the back of both volume and price cuts, then profit margins will take a hit (third panel, Chart 15). True, input cost inflation remains well contained, as both ethylene and raw food commodity prices are non-threatening. Moreover, labor cost inflation is subdued. Still, history shows that deflation typically leads to a margin squeeze. There is some hope that the export relief valve may partially neutralize soft domestic consumption. Consumer goods exports have contracted, but the depreciation in the U.S. dollar, especially against emerging market (EM) currencies, provides a glimmer of light that a turnaround lies ahead (third panel, Chart 16). But we are reluctant to forecast an export resurgence, given that EM consumption growth has continued to ease. Chart 16 shows that beverage sales growth closely follows the trend in real Asian retail sales, and the current message is bearish. Chart 15Mind The Gap Chart 16Do Not Bet On An Export-Led Recovery Adding it up, leading indicators of beverage demand remain muted (second panel, Chart 16), at a time when industry price deflation has intensified. This is a toxic brew for profitability, and we recommend using recent outperformance and sell down positions to underweight. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P soft drinks index to underweight. 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Great Expectations?", dated April 3, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.
Dear Client, Along with this brief Weekly Report, we are sending you a Special Report written by my colleague Marko Papic, Chief Strategist of BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service. Marko argues that the U.S. is vulnerable to serious socio-political instability by the 2020 election, as a result of the widening gulf between elites and the rest. Trump, thus far, seems unlikely to bridge this gap. I hope you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Strategist Global Investment Strategy Highlight U.S. growth will accelerate over the remainder of the year, thanks to easier financial conditions. This will force the Federal Reserve to raise rates more than the market is currently discounting. In contrast, the BoJ and the ECB will remain on hold. The net result would be a stronger dollar. Solid Chinese growth will support commodity prices. Stay overweight global equities over a cyclical horizon of 12 months. Feature U.S. Growth Will Surprise On The Upside I have been meeting clients in Asia over the past week. The ongoing decline in Treasury yields - the 10-year yield hit a 7-month low of 2.14% this week - was a frequent topic of conversation. Investors are becoming increasingly convinced that the U.S. economy is running out of steam. The OIS curve is pricing in only 48 basis points of rate hikes over the next 12 months. Since a June rate increase is now largely seen as a done deal, the market is essentially saying the Fed will abandon its tightening cycle later this year. We think that's too early. The U.S. economy may not be on fire, but it is hardly floundering. The Blue Chip consensus estimate for Q2 growth stands at 3.1%. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model is pointing to growth of 3.4%. There is little reason to think that growth will slow substantially later this year. Financial conditions have eased significantly over the past few months thanks to a weaker dollar, falling bond yields, narrower credit spreads, and higher equity prices (Chart 1). Our research has shown that GDP growth tends to react to changes in financial conditions with a lag of around 6-to-9 months (Chart 2). This means demand growth is likely to strengthen, not weaken, over the remainder of the year. Chart 1Financial Conditions Have Been Easing... Chart 2...Which Bodes Well For Growth Running Out Of Slack If demand growth does accelerate, does the U.S. economy have the supply capacity to fully accommodate it? We do not think so. The headline unemployment rate fell to a 16-year low of 4.3% in May. It is now half a percentage point below the Fed's estimate of full employment. The broader U-6 rate, which includes marginally-attached workers and those working part-time purely for economic reasons, dropped to 8.4%, essentially completing the roundtrip to where it was before the recession (Chart 3). Chart 3A Tight Labor Market Chart 4Wage Growth Is In An Uptrend Chart 5Wage Gains Are Broad Based Contrary to popular perception, wages are rising. Looking across the various official wage indices that are published on a regular basis, the underlying trend in wage growth has accelerated from 1.2% in 2010 to 2.4% (Chart 4). The acceleration in wage growth has been broad-based, occurring across most industries, regions, and worker characteristics (Chart 5). Wage Growth: No Mystery Here Granted, wage growth is still about a percentage point lower than it was before the recession, but that can be explained by slower productivity growth and lower long-term inflation expectations (Chart 6). Real unit labor costs, which take both factors into account, are rising at a faster pace than in 2007 and close to the pace in 2000 (Chart 7). Chart 6A Secular Downtrend In Productivity Growth ##br##And Inflation Expectations Chart 7Rising Real Unit Labor Costs: ##br##A Case Of Deja-Vu Looking out, wage growth is likely to accelerate further. The evidence strongly suggests that the Phillips curve has a "kink" at an unemployment rate of around 5% (Chart 8). In plain English, this means that a drop in the unemployment rate from 10% to 8% tends to have little effect on inflation, while a drop from 6% to 4% does. The Cost Of Waiting One might argue that the Fed can afford to take a "wait and see" approach to raising rates. There is some merit to this view, but it can be taken too far. If the Fed is to have any hope of achieving a soft landing for the economy, it needs to stabilize the unemployment rate at a level close to NAIRU. This may be possible if the unemployment rate is near 4%, but it would be difficult to pull off if the rate slips much below that level. Trying to stabilize the unemployment rate when it has already fallen well below its full employment level means accepting a permanently overheated economy. A standard "expectations-augmented" Phillips curve says that this is not possible to accomplish without accepting persistently rising inflation. If the Fed did find itself in a situation where the economy were overheating, it would have no choice but to jack up rates in order push the unemployment rate to a higher level. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that once the unemployment rate starts rising, it keeps rising. Indeed, there has never been a case in the post-war era where the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession ensuing (Chart 9). Chart 9Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle The inescapable fact is that modern economies contain numerous feedback loops. When unemployment is falling, this generates a virtuous cycle where rising employment boosts income and confidence, leading to more spending and even lower unemployment. The exact opposite happens when unemployment starts rising. History suggests that trying to raise the unemployment rate by just a little bit is like trying to get a little bit pregnant. It's simply impossible to pull off. The implication is that the Fed will not only raise rates in line with the dots, but could actually expedite the pace of rate hikes if aggregate demand accelerates later this year, as we expect. Remember, it wasn't that long ago that a typical tightening cycle entailed eight rate hikes per year. In this context, the market's expectation of less than two hikes over the next 12 months seems implausibly low. No Tightening In Japan Or Europe Chart 10Inflation Is Way Below The BoJ's Target Could other major central banks follow in the Fed's footsteps and tighten monetary policy more aggressively than what the market is currently discounting? We doubt it. Japanese inflation is nowhere close to the BOJ's 2% target (Chart 10). And even if Japanese growth surprises significantly to the upside, the first step the authorities will take is to tighten fiscal policy by raising the sales tax. Monetary tightening remains some ways off. Likewise, while the ECB might remove a few of its emergency measures, it is nowhere close to embarking on a full-fledged tightening cycle. The ECB's own research department recently put out a paper documenting that the combined unemployment and underemployment rate currently stands at 18% of the labor force across the euro area (Chart 11). This is 3.5 points above where it was in 2008. If one excludes Germany from the picture, the level of unemployment and underemployment is seven points higher than it was in 2008. This is not the stuff of which tightening cycles are made. Meanwhile, on the other side of the English Channel, the BoE must contend with the fact that growth remains underwhelming, partly due to ongoing angst about Brexit negotiations (Chart 12). Chart 12U.K. Is Lagging Its Peers EM Outlook Chart 13Positive Signs For The Chinese Housing Market... The outlook for EM currencies is a tougher call. On the one hand, a more hawkish Fed and broad-based dollar strength have usually been bad news for emerging markets, given that 80% of EM foreign-currency debt is denominated in U.S. dollars. On the other hand, stronger global growth should support commodity prices, even if the dollar is strengthening. Our energy strategists remain particularly convinced that oil prices will rise over the remainder of this year due to robust demand growth for crude and continued OPEC discipline. Strong Chinese growth should also boost metals demand, while limiting the need for further RMB weakness. Chart 13 shows that property developers have been snapping up new land at an accelerating pace. The percentage of households who intend to buy a new home has also surged to record high levels. This bodes well for construction, and by extension, commodity demand. The strong pace of growth in excavator sales - a leading indicator for capex - confirms this trend. Meanwhile, real-time measures of Chinese industrial activity such as rail freight traffic and electricity generation remain buoyant (Chart 14). This is helping to lift producer prices, which, in turn, is fueling a rebound in industrial company profits (Chart 15). And for all the talk about the government's crackdown on credit growth, the reality is that medium-to-long term lending to nonfinancial companies has actually picked up (Chart 16). Chart 14... And Positive Signs For Chinese Capex Chart 15Higher Producer Prices Boosting Profits Chart 16A Positive In China's Credit Picture Stick With Stocks... For Now In terms of global asset allocation, we continue to recommend a cyclical (12-month) overweight in equities relative to bonds. We have a slight preference for DM over EM stocks, although given some of the positive factors supporting EM economies noted above, we do not regard this as a high-conviction view. Within the DM universe, we favour higher-beta equity markets such Japan and the euro area over the U.S. (currency hedged). In the government bond space, we would underweight U.S. Treasurys, given the likelihood that the Fed will deliver more rate hikes over the coming months than the market is currently discounting. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Chart 1Something's Got To Give Last Friday's disappointing employment report reinforced the bond market's recent strength. The 10-year Treasury yield reached a new 2017 low of 2.15%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate broke below 1.8% and the overnight index swap curve is now priced for only 47 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months. Increasingly, the bond market is discounting two different future states of the world that cannot possibly coexist. Decelerating wage growth has caused the market to expect fewer Fed rate hikes, while concurrently, the cost of long-maturity inflation protection has fallen and the yield curve has flattened (Chart 1). This means the market expects that poor wage growth and inflation will cause the Fed to back away from its expected pace of two more rate hikes this year, but also that this relent will not be sufficient to prompt a recovery in economic growth or inflation. This dichotomy cannot exist for long. Either wage growth and inflation will bounce back in the second half of the year allowing the Fed to lift rates twice more in 2017 (our base case expectation), or inflation will continue to disappoint in which case the Fed will slow its pace of hikes. In both cases long-maturity Treasury yields should head higher, led by an increasing cost of inflation compensation. Stay at below benchmark duration. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in May. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 3 bps on the month and, at 113 bps, it remains well below its historical average (134 bps). Limited inflationary pressure will keep monetary policy accommodative enough to ensure excess returns consistent with carry. However, corporate spreads have already discounted a substantial improvement in leverage (Chart 2) and we do not see much potential for spread tightening from current levels. BEA data show that EBITD contracted in Q1, causing the annual growth rate to tick back below zero (panel 4). Meanwhile, gross issuance has been strong so far this year, suggesting that leverage will show an uptick in Q1 when the Flow of Funds data are released later this week. This aligns with our observation that, historically, net leverage - defined as total debt less cash as a percent of trailing EBITD - has never declined unless prompted by a recession. In other words, the corporate sector never voluntarily undertakes deleveraging, it only starts to pay down debt when forced by a severe economic contraction. For now, rising leverage will limit the amount of spread tightening, but shouldn't lead to negative excess returns. That will only occur when inflationary pressures are more pronounced and the Fed steps up the pace of tightening - probably sometime next year. Energy related sectors still appear cheap on our model (Table 3), and have outperformed the overall corporate index this year even though the oil price has fallen. Remain overweight. High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 48 basis points in May. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 8 bps on the month and, at 362 bps, it is currently 18 bps above its 2017 low. While the average spread on the junk index is a mere 38 bps above its post-crisis low, our estimate of the default-adjusted high-yield spread is 204 bps, only slightly below its historical average (Chart 3). Assuming our forecast for default losses is correct, a default-adjusted spread in this range has historically coincided with positive 12-month excess returns to high-yield bonds 74% of the time, with an average excess return of 82 bps. Our estimate of 12-month forward default losses is calculated using Moody's baseline assumption for the speculative grade default rate, which stands at 2.96%. We also incorporate an expected recovery rate of 47%. This expectation for a continued decline in the default rate squares with trends in corporate lending standards (which are once again easing), industrial production (which is accelerating) and job cut announcements (which are trending lower). Weak first quarter profit growth will be a headwind if it persists, but we expect it will recover alongside the broader economy in Q2. Overall, with muted inflationary pressures, an improving default back-drop and still moderate valuations, we think junk bonds will deliver small positive excess returns during the next 12 months. Stay overweight. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in May. The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) rose 2 bps on the month, but this was entirely offset by a 2 bps tightening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The most important issue for mortgage investors at the moment is when and how the Fed will cease the reinvestment of its MBS portfolio. We have written extensively on this topic in recent weeks,1 and through Fed communications have learned the following: The unwinding of the balance sheet will start before the end of this year (assuming the economic outlook does not deteriorate substantially) Both MBS and Treasury securities will be impacted The process will be "tapered" with monthly caps set on the amount of securities that will be allowed to run off. The caps will gradually increase according to a pre-set schedule. MBS OAS are already starting to look attractive, especially relative to Aaa-rated credit (Chart 4). But we are hesitant to move back into MBS at current levels. OAS have further upside relative to trends in net issuance (panel 4), and the increased supply from the end of Fed reinvestment will only add to the widening pressure. Remain underweight. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 86 bps. The Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors outperformed by 18 bps and 38 bps, respectively. Meanwhile, the low-beta Domestic Agency and Supranational sectors outperformed by 7 bps and 9 bps, respectively. The Sovereign sector underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 12 bps on the month. Sovereigns underperformed in May even though the broad trade-weighted dollar depreciated by 1.4%. Similarly, Mexican debt - which carries the largest weighting in the Sovereign index - underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 22 bps, even though the peso continued to appreciate versus the dollar (Chart 5). With U.S. growth likely to rebound following a weak Q1, the trade-weighted U.S. dollar should appreciate in the second half of this year. Meanwhile, our Emerging Markets Strategy thinks that Mexico's central bank could deliver another 25 bps rate hike, but it won't be long before tighter policy becomes a drag on consumer spending.2 The peso could stay well-bid for now, but the longer run trend is for a weaker peso versus the U.S. dollar. The Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors continue to offer attractive spreads, after adjusting for credit rating and duration, compared to most U.S. corporate sectors. We continue to recommend overweight positions in Foreign Agencies and Local Authorities within an overall underweight allocation to the Government-Related Index. Municipal Bonds: Cut To Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 85 basis points in May (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio declined 8% on the month, and is now more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean. In a recent report,3 we noted that the current weakness in state & local government revenue growth mostly reflected the fall-out from the mid-2014 commodity price slump. As such, we expect that revenue growth will rebound in the months ahead and that state & local government net borrowing will decline. However, this eventuality is now fully discounted in M/T yield ratios (Chart 6, panel 3). Further, M/T yield ratios benefited from a steep decline in issuance during the past few months (bottom panel), and the recent uptick in visible supply suggests that the tailwind from declining issuance is about to shift. Factor in the uncertainty surrounding tax reform and a potential infrastructure program, and it is difficult to make the case for much tighter yield ratios. We recommend investors reduce municipal bond exposure to underweight (2 out of 5). Investors should continue to capture the premium in long-maturity munis relative to short maturities (panel 2), and also favor the debt of commodity-dependent states where tax revenues should grow more quickly. In particular, Aaa-rated Texas General Obligation bonds offer a premium of 14 bps versus the overall Aaa muni curve at the 10-year maturity point. The average premium offered by other Aaa-rated states is -0.6 bps. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve shifted lower and flattened in May. The 2/10 slope flattened 8 basis points and the 5/30 slope flattened 3 bps. For the second consecutive month yields remained stable out to the 2-year maturity point, but declined further out the curve. As stated on the first page of this report, the recent flattening of the Treasury curve indicates that the market expects the Fed will maintain a policy that is too restrictive for inflation to return to target. We think this is flat out wrong. Either core inflation will turn higher in the second half of this year, allowing the Fed to lift rates twice more in 2017. Or, core inflation will remain depressed. In the latter scenario, the Fed would adopt a more dovish policy stance until inflation starts to rise. In either case, the cost of inflation compensation at the long-end of the curve is not high enough, and it will cause the curve to steepen as it rises (Chart 7). We previously documented that the positive correlation between TIPS breakeven rates and the slope of the yield curve still holds during Fed rate hike cycles.4 We continue to recommend positioning for a steeper 2/10 curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. This trade returned 0 bps in May, but is still 26 bps in the money since inception on December 20, 2016. While this trade no longer benefits from the extreme cheapness of the 5-year bullet relative to the rest of the curve (panel 3), it will continue to outperform as TIPS breakevens widen and the curve steepens in the second half of the year. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 107 basis points in May. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate fell 11 bps on the month and, at 1.79%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. A series of disappointing inflation reports have led to weakness in TIPS breakevens so far this year. Year-over-year trimmed mean PCE inflation fell to 1.75% in April, all the way from a peak of 1.91% as recently as January (Chart 8). As we discussed in two recent reports,5 a Phillips Curve model- based on lagged inflation, the employment gap, non-oil import prices and inflation expectations - forcefully predicts that core inflation will trend higher for the remainder of the year (panel 4). In a base case scenario in which both the unemployment rate and the trade-weighted dollar remain flat at current levels, the model projects that core PCE inflation will exceed 2% by the end of this year. In fact, we find it difficult to create a set of reasonable economic assumptions that don't result in core PCE inflation at (or above) the Fed's 1.9% forecast by year end. While we anticipate a rebound in core inflation between now and the end of the year, if that rebound does not seem to be materializing by the end of the summer, the Fed is likely to adopt a more dovish policy stance. Such a policy shift would lend support to TIPS breakeven wideners. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +52 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 7 bps on the month, and remains well below its average pre-crisis level. In a recent report, we highlighted that consumer balance sheets are in their best shape since prior to the start of the housing bubble.6 As such, consumer ABS should remain a relatively low risk investment. However, some signs of stress are beginning to emerge, particularly in the sub-prime auto space. According to the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Survey, credit card lending standards tightened in Q4 of last year, but have since reverted into net easing territory (Chart 9). In contrast, auto loan lending standards continue to tighten and net losses on auto loans appear to have bottomed for the cycle. At least so far, auto ABS are not discounting much deterioration in credit quality. After adjusting for volatility, Aaa-rated auto ABS do not offer much of a spread pick-up relative to Aaa-rated credit card ABS (panel 3) and the spread differential between non-Aaa auto ABS and Aaa auto ABS has fallen to one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean. We continue to recommend that investors favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans within an overall overweight allocation to consumer ABS. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 33 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +52 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 4 bps on the month, but remains below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). Apartment and office building prices are growing strongly, but retail sector property prices have been close to flat during the past year (bottom panel). Tighter lending standards and falling demand also suggest that credit stress is starting to mount in the commercial real estate sector. So far, this stress has manifested itself in rising retail and office delinquency rates, while multi-family delinquencies remain low (panel 5). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 31 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +50 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS tightened 5 bps on the month, and currently sits at 49 bps. The option-adjusted spread on Agency CMBS still looks attractive compared to other high-quality spread product: Agency MBS = 36 bps, Aaa consumer ABS = 39 bps, Agency bonds = 17 bps and Supranationals = 19 bps. We continue to recommend an overweight position in Agency CMBS. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.49% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.41%. The lower fair value results from the large spike in the uncertainty index last November, which has only been partially unwound. The U.S. PMI has dipped lower in recent months, but remains firmly entrenched above the 50 boom/bust line. Meanwhile, the Eurozone PMI continues to surge ahead. China's PMI is the real source of concern. It has recently dipped below 50, and there is a risk that tighter monetary policy could lead to further contraction in the near term (bottom panel).7 For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.15%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017, U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 23, 2017, U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017 and U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Way Forward For The Fed's Balance Sheet", dated February 28, 2017. All available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "A Time To Be Contrarian", dated April 5, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Will The Fed Stick To Its Guns?", dated May 16, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017 and U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 23, 2017. Both available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Doctrine", dated May 30, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Past Peak Pessimism", dated May 9, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon) Current Recommendation
Special Report Highlights Overall Investment Grade (IG) Corporates: An update of our regional sector relative value models shows that it has become increasingly difficult to find industries where debt looks cheap. Maintain overweight allocations to U.S. & U.K. IG, and stay underweight Euro Area IG, but keep overall spread risk close to neutral levels. U.S. IG: Within U.S. Investment Grade corporate debt allocations, upgrade Energy names (Oil Field Services, Integrated) and Cable & Satellite to overweight, while downgrading Consumer Cyclical sectors (Retailers) and Other Industrials to Underweight. Euro IG: Stay underweight and keep spread risk (i.e. DTS) close to index levels. Reduce exposure to Cable & Satellite, Electric Utilities and Natural Gas Utilities. U.K. IG: Stay overweight U.K. IG but keep overall spread risk near index levels. Feature Chart of the WeekCandidates For Additional Spread Convergence Back on January 24th, we published a Special Report that introduced specific Investment Grade (IG) corporate bond sector allocations for the U.S., Euro Area and U.K. to our model portfolio framework.1 The recommended weightings were based on the output from our sector relative value models for each region. We had presented those models on a semi-regular basis in the past, but without any specific numerical allocation among the sectors. By attaching actual weightings to each sector, within a "fully invested" model portfolio, we are now able to more accurately measure the aggregate success of our recommendations. In this follow-up report, we discuss the performance of our sector tilts since January, refresh our relative value models and present changes to our allocations. The broad conclusion is that, while our calls have done well over the past few months and our IG portfolios have outperformed the broad IG bond indices, it remains difficult to find compellingly cheap sectors (particularly in non-financial industries) given the overall tight level of corporate bond spreads. This is especially true in the Euro Area, where we see the poorest risk/reward tradeoff for IG exposure relative to the U.S. and U.K. We are more comfortable recommending an overweight stance on U.S. and U.K. IG corporates versus Euro Area equivalents, in line with our overall allocation in our main model portfolio. Given the tight overall level of spreads in all three regions, however, we are focusing our recommendations on sectors that have cheaper valuations but with riskiness closer to the overall IG indices - like Energy in the U.S. and Wireless in both the Euro Area and U.K. (Chart 1). Good Performance From Our Sector Tilts The performance of our sector recommendations has been reasonably solid since January (Chart 2). Our U.S. sector tilts added +5bps of excess return versus duration-matched U.S. Treasuries, coming mostly from our overweights in Energy and Financials. Within the Euro Area, we were able to generate +9bps of excess return versus government debt, also mainly from above-benchmark allocations to Energy and Financial names. In the U.K., our call to overweight Bank debt provided essentially all of our +23bps of outperformance versus Gilts. These strong excess returns came on top of a very strong performance for corporate debt since January 24th. Excess returns for IG in the U.S., Euro Area and U.K. were 0.9%, 1.3% and 1.3%, respectively. The detailed breakdown of the returns by sector are shown in Appendix Tables at the back of this report. To determine the success rate of our sector tilts, we can define "winners" as sectors where we had an active view (i.e. not neutral) and where the relative performance of the sector versus the overall IG corporate index was in the direction of that active view. For example, our decision to go underweight Diversified Manufacturing in the Euro Area was a good one, as that sector had an excess return of 0.7%, well below that of the overall Euro Area IG index (a 1.3% excess return). We can define "losers" in the same way, where the relative sector performance went against our active allocation. In Chart 3, we show the "winners" and "losers" for our U.S., Euro Area and U.K. sector allocations since late January. Our success rate was quite good, as we had far more winners than losers in all three regions. The Big Picture For Corporate Credit: Favorable Business Cycle, But Valuations Are Not Cheap We have been maintaining an overall overweight allocation to IG corporates since late January. This was based on a view that global economic activity was accelerating, which would support faster profit growth. This would provide cyclical relief for stressed corporate balance sheets in the U.S. Euro Area & U.K. corporates would also benefit from a better profit backdrop, with the added bonus of central bank asset purchases helping to improve the supply/demand balance for IG debt. Yet spreads have already tightened substantially throughout the IG universe. This reflects declining macro volatility and the ongoing investor stretch for yield after the rise in global government bond yields earlier this year faded significantly. The result is that there is now far less dispersion among corporate sectors, by industry or by credit quality, then we've seen in recent years (Charts 4, 5 & 6). Coming at a time of high corporate leverage, and with central bank liquidity growth starting to roll over as we discussed in last week's Weekly Report, we are recommending an "up in quality" bias to sector allocations and credit exposure, while favoring U.S. and U.K. corporates over Euro Area equivalents.2 Chart 4Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve##BR##In The U.S. Chart 5Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve##BR##In The Euro Area Chart 6Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve##BR##In The U.K. Bottom Line: An update of our regional sector relative value models shows that it has become increasingly difficult to find industries where debt looks cheap. Maintain overweight allocations to U.S. & U.K. IG, and stay underweight Euro Area IG, while keep overall spread risk close to neutral levels. U.S. Investment Grade: Stay Overweight, But Be Selective In Tables 1A and 1B, we present the results of our U.S. IG sector valuation model as of May 31st.3 We are maintaining an overweight recommendation on U.S. IG in our overall model portfolio, as we continue to see the backdrop for U.S. economic growth being much friendlier for corporate debt versus Treasuries. Credit spreads are very tight, however, so we are maintaining some degree of caution in our sector recommendations. Specifically, we are aiming to favor industries with option-adjusted spread (OAS) at or above that of the overall U.S. IG index, but with a positive valuation from our U.S. IG relative value model. We also wish to keep the aggregate level of spread risk, using our preferred "duration times spread" (DTS) metric, in line with that of the overall U.S. IG index. As can be seen in the scatter diagram in Chart 7, which plots the model valuations versus the DTS score for each sector, there are precious few non-financial sectors that offer attractive spreads that are not riskier than the overall index. Our model has shown some improvement in value within the sub-sectors of the Energy space, which is a consequence of the softness in oil prices over the past few months. With our commodity strategists calling for a recovery in oil prices back up towards to $55-60 range by year-end, we see this an opportunity to raise our allocations to Energy by upgrading the Independent and Integrated sub-sectors to overweight from neutral. At the same time, we are reducing the size of our prior overweights in Refining and Midstream to keep the overall Energy sector allocation to no more than two times that of the U.S. IG Energy index - a pure risk management move on our part. We are also upgrading some of our prior underweights in the Communications sectors to neutral (Media & Entertainment, Wirelines & Wireless) and to overweight (Cable & Satellite), given relatively attractive valuations in those areas. By the same token, we are cutting Other Industrials to underweight from neutral with valuations now looking unattractive. All of our U.S. sector changes result in an upgrade of our weighting to the broad Industrials grouping by 5 percentage points to 58.6%. We are reducing our large overweight to U.S. Banks by an equivalent amount to "fund" this new allocation within our 100% invested model IG portfolio. The net result of all these changes is that our U.S. IG portfolio has an overall DTS score of around 9, in line with that of the U.S. IG benchmark index. Thus, we are not making any changes to our aggregate recommended spread risk, in line with our top-down views on the overall level of credit spreads and curves, as described earlier. Bottom Line: Within U.S. Investment Grade corporate debt allocations, upgrade Energy names (Oil Field Services, Integrated) and Cable & Satellite to overweight, while downgrading Consumer Cyclical sectors (Retailers) and Other Industrials to Underweight. Euro Area Investment Grade: Not Much Value Left, Remain Underweight In Tables 2A and 2B, we show the output from our Euro Area IG sector valuation model. The scatter diagram showing the model residuals versus the individual sector DTS scores is shown in Chart 8. Finding value has become a problem in Europe, with only a few sectors (most notably, Metals & Mining, Oil Field Services, Life Insurance and P&C Insurance) showing a double-digit spread residual from our model. All those sectors also offer wider spreads than the overall Euro Area IG index, but the Insurers stand out as being much riskier from a DTS perspective. That is a function of the wide spread for the overall Insurance sector, which is nearly double that of the overall Euro Area IG index. We see no reason to change our existing allocations to those sectors in our model portfolio, keeping Metals & Mining and Oil Field Services at overweight and the Insurers at neutral (a prudent tradeoff between wide spreads and high risk). It would likely take a meaningful rise in European interest rates before any serious compression in Insurance spreads could unfold, given the struggles that industry faces from low yields on its fixed income investment assets. A rise in European bond yields could unfold later this year if the European Central Bank (ECB) signals that a tapering of its asset purchase program will begin next year. We see that scenario as increasingly likely, given the overall strength of the Euro Area recovery. The ECB will only shift its stance gradually, due to the lack of immediate inflation concerns. Any signal that that fewer bond purchases are in the offing, however, will pose a major risk for European corporates given the large ECB buying of that debt over the past year. We see very few necessary changes to our Euro Area allocations at the moment, as our overall portfolio DTS is in line with the IG benchmark index (around 6). We do recommend cutting Cable & Satellite and Utilities (Electric & Natural Gas) to underweight. Bottom Line: With corporate spreads at tight levels, and with few sectors showing compelling value, we are comfortable in remaining underweight Euro Area corporates, while keeping spread risk (i.e. DTS) close to index levels. Reduce Cable & Satellite, Electric Utilities and Natural Gas Utilities to underweight. U.K. Investment Grade: Stay Overweight, Focusing On Financials In Tables 3A and 3B, we present our update U.K. IG sector model, with the scatterplot of model residuals versus DTS scores shown in Chart 9. Not much has changed in terms of which sectors appear cheap in our model versus the late January levels. Financials, in general, have the cheapest spreads on an absolute basis, especially the Insurers. Although the cheap valuation on the Insurance debt mirrors the same problem highlighted above for the Euro Area insurers - interest rates that are too low to generate acceptable investment returns on the insurers' portfolios. We are maintaining our overall modest overweight allocation to U.K. IG, while keeping overall spread risk close to index levels. While the political and security risks within the U.K. are significant at the moment, there is no threat of the Bank of England moving to a less accommodative monetary policy anytime soon. A backdrop of churning economic growth, an undervalued British Pound and a central bank maintaining hyper-easy monetary policy is still a decent one for U.K. corporate debt. In terms of sector allocation changes based on our U.K. IG sector valuation model, we recommend upgrading Health Care and REITs to overweight, downgrading Other Industrials to neutral and cutting Tobacco to underweight. Bottom Line: Stay overweight U.K. IG but keep overall spread risk near index levels. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Adding Investment Grade Corporate Bond Sectors To Our Model Portfolio Framework", dated January 24 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Distant Early Warning", dated May 30 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Our valuation framework assesses the attractiveness of each IG sector within a cross-sectional analysis. The OAS for each sector is regressed against common risk factors (interest rate duration, credit quality) with the residual spread determining the valuation of each sector. Appendix