China

Highlights As US inflation proves to be not-so-transitory, US interest rate expectations will rise. Slowing Chinese domestic demand and rising US interest rate expectations will support the US dollar. The net impact from China’s slowdown and higher US interest rate expectations on mainstream EM will be currency depreciation. Rising mainstream EM nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates do not often lead to domestic currency appreciation A strengthening dollar vis-à-vis EM currencies is bad news for EM fixed-income markets – both local currency bonds and credit markets. Feature This report discusses EM local currency (domestic) bonds and US dollar bonds (credit markets). To begin with, we reiterate our main macro themes since January this year: (1) a slowdown in China and (2) rising US inflationary pressures and higher US bond yields. These macro themes will create tailwinds for the US dollar, at least for the next several months. A strengthening dollar is bad news for EM fixed-income markets. China’s Slowdown China’s slowdown will continue to unfold. China’s credit (TSF1 excluding equity) growth has slowed further in September (Chart 1, top panel). Similarly, household mortgages are also decelerating sharply (Chart 1, bottom panel). Chart 1China's Money And Credit Are Decelerating Chart 2Curtailed Financing For Property Developers = Less Construction Activity     China's ever-important property market and construction activity will contract in the months ahead. Property sales were down by 20% in September from a year ago. Property developers in recent years have been relying on pre-construction sales as a major source of financing. With pre-sales drying up and borrowing restrained by both government regulations and creditors’ unwillingness to lend, property developers will be unable to sustain the current pace of construction and completion (Chart 2). Chart 3Red Flags For EM ex-TMT Stocks For the same reason, property developers have curtailed their purchases of land. Land sales have been a major source of local government revenues – it is estimated to account for 45% of local government revenues including managed (off-balance sheet) funds. The upshot will be that local governments will be unable to ramp up their infrastructure spending to offset shrinking property construction. Altogether, these will have negative implications for the mainland’s industrial economy and raw materials. Notably, global material stocks have rolled over decisively even though CRB Raw Materials price index has yet to peak (Chart 3, top panel). Global industrial stocks in general and machinery stocks in particular have also relapsed. Finally, Chinese non-TMT share prices have dropped by 20% from their February high and EM ex-TMT equity prices have formed a head-and-shoulder pattern, which often precedes a major gap down (Chart 3, bottom panel). These equity market signals are foreshadowing a slowdown in China’s “old economy”. Bottom Line: The shockwaves emanating from the slowdown in China will hinder growth in Asia and commodity-producing economies in the rest of EM. This is positive for the US dollar because among major economic blocks, the US economy is the least exposed to the mainland economy. US Interest Rates Will Be Repriced US bond yields will continue marching higher, supporting the US dollar. The reasons for higher bond yields are as follows: Investors and commentators can differ on their assessment of the US inflation outlook. However, one thing that we should all agree on is that uncertainty over the US inflation outlook is extraordinarily high. Heightened uncertainty requires a higher risk premium in bonds, i.e., a wider bond term premium. Surprisingly, until August, the term premium on US bonds was very subdued (Chart 4). In brief, the US bond term premium will rise to reflect uncertainty around the inflation outlook, which will push bond yields higher. US wages hold the key to the inflation outlook. We believe that wage growth will surprise to the upside as many companies have strong order books but are struggling to hire. As people gradually return to the labor force, employers have a once in a decade chance to attract qualified employees. Hence, companies will likely compete with one another by offering higher wages to attract the most qualified candidates. The job quit rate is the highest it has been since the early 2000s. This rate also points to higher wages (Chart 5). Chart 4High Inflation Uncertainty Heralds Higher Bond Term Premium And Yields Chart 5US Wage Growth Will Accelerate   Three factors that had suppressed US bond yields will likely be reversing: US commercial banks have been major buyers of US Treasurys and agency securities; the US Treasury has depleted its account at the Fed due to the debt ceiling but will now begin issuing more bonds to fill in this account; the Fed has been purchasing $80 billion of US government bonds each month; however, the Fed is preparing to taper and therefore reduce these purchases. Chart 6US Banks Have Been Buying Bonds En Masse US commercial banks’ holdings of US government and agency securities has risen to 19% of their total assets – on par with their early 1990s all-time high (Chart 6, top panel). In turn, the share of loans and leases has fallen to an all-time low (Chart 6, middle panel). As US banks begin to expand their lending, they will likely reduce the pace of their buying of US Treasurys. This along with the US Treasury issuing more paper to increase its depleted Treasury General Account at the Fed (Chart 6, bottom panel) and the Fed’s tapering will likely push up US bond yields. Current shortages are the result of excessive demand, rather than producers operating below capacity.2 The fact is that the supply/shipment of goods is booming, at least from Asia/China to the US. This will prove to be inflationary, and therefore lead to higher bond yields. Chinese shipments to the US continue to thrive – in September, export values were up by 30.5% from a year ago (Chart 7, top panel). Given that US import prices from China are rising at an annual rate of 3.8%, China’s export volume to the US has grown to about 26.7% from last September when it was already booming. Consistently, inbound containers unloaded at the Long Beach and LA ports have surged to all-time highs (Chart 7, bottom panel). Hence, US ports are not operating below capacity, it is excessive demand for goods that has created these bottlenecks. Finally, concerning semiconductors, shortages are due to excessive demand not a failure to produce. Global semiconductor production has been growing rapidly over the past two years. A silver lining is that a capitalistic system will eventually expand production and meet demand. Although we broadly agree with this expectation, it will take a couple of years for this to take place. In the interim, we can expect to see higher prices, at least for goods, and rising inflation expectations. Bottom Line: As US inflation proves to be not-so-transitory, US interest rate expectations will rise, which will support the US dollar. The broad-trade weighted US dollar has been correlated with US TIPS yields (Chart 8). Chart 7Shipments From Asia To The US Have Been Booming Chart 8High US Rates Will Support The Dollar   EM Domestic Bonds Chart 9EM Inflation Has Been Spiking EM domestic bond yields have been rising as inflation in EM ex-China, Korea, Taiwan (herein referred as mainstream EM) has been surging (Chart 9). Even if commodity prices roll over, EM interest rate expectations will likely continue rising for now because of higher US bond yields and EM currency weakness. Many clients have been asking whether rising mainstream EM policy rates and local bond yields will support EM currencies. We do not think so. In high-yielding interest rate markets such as Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Russia and Turkey, neither short- nor long-term rates have been positively correlated with the value of their currencies (Chart 10 and 11). Chart 10Higher Bond Yields Do Not Lead To Currency Appreciation In Brazil And Mexico Chart 11Higher Bond Yields Do Not Lead To Currency Appreciation In Russia And South Africa Chart 12Higher EM Inflation-Adjusted Bond Yields Do Not Lead To EM Currency Appreciation Further, in these markets real (inflation-adjusted) rates also have not been positively correlated with their currencies (Chart 12). As illustrated in Charts 11, 12 and 13, there has been no positive correlation between both EM nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates and their currencies. Rather, there has often been a negative correlation. The basis is that exchange rates drive interest rate expectations, not vice versa. Currency depreciation leads to higher inflation expectations and rising interest rates. Conversely, exchange rate appreciation dampens inflation expectations paving the way for declining interest rates. Bottom Line: The net impact China’s slowdown and higher US interest rate expectations on mainstream EM domestic bonds will be currency depreciation with little room for their central banks to cut rates. As a result, local bonds’ risk-reward factor remains an unattractive tradeoff. EM Credit Markets As we laid out in A Primer on EM USD Bonds report  on April 29, EM exchange rates and their business cycle are the key drivers of EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads. If EM currencies drop, EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads will widen (Chart 13). The basis is that foreign currency debt servicing will become more expensive as EM currencies depreciate. As EM growth disappoints, EM credit spreads will widen too (Chart 14). Chart 13EM Credit Spreads And EM Currencies Chart 14EM Profit Expectations And EM Corporate Spreads   In addition, the continuous carnage in Chinese offshore corporate bonds will heighten odds of a material selloff in this EM credit. Chinese property companies’ USD bonds make up a more than half of China’s offshore USD corporate bond index and a large part of the EM corporate bond index. Poor performance of the EM corporate bond index could trigger outflows from this asset class. Investment Recommendations Slowing Chinese domestic demand and rising US interest rate expectations will support the US dollar. As the interest rate differential between China and the US narrows, the CNY will likely experience a modest setback versus the greenback (Chart 15). Even small RMB weakness could produce a non-trivial depreciation in EM exchange rates. The latter is negative for EM local currency bonds and EM credit markets. Absolute-return investors should stay on the sidelines of EM domestic bonds. For dedicated investors in this asset class, our recommended overweights are Mexico, Russia, Korea, India, China, Korea, Malaysia and Chile. EM credit markets will continue to underperform their US counterparts (Chart 16). Credit investors should continue underweighting EM credit versus their US counterparts, a strategy we have been recommending since March 25, 2021. Chart 15CNY/USD And The Interest Rate Differential Chart 16EM Credit Markets Are Underperforming Their US Peers   Finally, EM ex-TMT share prices correlate with inverted EM USD corporate bond yields (Chart 17). Higher EM corporate bond yields (shown inverted in Chart 17) entail lower EM ex-TMT share prices. Chart 17High EM USD Bond Yields Herald Lower Share Prices In turn, China’s TMT stocks remain vulnerable as we have argued in past reports. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Total Social Financing. 2 We made a similar case for Chinese electricity shortages in last week’s report. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Special Report

Dear Client, Owing to BCA’s Annual Investment Conference next week, there will be no report on Wednesday, October 20. We will return to our regular publication schedule on Wednesday, October 27. Please note that there will be a China Outlook panel discussion at 9 AM on Thursday, October 21. We hope you will join us for the event. Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist   Highlights In the next six to nine months, the long-end of the yield curve will likely drop as investors start to price in weaker-than-expected economic growth amid measured stimulus. China’s 10-year government bond yields are set to structurally shift to a lower bound as domestic demand decelerates along with the nation’s total population. Policymakers will favor lower borrowing costs to reduce stress due to high debt levels among companies, central and local governments, and households. National savings are not a constraint for a country to lower domestic bond yields. China will continue to open domestic financial markets to global investors. The country’s large foreign exchange reserves limit the risk to its internal markets from extreme volatility in foreign fund flows. Feature In the past two decades policy rates in advanced economies have been brought close to zero and bond yields have dropped to extremely low levels. The yields on China’s government bonds, however, have remained well above their peers in advanced economies and in neighboring countries (Chart 1). Chart 1China's Government Bond Yields Far Above Other Major Economies Moreover, despite China’s growth slowing from double to mid-single digits, yields on China’s 10-year government bonds have remained at around 2006 levels. China’s working-age population continues to decline and its total population is estimated to start falling in the next five years. China’s demographic headwinds, combined with high leverage in the private sector at around 220% of GDP, will cap the upside in yields. In this report we share our views on China’s short rates and long-term bond yields on a cyclical basis (next six to nine months) and in the next five years. The Cyclical Outlook The yield curve will likely flatten with China’s long-term government bond yields dropping more than short-term rates in next six to nine months. This will occur in the expectation of a further growth slowdown in at least the next two quarters. Meanwhile, the downside is limited on the short-end of the curve, given it is more sensitive to the PBoC’s guidance and monetary authorities will ease policy only gradually. Stimulus in the next two quarters may also disappoint. Credit growth will bottom in Q4 this year, but the rebound will be modest. Stronger issuance in local government bonds in the next two quarters will be offset by sluggish bank loan impulse. Chinese policymakers will refrain from using stimulus for the property market as a counter-cyclical policy tool to revive the economy. Restrictions will be maintained on bank lending to the real estate sector including mortgages and these controls will limit the rebound in credit expansion. Furthermore, infrastructure investment will improve modestly in the next two quarters, but local governments remain under pressure to deleverage, which will limit their incentive and capacity to spend. Chart 2Stimulus In 2018/19 Was Very Measured We maintain our view that the current policy backdrop is shaping up to resemble that of H2 2018 and 2019. At that time, even though the central bank maintained an accommodative monetary policy stance and kept liquidity conditions ample, the size of the stimulus was measured and the economy was lackluster (Chart 2). Recent liquidity injections by the PBoC through open market operations should not be viewed as monetary easing because they represent the bank’s efforts to keep policy rates steady, at best (Chart 3). The central bank provided the interbank system with substantial financing to avoid liquidity crunches following the May 2019 Baoshang Bank takeover and the November 2020 Yongcheng Coal company debt default (Chart 4). In both cases, 10-year bond yields did not fall by as much as short rates, reflecting investors’ expectations that the liquidity injections and resulting drop in short rates were not long-lasting. Chart 3Recent PBoC Liquidity Injections Intended To Keep Policy Rates Steady Chart 4APBoC Also Injected Liquidity After Previous High-Profile Defaults Chart 4BPBoC Also Injected Liquidity After Previous High-Profile Defaults Our view on China’s bond yields will not change with the liftoff of US Fed policy rates,  even if the Fed hikes rates earlier and by more than anticipated. The Fed’s policy has little bearing on China’s long-dated yields, which are driven by domestic business cycles and monetary policy (Chart 5). Concerning the exchange rate, we believe that the RMB will modestly depreciate in the next six to nine months, given that the China-US nominal and real interest rate differentials will narrow (Chart 6). While some depreciation in the currency is modestly reflationary for China’s exporters, it will not be enough to offset weaknesses in domestic demand. Chart 5Domestic Economic Fundamentals Drive Yields On China's Government Bonds Chart 6China-US Rate Differentials Are Set To Narrow Chart 7Pipeline Inflationary Pressures in China Remain Elevated Inflation remains a risk to our cyclical view on the 10-year bond yield. While the economy is weakening, pipeline inflationary pressures remain elevated (Chart 7).  We do not foresee that the PBoC will change its modestly dovish policy stance because of inflationary pressures stemming from supply-side bottlenecks. However, supply constraints will not abate soon and consequently, pipeline inflationary pressures and producer price inflation may not subside in the next six months. Thus, fixed-income investors may start to price in higher inflation, which could prevent long-duration bond yields from declining by much. Bottom Line: In the coming months, the long-end of the yield curve will likely drop as investors start to price in weaker-than-expected economic growth and very measured stimulus. The short-end of the curve will have limited downside potential because there is only a slim chance of aggressive monetary easing. Bond Yields Are On A Structural Downtrend Bond yields in China will likely downshift in the next three to five years. Our secular outlook for government bond yields is based on the country’s demographic trends, inflation, productivity growth and debt levels. While China’s long-term bond yields have persistently averaged below nominal GDP growth, in the past decade the gap has significantly narrowed as economic growth slowed while yields remained within a tight range (Chart 8).  This contrasts with other manufacturing and export-oriented Asian economies where interest rates have moved to a lower range in proportion with economic growth rates (Chart 9). Chart 8China's Economic Growth Has Downshifted But Yields Have Not... Chart 9...In Contrast With Other Asian Manufacturing-Based Economies China’s long-dated bond yields will also downshift in the next three to five years given the nation’s declining long-term potential output growth, based on the following: Chart 10Wages Have Risen In China A shrinking workforce can be inflationary due to higher labor costs and we expect Chinese workers’ compensation will continue to increase in the next five years (Chart 10). However, wage inflation will likely be offset by labor productivity, which has remained robust. The nation’s unit-labor cost (ULC), measured by the wages paid for each employee to produce one unit of output, has been flat to slightly down in the past decade despite strong wage growth (Chart 11). Similarly, ULC has sagged in Japan and is muted in South Korea (countries with shrinking labor forces) due to fast-growing labor productivity. This contrasts with the US, where ULC has risen even though the labor force has expanded in the past 10 years (Chart 12) China’s labor productivity will not likely undergo a significant decline in the next five years, particularly if China successfully maintains the manufacturing sector’s share in its aggregate economy, because productivity growth in this sector is usually higher than in others. Chart 11ULC Has Been Relatively Flat Chart 12ULC Muted In Asian Economies Compared With US   Meanwhile, China’s total population will shrink within the next five years, which will likely bring powerful disinflationary forces that will more than offset price increases created by labor shortages. Disinflation will cap the upside in interest rates/bond yields. Chart 13Japan's Household Consumption Share Fell Sharply When Total Population Started Shrinking A shrinking total population can significantly reduce demand, as evidenced in Japan in the past two decades. Japan’s working-age population started falling in the early 1990s, but the country’s household consumption share in GDP fell sharply after its total population peaked in 2010 and the urban population growth started contracting (Chart 13). In other words, Japan’s rapidly falling demand more than offset a muted increase in wage growth. China’s housing demand may have already peaked and the decline will gather speed in the next five years (Chart 14). Long-term growth in household consumption moves in tandem with housing and, therefore, will also downshift in the coming years (Chart 15). In the next five years or longer, China’s de-carbonization efforts will require shutting down production of many old economy enterprises.  Policymakers may keep low interest rates to accommodate such a transformation. Furthermore, amid the geopolitical confrontation with the US, Beijing will need lower interest rates to support the manufacturing sector and to undertake an industrial upgrade. Chart 14China's Demand For Housing Is On A Structural Downshift... Chart 15...Along With Consumption The main risk to our view is that China’s total factor productivity1 growth could accelerate to more than offset a declining total population. This would boost real per capita income and result in higher potential growth in the economy. In this scenario, long-duration bond yields could climb.  However, total factor productivity growth will need to outpace the rate of a shrinking labor pool and capital formation to prop up growth in the aggregate economy (Chart 16A and 16B). This is a daunting mission that Japan and South Korea, where productivity growth has been on par with China, have failed to accomplish. Chart 16AChina's Neighbors Have Not Accelerated Their Productivity Gains To Structurally Boost Economic Growth Chart 16BChina's Neighbors Have Not Accelerated Their Productivity Gains To Structurally Boost Economic Growth Chart 17China Cannot Drastically Improve Its Productivity Growth In The Next Five Years It is unrealistic to expect that China will drastically improve its productivity growth.  Productivity level is much higher now than it was 10-20 years ago when China’s manufacturing sector accounted for more than 40% of GDP (Chart 17). Even though China’s manufacturing share in the economy will stabilize and even increase from the current 27% of the economy, it cannot boost the sector drastically, particularly because its export market share cannot expand much further due to rising geopolitical tensions. In short, sectors of the economy where productivity gains have been most rapid – manufacturing sector including exports that drove China’s productivity in the past 20 years - cannot fully offset the deceleration in other growth drivers going forward. The service sector will grow, but it is much more difficult to achieve fast productivity gains in the service sector. All in all, productivity and economic growth will moderate as China’s growth model shifts from capital-intensive infrastructure and real estate to services. Bottom Line: In the next five years, China’s 10-year government bond yields are more likely to structurally move to a lower bound as final demand falls along with the nation’s total population. Savings, Debt And Interest Rates China’s national savings rate is one of the highest in the world, but it will drop as the population ages. Thus, some economists may argue that a structural decline in the national savings rate will lead to higher interest rates in the long run. Chart 18Lower Savings Rates Do Not Necessarily Herald Higher Interest Rates However, there is no empirical evidence that national savings drive interest rates. There has not been an inverse relationship between national savings rates and government bond yields in either Japan or the US, as illustrated in the middle and bottom panels of Chart 18.  There are more periods of positive rather than negative correlation between savings rates and bond yields. Note that China’s national savings rate and its interest rates also are not inversely related; a rising saving rate does not lead to lower interest rates and vice versa (Chart 18, top panel). This empirical evidence is in line with special reports published by BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy that concluded the following: Banks cannot and do not lend out or intermediate national or households “savings.” In an economy with banks, one does not need to save in the form of a deposit in a bank in order for a bank to lend money to another entity. In any economy, new money originates by commercial banks “out of thin air” when they lend to or buy assets from non-banks. Hence, there is little relationship between national savings (flow concept in economics) and money supply growth (a flow variable too) (Chart 19). The term “savings” in macroeconomics denotes an increase in the economy’s capital stock, not deposits at banks. China’s banking system has an enormous amount of deposits, created by the banks “out of thin air” and not from households’ savings. The above factors explain why Japan’s government bond yields and national savings rate have been falling since 1990 (Chart 18 on Page 12, bottom panel). A lack of demand for borrowing was not why bond yields fell. A reason why China’s bond yields will likely be in a secular decline is that commercial banks will purchase government and corporate bonds en masse as they have done in the past 10 years (Chart 20). To do so, commercial banks will not use existing deposits, but rather they will create new deposits/money “out of thin air.” Chart 19There Is Little Relationship Between National Savings And Money Growth Chart 20China's Commercial Banks Will Continue To Purchase Government And Corporate Bonds The same is true for the banks’ purchases of corporate bonds. In China, commercial banks own about 75% of government (including local government) bonds and 20% of onshore corporate bonds. To avoid a spike in bond yields, Chinese regulators could relax the limitations on commercial banks to purchase government and corporate bonds. The upshot will be a lack of crowding out and no upward pressure on bond yields despite a large bond issuance. Chart 21China's Debt-To-GDP Ratio And Service Costs Have More Than Doubled In The Past 10 Years What are the implications of high indebtedness on interest rates? China’s domestic debt-to-GDP ratio has jumped from 120% of GDP in 2008 to 260% (Chart 21, top panel). This includes local currency borrowing by/debt of government, enterprises and households. Critically, the debt-service ratio2 for enterprises and households has more than doubled from 10% of disposable income in 2008 to over 20% (Chart 21, bottom panel). China cannot afford much higher interest rates because enterprises and households will struggle and will not be able to service their debts. Mortgage rates in China are at around 5.5%, the one-year prime lending rate for companies is 3.85% and onshore corporate bond yields are 3.7%. These are not particularly low borrowing costs given both high indebtedness and the outlook for structurally slower economic growth. Onshore borrowing costs may be brought down further in the years ahead to rule out debt distress among households, enterprises and local governments. Since 2015 and prior to the pandemic, China’s debt-service ratio has been mostly flat despite a rising debt-to-GDP ratio.3 This has been achieved through declining interest rates. In the next five years policymakers will likely maintain a stable debt-to-GDP ratio. Hence, lower bond yields are all but inevitable to decrease the debt-servicing burden. In addition, China’s “common prosperity” policy means larger government spending/deficits. However, to cap the government debt-to-GDP ratio, bond yields should be kept down. This is another reason why China’s will opt for lower interest rates/bond yields. Bottom Line: The high level of debt among local governments, companies and households means that borrowing costs in China will be reduced in the years ahead. National savings are not a constraint in any country for commercial banks to expand credit and/or to buy bonds. China will encourage its banks to buy government and corporate bonds to trim yields amid continuous heavy bond issuance. Will China’s Financial Opening Continue? In the current environment which geopolitical tensions are rising between China and the West, many global investors are concerned whether China will impose tighter capital controls and even seize foreign assets. Despite these challenges, China has continued to make progress opening its domestic markets. The nation seems to be sticking to its key policy goals of attracting foreign capital and internationalizing the RMB; both aspects require open access and repatriation of foreign capital. In addition, the share of foreign holdings in onshore securities is very low and thus, poses limited risk to China’s onshore financial markets during global economic or geopolitical crises. China’s current exposure to foreign capital flows is much smaller than its Asian neighbors during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, as well as Russia during the geopolitical standoff in 2014-2016 following the capture of Crimea.4 Despite years of easing access to financial markets, foreign ownership (mostly concentrated in government bonds) remains at only around 3-4% of China’s entire onshore bond market. Furthermore, unlike other Asian economies in 1997-98, China has large foreign exchange reserves to buffer shocks from foreign fund flows. In recent years its capital control mechanism has also been successful in preventing implicit capital outflows and stabilizing the RMB exchange rate. We expect Chinese policymakers to feel confident in continuing their financial opening because they have the capability and sufficient funds to safeguard the economy against retrenchments by global investors. Bottom Line: China will continue to open its domestic financial markets, albeit gradually, to global investors. The country’s domestic financial markets have limited exposure to the extreme volatility of foreign capital flows. Investment Conclusions Chart 22The RMB Still Has Upside Structurally, But Will Modestly Depreciate On A Cyclical Basis We are constructive on China’s government bonds, both cyclically and structurally. In the next six to nine months, the yield curve will likely flatten, with long-duration bond yields dropping faster than the short-end. China’s 10-year government bond yield will structurally shift to a lower range in the next five years, driven by the impact of falling population on domestic demand, and the country’s rising debt levels and debt-servicing costs. Although the RMB still has upside structural potential, in the next 6 to 12 months the currency will likely modestly depreciate against the US dollar (Chart 22).   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is a measure of productive efficiency,  determining how much output can be produced from a certain amount of inputs. 2Defined by BIS as the ratio of interest payments plus amortizations to income. 3Despite a rising debt load, debt-servicing costs were contained due to (1) LGFV debt swap as new provincial government bonds had lower yields than LGFV bonds and (2) a large decline in the prime lending rate and mortgage rates. 4Foreign investors held more than 40% of local currency bonds in Indonesia, and over 20% in Malaysia. Foreign ownership accounted for 26% of Russia’s local currency bonds in 2014. Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance

Special Report

Highlights Taiwan remains the epicenter of global geopolitical risk, as highlighted by the past week’s significant increase in saber-rattling around Taiwan and across East Asia and the Pacific. Tensions may subside in the short run, as the US and China resume high-level negotiations. But then again they may not. And they will most likely escalate over the long run. Investors should judge the Taiwan scenario based on China’s capabilities rather than intentions. China’s intentions may never be known but it is increasingly capable of prevailing in a war over Taiwan. Before then, economic sanctions and cyber attacks are highly likely. The US has a history of defending Taiwan from Chinese military threats. Washington is trying to revive its strategic commitment to Asia Pacific. But US attempts to increase deterrence could provoke conflict. The simplest solution to Taiwan tensions is for a change of party in Taiwan. This would require an upset in the 2022 and especially 2024 elections. China may try to arrange that. Otherwise the risk of conflict will increase. A sharp economic slowdown in China is the biggest risk for investors, as it would not only be negative for the global economy but also would threaten domestic political stability, discredit the gradual and non-military approach to incorporating Taiwan, and boost nationalist and jingoistic pressures directed against Taiwan. Feature Chart 1China's Confluence Of Internal And External Risks China faces a historic confluence of internal and external political risks. This was our key view for 2021 and it continues to be priced by financial markets (Chart 1). The latest example of these risks is the major bout of saber-rattling over Taiwan. The US sent two aircraft carriers, and the UK one carrier, to the waters southwest of Okinawa for naval drills with Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. Related drills are occurring across Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and others. Meanwhile the Chinese air force let loose its largest yet intrusion into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (Chart 2). The US assured Japan that it would defend the disputed Senkaku islands, while Japan said that it would seek concrete options – beyond diplomacy – for dealing with Chinese pressure. Chart 2China’s Warning To Taiwan Chart 3Market Response To Saber-Rattling Over Taiwan Strait Yet, at the same time, a diplomatic opening emerged between the US and China. A virtual summit is expected to be scheduled between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. The Biden administration unveiled its review of US trade policy toward China, with mixed results (i.e. imply a defensive rather than offensive trade policy). China offered to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal (the CPTPP). All sides exchanged prisoners, with Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou back in China. In the short run global investors will cheer attempts by the US and China to stabilize relations. But over the long run tensions over Taiwan suggest the underlying US-China strategic confrontation will persist. We do not doubt that global risk appetite will improve marginally on the news, including toward Chinese and Taiwanese assets (Chart 3). But investors should not mistake summitry for diplomacy, or diplomacy for concrete and material strategic de-escalation. The geopolitical outlook is gloomy for China and Taiwan. Grand Strategies Collide US grand strategy forbids countries from creating regional empires lest they challenge the US for global empire. China has the long-term potential to dominate the eastern hemisphere. The US now quite explicitly seeks to counter China’s growing economic, technological, military, and political influence. China’s grand strategy forbids countries from interfering in its domestic affairs and undermining its economic and political stability. This could include eroding its territorial integrity, jeopardizing its supply security, or denying its maritime access. The US still has considerable capabilities on this front, particularly due to its control of the oceans and special relationship with Taiwan, the democratic island that China claims as a province but that the US supplies with arms. Historically, the Kingdom of Tungning (1661-83) exemplifies that a rival political and naval power rooted in Taiwan can jeopardize the security of southern China and hence all of China (Map 1). Taiwan’s predicament is geopolitically unsustainable and the difference between the past 72 years and today is that Beijing increasingly has the military means of doing something about it. Map 1Why Taiwan’s Status Quo Is Geopolitically Unsustainable China seeks to establish maritime access, expand its navy, and improve supply security. This process points toward turf battles with the US and its allies and could easily lead to conflict over Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, and other strategic approaches to China. It could also lead to conflict over technological access. The latter is an economic and supply vulnerability that relates directly to Taiwan, which produces the world’s most advanced computer chips. The Chinese strategy since the Great Recession, under two presidents of two different factions, has been to take a more assertive stance on domestic and foreign policy, economic policy, territorial disputes, and supply security. This hawkish turn occurred in response to falling potential GDP growth, which ultimately threatens social stability and the survival of the political regime. Hong Kong was long the symbol that the western liberal democracies could coexist with the Chinese Communist Party. China’s reduction of Hong Kong’s political autonomy over the past decade violated this understanding. Taiwan is now increasingly concerned about its autonomy while the West is looking to deter China from attacking Taiwan. China is willing to wage war if the West attempts to make Taiwan’s autonomous status permanent through increased military support. The US strategy since the Great Recession, under three presidents of two different parties, has been to raise the costs on China for its increasingly assertive policies, particularly in acquiring technology and using economic and military coercion against neighbors. The US is increasing its use of sanctions, secondary sanctions, tariffs, export controls, cyber warfare, and regional strategic deterrence. Hence the policy consensus in both the US and China is more confrontational than cooperative. The Biden administration is largely maintaining President Trump’s punitive measures toward China while trying to build an international coalition to constrain China more effectively. Meanwhile the Xi administration is refusing to hand over power to a successor in 2022, so there will not be a change in Chinese strategy. The US is politically divided, a major factor in Beijing’s favor. China is politically unified, particularly on the question of Taiwan. But one area of national consensus in the US is the need to become “tougher” with respect to China. President Trump’s policies and the COVID-19 pandemic reinforced this consensus. The number of Americans who would support sending US troops to Taiwan if China invaded has risen from 19% in 1982 to 52% today – meaning that the country is divided but fear of China is driving a shift in opinion.1 Chart 4Taiwan Strait Risk Shoots Up To 1950s Levels And Beyond The China Cross-Strait Academy, a new think tank with pro-mainland sympathies, has produced a Cross Strait Relations Risk Index that goes back to 1950 and utilizes 59 factors ranging from politics and diplomacy to military and economics. It suggests that tensions have reached historically high levels, comparable to the 1950s, when the first and second Taiwan Strait crises occurred (Chart 4). Beware Chinese Economic Crisis – Or Concerted US Action Tensions across the Taiwan Strait began to rise in 2012 when the Communist Party adopted a more hawkish national policy in response to potential threats to its long-term rule arising from the Great Recession. The 2014 “Sunflower Protests” in Taiwan and “Umbrella Protests” in Hong Kong symbolized the rise in tension as Beijing sought to centralize control across Greater China. Support for the political status quo in Taiwan peaked around this time, although most Taiwanese still prefer the status quo to any final decision on the island’s status, which could trigger conflict (Chart 5). China’s militarization of rocks and reefs in the South China Sea throughout the 2010s gave it greater control over the strategic approaches to Taiwan. Since 2016, we have argued that geopolitical risk in the Taiwan Strait would rise on a structural, long-term basis for the following reasons: (1) China’s economic downshift triggered power consolidation and outward nationalism (2) Taiwanese opinion was shifting away from integration with the mainland (3) the US was attempting a strategic shift of focus back to Asia and countering China. Underlying this assessment was the long-running trend of rising support for independence and falling support for unification with China (Chart 6). Chart 5Taiwanese Favor Status Quo Indefinitely Chart 6Very Few Taiwanese Favor Reunification, Now Or Later China’s crackdown on Hong Kong from 2016-19 escalated matters further as it removed the “one country, two systems” model for Taiwan (Chart 7). China continues to insist on this solution. In 2013 and again in 2019, Xi Jinping declared that the Taiwan problem cannot be passed down from one generation to another, implying that he intended to resolve the matter during his tenure, which is expected to extend through 2035. Whether Xi has formally altered China’s cross-strait policy is debatable.2 But his use of military intimidation is not. The US policy of “strategic ambiguity” is debatable but the historical record is clear. In the three major crises in the Taiwan Strait (1954-55, 1958, and 1995-96), the US has sent naval forces to the area and clearly signaled that it would defend Taiwan against aggression.3 However, in diplomatic matters, the US has constantly downgraded Taiwan: for instance, transferring its United Nations seat to China in 1971, revoking its mutual defense treaty in 1980, and prioritizing economic cooperation with China in recent decades. The implication is that the US will not stand in the way of unification unless Beijing attempts to achieve it through force of arms. China’s conclusion from US behavior must be that it can definitely overtake Taiwan by means of economic attraction and diplomacy over time. For example, Beijing’s assertion of direct control over Hong Kong took 20 years and ultimately occurred without any resistance from the West. By contrast, a full-scale attack poses major logistical and military risks and potentially devastating costs if the US upholds its historic norm of defending Taiwan. China’s economy and political system could ultimately be destabilized, despite any initial nationalistic euphoria. Taiwan’s wealth (and semiconductor fabs) would be piles of ash. Of course, Taiwan is different from Hong Kong. The Taiwanese people can believe realistically that they have an alternative to direct rule from Beijing. If mainland China’s economic trajectory falters then the option of absorbing Taiwan gradually will fall away. Today about 30%-40% of Taiwanese people believe cross-strait economic exchange should deepen (Chart 8). Only one period of Taiwanese policy since 1949, the eight years under President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-16), focused exclusively on cross-strait economic integration and deemphasized the tendency toward greater autonomy. If China’s economic prospects dim, then Beijing will become more inclined toward the military option, both to distract from domestic instability and to prevent Taiwan from entertaining independence. Chart 7Taiwanese Oppose "One Country, Two Systems" Chart 8Taiwanese Not Enthusiastic About Cross-Strait Economic Integration Chart 9Taiwanese Identify Exclusively As Taiwanese, Not Chinese Most likely China already has the capability to fight and win a war within the “first island chain,” including over Taiwan, especially if US intervention is hesitant or limited. But any doubts will likely be dispelled in the coming years. As long as China’s military advantage continues to grow, Beijing will increasingly view Taiwan as an object that it can take at will, regardless of whether economic gradualism would eventually work. The Taiwanese increasingly view themselves as distinctly Taiwanese – not Chinese or a mix of Taiwanese and Chinese (Chart 9). The implication is that it may be too late for China to win over hearts and minds. However, Beijing will presumably want to see whether Taiwan’s pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) can be dislodged from power in the 2024 elections before making a drastic leap to war. Taiwan, like the US and other democracies, is internally divided. President Tsai Ing-wen’s narrative of Taiwan’s democratic triumph over authoritarianism is not only applied to the mainland but also directed against Taiwan’s own Kuomintang (KMT).4 The country is unified on its right to expand economic and diplomatic cooperation with the West but it is starkly divided on whether the US should formally ally with Taiwan, sell it arms, and defend it from invasion (Chart 10A). Kuomintang supporters say they are not willing to fight and die for Taiwan in the face of any invasion (Chart 10B). American policymakers complain that Taiwan’s military structure and policies – long managed by the KMT – are not seriously aimed at preparing for asymmetric warfare against Chinese invasion. Chart 10ATaiwan Divided On Whether US Should Increase Military And Strategic Support Chart 10BTaiwan Divided On War Sacrifice The international sphere also matters for Beijing’s calculus. If the US remains divided and distracted – and allies curry favor with China – then China will presumably continue the gradualist approach. But if the US unifies at home and forges closer ties with allies, aiming to curb China’s economy and defend Taiwan’s democracy, then China may be motivated to take military action sooner. If the US and allies want to deter an attack on Taiwan, they need to signal that war will exact profound costs on China, such as crippling economic sanctions, a full economic blockade, or allied military intervention. But the West’s attempts to increase deterrence could spur China to take action before the West is fully prepared. Unlike the US in the Cuban Missile Crisis, China cannot accept a defeat in any showdown over arms sales to Taiwan. Its own political legitimacy is tied up with Taiwan, contrary to that of the US with Cuba. Given the lack of American willingness to fight a nuclear war over a non-treaty ally, the probability of China launching air strikes would be much higher (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Game Theory Of A Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis The US is not trying to give Taiwan nuclear arms, or other game-changing offensive systems, although the US has sent marines and special operations forces to help train Taiwanese troops. It is up to Beijing when to make an ultimatum regarding US military support.5 Ultimately the US still controls the seas and China depends on the Persian Gulf for nearly half of its oil imports. This is a good reason for China not to invade Taiwan. But if the US imposes an oil blockade, then the US and China will go to war – this is how the US and Japan came to blows in World War II. The danger is that China assesses that the US will not go that far. Will Biden-Xi Summit Reduce Tensions? Not Over The Long Run True, strategic tensions could be calmed in the short run. The US is restarting talks with China and setting up a bilateral summit between Presidents Biden and Xi. The two sides have exchanged prisoners (e.g. Meng Wanzhou), held climate talks, and Beijing has offered to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The US Trade Representative is suggesting it could ease some of President Trump’s tariffs under pressure from corporate lobbyists. The Biden administration is also likely to seek Beijing’s cooperation in other areas, such as North Korea and Iran. Biden has an urgent problem with Iran and may need China’s help constraining Iran’s nuclear program. However, none of the current initiatives change the underlying clash of grand strategies outlined above. A fundamental US-China reengagement is not in the cards. China is adopting nationalism and mercantilism to deal with its slowing potential growth, while China-bashing is one of the few areas of US national consensus. Specifically: Democracy over autocracy: The Biden administration cannot afford to be seen as smoothing the way for Xi Jinping to restore autocracy in the twentieth National Party Congress 12 months from now. China doubles down on manufacturing: China is not making liberal reforms to its economy to lower trade tensions but rather doubling down on state-led manufacturing and technological acquisition, according to the US Trade Representative.6 The US trade deficit is surging due to US fiscal stimulus. Biden will maintain or even expand high-tech export controls. Climate cooperation is limited: The US public does not agree that it should exchange its homegrown fossil fuels for Beijing’s renewable energy equipment, and the US and EU are flirting with “carbon adjustment fees,” which would be tariffs on carbon-intensive goods imports from places like China. Meanwhile China just told its state-owned enterprises to do everything in their power to secure coal for electricity and ordered banks to lend more to coal companies. North Korea is already a nuclear-armed state, which China condoned, despite multiple rounds of negotiations with the West. No agreement on Iran: If China helps force Iran to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, then that could mark a substantial improvement. But China has made long term commitments to Iran recently and probably will not backtrack on them unless the US makes major concessions that would undermine its attempts to counter China. The Taiwan conundrum undermines trust. If China can be brought to help the US with historic deals on North Korea or Iran, it will expect the US to stand back from Taiwan. The US may not see it that way. A failure to do so will appear a betrayal of trust. Consider China’s bid to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. China’s state-driven economic model is fundamentally at odds with the TPP. It only takes one member to veto China’s membership, and Australia and Japan would defer to the US on this issue. The US is only likely to rejoin the TPP, which requires Republican support in Congress, on the basis that it is a vehicle for countering China. Even if the TPP members could be convinced to accept China, they would also want to accept Taiwan, which Beijing would refuse. Ultimately if China’s membership is vetoed, then it will conclude that the West is not serious about economic integration. China will be excluded and will be more inclined to pursue its own solutions to problems. China possesses or is close to possessing the capability of taking Taiwan by force today. We cannot rule it out. Taiwanese Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng just claimed it could be attempted as early as 2025. Other estimates point to important Chinese calendar dates as deadlines for Taiwan’s absorption: 2027 (centenary of the People’s Liberation Army), 2035 (Xi Jinping’s long-term policy program), and 2049 (centenary of the People’s Republic of China). The truth is that any attack on Taiwan would not be based on symbolic anniversaries but on maximizing the element of surprise, China’s military capabilities, and foreign lack of readiness and coordination. Given that China’s capabilities are in place, or nearly in place, and nobody can predict such things precisely, investors should be prepared for conflict at any time. Investment Takeaways Chart 11Taiwanese Dollar Strengthened Since Trump The Taiwanese dollar has rallied since the escalation of US-China strategic tensions in 2016. The real effective exchange rate is now in line with its historic average after a long period of weakness (Chart 11). The trade war and COVID-19 have reinforced Taiwan’s advantage as a chokepoint for semiconductors and tech exports. If we thought there was no real risk of a war, we would not stand in the way of this rally. But based on geopolitical assessment above, the rally could be cut short at any time. Taiwanese equities have also rallied sharply for the same reasons – earnings have exploded throughout the pandemic and semiconductor shortage (Chart 12). Equities are not overly expensive on a cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings basis. But they are meeting resistance at a level that is slightly above fair value. Again, the macro and market fundamentals are positive but geopolitics is deeply negative. We remain underweight Taiwan. China’s willingness to try to stabilize relations with the US is an important positive sign that global investors will cheer in the short run. However, with the US economy fired up, and China’s export machine firing on all cylinders, Chinese authorities apparently believe they can maintain relatively tight monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy, according to our Emerging Markets Strategy and China Investment Strategy. This will lead to negative outcomes in China’s economy and financial markets. The domestic economy is weak and animal spirits in the private sector are depressed. Retail sales, for example, have dropped far beneath their long-term trend (Chart 13). Chart 12Taiwanese Stocks Not Exactly Cheap Chart 13China: Consumer Sentiment Weak The regulatory crackdown on the property sector could trigger an economic and financial crisis (Chart 14). Chinese onshore equity markets were ultimately not able to sustain the collapse in sentiment this year that hit offshore equities even harder. China’s technology sector will continue to struggle under the burden of hawkish regulation, while Chinese stocks ex-tech have long underperformed the broad market (Chart 15). Chart 14China's Huge Property Sector Looking Wobbly Chart 15Beware Financial Turmoil In Mainland China We maintain the view that Chinese authorities will ease policy when necessary to try to prevent deleveraging in the property sector from triggering a crisis ahead of the twentieth national party congress. A look at past five-year political rotations suggests that bank loans will be flat-to-up over the coming 12 months and that fixed asset investment will tick up (Chart 16). But as long as policymakers are reluctant, risks lie to the downside for Chinese assets and related plays. Chart 16National Party Congress 2022 Requires Overall Stability Chart 17GeoRisk Indicators Flash Warnings China’s shift from “consensus rule” to “personal rule,” i.e. reversion to strongman rule or autocracy, permanently increases the risk of policy mistakes. This could apply to fiscal and regulatory policy as much as to cross-strait policy or foreign policy. It is appropriate that our geopolitical risk indicators for China and Taiwan are rising, signaling that equities are not yet out of the woods (Chart 17). Over the long run China is capable of staging a surprise attack and defeating Taiwan. We have argued that the odds are small this year but that some crisis is imminent – and that the risk of war will rise in the coming years. This is especially true if China cannot engineer a recession to get the Kuomintang back into power in 2024. However, from a fundamentally geopolitical point of view, any attack is bound to be a surprise and hence investors should be prepared. The three main conditions for a conflict over Taiwan are: (1) Chinese domestic instability (2) an American transfer of game-changing offensive weapon systems to Taiwan (3) a formal Taiwanese movement toward independence. The likeliest of these, by far, is Chinese instability.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, "For First Time, Half Of Americans Favor Defending Taiwan If China Invades," Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 26, 2021, thechicagocouncil.org. 2 See Lu Hui, "Xi says ‘China must be, will be reunified’ as key anniversary marked," Xinhua, January 2, 2019, Xinhuanet.com. For a less alarmist reading of Xi’s recent speeches, see David Sacks, "What Xi Jinping’s Major Speech Means For Taiwan," Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2021, cfr.org. 3 See Ian Easton, "Will America Defend Taiwan? Here’s What History Says," Strategika, Hoover Institution, June 30, 2021, hoover.org. 4 See Tsai Ing-wen, "Taiwan and the Fight for Democracy," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2021, foreignaffairs.com. 5 See Gordon Lubold, "U.S. Troops Have Been Deployed In Taiwan For At Least A Year," Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2021, wsj.com. 6 Office of the US Trade Representative, "Fact Sheet: The Biden-Harris Administration’s New Approach To The U.S.-China Trade Relationship," October 4, 2021, ustr.gov.

Highlights Gold prices will continue to be challenged by conflicting information flows regarding US monetary policy; higher inflationary impulses from commodity prices and supply-chain bottlenecks; global economic policy uncertainty, and risks to EM economic growth (Chart of the Week). Concern over the likely tapering of the Fed's asset-purchase program this year, rate hikes next year and fiscal-policy uncertainty will support rising interest-rate risk premia and a stronger USD. These will remain headwinds for gold. Going into the Northern Hemisphere's winter, risk premia in fossil-fuel prices are at or close to their zeniths, as is the Bloomberg commodity index. This will keep short-term inflation elevated. Heightened geopolitical tensions – particularly between Western democracies and China – will keep the USD well bid by risk-averse investors. The commodity-induced element of PCEPI inflation will be transitory. Uncertainty over US monetary policy and rising geopolitical tensions, however, will remain part and parcel of gold fundamentals indefinitely. The trailing stop on our long 1Q22 natural gas call spread – long $5.00/MMBtu call vs. short $5.50/MMBtu call – was elected, leaving us with a 20% gain. We will not be re-setting the spread at tonight's close, due to the difficulty in taking a price view in markets with extremely high weather-related uncertainty. Feature The quality of information informing the analysis of gold markets is highly uncertain at present. US monetary policy uncertainty and the future of Fed chairman Jerome Powell keep expectations twitchy when it comes issues like the tapering of the Fed's asset-purchase program. Our colleagues at BCA's US Bond Strategy expect the Fed will announce a taper in asset purchases by November 2021 which will end in June 2022.1 But the tapering really is not, in our estimation, as big a deal as inflation and inflation expectations, which will drive the Fed's rate-hiking timetable. Chart of the WeekUncertainty Weighs On Gold The first Fed rate hike expected by our bond desk likely will come at the end of next year. Our colleagues expect the Fed will want to check off three criteria before increasing interest rates (Table 1). The inflation targets – actual and expected – already have been checked off, leaving the labor market's recovery as the only outstanding issue on our internal checklist. By December 2022, once the maximum employment criterion has been met, the Fed will commence with rate hike.2 Subsequent rate hikes will depend on inflation expectations. Table 1A Checklist For Liftoff Uncertain Inflation Expectations The higher inflation that checks off our bond desk's list resulted from COVID-19-impacted services and tight auto markets (Chart 2). We also find evidence commodities feed into inflation expectations and realized inflation, both of which are key variables for the Fed (Chart 3). Transitory effects – chiefly supply-chain bottlenecks and a global scramble for coal, gas and oil – have lifted realized inflation in 2H21, and have taken the Bloomberg commodity index to record levels (Chart 4). Nonetheless, given the fundamental backdrop for the key industrial commodities – chiefly oil, gas, coal and base metals – the inflationary impulse from commodity markets could persist indefinitely into the future, in our estimation. In order to incentivize the investment in base metals needed to literally build out the renewable energy infrastructure, the grids that support it and the electric vehicles that will supplant internal-combustion-engine technology, higher energy and metals prices will be required for years.3 This will be occurring as the production of traditional energy sources – i.e., fossil fuels – winds down due to lower investment over the next 10-20 years. This also will result in higher and more volatile oil and gas prices. Chart 2Inflation Meets Fed Targets Chart 3Commodities Feed Into Inflation Expectations All of these real-economy factors will feed into higher inflation over time, which will present the Fed with difficult choices regarding monetary policy and interest rates. Chart 4Record Commodity Index Levels USD Strength Suppresses Inflation And Gold Prices  It is worthwhile noting the current USD strength is suppressing inflation. However, it is not suppressing commodity prices entirely, as Chart 4 shows. The transitory weather-related price increases in energy commodities will pass, either when winter ends or if a less severe winter hits the Northern Hemisphere. We continue to expect a lower dollar, as the Fed's accommodative monetary policy remains in place. Even after the Fed tapers its asset-purchase program, policy will remain loose. The large fiscal packages that most likely will be approved by the US Congress will swell the US debt and budget deficits, which likely will weaken the USD over time. On a purchasing-power-parity basis (PPP) we also expect a weaker dollar (Chart 5). We also are expecting the availability of more efficacious vaccines in EM economies to boost economic activity, which will strengthen incomes and local currencies vis-à-vis the USD. Chart 5Weaker USD Expected On A PPP Basis The risk to this USD view – which would support gold prices – remains the heightened geopolitical tensions between Western democracies and China, which will keep political uncertainty elevated and will keep the USD well bid by risk-averse investors. Persistent USD strength would restrain inflation, and weaken the case for owning gold. Investment Implications We remain bullish gold over the medium- and long-term, expecting higher inflation and inflation expectations to lift demand for this safe haven. However, persistent commodity-induced inflation could force the Fed to tighten monetary policy more than is currently expected to get out ahead of higher inflation and inflation expectations. This could lead to stagflation, wherein inflation runs high but growth stalls as interest rates move higher. Persistent geopolitical risk also will keep risk-averse investors well bid for the USD. Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish First-line US natural gas prices were down ~ 9% as we went to press, following reports Russia would make more gas available to European buyers. This report apparently was later contradicted by a Gazprom official, who said Russian inventories still were being filled ahead of winter.4 WTI crude oil prices came close to hitting a seven-year high early in the trading day Wednesday, then promptly retreated (Chart 6). The news flow is indicative of the extreme sensitivity of gas and oil buyers going into the coming winter. Base Metals: Bullish Earlier this week, the Peruvian government struck an deal with MMG Ltd, owner of the Las Bambas mine, and the local community around the site, which reportedly will involve hiring local residents to provide services to the mine, including helping transport minerals and maintaining key transit roads. The community had been protesting to seek more of the income from the mine, and created blockades en route to the site, which threatened ~ 2% of global copper supply. Peru's newly elected president, TK Castillo, rose to power on the promise to redistribute mining wealth to Peruvian citizens. This was his first negotiation with a mining company since his election in July. MMG’s major shareholder is China Minmetals Corp. The Leftist president will need to balance the interests of local stakeholders on the one hand, while ensuring the world’s second largest copper producing nation is still attractive to international miners. Precious Metals: Bullish In 2021, the World Platinum Investment Council expects the platinum to swing to a physical surplus of 190k oz, which reverses an earlier forecast for a deficit made in the Council's 1Q21 report (Chart 7). Demand is forecast to increase year-over-year, spurred by increases in automotive, industrial and jewelry demand. On the supply side, growth in South Africa's mined output growth will keep markets in a surplus for 2021. According to SFA Oxford, gross palladium demand and refined supply for 2021 are expected to be at 10.03mm oz, and 6.77mm, respectively. Palladium balances (ex-ETFs) are projected to remain in a physical deficit of 495k ounces for 2021. Chart 6 Chart 7   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see Damage Assessment, published by BCA Research's US Bond Strategy on September 28, 2021. 2     Please see 2022 Will Be All About Inflation, published by BCA Research's US Bond Strategy on September 14, 2021, which notes the concept of maximum employment is not a well-defined term. 3    Please see La Niña And The Energy Transition, which we published last week. 4    Please see Energy price surge sends shivers through markets as Europe looks to Russia published by reuters.com on September 6, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations