China

Highlights The Delta variant will continue causing jitters but there is much greater evidence today than there was in early 2020 that humanity can curb the virus, both with vaccines and government stimulus. Delta jitters will reinforce the Fed’s dovishness and will, if anything, increase the odds that President Biden passes his mammoth spending package this fall. The very near term could easily see more volatility but by the end of the year the reflationary cast of global policy will have won the day. Tax hikes and rate hikes lurk beyond 2021. There is still no stabilization in US-China policy and the US and its allies have called out China for cyber aggression, signaling a new front of open competition. A cyber event is one of the leading contenders for the next negative shock to the global economy. Structural factors strongly support rising concerns among the global elite about cyber insecurity. Stick to this year’s key themes and views: long gold, long value over growth, long international stocks, long Mexico, long aerospace and defense, and short emerging market “strongmen” regimes. Feature Global equities sank and rose over the past week as investors struggled with “peak growth” in the US and China, the prospect of monetary policy normalization, and other risks on the horizon, including immediate concerns over the Delta variant of COVID-19. The rapid rebound, including for cyclicals like European stocks, suggested that investors are still buying the dip given a very supportive macro and policy backdrop (Chart 1). The BCA House View consists of accommodative policy, economic recovery, a weakening dollar, and the outperformance of cyclical risk assets. We largely agree, with the caveat that there will be “No Return To Normalcy” in the geopolitical realm. Meaning that over the medium and long term the US dollar will remain firmer than expected and cyclical economies and sectors will face headwinds.   Chart 1Equity Market Hits Wall Of Worry The pandemic will have unforeseen consequences, such as social unrest and regime failures, while China’s secular slowdown and the Great Power competition between the US and its rivals will intensify. Not only is China slowing but also President Joe Biden has been confirmed as a China hawk, coopting President Trump’s aggressive stance and courting US allies to pile the pressure on Beijing.    For most of this year the “normalcy” narrative has prevailed. Now investors are becoming fearful of the “abnormalcy” narrative. The US dollar has surprised its doubters on the basis of relative growth and interest rate differentials (Chart 2). Chart 2Dollar Remains Firm, Reflation Indicator Abates Over the next six months, the key point is that until these geopolitical risks boil over and explode, they reinforce the bullish macro view, since government spending will surge to address national challenges. The rich democracies have awoken to the threat posed by malaise at home and autocracy abroad. They have reactivated fiscal policy to rebuild their states and expand the social safety net. They are increasing investments in infrastructure, renewables, and defense. This trend is especially positive for US allied economies, global manufacturers ex-China, commodity prices, and commodity producing emerging markets, at least until the next shock erupts. We discuss the risk of a cyber shock as well as the points above in this report. Policy Responses To The Delta Variant The Delta variant began in India and has now swept the world. So far the variants respond to COVID vaccines, which are being rolled out globally. National and local political leaders will promote vaccination campaigns first – only if hospital systems are clogged will they resort to social restrictions. New infections have risen much faster than hospitalizations and deaths, although the latter are lagging indicators and will eventually follow cases (Chart 3). But financial markets will largely look past the scare, as they looked past the various waves of the original virus over the past 15 months. Today investors have greater evidence of humanity’s ability to curb the virus and can expect government spending to tide over the economy if new restrictions are necessary. New social restrictions should not be ruled out. They are not politically impossible. Public opinion in the developed countries shows that about 77% of people believe restrictions were about right or should have been tighter, while only 23% believe there should have been fewer restrictions (Chart 4). About 40% of Germans oppose the lifting of restrictions even for the vaccinated! Chart 3Delta Variant: A Limited Risk Unless Hospitals Clog Chart 4ANew Lockdowns Not Impossible Chart 4BNew Lockdowns Not Impossible Any financial or economic distress from virus variants will reinforce ultra-accommodative monetary policy. The European Central Bank adopted a symmetric inflation target of 2% as it completed its strategic review, up from a previous goal which simply aimed at inflation just under 2%. It is likely to expand rather than taper asset purchases (Chart 5). At the Fed, the balance of power between hawks and doves on the Federal Open Market Committee reflects the political and geopolitical trends of the day. In the wake of the Great Recession, the doves overwhelmed the hawks (Chart 6). The institution has fully transitioned today – it now aims to generate an inflation overshoot – and it will not jeopardize its new average inflation targeting regime by tightening policy too soon this year or next. Chart 5Central Banks Will Delay Normalization If COVID Crisis Persists Chart 6Doves Firmly In Ascendancy At Federal Reserve The Delta variant makes it more likely that governments will increase fiscal support. The European Union’s Recovery Fund has a modest impact but the EU Commission is not patrolling budget deficits anymore, in the event that new social restrictions set back the recovery. The Democratic Party will pass President Biden’s $3.5-$4.1 trillion American Jobs and Families Plan through Congress by Christmas (with a net deficit increase of $1.3-$2.5 trillion over eight years). Support rates among independents and Democrats suggest Biden will come up with the votes (Chart 7). A renewed sense of crisis will compel any straggling senators. Chart 7ADelta Variant Makes Biden Stimulus Even More Likely To Pass Chart 7BDelta Variant Makes Biden Stimulus Even More Likely To Pass Markets will cheer more government spending as they have done throughout the vast surge in budget deficits across the world, not least in the developed markets, where austerity stunted the recovery in the wake of the Great Recession (Chart 8). Beyond Delta jitters and reactive stimulus, there are clouds forming on the horizon over the medium and long term. Budget deficits will start contracting, central banks will start hiking rates, and taxes will go up (and not only in the US). Geopolitical risks that are suppressed today will erupt later. Bottom Line: The very near term could easily see more volatility but by the end of the year the reflationary cast of global economic policy will have won the day. The bigger problems come clearly into review after the ink dries on the last installment of the great Biden budget blowout. Chart 8Market Will Cheer Another Round Of Government Spending China Policy And Cyber War What might the next major negative shock be? A leading candidate is China, with its confluence of internal and external risks. China’s policymakers opened the floodgates of credit-and-fiscal stimulus to combat the global pandemic in 2020. They quickly shifted to tightening policy to prevent destabilizing asset bubbles. Now they are easing again. Stimulus and growth have both peaked. Authorities are on the verge of overtightening policy but tactical shifts in economic policy often occur in July. Right on cue the State Council ordered across-the-board cuts to bank reserve requirements on July 9. The Politburo’s July meeting on economic policy will bring an even more important policy signal. The concrete impact of the RRR cut should not be overstated. China has been lowering RRRs since late 2011 as its broad money growth has continually declined. The trend is indicative of China’s secular slowdown. A new series of RRR cuts is often attended by a global equity selloff (Chart 9). Chart 9China Blinked - But One RRR Cut Will Not Prevent A Global Selloff Our China Investment Strategy highlights that policy remains restrictive in other areas. Local governments have been told not to borrow if they have hidden debts. Moreover the crackdown on China’s tech sector also continues apace. These regulatory crackdowns are characteristic of the Xi Jinping administration and can continue for a while as it further consolidates power in advance of the twentieth National Party Congress in fall 2022. The US-China conflict is getting worse. The Biden administration took several punitive actions over the past month. It warned businesses against investing in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. It rejected a restart of the strategic and economic dialogue. While a bilateral summit between Biden and Xi Jinping is possible on October 30-31, it is not yet scheduled and would only temporarily improve relations. One of Biden’s more significant recent moves was to orchestrate a joint statement with allies condemning China for aggressive behavior in cyber space.1 A massive cyber attack should be high up on any investor’s list of “gray rhino” events (high-probability, high-impact events). The world has suffered large shocks from global terrorism, financial crisis, and pandemic. Lightning rarely strikes the same place twice. Of course, nobody knows what will cause the next upset. But a devastating cyber event has been underrated in the investment community and that is changing (Table 1). Fed Chair Powell, asked by a reporter what was the chief risk to the global financial system, said “cyber risk.” To quote in full: So you would worry about a cyber event. That's something that many, many government agencies, including the Fed and all large private businesses and all large private financial companies in particular, monitor very carefully, invest heavily in. And that's really where the risk I would say is now, rather than something that looked like the global financial crisis.2 Table 1Cyber Event Underrated In Consensus View Of Global Risks Here are six structural reasons that cyber risk will continue to escalate: Cyber space is one of the truly ungoverned spaces. The US is the preponderant power in cyber space, as elsewhere, but there is no regular order or code of conduct. The US cyber bureaucracy is decentralized and uncoordinated while its opponents are centrally commanded, aggressive, and sophisticated. Great power competition is escalating. The US is struggling with China, Russia, and Iran and all sides seek to intimidate enemies and gain allies. Cyber capabilities enhance essential tasks like spying, sabotage, and information warfare. The tech race is intensifying, with companies and governments investing heavily in innovation and industry, while US export controls exacerbate China’s frantic efforts to obtain advanced tech by any means. The pandemic boosted digital dependency across industry and commerce, creating a “perfect storm” for cyber attacks and hacking.3 The US and its allies are threatening to retaliate more actively against cyber attacks, which may initially lead to an increase in the total number of attacks. In addition, Israel will need to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program if it is not halted by diplomacy. The US is polarized and war-weary yet claiming greater commitment to its allies, a paradox that encourages foreign rivals to use cyber tools to foment US divisions; strike at regional opponents that lack US security guarantees; and test the US commitment to its allies. The current US-Russia negotiations toward a truce against cyber attacks on critical infrastructure are the sole example of a potential structural improvement. The US and Russia could conceivably lay down some rules of the road in cyber space. There may be a basis for an agreement in that already this year the US refrained from blocking the Nordstream II pipeline with Germany while Russia refrained from re-invading Ukraine. However, a Russo-American truce would not dispel the risk of a global cyber surprise. It could even increase the odds. Russia this year alone showed with the Colonial Pipeline hack and the JBS meat-packing hack that its proxies can disrupt critical US infrastructure. It would make sense to agree to a truce so that the US does not demonstrate the same capability against Russia. Even without a truce, Russia does not benefit from provoking massive US cyber attacks. The US is the world’s leading cyber power and has pledged that it will retaliate. Rather Russia will concentrate its efforts closer to home: suppressing dissent, intimidating the former Soviet Union, and testing the US’s willingness to defend its allies. It would be useful for Russia to use cyber attacks to undermine NATO unity and demonstrate that the US is reluctant to defend NATO members’ critical infrastructure. Remember the cyber strike against Estonia in 2007. Hence huge shocks could still emerge in Europe or elsewhere even if the US and Russia make a ceasefire regarding their own critical infrastructure.  The same can be said for China, Iran, and North Korea. Attacks in their neighborhood are even more likely than direct provocations against the United States now that the US is threatening graver consequences. Beijing is concentrating its cyber power on technological acquisition. But it will also try to intimidate its neighbors into neutrality and test America’s commitment to its allies. This applies to markets like Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Not all cyber attacks would cause a global shock but the danger of Biden’s emphasis on alliances and multilateralism is that the US will be tested and its commitments will expand. Local cyber attacks could escalate if the US believes it must prove its resolve.   Bottom Line: Cyber firms’ share prices have risen since we made our contrarian buy call back in March. True, fundamentals are poor despite the strong geopolitical tailwind. The BCA Equity Analyzer shows that valuations, debt, liquidity, and return on equity have deteriorated relative to the global large cap equity universe (Chart 10). Still, as long as liquidity is ample and geopolitical risk is high we expect cyber firms’ share prices to keep grinding upward. Chart 10Cyber Stocks: Poor Fundamentals But Geopolitics A Secular Driver Investment Takeaways We are sticking with our key themes and views: long gold; long value over growth; long DM-ex-US stocks such as FTSE100 (Chart 11) and European industrials; long US neighbors Mexico and Canada; long defense and cyber stocks; and short the assets of emerging market “strongman” regimes from China and Russia to Brazil, Turkey, and the Philippines. Taking several of our trade recommendations alongside the copper-to-gold ratio, a key measure of global reflation, there could be more near-term downside (Chart 12). Nevertheless these are strategic trades designed to bear rewards over 12 months and beyond. Mainland Chinese investors should book gains on long Chinese 10-year government bonds. We would not rule out a bigger bond rally later given China’s risks at home and abroad, but RRR cuts often lead to a selloff and the signal is that the socialist policy “put” remains in place. Book gains on long Italian / short Spanish equities. This tactical trade is now hitting the top of its range and will likely mean revert. We are still optimistic on European stocks and the euro as a whole and view the German election as a positive catalyst almost regardless of outcome. Chart 11Stay The Course: Long Value Over Growth   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Chart 12Stick To Cyclical Trades Over Near-Term Volatility   Footnotes 1     White House, “The United States, Joined by Allies and Partners, Attributes Malicious Cyber Activity and Irresponsible State Behavior to the People’s Republic of China,” July 19, 2021, whitehouse.gov. 2     “Jerome Powell: Full 2021 60 Minutes Interview Transcript,” CBS News, April 11, 2021, cbsnews.com. 3    Connor Fairman, “2020: Cybercrime’s Perfect Storm,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 20, 2021, cfr.org.

Dear Client, We will be presenting our quarterly webcast next week, and, as a result, will not be publishing on 29 July 2021.  We will cover our major calls for the quarter and provide a look-ahead.  I look forward to the Q+A, and am hopeful you will tune in. Bob Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist   Highlights Chart Of The WeekOPEC 2.0's Hand Strengthened By Production Agreement The deal crafted by OPEC 2.0 over the weekend to add 400k b/d of oil every month from August preserves the coalition, and sends a credible signal of its ability to raise output after its 5.8mm b/d of spare capacity is returned to market next year.1 KSA and Russia will remain primi inter pares, but the position of OPEC 2.0's core producers – not just the UAE, which negotiated an immediate baseline increase – was enhanced for future negotiations. This deal explicitly recognizes they are the only ones capable of increasing output over an extended period. We assume the revised production baselines for core OPEC 2.0 effective May 2022 reflect the coalition's demand expectations from 2H22 onward. Our modeling indicates core OPEC 2.0's output will almost converge on the revised baseline production of 34.3mm b/d by 2H23, when we expect these producers to be at ~ 33.4mm b/d. Holding our demand estimates constant from last week, our revised supply expectations prompt us to move our forecast closer to our June forecast. We expect Brent to average $70/bbl in 2H21, with 2022 and 2023 averaging $74 and $80/bbl (Chart of the Week). Feature The deal concluded by OPEC 2.0 over the weekend will do more than add 400k b/d of spare capacity to the market every month beginning next month. It also does more than preserve the producer coalition's successful production-management strategy.  The big take-away from the deal is the clear message being sent by the coalition's core members – KSA, Russia, Iraq, UAE and Kuwait – that they are able to significantly increase output after their 5.8mm b/d of spare capacity has been returned to the market over the next year or so. It does so by raising the baselines of the core producers starting in May 2022, clearly indicating the capacity and willingness to raise output and keep it there (Table 1). Table 1Baseline Increases For Core OPEC 2.0 What OPEC 2.0's Deal Signals Internally, the deal is meant to recognize the investment made by the UAE in particular, which was not being accounted for in its current baseline. Externally – i.e., to competitors outside the coalition – the deal signals OPEC 2.0's successful production management strategy will continue, by raising the likelihood the coalition will remain intact. This has kept the level of supply below demand over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 2), and is responsible for the global decline in inventories (Chart 3). Chart 2OPEC 2.0 Durability Increases Chart 3Inventories Will Remain Under Control Specifically, the massive spare capacity still to be returned to the market between now and 2H22 can be accomplished with minimal risk of a market-share war breaking out among the core OPEC 2.0 members seeking to monetize their off-the-market production before the other members of the coalition. Most importantly, the revised benchmark production levels that becomes effective May 2022 signal the coalition members with the capacity to increase production can do so. Longer-Term Forward Guidance We assume the revised production baselines for core OPEC 2.0 effective May 2022 reflect the coalition's demand expectations from 2H22 onward. Our modeling indicates core OPEC 2.0's output will approach the revised baseline reference levels of 34.3mm b/d, hitting 33.4mm b/d for crude and liquids output by 2H23 (Table 2).  Table 2BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 This implies the core group expects to be able to cover production declines within the coalition and to meet demand increases going forward. The estimates are far enough into the future to prepare ahead of time to increase production. Our estimates for core OPEC 2.0 production reflects our assumption the revised baseline levels do reflect demand expectations of the coalition. In estimating the coalition's production, we rely on historical data from the US EIA, which allows us to estimate future production using regressors we consider reliable (e.g., GDP estimates from the IMF and World Bank).  Non-OPEC 2.0 Production We use EIA historical data for non-OPEC 2.0 production as well. In last week’s balances, we substituted the EIA's estimates for non-OPEC 2.0 producers ex-US for our estimates, which resulted in lower supply numbers throughout our forecast sample.  This threw off our balances estimates in particular, as we did not balance the decrease in supply from this group using the new data set with an increase from another group. We corrected this oversight this week: We will continue to use EIA estimates for non-OPEC 2.0 ex-US countries, but will balance the decrease in oil production from this cohort with increased supply from other countries. Chart 4US Shales Are The Marginal Barrel For US oil production, we will continue to estimate it as a function of WTI price levels, the forward curve and financial variables – chiefly high-yield rates, which serve as a good proxy for borrowing costs for the marginal US shale producer, which we view as the quintessential marginal producer in the global price-taking cohort (Chart 4). Our research indicates US shale producers – like all producers, for that matter – are prioritizing shareholder interests first and foremost. This means they will focus on profitability and margins. While we have observed this tendency for some time, it appears it is gaining speed, as oil and gas producers are now considering whether they want to retain their existing exposure to their hydrocarbon assets.2   There appears to be a reluctance among resource producers generally – this is true in copper, as we have noted – to substantially increase capex. This could be the result of covid uncertainty, demand uncertainty, monetary-policy uncertainty or a real attempt to provide competitive returns. We think it is a combination of all of these, but the picture is clouded by the difficulty in separating all of these uncertainties. Income Drives Oil Demand Chart 5Income Drives Oil Demand Our demand estimates will continue to be driven by estimates of GDP from the IMF and the World Bank. We have found the level of oil consumption is highly correlated with GDP, particularly for EM states (Chart 5). Holding our demand estimates constant from last week, our revised supply expectations prompt us to move our forecast closer to our June forecast.  This week, we also will adjust our inventory calculations, which will rely less on EIA estimates of OECD stocks. In the recent past, these estimates played a sizeable role in our forecasts. From this month on, they will play a smaller part. This is why, even though our supply estimates have risen from last week, there is not a significant change to our inventory levels. Investment Implications Holding our demand estimates constant from last week, our revised supply expectations prompt us to move our forecast closer to our June forecast. We expect Brent to average $70/bbl in 2H21, with 2022 and 2023 averaging $74 and $80/bbl. We remain bullish commodities in general, given the continued tightness in these markets. We expect this to persist, as capex remains elusive in oil, gas and metals markets. This underpins our long S&P GSCI and COMT ETF commodity recommendations, and our long MSCI Global Metals & Mining Producers ETF (PICK) recommendation.   Robert P. Ryan  Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish US natural gas exports via pipeline to Mexico averaged just under 7 bcf/d in June, according to the EIA. Exports hit a record high of 7.4 bcf/d on 24 June 2021. The record high for the month was 7.4 Bcf/d on June 24. The EIA attributes the higher exports to increases in industrial and power demand, and high temperatures, which are driving air-conditioning demand south of the US border. Close to 5 bcf/d of the imported gas is used to generate power, according to the EIA. This was up close to 20% y/y. Increases in gas-pipeline infrastructure are allowing more gas to flow to Mexico from the US. Base Metals: Bullish China reportedly will be selling additional copper from its strategic stockpiles later this month, in an effort to cool the market. According to reuters.com, market participants expect China to auction 20k MT of Copper on 29 July 2021. This will bring total sales via auction to 50k MT, as the government earlier this month sold 30k MT at $10,500/MT (~ $4.76/lb). Prior to and since that first auction, copper has been trading on either side of $4.30/lb (Chart 6). Market participants expected a higher volume than the numbers being discussed as we went to press. In addition to auctioning copper, the government reportedly will auction other base metals. Precious Metals: Bullish Interest rates on 10-year inflation-linked bonds remain below -1%, as U.S. CPI inflation rises. US 10-year treasury yields have rebounded since sinking to a five-month low at the beginning of this week. The positive effect of negative real interest rates on gold is being balanced by a rising USD (Chart 7). Safe-haven demand for the greenback is being supported by uncertainty caused by COVID-19’s Delta variant. Gold prices are still volatile after the Fed’s ‘dot shock’ in mid-June.3 This volatility is reducing safe-haven demand for the yellow metal despite rising economic and policy uncertainty. Ags/Softs: Neutral Hot, dry weather is expected over most of the grain-growing regions of the US for the balance of July, which will continue to support prices, according to Farm Futures. Chart 6Copper Prices Going Down Chart 7Weaker USD Supports Gold   Footnotes 1Please see 19th "OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting concludes" published by OPEC 18 July 2021. 2Please see "BHP said to seek an exit from its petroleum business" published by worldoil.com July 20, 2021.  3Please refer to ‘“Dot Shock” Continues To Roil Gold; Oil…Not So Much’, which we published on  July 1, 2021 for additional discussion. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2021 Summary of Trades Closed

Feature June’s economic data and second-quarter GDP indicate that China’s economic recovery may have peaked. Slight improvements in some sectors, including manufacturing investment, exports and consumption, were offset by slowing in China’s old economy, such as infrastructure and real estate. A softening economy will weigh on Chinese corporate profits in 2H21. Inflation in Producer Price Index (PPI) has likely peaked, but it remains far above its historic average. Downstream industries may benefit from low interest rates and slightly less inflationary pressures on input prices, however, their profit growth has rolled over given weakening domestic demand and base effect. Industrial profits will shift downward in 2H21, meanwhile China’s macro policy will probably disappoint investors. Last week’s GDP’s numbers show that small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) and private-sector businesses bore the brunt of rising global commodity prices and a slow recovery in domestic household consumption and services. The data, coupled with recent policy moves, support our view that China’s leadership is focused on helping vulnerable segments of the economy rather than boosting domestic demand by broadly easing policies (Chart 1). Nonetheless, the authorities may resort to easing policy later in 2021 if export growth weakens significantly in the second half of the year. A series of Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR) and/or interest rate cuts, increased infrastructure project approvals, and/or looser real estate regulations, will signal that China’s ongoing policy tightening cycle has ended. In recent weeks both Chinese onshore and offshore stocks slipped further in absolute terms and relative to global benchmarks (Chart 2). We continue to recommend that investors remain cautious on Chinese stocks, at least through Q3. Chart 1No Broad Easing Yet Chart 2Investors Still Cautious On China's Economy And Policy   Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Q2 GDP: Recovering At A Slower Pace China’s official GDP growth, on a year-over-year basis, slowed to 7.9% in Q2 from 18.3% in Q1 (Chart 3, top panel). While Q2’s weaker reading reflects the base effect in the data, it was slightly below the market’s expectation of 8.0-8.5%. Moreover, on a sequential basis (quarter-over-quarter), Q2’s seasonally adjusted GDP growth was one of the slowest in the past decade (Chart 3, bottom panel). These figures and the underlying data highlight that China’s economic growth momentum, which historically lags the credit impulse by six to nine months, has peaked (Chart 4). However, in 1H21, China aggregate output still grew by a 5.5% average annual rate during the same period over the past two years, well within Chinese policymakers’ target of above 5% growth needed to maintain a stable economy.  Meanwhile, the bifurcation in China’s economic recovery continues.  While robust external demand for Chinese goods helped to underpin manufacturing output, the sector’s profit growth has lagged upstream industries. Moreover, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are experiencing soaring profit growth whereas SMEs have struggled with rising global commodity prices and sluggish domestic consumption as discussed below. We expect that the pace in credit growth deceleration will moderate in 2H21 and interest rates will stay at historically low levels. However, the authorities are unlikely to loosen macro policies until more signs of economic weaknesses emerge. Chart 3Q2 GDP: Slowing From An Elevated Level Chart 4Chinese Economic Growth Should Soften Further In 2H21   Robust Exports, Sluggish Manufacturing Investment Chart 5Subdued Manufacturing Investment Recovery Despite Robust Exports China’s export growth in June beat market expectations, despite shipping disruptions at major ports in Guangdong province due to a resurgence in COVID-19 cases. However, the recovery in manufacturing investment was muted through most of 1H21 even though export growth was resilient (Chart 5). There are several reasons for the sluggish recovery: the RMB’s rapid appreciation in the first five months of 2021, rising inflation and the limited pricing power that Chinese exporters gained in the first half of the year likely impeded their profits and curbed their propensity to invest (Chart 6). Total export values in USD significantly outpaced those in RMB terms, suggesting that the profit gains by Chinese exporters were offset by the strengthening local currency (Chart 7). Chart 6Rapid RMB Appreciation Will Weigh On Industrial Profits Chart 7Divergence Between Exports In USD versus RMB Furthermore, manufacturers in mid-to-downstream industries have been unable to fully pass on rising input costs to domestic consumers, which is evidenced in the faster growth of manufacturing output volume compared with price increases. It contrasts with the previous inflationary cycles, where surging prices for manufactured goods surpassed output volume (Chart 8A & 8B). Chart 8AChina's Manufacturing Recovery: Stronger Volume Than Prices Chart 8BMuted Profit Margin Recovery In Manufacturing Compared With Mining June’s improvement in manufacturing investment may not advance into 2H21 without added policy support. The nearly 2% depreciation in the RMB against the dollar in recent weeks will alleviate some pressure on exporters’ profit margins. However, export prices in USD also started to weaken (Chart 9). In addition, June’s manufacturing PMI and a Chinese business school survey,1 reported a deterioration in business conditions among smaller businesses. The weaker sentiment will depress manufacturing investments since China’s manufacturing sector is dominated by private and smaller businesses (Chart 10). Chart 9Chinese Export Prices In USD Are Rolling Over Chart 10Deteriorating Business Sentiment Will Depress Manufacturing Investments Recent policy measures to keep a low interest-rate environment will help the export and manufacturing sectors by reducing operating costs. The measures are also in keeping with China’s shift from boosting its service sector to maintaining a steady share of manufacturing output in its domestic economy (Chart 11). Chart 11Maintaining A Steady Share Of Manufacturing Output In China's Economy   Policy Tightening In The Old Economy Continues Chart 12Investments In Real Estate Have Lost Steam Infrastructure investment growth slowed further in June. Investments in real estate, which drove China’s economic recovery in the second half of 2020, are also losing momentum (Chart 12). The slowdown, engineered by policymakers, will likely endure for the rest of the year. Bank loans to real estate developers tumbled to a cyclical low (Chart 13). In addition, deposit and advance payments, the main source of funds for real estate projects, nose-dived along with home sales (Chart 14).  Chart 13No Signs Of Looser Financing Regulations In Property Sector Chart 14Falling Home Sales Will Further Depress Real Estate Investments Chart 15Sharp Pullback In New Infrastructure Project Approvals This Year Infrastructure project approvals by the Ministry of Finance remain on a downward trend (Chart 15). Last week, China’s Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) announced a new rule to stop financial institutions from lending to local government financing vehicles (LGFV) that hold off-balance sheet government debt. LGFVs are largely used by provincial governments to borrow from banks to help fund infrastructure projects. Regulations targeting the real estate sector will further dampen real estate investments in the second half of this year. Land purchases and housing starts, both leading indicators for real estate investment, have declined since February. Excavator sales and investment in construction equipment also deteriorated sharply (Chart 16). Given that housing prices remain elevated, we do not expect real estate regulations to shift to an easier tone.  The deceleration in China’s old economy is reflected in imports. While the value of imports remains strong, the volume has slowed, which suggests that the surge was due to soaring commodity prices (Chart 17, top panel). In particular, the growth in China’s imports of copper and steel, on a year-over-year basis and in volume terms, contracted in June (Chart 17, bottom panel). Chart 16Construction Activities Set To Slow Further Chart 17Falling Import Volume   The Key To A Consumption Recovery Retail sales picked up slightly in June following two consecutive months of decline.  However, retail sales remain below their pre-pandemic level (Chart 18). Labor market dynamics and household income growth, which stayed sluggish through 1H21, hold the key to the speed and magnitude of a recovery in consumption this year (Chart 19). Chart 18Sluggish Recovery In Household Consumption Chart 19A Lackluster Consumption Recovery Due To Slow Recovery in Household Income Household precautionary savings, which remain elevated compared with their historical norms, have depressed the propensity to spend (Chart 20). While the overall unemployment rate in China’s urban centers has steadily declined this year, the rate of jobless young graduates (ages 16-24) picked up and is nearly three percentage points higher than its historical mean (Chart 21). However, the high unemployment among graduates will not encourage policymakers to stimulate the economy. The number of new graduates in both 2020 and 2021 is larger than the historical average, while the growth in new job creation has nearly recovered to that of the pre-pandemic years (Chart 22). Chart 20Households' Propensity For Precautionary Savings Remains Elevated Chart 21Rising Unemployment Rate Among Younger Workers Moreover, labor market slack among young graduates seems to be concentrated in the services sector, and this sector’s improvement is dependent on China’s domestic pandemic situation and inoculation rates rather than on stimulus (Chart 23). Chart 22Urban Job Creation Growth Still On The Mend Chart 23Interruptions In Service Sector Recovery Due To Lingering COVID Cases   Elevated Inflation, Downshifting Industrial Profits Chart 24China's PPI May Have Reached A Cyclical Peak... China’s domestic inflationary pressures eased slightly in June with a small decline in both consumer and producer prices. The input price component of the manufacturing PMI, which normally leads the PPI by about three months, dropped sharply last month, which indicates that the PPI may have reached its cyclical peak (Chart 24). However, producer price inflation will likely remain elevated in the second half of the year. Although global industrial metal prices have rolled over since May, they remain at their highest level since 2011 (Chart 25). A rapid deceleration in Chinese credit growth and weakening demand in 2H21 will remove some pressure in the sizzling hot commodity market, but global supply-side constraints will limit the downside in raw material prices, at least through the next six months. Therefore, diminishing inflationary pressures on the PPI will only slightly reduce input costs for China’s mid-to- downstream manufacturers, which have been unable to pass on rising commodity prices to domestic consumers (Chart 26). As discussed earlier, Chinese export prices in both USD and RMB terms have also rolled over. Chart 25...But Global Commodity Prices Are Still Elevated Chart 26Absence Of Inflation Pass-Through Given that price changes are more important to corporate profits than volume changes, Chinese mid-to-downstream industries will continue to face downward pressure on their profit margins. Profit growth in mid-to-downstream industries consistently lagged their upstream counterparts in the past 12 months (Chart 27). Moreover, state-holding enterprises, which dominate upstream industries, have seen a 150% jump in profit growth from a year ago, while the rate of profit gains among privately owned industrial companies tumbled this year (Chart 28). Chart 27A Faster Mean Reversal In Profit Growth Among Private Companies Chart 28A Faster Mean Reversal In Profit Growth Among Private Companies Chinese policymakers will probably focus on addressing imbalances in China’s industrial sector and economy by supporting SMEs and the private sector. Meanwhile, industrial profit growth will decline in 2H21 from its V-shaped recovery last year, given weakening domestic demand and the waning base effect. Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary Footnotes 1The CKGSB (Cheung Kong Graduate School Of Business) Business Conditions Index (BCI) comprises four sub-indices: corporate sales, corporate profits, corporate financing environment and inventory levels. Equity Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance

Highlights The ECB has changed its inflation target, but its credibility remains weak. Inflation will not allow the ECB to tighten policy anytime soon. Instead, the ECB will have to add to its asset purchase program next year and may even consider dual interest rates. EUR/USD should continue to appreciate because of the weakness in the USD, but EUR/GBP, EUR/NOK, and EUR/SEK will soften. The SNB will follow the ECB; buy Swiss stocks / sell Eurozone defensives as an uncorrelated trade. China matters more than COVID-19 for the cyclical/defensive ratio. Despite our pro-cyclical medium- to long-term portfolio bias, the reflation trade is pausing. Remain tactically long telecom / short consumer discretionary as a hedge. European momentum stocks are near critical levels relative to growth equities. Feature The European Central Bank has found a new way to shed its Bundesbank heritage further and to justify the continuation of its QE program well after other central banks around the world will have ended their asset purchases. The early results of the Strategy Review and the subsequent comments by President Christine Lagarde will make it near impossible for the ECB to taper its asset purchases anytime soon. Practically, this means that the European yield curve will steepen relative to that of the US. Additionally, this policy should not hurt EUR/USD, but it will hurt EUR/GBP, EUR/NOK, and EUR/SEK. In the equity space, Swiss stocks will outperform European defensive equities, creating an opportunity for an uncorrelated trade. A New Tougher Target The ECB has abandoned its long-standing target of “close but below” 2% inflation. Even more importantly, the ECB followed the Bank of Japan and the Fed in adopting an approach whereby both downside and upside deviations from the 2% inflation target are to be fought. The ECB’s credibility was already hurt by its inability to achieve its more modest previous inflation target. Since 2009, the Euro Area HICP only averaged 1.2% (Chart 1). To prevent losing further credibility under its new mandate, the ECB will have to increase its stockpile of assets. Moreover, the ECB is far from achieving its new mandate, which will add to the ECB’s need to expand stimulus to the system even once the impact of owner-equivalent rent is included in CPI. Chart 1Mission Impossible Chart 2Narrow Inflationary Pressures Today, the ECB’s measure of core inflation stands at 1%, while headline inflation is 1.9%. As the economy re-opens, a surge in inflation is likely, but this spike will be transitory, even more so than in the US. As we recently showed, our estimate of the Eurozone trimmed-mean CPI has plunged close to 0%, which highlights that inflation pressures remain narrow (Chart 2). The labor market is another hurdle that will prevent Eurozone inflation from durably reaching 2% anytime soon. Currently, the total hours worked in the Euro Area remains well below the equilibrium level implied by the working-age population (Chart 3), which historically constrains wages. Moreover, it generally takes many quarters after labor shortages become prevalent before inflation begins to inch higher (Chart 4). Chart 3No Wage Pressure Yet Chart 4No Inflation Labor Shortages For A While The euro is the last force that caps European inflation. Despite the recent depreciation in EUR/USD, the trade-weighted euro remains near all-time highs, which historically imparts strong deflationary pressures to the economy (Chart 5). Beyond the time it will take for realized inflation to reach the ECB’s new target, inflation expectations are still inconsistent with 2% inflation. As the top panel of Chart 6illustrates, market-based inflation expectations in the Eurozone remain well below both 2% and the levels that prevailed before the Great Financial Crisis, even though rising commodity prices are lifting global inflation expectations. Market participants are not alone in doubting the ECB; professional forecasters do not see inflation at 2% in the near-term or the long-term (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5The Euro Is Deflationary Chart 6The ECB Lacks Credibility   In addition to the continued inability of the ECB to achieve its previous inflation target, let alone its present one, sovereign risk still hamstrings the central bank. The Italian economy remains fragile, because little structural reform has taken place. The Spanish economy cannot stand on its own two feet while the tourism industry continues to suffer due to COVID-19 related fears. And the exploding debt load of the French economy as well as its structural current account deficit raise the possibility that OATs will become unmoored. The ECB will ensure that spreads in those nations do not widen, or Eurozone inflation will never reach the new 2% target. Bottom Line: When it was time to achieve near—but below—2% inflation, the credibility of the ECB was already limited. The new target will be even harder to reach, but the symmetry around it gives the ECB more leeway to provide additional support to the Eurozone economy. Market Implications The ECB is now bound to maintain policy accommodation beyond the scheduled end of the PEPP program in March 2022, or the new policy target will be even less credible than the previous one. BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy team expects the ECB to maintain its asset purchase program beyond the stated end of the PEPP. Practically, this means that the ECB will fold the program into the pre-pandemic APP. The ECB cannot tighten policy while it remains so far from its target, especially now that missing the goalpost to the downside is as problematic as missing it to the upside. We expect the ECB to hint at this on Thursday. Chart 7The EONIA Curve Anticipated The Strategy Review The ECB will also not increase interest rates for the foreseeable future, which the EONIA curve already anticipates (Chart 7). Money markets only expect a first hike in late 2024, which is appropriate. Compared to a month ago, overnight rates 10-year forward fell by more than 10bps, from 0.75% to 0.61%. We are inclined to fade this move. More stimulus raises the outlook for long-term policy rates. Amid the correction in global bond yields, betting against the decline in the long-term EONIA rate is akin to catching a falling knife; however, because the ECB is easing relative to the Fed, a box trade of buying European steepeners at the same time as US flatteners remains appropriate. The ECB could also lower the rate on TLTRO operations, resulting in a dual interest rate regime in the Eurozone. As Megan Greene and Eric Lonergan have argued, this policy would provide a further lift to the Euro Area economy by boosting the attractiveness of borrowing; at the same time, it would limit the deleterious impact of ever-more negative deposit rates on the profitability of the banking sector, because banks would borrow at extremely negative rates to finance lending activities.  Chart 8JPY And YCC The effect of the policy on the euro is more complex. When Japan announced its Yield Curve Control strategy in September 2016, it defined price stability as achieving a 2% inflation rate over the span of the business cycle. In other words, the BoJ implemented a backdoor average inflation mandate. Following this announcement, USD/JPY strengthened (Chart 8), but this move reflected the dollar rally and the global bond selloff around the US election, not yen-specific factors. This suggests that the euro will continue to track the USD inversely. BCA’s FX Strategy team remains bearish on the greenback, as a result of the growing US current account deficit and the fact that the Fed continues to target an overshoot in inflation, which suggests that, even if US nominal interest rates rise, real rates will lag behind. The EUR is nonetheless set to underperform compared to other European currencies. In the UK, house price gains are accelerating, the jobless count is declining rapidly as the economy re-opens, and the cheapness of the pound is accentuating positive inflation surprises. This combination suggests that the BoE is likely to follow the path of the Bank of Canada or the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, by beginning to tighten policy by early next year. Norway also faces a similar set of circumstances and has already announced it will lift interest rates this year. As we argued two months ago, the Riksbank is likely to follow its western neighbor, because the Swedish housing market is roaring, and the economy will remain well supported by the upcoming global capex boom. Hence, EUR/GBP, EUR/NOK, and EUR/SEK will depreciate.  The Swiss National Bank should be the outlier that will follow the ECB. Swiss headline and core inflation linger at 0.6% and 0.4%, respectively. Wage growth is a meager 0.5%, because the Swiss output gap remains a massive 5.5% of GDP (Chart 9, top panel). Meanwhile, consumer confidence and retail sales are much weaker than those of Sweden, Norway, or the UK. Finally, Swiss private debt stands at 270% of GDP, which means that this economy still risks falling into a Fisherian debt-deflation trap. As a result, the SNB will continue to try to cap the upside in the CHF vis-à-vis the EUR, because the currency remains the main determinant of Swiss monetary conditions. Moreover, according to the central bank, the Swiss franc is still 10% overvalued relative to the euro, which is weighing on the country’s competitiveness (Chart 9, bottom panel). To fight the recent depreciation of EUR/CHF, the SNB will not raise rates for a long time and will intervene further in the FX market. The liquidity injections should prompt additional increases in the SNB’s domestic sight deposits, which since 2015 have resulted in a rise of Swiss bond yields relative to those of Germany (Chart 10). While counterintuitive, this relationship reflects the reflationary impact of the SNB’s asset purchases. It also means that the Swiss real estate market is set to become ever bubblier. Chart 9The SNB Will Follow The ECB Chart 10Swiss/German Spreads To Widen For Swiss shares, the picture is more complex. Swiss equities are extremely defensive, but, while they underperform Euro Area stocks when global yields rise, widening Swiss / German spreads often provide a lift to the SMI. A simple model, assuming US 10-year Treasury yields rise to 2.25% by the end of 2022 (BCA’s US Bond Strategy forecast) and that Swiss/German spreads widen to 20bps as the SNB domestic sight deposits swell, suggests that Swiss stocks will underperform that of the Euro Area over the coming 18 months (Chart 11). However, if we compare Swiss equities to European defensive sectors, then the widening in Swiss/German spreads should prompt an outperformance of Swiss equities, because their multiples benefit from ample liquidity conditions in Switzerland (Chart 12). Chart 11Swiss Stocks Are Too Defensive To Outperform Durably... Chart 12...But They Will Beat Euro Area Defensives Bottom Line: The results of the ECB Strategy Review will force this central bank to remain a laggard and continue to expand its balance sheet well after the expected end of the PEPP program. Eurozone interest rates will also fall behind that of other major economies. The ECB may even consider cutting the interest rate on TLTROs to boost lending. These policies will have a minimal impact on EUR/USD, which will continue to be dominated by the dollar’s fluctuations. However, EUR/GBP, EUR/SEK, and EUR/NOK will suffer. Finally, the SNB will follow the ECB and expand its balance sheet further, which will paradoxically lift Swiss/German spreads. As a result of their defensive nature, Swiss stocks will underperform Euro Area ones over the next 18 months, but they will outperform European defensive equities. Go long Swiss equities relative to European defensives, as a trade uncorrelated to the broad market. Follow China, Not Delta Chart 13 In recent days, doubts have grown about the European re-opening trade because of the resurgence of COVID-19 cases. The Delta variant (or any subsequent mutation for that matter) will cause hiccups along the way, but, ultimately, the re-opening will continue to proceed. As a result of the growing rate of vaccination, hospitalizations and deaths remain stable even if new cases are climbing rapidly in many countries (Chart 13). As long as the burden on the healthcare system remains limited, governments will find it difficult to justify further large-scale lockdowns. Instead, measures such as Macron’s Pass Sanitaire will provide increasing, widespread incentives for greater vaccination. Despite this sanguine take on the Delta variant, we remain concerned for the near-term outlook for cyclical equities because of the Chinese economy, even after the recent 50bps cut in the Reserve Requirement Ratio. BCA’s China Investment Strategy service believes that the RRR cut does not signal the beginning of a policy easing cycle.  More evidence would be needed, such as additional RRR cuts, rising excess reserves, or supportive policies for the infrastructure and real estate sectors. For now, we heed the message from PBoC official Sun Guofeng that “the RRR cut is a standard liquidity operation.” Chart 14Fade The RRR Cut The dominant force for the Chinese economy remains the previous deterioration in the credit impulse, which suggests that Q3 and Q4 growth will decelerate materially (Chart 14, top panel). Moreover, the softening impulse is consistent with weaker global economic activity, as approximated by our Global Nowcast (Chart 14, middle panel), especially since the lingering effect of the past RRR increases is still consistent with a global deceleration (Chart 14, bottom panel). In this context, we continue to hedge our long-term preference for cyclical stocks because of the near-term risks created by China and the excessively rapid move in the cyclical-to-defensives ratio (Chart 15). In response to this pause in the reflation trade, we continue to favor a long telecom/short consumer discretionary tactical position, which is supported by valuations and RoE differentials, as well as the still extended relative momentum (Chart 16). The period of risk to the global reflation trade should also allow the dollar to remain firm in the near-term, which means that for the coming months, the euro will not go beyond its trading range in place since the beginning of the year. Chart 15Cyclicals Remain Tactically Vulnerable Chart 16Stay Long Telecom / Short Consumer Discretionary Bottom Line: China’s RRR cut is not yet enough to bet against the temporary pause in the global reflation trade. Thus, investors should continue to hedge pro-cyclical long-term bets in their portfolios via a long telecom / short consumer discretionary position. An Exciting Chart A chart caught our eye this week: The underperformance of Eurozone momentum stocks relative to growth stocks is massively overdone (Chart 17). For now, we only want to highlight the phenomenon, but, in the coming weeks, we will delve deeper into the topic to gauge if these oversold conditions constitute an attractive opportunity. Chart 17Washed Out Moment   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds Corporate Bonds Equity Performance Major Stock Indices Geographic Performance Sector Performance

Special Report

Highlights With geopolitical risks increasing around China, India is attracting greater attention from global investors. India’s youthful demographics also mark a stark contrast with China. While this demographic dividend is real, its benefits should not be overstated. India is young but socially complex, which will create unique social conflicts and policy risks. In particular, the country faces structurally large budget deficits. Regional political differences could slow down reforms. Lastly, competition with China will increase India’s own geopolitical risks. Macroeconomic and (geo)political factors, not youth alone, will determine India’s equity market returns. The bullish long-term view faces near-term challenges. Feature Map 1 PreviewIndia’s Demographic Dividend Can Be Overstated “Independence had come to India like a kind of revolution; now there were many revolutions within that revolution … All over India scores of particularities that had been frozen by foreign rule, or by poverty or lack of opportunity or abjectness, had begun to flow again.” – Sir VS Naipaul, India: A Million Mutinies Now (Vintage, 1990) What is well known is that India is populous, young, and boasts a high GDP growth rate. India is also largely free of internal conflicts. Its democratic framework is seen as a pressure valve that can release social tensions. India’s hefty 58% cross-cycle premium to Emerging Markets (EM) is often attributed to the fact that India is younger than its peers, especially China. In this report we highlight that India’s demographic advantage is real but should not be overstated. For instance, India’s northern region can be likened to a demographic tinderbox. It accounts for about 45% of India’s population and is also younger than the national average. However, per capita incomes in this region are lower than the national average and to complicate matters, this region is crisscrossed by several social fault lines. This heterogeneity and economic backwardness in India’s population is the reason why the trend-line of India’s demographic dividend will not be linear. Its diverse population’s attempt to break out of its poverty will spawn unique policy risks. The North Is A Demographic Tinderbox, The South Is Prosperous But Ageing India will soon be the most populous country in the world (Chart 1). India’s median age is a decade lower than that of China to boot (Chart 2). Some emerging market investors fret about India’s low per capita income but India holds the promise of lifting individual incomes over time. This is because its GDP growth rate has been higher than that of its peers (Chart 3). Chart 1India Will Soon Be The Most Populous Country Chart 2India Is A Decade Younger Than China Chart 3India’s Per Capita Income Is Low, But GDP Growth Rate Is High However, the “demographic dividend” narrative oversimplifies India’s investment case. India is young but also socially heterogenous and its median voter is poor. This complicates India’s development process and makes its demographic dividend trend-line non-linear. India’s social complexity is best understood if India is characterized as an amalgamation of three major regions: the North, the South (which we define to include the western region), and the East. Each of these parts are unique and have distinctive socio-demographic identities. India hence is more comparable to a continent like Europe than a country like the US. Like the European Union, India is a union of multiple social, religious, and ethnic groups. It straddles a vast geography and represents a very wide spectrum of interests. India’s South is more like a middle-income Asian country such as Sri Lanka or Vietnam whilst India’s East is more like a poor Latin American economy with latent social unrest. Understanding the heterogeneity of India’s vast populace is key to get a better sense of why an investment strategy for India must be nuanced and tactical in its approach, even if the overarching strategic view is constructive. The key features of each of these three regions can be summarized as follows: Region #1: The North This region comprises the triangular area between Jammu & Kashmir, Rajasthan and Jharkhand. This is the largest landmass in India stretching from the Himalayas to the fertile Gangetic plains of central India. Ethnically most of the population here is of Indo-Aryan descent. A lion’s share of this region’s population remains engaged in agriculture and allied activities. The North accounts for about 45% of the nation’s total population and is a demographic tinderbox. Per capita incomes are low and one in five persons falls in the age group of 15-24 years. To complicate matters, wage inflation in the farm sector, which employs a large majority of the populace in this region, has been slowing. If job creation in the non-farm sector stays insufficient then it will fan fires of social instability. The North includes states like Uttar Pradesh and Punjab which have seen a steady increase in small but notable socio-political conflicts in the recent past. Issues that triggered social conflict ranged from inter-religious marriages to resistance to amending farmer-friendly laws. Region #2: The South India’s South constitutes the large inverted-triangular region on the map and spans the area between Gujarat, Kerala, and West Bengal. We include India’s western region in this category because of its socio-economic similarities with the southern peninsula. Together the South and West account for the entirety of India’s peninsular coastline and for about 40% of total population. Historically, the South has seen far fewer external invasions and its social fabric is more homogenous than that of the North. This region is characterized by high per capita incomes, balanced gender ratios (Chart 4), and higher literacy ratios (Chart 5). Socio-political conflicts in this region are less common as compared to the North. Chart 4India’s South Has Healthy Gender Ratios Compared To North Chart 5India’s South Is More Educated Than The Rest Of India The state of Kerala is an exception in this region. The social fabric in this state is unusual, with Hindus accounting for only 55% of its population (versus the national average of 80%). The high degree of religious heterogeneity in this southern Indian state could perhaps be the reason why the state has lately seen a rise of small but significant incidences of social conflict. Unlike India’s young North, the median age of the population in India’s South is likely to be higher than the national average. Whilst India’s South is clearly young by global standards, this region will have to deal with problems of an ageing population before India’s North or East. The Southern region in India even today relies on migrant workers from India’s North. Region #3: The East This region is the youngest and the smallest of the three, as it accounts for the remaining 15% of India’s population. The region is young but must contend with low per capita incomes and very high degrees of religious diversity. Muslims, Christians, and other religions account for 20% of India’s population nationally but +50% of the population in India’s East. By virtue of sharing borders with countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar, this region is often the entry point for migration into India. It is historically the least stable of the three regions owing to its heterogeneity and the steady influx of migrants. To conclude, India is young but is also socially complex. Whilst a youthful population yields economic advantages, if this young population lacks economic opportunity then social dissatisfaction and associated risks can be a problem. Furthermore, history suggests that if a region’s populace is young but poor and diverse, then it often spawns the rise of identity politics, which takes policymakers’ attention away from matters of economic development. Social Complexity Index To better represent India’s demographic granularities, we created a Social Complexity Index (SCI), as shown in Map 1. Map 1India’s North Is A Demographic Tinderbox; South Is Prosperous But Ageing The SCI for Indian states is created by adding a layer of socio-economic data over the demographic data. It uses three sets of variables: Economic well-being of a state as proxied by state-level per capita incomes. The lower the incomes, the greater the risk of social instability. This is because India’s per capita income is low to start with and if pockets have incomes that are substantially lower than the national average then the associated economic duress can be significant. Religious diversity in a state as measured by creating a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of religious diversity in the state. The greater the religious diversity the greater the social complexity is expected to be. Youthfulness of a state as measured by population in the age group of 15-24 years relative to the total population. The greater the youth population ratio, the more complex are the social realities likely to be. If a state is exposed unfavorably to all three of the above stated parameters then such a state is deemed to have a high degree of social complexity and hence could be exposed to a higher risk of social conflicts and/or policy risks. Our Social Complexity Index (SCI) (Map 1) shows how parts of India are young but also socially complex. Why does this matter? This matters because a diverse, young and vast population’s attempt to develop will create policy risks. Policy Impact: Left-Leaning Economics, Right-Leaning Politics To be sure, governments in India will stay focused on creating large-scale jobs, a big concern for India’s median voter (Chart 6). However, given the time involved in building consensus for any major reform, progress on economic reforms (and hence job creation) will remain slow. India’s large population and democratic framework render the reform process more acceptable, but also less nimble. This contrasts with the speed of reforms executed by East Asian countries in the 1970s-90s, which turned them into export powerhouses. Two recent examples illustrate the problem of slow reform in India: Implementation of GST: Goods and services tax (GST) was a major reform that India embraced in 2017. However, the creation of a nation-wide GST was first mooted in 2000 and it took seventeen years for this reform to pass into law. Even in its current form India’s GST does not cover all products. It excludes large categories like petroleum products and electricity owing to resistance from state governments. Industrial sector growth: Despite India’s consistent efforts to grow its industrial sector as a source of large-scale, low-skill jobs, the share of this sector in India’s GDP has remained static for three decades (Chart 7). The services sector has grown rapidly in India over this period but its ability to absorb low-skill workers on a large scale is fundamentally restricted since (1) the sector needs mid-to-high skill workers and (2) the sector generates fewer jobs per unit of GDP owing to high degrees of productivity in the sector. Chart 6India’s Median Voter Worries Greatly About Job Creation Chart 7India’s Industrial Sector Stuck In A Rut, India’s Workforce Is Connected And Aware India’s inability to reform rapidly and create jobs on a large-scale will trigger policy risks. This factor is more relevant now than ever. In the 1990s, India was a small, closed economy that was just opening up. Hence slow reforms were acceptable as they yielded high growth off a low base. By contrast India’s masses today are at the forefront of connectivity (Chart 7). Slow job growth in a young country with high degrees of connectivity will have to be managed in the short term by responding to other needs of India’s median voter. This process might delay painful structural reforms necessary to improve productivity and hence create policy risks in the interim. What policy-risks is India exposed to? We highlight three policy risks that investors must brace for: Policy Risk #1: Structurally Large Budget Deficits Despite being young, India’s fiscal deficit has been large and as such comparable to that of countries that have an older demographic profile (Chart 8). Chart 8Despite India’s Youth, Its Fiscal Deficit Has Been Comparable To That Of Older Countries Chart 9Unlike China, The Majority Of India’s Citizenry Lives On Less Than US$10 A Day Whilst India’s fiscal deficit will rise and fall cyclically, it will remain elevated on a structural basis as India’s median voter is young but poor (Chart 9). This median voter will keep needing government support to tide over her economic duress. These fiscal transfers are likely to assume the form of transfer payments, food subsidies and a large interest burden on the exchequer who will need to borrow funds in the absence of adequate tax revenue growth. Two manifestations of this fiscal quagmire that India must contend with include: Revenue expenditure for India’s central government accounts for 85% of its total expenditure, with only 15% being set aside for more productive capital expenditure. Within central government revenue expenditure, 40% is foreclosed by food-subsidies, transfer payments, and interest payments. Can India’s fiscal deficit be expected to structurally trend lower? Only if India embraces big-ticket tax reforms. This appears unlikely given that India’s central tax revenue to GDP ratio has remained static at 10% of GDP for two decades owing to its inability to widen its tax base. Policy Risk #2: Foreign Policy Will Turn Rightwards India’s northern states are known to harbor unfavorable views of Pakistan. These are more unfavorable than the rest of India (Map 2). Geopolitical tension will persist due to a confluence of factors. Map 2Northern India Views Pakistan Even More Unfavorably Than Rest Of India India may be forced to adopt a far more aggressive foreign policy response and shed its historical stance of neutrality. This will be done to respond to tectonic shifts in geopolitics as well as the preferences of India’s north that accounts for about 45% of India’s population. China’s active involvement in South Asia will accentuate this phenomenon whereby India tilts towards abandoning its historical foreign policy stance of non-alignment. An aggressive foreign policy stance will engender fiscal costs as well as diverting attention away from internal reform. The adoption of a more aggressive foreign policy stance will necessitate the maintenance of high defense spending when these scarce resources could be used for boosting productivity through spends on soft as well as hard infrastructure. Despite having low per capita incomes, India already is the third largest military spender globally. In 2022, India’s central government plans to allocate ~15% of its budget for defense, which is the same allocation that productivity-enhancing capital expenditure as a whole will attract. Since it will be politically untenable to cut social spending, defense spending will simply add to the budget deficit. Policy Risk #3: Regional Differences Could Get Amplified Over Time India’s northern states typically lag on human development indicators (Charts 4 and 5). Owing to their large population, these states have also lagged smaller states in the east more recently on vaccination rates, which could be a symptom of deeper problems of managing public services in highly populous states (Chart 10). Chart 10India’s Northern States Lagging On Vaccinations, Smaller Eastern States Are Leading Whilst such differences between India’s more populous and less populous states are commonplace, these tensions could grow over the next few years. In specific, it is worth noting that a delimitation exercise in India is due in 2026. Delimitation refers to the process of redrawing boundaries for Lok Sabha seats to reflect changes in population. India’s Northern states are likely to receive an increased allocation of seats in India’s lower house (i.e. the Lok Sabha) beginning in 2026, despite poor performance on human development indicators. This is because India’s North accounted for 40% of seats in India’s lower house and accounted for 41% of its population in 1991. Owing rapid population growth, this region’s population share rose to 44% by 2011 and the ratio could rise further. Given that a review of the allocation of Lok Sabha seats is due in 2026, it is highly likely that India’s northern states get allocated more seats at this review. A change in political influence of different regions will have two sets of implications. Firstly, reforms that require a buy-in from all Indian states (such as GST implementation in 2017) could become trickier to implement if states that have delivered improvements in human development have to contend with a decline in political influence. Secondly, the rising political influence of India’s more populous states in the North could reinforce the trend of a less neutral and more aggressive foreign policy stance that we expect India to assume. Investment Conclusions Indian equity markets have historically traded at a hefty premium to Emerging Markets (EMs). This premium is often attributed to India’s youthful demographic structure. However academic literature has shown that realizing benefits associated with a youthful demographic structure is dependent on a country’s institutions and requires the productive employment of potential workers. It has also been shown, both theoretically and empirically, that there is nothing automatic about the link from demographic change to economic growth.1 Country-specific studies have also shown that it is difficult to find a robust relationship between asset returns on stocks, bonds, or bills, and a country’s age structure.2 An analysis of equity market returns generated by young EMs confirms that a youthful demographic structure can aid high equity returns but the geopolitical setting and macroeconomic factors matter too. Moreover, history confirms that each young country spawns a new generation of winners and losers. Fixed patterns in terms of top performing or worst performing sectors are not seen across young and populous EMs. The rest of this section highlights details pertaining to these two findings. Investment Implication#1: Youth Does Not Assure High Equity Market Returns China in the nineties, Indonesia & Brazil in the early noughties and India over the last decade had similar demographic features (see Row 1, 2 and 3 in Table 1). Table 1Leader And Laggard Sectors Can Vary Across Young, Populous Countries However, it is worth noting that these four EMs delivered widely varying returns even when their demographic features were similar (see Row 5, 6 and 7 in Table 1). In real dollarized terms equity returns ranged from a CAGR of -22% to 8% for these four countries. The variation in returns can be attributed to differences in macroeconomic and geopolitical factors. Brazil’s period of political stability in the early 2000s along with its relatively high per capita incomes were potentially responsible for Brazil’s youthful demography translating into high equity market returns. At the other end of the spectrum, equity returns in China were the lowest despite a young demography owing to low per capita incomes and economic restructuring prevalent in the nineties. Investment Implication#2: Each Young Country Spawns A New Generation Of Winners And Losers Given that a young populace is expected to display a higher propensity to consume, sectors like consumer staples, consumer discretionary, and financials are expected to outperform in young countries. However, a cross-country analysis suggests that a young country does not necessarily throw up any consistent patterns of sector performance. Sectoral performance patterns too appear to be affected by demographics along with macroeconomic and geopolitical factors. Similarities in the profile of top performing sectors in India, China, Brazil and Indonesia when these countries were young are few and far between (see Row 9, 10 and 11 in Table 1). No patterns or similarities are evident even in the profile of worst performing sectors in India, China, Brazil and Indonesia when they had similar demographic features (see Row 12, 13 and 14 in Table 1). Even India’s own experience confirms that: There exists no correlation between India’s equity market returns and its demographic structure. India was at its youngest in the nineties and yet its peak equity market returns were achieved in the subsequent decade (see Row 4, 5 & 6 in Table 2). High domestic growth combined with the emergence of political stability potentially allowed India’s youth to translate into high equity market returns over 2000-2010. Table 2Youth Is Not A Sufficient Condition For A Market To Deliver High Returns There exists no pattern in terms of top or worst performing sectors in India as it has aged over the last three decades (see Row 8 to 13 in Table 2). Healthcare for instance was the top performing sector in India in the 1990s when India’s median age was only 21 years. Industrials as a sector have featured as one of the worst performing sectors in India in the 1990s as well as the late noughties despite India’s youthful age structure. This could be attributed to the fact that India’s growth model pivoted off service sector growth while industrial sector development has lagged. Bottom Line: History suggests that a youthful demographic structure is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an emerging market like India to deliver high equity market returns. Besides demographics, domestic macroeconomic and regional geopolitical factors create a deep imprint on equity returns’ patterns too. India faces a geopolitical tailwind as its economy develops and China’s risks increase. Nevertheless, owing to India’s heterogeneity and poverty, its road to realizing its demographic dividend will be paved with policy risks. Even as India’s lead on the demographic front is expected to continue, tactical underweights on this EM too are warranted from time to time.   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 David Bloom et al, "Global demographic change: dimensions and economic significance", NBER Working Paper No. 10817, September 2004, nber.org. 2 James M Poterba, "Demographic Structure and Asset Returns" The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 83, No. 4, November 2001, The MIT Press.

Highlights Global oil demand will remain betwixt and between recovery and relapse through 3Q21, as stronger DM consumer spending and increasing mobility wrestles with persistent concerns over COVID-19-induced lockdowns in Latin America and Asia. These concerns will be allayed as vaccines become more widely distributed, and fears of renewed lockdowns – and their associated demand destruction – recede.  Going by US experience – which can be tracked on a weekly basis – as consumer spending rises in the wake of relaxed restrictions on once-routine social interactions, fuel demand will follow suit (Chart of the Week). OPEC 2.0 likely will agree to return ~ 400k b/d monthly to the market over the course of the next year and a hal. For 2021, we raised our average forecast to $70/bbl, and our 2H21 expectation to $74/bbl. For 2022 and 2023, we expect Brent to average $75 and $78/bbl. These estimates are highly sensitive to demand expectations, particularly re containment of COVID-19. Feature For every bit of good news related to the economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a cautionary note. Most prominently, reports of increasing demand for refined oil products like diesel fuel and gasoline in re-opening DM economies are almost immediately offset by fresh news of renewed lockdowns, re-infections in highly vaccinated populations, and fears a new mutant strain of the coronavirus will emerge (Chart 2).1 In this latter grouping, EM economies feature prominently, although Australia this week extended its lockdown following a flare-up in COVID-19 cases. Chart of the WeekUS Product Demand Revives As Economy Reopens Chart 2COVID-19 Infection And Death Rates Keep Markets On EdgeOur expectation on the demand side is unchanged from last month – 2021 oil demand will grow ~ 5.4mm b/d vs. 2020 levels, while 2022 and 2023 consumption will grow 4.1 and 1.6mm b/d, respectively (Chart 3). These estimates reflect the slowing of global GDP growth over the 2021-23 interval, which can be seen in the IMF's and World Bank's GDP estimates, which we use to drive our demand forecasts.2 Weekly data from the US seen in the Chart of the Week provide a hint of what can be expected as DM and EM economies re-open in the wake of relaxed restrictions on once-routine social interactions. Demand for refined products – e.g., gasoline, diesel fuel and jet fuel – will recover, but at uneven rates over the next 2-3 years. The US EIA notes the recovery in diesel demand, which is included in "Distillates" in the chart above, has been faster and stronger than that of gasoline and jet fuel. This is largely because it reflects the lesser damage done to freight movement and activities like mining and manufacturing. The EIA expects 4Q21 US distillate demand to come in 100k b/d above 4Q19 levels at 4.2mm b/d, and to hit an all-time record of 4.3mm b/d next year. US gasoline demand is not expected to surpass 2019 levels this year or next, in the EIA's forecast. This is partly due to improved fuel efficiencies in automobiles – vehicle-miles travelled are expected to rise to ~ 9mm miles/day in the US, which will be slightly higher than 2019's level. Jet fuel demand in the US is expected to return to 2019 levels next year, coming in at 1.7mm b/d. Chart 3Global Oil Demand Forecast Remains Steady Quantifying Demand Risks We use the recent uptick in COVID-19 cases as the backdrop for modelling demand-destruction scenarios in this month’s oil balances (Chart 2). We consider different scenarios of potential demand destruction caused by the resurgence in the pandemic (Table 1). Last year, demand fell by 9% on average, which we take to be the extreme down move over an entire year. In our simulations, we do not expect demand to fall as drastically this time. Table 1Demand-Destruction Scenario Outcomes We modelled two scenarios – a 5% drop in demand (our low-demand-destruction scenario) and an 8% drop in demand (our high-demand-destruction scenario). A demand drop of a maximum of 2% made nearly no difference to prices, and so, we did not include it in our analysis. In both cases, demand starts to fall by September and reaches its lowest point in October 2021. We adjusted changes to demand in the same proportion as changes in demand in 2020, before making estimates converge to our base-case by end-2022. The estimates of price series are noticeably distinct during the period of the simulation (Chart 4). Starting in 2023, the low-demand-destruction prices and base-case prices nearly converge, as do their inventory levels. Prices and inventory levels in the high-demand-destruction case remain lower than the base-case during the rest of the forecast sample. OPEC 2.0 and world oil supply were kept constant in these scenarios. World oil supply is calculated as the sum of OPEC 2.0 and Non-OPEC 2.0 supply. Non-OPEC 2.0 can be broken down into the US, and Non-OPEC 2.0, Ex-US countries. Examples of these suppliers are the UK, Canada, China, and Brazil. OPEC 2.0 can be broken down into Core-OPEC 2.0 and the cohort we call "The Other Guys," which cannot increase production. Core-OPEC 2.0 includes suppliers we believe have excess spare capacity and can inexpensively increase supply quickly. Chart 4Brent Forecasts Rise As Global Economy Recovers COVID-19 Demand Destruction Scenarios OPEC 2.0 Remains In Control We continue to expect the OPEC 2.0 producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia to maintain its so-far-successful production policy, which has kept the level of supply below demand through most of the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 5). This allowed OECD inventories to fall below their pre-COVID range, despite a 9% loss of global demand last year (Chart 6). We expect this discipline to continue and for OPEC 2.0 to continue restoring its market share (Table 2). Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Production Policy Kept Supply Below Demand Chart 6...And Drove OECD Inventories Down Table 2BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Our expectation last week the KSA-UAE production-baseline impasse will be short-lived remains intact. We expect supply to be increased after this month at a rate of 400k b/d a month into 2022, per the deal most members of the coalition signed on to prior to the disagreement between the longtime GCC allies. This would, as the IEA notes, largely restore OPEC 2.0's spare capacity accumulated via production cutbacks during the pandemic of ~ 6-7mm b/d by the end of 2022 (Chart 7). It should be remembered that most of OPEC 2.0's spare capacity is held by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which includes the UAE. The UAE's official baseline production number (i.e., its October 2018 production level) likely will be increased to 3.65mm b/d from 3.2mm b/d, and its output in 2H21 and 2022 likely will be adjusted upwards. As one of the few OPEC 2.0 members that actually has invested in higher production and can increase output meaningfully, it would, like KSA, benefit from providing barrels out of this spare capacity.3 Chart 7OPEC 2.0 Spare Capacity Will Return As we noted last week, we do not think this impasse was a harbinger of a breakdown in OPEC 2.0's so-far-successful production-management strategy. In our view, this impasse was a preview of how negotiations among states with the capacity to raise production will agree to allocate supply in a market starved for capital in the future. This is particularly relevant as US shale producers continue to focus on providing competitive returns to their shareholders, which will limit supply growth to that which can be done profitably. We see the "price-taking cohort" – i.e., those producers outside OPEC 2.0 exemplified by the US shale-oil producers – remaining focused on maintaining competitive margins and shareholder priorities. This means maintaining and growing dividends, and returning capital to shareholders will have priority as the world transitions to a low-carbon business model (Chart 8).4 For 2021, we raised our average forecast to $70/bbl on the back of higher prices lifting the year-to-date average so far, and our 2H21 expectation to $74/bbl. For 2022 and 2023, we expect Brent to average $75 and $78/bbl (Chart 9). These estimates are highly sensitive to demand expectations, which, in turn, depend on the global success in containing and minimizing COVID-19 demand destruction, as we have shown above. Chart 8US Shale Producers Focus On Margins Chart 9Raising Our Forecast Slightly Investment Implications In our assessment of the risks to our views in last week's report, we noted one of the unintended consequences of the unplanned and uncoordinated rush to a so-called net-zero future will be an improvement in the competitive position of oil and gas. This is somewhat counterintuitive, but the logic goes like this: The accelerated phase-out of conventional hydrocarbon energy sources brought about policy, regulatory and legal imperatives already is reducing oil and gas capex allocations within the price-taking cohort exemplified by US shale-oil producers. This also will restrict capital flows to EM states with heavy resource endowments and little capital to develop them. Our strong-conviction call on oil, gas and base metals is premised on our view that renewables and their supporting grids cannot be developed and deployed quickly enough to make up for the energy that will be foregone as a result of these policies. Capex for the metals miners has been parsimonious, and brownfield projects continue to dominate. Greenfield projects can take more than a decade to develop, and there are few in the pipeline now as the world heads into its all-out renewables push. In a world where conventional energy production is being forced lower via legislation, regulation, shareholder and legal decisions, higher prices will ensue even if demand stays flat or falls: If supply is falling, market forces will lift oil and gas prices – and the equities of the firms producing them – higher. As for metals like copper and their producers, if supply is unable to keep up with demand, prices of the commodities and the equities of the firms producing them will be forced to go higher.5 This call underpins our long S&P GSCI and COMT ETF commodity recommendations, and our long MSCI Global Metals & Mining Producers ETF (PICK) recommendation. We will look for opportunities to get long oil and gas producer exposure via ETFs as well, given our view on oil and metals spans the next 5-10 years.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The US EIA expects growth in large-scale solar capacity will exceed the increase in wind generation for the first time ever in 2021-22. The EIA forecasts 33 GW of solar PV capacity will be added to the US grid this year and next, with small-scale solar PV increasing ~ 5 GW/yr. The EIA expects wind generation to increase 23 GW in 2021-22. The EIA attributed the slow-down in wind development to the expiration of a $0.025/kWH production tax credit at the end of 2020. Taken together, solar and wind generation will account for 15% of total US electricity output by the end of 2022, according to the EIA. Nuclear power will account for slightly less than 20% of US generation in 2021-22, while hydro will fall to less than 7% owing to severe drought in the western US. At the other end of the generation spectrum, coal will account for ~ 24% of generation this year, as it takes back incremental market share from natural gas, and ~ 22% of generation in 2022. Base Metals: Bullish Iron ore prices continue to trade above $215/MT in China, even as demand is expected to slow in 2H21. Supply additions from Brazil, which ships higher quality 65% Fe ore, have been slower than expected, which is supporting prices (Chart 10). Separately, the Chinese government's auction of refined copper earlier this month cleared the market at $10,500/MT, or ~ $4.76/lb. Spot copper has been trading on either side of $4.30/lb this month, which indicates the Chinese market remains well bid. Precious Metals: Bullish The 13-year record jump in the US Consumer Price Index reported this week for the month of June is bullish for gold, as it produced weaker real rates and sparked demand for inflation hedges. Fed Chair Powell continued to stick to the view that the recent rise in inflation is transitory. The Fed’s dovish outlook will support gold prices and likely will lead to a weaker US dollar, as it reduces the possibility that US interest rates will rise soon. A falling USD will further bolster gold prices (Chart 11). Chart 10 Chart 11     Footnotes 1     We highlighted this risk in last week's report, Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views, which is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Two events – in the Seychelles and Chile, where the majority of the populations were inoculated – highlight re-infection risk. Re-infections in Indonesia along with lockdowns following the spread of the so-called COVID-19 Delta variant also are drawing attention. Please see Euro 2020 final in UK stokes fears of spread of Delta variant, published by The Straits Times on July 11, 2021. The news service notes that in addition to the threats super-spreader sporting events in Europe present, "The rapid spread of the Delta variant across Asia, Africa and Latin America is exposing crucial vaccine supply shortages for some of the world's poorest and most vulnerable populations. Those two factors are also threatening the global economic recovery from the pandemic, Group of 20 finance ministers warned on Saturday." 2     Please see the recently published IMF World Economic Outlook Reports and the World Bank Global Economic Prospects. 3    If, as we suspect, KSA and the UAE are playing a long game – i.e., a 20-30-year game – this spare capacity will become more valuable as investment capex into oil production globally slows. Please see The $200 billion annual value of OPEC’s spare capacity to the global economy published by kapsarc.org on July 17, 2018. 4    Please see Bloomberg's interview with bp's CEO Bernard Looney at Banks Need ‘Radical Transparency,’ Citi Exec Says: Summit Update, which aired on July 13, 2021. In addition to focusing on margins and returns, the company – like its peers among the majors – also is aiming to reduce oil production by 20% by 2025 and 40% by 2030. 5    This turn of events is being dramatically played out in the coal markets, where the supply of metallurgical coals is falling as demand increases. Please see Coal Prices Hit Decade High Despite Efforts to Wean the World Off Carbon published by wsj.com on June 25, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades