Commodities & Energy Sector

Highlights Exogenous risks will remain more of a threat to grain prices than out-of-whack fundamentals, which are closer to balance than not, as the USDA’s World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) indicate. COVID-19-induced public-health risks leading to renewed lockdowns – particularly in the US, where infection rates are rampaging ahead of its trading partners’ – remain at the forefront of these exogenous risks (Chart of the Week). Headline-grabbing grain purchases notwithstanding, fraying Sino-US trade, diplomatic and military relations again threaten these markets, particularly soybeans. China promises to retaliate against actions taken by US President Donald Trump in response to a new security law Beijing foisted on Hong Kong at the end of June, which sharply curtails freedom and autonomy. Sino-US military tensions in the South China Sea remain elevated. Countering these risks, a weaker USD – in line with our House view – would boost demand for grains as EM income growth picks up. Still, global economic policy uncertainty will remain a formidable headwind to a weaker USD. Feature Grains generally are closer to balance than not globally, which suggests the next market-moving developments – outside weather – will be caused by news exogenous to fundamentals (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekCOVID-19 Infection Surge In US Could Lead To Renewed Lockdowns The four key markets tracked by the UN’s Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) – corn, wheat, rice and soybeans – are in “a generally comfortable global supply situation. However, in many parts of the world, local markets brace for the looming impacts of COVID-19, amid uncertainties related to demand, logistics and even access to food.”1 Chart 2Grain Markets Close To Balanced The USDA sees corn markets tightening in the coming 2020-21 crop year beginning in September, with US production down 995mm bushels on the back of lower plantings and harvests.2 Output ex-US is expected to be largely unchanged, while Chinese corn demand will pick up in response to higher soybean feed usage. Stocks in China, Argentina, the EU, Canada, and Mexico, are expected to be lower leading to a net decline in global inventories. US soybean stocks are expected to increase, but this will be offset by declines in Brazil and China, reducing global bean inventories by some 1.3mm tons to 95.1mm, based on USDA estimates. The USDA’s soybean export commitments to China (i.e., outstanding sales plus accumulated exports) are 1.8mm tons higher than last year at 16.2mm tons, but still are well below historic levels (Chart 3). The US slack has been picked up by Brazilian exports, which have been aided by a weak BRL and record bean crops. A weaker USD and a resumption of Sino-US bean trade would reverse this. Wheat and rice stocks are expected to increase globally. Wheat inventories are expected to hit record highs globally, with China accounting for a little more than half of these stocks, and India accounting for 10%. Rice supplies are expected to increase more than demand globally, lifting ending stocks for the 2020-21 crop year to a record 186mm tons; China and India account for 63% and 21% of these inventories, respectively, in the USDA’s estimates. Chart 3Sino-US Trade Tensions Reduce Soybean Exports Chart 4Rising US COVID-19 Infections Are A Risk, But Won’t Derail Global Recovery Sources Of Market-Moving News The public-health fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic continues, particularly in the US, which is seeing a second wave of infections multiplying rapidly. With markets largely in line with fundamentals, the three most likely sources of market-moving “new news” affecting grain markets – outside weather – will come from public-health developments, particularly in the US; political developments affecting global trade, particularly the escalating Sino-US diplomatic tensions; and FX-market developments, which will continue to process these developments in real time. The public-health fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic continues, particularly in the US, which is seeing a second wave of infections multiplying rapidly (Chart 4). While we do not except a repeat of the massive lockdowns earlier this year, rising infection rates do place increasing strains on public-health resources, which could force officials to reimpose lockdowns locally. The global recovery from the pandemic remains uneven, with China’s recovery apparently ahead of most other states in terms of returning its economy to normal. China was first to be hit by the virus and first to largely recover, due to its more extensive lockdowns. Rising geopolitical tensions centered on China could throw global trade patterns into disarray again, just as the world is attempting to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic. For grain markets, China remains an attractive destination for exporters, given the premium grains and soybeans trade at relative to other destinations (Chart 5). This should keep China’s imports of grains robust in the near future, particularly for corn (Chart 6). Chart 5China Grains Prices Are Attractive To Exporters While economics favor movement of grains – and other commodities – to China, rising geopolitical tensions centered on China could throw global trade patterns into disarray again, just as the world is attempting to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic. Chart 6China Should Remain Well Bid For Corn A new security law foisted on Hong Kong by Beijing at the end of June limiting freedom and autonomy drew sharp responses from the US and EU. President Trump this week signed an order ending Hong Kong’s preferential status as a US trading partner in the wake of the new law, and threatened direct sanctions against Chinese officials involved in enforcing the law.3 The European Union issued a statement on July 1, which decried the passage of the law by the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, expressing “grave concerns about this law which was adopted without any meaningful prior consultation of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council and civil society.”4 In addition to this political turmoil, the US and China are engaged in a war of words over China’s territorial claims on the South China Sea, which is contested by states surrounding the sea and branded as illegal by the US.5 The US and China carried out simultaneous large-scale naval exercises earlier this month, raising concerns of an unintended military confrontation.6 Weaker USD Will Buoy Grain Markets We are aligned with our House view expecting a weakening of the USD, driven by the massive fiscal and monetary stimulus from the US; lower real rates in the US, and America’s apparent inability to successfully contain the COVID-19 pandemic to the degree other states (e.g., China) have (Chart 7). This implies the US is at a greater risk of a marked slowdown in its ongoing economic recovery. These factors will support flows to markets ex-US, pressuring the USD lower. For grain markets this will be bullish for demand. A weaker USD lifts EM GDP growth, which boosts industrial activity (Chart 8). Higher income boosts demand for protein, which drives demand for corn and soybeans used as animal feed, and grain consumption (wheat and rice).7 Chart 7USD Weakness Expected As Real Rates Fall, Deficits Rise Chart 8Weaker USD Boosts EM Income, Which Lifts Protein and Grain Demand   On the supply side, a higher (lower) US dollar decreases (raises) the local costs of production for ag exporting countries with a certain lag. A persistently high (low) dollar will incentivize (disincentivize) crop planting in these countries – allowing producers to increase local currency profits from USD-denominated ag exports. This pushes up (down) global supply at the margin. Hence, over relatively long periods, ag prices and the US dollar tend to trend in opposite directions. We cannot ignore the USD’s role as a safe-haven, which is particularly evident during periods of financial, economic and geopolitical stress. Longer term, disparities in monetary and fiscal policies, interest rates, and economic activity between the US and other DM economies will dominate the evolution of the dollar. In our simulations for the USD’s trajectory between now and the end of the year, a 5% depreciation of the USD would lift the CCI grains and oilseed index 13%, while a 5% strengthening of the dollar would push the index down by -8% by December 2020 (Chart 9).8 Should this weakening in the USD materialize, we can expect US grains’ stocks-to-use ratios to fall, which would reinforce price strength in grains (Chart 10). Chart 9USD Weakness Will Buoy Grains While the weaker-dollar scenarios are our favored evolution, we cannot ignore the USD’s role as a safe-haven, which is particularly evident during periods of financial, economic and geopolitical stress (Chart 11). Chart 10Weaker USD Would Lower STU Ratios, And Provide Support To Grain Prices Chart 11USD's Safe-Haven Status Could Keep Dollar Well Bid Bottom Line: Global grain markets are closer to balance than not, leaving exogenous risks – i.e., a COVID-19 second wave, renewed Sino-US trade and military tensions, and a stronger USD – as the key threats to grain prices. The impact of these exogenous risks will be filtered through to grain markets – and commodities generally – via FX markets. While we expect a weaker USD to prevail, in line with our House view, we cannot gainsay the dollar’s safe-haven role and its attraction during times of tension and crisis.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Fernando Crupi Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy FernandoC@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight As we go to press, Brent prices are steady at ~ $43/bbl as market participants await OPEC 2.0's Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee decision on next month's output levels. The group is reportedly set to ease production curtailment to 7.7mm b/d starting next month from 9.7mm b/d in July. This would add to the growing concerns about the impact on oil demand of mounting COVID-19 cases in the US and in EM economies. Still, Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister reiterated the effective cuts would be deeper as countries that overproduced in May/Jun will have to compensate with extra cuts over the coming months. Our global oil balances point to a supply deficit in 2H20. Thus, prices will recover if a correction were to occur. Base Metals: Neutral Copper prices surged by 5% since last week and have now completely recovered from the damaging COVID-19 shock – up 4% ytd. Fears of strike over wages at Antofagasta’s Zaldivar mine in Chile – following unionized workers rejection of a pay offer – and of virus-related mine disruptions in Latin America, combined with strong imports numbers out of China for the month of June supported the recent rally.9 In USD terms, Chinese imports growth recovered to 2.7% from -16.7% in May as stimulus programs start impacting the real economy (Chart 12). Precious Metals: Neutral Gold and silver prices are up 19% and 9% ytd. Silver rose to $19.5/oz as of Tuesday’s close, pushing the gold-to-silver ratio down to 93 after several weeks at ~ 100. Silver prices are supported by both safe-haven and industrial demand at the moment, which is pushing its equilibrium value higher, based on our silver price model (Chart 13). Our long Dec/20 silver futures trade is up 6.4% since inception on July 2, 2020. Ags/Softs:  Underweight On Tuesday the corn market shrugged off the biggest Chinese single-day purchase of U.S. corn and the USDA’s report of a 2% decline in corn crop conditions rated good to excellent. Despite this arguable bullish news, corn prices were still down on prospects of large carryovers both this season and the next marketing year, which begins in September. Going forward, the USDA cattle on feed inventory figure as well as ethanol demand will be key to assessing the evolution of corn carryovers. Feed and residual use of corn went down in the latest WASDE report, with year-to-date cattle on feed inventory lower than 2019, due to consumer stockpiling during the pandemic. With the beginning of grilling season well on its way re-stocking will be a challenging task. Chart 12Chinese Stimulus Will Lift Import Growth Chart 13Higher Equilibrium Value of Silver     Footnotes 1     Please see the UN’s AMIS Market Monitor for July 2020. 2     Please see World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) published by the USDA July 10, 2020. 3    Reuters reports that per the executive order signed by Trump this week, “U.S. property would be blocked of any person determined to be responsible for or complicit in ‘actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Hong Kong.’”  In addition, the order requires US officials to “revoke license exceptions for exports to Hong Kong.”  Hong Kong passport holders no longer will be accorded special treatment under the order as well.  Please see China vows retaliation after Trump ends preferential status for Hong Kong published by reuters.com July 14, 2020. 4    Please see Declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the adoption by China’s National People’s Congress of a National Security Legislation on Hong Kong. This was issued by the EU July 1, 2020. 5    Please see South China Sea dispute: China's pursuit of resources 'unlawful', says US published by bbc.com July 14, 2020.  See also China Pushes Back Against U.S. Statement on South China Sea Claims, ASEAN Stays Silent published by news.usni.org July 14, 2020. 6    Please see U.S. Carriers Send a Message to Beijing Over South China Sea published by foreignpolicy.com July 9, 2020. 7     In our modeling, we find that ag prices are generally less responsive to short-term changes in the US dollar compared to oil or base metals, but that they follow a common trend with the dollar over the long term. 8    These percent changes scale linearly in percentage terms, so a 10% weakening of the USD would lift the index 26%. 9    Please see Workers at Antofagasta's Zaldivar copper mine in Chile vote to strike: union published by reuters.com on July 10, 2020.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights The EM equity benchmark’s concentration in the top six stocks – that in turn correlate with US FAANGM – has risen substantially. Hence, the outlook for US mega-cap stocks will continue to significantly impact the EM equity benchmark. US FAANGM stocks have been closely tracking the trajectory of – and share many other similarities with – previous bubbles. Hence, it is risky to dismiss the mania thesis. That said, it is impossible to know how long this equity mania will last, how far it will go and what will trigger its volte-face. Odds of a repeat of the 2015 boom-bust cycle in Chinese equities are low. The rally in Chinese stocks and commodities might be due for a pause. Feature Concentration Risk Chart 1EM: Mega-Caps Stocks Versus The Equal-Weighted Index The EM equity index's hefty gains since the late-March lows have largely been at the hands of about six stocks: Alibaba, Tencent, TSMC, Samsung, Naspers and Meituan-Dianping (Chart 1). The latter is a Chinese web-service platform company, while Naspers derives 75% of its revenue from its equity ownership in Tencent and 25% from a Russian internet company. For ease of reference, we refer to the big four (Alibaba, Tencent, Samsung and TSMC) as EM ATST. Table 1 illustrates that the top six companies combined account for about 24.3% of the MSCI EM equity market cap. For comparison, US FAANGM (Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Google and Microsoft) account for 25% of the S&P 500 market cap. The remainder of the EM equity universe – including all Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese stocks other than the six mega caps listed above – has rallied less (Chart 1). This is very similar to the dynamics in the US equity market, where the equally-weighted index has substantially diverged from the FAANGM index (Chart 2). Table 1Market Cap Weights & Performance Since March Lows Chart 2US: FAANGM Versus The Equal-Weighted Index   Table 2MSCI EM Stocks: Country Weights The EM ATST’s exponential rise has also boosted their respective country weightings in the MSCI EM equity benchmark. Table 2 demonstrates that China, Korea and Taiwan together account for 65% of the EM benchmark, India for 8% and all other 22 countries combined for 27%. Note that the market cap ($1.7 trillion) of the remaining 22 countries is almost as large as the market cap of the top six EM individual stocks. On the whole, concentration in the EM benchmark is as high as ever. Apart from global trade and Chinese growth, there are two other forces that will define the direction of EM mega-cap stocks: (1) rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China, and (2) a continuous mania or bust in “new economy” stocks. We discuss the latter in the following section. Escalating tensions between the US and China, including North Korea’s potential assault on South Korea, pose risks to Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese stocks. This is one of the critical reasons why we have been reluctant to chase these markets higher, despite upgrading our outlook on Chinese growth. If these bourses relapse, their sheer weight in the EM benchmark will pull the index down. The EM equity index’s outperformance in recent weeks has been due to the surge in both EM mega-cap stocks and Chinese share prices more broadly. Bottom Line: The EM equity benchmark concentration has risen substantially due to outsized gains in several “new economy” stocks. What’s more, the EM equity index’s outperformance in recent weeks has been due to the surge in both EM mega-cap stocks and Chinese share prices more broadly (we discuss the latter below). If the global mania in “new economy” stocks persists, EM ATST could well drive the overall EM equity index higher. Conversely, if “new economy” shares roll over for whatever reason, the EM equity benchmark’s advance will reverse. A Bubble Or Not? An assessment of the sustainability of the rally in US FAANGM stocks is critical for investors in the EM equity benchmark if for no other reason than the concentration hazard. We present the following considerations in assessing whether the FAANGM and EM ATST rally is or is not a mania: First, the exponential rally in FAANGM stocks is not a new phenomenon: It has been taking place over the past 10 years. Our FAANGM index – an equal-weighted average of six stocks (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, Google and Microsoft) – has increased 20-fold in real (inflation-adjusted) US dollar terms since January 2010. Its rise is on par with the magnitude of the bull market in the Nasdaq 100 index in the 1990s and Walt Disney in the 1960s, and well exceeds other bubbles, as illustrated in Chart 3. All price indexes on Chart 3 are shown in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Chart 3Each Decade = One Mania All these manias and bubbles started with excellent fundamentals, and price gains were initially justified. Toward the end of the decade, however, their outsized gains attracted momentum chasers and speculators, catapulting share prices exponentially higher. Second, a financial mania requires: (1) solid past performance; (2) a story that can capture investors’ imaginations, and (3) plentiful liquidity. The “new economy” stocks fit all of these criteria: They have delivered super-sized performance over the past 10 years; They easily capture ordinary people’s imaginations – the average person on the street knows that FAANGM and EM ATST stocks benefit from people working from home and spending more time online; The Federal Reserve and many other central banks are injecting enormous amounts of liquidity into their respective economies. Third, there is a striking similarity between the FAANGM rally and previous bubbles: The mania-subjects of the preceding decades assumed global equity leadership early in their respective decade, rose steadily throughout, and went exponential at the very end of the decade. The latest parabolic surge in FAANGM stocks along with its duration (10 years of global equity outperformance and leadership) and magnitude (20-fold price appreciation in real inflation-adjusted terms) conspicuously resembles those of previous bubbles. Interestingly, the majority of previous bubbles peaked and tumbled around the turn of each decade, the exception being Walt Disney – the Nifty-Fifty bubble of the 1960s – which rolled over in 1973. Given FAANGM stocks have been closely tracking the trajectory of previous bubbles, it will not be surprising if 2020 ends up marking the peak for “new economy” stocks. Fourth, the last exponential upleg in the tech and telecom bubble of 1999-2000 occurred amid a one-off demand surge for tech hardware and software. The Y2K scare – worries that computers and networks around the world might malfunction on the New Year/new millennium eve – spurred many companies to order new hardware and upgrade their systems and networks. As a result, there was a one-off boom in orders in the global technology industry in the fourth quarter of 1999 and first quarter of 2000. Chart 4Orders For Computers And Electronics Have Remained Resilient Investors extrapolated this one-off demand surge into the future, mistaking it for recurring growth. As a result, they assigned extremely high valuations to these tech stocks in the first quarter of 2000. Similarly, since March, working and shopping from home has sharply increased demand for web services, online shopping, cloud computing and tech hardware. The top panel of Chart 4 demonstrates that US manufacturing orders for computers and electronic products did not contract in the March-May period, while orders for capital goods have plunged since March. Similarly, Taiwanese exports – which are heavy on tech hardware – are holding up well despite the crash in global trade (Chart 4, bottom panel). Some of this demand strength is structural, but part of it is one-off and non-recurring. Certainly, one should not extrapolate their recent growth rates into the future. However, investors are prone to extrapolation and chasing winners. Fifth, valuations of US FAANGM and EM ATST are elevated. Trailing P/E ratios for EM ATST stocks are shown in Table 3. Table 3Price-To-Earnings For Top 6 EM Stocks All in all, provided both US FAANGM and EM ATST consist of admirable companies with great competitive advantages and business models, it is tempting to dismiss the bubble argument. Nevertheless, there are enough similarities with previous manias to compel investors to be vigilant. Even great companies have a fair price, and substantial price overshoots will not be sustainable. We sense a growing number of investors deem US FAANGM and EM ATST stocks as invincible. When some stocks are regarded as unbeatable, their top is not far. Our major theme for the past decade – elaborated in the report, How To Play EM In The Coming Decade1 published in June 2010 – has been as follows: Sell commodities / buy health care and technology. Until 2019, we were recommending being long EM tech/short EM resource stocks. Unfortunately, since 2019, the corrections in EM “new economy” stocks have proved to be too short and fleeting, and we were unable to buy-in. Their share prices have lately gone parabolic: They are now in a full-blown mania phase. As to global equity leadership change from growth to value stocks, we maintain that major leadership rotations typically occur during or at the end of an equity selloff, as we elaborated in our October 3, 2019 report (Charts 5 and 6). Chart 5EM vs DM: Leadership Rotation Requires Market Turbulence Chart 6Growth vs Value: Leadership Rotation Requires Market Turbulence Apparently, the February-March selloff did not produce a shift in equity leadership. Barring a major selloff, “new economy” stocks will likely continue to lead. Chart 7Fed Rate Cuts Did Not Prevent The S&P 500 Bubble From Unravelling Finally, easy money policies encourage speculation and contribute to the build-up of manias. However, when a bubble starts unravelling, low interest rates are often unable to avert the bust. For example, when the tech bubble began bursting in 2000, the Fed cut rates aggressively and US bond yields plunged. Yet, low interest rates did not prevent tech share prices from deflating further (Chart 7). Bottom Line:  It is impossible to know how long this equity mania will last, how far it will go and what will trigger its volte-face. One thing is certain: there is a lot of froth – particularly in terms of valuation and positioning – in these “new economy” stocks. Yet, these excesses could last longer and get larger. A Mania In Chinese Equities? Many commentators have rushed to compare the latest surge in Chinese stocks with the exponential advance in the first half of 2015. We do not think this rally will go on without interruption for another five months like it did back then. Our rationale is as follows:   The Chinese authorities are much more vigilant now, and they will try to induce periodic corrections to avoid another mania and bust similar to those that occurred five years ago. The Chinese authorities are much more vigilant now, and they will try to induce periodic corrections to avoid another mania and bust similar to those that occurred five years ago. Both China’s MSCI Investable and CSI 300 equity indexes are retesting their previous highs (Chart 8). In the past they failed to break above these levels, and this time is likely to be no different, at least for now. The latest spike is more likely to be the final hurrah before a setback. Critically, the 12-month forward P/E ratio for China’s MSCI Investible index has also risen to its previous peaks (Chart 9, top panel). This has occurred with little improvement in the 12-month forward EPS (Chart 9, bottom panel). In short, share prices have run ahead of the business cycle and are already pricing in a lot of profit recovery. Chart 8Chinese Stocks Are At Their Previous Highs Chart 9Chinese Investable Stocks: A Rally Driven By P/E Expansion Chart 10Chinese Onshore Stocks: A Two-Tier Market Most of the rally since the March lows has been due to “new economy” stocks. Share prices of “old economy” companies did not do that well before July. Tech stocks in the onshore market have gone parabolic (Chart 10, top panel). This contrasts with lackluster performance of materials, industrials, and property stocks (Chart 10, bottom panels). Critically, in the onshore market, tech stocks are trading at the following trailing P/E ratios: the market cap-weighted P/E is 155, and the median P/E is 60. Needless to say, these valuations are outright expensive.   Bottom Line: Odds of a repeat of the 2015 boom-bust cycle are low. The rally in Chinese stocks might be due for a pause. On June 18, we upgraded Chinese stocks to overweight from neutral within the EM benchmark, a recommendation that remains intact. We have a much lower conviction on the absolute performance of Chinese stocks in the near-run. China And Commodities An important question to address is whether the rally in commodities in general and copper in particular are signals of a sustainable recovery in the mainland economy. Without a doubt, economic conditions in China have been improving, and infrastructure spending has been accelerating. However, the magnitude of the upswing in copper prices is excessive relative to the strength of the Chinese economy. The spike in resource prices in general and copper in particular has been due to three forces: (1) China’s unprecedented super-strong imports; (2) global investors buying commodities; and (3) output cuts. It is highly unlikely that commodity demand in China is this strong. In our opinion, this reflects restocking. Chart 11 shows that Chinse imports of copper and copper products surged by 100% in June from a year ago, while imports of steel products increased by 100% and oil import volumes rose by 34%. It is highly unlikely that commodity demand in China is this strong. In our opinion, this reflects restocking. Provided cheap credit availability, wholesalers, intermediaries or users of commodities have rushed to buy before prices rise further. In the case of copper, it will take several months before the real economy absorbs that much of the red metal. Hence, China’s copper imports are poised to relapse in the coming months.   Chart 12 illustrates that investors’ net long positions in copper have risen to their highest level since early 2019. Consistently, the July Bank of America/Meryl Lynch Global Fund Manager Survey revealed that as of early July, portfolio managers had built up their largest net long positions in commodities since July 2011.   Not only oil but also copper and iron ore prices have benefitted from production declines. Due to surging COVID infections, Chile and Peru have sharply reduced copper output and Brazil has curtailed iron ore production. Chart 11Chinese Imports Of Commodities Have Surged Chart 12Investors Have Gone Long Copper Simultaneous buying of commodities by China and global investors as well as production cuts have considerably benefited resource prices as of late. Our suspicion is that commodities inventories in China have become elevated. This entails reduced purchases by China, and by extension an air pocket in commodities prices in the months ahead. Bottom Line: The rally in resources in general and copper in particular is at risk of a correction. We remain long gold/short copper.     Investment Strategy In absolute terms, the risk-reward of EM share prices is not attractive. However, as we have argued in the past two months, FOMO (fear-of-missing-out) mania forces could take share prices higher. The timing of a reversal is never easy especially when a FOMO-driven mania is alive. For now, for asset allocators we reiterate a below-benchmark allocation in EM stocks within a global equity portfolio. However, a breakdown in the trade-weighted US dollar will prompt us to upgrade EM within the global equity benchmark (Chart 13). The broad trade-weighted dollar is teetering on an edge but has not yet broken down (Chart 14). In sum, global equity portfolios should be ready to upgrade their EM allocation to neutral on signs that the broad trade-weighted US dollar is breaking down. Chart 13EM vs DM: Is The Downtrend Intact? Chart 14The Broad Trade-Weighted Dollar Is On An Edge   As we argued last week, the US dollar could weaken against DM currencies amid the next selloff in global share prices. This is why last week we switched our short positions in an EM currency basket from the US dollar to an equally-weighted basket of the euro, the Swiss franc and Japanese yen. This strategy remains valid. The US dollar is at risk versus DM currencies. However, EM exchange rates may not be out of the woods, given their poor fundamentals on the one hand and potential geopolitical risks in North Asia on the other. We are neutral on both EM local currency bonds and EM sovereign and corporate credit.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "How To Play EM In The Coming Decade," dated June 10, 2010. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights Energy Bond Model: This report presents models for both investment grade and high-yield Energy bond excess returns. The models are based on overall corporate bond index spreads and the oil price. They can be used to generate Energy bond excess return forecasts for investment horizons up to 12 months. IG Energy Bonds: Our model suggests that investment grade Energy bond excess returns will be strong during the next 12 months under likely economic scenarios. We recommend an overweight allocation to investment grade Energy bonds.  HY Energy Bonds: Our models imply positive excess return outcomes for high-yield Energy bonds, but we remain concerned about near-term default risk for lower-rated issuers. We advise a cautious (neutral) allocation for now. Part 2 of this Special Report, to be published next week, will dig further into the high-yield Energy index on an issuer-by-issuer basis. Feature Table 1Energy Bond Excess Return* Scenarios (12-Month Investment Horizon) During the past couple of months we’ve published several reports that take more detailed looks at specific industry groups within both the investment grade and high-yield corporate bond markets. So far, we’ve published reports on: Banks1 Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals2 Technology3 This week and next week, we continue our series with a deep dive into Energy bonds that is split between two Special Reports. This week’s report develops a model for Energy bond excess returns based on overall corporate bond index excess returns and the oil price. In next week’s report, we look more deeply into the characteristics of the investment grade and high-yield Energy indexes. We also consider the outlooks for the five sub-categories of Energy debt: Independent, Integrated, Oil Field Services, Refining and Midstream. A Model Of Energy Bond Excess Returns A good starting point for modeling the excess returns of any corporate bond sector is to combine the sector’s Duration-Times-Spread (DTS) ratio with the excess returns of the overall corporate bond index.4 Please note that “excess returns” refers to returns relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. The DTS-only model explains 86% of the variance in monthly investment grade Energy excess returns. Considering only a sector’s DTS ratio, we can define the following model for monthly investment grade Energy excess returns: EXSENRG = (DTSENRG / DTSCORP) * EXSCORP Where: EXSENRG = Monthly investment grade Energy excess returns versus duration-matched Treasuries (DTSENRG / DTSCORP) = The investment grade Energy sector’s DTS ratio EXSCORP = Monthly investment grade corporate index excess returns versus duration-matched Treasuries For example, the current DTS for the investment grade Energy sector is 18. The DTS for the overall corporate index is 12. This means that the DTS ratio for the Energy sector is 18/12 = 1.5. According to our simple model, we would expect Energy sector excess returns to be 1.5 times corporate index excess returns in any given month. It turns out that our simple model performs quite well. Chart 1 shows monthly investment grade Energy sector excess returns versus our model’s prediction. Our sample period spans from 1997 to the present. Specifically, we find that our model explains 86% of the variance in monthly investment grade Energy excess returns. Chart 1Investment Grade Energy Monthly Excess Returns*: DTS-Only Model** The simple (DTS-only) model’s performance is admirable, but we can do slightly better if we also incorporate the oil price. Chart 2 shows a statistically significant relationship between the residual from the DTS-only model and the monthly change in the Brent crude oil price. Chart 2Residual From DTS-Only Model* Versus Oil Price Combining the models shown in Charts 1 and 2, we get a model for investment grade Energy monthly excess returns based on both corporate index excess returns and the oil price: EXSENRG = (DTSENRG / DTSCORP) * EXSCORP + (376.84 * ∆ ln Oil) – 1.0587 Where excess returns are measured in basis points and (∆ ln Oil) = the monthly change in the natural logarithm of the Brent crude oil price. Chart 3 shows the historical performance of this complete model. Note that the model now explains 91% of the historical variance of investment grade Energy excess returns, 5% more than the initial DTS-only model. Chart 3Investment Grade Energy Monthly Excess Returns*: Complete Model (DTS & Oil)** Robustness Checks We performed the same analysis for 3-month, 6-month and 12-month excess returns and found very consistent results (Table 2). The oil price adds significant explanatory power to the model in each case, but the bulk of variation in investment grade Energy excess returns is determined by trends in the overall corporate index spread. Table 2Investment Grade Energy Excess Returns*: Model Results Using Different Return Frequencies (1997 - Present) We also find consistent results when looking at high-yield Energy returns (Table 3). Once again, the bulk of excess return variation is explained by multiplying the DTS ratio and the benchmark index’s excess returns. The oil price also adds a statistically significant amount of extra explanatory power. Table 3High-Yield Energy Excess Returns*: Model Results Using Different Return Frequencies (1997 - Present) One final observation is that oil explains a greater proportion of the variation in Energy sector excess returns if we limit our sample period to the past few years. Specifically, we re-ran the monthly iterations of both the investment grade and high-yield models from July 2014 to present. We found that the DTS component of the model explains the same amount of excess return variation as it did for the full sample. However, we also found that the oil price has a much greater impact if the sample is limited to the past six years (Table 4). Table 41-Month Excess Return* Models: Full Sample (1997 - Present) Versus Recent Sample (2014 - Present) Energy Excess Return Scenarios Finally, using our 12-month excess return models for investment grade and high-yield Energy, we can project likely outcomes for Energy excess returns versus Treasuries for the next 12 months. All we have to do is assume different outcomes for the overall benchmark index spread (either the investment grade or High-Yield index, depending on the model) and the oil price.5 The results of this scenario analysis are shown in Table 1. Starting with investment grade Energy, we see that all scenarios where the investment grade corporate index spread tightens lead to positive Energy excess returns. This is true even in a scenario where the oil price falls by $20 during the next year. Our model also suggests that a $10-$20 increase in the oil price during the next 12 months will keep Energy excess returns positive, even in a modest “risk off” scenario where the corporate index spread widens by 25 bps. All scenarios where the investment grade corporate index spread tightens lead to positive Energy excess returns. The story is similar in high-yield, though returns are much more variable. For example, high-yield Energy is projected to lose money relative to Treasuries in a scenario where the junk index spread tightens 50 bps and the oil price falls by $20. There are no scenarios where benchmark index spread tightening coincides with negative Energy excess returns in the investment grade model. Chart 4Watch For Falling Inventories In terms of likely scenarios for the next 12 months, we anticipate further spread tightening for corporate bonds rated Ba & above. But we also view B-rated and lower spreads as too tight given the default outlook for the next 12 months and the fact that these lower-rated issuers usually can’t access the Fed’s emergency lending facilities.6 With that in mind, we would confidently bet on investment grade index spread tightening during the next 12 months, but can envision high-yield spread widening driven by the lower credit tiers. On oil, our Commodity & Energy Strategy service forecasts an average Brent crude oil price of $65 in 2021, a sizeable increase relative to the current price of $43.27.7 Our strategists expect a significant supply contraction in the second quarter of this year that will cause the oil market to enter a physical deficit in the second half of 2020. Investors can look for falling storage levels in the coming months to confirm whether that forecast is playing out (Chart 4). Escalating tensions between the US and Iran pose an additional near-term upside risk to oil prices. This risk increased during the past few weeks as a string of mysterious explosions struck several Iranian military and economic facilities.8 However, with major oil producers now operating significantly below capacity, any net impact on oil prices from a supply disruption in the Persian Gulf would likely be short-lived. Investment Conclusions All in all, our bullish outlook for both investment grade corporate bond spreads and the oil price makes us inclined to overweight investment grade Energy bonds on a 12-month horizon. Within high-yield, our model also suggests that we should have a bullish bias toward Energy, but we remain concerned about default risk for lower-rated (B & below) Energy issuers during the next few months. We will dig into the high-yield Energy index on an issuer-by-issuer basis in Part 2 of this report, to be published next week. For now, we advise a more cautious stance toward high-yield Energy.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation”, dated April 28, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Assessing Healthcare & Pharma Bonds In A Pandemic”, dated June 9, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Duration-Times-Spread (DTS) is a simple measure that is highly correlated with excess return volatility for corporate bonds. The DTS ratio is the ratio of a sector’s DTS to that of the benchmark index. It can be thought of like the beta of a stock. A DTS ratio above 1.0 signals that the sector is cyclical (or “high beta”), a DTS ratio below 1.0 signals that the sector is defensive or (“low beta”). For more details on the DTS measure please see: Arik Ben Dor, Lev Dynkin, Jay Hyman, Patrick Houweling, Erik van Leeuwen & Olaf Penninga, “DTS (Duration-Times-Spread)”, Journal of Portfolio Management 33(2), January 2007. 5 We translate changes in benchmark index spread into 12-month excess returns using the formula: excess return = option-adjusted spread – (duration * change in option-adjusted spread) 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “Low Vol, High Uncertainty Keeps Oil-Price Rally On Tenterhooks”, dated June 18, 2020, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Alert, “Cyber-Rattling In The Middle East”, dated July 10, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com

Special Report

Highlights The underperformance of value versus growth has been a reason behind the dollar bull market rather than a consequence of it. The rationale is that the catalyst for any sector to outperform is return on capital rather than the cost of capital. The outperformance of health care and technology has been on the back of rising profits, rather than just investor exuberance and/or low bond yields. Cyclical currencies with a high concentration of value sectors have tracked the relative performance of their representative bourses. A reversal will require value sectors to start outperforming on a sustainable basis. It is encouraging that leadership changes in equity markets occur more often than not. Historically, these tend to take place every decade. Bombed-out valuations suggest some deep-value sectors have become sufficiently cheap to compensate for a pessimistic profit scenario. An outperformance of value versus growth will favor cyclical currencies. We are long a basket of petrocurrencies, the SEK, and GBP. We are also short USD/JPY as portfolio insurance (and as a play on the cyclical Japanese market). Feature The usual market narrative is that for non-US stocks to outperform, the dollar has to decline. This also applies to value stocks that have a higher weighting outside the US, compared to growth stocks. At the center of this premise is that the dollar is a reserve currency. As a result, three reasons emblem the view. First, a fall in the dollar eases financing costs for non-US corporations borrowing in dollars. Second, commodities tend to do well when the dollar declines, benefiting emerging market and commodity-producing countries. And finally, a lower dollar boosts the common-currency returns for US-based investors, leading to more capital deployment in offshore markets. On the surface, this makes sense. But digging deeper into the thesis, it appears that a lower US dollar is a necessary but not sufficient condition for non-US (or value) stocks to outperform. The reason is that profit growth (the ultimate driver of stock prices) is more contingent on productivity gains rather than translation effects. As such, the value-versus-growth debate is important, not only for the sectors involved, but for currency strategy as well. A Two-Decade Postmortem Chart I-1Value/Growth Turns Before The Dollar Chart I-1 plots the MSCI global value index versus its growth counterpart, superimposed against the US dollar. Two trends become apparent: The relative performance of value versus growth typically bottoms or peaks ahead of turns in the US dollar. The relationship between the value/growth ratio and the US dollar is not always in sync. There was a period of decoupling after the financial crisis, and, more recently, in 2015-2016. This was also the case in the ‘80s and around the Asian crisis in the late ‘90s. Flows tend to gravitate to capital markets with the highest expected returns, and this is certainly the case when value or growth style tilts are concerned. This is important for currency strategy, since sector composition can drive a country’s equity returns. Meanwhile, both equity and currency relative performances tend to be in sync (Chart I-2A and Chart I-2B). Chart I-2ACurrencies Follow Relative Equity Performance Chart I-2BCurrencies Follow Relative Equity Performance According to the MSCI classification, information technology and health care are the biggest components of the growth index – a whopping 49%. This is in stark contrast to financials and industrials, which make up 33% of the value index. Not surprisingly, currencies with a heavy value weighting in their domestic bourses (Table I-1) have suffered indiscriminately compared to their growth counterparts, over the last decade. Table I-1Sector Weights Across G10 Take the US and Switzerland, which have the highest equity concentration in traditional growth sectors, at over 60%. Both the US dollar and Swiss franc have held up remarkably well in trade-weighted terms since the onset of the dollar bull market (Chart I-3). Likewise, it would have been a miracle for petrocurrencies (CAD, NOK and AUD) to hold up amid the recent underperformance in energy and financials. Chart I-3Style Tilt Drives Currency Performance This suggests that at minimum, the underperformance of value versus growth has been a reason for the dollar bull market rather than a consequence of it. Chicken And Egg Problem? What about the narrative that a decline in the dollar greases the engine of non-US stocks? Yes, but not entirely. It is certainly the case that most global trade and financing is conducted in US dollars, and so a fall in the US dollar (commensurate with lower interest rates) leads to easier global financial conditions. As Chart I-4 clearly illustrates, corporate spreads abroad have been tightly correlated to dollar volatility. A lower dollar also eases repayment costs for non-US borrowers. Chart I-4The Dollar And Funding Stresses A lower dollar also boosts resource prices through the numeraire effect (Chart I-5). Meanwhile, rising commodity prices flatter industries tied to the resource value chain such as industrials, materials, and energy. Second-round economic effects also buffet other cyclical industries such as retail and hospitality, which help boost the domestic equity index. That said, the rally in commodities, value stocks, and emerging market share prices in 2016-2017 occurred despite a dollar that was flat-to-higher – so the causality versus effect link is not always trivial. Part of the reason is that, over the past few years, both emerging market and other non-US corporates have diversified their sources of debt funding. Euro- and yen-denominated debt have been surging (Chart I-6), which has kept their cost of capital low, even as the dollar has risen. Chart I-5Tied To The Hip Chart I-6Lots Of Non-US Debt It is also important to note that in commodity bull markets, prices tend to rise in all currencies, including domestically (Chart I-7). This is crucial for sector outperformance since the translation effect for profits will otherwise be negative, given local-currency fixed and variable costs. This suggests that demand is the driving force behind bull markets in commodity prices and cyclical stocks, rather than a lower greenback. Chart I-7Commodity Bull Markets In Different Currencies This demand has come in the form of Chinese stimulus. Chart I-8 shows a close correlation between excess liquidity in China (a measure of the centripetal force from Chinese credit) and resource share valuations. Ergo, a key barometer for value to outperform growth is that Chinese demand picks up, plugging the hole in exactly the sectors that have borne the brunt of deleveraging in recent years. Chart I-8China And Commodities A look at corporate balance sheets and income statements corroborates this view. Growth has outperformed value on the back of a re-rating, but also on profitability. Chart I-9A and Chart I-9B rank G10 equity bourses on the basis of return on equity and their corresponding price-to-book ratios. Not surprisingly, the winners of the last decade have had the biggest returns on equity, as was the case for the winners during the prior decade. Chart I-9AMarkets Bid Up High Returns To Capital Chart I-9BMarkets Bid Up High Returns To Capital As such, the catalyst for any sector to outperform is return on capital rather than the cost of capital. Structural Shift? There is some evidence that the underperformance of value versus growth could be structural. For one, being a value manager seems to be following the fate of telephone switchboard operators in the early 1900s. Perhaps the advent of computer trading systems has systematically eroded the value premium. As such it is becoming more and more difficult, even for the most skillful value managers, to beat their own index. An inability for value sectors to outperform will be a key risk to a dollar-bearish view. Work done on our in-house Equity Trading Strategy platform corroborates this view. Since about 2014, a long/short strategy based on the best value stocks relative to the worst in terms of a swath of fundamental valuation metrics has been flat compared to a more blended strategy (Chart I-10). According to our quantitative specialists, the best value can be found in European countries such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany (Chart I-11). Surprisingly, their proprietary value model rate Switzerland and New Zealand quite highly, despite a clear defensive bias in these equity markets. Unsurprisingly, some of the countries that have had the weakest currencies in the last decade such as Sweden and the Eurozone members have highly favored value sectors. Chart I-10A Dearth Of Value Managers Chart I-11Lots Of Value Outside The US Going forward, a few things could change. One of the primary reasons why growth has outperformed value has been the drop in bond yields, which has increased the appeal of companies with low payout ratios and much more backdated cash flows (Chart I-12). But as countries from Japan to Australia implement yield-curve controls at the zero bound, the capitalized dividend from low yields is bound to be exhausted. Meanwhile, any rise in yields will favor deep-value sectors like banks (due to rising net interest margins) and commodities (due to inflation protection). Chart I-12A Lower Discount Favors Long-Duration Assets Second, falling global trade and the proliferation of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) investing has hammered traditional industries such as energy and autos. Part of this trend is structural, but there is also a cyclical component. For the auto industry in particular, auto sales are strongly (inversely) correlated to the unemployment rate, and as more economies reopen, car sales should pick up. Meanwhile, traditional auto and energy companies are stepping up their electric vehicle and alternative energy strategies, meaning the first-mover advantage for the avant-gardes like Tesla and Nikola could be eroded. Finally, valuation tends to be a key catalyst near recessions. Given that over the years, one of the more consistent drivers of long-term equity returns has been the valuation starting point, this favors non-US stocks (Chart I-13A, Chart I-13B, Chart I-13C, Chart I-13D). Not surprisingly, the currencies that are the most undervalued in our models1 also have cheap equity markets. Even if one focuses solely on growth sectors such as technology and health care, non-US companies are still more attractive, according to our Equity Trading Strategy platform (Chart I-14). This suggests some measure of convergence is due. Chart I-13AProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Chart I-13BProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Chart I-13CProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Chart I-13DProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Chart I-14Attractive Growth Stocks Outside The US It is encouraging that leadership changes in equity markets occur more often than not. Historically, these tend to occur every decade. Bombed-out valuations suggest some deep-value sectors have become sufficiently cheap to compensate for a pessimistic profit scenario. Portfolio Construction Chart I-15CAD/NZD And Relative Stocks An outperformance of value versus growth will favor cyclical currencies. The catalyst will have to be improving return on capital from value sectors, but the valuation starting point is already quite compelling. Meanwhile, even traditional growth sectors are still cheaper outside the US. We are already selectively long a basket of petrocurrencies, the SEK, and GBP. We are also short USD/JPY as portfolio insurance (and as a play on the cyclical Japanese market). Should value stocks gain more widespread appeal, we will add the Eurozone and emerging market currencies to this basket. Elsewhere, a tactical trading opportunity has also opened up to go short the NZD/CAD cross. Little known is that the New Zealand stock market is the most defensive in the world (previously referenced in Table I-1). This has helped keep the New Zealand dollar higher than would have otherwise been the case. Should value start to outperform growth, this will favor the CAD/NZD cross (Chart I-15). While we commend Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s efforts to limit the spread of COVID-19 in New Zealand, the economy will soon start to bump against supply-side constraints. More specifically, COVID-19 has accentuated the immigration cliff in New Zealand, an important hit to the labor dividend for the economy (Chart I-16). As such, the neutral rate of interest is bound to head lower. Chart I-16A Top For NZD/CAD? This is in stark contrast to Canada, where the current government was pro-immigration even before widespread lockdowns. Meanwhile, in the commodity space, our bias is that energy will fare better than agriculture, boosting relative Canadian terms of trade. Go short NZD/CAD for a trade.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report , "Updating Our Intermediate-Term Models", dated July 3, 2020. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been robust: The ISM non-manufacturing PMI jumped from 45.4 to 57.1 in June, with the new orders component surging from 41.9 to 61.6 and the employment component at 43.1 versus 31.8 earlier. JOLTS job openings increased from 5 million to 5.4 million in May. Initial jobless claims fell from 1413K to 1314K for the week ended July 3rd. The DXY index fell by 1% this week, alongside the outperformance of non-US equities, particularly emerging market stocks. Recent data have shown budding signs of a recovery as many countries gradually reopen their economies. As a counter-cyclical currency, this has pressured the dollar. Report Links: DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market? - June 5, 2020 Cycles And The US Dollar - May 15, 2020 Capitulation? - April 3, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mostly positive: The Markit services PMI increased from 47.3 to 48.3 in June. The Sentix investor confidence index rebounded from -24.8 to -18.2 in July. Retail sales fell by 5.1% year-on-year in May. However, this is a 17.8% increase on a month-on-month basis.  The euro increased by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. While recent data have been promising, the Summer 2020 Economic Forecast released by the European Union sounded quite pessimistic this week. The Summer Forecast projects that the euro area will contract by 8.7% in 2020 and grow by 6.1% in 2021, much worse than the spring forecast. That said, a mild second wave could trigger the European Union to revise these estimates higher. Meanwhile, the ECB remains committed to lowering the cost of capital for Eurozone countries. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mostly negative: The current account balance surged from ¥262.7 billion to ¥1176.8 billion in May, as imports fell faster than exports. The preliminary coincident index fell from 80.1 to 74.6 in May, while the leading economic index increased from 77.7 to 79.3. Machinery orders fell by 16.3% year-on-year in May, following a 17.7% decrease the previous month. Moreover, preliminary machine tool orders in June continued to fall by 32% year-on-year. USD/JPY fell by 0.5% this week. The June Eco Watchers Survey released this Wednesday shows that the current conditions index increased sharply from 15.5 to 38.8. Moreover, the outlook index rose to 44 in June from 36.5 the previous month. The Survey sounded cautiously optimistic and indicated that while COVID-19 continues to be a downside risk, activities are starting to pick up in recent months. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been positive: The Markit services PMI ticked up marginally from 47 to 47.1 in June. The construction PMI surged from 28.9 to 55.3. Halifax house prices increased by 2.5% year-on-year in June. The British pound jumped by 1.3% against the US dollar this week. The Bank of England chief economist, Andy Haldane, has warned about second, third or even fourth wave of COVID-19 infections. However, he also acknowledged that the UK economy has received a boost since restaurants and bars have reopened. We remain bullish on the pound as an undervalued currency, but are monitoring Brexit developments closely as they continue to add more volatility to trading patterns. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mostly negative: The AiG services performance index was flat at 31.5 in June. Home loans fell by 7.6% month-on-month in May, following a 4.4% decline the previous month. The Australian dollar rose by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. On Tuesday, the RBA held its interest rate unchanged at 0.25%, as widely expected. The Bank sounded optimistic about the recovery and the government’s effective measures to contain the virus. That said, with Melbourne returning into lockdown, a dose of skepticism is warranted. We continue to favor the Australian dollar as a key barometer for procyclical trades, but domestic factors could be a risk to this view. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: The ANZ preliminary business confidence index recovered from -34.4 to -29.8 in July. The New Zealand dollar rose by 0.9% against the US dollar this week. The Q2 NZIER Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion (QSBO) indicated that economic activities plunged sharply in Q2. According to the survey, a net 63% of businesses expect conditions to deteriorate, compared with 70% in the previous survey. While confidence has picked up slightly, business sentiment remains downbeat with less intensions to invest and hire, particularly in the subdued construction sector. As such, a tactical opportunity is opening for short NZD trades at the crosses. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been positive: The Ivey PMI surged from 39.1 to 58.2 in June. The Markit manufacturing PMI also increased from 40.6 to 47.8 in June. Bloomberg Nanos confidence increased from 46 to 46.2 for the week ended July 3rd. Housing starts picked up from 195.5K in May to 211.7K in June. The Canadian dollar appreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The BoC Business Outlook Survey was released this week and survey results suggest that “business sentiment is strongly negative in all regions and sectors” due falling energy prices. Most firms believe that production could pick up quickly but sales might take longer to recover. That said, both interest rate differentials and recovering oil prices are bullish for the Canadian dollar for now.  Report Links: More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been positive: FX reserves increased from CHF 817 billion to CHF 850 billion in June. The unemployment rate declined from 3.4% to 3.2% in June. Total sight deposits increased from CHF 683 billion to CHF 687 billion for the week ended July 3rd. The Swiss franc appreciated by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. The Swiss franc has been quite resilient recently despite the rebound in risk sentiment since the March lows. The expensive franc remains a headache for the SNB and the Swiss economy. We are looking to go long EUR/CHF at 1.055. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been negative: Manufacturing output fell by 3% month-on-month in May. The Norwegian krone surged by 1.3% against the US dollar this week. We remain bullish on the krone due to its cheap valuation and signs of a recovery in energy prices. Our Nordic Basket is now around 10% in the money and we also went long a petrocurrency basket including the Norwegian krone last week. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been negative: Industrial production fell by 15.5% year-on-year in May. Manufacturing new orders plunged by 18.4% year-on-year in May. The Swedish krona surged by 1.3% against the US dollar this week. Like the Norwegian krone, the Swedish krona is tremendously undervalued and remains one of our favorite G10 currencies at the moment. As a small open economy, Sweden relies heavily on exports and imports. While global trade was hit hard during COVID-19, signs of stabilization bode well for the Swedish krona. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights In this report, we initiate coverage of the EU Emission Trading System’s (ETS) CO2 allowances. We expect this policy-driven cap-and-trade market to become central to the market-driven pricing mechanism for CO2 fundamentals. Futures on EU CO2 emissions allowances will resume their rally – and surpass the €30 level seen in July 2019 – as ETS allowances supplies tighten in September. Global CO2 emissions are projected to fall 8% this year – 2.6 billion MT (2.6 gigatonnes, or Gt) – as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, based on IEA modeling. If realized, this would be up to six times the decline in CO2 emissions following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The speed at which actual CO2 emissions return to pre-COVID-19 levels will be a function of how quickly global growth recovers, and the intensity of “green” investments. Post-COVID-19, the rebound in emissions could be sharply higher, as has been the case with previous global downturns. Following the GFC, CO2 emissions recovered all of the year-on-year (y/y) decline in 2009 by 2010 (Chart of the Week). As with any COVID-19-related projection, uncertainty – to the upside and downside – dominates our outlook. Chart of the WeekCOVID-19 Crushes Global CO2 Emissions Feature The EU’s CO2 emissions market is designed to achieve policy goals – i.e., reducing the carbon footprint of utilities and manufacturers in Europe. As tempting as it may be to view the surge in EU CO2 emission allowances futures as a harbinger of a powerful recovery in European economic growth, such hopes would be misplaced (Chart 2).1 The sharp rally in part reflects the expected decrease in the volume of CO2 emission allowances that will be available for trading over the September 2020 – August 2021 period. In line with its policy mandates, the ETS reduced this volume by 0.33 Gt following a May 2020 meeting, bringing the total volume available for trade in the year beginning in September to ~ 1.32 Gt.2 The EU’s CO2 emissions market is designed to achieve policy goals – i.e., reducing the carbon footprint of utilities and manufacturers in Europe – vs. pricing those emissions purely as a function of supply-demand fundamentals. Chart 2CO2 Allowances Rally Reflects Anticipated Supply Squeeze CO2 Emissions As is the case with industrial commodities – particularly oil, base metals, iron ore and steel – non-OECD markets dominate CO2 emissions. CO2 is the largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitted into the atmosphere, and the largest share – almost two-thirds – of it is accounted for by fossil fuel use in industrial and transportation processes (Chart 3). CO2 emissions are closely tied to oil consumption. In non-OECD economies, this means they are closely tied to GDP, as the income elasticity of oil consumption for EM economies is ~ 0.65, meaning a 1% increase in income translates to a 0.65% increase in oil demand. In DM, transportation and electric generation drive hydrocarbon usage. In non-OECD and OECD markets, we model emissions as a function of oil consumption and financial variables (Chart 4). Chart 3Fossil-Fuel CO2 Dominates GHG Emissions It comes as no surprise that commodity prices generally are highly correlated with CO2 emissions, given the markets in which they trade are continually responding to supply-demand shifts in industrial and consumer markets. This can be seen in our Global Commodity Factor, which extracts the common factor across 28 real commodity prices (Chart 5). Chart 4CO2 Emissions Trend With GDP, Oil Consumption As is the case with industrial commodities – particularly oil, base metals, iron ore and steel – non-OECD markets dominate CO2 emissions (Chart 6). Chart 5CO2, Commodity Prices Closely Aligned Chart 6Non-OECD Economies Dominate CO2 Emissions Within this category, China accounts for ~ 45% of non-OECD CO2 emissions post-GFC, and close to 28% of global emissions, according to BP’s 2020 Statistical Review.3 China’s heavy reliance on coal-fired power generation and heating drive its CO2 emissions (Chart 7, top panel). Asia as a whole accounts for ~ 19 Gt of CO2 emissions, or 53% of the global total, while the US and Europe account for 18% and 17%, respectively.4 US CO2 emissions are driven by electric generation and transport, as the bottom panel of Chart 7 shows. Chart 7Electric Generation And Heating Drive China’s CO2 Emissions EU CO2 Emission Allowances The ETS also will force the overall number of emission allowances to contract at a 2.2% rate p.a. beginning next year. In the 21st century, ICE EUA futures prices have not followed actual EU CO2 emissions (Chart 8). This is not unexpected, given this market largely is a policy-driven market, not a fundamentally driven market. The ETS runs a cap-and-trade system covering ~ 45% of the EU’s GHG emissions, which limits emissions by more than 11,000 power stations, industrial plants and other heavy energy-use applications. Until 2019, the ETS adjusted supplies of emissions allowances by literally removing surpluses from the market resulting from overallocations of supplies via its free allocations and auctions. Thereafter, the ETS Market Stability Reserve (MSR), began absorbing unallocated emissions allowances to keep prices from falling to the point that investment in CO2 abatement would be disincentivized.5 Chart 8Two Ships In The Night: EU CO2 Emissions and EUA Futures As ETS system surplus allocations are reduced, we expect this market will more closely reflect the actual supply and demand for CO2 allowances. The ETS also will force the overall number of emission allowances to contract at a 2.2% rate p.a. beginning next year, versus the 1.74% p.a. contraction observed over the 2013-2020 period, in order, it says, to keep the GHG emissions falling to policy levels set for 2030. Even with its flaws vis-à-vis a true commodity market driven by supply-demand fundamentals, the ETS’s CO2 emissions allowances market is extremely important as a source of information regarding the state of the world. Last year, Reuters’s Refinitiv service estimated that of the $164 billion worth of CO2 emissions traded globally 90% was accounted for by the European market.6 As ETS system surplus allocations are reduced, we expect this market will more closely reflect the actual supply and demand for CO2 allowances. This will allow it to generate a market-clearing price for emissions allowances, which will be a valuable data point for global markets, especially when it comes to allocating capital to reducing GHG emissions. The ETS is retaining the right to issue free allocations, so that participants in the system are not disadvantaged by other jurisdictions not subject to the stringent requirements imposed by the ETS. Bottom Line: The ETS’s CO2 emission allowances will resume the rally launched in March 2020, as the supply of allowances contracts beginning in September. We are not ready to recommend any positions in this market, but will continue to follow and write about it going forward, expecting it will become not only a viable market but an important source of information of the market-clearing price of CO2 emissions.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Fernando Crupi Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy FernandoC@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Brent and WTI prices have been moving side-ways since June at ~ $41/bbl and $39/bbl, respectively. Fundamentals are tightening but fear of a second wave of COVID-19 infections weighs on prices. Bakken shale-oil producers could struggle to restart drilling and production activities after a court ordered the closure of the basin’s crucial Dakota Access pipeline – responsible for moving ~ 600k b/d – due to insufficient environmental checks. As previously shut-in production comes back on line, regional prices could remain under pressure to incentivize additional crude-by-rail volumes – at close to double the transportation costs – out of the basin, keeping prices below producers’ breakevens (Chart 9). Base Metals: Neutral Copper prices continue moving up as economic activity in China recovers (Chart 10). Prices are now 32% higher vs. March lows. Large metal-producing countries in Latin America have been hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic. This puts supply at risk and could have lasting impacts as needed investment in new mines is delayed. In fact, Codelco announced it is suspending construction at its El Teniente mine in Chile due to rising COVID-19 cases in the region. Copper could enter a persistent supply-deficit period if demand remains in its upward trend. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold prices crossed $1,800/oz on Tuesday, reaching their highest level since 2011. The yellow metal’s rally continues to be fueled by record Western investment demand. ETFs inflows in June reached 104 tons, pushing gold-backed ETF volumes and AUM to new highs. Globally, ETF holdings’ tonnage increased by 25% ytd. This more than offsets the collapse in physical demand from China and India. Going forward, we expect a lower US dollar will support income growth in EM countries, providing additional demand for gold. Ags/Softs:  Underweight The latest USDA Acreage report surprised the market, with corn producers planting 5 million less acres than their intentions in March. This large decline caused corn futures to rally to 3-month highs. Since then, the market has focused on adverse weather, hoping dryness in major corn producing areas would reduce corn yields. However, that didn’t materialize. Forecasts are showing less intense heat in the Midwest crop belt and futures are losing some ground compared to recent highs. The market is now awaiting Friday’s USDA Supply and Demand report. With exports on pace to come in slightly below the USDA estimate for the year and a much-reduced planting area, we expect corn ending stocks to be well below the June estimate of 3.32 Bn bushels. Chart 9Bakken Crude Prices Are Falling Vs WTI Chart 10China's Economic Growth Supports Copper Prices     Footnotes 1    These futures are the EUA contracts for delivery of Carbon Emission Allowances at the Union Registry, which was set up to account “for all allowances issued under the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS).”  Contracts for delivery of these allowances are traded on ICE Futures Europe’s platform. 2    Please see ETS Market Stability Reserve to reduce auction volume by over 330 million allowances between September 2020 and August 2021 published by the European Commission May 8, 2020. 3    Please see bp Statistical Review of World Energy 2020: a pivotal moment published June 17, 2020. 4    Please see CO2 and Greenhouse Gas Emissions published by Our World in Data, a collaboration between researchers at the University of Oxford, and the non-profit organization Global Change Data Lab, in December 2019. 5    Surpluses have been a feature of the market since 2009.  Please see Market Stability Reserve published by the European Commission. 6    Please see Value of global CO2 markets hit record 144 billion euros in 2018: report published January 16, 2019 by reuters.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2020 Summary of Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights Theoretically the US could employ a “Reverse Kissinger” strategy – befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  But Trump has made no headway in relations with Russia. Meanwhile Democrats now see engagement with Putin as a failure and will pursue a more aggressive policy. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader Russo-American geopolitical confrontation. Russia will likely succeed in preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but not in the long run. We remain overweight Russian equities and bonds relative to EM benchmarks, but will downgrade if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion. Feature Investors do not need to wait for the US election verdict to assess the general trajectory of US-Russia relations. Some points are clear regardless of whether President Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden prevails: US-Russia engagement had mostly but not entirely failed between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and President Trump’s election in 2016.   President Trump could not break free of the constraints of office and his administration has remained adversarial toward Russia despite his preference for deeper engagement. Whether Democrats or Republicans take the White House in 2021, the result will be confrontation with Russia over the four-year term and likely beyond. The geopolitical risk premium in the Russian ruble will rise relative to its current level. A Trump victory would reduce this risk, but only temporarily.   The Failure Of Engagement Russia’s rise from the ashes of the Soviet Union can be illustrated by our Geopolitical Power Index – it shows Russia’s rise relative to the US in terms of demographic, economic, technological, commercial, and military variables that make a nation strong (Chart 1). Chart 1Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia is a shadow of its Soviet self and lags far behind the US in raw capability. But its recovery from the chaos of the 1998 financial crisis, fueled by a global commodity bull market, has consisted of a systematic removal of domestic political constraints. It is politically unified under the personal rule of Putin, has reformed its economy and modernized its military, and has successfully pushed back against the US and the West in its sphere of influence. Russia punches above its economic weight in the world by means of its military, which it has wielded opportunistically in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya (Chart 2). Neither the US nor any other power was willing to fill the power vacuum in these locations. A Trump victory only temporarily reduces the rise in Russian geopolitical risk. The US and Russia have a fundamentally antagonistic relationship over influence in Europe and occasionally the Far East. They have little need to trade with each other. They are both large, independent commodity exporters and advanced weapon-makers separated by vast distances. Russia is threatened by the US’s military and technological superiority, its economic strength and newfound status as an energy exporter (see energy section), and its ability to undermine Russian legitimacy in the former Soviet sphere by promoting democracy.  Russia’s advantage is that the US is internally divided by political factions. Putin’s popular approval has benefited from his restoration of domestic order and Russia’s standing as a great power. Successive American presidents have floundered under domestic partisanship and polarization (Chart 3).   Chart 2Russia’s Military Punches Above Its Economic Weight Chart 3Russia Is Politically Unified, The US is Internally Divided   Attempts to “reset” relations have failed.1 The Barack Obama administration’s 2009-11 Reset, announced by Biden, saw several concrete compromises, including the New START treaty and Russia’s joining the WTO. But the Bolotnaya Square protests in 2011-12, at the height of the Arab Spring, rekindled Moscow’s fear that the US aimed to foment “color revolutions” not only in Russia’s periphery but even in Russia itself. Faced with losing its control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, Russia invaded parts of Ukraine and seized Crimea, the first military annexation of territory in Europe since World War II. The US and Europe applied extensive sanctions that last to this day and drag on Russian growth.2  True, Moscow cooperated on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Russia does not want Iran to get nuclear weapons. Yet this is not imminent. And Russia gained global oil market share when the US walked away from the deal and restarted sanctions (Chart 4). Either way, Iran survives as a Russian ally capable of exerting influence across the Middle East.   President Trump launched another attempt at engagement with Russia. If there is a strategic basis for this policy – i.e. if it is not just based in Trump’s personal proclivities – then it is the idea of a “Reverse Kissinger” maneuver. During the Cold War, the US befriended Maoist China in order to isolate the Soviet Union. Today, with China posing the clear threat to US hegemony, the US could try to befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  The difference is that in 1972, American and Chinese interests were complementary. China wished to stabilize its borders and the US offered geopolitical relief as well as technology and knowhow. Today American and Russian interests are not complementary other than the political convenience of demonizing each other (Chart 5). The US offers Russia limited investment capital; Russia does not offer cheap labor or a vast consumer market. Chart 4Russia’s Oil Market Share Benefitted From Iran Sanctions Chart 5US-Russo Interests Are Not Complementary   The Trump administration’s attempt to engage Putin has failed. Putin’s declaration of a global oil market share war this year drove American shale oil companies into bankruptcy during an election year. Barring an “October surprise” engineered by Putin to get Trump reelected, their “alliance” is at best rhetorical and at worst a mirage. Putin might favor Trump because he sharpens US internal divisions, or because he has an isolationist foreign policy preference, but Putin’s actions so far in 2020 suggest a deeper strategic reality: Russia seeks to foment political turmoil in the US, not solidify either of the parties in power, as the latter could backfire against Russia. What Comes After Engagement? Russia lacks the power to create a new world order, but it will continue to leverage its relative power to exercise a veto over affairs in the current global order, in which US influence is weakening. It can hasten the West’s decline by sowing divisions within the West. Chart 6COVID-19 Dented Support For Trump And Putin What happens when US polarization falls and a new political consensus takes shape? This would pose a major threat to Putin’s strategic options. Thus it is relevant if Joe Biden wins the 2020 election with a strong majority and a full Democratic sweep of government. Presidents Trump and Putin, and their political parties, are among the worst performers amid the COVID-19 pandemic and recession (Chart 6). The implication is that Trump will lose the election and Putin will resort to time-tried techniques of confrontation with the West to restore his domestic support. Democrats will pursue a more aggressive policy toward Russia. The Democrats harbor a deep vendetta against Russia over its interference in the 2016 election and will go on the offensive to prevent Russia from trying to undermine their grip on power again. They will also seek to deter Russia from further undermining American strategic interests. Biden will try to revive NATO, expand US troop presence in eastern Europe, and promote democracy and human rights in Russia’s periphery, using the Internet to launch a disinformation campaign against Putin’s regime. Cyber warfare will escalate.  A “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China. The silver lining for Russia is economic: Biden’s policies will help to weaken the dollar and cultivate a global growth recovery. Biden will be less inclined to start disruptive Trump-style trade war with China that could permanently damage China’s potential growth or global growth. Chinese imports are essential to propping up Russia’s sluggish economy. In enabling commodity prices to recover, and reducing global policy uncertainty, Biden would inadvertently aid Russian recovery (Chart 7). Chart 7The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar Ultimately Russia is insecure because the US threatens to undermine its economy and political legitimacy both at home and in its strategic buffers. Putin has re-centralized control while shutting out foreign influence. This approach is not changing anytime soon given the recent constitutional changes to prolong Putin’s rule till 2036. Preliminary reports claim that, with 65% of the public voting, these changes were ratified by 76% of the population.3  What changed is that the US is no longer as optimistic about engaging Russia. If anything, its internal divisions will encourage it to go on the offensive. Sanctions may well be expanded before they are eased, the Ukraine conflict could revive rather than simmer down, and new fronts in the conflict could widen, particularly in cyberspace. This is particularly the case if Biden wins the White House in November. The structural, geopolitical risk premium of US-Russia conflict is priced into Russian assets, but there is room for a cyclical increase if Biden is elected. Our market-based Russian geopolitical risk indicators – which define geopolitical risk as excessive ruble weakness relative to its macro context – show that Russian risk is elevated because of COVID-19, but dropping. The US election should reverse this trend, unless Trump wins (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Alternative measures of political risk that utilize non-market variables support our qualitative assessment, such as the indicator provided by GeoQuant. The implication is that Russian political risk is higher than the market is pricing (Chart 9). Chart 9Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Kissinger Reversed? Not Yet. If Trump wins, could he not engineer a major détente with Russia? In 2018 the US shifted its national defense strategy to emphasize that “the central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition,” arguing specifically that “it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.4”  Yet US geopolitical power has declined such that taking an offensive approach to Russia and China simultaneously is not practicable.  If the US pursues the Reverse Kissinger strategy, then it will have to make major concessions to Putin’s Russia. It would need to provide substantial sanctions relief, accept the Crimean annexation, allow a high degree of Russian influence in Donbass (Ukraine), abandon hopes of retribution for the 2016 election interference, ask for a return to the 2015 nuclear deal on Iran at best, and settle for arms control agreements that do not cover new technologies. It is not clear that President Trump would concede this much in a second term, though in most cases he would have the power to do so. Yet Moscow cannot downgrade its cooperation with Beijing by much, since US-Russia détente never lasts long and China weighs more heavily in its economic calculus than the West’s sanctions. Chart 10US-Russo Struggle Is Subordinate To US-Sino Conflict The Democrats, by contrast, are not prepared to make these concessions, particularly on 2016. They are more willing to pursue a gradualist approach in dealing with China, which they believe is less urgent due to shared economic interests.5  If the US confronts Russia, then Russia will draw closer to China. The informal alliance between these two powers is well advanced. A closer association provides China with a better position in waging its long-term geopolitical competition with the United States.  Ultimately US grand strategy and public opinion will drive American presidents to take a harder line on China because it rivals the US in economic resilience and technology over the long run (Chart 10). The conflict with Moscow will eventually be subordinate to the US-China struggle. But a “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China, either through its own weakness or Chinese strength. A much stronger trans-Atlantic alliance, or much greater Chinese influence over East Asia and/or the Middle East, could trigger a shift in Russian strategy. We are not there yet. Russia’s cooperation with China will deepen, strengthening China’s hand and making it all the more imperative for the United States to solidify the trans-Atlantic alliance with Europe. Otherwise the risk of a precipitous decline in American power will threaten global stability.  Bottom Line: US-Russian antagonism will continue for the foreseeable future. Russian geopolitical risk is underpriced, particularly if Biden wins the election. A Trump victory would offer only a temporary reprieve.  Direct Competition In Energy Russia can offer low cost natural gas alongside an existing and projected (under construction) network of pipelines into Europe. This capability will help it to sustain and marginally increase its market share in Europe relative to the US in the medium term. In turn, this will help Russia secure vital revenues for its macro stability.  Natural gas exports to Europe represent 2.5% of GDP or 9% of total exports. A Biden presidency is negative for Russian assets, but Russia has room to ease policy. In the long run, however, US LNG will challenge Russia’s share in the European natural gas market. On the whole, the US sees Russia as an economic competitor in the European natural gas market and it will continue to disrupt Russian natural gas exports to Europe through sanctions and/or by other means. A resulting market share war between the US and Russia will lead to low natural gas prices benefitting the consumer, Europe. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader geopolitical confrontation between the US and Russia. The following factors will shape heightened competition: Escalating Competition For European Natural Gas Market Europe will remain a major market for natural gas. The combination of falling domestic production, steady consumption growth and the ongoing structural shift to cleaner sources of energy will require greater imports of natural gas (Chart 11). Critically, Europe’s natural gas consumption might rise faster than its GDP making this market attractive to energy producers. According to the IEA, Europe’s consumption of natural gas will continue to grow at a steady rate over the next 5 years. In a nutshell, European policymakers are promoting cleaner energy such as natural gas over coal and nuclear energy. This push will facilitate rising demand for natural gas.  Yet, European natural gas production is expected to drop by 40%, driven by field closures in the Netherlands and the UK.  As such, the diverging gap between falling production and steady consumption opens up a space for both Russian and US natural gas exports into the continent. Russia Natural Gas Strategy: Russia and its largest natural gas producer, Gazprom, are aiming to increase their share in the European market from their current 36% to 40% (Chart 12). Chart 11Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Chart 12...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share   Table 1Russia’s Pipeline Export Capacity More specifically, Russia’s latest 2035 strategy (known as ES-2035) reaffirms its two-pronged strategy: (i) continue to provide low-cost natural gas to Europe and Asia through pipelines and (ii) developing LNG export capacity for exports to the Far East. Pipelines: Russia’s export capacity to Europe is set to increase to 190 Bcm/y by 2022 excluding existing transit routes passing through Ukraine (Table 1). Two new sources of pipeline routes will be the Nord Stream2, coming online by the end of this year, and Turk Stream, expected to come online by 2022. These pipelines will have an export capacity of 55 Bcm/y and 31.5/y Bcm, respectively (Map 1).   Map 1Russia’s Latest Pipelines Bypass Ukraine Chart 13Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Meanwhile, pipeline capacity through Ukraine will remain 140 Bcm/y. Ultimately, Russia has been determined to diversify its natural gas transit routes despite pressures from the US.6 In addition, Gazprom natural gas production for transport via pipeline is expected to increase by 35% to 983 Bcm in the next 15 years. The European market is essential to Russia’s export revenues, as it currently represents 56% of Russia’s total gas export volumes compared with 83% total export to non-CIS countries (Chart 13). Lastly, regarding natural gas pricing, Gazprom will continue to move away from oil-indexed long-term contracts to shorter-term spot market contracts. This change of tack will cause deflation in Gazprom’s export prices to Europe but will preserve Russia’s market share in its strategic European market.   LNG: Russia will continue to be one the top four LNG producers alongside Qatar, Australia and the US. According to the latest estimates by the IEA, Russian exports of LNG, currently at 39 Bcm, are set to expand by 20% by 2025. The development of the Yamal peninsula into a major natural gas and LNG hub will allow Russia to produce close to 110 Bcm of LNG by 2035, which will constitute 16% of its overall current gas production. This will lead to continued LNG exports to various markets, particularly Europe, which consumes 50% of Russia’s LNG exports. Imported technology from Europe and external financing from China have allowed Novatek, Russia’s second largest natural gas producer, to become the leader in production and exports of LNG. Russia is also investing heavily in liquefaction. It is now fifth globally in liquefaction capacity. There are currently $21 billion in pre-final investment decision (FID) from the LNG Artic 2 in the Yamal that will increase its liquefaction capacity by over 200% by 2026.  Lastly, it is estimated that 70-80% of total commodity exporters’ costs are sourced locally and are in rubles due to the import substitution policy adopted by Moscow in 2015. This will alleviate cost pressures arising from a potentially weaker ruble in exploiting the Yamal reserves. US Needs To Find A Market For Its LNG: US produces 920 bcm/y of natural gas but consumes only 830 bcm/y. The rest is available for export. The need to export rising excess of natural gas output puts the US in direct competition with other natural gas exporters such as Russia. Chart 14US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise In the medium term, an oversupplied market alongside the COVID-19-induced demand shock in Europe will reduce European natural gas demand, hurting both the US and Russia. US LNG might lose market share in the European market to Russia due to falling production arising from capex cuts and bankruptcies in the US natural gas sector.7 Yet, in the long run, Europe’s geopolitical ties with the US and strategic interest in diversifying away from Russia make US LNG an obvious area of cooperation. The Trump-Juncker agreement in July 2018 led to a 300% increase in US LNG exports to Europe before the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 14). Since coming into effect, the agreement also resulted in a doubling of EU utilization of LNG regasification capacity, from 30% to close to 60% in early 2020 and is expected to continue expanding in the years to come. Bottom Line: Russia will likely succeed in at least preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but will be challenged by US LNG in the long run. Macro And Financial Market Implications For Russia Chart 15Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Heightened confrontation with the US and new sanctions on Russia will materialize if Biden wins the presidency. All else constant, this is unfavourable for Russian asset prices. It should be noted, however, that years of fiscal conservativism, tight monetary policy, a prudent and pro-active bank regulatory stance as well as some success in import substitution have given Russia the capacity to offset negative external shocks by easing macro policy: Russia has one of the lowest public debt-to-GDP ratios among the largest countries in the world. Its total public debt stands at 13.5% of GDP (Chart 15). Its external public debt is at a mere 4% of GDP. As in many other countries, Russia’s fiscal deficit is widening sharply due to the pandemic and low oil prices. However, we expect the primary and overall fiscal deficits will be only 4.25% and 5% of GDP in 2020, respectively. So far, at 3.5% of GDP, the announced fiscal stimulus in response to the pandemic has been small by global standards. Russia has room to boost fiscal expenditure substantially this year and in the coming years to offset negative external shocks. The Central Bank still has room to reduce interest rates further. The real policy rate is 2.5% compared with 1% for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan (Chart 16, top panel). Russia’s local currency government bond yields offer value: their real yield is 2.5% compared with the EM GBI benchmark real yield of 1.5% (Chart 16, bottom panel). The Central Bank of the Russian Federation will refrain from QE-type policies (i.e., public debt monetization). This is a plus for the ruble relative to other EM currencies where central banks are engaged in QEs. Bank lending rates remain extremely elevated in Russia and local currency credit penetration is reasonably low (Chart 17). Companies and banks’ external indebtedness has declined from $1,200 bn in 2014 to $900 bn currently. Chart 16Russian Real Rates Offer Value Chart 17Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated!   Authorities have cleaned up the banking system. The number of banks has dropped from 1000 in 2010 to 430. Banks have written down and provisioned for a large amount of loans. All of these reduce Russia’s vulnerability to negative shocks. Finally, pressured by US and EU sanctions, Russia has been moderately successful in import substitution as we discussed in a previous report. The nation has expanded its productive capacity, especially in agriculture and some other industries. As a result, it now has more room to deploy fiscal and monetary stimulus to boost demand that will be satisfied by domestic rather than foreign output. In short, fiscal and monetary stimulus will not cause the currency to plunge. On the negative side, the outlook for productivity growth remains lukewarm. Russia’s long-term economic outlook will be characterized by relative stability but low growth, as has been the case in recent years. Combining our geopolitical and macro analysis, two conclusions stand out. First, we remain overweight Russian equities as well as both local currency and US dollar bonds relative to their EM benchmarks. If Trump stages a comeback over the next four months, which is not impossible, then the geopolitical risk premium will continue to fall. Trump would offer a reprieve in tensions for a year or two.  Second, the US election threatens this view because Joe Biden is currently heavily favoured to beat Trump and if he does, he is likely to impose fresh sanctions on Russia, possibly as early as 2021. Therefore, if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion, we will downgrade Russian assets. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist  mattg@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Michael McFaul, From Cold War To Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America (London: Penguin, 2018). 2  International Monetary Fund, “Russian Federation: 2019 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report 19/260 (August 2019). 3  Ann M. Simmons and Georgi Kantchev, “Russians Vote for Overhaul That Could Keep Putin in Power Until 2036,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2020.  4  “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening The American Military’s Competitive Edge,” Department of Defense, 2018. 5  Victoria Nuland, “Pinning Down Putin: How A Confident America Should Deal With Russia,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020. 6  The US has tried to stop Russia’s expansion of pipelines into Europe in the past. Evidenced from both Kennedy and Reagan administration policies directed towards the building of the Friendship oil pipeline in the 1960s and the Brotherhood gas pipeline in the 1980s, respectively. In response, Russia began developing its own technological capacity through import substitution, hurting western firms in the process. 7  "U.S. natural gas giant Chesapeake Energy goes bankrupt,” CBC, June 29, 2020.

Highlights Silver will outperform gold in 2H20, as industrial production and consumer-product demand revives on the back of the massive global stimulus deployed to reverse the hit to aggregate demand inflicted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Silver’s physical supply growth largely is a by-product of base-metals mining, specifically copper, zinc and lead.  As mining capex for these base metals is reduced in response to weaker demand, silver’s physical surplus will continue to contract.  On the demand side, a pick-up in industrial activity will benefit silver more than gold, given its relatively higher share of industrial consumption. The gold/silver ratio most likely contracts from its current level of 99 over the remainder of the year, given our expectation gold will appreciate 7% in 2H20 and finish the year at $1,900/oz, while silver is expected to appreciate ~ 16% ending 2020 at $21/oz. Elevated economic and political uncertainty – chiefly escalating US-China and US-Europe trade tensions – likely will keep a bid under gold and the USD. This could limit the rally in commodities (ex-gold) generally. We are getting long December 2020 COMEX silver at tonight’s close. Feature While silver is sensitive to the same financial variables driving gold’s performance – chiefly real rates, the broad trade-weighted USD, inflation and inflation expectations – it is far more responsive to the evolution of the real economy. When investors seek a safe haven in especially volatile or highly uncertain markets, silver is not their first choice. Nor is it the go-to portfolio diversifier investors seek out to hedge against higher inflation or inflation expectations. Investors typically turn to the USD and gold when risks rise (Chart of the Week).1 While silver is sensitive to the same financial variables driving gold’s performance – chiefly real rates, the broad trade-weighted USD, inflation and inflation expectations – it is far more responsive to the evolution of the real economy than gold: More than half of silver’s demand is accounted for by industrial applications – e.g., solar panels, batteries and electronics, vs. ~ 10% for gold (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekUSD, Gold Attract Investors In Volatile, Uncertain Markets Chart 2Silver Is More Responsive To the Real Economy Than Gold Gold is a far deeper market than silver (Chart 3). Greater two-way flow on the bid and offer – augmented by the greater involvement of institutions and central banks in those flows – makes the gold market more efficient in terms of processing financial and economic information. Because of this, gold prices and gold options’ implied volatility are useful parameters for following investors’ (and central banks’) assessments of future economic conditions. Silver tends to overshoot and undershoot in its response to the arrival of new economic and financial information – e.g., economic shocks like the COVID-19 outbreak (Chart 4).2 Chart 3Gold Market Is Deeper Than Silver ... Chart 4... Making Gold Less Volatile Relative To Silver Because silver is sensitive to the same financial variables driving gold, it can attract more retail speculative interest when the larger investment narrative favors gold as a portfolio hedge. All the same, because silver is sensitive to the same financial variables driving gold, it can attract more retail speculative interest when the larger investment narrative favors gold as a portfolio hedge. For this reason, it is difficult to recommend silver as a long-term portfolio hedge. It is, however, useful in expressing a view on short-term economic and financial expectations. Supply Growth Will Be Subdued Mining output of silver is largely a by-product of copper, zinc and lead mining, as the white metal often is found in deposits of these ores. Because of the COVID-19-induced base-metals demand destruction, miners most likely will reduce capex at least for this year (Chart 5).3 This will cause mine production to fall, which will reduce the rate of growth in supply, even with recycling remaining fairly constant (Chart 6). As a result, the white metal’s physical surplus is expected to continue contracting relative to demand this year (Chart 7). Chart 5Expect Lower Base-Metals Capex To Reduce Silver Supply Growth   Chart 6Falling Supplies Of Silver Will Tighten Physical Balances Chart 7Silver’s Supply Surplus Likely Will Contract   Demand Follows The Real Economy Slightly more than half of silver demand is accounted for by industrial applications (Chart 8). Gold’s industrial-applications share is ~ 10%, as noted above. This keeps the silver-to-gold ratio closely aligned with global industrial production (Chart 9). Chart 8Industrial Usage Dominates Silver Demand Chart 9Silver Prices Closely Tied To Global Industrial Production The massive fiscal and monetary stimulus deployed by governments and central banks globally certainly raises the odds of an overshoot, as demand revives and miners are reducing capex (Chart 10).4 Against this backdrop, a better-than-expected recovery in commodity demand cannot be ruled out. However, it is important to emphasize that – given the profound uncertainty dogging commodities generally – a severe undershoot also is possible.  Chart 10Massive Global Stimulus Could Cause Metals (Silver Included) To Overshoot Silver Poised To Outperform In modeling prices, we capture silver’s safe-haven vs. industrial demand using precious and industrial metals prices (Chart 11). Historically, silver has been as substitute to gold for investors seeking lower-cost exposure to precious metals. This implies silver will follow gold in times of decreasing real rates, rising inflation and/or increasing economic uncertainty. Following a sharp increase in gold prices, silver becomes an attractive safe-haven asset and gets bid up until the disequilibrium between both variables closes. These series are cointegrated in the long-run. On the other hand, silver prices are more responsive to the global industrial cycle than gold. Thus, it partly follows the same underlying trend as industrial metals – mainly copper – prices. Chart 11BCA's Silver Model: Rally Expected The model shown in Chart 11 leads us to expect silver prices will outperform gold prices in 2H20. We expect silver to end the year at $21/oz, a 16% increase over the next six months, versus $1,900/oz for gold (up 7%). Given our assessment of these respective markets, we are recommending a long December 2020 COMEX silver position at tonight’s close. We are remaining long gold, as it is more likely to respond favorably to the additional fiscal and monetary stimulus such a turn of events would prompt. Bottom Line: Silver is a thinner market than gold and is more subject to higher volatility. In an environment of historically high global economic policy uncertainty, rising Sino-US and -European trade tensions, and the economic destruction wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic, this amounts to a significant risk for investors (Chart 12). While our modeling indicating silver should outperform gold in 2H20 inclines us to go long December 2020 silver, this could be upended by another wave of COVID-19-induced lockdowns in systematically important economies. This would stop a global economic recovery dead in its tracks. For this reason, we are remaining long gold, as it is more likely to respond favorably to the additional fiscal and monetary stimulus such a turn of events would prompt. Chart 12Heightened Economic Uncertainty Elevates Risk To Silver Positions     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com       Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Expectations of a deal allowing Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) to resume oil production at some of its fields have increased, following reports of discussions between the Government of National Accord (GNA), the NOC and regional countries overseen by the United Nations and the United States.5 Nonetheless, restarting production will be gradual, as the lack of elementary maintenance since the start of the conflict left pipelines corroding and storage facilities collapsing. Base Metals: Neutral The Baltic Dry Index (BDI) rebounded by more than 300% from its May 2020 low, led by rising iron ore exports to China (Chart 13). As Chinese economic growth resumes, iron ore and base metals demand is expected to increase in 2H20. However, some of the recent support to shipping markets is due to China’s restocking of iron ore, which will fade as inventories return to desired levels. While we expect the BDI to end the year higher, a near-term pullback is possible, given iron ore and freight rates appear to have overshot to the upside. Precious Metals: Neutral The risk of an incessantly strong US dollar remains a headwind to gold and silver prices. The dollar benefits from mounting global economic uncertainty. Thus, the risk of a severe second COVID-19 infection wave, escalating Sino-US and US-European tensions, and the upcoming US election could increase economic and market volatility in 2H20 and keep the dollar in its bull market, which began in 2011, intact (Chart 14). Ags/Softs:  Underweight The USDA this week reported farmers rated 73% of corn planted this season in good to excellent condition for the week ended Jun 28, vs. 56% last year. Soybeans were rated 71% vs 54% in good to excellent condition last year. Winter wheat bucked the year-on-year improvement trend, with 52% of the crop in good to excellent condition vs. 63% last year. Chart 13BDI Rebounding Sharply Chart 14Elevated Policy Uncertainty Supports Gold     Footnotes 1     We have noted the anomalous correlation between the broad trade-weighted USD and gold during periods of elevated uncertainty in pervious research. See, e.g., Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Lifts Gold And USD Together, which we published October 24, 2019, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic’s outbreak. This correlation has increased in the wake of the pandemic. 2     For an excellent discussion of information processing by markets, please see Timmerman, Allan and Clive W.J. Granger (2004), “Efficient market hypothesis and forecasting,” International Journal of Forecasting, 20:1, pp. 15 27. 3    Please see PwC’s Mine 2020, Resilient and Resourceful, June 2020 report for discussion of miners’ capex intensions. 4    We would note in passing OPEC 2.0 – the oil-production coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – faces a similar problem in our estimation: It is attempting to sharply lower crude oil output against a highly stimulative global fiscal and monetary backdrop.  The risk that the stimulus is insufficient to revive demand is very real, but a faster-than-expected recovery would spike prices to the upside if demand revives before the producer coalition can increase supply sufficiently to absorb that demand. 5    Please see Libya's NOC confirms international talks on resuming oil output published by reuters.com June 29, 2020..     Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2020 Summary of Trades Closed Trades