Financial Markets

Next week, on September 7-8, is the BCA New York Conference, the first in-person version since 2019. I look forward to seeing many of you there, and if you haven’t already booked your place, you still can! (a virtual version is also available). As such, the next Counterpoint report will come out on September 15. Executive Summary The 2022-23 = 1981-82 template for markets is working well. If it continues to hold, these are the major investment implications: Bonds: The 30-year T-bond (price) will trend sideways for the next few months, albeit with a potential correction that lifts the yield to 3.5 percent. However, bond prices will enter a sustained rally in 2023, in which the 30-year T-bond yield will fall to sub-2.5 percent. Stocks: A coordinated global recession will depress profits, causing the S&P 500 to test 3500. However, once past the worst of the recession, a strong rally will lift it through 5000 later in 2023. Sector allocation: Longer duration defensive sectors (such as healthcare) will strongly outperform shorter duration cyclical sectors (such as basic resources) until mid-2023, after which it will be time to flip back into cyclicals. Industrial metals: A tactical rebound in copper could lift it to $8500/MT after which the structural downtrend will resume, taking it to sub-$7000/MT in 2023. Oil: Just as in 1981-82, supply shortages will provide near-term support. But ultimately, demand destruction will dominate, depressing the price to, at best, $85, though our central case is $55 in 2023.  If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To The Copper Price Bottom Line: The 2022-23 = 1981-82 template for markets is working well, and should continue to do so. Feature History doesn’t repeat, but it does rhyme. And the period that rhymes closest with the current episode in the global economy and markets is 1981-82, a rhyming which we first highlighted four months ago in Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession, and then developed in More On 2022-23 = 1981-82, And The Danger Ahead. In those reports, we presented three compelling reasons why 2022-23 rhymes with 1981-82: 1981-82 is the period that rhymes closest with the current episode in the global economy and markets. First, the simultaneous sell-off in stocks, bonds, inflation protected bonds, industrial commodities, and gold in the second quarter of 2022 is uniquely linked with an identical ‘everything sell-off’ in the second quarter of 1981. It is extremely rare for stocks, bonds, inflation protected bonds, industrial commodities, and gold to sell off together. Such a simultaneous sell-off has happened in just these 2 calendar quarters out of the last 200. Meaning a ‘1-in-a-100’ event conjoins 2022 with 1981 (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). Chart I-1A 1-In-A-100 Event: The 'Everything Sell-Off' In 2022... Chart I-2...And The 'Everything Sell-Off' In 1981 Second, the Jay Powell Fed equals the Paul Volcker Fed. Now just as then, the world’s central banks are obsessed with ‘breaking the back’ of inflation. And now, just as then, the central banks are desperate to repair their badly battered credibility in managing inflation. Third, the Russia/Ukraine war that started in February 2022 equals the Iraq/Iran war that started in September 1980. Now, just as then, a war between two commodity producing neighbours has unleashed a supply shock which is adding to the inflation paranoia. To repeat, it is a 1-in-a-100 event for all financial assets to sell off together. This is because it requires an extremely rare star alignment. Inflation fears first morph to stagflation fears and then to recession fears. Leaving investors with nowhere to hide, as no mainstream asset performs well in inflation, stagflation, and recession. So, the once-in-a-generation star alignment conjoining 2022 with 1981 is as follows: Inflation paranoia is worsened by a major war between commodity producing neighbours, forcing reputationally damaged central banks to become trigger-happy in their battle against inflation, dragging the world economy into a coordinated recession. September 2022 Equals August 1981 If 2022-23 = 1981-82, then where exactly are we in the analogous episode? There are two potential synchronization points. One potential synchronization is that the Russia/Ukraine war which started on February 24, 2022 equals the Iraq/Iran war which started on September 22, 1980. In which case, September 2022 equals April 1981. But given that inflation is public enemy number one, a better synchronization is the Fed’s preferred measure of underlying inflation, the US core PCE deflator. Aligning the respective peaks in core PCE inflation, we can say that February 2022 equals January 1981. Meaning that our original report in May 2022 aligned with April 1981, and September 2022 equals August 1981 (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3The Peak In Core PCE Inflation In ##br##February 2022 Chart I-4...Aligns With The Peak In Core PCE Inflation In ##br##January 1981 In which case, how has the template worked since we introduced it on May 19th? The answer is, very well. The template predicted that the long bond price would track sideways, which it has. The template predicted that the S&P 500 would decline from 4200 to 4000, which it has. The template predicted that the copper price would decline from $9250/MT to $8500/MT. In fact, it has fallen even further to $8200/MT. In the case of oil, the better synchronization is the starts of the respective wars. This template predicted that the Brent crude price would decline sharply from a knee-jerk peak in the $120s, which it has. Not a bad set of predictions! If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Here’s What Happens Next Assuming the template continues to hold, here are the major implications for investors: Bond prices will enter a sustained rally in 2023. Bonds: The 30-year T-bond (price) will trend sideways for the next few months, albeit with a potential tactical correction that takes its yield to 3.5 percent. However, bond prices will enter a sustained rally in 2023 in which the 30-year T-bond yield will fall to sub-2.5 percent (Chart I-5). Chart I-5If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To Bond Prices Stocks: A coordinated global recession will depress profits, causing the S&P 500 to test 3500 in the coming months. However, once past the worst of the recession, a strong rally will lift it through 5000 later in 2023 (Chart I-6). Chart I-6If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To Stock Prices Sector allocation: Longer duration defensive sectors (such as healthcare) will strongly outperform shorter duration cyclical sectors (such as basic resources) until mid-2023, after which it will be time to flip back into cyclicals (Chart I-7). Chart I-7If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To Sector Allocation Industrial metals: A tactical rebound in copper could lift it to $8500/MT after which the structural downtrend will resume, taking it to sub-$7000/MT in 2023 (Chart I-8). Chart I-8If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To The Copper Price Oil: Just as in 1981-82, supply shortages will provide near-term support. But ultimately, demand destruction will dominate, depressing the price to, at best, $85 (Chart I-9) though our central case is $55 in 2023.  Chart I-9If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To The Oil Price But What If 2022-23 Doesn’t = 1981-82? And yet, and yet…what if the Jay Powell Fed doesn’t equal the Paul Volcker Fed? What if central banks lose their nerve before inflation is slayed? Long bond yields could gap much higher, or at least not come down, causing a completely different set of investment outcomes. In this case, the correct template would not be 1981-82, but the 1970s. If central banks lose the stomach to slay inflation, then the consequent housing market crash will do the job for them. However, there is one huge difference between now and the 1970s, which makes that template highly unlikely. In the 1970s, the global real estate market was worth just one times world GDP, whereas today it has become a monster worth four times world GDP, and whose value is highly sensitive to the long bond yield. In the US, the mortgage rate has surged to well above the rental yield for the first time in 15 years. Simply put, it is now more expensive to buy than to rent a home, causing a disappearance of would be homebuyers, a flood of home-sellers, and an incipient reversal in home prices (Chart I-10). Chart I-10If Bond Yields Don't Come Down, Then House Prices Will Crash Hence, if long bond yields were to gap much higher, or even stay where they are, it would trigger a housing market crash whose massive deflationary impulse would swamp any inflationary impulse. The upshot is that the 2022-23 = 1981-82 template would suffer a hiatus. Ultimately though, it would come good, because a crash in the $400 trillion global housing market would obliterate inflation. In other words, if central banks lose the stomach to slay inflation, then the consequent housing market crash will do the job for them. Fractal Trading Watchlist As just discussed, copper’s tactical rebound is approaching exhaustion. This is confirmed by the 130-day fractal structure of copper versus tin reaching the point of extreme fragility that has consistently marked turning-points in this pair trade (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Copper's Tactical Rebound Is Exhausted Hence, this week’s recommendation is to short copper versus tin, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 12 percent.   Chart 1Expect Hungarian Bonds To Rebound Chart 2Copper Is Experiencing A Tactical Rebound Chart 3US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 4FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 5Netherlands' Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Ended Chart 6The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond At Fractal Fragility Chart 7Food And Beverage Outperformance Is Exhausted Chart 8German Telecom Outperformance Has Started To Reverse Chart 9Japanese Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 10The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Has Ended Chart 11The Strong Downtrend In The 3 Year T-Bond Has Ended Chart 12A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 13Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 14Norway's Outperformance Has Ended Chart 15Cotton Versus Platinum Has Reversed Chart 16Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Is Exhausted Chart 17USD/EUR Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 18The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Has Ended Chart 19US Utilities Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 20The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-12 Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Executive Summary The US dollar has become expensive, but it is not unusual for currencies to overshoot or undershoot their fair value. Valuation is not an effective market timing tool. In the US, high interest rates and a strong exchange rate are needed to bring down inflation. The US dollar will remain firm as long as the Fed maintains its credibility in the fight against inflation. China needs lower interest rates and a weaker currency to battle deflationary pressures. The PBoC will continue cutting interest rates. Persistent divergence between Chinese and US monetary policies heralds further yuan depreciation against the dollar. For a number of EM countries, exchange rate fluctuations have historically determined trends in their interest rates rather than the other way around (i.e., interest rates dictating EM currency trends). Shrinking global trade will boost the US dollar while EM currencies will depreciate further. The US Dollar Is Expensive But Could Still Overshoot Bottom Line: We continue to short the following currencies versus the USD: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN and IDR. In addition, we recommend shorting HUF vs. CZK, KRW vs. JPY, and BRL vs. MXN. Macro forces that are bullish for the US dollar are bearish for global equities and other risk assets. A defensive investment stance is still warranted. Feature The US dollar is now in expensive territory (Chart of the week above) but we maintain our view that the US dollar is poised to overshoot. Chart 1EM Currencies Are Breaking Down BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team has been structurally bullish on the US dollar since 2011, with a brief period during which we sidestepped our positive view from July 9, 2020 until late March 2021 (Chart 1). We then re-instated short positions in select EM currencies versus the US dollar on March 25, 2021. This strategy has paid off. In this report, we discuss reasons why we expect the greenback to continue overshooting in the near run. Currency Valuations In Appendix 1 we present our valuation models for various currencies using the real effective exchange rate (REER) based on unit labor costs. In our opinion, the REER based on unit labor costs is the most accurate measure of exchange rate valuation. The basis is that it takes into account both wages and productivity. Labor costs are the largest cost component for many companies, and unit labor costs are critical to competitiveness. Hence, this measure is superior to the ones based on CPI and PPI. Table 1Currency Valuation Ranking Using Real Effective Exchange Rate Based on Unit Labor Costs* The underlying data for the REER based on unit labor costs are from the IMF and OECD. Unfortunately, the IMF and OECD do not provide REER based on unit labor costs for many emerging economies. Appendix 1 contains valuation indicators for those EM exchange rates (MXN, CLP, COP, KRW, SING, PLN, HUF and CZK) for which IMF or OECD data is available. Charts 15-17 in the appendix show that the US dollar is currently more than one standard deviation above its fair value. Meanwhile, the euro and yen are extremely cheap – each standing at more than one standard deviation below their respective fair value.   Table 1 shows the valuation ranking of various currencies using REER based on unit labor costs. For mainstream EM currencies, excluding China, Russia, Korea and Taiwan, we have built valuation aggregates using an average REER based on CPI and PPI measures. Chart 2 presents an equal-weighted aggregate REER based on CPI and PPI for 15 EM currencies. This indicator does not suggest that mainstream EM currencies are cheap. Finally, the same indicator − REER based on CPI and PPI – for the Chinese yuan reveals that the currency is modestly cheap (0.8 standard deviation below its mean) (Chart 3). Chart 2Mainstream EM Currencies Are Not Cheap Chart 3The RMB Is Modestly Cheap But Might Undershoot   While we acknowledge that the US dollar is expensive, we continue to expect the greenback to overshoot over the coming months. First, valuations matter only at extremes. Most currencies (other than the yen and the euro) are not cheap. For example, Charts 21-24 (in the Appendix) demonstrate that commodity currencies including AUD, NZD, and NOK are on the expensive side, while the Canadian dollar is fairly valued. Second, our macro themes – a hawkish Fed and contracting global trade (discussed below) − call for a stronger greenback. Finally, our Foreign Exchange Strategy team has shown that momentum indicators work well for currency trading in the short term. Bottom Line: The US dollar has become expensive, but it is not unusual for currencies to overshoot or undershoot their fair value. Valuation is not an effective market timing tool. Presently, the US dollar's momentum is strong and it will likely continue supporting the currency's upward trajectory. Monetary Policy Divergence Chart 4US Core Inflation Is Well Above 2% The US economy is relatively less exposed to headwinds from rising interest rates than the rest of the world. This dynamic favors the US dollar against other currencies. US: We view US inflation as genuine and entrenched. The average of seven measures of underlying inflation remains very elevated at 5.5% (Chart 4). In the US, high interest rates and a strong exchange rate are needed to bring down inflation. As long as the Fed remains committed to bringing down inflation, the US dollar will be firm. The US dollar will plummet if the Fed turns dovish prematurely. The basis is that US inflation expectations will spike and real interest rates will tumble, which will weigh on the dollar. Although the Fed might eventually pivot earlier than needed, this policy shift is not imminent. China: In contrast with the US, China’s inflation is too low: core and services CPI inflation have rolled over and are below 1% (Chart 5). The mainland economy is extremely weak, and the property market is struggling. China needs lower interest rates and a weaker currency to battle deflationary pressures. The PBoC will continue cutting interest rates. Persistent divergence between Chinese and US monetary policies heralds further yuan weakness against the dollar (Chart 6). Chart 5China's Inflation Is Too Low And Falling Chart 6The CNY Will Depreciate Versus The USD     A weakening RMB versus the US dollar is typically associated with declining commodity prices (Chart 7). Falling commodity prices will weigh on commodity currencies. The yuan depreciation will also continue reinforcing the downtrend in emerging Asian currencies. Mainstream EM: For many emerging markets, interest rates do not explain fluctuations in their currencies. In developing countries that run current account deficits and/or rely on foreign capital, interest rates rise when their exchange rates plummet (Chart 8). Chart 7CNY Depreciation = Lower Commodity Prices Chart 8Interest Rates Do Not Drive EM FX   On the flip side, appreciating EM currencies unleash disinflationary pressures in their domestic economies, giving room for central banks to cut rates. Therefore, for EM economies that are dependent on global capital, it is exchange rates that have historically dictated interest rate dynamics, rather than the other way around. Continental Europe: The European economy is hamstrung by extremely high energy prices and rising interest rates. Importantly, wages in Europe are not rising as fast as they are in the US. Household real disposable income is falling faster in Europe than it is in the US. Plus, the continental European economy is more exposed than the US to global trade − which is about to contract (more on this below). Thus, the European economy has a reduced capacity to absorb higher borrowing costs vis-a-vis the US. Consequently, the real interest rate differential will continue moving in favor of the US, supporting the greenback versus the euro. The Anglo-Saxon block: The US economy will prove to be more resilient to higher borrowing costs than many other DM economies such as the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. As a result, the interest rate differential will move in favor of the US dollar. Chart 9US Households Have Deleveraged In many of these countries, the household debt burden is higher than it is in the US. In fact, US consumer debt and debt servicing have fallen significantly over the past 15 years (Chart 9). Importantly, a considerable portion of outstanding mortgages in the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada have either a floating rate or a fixed rate for only a few years. As borrowing costs rise, consumer finances in these countries will experience material distress. By comparison, the majority of outstanding US mortgages are fixed for 30 years or so. Hence, rising borrowing costs hurt new American homebuyers but do not impact existing mortgage holders. Bottom Line: On a relative basis, the US is in a better position to absorb higher interest rates than many other economies. As a result, the interest rate differential will move in favor of the US over the rest of the world, hence, supporting the greenback in the near run. Shrinking Global Trade Is Bullish For The US Dollar The US dollar is a counter-cyclical currency, and it will continue to appreciate as the global manufacturing cycle slows (Chart 10).  The rationale is that manufacturing and exports constitute a smaller share of GDP in the US than in many other major economies. What if Fed over-tightening, causes a recession and pushes down US interest rates considerably? Would the US dollar plunge in this case? We do not believe so. Instead, a recession could be positive for the broad trade-weighted dollar. As US domestic demand and consumption shrink, its imports will also drop. The US dollar often rallies when the nation’s imports are contracting (Chart 11). Chart 10The US Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency Chart 11Shrinking US Imports = Rising US Dollar   Dwindling imports mean that the US will be emitting fewer dollars to the rest of the world. Global US dollar liquidity will continue to shrink, and the greenback will rally further, including against EM currencies (Chart 12). Bottom Line: As global trade shrinks, the US dollar will extend its rally. Mainstream EM Currencies In the long run, return on capital – not interest rate differentials – drive mainstream EM currencies. Chart 12 illustrates that EM currencies depreciate when their return on equity differential versus the US is negative and vice versa. In turn, the key driver of return on capital is productivity. Productivity growth has been downshifting across mainstream EMs since 2007 (Chart 13). Chart 12Tightening Global USD Liquidity = A Strong US Dollar Chart 13EM vs. US: Relative Return On Capital And Exchange Rates       Weak productivity growth and lower return on capital (versus the US) explain EM currency and equity underperformance since 2010. We have not yet detected a major change in EM fundamentals. Investment Strategy Chart 14Weak EM Productivity = EM Currency Depreciation The US dollar will overshoot in the near term. We continue to short the following currencies versus the USD: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN and IDR. In addition, we recommend shorting HUF vs. CZK, KRW vs. JPY, and BRL vs. MXN. When the dollar appreciates it is neither the time to be long EM risk assets in absolute terms nor to be overweight EM in global equity and fixed-income portfolios. We continue underweighting EM in global equity and credit portfolios. EM local currency bonds offer value, but further currency depreciation and more rate hikes by their central banks are near-term risks to EM domestic bonds. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Appendix   Chart 15The US Dollar Chart 16The Japanese Yen Chart 17The Euro Chart 18The British Pound Chart 19The Swiss Franc Chart 20The Swedish Krona Chart 21The Norwegian Krone Chart 22The Canadian Dollar Chart 23The Australian Dollar Chart 24The New Zealand Dollar Chart 25The Korean Won Chart 26The Singapore Dollar Chart 27The Mexican Peso Chart 28The Chilean Peso Chart 29The Colombian Peso Chart 30The Polish Zloty Chart 31The Hungarian Forint Chart 32The Czech Koruna Footnotes   Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Dear Clients, Next week we will attend the BCA Investment Conference in New York. Therefore we will not publish our regular report. We will resume regular publication in the week of September 12. We apologize in advance for any inconvenience. Thank you, Matt Gertken, Senior Vice President US Political Strategy Executive Summary Top Issues On Voters’ Minds President Biden has a foreign policy but not yet a foreign policy doctrine.  The Biden Doctrine will emerge after critical tests. These tests are likely to be imminent, signaling more volatility and negative surprises for global investors. The three key foreign policy tests are: the Russia-EU energy crisis, the Iran nuclear crisis, and the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis. Of these, only Iran is looking like it could become a win for Biden – and a boon for markets – but even there deal is not yet confirmed. Biden’s foreign policy is domestically focused given the looming midterm elections. The result is likely to be high or higher volatility in the short run. Recommendation (Tactical) INITIATION DATE Return Long DXY (Dollar Index) Feb 23, 2022 13.1% Bottom Line: Stay defensive and long US dollar in the short run. The fourth quarter could be a turning point but for now political risk remains negative for risk assets. Feature Successful US presidents establish a foreign policy doctrine. The doctrine should not be defined by ideas and ideals but rather by the test of reality and experience – i.e. the decisions the president makes during crises. The Biden administration has a foreign policy and it has been tested in Ukraine. The focal point is to strengthen US alliances – even if that means deferring to allies’ interests on critical points. For example, while the US wanted to sell natural gas to Europe at the expense of Russia, Biden approved of Germany’s decision to finish building and operate the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to Russia in summer 2021. He condoned this decision even though Russia was already threatening Ukraine with invasion. Once Russia invaded, Germany froze the pipeline. The US had given its ally a choice, the choice ended badly, and now the ally is more certain that its interest lies with the United States. Bottom Line: The Biden administration’s foreign policy aims to restore US alliances and thus looks for the common denominator among allies. Biden’s Reactive Foreign Policy Biden’s foreign policy is fundamentally defensive, not offensive like that of the Trump administration. Trump initiated a trade war with China and others, revoked several international deals, tried to build a wall on the Mexican border, and imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran. By contrast, Biden, who entered office with a weak grip on Congress and a rebellion at the capitol, preferred to focus on domestic politics and social issues. He preferred to be reactive rather than proactive abroad, slapping sanctions on Russia only after it invaded Ukraine and so far avoiding major new sanctions on Iran or China. Biden’s foreign policy has also been reactive in the sense that it aims to win the approval of his domestic audience. Biden is a first-term US president, he faces midterm elections and the potential for re-election in 2024 – and the odds for him and his party are not great (Chart 1). Elections encourage him to maximize domestic legislation and minimize risks on the international scene. Chart 1Midterm Election Odds From The Street The second term – when the president is no longer eligible for re-election and could become a “lame duck” – is opportune for prioritizing national interests over partisan interests and taking risks abroad. The 2022 midterm election fits into this rubric: Biden’s foreign policy this year has been domestically focused and will continue to be through November. Biden’s goal must be balanced: to pursue his foreign policies but avoid worsening the Democratic Party’s difficulties at the voting booth. Our quantitative election models show that Democrats are likely to lose 21 seats in the House of Representatives (Table 1) and two seats in the Senate (Chart 2), thus losing control of all Congress to Republicans. The Senate is uncertain but the House is not. Given that the Senate is highly competitive, Biden must tread carefully to avoid worsening the economy or suffering a policy humiliation. Table 1BCA’s US House Election Quant Model Chart 2BCA’s US Senate Election Quant Model Hence while sanctions on Russia have pushed up energy prices and given ammunition to critics at home, Biden has encouraged Europe to take a pragmatic and gradual approach so as to soften the blow. The EU agrees for its own reasons and the oil embargo will not fully kick in until December 5, after the midterm election. Bottom Line: The Biden administration’s foreign policy is focused on its domestic audience, which means that midterm elections will continue to drive US foreign policy this year. Taking Risks Before The Midterms Since May we have observed that the Ukraine war and Biden’s midterm woes have stirred the administration into taking greater risks in its foreign policy. If American interests are asserted, Biden will look stronger at home. If a crisis erupts, Americans will rally around the flag. For example, Biden agreed to sell long-range artillery rockets (HIMARS) to Ukraine and provide higher value targeting intelligence to Ukraine. Biden expanded export controls on China and agreed to send legislators and eventually a new arms package to Taiwan. The current crisis in the Taiwan Strait arose because of the Biden administration’s initiatives – House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip. Similarly Biden has not, as of August 31, provided Iran with the concessions necessary to clinch a nuclear agreement, raising the risk of rising tensions across the Middle East. He has slightly expanded sanctions, though, to be fair, the odds of an Iran deal are not low.1 We are contrarians on this issue and have put the odds of a deal at 40%, but rumors are swirling in the news media that a deal is at hand. In short, with his job approval rating falling to a net negative 13 percentage points (net negative 18 percentage points on his handling of the economy), Biden is increasingly willing to take foreign policy risks. The domestic focus of foreign policy is overwhelming its initial defensiveness. Biden’s policy is becoming more offensive, albeit still not to the same degree as the Trump administration’s. This shift in foreign policy does not line up well with what voters want. Voter priorities for the midterms are shaping up as follows: Economy: Voters are far more concerned about the economy than anything else (Chart 3, first panel). Biden’s foreign policy actions – sanctions on oil producers like Russia and Iran and tariffs on manufacturers like China – add to inflation, which is the top concern for voters within the economic sphere. Society: Voters are concerned about a range of social grievances such as gun policy, health care, crime, the electoral system. Abortion access and gun rights have become more important over the year, while foreign policy and energy policy have become less important (Chart 3, second panel). Foreign Policy: True, Biden’s foreign policy can tap into unfavorable views of Russia, Iran, and China (Chart 3, third panel). But voters are not demanding a more hawkish foreign policy in this election, so Biden’s decision to take more foreign policy risks this year must come from somewhere else. That somewhere else is the need to respond to foreign events, such as Russian invasions, but there is also the political expediency of stirring up nationalism, as is clear in the case of China. Chart 3Top Issues On Voters’ Minds Bottom Line: Voters are focused on the economy and social issues but Biden must respond to international challenges. In doing so, Biden is increasingly willing to take risks as the Democrats could benefit from any crisis that leads to an outburst of nationalism and patriotism. Biden’s Foreign Policy And Anti-Inflation Drive Back in June the Biden administration unveiled an anti-inflation plan that consisted of (1) Fed rate hikes (2) a reconciliation bill (3) budget discipline. We pointed out that the first option was the only one that would truly reduce inflation – but that it would also bring recession within a year or two. Once the reconciliation bill passed, we showed how the Inflation Reduction Act would increase budget deficits and inflation, especially when taken along with other new legislation like the Chips and Science Act. More recently Biden’s $500 billion plan for student debt forgiveness has underscored the continuing inflationary bent of his policies. Gasoline prices have come down slightly over the summer but not to the extent that Democrats can declare victory (Chart 4). Midterm voters will feel the year-on-year increase in headline inflation. Chart 4Prices At The Pump Market-based inflation expectations are rising again and consumers still report very high expectations for the one-year period, which is most relevant this fall (Chart 5). This brings us to Biden’s three foreign policy options for reducing inflation: reduce tensions with Russia, lift sanctions on Iran, and lift tariffs on China. Back in June we doubted that any of these would come to fruition. Now Biden faces a series of tests that will define his foreign policy doctrine: Chart 5Inflation Expectations Unabated   European Energy Crisis: Biden faces a European energy crisis stemming from Russia’s clash with NATO. Biden is providing Ukraine with extensive support in the form of money and weapons. That will continue in the short run as the Ukrainians are launching a counter-offensive against Russia. There are some signs of Russia signaling a willingness to negotiate but until Russia defeats the new counter-offensive it is highly unlikely to offer any serious concessions, or to relieve the pressure on Europe. The Biden administration has not yet accepted Russia’s broader demands, namely on the topic of NATO enlargement and whether NATO will ever try to station military bases in Finland or Sweden when they join the alliance (Table 2). Russia’s reaction to western policy is to constrict Europe’s energy supply further – namely shutting down the Nord Stream 1 pipeline – which will also tighten American energy supply via exports and exacerbate energy price inflation and expectations (Chart 6). Table 2US Response To Russia’s Demands On Finland, Sweden  Biden can allow slippage on sanction enforcement prior to the midterm but still his Russia policy will be a source of both conflict and inflation. Chart 6Russia Squeezes Europe Harder   Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Biden faces an Iranian nuclear crisis but it could be resolved quickly through a return to the 2015 nuclear deal. Apparently Biden is closer to clinching a deal. But the US and Iran do not trust each other, as shown in Chart 3 above. Biden could unilaterally relieve sanctions and allow Iranian their oil exports to pick up substantially (Chart 7). He can overcome Congress after a 30-day delay. But any deal will alienate the Saudi Arabians, who are threatening to cut oil production and reverse the oil price drop that Biden is seeking on behalf of US voters. So Iran is an option for Biden but it is not very compelling: the oil can be traded regardless of any deal. Biden’s capitulation would hurt politically without helping much economically. However, the failure of a deal poses a greater risk of instability in the Middle East and inflationary energy price shocks. So Biden faces an immediate and critical foreign policy test on this issue. Chart 7Iranian Oil Exports By Destination Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis: Biden also faces a crisis in relations with China over the One China Policy and the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. This is the fourth such crisis since 1954. In previous crisis the US sent aircraft carriers through the strait, including in 1995-96. But it is not clear that Biden will do so given that China’s capabilities are much greater today (Map 1). The crisis probably will not be resolved before the midterm election since China will remain firm given its own domestic concerns this fall. Recently there emerged a tentative deal on the US auditing Chinese firms that list on US stock exchanges and an attempt to restart talks on climate change cooperation. The US and China are still talking despite tensions. But Biden has ruled out the option of reducing tariffs … which would only marginally have reduced inflation anyway. Map 1US Aircraft Carriers Suggest Taiwan Risk Is Substantial Bottom Line: Biden faces three foreign policy crises that threaten to exacerbate inflation. In each case he will likely uphold US security interests at the expense of higher inflation expectations in the short run. Investment Takeaways The Biden administration has a foreign policy but it does not yet have a foreign policy doctrine. The Biden Doctrine will be forged in the crucible of experience. The critical tests look to be coming soon. It will be difficult for Biden to pass the tests without fanning inflation expectations, at least in the short run. While bold action on Iran will not reduce oil prices as much as the consensus holds, a deal could avoid a worse scenario in which the Middle East destabilizes and energy shocks multiply. Investors should brace for more volatility, at least through the November 8 midterm election. Investors will need to see US-Russia, US-China, and US-Iran relations improve concretely and verifiably before determining that the geopolitical and macroeconomic backdrop are turning more favorable for risk assets.   Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     See Ivana Saric, “Biden administration ramps up Iran sanctions as nuclear talks falter,” Axios, June 16, 2022, axios.com; Ellen Nakashima, “Biden administration slaps export controls on Chinese firms for aiding PLA weapons development,” Washington Post, April 8, 2021, washingtonpost.com; see also Karen Freifeld, “Biden administration reviewing China chip export policies, official says,” Reuters, July 14, 2022, reuters.com.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3US Political Capital Index Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model  Table A4House Election Model Table A5APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A5BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A5CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets 

Executive Summary   Reshoring And FDI Job Creation Have Accelerated After The Pandemic The US is entering a period of an industrial boom thanks to limited manufacturing capacity paired with strong demand for industrial and consumer goods. In addition, a trifecta of positive developments is further boosting US manufacturing: Onshoring, automation, and fiscal stimulus. Onshoring has accelerated after the onset of the pandemic and reshoring announcements are growing steadily. Automation and robotization allow industrial companies to circumvent labor shortages and rising wages and, hence, boost their profit margins.  The domestic political landscape in the US is also favorable for industrial stocks given the three major legislative Acts (Infrastructure Investment & Jobs, Inflation Reduction, and National Defense Authorization) that will secure a healthy demand pipeline. While long-term trends are favorable for the sector, a macroeconomic backdrop of slowing growth is a headwind.  However, thanks to a confluence of positive long-term trends, most companies are optimistic. Bottom Line: The US industrial sector is in the middle of a boom fueled by onshoring, automation, and favorable government policy. This trifecta of positives helps the sector to defy the gravity of the slowing economy. We remain overweight Industrials on both tactical and strategical time horizons but will continue to monitor it closely, watching out for potential cracks in operating performance. Feature A little over a year ago EMS, GIS, and USES co-published a report “Industrials as equity sector winner in the coming years”. In that report, we posited that the Industrial sector is poised for outperformance as it enjoys a boom thanks to strong new trends in onshoring and automation. In addition to the tectonic shifts described above, the sector has also found itself at the epicenter of the US legislative activity, which will provide a significant tailwind for its performance. Since we published the report on July 30, 2021, Industrials have performed in line with the S&P 500. However, since the beginning of the year, Industrials and Capital Goods outperformed the index by 7%, showing impressive resilience (Chart 1 and Table 1). Chart 1A Resilient Cyclical Sector In this week’s report, we take a close look at the trends highlighted above and conduct a deep dive to evaluate whether the sector is still attractive on a tactical basis considering the backdrop of rising rates and slowing economic activity. Our focus is on the Industrial sector in general, and the Capital Goods Industry Group, in particular. We will also assess which industries are best positioned for outperformance. Table 1Industrials Outperformed On The Way Down And During The Summer Rally Sneak Preview: The US industrial sector is in the middle of a boom fueled by onshoring, automation, and favorable government policy. This trifecta of positives helps the sector to defy the gravity of the slowing economy. For now, we are both strategically and tactically bullish on the sector but remain vigilant. US Manufacturing Capacity Has Been Severely Limited For Years US manufacturing capacity has been stagnant over the past 20 years, and the level of US manufacturing employment has declined by 30% since 2000 (Charts 2 & 3). Presently, manufacturing employment accounts for only 8% of total US employment. Chart 2US Manufacturing Employment Has Been Shrinking For Decades Chart 3US Manufacturing Capacity Has Not Expanded In The Past Two Decades The reason for the lack of capacity expansion over the past 20 years has been the outsourcing and shifting of production to other countries, especially China. The peak in US manufacturing capacity and employment occurred after the massive Asian currency devaluation in 1998 and China’s WTO admission in 2001. The semiconductor sector, which has recently come into the limelight, is a case in point: From 1990 to 2020, the percentage of chips manufactured in the US has fallen from 37% to 10%, with the lion’s share of chips manufactured in Asia. This trend has brought about The Chips Act which seeks to reverse the trend for national security reasons. Notably, more recently, the decline in manufacturing capacity and employment has started to reverse. More about this later. American Manufacturing Is Booming Again Limited manufacturing capacity paired with a strong demand for industrial and consumer goods translates into an industrial boom. Industrial companies are incentivized to expand given they are already operating at nearly full capacity (Chart 4) and enjoying considerable pricing power. Building industrial capacity in itself lifts demand for industrial goods and the US may be in the early innings of the new Capex cycle, unless the trend is derailed by headwinds from a significantly tighter monetary policy. After all, the age of US capital stock, at 24 years, is two years older than at previous peaks, indicating that many companies are overdue for replacing some of their equipment and machinery (Chart 5). Chart 4Industrial Companies Operate At Nearly Full Capacity Chart 5The US Capital Stock Has To Be Renewed Indeed, this may already be happening. According to S&P Dow Jones Indices, which analyzed second-quarter earnings season data, capital expenditures of the companies in the S&P 500, have been growing at a faster pace than stock repurchases for the first time since the first quarter of 2021, rising by 20% from a year earlier. Companies from Pepsi to Google to GM are investing in their production capacity, which in itself may be an encouraging sign that they are comfortable with the demand outlook. Of course, the caveat here is that industrials are late in cycle performance, as companies usually wait towards the end of the cycle to expand, only to find waning demand for their products. You Say “Reshoring,” I Say “Onshoring” A multi-decade decline in US manufacturing employment has started to reverse after the GFC, with the onset of the pandemic and geopolitical tensions accelerating the pace of reshoring and Foreign Direct Investing (FDI). Reshoring and FDI job announcements have increased from 6K in 2010 to 345K in 2022 (Chart 6). The resulting cumulative 950,000 incremental hires represent about 7% of US manufacturing employment. The acceleration of jobs coming back combined with the decline in the rate of offshoring has resulted in a 12-year steady uptrend in US manufacturing jobs. Truly amazing! Onshoring remains on top of mind for companies’ management. According to Statista, mentions of onshoring buzzwords in earnings calls and presentations of US public companies have increased from about 100 throughout 2020 to nearly 200 in Q2-2020. Chart 6Reshoring And FDI Job Creation Have Accelerated After The Pandemic According to Morgan Stanley’s survey of more than 400 executives of large corporations from the US to Germany to Japan, the most important factor in supply chain decisions is geopolitical stability, followed by skilled labor, physical infrastructure, and a developed supply chain ecosystem. On nearly every count, the US outranked Europe, China, and Mexico. Some 18% of the companies planned to significantly expand US manufacturing in the next 12 months, while 36% anticipated doing so within three years. More than 40% of US companies were taking steps to “onshore” supply chains. The reasons are well publicized: The COVID crisis has revealed over-dependence on imports. China’s decoupling from the US, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and the Russian/Ukraine war have invoked concerns about the reliability of the existing supply chains. Supply chain disruptions have highlighted corporate vulnerabilities and had made companies realize that “just-in-case” trumps “just-in-time.” The US is pursuing protectionist policies that are to benefit companies operating in the US, Mexico, and Canada. According to Reshoring Initiative,1 Industrial and Tech companies are at the forefront of reshoring: Electrical Equipment, Chemicals, Transportation Equipment, Computer, and Electronic Products, and Medical Equipment suppliers are the leaders in onshoring (Table 2). Many large manufacturers such as Caterpillar have implemented or announced plans to bring offshore manufacturing back to the US. Table 2Reshoring Jobs By Top 5 Industries Will onshoring benefit some of the former manufacturing hubs? We believe it will, as Kentucky, North Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, and Alabama are the top five destinations (Table 3). However, there is a hitch. The US unemployment rate, which is at an all-time low of 3.5%, is certainly a speed limit. Moreover, companies that bring their businesses back home do realize that labor costs in this country are many times higher than, say, in Asia. Hence, one of the solutions they pursue is automation. After many years in the making, onshoring is finally gaining pace, benefiting the US manufacturing base. Table 32022 Projected Reshoring Jobs By Top 10 States Automation To The Rescue! The Pace of Robotization And Automation Is Accelerating A critical constraint for the expansion of US manufacturing is the labor shortage. Open vacancies in manufacturing are now at a record high, 100% above the 2018 peak (Chart 7, top panel). Notably, industrial companies have been experiencing difficulties hiring qualified staff over the past 10 years which has led to high wage growth (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 7US Manufacturers Cannot Fill Vacant Positions, Wages Are Surging Chart 8Automation Expands Profits Margins Of Global Industrials One remedy is automation. Replacing labor with automation/robots allows companies to produce more and avoid a profit margin squeeze (Chart 8). In a recent report published by the International Federation of Robotics, industrial robots reported record preliminary sales in 2021 with 486,800 units shipped globally, a 27% increase from 2020. The US has been lagging behind other developed countries in terms of automation and robotization (Chart 9). However, labor shortages brought about by the pandemic appear to have “moved the needle.” According to the Association for Advancing Automation (A3),2 the number of robots sold in the US in 2021 rose by 27% over 2020 with 49,900 units installed. 2022 is on pace to exceed previous records, with North American companies ordering a record 11,595 robots. Chart 9US Has Been Lagging Other Developed Nations In Robot Installations Non-automotive sales now represent 58% of the total, demonstrating a broadening reach of automation. Metals, Auto, and Food and Consumer Goods have the highest growth in the purchase of robots (Chart 10). Chart 10In 2021 The Pace Of Robot Installation Has Picked Up Implications For Industrial Companies The Industrials sector is home to companies that create robots and offer automation solutions as well as companies on the receiving end of the trend. Both sellers and buyers are to benefit: Buyers Of Robots: Manufacturing companies automating production and enlisting robots into their operations will enjoy higher operating leverage, lower labor costs, and more resilient margins. It is easier to automate processes in manufacturing than in service sectors. Consequently, we believe profit margins in manufacturing will outperform those of service sector companies, where automation will be slower. Sellers Of Robots: The sizzling demand for robots demonstrates that technological breakthroughs are no longer just about the Tech companies, and many industrial companies are to benefit from these nascent trends. Rockwell Automation, Eaton, and Caterpillar are the leaders in industrial automation. These companies also reach across the aisle to software companies to leverage their expertise in data storage, computing, and artificial intelligence. Rockwell has just recently partnered with Microsoft, while others are acquiring software companies. Deere has acquired GUSS Automation, a pioneer in semi-autonomous springs for high-value crops. These companies are to benefit from strong demand for their products and should exhibit strong sales and profit growth. To meet strong demand, industrial/manufacturing companies will automate their processes. This will allow them to boost volume and cap costs resulting in widening profit margins. Uncle Sam Loves American Manufacturing Both Biden and Trump before him, have stated that their overarching objective is to revive America’s manufacturing. However, their methods were drastically different, with Trump introducing tax cuts and tariffs, while Biden leans heavily on fiscal stimulus. The following is a recap of some of the recent laws passed by Congress and signed by President Biden. Infrastructure Investment And Jobs Act The $1.2-trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act will increase US government non-defense spending to bring it to around 3% of GDP, a level comparable to the 1980s-90s and larger than the 2010s. The bill’s focus is on traditional infrastructure – roads, bridges, ports, and electrical grid modernization – but also includes more modern elements such as $65 billion for 5G broadband Internet and $36 billion for electric vehicles and environmental remediation (Table 4). Implementation of the bill is delayed to 2023-24. Table 4Itemized Infrastructure Plan However, the market is forward-looking and companies in Construction & Engineering, and Building Products industries are already winners, and are up 12% in relative terms since the bill was passed on November 15, 2021. The potential increase in public construction will help offset a slump in residential construction on the back of the softening housing market (Chart 11). Chart 11The Increase In Public Construction Will Help Offset A Slump In Residential Construction Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) The bill earmarks $370 billion for clean energy spending as well as EV tax credits for both new and used cars. We have written on the topic of “Green and Clean” and the effect of the IRA on renewable energy and EV industries, two industries that are major beneficiaries of the bill. However, the bill also creates an enormous opportunity for industrial companies, which can build and service renewable infrastructure, such as Quanta Services (PWR) and Eaton (ETN). Companies that produce and service wind turbines (GE) and solar batteries will also get a revenue boost from the package. Chips Act Congress has passed the CHIPS+ bill to alleviate the chip shortage and shore up US competitiveness with China. Money is earmarked for domestic semiconductor production and research, and factory construction. While the key beneficiaries are chip foundries, construction of new factories will require equipment and services of a wide range from industrial companies from Construction to Machinery. National Defense Authorization Act In December, the House and Senate Armed Services Committee leadership released the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This bill introduces an overall discretionary authorization of $768.2 billion including $740.3 billion for base Department of Defense programs and $27.8 billion for national security programs in the Department of Energy. At a later date, another $37 billion was amended to the bill to include $2.5 billion to help pay higher fuel costs; $550 million for Ukraine, funding for five ships, eight Boeing Co-made F-18 Super Hornet fighter jets, and five Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules planes; and about $1 billion for four Patriot missile units. For FY 2023, the House has already passed $839 billion, which is $37 billion above the White House request. The Senate will work on the bill after the summer recess. But it is already clear that defense spending has become a bipartisan issue. The increase in the defense budget, as well as additional allocation of funds towards Ukraine, have been a major boost for the Aerospace and Defense industry. We overweighted the sector back in January and it is up 24% in relative terms. Overweight Or Not, That Is The Question Macroeconomic Backdrop Business Cycle: Performance of the Industrial sector tends to lag the business cycle, as sector customers tend to wait until they are sure of recovery and have high utilization of their existing capacity before they expand their own production. However, demand is not entirely cyclical, as the need to replace obsolete or aging equipment or machines is relatively stable. There is also a stark difference in behavior of the largest industrial companies and smaller companies in their ecosystems. Larger manufacturers are long-cycle as it takes months to build machines, planes, or equipment. These companies are less sensitive to the business cycle. On the other hand, their suppliers are “short cycle” as they sell parts to many customers, turn their inventory frequently, and are very sensitive to the economic condition. At present, as economic growth is slowing, long-cycle industrial companies are preferable to short-cycle ones. Despite a bifurcation in demand, Industrials tend to underperform in a generic economic slowdown (Chart 12). This is unsurprising as the relative performance of Industrials is correlated to industrial production and the ISM PMI (Chart 13). Chart 12Historically, Industrials Underperformed During The Slowdown Stage Of The Business Cycle Chart 13Industrials Usually Underperform When IP And ISM PMI Decline Chart 14Survey Of Capex Intentions Is Weakening And while we touted the beginning of the new industrial boom in the US, and a brand new Capex cycle, we need to monitor it carefully, as multiple surveys of Capex intentions are decelerating (Chart 14). Tighter Monetary Policy: Another potential headwind comes from rising rates. After all, the higher cost of corporate borrowing may weigh on demand for industrial goods. However, historically, US industrial stocks outperformed the S&P 500 Index in the past 70 years during periods of rising bond yields, including the inflation decade of the 1970s (Chart 15). Industrial companies are well positioned to withstand inflation as strong pricing power allows them to pass on their costs to customers. Chart 15When Rates Rise, Industrials Outperform The macroeconomic backdrop presents challenges to Industrial companies Fundamentals Are Strong Significant Pricing Power: While dangers are looming in the macroeconomic backdrop, so far industrial companies have been doing well thanks to their significant pricing power (Chart 16), which they enjoy due to high capacity utilization. The relationship between capacity utilization and selling prices is not linear but exponential. When capacity reaches its limit and shortages arise, potential buyers will likely be willing to pay considerably higher prices to secure the supply of goods that they require. High Operating Leverage: In addition to high pricing power, industrial companies enjoy high operating leverage, which implies that while the economy is growing, even if at a slower pace, they can easily convert sales into profits. This will not be the case when the economy is outright contracting – then high operating leverage will become a liability. Chart 16Industrials Enjoy Substantial Pricing Power Strong Q2-2022 Earnings And Sales Results: This explains the strong Q2-2022 sales and earnings results of the Industrial sector. Industrial earnings grew at 17.4%, while its sales increased by 13.3% – a remarkable feat, considering that many companies, especially consumer-facing ones, are struggling with shrinking profitability – earnings growth of the Consumer Discretionary sector was down 12.6%. Clearly, business-to-business companies are faring much better than consumer-facing ones, whose demand was pulled forward by the pandemic, and whose customers are reeling from rising prices and are tightening their belts. Looking ahead, margins are expected to shrink by 0.5% (Chart 17), which is modest compared to the 2.5% contraction expected for the S&P 500. In terms of earnings growth expectations, they have fallen but still exceed the market by an impressive 10% even after a series of downgrades. Importantly, earnings growth in real terms is also positive (Charts 18 & 19). Chart 17Operating Margins Are Expected To Hold Up Well Chart 18Industrial Earnings Will Grow Faster Than The Market Chart 19Earnings Expectations Have Been Re-calibrated What Companies Are Saying All the charts and numbers align well with what we have heard from companies during the earnings season. For instance, nearly every major player within its own respective sub-industry reported healthy demand, low inventories, and a hefty backlog this quarter. Here are a few quotes from the largest players: Caterpillar (CAT): “We expect production and utilization levels will remain elevated, and our autonomous solutions continued to gain momentum … overall demand remained healthy across our segments … was unable to completely satisfy strong customer demand for our machines and engines.” MMM: “Continued strong demand for our solutions in semiconductor, factory automation, and automotive end markets.” GE: “In Renewables, … we are making progress. Our pricing has substantially improved onshore … we're growing our higher-margin businesses, such as grid automation, which delivered double-digit orders growth.” Honeywell (HON): “Orders were up 12% year over year and closing backlog was also up 12% year over year.” The profitability of the Industrial sector is expected to be resilient and to better the market. Valuations And Technicals The Industrial sector and the Capital Goods Industry group trade on par with the S&P 500 on a forward earnings basis (17.7x and 17.9x to 18.0x). The BCA Valuations Indicator signals a neutral level of valuation which is roughly in line with the 10-year average. From the BCA Technical Indicator standpoint, Capitals Goods are also in the neutral zone (Chart 20). Valuations and technicals are moderate for the sector. Chart 20Valuations And Technicals Investment Implications The US industrial sector is in the middle of a boom fueled by a trifecta of positives: Onshoring, automation, and favorable government policy. And while it is hard to fight the Fed and the business cycle, it appears that for now, the sector is defying gravity despite slowing manufacturing surveys and tighter monetary policy. So far fundamentals appear strong, and earnings expectations are robust thanks to the high pricing power and operating leverage of the sector. Within Capital Goods, we favor industries and companies that benefit from these tailwinds: Aerospace and Defense which is to benefit from increased federal defense spending; Robotics and Automation which is overrepresented in the Electrical Equipment industry; and Renewables, i.e., companies that manufacture and service wind turbines and solar panels. Construction and building materials will have a second breath when Infrastructure spending projects will actually get selected and approved. We are both strategically and tactically bullish on the sector but will monitor it closely from a tactical standpoint. After all, industrial surveys are at odds with the resilient earnings expectations. ETFs There are a number of very inexpensive and highly liquid ETFs from Vanguard, iShares, and State Street, that capture the performance of the Industrial sector (Table 5). Table 5Industrial Sector ETFs Bottom Line The US industrial sector is in the middle of a boom fueled by onshoring, automation, and favorable government policy. This trifecta of positives helps the sector to defy the gravity of the slowing economy. Companies are optimistic and earnings growth expectations are both robust and resilient. We are both strategically and tactically bullish on the sector but will continue to monitor it closely, watching out for potential cracks in operating performance.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Reshoring Initiative reshorenow.org 2     https://www.automate.org/   Recommended Allocation Recommended Allocation: Addendum 

Executive Summary   Reshoring And FDI Job Creation Have Accelerated After The Pandemic The US is entering a period of an industrial boom thanks to limited manufacturing capacity paired with strong demand for industrial and consumer goods. In addition, a trifecta of positive developments is further boosting US manufacturing: Onshoring, automation, and fiscal stimulus. Onshoring has accelerated after the onset of the pandemic and reshoring announcements are growing steadily. Automation and robotization allow industrial companies to circumvent labor shortages and rising wages and, hence, boost their profit margins.  The domestic political landscape in the US is also favorable for industrial stocks given the three major legislative Acts (Infrastructure Investment & Jobs, Inflation Reduction, and National Defense Authorization) that will secure a healthy demand pipeline. While long-term trends are favorable for the sector, a macroeconomic backdrop of slowing growth is a headwind.  However, thanks to a confluence of positive long-term trends, most companies are optimistic. Bottom Line: The US industrial sector is in the middle of a boom fueled by onshoring, automation, and favorable government policy. This trifecta of positives helps the sector to defy the gravity of the slowing economy. We remain overweight Industrials on both tactical and strategical time horizons but will continue to monitor it closely, watching out for potential cracks in operating performance. Feature A little over a year ago EMS, GIS, and USES co-published a report “Industrials as equity sector winner in the coming years”. In that report, we posited that the Industrial sector is poised for outperformance as it enjoys a boom thanks to strong new trends in onshoring and automation. In addition to the tectonic shifts described above, the sector has also found itself at the epicenter of the US legislative activity, which will provide a significant tailwind for its performance. Since we published the report on July 30, 2021, Industrials have performed in line with the S&P 500. However, since the beginning of the year, Industrials and Capital Goods outperformed the index by 7%, showing impressive resilience (Chart 1 and Table 1). Chart 1A Resilient Cyclical Sector In this week’s report, we take a close look at the trends highlighted above and conduct a deep dive to evaluate whether the sector is still attractive on a tactical basis considering the backdrop of rising rates and slowing economic activity. Our focus is on the Industrial sector in general, and the Capital Goods Industry Group, in particular. We will also assess which industries are best positioned for outperformance. Table 1Industrials Outperformed On The Way Down And During The Summer Rally Sneak Preview: The US industrial sector is in the middle of a boom fueled by onshoring, automation, and favorable government policy. This trifecta of positives helps the sector to defy the gravity of the slowing economy. For now, we are both strategically and tactically bullish on the sector but remain vigilant. US Manufacturing Capacity Has Been Severely Limited For Years US manufacturing capacity has been stagnant over the past 20 years, and the level of US manufacturing employment has declined by 30% since 2000 (Charts 2 & 3). Presently, manufacturing employment accounts for only 8% of total US employment. Chart 2US Manufacturing Employment Has Been Shrinking For Decades Chart 3US Manufacturing Capacity Has Not Expanded In The Past Two Decades The reason for the lack of capacity expansion over the past 20 years has been the outsourcing and shifting of production to other countries, especially China. The peak in US manufacturing capacity and employment occurred after the massive Asian currency devaluation in 1998 and China’s WTO admission in 2001. The semiconductor sector, which has recently come into the limelight, is a case in point: From 1990 to 2020, the percentage of chips manufactured in the US has fallen from 37% to 10%, with the lion’s share of chips manufactured in Asia. This trend has brought about The Chips Act which seeks to reverse the trend for national security reasons. Notably, more recently, the decline in manufacturing capacity and employment has started to reverse. More about this later. American Manufacturing Is Booming Again Limited manufacturing capacity paired with a strong demand for industrial and consumer goods translates into an industrial boom. Industrial companies are incentivized to expand given they are already operating at nearly full capacity (Chart 4) and enjoying considerable pricing power. Building industrial capacity in itself lifts demand for industrial goods and the US may be in the early innings of the new Capex cycle, unless the trend is derailed by headwinds from a significantly tighter monetary policy. After all, the age of US capital stock, at 24 years, is two years older than at previous peaks, indicating that many companies are overdue for replacing some of their equipment and machinery (Chart 5). Chart 4Industrial Companies Operate At Nearly Full Capacity Chart 5The US Capital Stock Has To Be Renewed Indeed, this may already be happening. According to S&P Dow Jones Indices, which analyzed second-quarter earnings season data, capital expenditures of the companies in the S&P 500, have been growing at a faster pace than stock repurchases for the first time since the first quarter of 2021, rising by 20% from a year earlier. Companies from Pepsi to Google to GM are investing in their production capacity, which in itself may be an encouraging sign that they are comfortable with the demand outlook. Of course, the caveat here is that industrials are late in cycle performance, as companies usually wait towards the end of the cycle to expand, only to find waning demand for their products. You Say “Reshoring,” I Say “Onshoring” A multi-decade decline in US manufacturing employment has started to reverse after the GFC, with the onset of the pandemic and geopolitical tensions accelerating the pace of reshoring and Foreign Direct Investing (FDI). Reshoring and FDI job announcements have increased from 6K in 2010 to 345K in 2022 (Chart 6). The resulting cumulative 950,000 incremental hires represent about 7% of US manufacturing employment. The acceleration of jobs coming back combined with the decline in the rate of offshoring has resulted in a 12-year steady uptrend in US manufacturing jobs. Truly amazing! Onshoring remains on top of mind for companies’ management. According to Statista, mentions of onshoring buzzwords in earnings calls and presentations of US public companies have increased from about 100 throughout 2020 to nearly 200 in Q2-2020. Chart 6Reshoring And FDI Job Creation Have Accelerated After The Pandemic According to Morgan Stanley’s survey of more than 400 executives of large corporations from the US to Germany to Japan, the most important factor in supply chain decisions is geopolitical stability, followed by skilled labor, physical infrastructure, and a developed supply chain ecosystem. On nearly every count, the US outranked Europe, China, and Mexico. Some 18% of the companies planned to significantly expand US manufacturing in the next 12 months, while 36% anticipated doing so within three years. More than 40% of US companies were taking steps to “onshore” supply chains. The reasons are well publicized: The COVID crisis has revealed over-dependence on imports. China’s decoupling from the US, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and the Russian/Ukraine war have invoked concerns about the reliability of the existing supply chains. Supply chain disruptions have highlighted corporate vulnerabilities and had made companies realize that “just-in-case” trumps “just-in-time.” The US is pursuing protectionist policies that are to benefit companies operating in the US, Mexico, and Canada. According to Reshoring Initiative,1 Industrial and Tech companies are at the forefront of reshoring: Electrical Equipment, Chemicals, Transportation Equipment, Computer, and Electronic Products, and Medical Equipment suppliers are the leaders in onshoring (Table 2). Many large manufacturers such as Caterpillar have implemented or announced plans to bring offshore manufacturing back to the US. Table 2Reshoring Jobs By Top 5 Industries Will onshoring benefit some of the former manufacturing hubs? We believe it will, as Kentucky, North Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, and Alabama are the top five destinations (Table 3). However, there is a hitch. The US unemployment rate, which is at an all-time low of 3.5%, is certainly a speed limit. Moreover, companies that bring their businesses back home do realize that labor costs in this country are many times higher than, say, in Asia. Hence, one of the solutions they pursue is automation. After many years in the making, onshoring is finally gaining pace, benefiting the US manufacturing base. Table 32022 Projected Reshoring Jobs By Top 10 States Automation To The Rescue! The Pace of Robotization And Automation Is Accelerating A critical constraint for the expansion of US manufacturing is the labor shortage. Open vacancies in manufacturing are now at a record high, 100% above the 2018 peak (Chart 7, top panel). Notably, industrial companies have been experiencing difficulties hiring qualified staff over the past 10 years which has led to high wage growth (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 7US Manufacturers Cannot Fill Vacant Positions, Wages Are Surging Chart 8Automation Expands Profits Margins Of Global Industrials One remedy is automation. Replacing labor with automation/robots allows companies to produce more and avoid a profit margin squeeze (Chart 8). In a recent report published by the International Federation of Robotics, industrial robots reported record preliminary sales in 2021 with 486,800 units shipped globally, a 27% increase from 2020. The US has been lagging behind other developed countries in terms of automation and robotization (Chart 9). However, labor shortages brought about by the pandemic appear to have “moved the needle.” According to the Association for Advancing Automation (A3),2 the number of robots sold in the US in 2021 rose by 27% over 2020 with 49,900 units installed. 2022 is on pace to exceed previous records, with North American companies ordering a record 11,595 robots. Chart 9US Has Been Lagging Other Developed Nations In Robot Installations Non-automotive sales now represent 58% of the total, demonstrating a broadening reach of automation. Metals, Auto, and Food and Consumer Goods have the highest growth in the purchase of robots (Chart 10). Chart 10In 2021 The Pace Of Robot Installation Has Picked Up Implications For Industrial Companies The Industrials sector is home to companies that create robots and offer automation solutions as well as companies on the receiving end of the trend. Both sellers and buyers are to benefit: Buyers Of Robots: Manufacturing companies automating production and enlisting robots into their operations will enjoy higher operating leverage, lower labor costs, and more resilient margins. It is easier to automate processes in manufacturing than in service sectors. Consequently, we believe profit margins in manufacturing will outperform those of service sector companies, where automation will be slower. Sellers Of Robots: The sizzling demand for robots demonstrates that technological breakthroughs are no longer just about the Tech companies, and many industrial companies are to benefit from these nascent trends. Rockwell Automation, Eaton, and Caterpillar are the leaders in industrial automation. These companies also reach across the aisle to software companies to leverage their expertise in data storage, computing, and artificial intelligence. Rockwell has just recently partnered with Microsoft, while others are acquiring software companies. Deere has acquired GUSS Automation, a pioneer in semi-autonomous springs for high-value crops. These companies are to benefit from strong demand for their products and should exhibit strong sales and profit growth. To meet strong demand, industrial/manufacturing companies will automate their processes. This will allow them to boost volume and cap costs resulting in widening profit margins. Uncle Sam Loves American Manufacturing Both Biden and Trump before him, have stated that their overarching objective is to revive America’s manufacturing. However, their methods were drastically different, with Trump introducing tax cuts and tariffs, while Biden leans heavily on fiscal stimulus. The following is a recap of some of the recent laws passed by Congress and signed by President Biden. Infrastructure Investment And Jobs Act The $1.2-trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act will increase US government non-defense spending to bring it to around 3% of GDP, a level comparable to the 1980s-90s and larger than the 2010s. The bill’s focus is on traditional infrastructure – roads, bridges, ports, and electrical grid modernization – but also includes more modern elements such as $65 billion for 5G broadband Internet and $36 billion for electric vehicles and environmental remediation (Table 4). Implementation of the bill is delayed to 2023-24. Table 4Itemized Infrastructure Plan However, the market is forward-looking and companies in Construction & Engineering, and Building Products industries are already winners, and are up 12% in relative terms since the bill was passed on November 15, 2021. The potential increase in public construction will help offset a slump in residential construction on the back of the softening housing market (Chart 11). Chart 11The Increase In Public Construction Will Help Offset A Slump In Residential Construction Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) The bill earmarks $370 billion for clean energy spending as well as EV tax credits for both new and used cars. We have written on the topic of “Green and Clean” and the effect of the IRA on renewable energy and EV industries, two industries that are major beneficiaries of the bill. However, the bill also creates an enormous opportunity for industrial companies, which can build and service renewable infrastructure, such as Quanta Services (PWR) and Eaton (ETN). Companies that produce and service wind turbines (GE) and solar batteries will also get a revenue boost from the package. Chips Act Congress has passed the CHIPS+ bill to alleviate the chip shortage and shore up US competitiveness with China. Money is earmarked for domestic semiconductor production and research, and factory construction. While the key beneficiaries are chip foundries, construction of new factories will require equipment and services of a wide range from industrial companies from Construction to Machinery. National Defense Authorization Act In December, the House and Senate Armed Services Committee leadership released the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This bill introduces an overall discretionary authorization of $768.2 billion including $740.3 billion for base Department of Defense programs and $27.8 billion for national security programs in the Department of Energy. At a later date, another $37 billion was amended to the bill to include $2.5 billion to help pay higher fuel costs; $550 million for Ukraine, funding for five ships, eight Boeing Co-made F-18 Super Hornet fighter jets, and five Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules planes; and about $1 billion for four Patriot missile units. For FY 2023, the House has already passed $839 billion, which is $37 billion above the White House request. The Senate will work on the bill after the summer recess. But it is already clear that defense spending has become a bipartisan issue. The increase in the defense budget, as well as additional allocation of funds towards Ukraine, have been a major boost for the Aerospace and Defense industry. We overweighted the sector back in January and it is up 24% in relative terms. Overweight Or Not, That Is The Question Macroeconomic Backdrop Business Cycle: Performance of the Industrial sector tends to lag the business cycle, as sector customers tend to wait until they are sure of recovery and have high utilization of their existing capacity before they expand their own production. However, demand is not entirely cyclical, as the need to replace obsolete or aging equipment or machines is relatively stable. There is also a stark difference in behavior of the largest industrial companies and smaller companies in their ecosystems. Larger manufacturers are long-cycle as it takes months to build machines, planes, or equipment. These companies are less sensitive to the business cycle. On the other hand, their suppliers are “short cycle” as they sell parts to many customers, turn their inventory frequently, and are very sensitive to the economic condition. At present, as economic growth is slowing, long-cycle industrial companies are preferable to short-cycle ones. Despite a bifurcation in demand, Industrials tend to underperform in a generic economic slowdown (Chart 12). This is unsurprising as the relative performance of Industrials is correlated to industrial production and the ISM PMI (Chart 13). Chart 12Historically, Industrials Underperformed During The Slowdown Stage Of The Business Cycle Chart 13Industrials Usually Underperform When IP And ISM PMI Decline Chart 14Survey Of Capex Intentions Is Weakening And while we touted the beginning of the new industrial boom in the US, and a brand new Capex cycle, we need to monitor it carefully, as multiple surveys of Capex intentions are decelerating (Chart 14). Tighter Monetary Policy: Another potential headwind comes from rising rates. After all, the higher cost of corporate borrowing may weigh on demand for industrial goods. However, historically, US industrial stocks outperformed the S&P 500 Index in the past 70 years during periods of rising bond yields, including the inflation decade of the 1970s (Chart 15). Industrial companies are well positioned to withstand inflation as strong pricing power allows them to pass on their costs to customers. Chart 15When Rates Rise, Industrials Outperform The macroeconomic backdrop presents challenges to Industrial companies Fundamentals Are Strong Significant Pricing Power: While dangers are looming in the macroeconomic backdrop, so far industrial companies have been doing well thanks to their significant pricing power (Chart 16), which they enjoy due to high capacity utilization. The relationship between capacity utilization and selling prices is not linear but exponential. When capacity reaches its limit and shortages arise, potential buyers will likely be willing to pay considerably higher prices to secure the supply of goods that they require. High Operating Leverage: In addition to high pricing power, industrial companies enjoy high operating leverage, which implies that while the economy is growing, even if at a slower pace, they can easily convert sales into profits. This will not be the case when the economy is outright contracting – then high operating leverage will become a liability. Chart 16Industrials Enjoy Substantial Pricing Power Strong Q2-2022 Earnings And Sales Results: This explains the strong Q2-2022 sales and earnings results of the Industrial sector. Industrial earnings grew at 17.4%, while its sales increased by 13.3% – a remarkable feat, considering that many companies, especially consumer-facing ones, are struggling with shrinking profitability – earnings growth of the Consumer Discretionary sector was down 12.6%. Clearly, business-to-business companies are faring much better than consumer-facing ones, whose demand was pulled forward by the pandemic, and whose customers are reeling from rising prices and are tightening their belts. Looking ahead, margins are expected to shrink by 0.5% (Chart 17), which is modest compared to the 2.5% contraction expected for the S&P 500. In terms of earnings growth expectations, they have fallen but still exceed the market by an impressive 10% even after a series of downgrades. Importantly, earnings growth in real terms is also positive (Charts 18 & 19). Chart 17Operating Margins Are Expected To Hold Up Well Chart 18Industrial Earnings Will Grow Faster Than The Market Chart 19Earnings Expectations Have Been Re-calibrated What Companies Are Saying All the charts and numbers align well with what we have heard from companies during the earnings season. For instance, nearly every major player within its own respective sub-industry reported healthy demand, low inventories, and a hefty backlog this quarter. Here are a few quotes from the largest players: Caterpillar (CAT): “We expect production and utilization levels will remain elevated, and our autonomous solutions continued to gain momentum … overall demand remained healthy across our segments … was unable to completely satisfy strong customer demand for our machines and engines.” MMM: “Continued strong demand for our solutions in semiconductor, factory automation, and automotive end markets.” GE: “In Renewables, … we are making progress. Our pricing has substantially improved onshore … we're growing our higher-margin businesses, such as grid automation, which delivered double-digit orders growth.” Honeywell (HON): “Orders were up 12% year over year and closing backlog was also up 12% year over year.” The profitability of the Industrial sector is expected to be resilient and to better the market. Valuations And Technicals The Industrial sector and the Capital Goods Industry group trade on par with the S&P 500 on a forward earnings basis (17.7x and 17.9x to 18.0x). The BCA Valuations Indicator signals a neutral level of valuation which is roughly in line with the 10-year average. From the BCA Technical Indicator standpoint, Capitals Goods are also in the neutral zone (Chart 20). Valuations and technicals are moderate for the sector. Chart 20Valuations And Technicals Investment Implications The US industrial sector is in the middle of a boom fueled by a trifecta of positives: Onshoring, automation, and favorable government policy. And while it is hard to fight the Fed and the business cycle, it appears that for now, the sector is defying gravity despite slowing manufacturing surveys and tighter monetary policy. So far fundamentals appear strong, and earnings expectations are robust thanks to the high pricing power and operating leverage of the sector. Within Capital Goods, we favor industries and companies that benefit from these tailwinds: Aerospace and Defense which is to benefit from increased federal defense spending; Robotics and Automation which is overrepresented in the Electrical Equipment industry; and Renewables, i.e., companies that manufacture and service wind turbines and solar panels. Construction and building materials will have a second breath when Infrastructure spending projects will actually get selected and approved. We are both strategically and tactically bullish on the sector but will monitor it closely from a tactical standpoint. After all, industrial surveys are at odds with the resilient earnings expectations. ETFs There are a number of very inexpensive and highly liquid ETFs from Vanguard, iShares, and State Street, that capture the performance of the Industrial sector (Table 5). Table 5Industrial Sector ETFs Bottom Line The US industrial sector is in the middle of a boom fueled by onshoring, automation, and favorable government policy. This trifecta of positives helps the sector to defy the gravity of the slowing economy. Companies are optimistic and earnings growth expectations are both robust and resilient. We are both strategically and tactically bullish on the sector but will continue to monitor it closely, watching out for potential cracks in operating performance.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Reshoring Initiative reshorenow.org 2     https://www.automate.org/   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3US Political Capital Index Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model  Table A4House Election Model Table A5APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A5BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A5CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets 

Special Report

Highlights The risk of a US recession has increased sharply over the past several months. We have not yet concluded that a recession over the coming year is inevitable, but substantial (further) supply-side and pandemic-related disinflation is likely needed for the US economy to avoid a contraction in output. The increased risk of a contraction has caused investors to ponder what the next recession might look like. One very important question concerns the likely behavior of short-term interest rates during the next recession, especially if it occurs sooner rather than later. The historical experience suggests that the Fed may cut interest rates to zero during the next recession, but that the re-establishment of a long-lasting zero interest rate policy and the associated resumption of large-scale asset purchases seem quite unlikely unless the recession is severe. In the post-WWII environment, severe US recessions have been accompanied by aggravating factors that appear to be missing in the current environment. In addition, there are several arguments pointing to the next US recession being a mild one. For fixed-income investors, the implication is that investors should not overstay their welcome in a long-duration position during the next US recession, and should be looking to reduce their duration exposure earlier rather than later. For equity investors, our findings underscore that meaningful downside risk exists for stocks even in a mild recession environment, because the decline in bond yields is not likely to offset a rise in the equity risk premium. Feature Over the past several months, investors have been faced with a sharp increase in the odds of a US recession. Gauging the risk of a recession has featured prominently in our recent reports, and we have concluded, for now, that a US recession over the coming year is not yet inevitable. Still, we acknowledge that the risks are quite elevated, and that substantial (further) supply-side and pandemic-related disinflation is likely needed for the US economy to avoid a contraction in output. Economic expansions do not last forever. This means that the US economy will eventually succumb to a recession at some point over the coming few years. One very important question for investors concerns the likely behavior of short-term interest rates during the next recession, especially if a contraction occurs sooner rather than later. A key aspect of this question is whether the Fed is likely to be forced back towards a zero or negative interest rate policy, and whether it will need to employ asset purchases as part of its stabilization efforts as it has during the last two recessions. If so, long-maturity bond yields are likely to fall significantly during the next recession; if not, investors may be surprised by how modestly long-maturity yields decline. In this report, we examine the historical record of short-term interest rates during recessions and discuss whether the next US recession is likely to be severe or mild. We conclude that the next US recession is more likely to be mild than severe, and that the 10-year Treasury yield is unlikely to fall below 2% during the recession (or fall below this level for very long). In the case of a more severe recession driven by unanchored inflation expectations, the implications would be clearly bearish for bonds. Within a fixed-income portfolio, one conclusion of our analysis is that investors should not overstay their welcome in a long-duration position during the next recession and should be looking to reduce their duration exposure earlier rather than later. For equity investors, our findings underscore that meaningful downside risk exists for stocks even in a mild recession environment, because the decline in bond yields is not likely to offset a rise in the equity risk premium. The Historical Recessionary Path Of Short-Term Interest Rates When projecting how the Fed funds rate is likely to evolve during the next US recession, most investors typically look to the average decline in short-term interest rates during previous recessions as a guide. Based on that approach, Table II-1 highlights that the Fed would likely have to cut rates into negative territory if a recession occurred over the coming 12-18 months, unless it is able to hike interest rates significantly more over the coming year than the market is currently expecting and the FOMC itself is projecting. But in our view, focusing on the historical recessionary decline in interest rates from their peak is not the right approach, because it ignores the fact that recessions typically occur when monetary policy is tight. If a recession occurs within the next 18 months, it will have happened in large part because of a collapse in real wage growth, not just because of the increase in interest rates that has occurred. Chart II-1 highlights that short-term interest rates remain well below potential GDP growth, highlighting that monetary policy would still be easy today – despite the quick pace of increase in short rates – if real wages were growing rather than contracting sharply. In our view, the right approach is to examine how much short-term interest rates have typically fallen during recessions relative to potential or average historical GDP growth. This method captures the degree to which monetary policy easing has typically been required relative to neutral levels to catalyze an economic recovery. Table II-1Based Only On The Historical Decline In Short-Term Interest Rates, The Fed Would Ostensibly Have To Cut Rates Into Negative Territory During The Next Recession Chart II-1Monetary Policy Would Still Be Easy Today If Real Wage Growth Was Positive Based on this approach, Chart II-2 highlights that the Fed might have to cut the target range for the Fed funds rate to 0-0.25% during the next recession, but there are some examples (like the 1990-1991 recession) that point to a cut to just 0.25-0.5%. The goal of this exercise is not to be specific about the exact level to which the Fed will have to cut the Fed funds rate, but rather whether the de facto re-establishment of a long-lasting zero interest rate policy and the associated resumption of large-scale asset purchases is likely. Chart II-2The Fed May Have To Cut To Zero During The Next Recession, But Probably Not Into Negative Territory Structural bond bulls might note that there are five recessions in the post-war era that could potentially point to that outcome based on Chart II-2. However, these episodes involved circumstances that we doubt would be present during the next US recession, especially if one were to emerge over the coming 12-18 months. The 1950s Recessions The recessions of 1953-54 and 1957-58 were fairly sizeable based on the total rise in the unemployment rate, but the monetary policy stance at that time was wildly stimulative in a way that is very unlikely to repeat itself today. In the 1950s, the level of interest rates was still an artifact of WWII (with the Treasury-Fed accord having only been agreed upon in March 1951). Monetary policy was both overly responsive to a period of pent-up disinflation following the initial burst of government spending associated with the Korean war and insufficiently responsive to a strongly positive output gap (Chart II-3). This was meaningfully compounded by a poor understanding of the size of the output gap at that time; the deviation of the unemployment rate from its 10-year average was significantly smaller than its deviation from today’s estimate of NAIRU (Chart II-4). In sum, the economic and monetary policy conditions that existed in the 1950s and that contributed to an interest rate level that was well below the prevailing rate of economic growth do not exist today. As such, we strongly doubt that the Fed’s response to the next US recession would resemble what occurred during that decade. Chart II-3We Strongly Doubt The Fed's Response To The Next US Recession Would Resemble What Occurred In The 1950s Chart II-4Low Interest Rates In The 1950s Were Partly Caused By Wrong Output Gap Estimates   1973-1975 The recession that began in 1973 occurred because of a huge energy shock that proved to be stagflationary in the true sense of the word. Excluding the 2020 recession, this was the third largest rise in the unemployment rate of any recession since WWII, following 2008/2009 and the 1981/1982 recessions. There are some parallels between this recession and the current economic environment, but the stability of inflation expectations so far does not point to a truly stagflationary outcome. As such, we do not see the 1973-74 recession as a reasonable parallel to today’s environment. In addition, manufacturing employment – which was heavily impacted by the permanent rise in oil prices due to the sector’s energy intensity – stood at 24% of total nonfarm employment in 1973, compared with 8% today. Finally, the weight of food and energy as a share of total consumer spending today is roughly half of what it was during the 1970s (Chart II-5). 2001 Of the five recessions potentially implying that the Fed may have to cut interest rates into negative territory during the next US recession, the 2001 recession is the most relevant parallel to today. It was a modern recession in which the Fed maintained very easy monetary policy for a significant amount of time, in response to concerns about a significant tightening in financial conditions and the impact of prior corporate sector excesses on aggregate demand. The total rise in the unemployment rate during this recession was not very large, but it took some time for the unemployment rate to return to NAIRU. Still, even though this justified a later liftoff, a Taylor rule approach makes it clear that the Fed overstimulated the economy in response to the recession – a view that is reinforced by the enormous rise in household debt that fueled the housing market bubble during that period (Chart II-6). The Fed was very concerned about the negative wealth effects of the bursting of the equity market bubble, which had been caused by a massive decline in the equity risk premium in the second half of the 1990s. These conditions are simply not present today. Chart II-5Today's US Economy Is Meaningfully Less Impacted By Energy And Food Prices Chart II-6The Fed Clearly Overstimulated In Response To The 2001 Recession 2008/2009 Chart II-7A Repeat Of The 2008/2009 Recession In The US Is A Totally Implausible Scenario Chart II-2 highlighted that the Fed would have to cut interest rates to -1% were the 2008/2009 recession to repeat itself, but we judge that to be a totally implausible scenario given the improvement in US household sector balance sheets and financial sector health since the global financial crisis (Chart II-7). As we discuss below, the next US recession is likely to be meaningfully less severe than the 2008/2009 and 2020 recessions, which we believe carries important significance for the path of interest rates and the response of long-maturity bond yields. The bottom line for investors is that, based on the historical experience of rate cuts during recessions, the Fed may end up cutting interest rates back to or close to the zero lower bound in response to the next recession. But the de facto re-establishment of a long-lasting zero interest rate policy and the associated resumption of large-scale asset purchases seems quite unlikely unless the recession is severe, which we do not expect. Will The Next US Recession Be Severe Or Mild? Chart II-8The Most Severe US Recessions Have Had Aggravating Factors That Do Not Appear To Be Present Today How drastically the Fed will be forced to cut interest rates during the next recession will be driven by its severity. Chart II-8 presents the total rise in the unemployment rate during post-WWII recessions (excluding 2020), in order to gauge whether the factors that have led to severe recessions in the past are likely to be present during the next contraction in output. From our perspective, the most severe US recessions in the post-WWII era have been driven by factors that are very unlikely to repeat themselves in the current environment. We noted above that a repeat of the 2008/2009 recession is a totally implausible scenario, leaving the 1981-1982, 1973-1975, and 1950s recessions as potential severe recession analogues. In three of these four cases we see clear signs of an aggravating factor that we do not (yet) believe will be present during the next US recession. Chart II-9Inflation Expectations Have Not Yet Unanchored To The Upside, In Sharp Contrast To The 1970s In the 1981-1982 recession, the unemployment rate rose significantly as the Federal Reserve confronted the fact that inflation expectations had become severely unanchored to the upside, causing a persistent wage/price spiral. While unanchored inflation expectations is a risk today, so far the evidence suggests that both households and market participants expect that currently elevated inflation will not persist over the long run (Chart II-9). If inflation expectations do become unanchored to the upside at some point over the coming 12-18 months (or beyond), we are very likely to change our view about the severity of the next recession. However, this would be a bond bearish outcome (at least initially), as it would imply sharply higher yields at both the short and long end of the yield curve in order to tame inflation and re-anchor inflation expectations. As noted above, in the 1973-74 recession, the unexpected and permanent rise in oil prices and outright energy shortages rendered a significant amount of capital and labor uneconomic, which is different than what has been occurring during the pandemic. Were the recent rise in natural gas prices to be permanent and no alternatives available, Europe’s current energy situation would be more reminiscent of the 1973-1974 recession than the pandemic-driven price pressures and supply shortages affecting the US and other developed economies. Chart II-10The US Is Currently Experiencing Fiscal Drag, But That Will Lessen Next Year Finally, while the 1957-58 recession appears to be somewhat of an anomaly driven by a mix of factors, the 1953-54 recession was clearly exacerbated by a sharp slowdown in government spending following the end of the Korean war. It is true that the US is currently experiencing fiscal drag (Chart II-10), but this has occurred against the backdrop of a strong labor market, and IMF forecasts imply that the drag will be significantly smaller over the coming year than what the US is currently experiencing. There are several additional points suggesting that the next US recession will be comparatively mild: Chart II-11The Milder US Recessions Were All Seemingly Triggered By Tight Monetary Policy (As Would Be The Case Today) Chart II-11 highlights that the milder recessions, those which have seen the unemployment rate rise by less than 3% from their previous low, have generally been the recessions that appear to have simply been triggered by monetary policy becoming tight or nearly tight. This would likely be the case during the next US recession. In the lead up to the 1970, 1990-91, and 2001 recessions, short-term interest rates approached or exceeded either potential growth or the rolling 10-year average growth rate of nominal GDP. The 1960-61 recession stands out slightly as an exception to this rule, in that interest rates were still moderately easy, which is based on our definition of the equilibrium short-term interest rate. But interest rates had risen close to 400 basis points from 1958 to 1960 (suggesting a change in addition to a level effect of interest rates on aggregate demand), and it is notable that the 60-61 recession was the mildest in post-war history, based on the total rise in the unemployment rate. Chart II-12Labor Scarcity May Mean That Firms Will Be Somewhat More Reluctant To Shed Labor During The Next Recession We argued in Section 1 of our report that monetary policy is not currently restrictive on its own, and that the recessionary risk currently facing the US is the result of a combination of the speed of adjustment in interest rates, the fact that real wages have fallen sharply, and the fact that the Fed is determined to see inflation quickly return to target levels. However, what this also highlights is that a recession would likely cause a rise in real wages via a significant slowdown in inflation (at least for a time); this would likely help stabilize aggregate demand and cause a comparatively mild rise in the unemployment rate. While the odds and magnitude of this effect are difficult to quantify, the fact that the labor market has been so tight over the past year and that the participation rate has yet to recover to its pre-pandemic levels suggests that some firms may be reluctant to shed labor during a recession (Chart II-12), suggesting that the total rise in unemployment in the next recession could be relatively small. Finally, Chart II-13 shows that the excess savings that have accumulated over the course of the pandemic, now primarily the result of reduced spending on services, dwarf the magnitude of precautionary savings that were generated in the prior three recessions as a % of GDP. We agree that the savings rate would likely still rise during the next recession, but the existence of excess savings implies that the rise in the savings rate may be surprisingly small – which would, in turn, imply a comparatively mild rise in the unemployment rate. We noted above that the household sector has deleveraged significantly, which is strong evidence against an outsized or long-lasting decline in consumer spending as a possible driver of an above-average rise in the unemployment rate during the next recession. One question that we often receive from clients is whether excessive corporate sector leverage could cause a more severe decline in economic activity once a recession emerges. Chart II-14 illustrates that the answer is “probably not.” The chart presents one estimate of the US nonfinancial corporate sector debt service ratio, based on national accounts data. The chart highlights that the current debt burden for the nonfinancial corporate sector is very low, underscoring that elevated corporate sector debt would not likely act as an aggravating factor driving an outsized rise in the unemployment rate were a recession to occur today. The chart also shows that even if the 10-year Treasury yield were to rise to 4% and corporate bond spreads were to widen in the lead up to a recession, the nonfinancial corporate sector debt service burden would rise to a lower peak than seen in the last three recessions. One key risk to a mild recession view is a scenario in which inflation does not return to or below the Fed’s target during the recession. In that kind of environment, the Fed would not likely cut interest rates to as low a level as they have in the past relative to potential growth. But the historical record is clear that recessions cause a deceleration in inflation, and if a recession emerges over the coming 12-18 months it will likely happen after supply-side and pandemic-related disinflation has already occurred. That means that inflation is likely to move back to or below the Fed’s target in a recessionary environment. We should note that this assessment differs somewhat from the scenario described by my former colleague Martin Barnes, who wrote a guest report on inflation published in our July Bank Credit Analyst.1 Chart II-13Today’s Pandemic-Related Excess Savings Dwarf Precautionary Savings During The Prior Three Recessions Chart II-14US Corporate Sector Debt Unlikely To Lead To A More Severe Recession, Even In A Higher Yield Environment   Long-Maturity Bond Yields And The Next US Recession What does our analysis imply for long-maturity bond yields and the duration call over the coming few years? In order to judge what is likely to happen to long-maturity bond yields in a recession scenario over the coming 12-18 months, we first project the fair value of the 5-year Treasury yield based on the following hypothetical circumstances: The onset of recession in March 2023 and a peak in the Fed funds rate at a target range of 3.75-4%. A recession duration of eight months, over which time the Fed steadily cuts the policy rate to 0-0.25%. An initial Fed rate hike in September 2024, nine months following the end of the recession, consistent with a relatively short return of the unemployment rate to NAIRU as an expansion takes hold. A rate hike pace of eight quarter-point hikes per year, with the Fed again raising rates to a peak of 4% A longer-term average Fed funds rate of 3%, which we regard as a low estimate. Chart II-15The 5-Year Treasury Yield Would Not Fall Enormously In A Mild Recessionary Scenario Chart II-15 highlights the fair value path for the 5-year Treasury yield in this scenario. Not surprisingly, the fair value today is lower than the current level of the 5-year yield, highlighting that a shift to a long duration stance will be warranted at some point over the coming year if the US economy enters a non-technical, typical income-statement recession. However, the chart also highlights that a long duration position is not likely to be warranted for very long, given that the lowest level of the 5-year fair value path is substantially higher than it was in 2020 and 2021 and is also higher than its 10-year average. Chart II-16 reveals the importance of forecasting the near-term path of interest rates when predicting the likely behavior of long-maturity bond yields. Even though near- and long-term interest rate expectations should be at least somewhat differentiated, the chart highlights that the real 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield is very closely explained by the real 5-year Treasury yield and a 3-year lag of our adaptive inflation expectations model (which is highly consistent with BCA’s Golden Rule of bond investing framework). Chart II-16 shows that long-maturity bond yields should be higher than they are based on the current level of real 5-year yields and lagged inflation expectations, underscoring the point that we made in Section 1 of our report that significant upside risk exists for long-maturity bond yields in a non-recessionary outcome over the coming year. In a recessionary outcome, it is clear that bond yields will fall as the Fed cuts interest rates, as Chart II-15 demonstrated. But, Chart II-17 highlights that during recessions, there is little precedent for a negative 5-10 yield curve slope outside of the context of the persistently high inflation environment of the late 1960s and 1970s. Applying that template to the fair value path that we showed in Chart II-15 suggests that the 10-year Treasury yield will not fall below 2% during the next recession. As we noted in our August report,2 a 10-year Treasury yield decline to 2% would result in significant performance for long-maturity bonds, but it would not end the structural bear market in bonds that began two years ago – a fact that we suspect would be very surprising to bond-bullish investors. Chart II-165-Year Bond Yields Strongly Explain Yields 5-Years/5-Years Forward Chart II-17There Is Not Much Precedent For A Negative 5/10 Yield Curve During Modern Recessions, Suggesting 10-Year Yields Will Not Fall Below 2% During The Next Recession It is true that bond yields may deviate from the fair value levels shown in Chart II-15 if investors expect a different outcome for the path of the Fed funds rate than we described. However, it is worth noting that changes in our assumed post-recession peak Fed funds rate and the long-term average do not substantially change the outcome shown in Chart II-15. If investors instead assume that the Fed funds rate will peak at 3% during the next expansion, that lowers the fair value path for the 5-year yield by approximately 5 basis points. Changing the long-term average Fed funds rate to 2.4%, the Fed’s current neutral rate expectation, would reduce it by about 25 basis points. These levels would still be significantly above the lows reached in 2011-2013 and in 2020, underscoring that the length of the recession and the speed at which the Fed begins to raise interest rates will be far more important determinants of the path of US Treasury yields. We strongly suspect that investors will recognize that a comparatively mild recession will not result in the same hyper-accomodative monetary policy stance that occurred during the past two recessions, implying that long-maturity bond yields will have less downside during the next recession than may be currently recognized. Investment Conclusions As we have presented, the historical experience suggests that the Fed may cut interest rates to zero during the next recession, but that the re-establishment of a long-lasting zero interest rate policy and the associated resumption of large-scale asset purchases seem quite unlikely unless the recession is severe. In the post-WWII environment, severe US recessions have been accompanied by aggravating factors that appear to be missing in the current environment. In addition to this, there are several arguments pointing to the next US recession being a mild one. In a mild recession scenario, we doubt that the 10-year Treasury yield would fall below 2%, or fall below this level for very long. For fixed-income investors, while bond yields will fall for a time if a recession emerges, the implication is that investors should not overstay their welcome in a long-duration position during the recession and should be looking to reduce their duration exposure earlier rather than later. For equity investors, our findings underscore that meaningful downside risk exists for stocks even in a mild recession environment, because the decline in bond yields is not likely to offset a rise in the equity risk premium. We noted in our July report that if a recession occurred within the coming 6-12 months, that the S&P 500 would likely fall to 3100, even if the recession were average. A mild recession may see the S&P 500 decline less severely than this, but stocks are still likely to incur significant losses during the next recession unless investors price in a much shallower path for short-term interest rates than we believe will be warranted. As noted in Section 1 of our report, we have not yet concluded that a US recession is inevitable over the coming 6-12 months. Still, we acknowledge that the risks are quite elevated, and that substantial (further) supply-side and pandemic-related disinflation is likely needed for the US economy to avoid a contraction in output. Additional changes to our recommended cyclical allocation may thus occur over the coming few months, in response to incoming data, our assessment of the likely implications for monetary policy, and the response of long-maturity government bond yields. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "Inflation Whipsaw Ahead," dated June 30, 2022, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "August 2022," dated July 28, 2022, available at bca.bcaresearch.com

Executive Summary US Companies Will Attempt To Raise Selling Prices To Protect Their Profit Margins China needs lower interest rates and a weaker currency to battle deflationary pressures. In the US, the main problem is elevated inflation. This heralds higher interest rates and a stronger currency. Hence, the Chinese yuan will depreciate against the greenback. When the RMB weakens versus the US dollar, commodity prices usually fall, and EM currencies and asset prices struggle. Faced with surging unit labor costs, US companies will continue to raise their prices to protect their profit margins and profitability. This will lead to one of the following two possible scenarios in the months ahead. Scenario 1: If customers are willing to pay considerably higher prices, nominal sales will remain robust, profits will not collapse, and a recession is unlikely. However, this also implies that the Fed will have to tighten policy by more than what is currently priced in by markets. Scenario 2: If customers push back against higher prices and curtail their purchases, then the economy will enter a recession. In this scenario, inflation will plummet, corporate margins will shrink, and their profits will plunge.  In both scenarios, the outlook for stocks is poor. However, one key difference is that scenario 1 is bearish for US Treasurys while scenario 2 is bond bullish. Bottom Line: On the one hand, the US has a genuine inflation problem. The upshot is that the Fed cannot pivot too early. The Fed’s hawkish rhetoric will support the US dollar. A strong greenback is bad for EM financial markets. On the other hand, the Chinese economy and global trade are experiencing deflation/recession dynamics. Cyclical assets underperform and the US dollar generally appreciates in this environment. This is also a toxic backdrop for EM financial markets.   Financial markets have been caught in contradictions. The reason is that investors cannot decide if the global economy is heading into a recession with deflationary forces prevailing, or whether a goldilocks economy or a period of inflation or stagflation will emerge in the foreseeable future. There are also plenty of contradictory data to support all the above scenarios.  As such, financial markets are volatile, swinging wildly as market participants absorb new economic data points. The S&P 500 index has rebounded from its 3-year moving average, which had previously served as a major support (Chart 1). Yet, the rebound has faltered at its 200-day moving average. Its failure to break decisively above this 200-day moving average entails that a new cyclical rally is not yet in the cards. Chart 1The S&P 500 Is Stuck Between Technical Resistance And Support Lines The S&P 500 index will remain between these resistance and support lines until investors make up their minds about the economic outlook. The EM equity index has been unable to rebound strongly alongside US stocks. A major technical support that held up in the 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008, 2015 and 2020 bear markets is about 15% below the current level (Chart 2). Hence, we recommend that investors remain on the sidelines of EM stocks. Chart 2EM Share Prices Are Still 15% Above Their Long-Term Technical Support Level BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team’s macro themes and views remain as follows: Related Report  Emerging Markets StrategyCharts That Matter In China, the main economic risk is deflation and the continuation of underwhelming economic growth. Core and service consumer price inflation are both below 1% and property prices are deflating. Falling prices amid high debt levels is a recipe for debt deflation. We discussed the government’s stimulus – including measures enacted for the property market – in the August 11 report. The latest announcement about the RMB 1 trillion stimulus does not change our analysis. In fact, we expected an additional RMB 1.5 trillion in local government bond issuance for the remainder of the current year. Yet, the government authorized only an additional RMB 0.5 trillion. This is substantially below what had been expected by analysts and commentators in recent months.   In Chinese and China-related financial markets, a recession/deflation framework remains appropriate. Onshore interest rates will drop further, the yuan will depreciate more, and Chinese stocks and China related plays will continue experiencing growth/profit headwinds. Meanwhile, the US economy has been experiencing stagflation this year. Chart 3 shows that even though the nominal value of final sales has expanded by 8-10%, sales and output have stagnated in real terms (close to zero growth). Hence, nominal sales and corporate profits have so far held up because companies have been able to raise prices by 8-9.5% (Chart 4). Is this bullish for the stock market? Not really. Chart 3US Stagflation: Strong Nominal Growth, But Small In Real Terms Chart 4US Corporate Profits Have Held Up Because Of Pricing Power/Inflation The fact that companies have been able to raise their selling prices at this rapid pace implies that the Fed cannot stop hiking rates. Besides, US wages and unit labor costs are surging (Chart 9 below). The implication is that inflation will be entrenched and core inflation will not drop quickly and significantly enough to allow the Fed to pivot anytime soon. Overall, US economic data releases have been consistent with our view that although real growth is slowing, the US economy is experiencing elevated inflations, i.e., a stagflationary environment. Critically, wages and inflation lag the business cycle and are also very slow moving variables. Hence, US core inflation will not drop below 4% quickly enough to provide relief for the Fed and markets. Is a US recession imminent? It depends. One thing we are certain of is that faced with surging unit labor costs, US companies will attempt to raise their prices to protect their profit margins and profitability. Our proxy for US corporate profit margins signals that they are already rolling over (Chart 5). Hence, business owners and CEOs will attempt to raise selling prices further. Chart 5US Companies Will Attempt To Raise Selling Prices To Protect Their Profit Margins This will lead to one of two possible scenarios for the US economy in the months ahead. Scenario 1: If customers (households and businesses) are willing to pay considerably higher prices, nominal sales will remain very robust, and profits will not collapse, reducing the likelihood of a recession. Yet, this means that inflation will become even more entrenched, and employees will continue to demand higher wages. A wage-price spiral will persist. The Fed will have to raise rates much more than what is currently priced in financial markets. This is negative for US share prices. Scenario 2: If customers push back against higher prices and curtail their purchases, output volume will relapse, i.e., the economy will enter a recession. In this scenario, inflation will plummet, corporate margins will shrink (prices received will rise much less than unit labor costs) and profits will plunge.  Suffering a profit squeeze, companies will lay off employees, wage growth will decelerate, and high inflation will be extinguished. In this scenario, bond yields will drop significantly but plunging corporate profits will weigh on share prices. We are not certain which of these two scenarios will prevail: it is hard to determine the point at which US consumers will push back against rising prices. Nevertheless, it is notable that in both scenarios, the outlook for stocks is poor.   Finally, as we have repeatedly written, global trade is about to contract. Charts 10-18 below elaborate on this theme. This is disinflationary/recessionary. Investment Conclusions On the one hand, the Chinese economy and global trade are experiencing deflation/recession dynamics. Cyclical assets struggle and the US dollar does well in this environment. This constitutes a toxic backdrop for EM financial markets. On the other hand, the US has a genuine inflation problem. The upshot is that the Fed cannot pivot too early. The Fed’s hawkish rhetoric will support the US dollar. A strong greenback is also bad for EM financial markets. Thus, we do not see any reason to alter our negative view on EM equities, credit and currencies. Investors should continue underweighting EM in global equity and credit portfolios. Local currency bonds offer value, but further currency depreciation and more rate hikes remain a risk to domestic bonds. We continue to short the following currencies versus the USD: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN and IDR. In addition, we recommend shorting HUF vs. CZK, KRW vs. JPY, and BRL vs. MXN.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Messages From Various US High-Beta / Cyclical Stock Prices US high-beta consumer discretionary, industrials, tech and early cyclical stocks have not yet broken out. The rebounds in high-beta tech and industrials have been rather muted. We are watching these and many other market signs and technical indicators to gauge if the recent rebounds can turn into a cyclical bull market. Chart 6 Chart 7 Falling Global Trade + Sticky US Inflation = US Dollar Overshot On the one hand, US household spending on goods ex-autos is already contracting and will drop further. The same is true for EU demand. The reasons are excessive consumption of goods over the past two years and shrinking household real disposable income. As a result, global trade is set to shrink, which is positive for the US dollar. On the other hand, surging US unit labor costs entail that core CPI will be very sticky at levels well above the Fed’s target. Hence, the Fed will likely maintain its hawkish bias for now, which is also bullish for the greenback. In short, the US dollar will continue overshooting.  Chart 8 Chart 9 Chinese Exports Will Contract, And Imports Will Fail To Recover Chinese export volume growth has come to a halt. Shrinking imports of inputs used for re-export (imports for processing trade) are pointing to an imminent contraction in the mainland’s exports. Further, Chinese import volumes have been contracting for the past 12 months. The value of imports has not plunged only because of high commodity prices. As commodity prices drop, import values will converge to the downside with import volumes. This is negative for economies/industries selling to China. Chart 10 Chart 11 Global Manufacturing / Trade Downtrend Is Intact China buys a lot of inputs from Taiwan that are used in its exports. That is why the mainland’s imports from Taiwan lead the global trade cycle. This is presently heralding a considerable deterioration in global trade.  In addition, falling freight rates and depreciating Emerging Asian (ex-China) currencies are all currently pointing to a further underperformance of global cyclicals versus defensive sectors. Chart 12 Chart 13 Chart 14 Taiwan Is A Canary In A Coal Mine Taiwanese manufacturing companies have seen their export orders plunge and their customer inventories surge. This has occurred in its overall manufacturing and semiconductor companies.  This corroborates our thesis that global export volumes will contract in the coming months. Chart 15 Chart 16 Korean Exporters Are Struggling Korean export companies are experience the same dynamics as their Taiwanese peers. Semiconductor prices and sales are falling hard in Korea. Export volume growth has come to a halt and will soon shrink. Chart 17 Chart 18 EM Equities: Cheap And Unloved? The EM cyclically adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio has fallen to one standard deviation below its mean. Based on this measure, EM stocks are currently as cheap as they were at their bottoms in 2020, 2015 and 2008. EM share prices in USD deflated by US CPI are now at two standard deviations below their long-term time-trend. This is as bad as it got when EM stocks bottomed in the previous bear markets. The reason for EM stocks poor performance and such “cheapness” is corporate profits. EM EPS in USD has been flat, i.e., posting zero growth in the past 15 years. Besides, EM narrow money (M1) growth points to further EM EPS contraction in the months ahead. Chart 19 Chart 20 Chart 21 Chart 22 Commodity Prices Remain At Risk China needs lower interest rates and a weaker currency to battle deflationary pressures. In the US, the problem is inflation, which heralds higher interest rates and a stronger currency to fight rising prices. Hence, the yuan will depreciate versus the greenback. When the RMB depreciates versus the US dollar, commodity prices usually fall. Further, commodity currencies (an average of AUD, NZD and CAD) continue drafting lower. This indicator correlates with commodity prices and also presages further relapse in resource prices. Chart 23 Chart 24 Oil Prices: A Major Top In Place, But Geopolitics Will Drive Near-Term Fluctuations Chinese crude oil imports have been contracting for almost a year. Global (including US) demand for gasoline has relapsed. Meantime, Russia’s oil and oil product exports have fallen only by a mere 5% from their January level. This explains why oil prices have recently fallen. Oil lags business cycles: its consumption will shrink as global growth downshifts. However, geopolitics remain a wild card. Hence, we are uncertain about the near-term outlook for oil prices. That said, oil has made a major top and any rebound will fail to last much longer or push prices above recent highs. Chart 25 Chart 26 Chart 27 Chart 28 What Is Next For The Chinese RMB? The Chinese yuan will continue depreciating versus the US dollar. China needs lower interest rates and a weaker currency to battle deflationary pressures. While currency is moderately cheap, exchange rates tend to overshoot/undershoot and can remain cheap/expensive for a while. The CNY/USD has technically broken down. Interestingly, the periods of RMB depreciation coincide with deteriorating global US dollar liquidity and, in turn, poor performance by EM assets and commodities. Chart 29 Chart 30 Chart 31 Stay Put On Chinese Equities Odds are rising that Chinese platform companies will likely be delisted from the US as we have argued for some time. Hence, international investors will continue dampening US-listed Chinese stocks. The outlook for China’s economic recovery and profits is downbeat. This will weigh on non-TMT stocks and A shares. Within the Chinese equity universe, we continue to recommend the long A-shares / short Investable stocks strategy, a position we initiated on March 4, 2021. Chart 32 Chart 33 Chart 34 Chart 35 Messages For Stocks From Corporate Bonds Historically, rising US and EM corporate bond yields led to a selloff in US and EM share prices, respectively. Corporate bond yields are the cost of capital that matters for equities. Unless US and EM corporate bond yields start falling on a sustainable basis, their share prices will struggle. Corporate bond yields could increase because of either rising US Treasury yields or widening credit spreads. Chart 36 Chart 37 EM Currencies And Fixed-Income: An Unfinished Adjustment The profiles of EM FX and credit spreads suggest that their adjustment might not be complete. We expect further EM currency depreciation and renewed EM credit spread widening. EM domestic bond yields have risen significantly and offer value. However, if and as US TIPS yields rise and/or EM currencies continue to depreciate, local bond yields are unlikely to fall. To recommend buying EM local bonds aggressively, we need to change our view on the US dollar. Chart 38 Chart 39 Chart 40 Chart 41   Footnotes Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Special Report

Please note that there will no US Bond Strategy publication next week. Our regular publishing schedule will resume on September 6th with our Portfolio Allocation Summary for September. Executive Summary This report describes a framework for implementing long/short positions in the TIPS market relative to duration-matched nominal Treasuries. The framework is modeled after the Golden Rule of Bond Investing that we use to implement portfolio duration trades. The TIPS Golden Rule states that investors should buy TIPS versus nominal Treasuries when their 12-month headline inflation expectations are above those priced into the market, and vice-versa. We demonstrate a method for forecasting headline CPI inflation and conclude that it will fall into a range of 2.4% to 4.8% during the next 12 months, with risks to the upside. This suggests a high likelihood that headline inflation will exceed current market expectations. The TIPS Golden Rule’s Track Record Bottom Line: We see value in TIPS on a 12-month investment horizon but anticipate that an even better entry point to get long TIPS versus nominal Treasuries will emerge during the next couple of months as headline CPI weakens. We recommend a neutral allocation to TIPS for now, though we are looking for a good opportunity to increase exposure. Feature Regular readers will no doubt be familiar with our Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, the framework we use to think about our portfolio duration recommendations. In brief, the Golden Rule states that investors should set their overall bond portfolio duration based on how their own 12-month fed funds rate expectations differ from the expectations that are priced into the market. Our research shows that this investment strategy has a strong historical track record.1 The thing we like most about the Golden Rule framework is that it provides us with a good method for filtering incoming information. Does this new piece of news or economic data change our 12-month rate expectations? If not, then we probably don’t want to assign much weight to it when setting our portfolio duration. In this Special Report we demonstrate that the same Golden Rule logic that we apply to duration trading can also be applied to the TIPS market. Specifically, it can be applied to long/short positions in TIPS versus duration-matched nominal Treasuries. Developing The TIPS Golden Rule Before diving into the TIPS Golden Rule, it’s worth running through the logic that underpins this investment strategy. The logic starts with the Fisher Equation – the well-known formula that relates nominal bond yields to real bond yields. Simply, the Fisher Equation can be stated as follows:     Nominal Yield = Real Yield + The Cost Of Inflation Protection In financial market terms, we can re-write the equation as:     Nominal Treasury Yield = TIPS Yield + TIPS Breakeven Inflation Rate Two of the three variables in this equation have what we call valuation anchors. The nominal Treasury yield’s valuation is anchored by expectations about the future path for the federal funds rate. Put differently, if you buy a 5-year Treasury note and hold it until maturity, your excess returns versus a position in cash are purely determined by the path of the federal funds rate over that 5-year investment horizon. Similarly, the TIPS breakeven inflation rate’s valuation is anchored by expectations about CPI inflation. If held to maturity, the profits from an inflation protection position (long TIPS/short nominals or short TIPS/long nominals) are purely determined by the path of CPI inflation during the investment horizon. It’s worth noting that, unlike the nominal Treasury yield and the TIPS breakeven inflation rate, the TIPS yield has no independent valuation anchor. Within our framework, the best way to forecast the TIPS yield is to follow a 3-step process: Forecast the nominal yield based on a view about the fed funds rate. Forecast the TIPS breakeven inflation rate based on a view about inflation. Use the Fisher Equation to combine the results from steps 1 and 2 into a forecast for the TIPS yield. As an aside, while our framework relies on viewing the nominal Treasury yield and the TIPS breakeven inflation rate as reflective of expectations for the fed funds rate and CPI inflation respectively, we do not argue that those bond yields can be used to accurately forecast the fed funds rate or CPI inflation. In fact, history tells us that bond markets are usually poor predictors of future outcomes for the fed funds rate and for CPI inflation. Chart 1 shows that there is only a loose correlation (R2 = 22%) between 12-month bond-market implied expectations for the change in the fed funds rate and the actual change in the fed funds rate. Similarly, Chart 2 shows that there is hardly any correlation (R2 = 3%) between market-implied inflation expectations and the 12-month rate of change in headline CPI. Chart 1Market Prices Are A Poor Predictor Of The Fed Funds Rate Chart 2Market Prices Are A Poor Predictor Of Inflation In other words, it’s more advisable to view the expectations priced into bond markets as a breakeven threshold for trading, not as a tool for forecasting. Stating The TIPS Golden Rule To apply the TIPS Golden Rule, investors should follow these three steps: Calculate market-implied expectations for what headline CPI inflation will be over the next 12 months. This can be done by looking at the 1-year CPI swap rate or the 1-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate.2 Develop an independent forecast for 12-month headline CPI inflation. We demonstrate one method for doing this later in the report.3 Compare your own headline CPI forecast with the forecast that is priced in the market. If your own forecast is higher, then you should go long TIPS/short nominal Treasuries. If your own forecast is lower, then you should go short TIPS/long nominal Treasuries. Testing The TIPS Golden Rule Chart 3 shows the historical track record of the TIPS Golden Rule going back to 2005.4 The top panel shows 12-month excess returns from the Bloomberg Barclays TIPS index relative to a duration-matched position in nominal Treasuries. The bottom panel shows whether inflation surprised market expectations to the upside or to the downside during the investment horizon. We can see that, visually, it looks as though TIPS tend to outperform nominal Treasuries when there is an inflationary surprise and underperform when there is a deflationary surprise. Chart 3The TIPS Golden Rule's Track Record Chart 4 shows the same relationship in a little more detail. The 12-month inflation surprise is placed on the x-axis and 12-month TIPS excess returns are on the y-axis. For the TIPS Golden Rule to be useful, we would need to see most of the datapoints in the top-right and bottom-left quadrants of the chart, and indeed this is the case. Chart 412-Month TIPS Excess Returns Vs. Inflation Surprises Finally, Table 1 shows the relationship in even more detail. It shows that inflationary surprises coincide with positive TIPS excess returns 73% of the time for an average excess return of 2.6%. It also shows that deflationary surprises coincide with negative TIPS excess returns 80% of the time, for an average excess return of -3.2%. Table 112-Month TIPS Excess Returns* And Inflation Surprises (2005 – Present) Please note that all the above return calculations are performed on the overall Bloomberg Barclays TIPS Index relative to a duration-matched position in nominal Treasuries. However, the TIPS Golden Rule also performs well when applied to TIPS of any maturity. The Appendix of this report replicates the above analysis for every point along the TIPS curve and shows that the results are consistently excellent. Applying The TIPS Golden Rule Now that we have stated the TIPS Golden Rule and demonstrated its effectiveness as an investment strategy, it is time to apply it to the current market. To do that, we first determine 1-year market-implied inflation expectations by looking at the 1-year CPI swap rate. As of last Friday’s close, the 1-year CPI swap rate is 3.16%. This means that if we think headline CPI inflation will be above 3.16% during the next 12 months, then we should go long TIPS versus duration-matched nominal Treasuries. If we think headline CPI inflation will come in below 3.16% during the next 12 months, then we should go short TIPS versus duration-matched nominal Treasuries. Next, we must build up our own forecast of headline CPI inflation for the next 12 months. To do this, we follow a bottom-up approach where we split the CPI basket into five components (energy, food, shelter, core goods, and core services ex. shelter) and model each one individually. Energy Inflation (9% Of Headline CPI) Chart 5Modeling Energy Inflation Energy accounts for roughly 9% of headline CPI, though its often violent price swings mean that this component usually accounts for a much larger percentage of the volatility in headline CPI. In practice, we can accurately model Energy CPI using the prices of retail gasoline, natural gas, and heating oil (Chart 5). To get a 12-month forecast for Energy CPI we therefore need forecasts for the prices of retail gasoline, natural gas, and heating oil. In this analysis, we will consider two possible scenarios for energy prices. First, a benign ‘low oil price’ scenario where we assume that the prices of retail gasoline, natural gas and heating oil follow the paths discounted in their respective futures curves. Second, we consider a ‘high oil price’ scenario that incorporates the view of our Commodity & Energy Strategy service that a drop in Russian oil supply, among other factors, will cause the Brent crude oil price to reach $119 per barrel by the end of this year and average $117 per barrel in 2023.5 To incorporate this outlook into our model, we regress the prices of retail gasoline, natural gas and heating oil on the Brent crude oil price and extrapolate forward using our commodity strategists’ forecasts. The ‘low oil price’ scenario has Energy CPI inflation falling from its current 32.9% level all the way down to -9.9% during the next 12 months. In contrast, our ‘high oil price’ scenario has it falling to just 15.8%. Food Inflation (13% Of Headline CPI) Chart 6Modeling Food Inflation Our Food CPI model is based on the cost of fertilizer, agricultural commodity prices and diesel prices. This model has done a reasonably good job explaining trends in Food CPI inflation over time, but the last few months have seen food inflation jump well above the levels suggested by our model (Chart 6). Given that the inputs to our Food CPI model are highly correlated with the oil price, we also apply the ‘low oil price’ and ‘high oil price’ scenarios discussed above to our Food CPI forecast. Using this method, the ‘low oil price’ scenario has Food CPI inflation falling to 3.8% during the next 12 months and the ‘high oil price’ scenario has it coming down to 4.2%. One key risk to these forecasts is that they both assume that the current gap between food inflation and our model’s fair value will close. It’s possible that other factors not included in our model could prevent the gap from closing. We therefore consider our Food CPI forecast to be quite optimistic. Core Goods Inflation (21% Of Headline CPI) Chart 7Modeling Goods Inflation Core goods inflation, currently running at 6.9%, appears to have already peaked following its post-pandemic surge. We model Core Goods CPI using the New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, as it is the supply chain constraints that arose during the pandemic that explain the bulk of the movement in core goods prices since that time (Chart 7).6 To forecast Core Goods CPI, we assume that global supply chain constraints continue to ease and that the New York Fed’s index reverts to its pre-pandemic level during the next 12 months. This gives us a forecast for 12-month Core Goods CPI inflation of 0%. Shelter Inflation (32% Of Headline CPI) Chart 8Modeling Shelter Inflation We model shelter inflation, currently running at 5.6%, using the unemployment rate, rental vacancy rate and home prices (Chart 8). Except for the unemployment rate, all our model’s independent variables enter with a lag of at least 12 months. In other words, we wouldn’t expect any near-term change in home prices to impact Shelter CPI for at least a year. To forecast Shelter CPI, we assume that the unemployment rate rises to 4% during the next 12 months. This results in a shelter inflation forecast of 4.7% for the next 12 months. Much like with food inflation, we tend to view this forecast as relatively optimistic as it assumes a large reversion from the current rate of shelter inflation back to our model’s fair value. It’s conceivable that other factors not included in our model, such as rapid wage growth, could prevent this reversion from occurring. Services ex. Shelter Inflation (24% Of Headline CPI) Chart 9Modeling Services Inflation This final component of CPI is a bit of a hodgepodge of different service industries that may not have much in common. However, we find that wage growth does a good job of tracking its trends (Chart 9). We therefore model Services ex. Shelter CPI using the Employment Cost Index, which enters our model with a 10 month lag. To forecast Services ex. Shelter CPI, we assume that the Employment Cost Index holds steady at its current growth rate. This gives us a Services ex. Shelter CPI inflation forecast of 5.5% for the next 12 months. Combining Our Bottom-Up Inflation Forecasts & Investment Conclusions Combining our bottom-up forecasts, we calculate a 12-month headline CPI inflation rate of 2.4% for the ‘low oil price’ scenario and a rate of 4.8% for the ‘high oil price’ scenario. For core CPI inflation, we calculate a 12-month forecast of 3.6%. Given the optimistic assumptions that we incorporated into our forecasts, particularly the large reversions of food and shelter inflation back to our estimated fair value levels, we view the risks to our forecasts as heavily tilted to the upside. We also acknowledge that the re-normalization of global supply chains may not proceed as smoothly as the scenario that is baked into our forecasts. Any hiccup in that process would cause our goods inflation forecast to be too low. Chart 10Inflation Forecasts Chart 10 shows our 12-month headline and core CPI forecasts alongside the market-implied forecast from the CPI swap curve, currently 3.16%. Notice that the market-implied inflation forecast is much closer to the bottom-end of our range of headline CPI estimates, and we have already acknowledged that a lot of things will have to go right for our estimates to pan out. In other words, we see a high likelihood that 12-month headline CPI will be above 3.16% for the next 12 months which, according to our TIPS Golden Rule, tells us that we should go long TIPS versus duration-matched nominal Treasuries. While we acknowledge that there is likely some value in going long TIPS versus nominal Treasuries today, we are inclined to maintain our recommended neutral allocation to TIPS versus nominals for now. Given the recent drop in oil prices, we anticipate further weakness in headline inflation during the next couple of months. This could push TIPS breakeven inflation rates even lower in the near term, creating even more value. The bottom line is that we see attractive value in TIPS versus nominal Treasuries on a 12-month investment horizon. While we maintain a neutral allocation to TIPS for now, we anticipate turning more bullish in the near future, hopefully from a better entry point after one or two more weak CPI prints. Appendix Chart A112-Month TIPS Excess Returns Vs. Inflation Surprises (1-3 Year Maturities) Table A112-Month TIPS Excess Returns* And Inflation Surprises (1-3 Year Maturities) Chart A212-Month TIPS Excess Returns Vs. Inflation Surprises (3-5 Year Maturities) Table A212-Month TIPS Excess Returns* And Inflation Surprises (3-5 Year Maturities) Chart A312-Month TIPS Excess Returns Vs. Inflation Surprises (5-7 Year Maturities) Table A312-Month TIPS Excess Returns* And Inflation Surprises (5-7 Year Maturities) Chart A412-Month TIPS Excess Returns Vs. Inflation Surprises (7-10 Year Maturities) Table A412-Month TIPS Excess Returns* And Inflation Surprises (7-10 Year Maturities) Chart A512-Month TIPS Excess Returns Vs. Inflation Surprises (10-15 Year Maturities) Table A512-Month TIPS Excess Returns* And Inflation Surprises (10-15 Year Maturities) Chart A612-Month TIPS Excess Returns Vs. Inflation Surprises (15+ Year Maturities) Table A612-Month TIPS Excess Returns* And Inflation Surprises (15+ Year Maturities) Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Robert Timper Research Analyst robert.timper@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018. 2 In this report we use the 1-year CPI swap rate because it is easier to access. 3 To make the TIPS Golden Rule easy to implement, we use seasonally adjusted headline CPI for all our calculations even though TIPS are technically linked to the non-seasonally adjusted index. We also ignore the fact that TIPS coupons adjust to CPI releases with a lag. Our analysis shows that the rule works very well even without incorporating these complications. 4 CPI swap rates are only available from 2004 onwards, so this is the largest historical sample we can use. 5 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices”, dated August 18, 2022. 6 For more details on the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/gscpi#/overview Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Executive Summary The Fed Versus The Market In today’s report, we summarize the arguments of bulls and bears to examine the possible longevity of the rally. The Bulls’ view is centered around several key themes:  Inflation has turned.  The Fed is less hawkish than initially assumed, and Jay Powell is not Paul Volcker.  The economy is resilient, and consumers are spending.  Corporate earnings will surprise on the upside thanks to consumer strength. Meanwhile, the bears argue that:  Growth is slowing and a soft landing is elusive, which will lead to earnings disappointment.  Valuations and Technicals are no longer attractive – the best part of the rally is likely over, and risk-reward is skewed to the downside.  Inflation is embedded and broad-based and it will take many months to reach the level that is palatable to the Fed. Bottom Line: The rally was expected, but its force and durability took us by surprise. Now, after a strong rebound, risks are skewed to the downside and the markets are fragile, but the rally may continue.  We offer our take on what can bring this rally to a halt, and the “danger” signs investors need to be on the lookout for. Feature The fast and furious rally off the June 16 lows has taken many investors by surprise. Over the past two months, the S&P 500 has rebounded by 17%, the NASDAQ is up 22%, while Growth has outperformed Value by 9%. Thematic small-cap growth ETFs have fared even better (Chart 1) with Cathie Wood’s ARKG and ARKK up nearly 50%. The Technology and Consumer Discretionary sectors are up 23% and 28% respectively, while Energy and Materials are relatively flat, showcasing a rotation away from the inflation winners to losers. In this week’s report, we will “dissect” the rally and its key drivers to better understand what can bring this rally to a halt. We will also summarize the arguments of the bulls and present our “bearish” rebuttal to some of the assumptions. Sneak Preview: After the powerful rebound, the market is fragile, and risks are skewed to the downside. By summarizing the arguments of bulls and bears, we are offering our take on what can bring this rally to a halt, i.e., hawkish Fed speeches, disappointing inflation readings, rising rates, and bad earnings. However, a positive surprise along each of these dimensions may also result in the next leg up. Chart 1ETF Universe Overview Anatomy Of The Rally To understand what fuels the rally, we need to understand what its key catalysts are. Oversold: First and foremost, in mid-June, US equities were severely oversold – the BCA Capitulation Indicator hit levels last seen in the spring of 2020 (Chart 2). The BoA institutional survey has also reported an extreme level of bearishness. Pull back in the price of energy: This created fertile ground for a rebound, but the catalyst came from the turn in commodities and energy prices. Extreme pessimism about global growth after the Fed’s aggressive response to a disappointing inflation print has triggered a sell-off in oil and metals. Since mid-June, the GSCI Commodities and the GSCI Energy index are in a bear market downtrend, 21% and 25% off their peaks. Inflation moderating: This disinflationary development has unleashed a positive reinforcement loop: Lower energy prices led to a turn in the CPI print. And many still believe that, after all, inflation is transitory: With supply disruptions clearing and prices of energy and commodities turning, inflation will dissipate just as fast as it arrived. We know this because inflation breakevens are currently at levels last seen a year ago (Chart 3). Chart 2Capitulated Chart 3Cooling Off : Back To 2021 Gentler Fed: That is when the market decided that easing price pressures in concert with slowing growth would compel the Fed to pursue a shallower and shorter path of interest rate increases than initially expected – rate increases derived from OIS started to undershoot the “dot plot” (Chart 4). Effectively, the bond market started to forecast that the Fed will end the year at 3.5% and ease as soon as early 2023. In other words, the Fed is nearing the end of the hiking cycle. Naturally, the long end of the Treasury curve has pulled back to April levels, despite a much higher Fed rate. One way or another, yields have stabilized. Lower rates are a boon for equities: As a long-duration asset, equity valuations are inversely correlated with long yields (Chart 5). A better-than-expected Q2 earnings season was the icing on the cake. Chart 4The Market Expects Cuts As Soon As Early 2023 Chart 5Falling Yields Propelled Equities Higher Was The Rally Surprising? The rally itself did not surprise us – after all, we did expect the market to turn on a dime at the earliest whiff of falling inflation (Chart 6). Admittedly, we were taken aback by its strength and longevity. With inflation turning, we also expected a change in leadership from the Energy and Materials sectors to Technology and Consumer Discretionary (Chart 7). We also predicted back in January in our “Are We There Yet?!” report that, based on the previous hiking cycles, Tech would rebound roughly three months after the first rate hike (Chart 8), which was taking us to June. Chart 6When Inflation Turns, Equities Rebound Chart 7Turn in Inflation Triggers A Change In Sector Leadership Chart 8A Closer Look At Technology In early July, we upgraded Growth to overweight as an asset that would benefit from an anticipated turn in CPI, rate stabilization, and slowing growth (Chart 9). We have also reaffirmed our overweight in Software and Services as a way to play Growth on a sector level. We have downgraded Energy to underweight to reduce exposure to Value. Chart 9Growth And Quality Lead Markets Higher When Inflation Abates What The Bulls Think Let’s summarize what the bulls think are the catalysts for the next leg up: Inflation has turned. Looking for further signs that inflation is easing. The Fed is less hawkish than initially assumed, and Jay Powell is not Paul Volcker. Looking for signs that the Fed is getting closer to the end of the hiking cycle. So far, the economy is resilient, and consumers are spending – excess savings and excess demand for labor will soften the blow. Looking for signs that the recession can be avoided. Corporate earnings will surprise on the upside thanks to consumer strength. In the next section, I will juxtapose these optimistic expectations with those of a bear, i.e., of yours truly. A full disclosure – I am not a perma-bear but even eight weeks into the best recovery rally ever, I can’t shake off my pessimism. After all, I am used to the markets going up on injections of liquidity and expect them to shudder when liquidity is mopped out of the system. What The Bears Think, Or A Litany Of Worries Inflation is embedded and broad-based Broad-based: While headline inflation is turning, mostly thanks to prices of energy and materials, it will take a long time for core inflation to revert to the desired 2% as it is broad-based. This is evident from trimmed and median CPI metrics, which continue their ascent. Inflation has also spilled into sticky service items, such as rent (Chart 10). Wage-price spiral: Then there is that pesky wage-price spiral that is manifesting itself in soaring labor costs (Chart 11), which companies pass on to their customers. In the meantime, productivity is falling, and unit labor costs are increasing at 9.5% per year, a rate of growth last seen in 1980s (Chart 12). Demand for labor still exceeds supply with 1.8 job openings for every job seeker, and much more tightening is required to bring supply and demand into balance. Chart 10Entrenched? Chart 11Wage-price Spiral Chart 12ULC Soaring Wages and service inflation are more important to structural inflation than energy. Rent and its equivalents constitute 30% of the CPI basket, while wages are roughly 50% of corporate sales and by far the largest component of the cost structure. Inflation is embedded and broad-based and it will take many months to reach the level that is palatable to the Fed. What Does The Fed Think? Fed minutes: Fortunately, we don’t need to guess. The Fed minutes state that "participants agreed that there was little evidence to date that inflation pressures were subsiding" and that inflation “would likely stay uncomfortably high for some time.” Further, “though some inflation reduction might come through improving global supply chains or drops in the prices of fuel and other commodities … Participants emphasized that a slowing in aggregate demand would play an important role in reducing inflation pressures," the minutes said. The Fed minutes state that in moving expeditiously to neutral and then into restrictive territory, “the Committee was acting with resolve to lower inflation to 2% and anchor inflation expectations at levels consistent with that longer-run goal.” In its previous communications, the Fed emphasized that its commitment to a 2% target is unconditional. Is powell more like burns or volcker? In addition, there is an ongoing debate between bulls and bears on the character of the Fed – is Jay Powell a strong-willed hawk like Paul Volker, or more of a waverer like Arthur Burns, who presided over the relentless march of inflation in the seventies? We think that the Chairman can channel Paul Volcker. After all, the Fed has surprised investors by acting swiftly and decisively. Back in March, the Fed dot plot indicated that by the end of the year, the target rate will reach a mere 1.75%. However, we hit a 2.25%-2.50% rate range as soon as July. Jay Powell is concerned about his legacy: He would not want to be remembered as a Chair who mishandled inflation by keeping rates too low despite historically low unemployment and resilient consumers whose accounts are padded with excess post-pandemic savings. The Fed is more hawkish than what the majority of market participants, unscathed by the inflation of the seventies and eighties, believe. The Fed dot plot, to which the Chairman referred on multiple occasions, projects a Fed funds rate of 4% at year-end and of 4.5-5.0% next year (Chart 13). Meanwhile, Fed funds futures are only pricing a rate of about 3.4% for December 2022, even after the hawkish talk from both ex-dove Kashkari and a hawk Bullard (3.75%-4.0% by year-end and 4.4% by the end of 2023). Further, the Fed itself states in its minutes that rates would have to reach a "sufficiently restrictive level" and remain there for "some time" to control inflation that was proving far more persistent than anticipated. The Chicago Fed President Charles Evans has also affirmed that the Fed is definitely not cutting rates in March 2023. Chart 13The Fed Versus The Market Doves latch on to comments from the meeting that the Fed will be data-driven, and that it is concerned about overtightening. To us, these are just the musings of the “responsible grown-ups.” Quantitative Tightening: Now let’s not forget another leg of the stool – Quantitative Tightening. QT has been very tame so far and, since the program commenced, the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, $8.9 trillion, has barely budged. In September, the Fed is scheduled to step up QT to a maximum pace of $95 billion from $47.5 billion— running off up to $60 billion in Treasuries, and $35 billion of mortgage securities. Shortages of securities available for run-off due to a dearth of refinancing may trigger a shift to outright selling, further tightening financial conditions. Equities are at odds with the Fed: Last, but not least, equity markets are on a collision course with the Fed. Since June, financial conditions have eased as opposed to tightened, making the Fed’s job so much harder (Chart 14). Chart 14The Rally Eased Financial Conditions The Fed may prove to be more hawkish than in the past as it is on a quest to combat inflation and takes its mission very seriously. “Don’t fight the Fed” the adage holds. Economic Growth Is Slowing The BCA Business Cycle Indicator signals that economic growth is slowing (Chart 15), which is also evident from a host of economic data releases, ranging from GDP growth to business surveys to housing data. One of the few data series that has defied gravity so far is the jobs report, but the job creation rate is a coincidental indicator at best, and a lagging one at worst. Jobs are usually lost after the start of a recession (Chart 16). Chart 15Economy Is Slowing Chart 16Unemployment Never "Just Ticks Up" Can consumers save the day? After all, $2.2 trillion in excess savings should help to handle the pressures of negative real wage growth and income growth that is below trend. Yes and no. Gasoline savings can certainly support increases in discretionary spending, all else equal. As for excess savings – adding this money back into the economy may ignite another bout of inflation, working against the Fed, and triggering more rate increases. Many clients ask us if we anticipate a recession. Broadly speaking we do, as the Fed has an arduous task ahead of it in balancing the supply and demand of labor. However, we do not expect a recession in 2022 or even early 2023. Can the Fed succeed by only reducing excess job openings from 1.8 to 1, thus avoiding a rise in unemployment? This is possible, but the probability of such an outcome is low as unemployment never “just ticks up” (Chart 16). However, what the market is pricing is also important. At the moment, the rally shows that it considers the current growth slowdown just a growth scare to be shrugged off. Will there be more disappointments? We think so, as the US economy is facing multiple headwinds from slowing demand for exports due to geopolitical turbulence and payback of overstimulated consumer demand at home. And it is not a recession per se, but a growth disappointment, that may take equities on the next leg down. Growth is slowing and a soft landing is illusive. Earnings Growth Will Continue Its March Towards Zero We believe that earnings growth will continue to slow into year-end – flagging consumer demand at home and abroad, a strong dollar, and soaring unit labor costs that can no longer be fully passed on to stretched consumers, as corporate pricing power is decelerating. Even in Q2-2022, ex-Energy EPS growth is already negative at -1.5%, with Consumer Discretionary, Financials, Communications, and Utilities reporting an earnings contraction. As we predicted back in October, the S&P 500 margins are also compressing, currently at 50bps off their peak, with consensus expecting them to lose another two points within the next 12 months as companies are grappling with rising costs (Chart 17). Analysts are finally in a downgrading mode (Chart 18), with growth over the next 12 months now expected to be 7.7% compared to 10% earlier this summer. Analyst downgrades will continue, and an earnings recession is highly probable as early as Q4-2022. Chart 17Profitability Is Under Pressure Chart 18Earnings Are Finally Being Downgraded In terms of the durability of the rally – earnings growth disappointment will be enough to cause equities to pull back. Earnings growth is slowing and more disappointments may be in store. Valuations And Technicals The S&P 500 is currently trading at 18x forward earnings, which is nearly a two-point rebound off the market trough of 15.8x. This is roughly where PE NTM was in April when the 10-year yield stood at 2.80%. Therefore, the multiple reverted on the back of falling rates, and the market is fairly valued considering where rates are now. And another factor to consider: Analysts are slashing earnings expectations, and with E in a P/E likely to be downgraded further – the “true” forward multiple is likely higher than it appears. The BCA Valuation Indicator is also flashing “overvalued” (Chart 19). From the equity risk premium standpoint, 3% is low by historical standards (Chart 20). And if we consider Shiller PE, it has come down from an eye-watering 38x to a still elevated 29x. Chart 19Pricey Again? Chart 20Equities Are No Longer Cheap By ERP Or Shiller PE Metrics Therefore, it is hard to call equities cheap at this point. But being generous, we will call them “fairly priced.” Regardless – at these levels of valuations, the best part of the rally is likely over, and risk-reward is no longer favorable. From a technical standpoint, this rally is broad-based with nearly 90% of the S&P 500 industries trading above their 50-day moving average (Chart 21). But according to the BCA Technical Indicator, equities are no longer oversold and have just crossed into neutral territory (Chart 22). Interestingly, once the Technical indicator starts to rise, it usually ascends for a while, making us wary to boldly call an immediate end to this rally. Chart 21Thrusting Chart 22No Longer Oversold? Valuations and Technicals are no longer attractive – the best part of the rally is likely over and risk-reward is skewed to the downside. Investment Implications Or Can This Rally Continue? Timing the market is hard at best, impossible at worst. After a 17% rise from the bottom, the S&P 500 is no longer cheap or oversold. Buying equities for valuations or technical reasons is too late – risks are skewed to the downside. Our working assumption is that the rally will pause waiting for the new data that will trigger a new leg up or down. Further, as we pointed out in the Fat and Flat report, the current period is reminiscent of the 1980-1982 Volcker era. So far, the market is following this pattern to a T (Chart 23). The problem is that each leg of the up-and-down market may take months. As such, being (eventually) right and principled does not pay off. After all, the economy is not a market. Therefore, until one of the following happens, the music will continue and the markets can keep dancing, which may be for a while. Chart 23Volcker Era Redux The rally will continue until: There is a communication from the Fed re-emphasizing its hawkish stance and determination to get inflation back to 2%. It may be as one of the FOMC member’s speeches broadcast at Jackson Hole. Long-term Treasury yields pick up either because of the Fed’s actions or speeches or because the economy is overheating. Negative inflation surprise – it may come as either a higher-than-expected inflation reading or evidence that inflation is entrenched, such as rising service or rent inflation, soaring wages, a pick-up in the price of oil or commodities, or a growth surprise out of China, to name but a few. Negative earnings surprise – guidance from a number of companies indicating that economic growth is slowing, and earnings will disappoint. A negative economic surprise may be perceived by the market as “bad news is good news.” We recommend the following: Maintain a well-diversified portfolio, with sufficient allocation to both cyclicals and defensives. Increase exposure to Growth sectors, such as Technology. We particularly favor Software and Services as it leverages the pervasive theme of digitization and migration to the cloud. Reduce allocation to Energy and Materials – these sectors tend to underperform when inflation turns. They are also quintessential value sectors. Maintain some allocation to cyclicals – we are overweight the Industrial sector as it leverages a long-term theme of onshoring and automation. We may be upgrading the Consumer Discretionary sector in the near future. We are also overweight Banks and Insurance for portfolio diversification – these sectors benefit from rising rates and positive growth surprise. Markets turn on a dime and it is good to be prepared. Allocate capital to long-term investment themes: Green and Clean and EV, benefiting from the funds allocated by the IRA bill, Cyber Security, and Defense. Bottom Line: The rally was expected, but its force and durability took us by surprise. Now, after a strong rebound, risks are skewed to the downside and the markets are fragile, but the rally may still continue. We offer our take on what can bring this rally to a halt, and the “danger” signs investors need to be on the lookout for. In the meantime, overweight Growth and maintain a well-diversified portfolio.     Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com   Recommended Allocation   Recommended Allocation: Addendum 

Special Report

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary Back From The Future: An Investor’s Almanac Stocks will rally over the next six months as recession risks abate but then begin to swoon as it becomes clear the Fed will not cut rates in 2023. A second wave of inflation will begin in mid-2023, forcing the Fed to raise rates to 5%. The 10-year US Treasury yield will rise above 4%. While financial conditions are currently not tight enough to induce a recession, they will be by the end of next year. In the past, the US unemployment rate has gone through a 20-to-22 month bottoming phase. This suggests that a recession will start in early 2024. The US dollar will soften over the next six months but then get a second wind as the Fed is forced to turn hawkish again. Over the long haul, the dollar will weaken, reflecting today’s extremely stretched valuations.   Bottom Line: Investors should remain tactically overweight global equities but look to turn defensive early next year. Somewhere in Hilbert Space I have long believed that anything that can possibly happen in financial markets (as well as in life) will happen. Sometimes, however, it is useful to focus on a “base case” or “modal” outcome of what the world will look like. In this week’s report, we do just that, describing the evolution of the global economy from the perspective of someone who has already seen the future unfold. September 2022 – Goldilocks! US headline inflation continues to decline thanks to lower food and gasoline prices (Chart 1). Supply-chain bottlenecks ease, as evidenced by falling transportation costs and faster delivery times (Chart 2). Most measures of economic activity bottom out and then begin to rebound. The surge in bond yields earlier in 2022 pushed down aggregate demand, but with yields having temporarily stabilized, demand growth returns to trend. The S&P 500 moves up to 4,400. Chart 1ALower Food And Gasoline Prices Will Drag Down Headline Inflation (I) Chart 1BLower Food And Gasoline Prices Will Drag Down Headline Inflation (II)   October 2022 – Europe’s Prospects of Avoiding a Deep Freeze Improve: Economic shocks are most damaging when they come out of the blue. With about half a year to prepare for a cut-off of Russian gas, the EU responds with uncharacteristic haste: Coal-fired electricity production ramps up; the planned closure of Germany’s nuclear power plants is postponed; the French government boosts nuclear capacity, which had been running at less than 50% earlier in 2022; and, for its part, the Dutch government agrees to raise output from the massive Groningen natural gas field after the EU commits to establishing a fund to compensate the surrounding community for any damage from increased seismic activity. EUR/USD rallies to 1.06.  November 2022 – Divided Congress and Trump 2.0: In line with pre-election polling, the Democrats retain the Senate but lose the House (Chart 3). Markets largely ignore the outcome. To no one’s surprise, Donald Trump announces his candidacy for the 2024 election. Over the following months, however, the former president has trouble rekindling the magic of his 2016 bid. His attacks on his main rival, Florida governor Ron DeSantis, fall flat. At one rally in early 2023, Trump’s claim that “Ron is no better than Jeb” is greeted with boos. Chart 2Supply-Chain Pressures Are Easing Chart 3Democrats Will Lose The House But Retain The Senate   December 2022 – China’s “At Least One Child Policy”: The 20th Party Congress takes place against the backdrop of strict Covid restrictions and a flailing housing market. In addition to reaffirming his Common Prosperity Initiative, President Xi stresses the need for actions that promote “family formation.” The number of births declined by nearly 30% between 2019 and 2021 and all indications suggest that the birth rate fell further in 2022 (Chart 4). Importantly for investors, Xi says that housing policy should focus not on boosting demand but increasing supply, even if this comes at the expense of lower property prices down the road. Base metal prices rally on the news. Chart 4China's Baby Bust January 2023 – Putin Declares Victory: Faced with continued resistance by Ukrainian forces – which now have wider access to advanced western military technology – Putin declares that Russia’s objectives in Ukraine have been met. Following the playbook in Crimea and the Donbass, he orders referenda to be held in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and parts of Kharkiv, asking the local populations if they wish to join Russia. The legitimacy of the referenda is immediately rejected by the Ukrainian government and the EU. Nevertheless, the Russian military advance halts. While the West pledges to maintain sanctions against Russia, the geopolitical risk premium in oil prices decreases. February 2023 – Credit Spreads Narrow Further: At the worst point for credit in early July 2022, US high-yield spreads were pricing in a default rate of 8.1% over the following 12 months (Chart 5). By late August, the expected default rate has fallen to 5.2%, and by January 2023, it has dropped to 4.5%. Perceived default risks decline even more in Europe, where the economy is on the cusp of a V-shaped recovery following the prior year’s energy crunch. Chart 5The Spread-Implied Default Rate Has Room To Fall If Recession Fears Abate March 2023 – Wages: The New Core CPI? US inflation continues to drop, but a heated debate erupts over whether this merely reflects the unwinding of various pandemic-related dislocations or whether it marks true progress in cooling down the economy. Those who argue that higher interest rates are cooling demand point to the decline in job openings. Skeptics retort that the drop in job openings has been matched by rising employment (Chart 6). To the extent that firms have been converting openings into new jobs, the skeptics conclude that labor demand has not declined. In a series of comments, Jay Powell stresses the need to focus on wage growth as a key barometer of underlying inflationary pressures. Given that wage growth remains elevated, market participants regard this as a hawkish signal (Chart 7). The 10-year Treasury yield rises to 3.2%. The DXY index, having swooned from over 108 in July 2022 to just under 100 in February 2023, moves back to 102. After hitting a 52-week high of 4,689 the prior month, the S&P 500 drops back below 4,500. Chart 6Drop In Job Openings Is Matched By Rise In Employment Chart 7Wage Growth Remains Strong   April 2023 – Covid Erupts Across China: After successfully holding back Covid for over three years, the dam breaks. When lockdowns fail to suppress the outbreak, the government shifts to a mitigation strategy, requiring all elderly and unvaccinated people to isolate at home. It helps that China’s new mRNA vaccines, launched in late 2022, prove to be successful. By early 2023, China also has sufficient supplies of Pfizer’s Paxlovid anti-viral drug. Nevertheless, the outbreak in China temporarily leads to renewed supply-chain bottlenecks. May 2023 – Biden Confirms He Will Stand for Re-Election: Saying he is “fit as a fiddle,” President Biden confirms that he will seek a second term in office. Little does he know that the US will be in a recession during most of his re-election campaign. Chart 8Consumer Confidence And Real Wages Tend To Move Together June 2023 – Inflation: The Second Wave Begins: The decline in inflation between mid-2022 and mid-2023 sows the seeds of its own demise. As prices at the pump and in the grocery store decline, real wage growth turns positive. Consumer confidence recovers (Chart 8). Household spending, which never weakened that much to begin with, surges. The economy starts to overheat again, leading to higher inflation. After having paused raising rates at 3.5% in early 2023, the Fed indicates that further hikes may be necessary. The DXY index strengthens to 104. The S&P 500 dips to 4,300. July 2023 – Tech Stock Malaise: Higher bond yields weigh on tech stocks. Making matters worse, investors start to worry that many of the most popular US tech names have gone “ex-growth.” The evolution of tech companies often follows three stages. In the first stage, when the founders are in charge, the company grows fast thanks to the introduction of new, highly innovative products or services. In the second stage, as the tech company matures, the founders often cede control to professional managers. Company profits continue to grow quickly, but less because of innovation and more because the professional managers are able to squeeze money from the firm’s customers. In the third stage, with all the low-lying fruits already picked, the company succumbs to bureaucratic inertia. As 2023 wears on, it becomes apparent that many US tech titans are entering this third stage. August 2023 – Long-term Inflation Expectations Move Up: Unlike in 2021-22, when long-term inflation expectations remained well anchored in the face of rising realized inflation, the second inflation wave in 2023 is accompanied by a clear rise in long-term inflation expectations. Consumer expectations of inflation 5-to-10 years out in the University of Michigan survey jump to 3.5%. Whereas back in August 2022, the OIS curve was discounting 100 basis points of Fed easing starting in early 2023, it now discounts rate hikes over the remainder of 2023 (Chart 9). The 10-year yield rises to 3.8%. The 10-year TIPS yield spikes to 1.2%, as investors price in a higher real terminal rate. The S&P 500 drops to 4,200. The financial press is awash with comparisons to the early 1980s (Chart 10). Chart 9The Markets Expect The Fed To Cut Rates By Over 100 Basis Points Starting In 2023 Chart 10The Early-1980s Playbook October 2023 – Hawks in Charge: After a second round of tightening, featuring three successive 50 basis-point hikes, the Fed funds rate reaches a cycle peak of 5%. The 10-year Treasury yield gets up to as high as 4.28%. The 10-year TIPS yield hits 1.62%. The DXY index rises to 106. The S&P 500 falls to 4,050. November 2023 – Housing Stumbles: With mortgage yields back above 6%, the US housing market weakens anew. The fallout from rising global bond yields is far worse in some smaller developed economies such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, where home price valuations are more stretched (Chart 11). Chart 11Rising Rates Will Weigh On Developed Economies With Pricey Housing Markets January 2024 – Unemployment Starts to Rise: After moving sideways since March 2022, the US unemployment rate suddenly jumps 0.2 percentage points to 3.6%, with payrolls contracting for the first time since the start of the pandemic. The 22-month stretch of a flat unemployment rate is broadly in line with the historic average (Table 1). Table 1In Past Cycles, The Unemployment Rate Has Moved Sideways For Nearly Two Years Before A Recession Began February 2024 – The US Recession Begins: Although there was considerable debate about whether the US was entering a recession at the time, in early 2025, the NBER would end up declaring that February 2024 marked the start of the recession. The 10-year yield falls back below 4% while the S&P 500 drops to 3,700. Lower bond yields are no longer protecting stocks.  March 2024 – The Fed Remains in Neutral: Jay Powell says further rate hikes are unwarranted in light of the weakening economy, but with core inflation still running at 3.5%, the Fed is in no position to ease. April 2024 – The Global Recession Intensifies: The US unemployment rate rises to 4.7%. The economic downdraft is especially sharp in America’s neighbor to the north, where the Canadian housing market is in shambles. Back in June 2022, the Canadian 10-year yield was 21 basis points above the US yield. By April 2024, it is 45 basis points below. Europe and Japan also fall into recession. Commodity prices continue to drop, with Brent oil hitting $60/bbl. May 2024 – The Fed Cuts Rates: Reversing its position from just two months earlier, the Federal Reserve cuts rates for the first time since March 2020, lowering the Fed funds rate from 5% to 4.5%. The Fed funds rate will ultimately bottom at 2.5%, below the range of 3.5%-to-4% that most economists will eventually recognize as neutral. August 2024 – Republican National Convention: Unwilling to spend much of his own money on the campaign, and with most donations flowing to DeSantis, Trump’s bid to reclaim the White House fizzles. While the former president never formally bows out of the race, the last few months of his primary campaign end up being a nostalgia tour of his past accomplishments, interspersed with complaints about all the ways that he has been wronged. In the end, though, Trump makes a lasting imprint on the Republican party. During his acceptance speech, in typical Trumpian style, Ron DeSantis attacks Joe Biden for “eating ice cream while the economy burns” and declares, to thunderous applause, that “Americans are sick and tired of having woke nonsense hurled in their faces and then being dared to deny it at the risk of losing their jobs.” Chart 12The Dollar Is Very Overvalued October 2024 – The Stock Market Hits Bottom: While the unemployment rate continues to rise for another 12 months, ultimately reaching 6.4%, the S&P troughs at 3,200. The 10-year Treasury yield settles at 3.1% before starting to drift higher. The US dollar, which began to weaken anew after the Fed starts cutting rates, enters a prolonged bear market. As in past cycles, the dollar is unable to defy the gravitational force from extremely stretched valuations (Chart 12). November 2024 – President DeSantis: Against the backdrop of rising unemployment, uncomfortably high inflation, and a sinking stock market, Ron DeSantis cruises to victory in the 2024 presidential election. Unlike Trump, DeSantis deemphasizes corporate tax cuts and deregulation during his presidency, focusing instead on cultural issues. With the Democrats still committed to progressive causes, big US corporations discover that for the first time in modern history, neither of the two major political parties are willing to champion their interests. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on LinkedIn & Twitter Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores