South Korea
South Korea's exports for the first 20 days of July fell by -12.8% year-on-year, representing a deterioration compared to last month's -7.5% contraction. On the positive side, the contraction in exports per working day is tapering off. The slowdown in the…
BCA Research's Emerging Markets Strategy service is moving China from neutral to overweight and downgrading Korea from overweight to neutral relative to the EM equity benchmark. Regarding Korean equities, the risks are as follows: First, rising…
Chart I-15DRAM And Korean Tech Stocks We are moving China from neutral to overweight and downgrading Korea from overweight to neutral relative to the EM equity benchmark. Regarding Korean equities, the risks are as follows: First, rising threats of North Korea testing a strategic weapon is negative for South Korea’s equities and currency. Second, DRAM prices and volumes are dropping. Chart I-15 shows that the DRAM revenue proxy is falling, a bad omen for Korean tech stocks that derive a lot of operating profits from DRAM sales. Finally, the Korean bourse is heavy in old-economy stocks, which will experience a slow recovery in their profits from very low levels amid the enduring global trade downturn. Chart I-16Long Chinese Investable / Short Korean Equities The reasons to upgrade Chinese investable stocks relative to the EM equity benchmark include: As we discussed above, the medium-term growth outlook for China is mildly positive due to the credit and fiscal stimulus Beijing has unleashed. The outlook for domestic demand is worse in many other developing economies. The credit and money bubble in China will inflate further and will pose a major challenge in the years ahead. That said, another round of major credit/money expansion will likely stabilize the system in the medium term. If the FOMO-driven mania continues, FAANG stocks will likely outperform, which will spread to similar stocks around the world. The Chinese investable index includes Alibaba, Tencent and other new economy stocks that will likely outperform the EM benchmark. If global markets correct and EM currencies drop, the Chinese RMB will appreciate relative to most EM exchange rates. This will help China’s equity performance relative to other EM bourses. Finally, if US-China tensions escalate and EM markets sell off, Chinese authorities will support share prices by deploying the national team and other government proxies to buy Chinese stocks. This will help the broad universe of Chinese stocks to outperform the EM benchmark. Bottom Line: We are upgrading Chinese stocks from neutral to overweight and downgrading the Korean bourse from overweight to neutral within an EM equity portfolio. Market-neutral investors should consider the following trade: long Chinese / short Korean equities (Chart I-16). Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com
Highlights When retail investors invest aggressively and central banks buy assets en masse, economic fundamentals take the back seat and momentum becomes king. Global risk assets are at a fork in the road: either they will relapse meaningfully as they have run well ahead of fundamentals or a budding mania will push global share prices to fresh new highs. A budding mania is the basis behind our strategy of chasing momentum from this point on. Investors should adjust their strategy based on momentum in global stocks and the broad trade-weighted US dollar in the coming weeks. We are upgrading Chinese stocks from neutral to overweight and downgrading the Korean bourse from overweight to neutral within an EM equity portfolio. Feature Chart I-1Make It Or Break It Moment For US Dollar Global share prices have reached a point where they are no longer oversold. In turn, the trade-weighted US dollar has worked out its overbought conditions and is sitting on major defensive lines (Chart I-1). If the dollar relapses below its technical resistances, it will enter a bear market. Consistently, EM risk assets will enter a bull market. The trajectory of EM risk assets and currencies in the coming months will ultimately depend on what happens to the ongoing global FOMO (fear-of-missing-out) rally. We refer to it as a FOMO rally because both the DM and EM equity rallies have been taking place despite deteriorating corporate profit expectations, as we documented in our June 4 report. Why The FOMO Rally May Still Have Legs There are a number of reasons why this FOMO-driven rally could persist: Chart I-2Helicopter Money In The US First, the Federal Reserve is explicitly targeting higher asset prices, and to achieve this goal it is deploying its “nuclear” arsenal – printing money and monetizing public debt, lending to the private sector as well as buying corporate bonds. US broad money growth is at an all-time high (Chart I-2). Consequently, the risk of a full-blown equity bubble formation in the US cannot be ruled out. If this occurs, all EM risk assets will rally along with the S&P 500. US policymakers are throwing everything into the system to keep financial asset prices inflated. It seems that after any day that the S&P 500 sells off, the Fed or the US administration comes up with some sort of new measure to support the economy and asset prices. Historically, investors have placed a lot of weight on the Fed’s actions. Aggressive measures by the Fed have recently led investors to purchase stocks and corporate bonds, irrespective of the condition of the underlying economy. As a result, share prices worldwide have decoupled from corporate profit expectations (Chart I-3A and I-3B). If US policymakers succeed in lifting US share prices further, every investor will likely chase the rally and the US equity market will become a full-scale bubble. Chart I-3AGlobal Stocks Are Pricing In A Lot Of Good News Chart I-3BSurging EM Share Prices Amid Plunging Forward EPS Chart I-4Retail Investors Have Driven Up Trading Volumes At some point, the bubble will start cracking even if corporate earnings find their way back to a recovery path. When equities make up a large share of investors’ assets, any trigger could lead to marginal sellers outnumbering marginal buyers. As we discuss below, there are plenty of risks that could result in a trigger. Both retail and institutional investors are very averse to losses, and when the market begins to slide, investors will sell their shares simultaneously. The market will plunge. The Fed will be forced to buy stocks to avert the negative impact of falling share prices on the economy. In a nutshell, US equities and corporate bonds have become extremely dependent on the Fed. This might be good news in the short and medium term. Nevertheless, it is negative for the US in the long run. Second, when retail investors rush into the market and actively trade, fundamentals take the back seat. This is what has been occurring since March. Retail investors appear to be especially attracted to crushed or near-bankrupt US stocks as well as popular tech stocks. This is illustrated by the surge in turnover volumes on the Nasdaq as well as in Southwest Airline, Norwegian Cruise Lines and Chesapeake Energy stocks (Chart I-4). Yet the impact of their actions is not limited to these stocks. Stocks are fungible. When retail investors purchase shares of near-bankrupt companies at elevated prices (at higher than fundamentals warrant), institutional investors sell those stocks and move capital to other companies. In aggregate, the stock market index rises. The ongoing retail investor mania is not solely a US phenomenon. It has become prevalent in many other countries. There are anecdotes that Japanese retail investors have been actively trading Jasdaq stocks, while Korean, Taiwanese and Filipino retail investors have been buying local shares en masse.1 The top panel of Chart I-5 illustrates that Korean individual investors have been accumulating stocks while foreigners have been selling out. In Taiwan, the share of individual investors in equity trading has been rising at the expense of domestic institutional investors (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Retail investors do not do much fundamental analysis, and it should not come as a surprise that share prices have decoupled from their fundamentals (profits) and have gained despite lingering massive risks. Retail investors appear to be especially attracted to crushed or near-bankrupt US stocks as well as popular tech stocks. Third, the mania phase – the last and most speculative stage – in bubble formation typically lasts between nine and 18 months. This is based on the duration of the mania phase in the Nikkei (1989), the NASDAQ (1999-2000), oil (2008) and Chinese A shares (2014-‘15) (Chart I-6). The retail investor-driven equity mania began in March and is now three months old. If the duration of previous manias is any guide, the current rally could last another six months at least. Chart I-5Strong Retail Buying Is Also Evident In Korea And Taiwan Chart I-6How Long Mania Phase Lasted During Previous Bubbles? Chart I-7China A-Share Bubble: A Divergence Between Stocks And EPS The current equity mania resembles the one in China’s A-share market in 2014-‘15 in two aspects: (1) it is driven by retail investors and (2) it is occurring amid very underwhelming corporate profits. Chart I-7 demonstrates that Chinese A-share prices skyrocketed in H1 2015, despite a deteriorating corporate profit picture. It lasted for a while and ended with a bust without any policy tightening taking place. Finally, retail investors are not quick to give up when they lose money. Having acquired a taste for capital gains over the past few months, retail investors will likely become even more aggressive and will keep buying the dips. In such a scenario, institutional and professional investors may be forced to capitulate and chase risk assets higher. We are at a fork in the road: either retail investors will begin reducing their equity holdings soon, or institutional and professional investors will capitulate and start buying en masse. In the first scenario, stocks will tumble as retail investors rapidly head for the exits. The latter scenario on the other hand will push share prices considerably higher. This is the basis behind our strategy of chasing momentum from this point on. Bottom Line: All financial market manias eventually crash. However, if the market breaks out, the rally could endure for several months. Not chasing the rally will be very painful for portfolio managers. This is why even though we believe the current global equity rally has been a FOMO-driven mania, we recommend to play it if EM share prices break above, and the broad-trade weighted dollar relapses below, current levels. Plenty Of (Disregarded) Risks Chart I-8Number Of New Inflections Is Rising In Large EM Countries Even though global risk assets have been rallying, the global investment landscape remains poor, with plenty of risks. In particular: Geopolitical tensions are bound to rise between the US and China. Taiwan and its semiconductor sector are at the epicenter of the US-China technological and geopolitical standoffs. Timing any escalation is tricky, but Taiwanese stocks are not pricing in these risks. Further, odds are high that North Korea will test a strategic weapon, which will undermine the credibility of President Trump’s foreign policy. This is negative for the KOSPI and the Korean won. An escalation in US-China tensions encompassing technology, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Koreas is negative for equity markets in China, South Korea and Taiwan alike. Together they account for about 60% of the EM MSCI equity benchmark market cap. Moreover, the China-India skirmish is a risk for Indian stocks. The number of new Covid-19 infections is rising in the majority of EM countries excluding China, Korea and Taiwan as demonstrated in Chart I-8. It will be hard to ameliorate consumer and business confidence and thereby boost spending in these countries amid a worsening trend in the global pandemic. Indeed, a second wave of the coronavirus now hitting Beijing is evidence that even the very efficient Chinese system is not able to prevent pockets of renewed infection outbreaks. This risk still looms large over many advanced and developing nations after the first wave subsides. The post-lockdown natural snapback in economic activity is creating a mirage of a V-shaped recovery. Like any mirage, it can last and drive markets for a while. However, it will eventually fade. When that happens, misalignments in financial markets will be ironed out rather abruptly. A snapback in economic activity around the world is natural following the unwinding of strict lockdowns. Nevertheless, the level of business activity remains very low. Going forward, persistent social distancing, the threat of a second wave and an initial substantial income drawdown will cap the speed of recovery in household and business spending around the world. In our February 20 report titled EM: Growing Risk Of A Breakdown, we contended that the most likely trajectory for Chinese growth is the one demonstrated in Chart I-9. It assumed the plunge in business activity would be succeeded by a rather sharp snap-back due to pent-up demand. However, this snapback would likely be followed by weaker growth in the following months. This is also our roadmap for the business cycles of many DM and EM economies. Even though on May 28 we upgraded our economic outlook for Chinese growth from negative to mildly positive, near-term risks for China-related plays remain. Consistent with the trajectory described above, the Chinese economy has been coming back to life, aided in large part by significant credit and fiscal stimulus (Chart I-10, top and middle panel). Traditional infrastructure investment has accelerated strongly (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Chart I-9Our Roadmap For China’s Business Cycle Chart I-10China: Money/Credit And Infrastructure Are Accelerating Consequently, mainland demand for commodities has been very robust and raw materials prices have rallied. However, it remains to be seen if the recent strength in commodities purchases can be maintained going forward. A couple of our indicators and market price signals are also suggesting that caution is warranted in the near term with respect to China-related plays. First, our indicators for marginal propensity to spend among households and enterprises continue to deteriorate, even when May data points are included (Chart I-11). These indicators have been good pointers for consumer discretionary spending and business investment/demand for industrial metals, as illustrated in Chart I-11. Chart I-11Marginal Propensity To Spend Is Falling For Consumers And Enterprises Chart I-12Copper: Shanghai/London Premium And Prices Second, the copper price premium in Shanghai over London has been a good coincident indicator for copper prices and has recently been flagging short-term risks to copper prices (Chart I-12). A rising Shanghai/London copper premium implies more robust demand in China, while a declining premium signals weaker copper demand in the mainland. Finally, share prices of property developers, industrials and materials in the onshore market have failed to advance much (Chart I-13). This fact does not corroborate that there is a strong recovery occurring in China’s broad capital spending outside infrastructure. Chart I-13Chinese Stocks Do Not Corroborate A Strong Recovery A similar message stems from the investable universe of Chinese stocks. We are using the sector indexes from the onshore market because they are less hyped by the global FOMO rally, and the number of companies included in these onshore sector indexes is larger than in the investable indexes. Bank share prices have done even worse (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Overall, near-term risks to China-plays remain and we are looking for a better entry point in the weeks and months ahead. The trend-setting US equity market is expensive, as we corroborated in our report on EM and US equity valuations a month ago. The forward P/E ratio stands at 22, using analysts’ 12-month forward EPS expectations that we believe are still optimistic. Global financial market correlations are presently high, and domestic conditions in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan are rather grim. If the S&P 500 relapses for whatever reason, there is little chance EM risk assets will avoid selling off. Bottom Line: Risks are abundant and fundamentals (profits, valuations, geopolitical risks, the ongoing pandemic) do not justify higher share prices. However, if a FOMO-driven rush into stocks persists, financial markets will continue ignoring fundamentals. Investment Strategy: Momentum Is Now King When retail investors invest aggressively and central banks buy assets en masse, it is not the time for fundamental analysis. Indeed, momentum becomes king. Investors should adjust their strategy based on momentum in global stocks and the broad trade-weighted US dollar in the coming weeks. Our composite momentum indicator for global share prices has risen to zero from extremely oversold levels (Chart I-14). Chart I-14Global Share Prices Are At A Critical Juncture If global and EM share prices break meaningfully above their 200-day moving averages and the US dollar breaks materially below its 200-day moving average (see Chart I-1 on page 1), our advice will be for investors to chase the rally. Even if DM and EM share prices break out, the odds are that EM stocks will continue underperforming DM ones. Hence, we continue to underweight EM in a global equity portfolio. The basis is that North Asian equity markets (China, Korea and Taiwan) are at risk of a heightened geopolitical confrontation between the US and China, as per our discussion above. Meanwhile, the remainder of EM is struggling with the pandemic. Hence, EM will continue to underperform, even if global share prices rise a lot. The current equity mania resembles the one in China’s A-share market in 2014-‘15 in two aspects: (1) it is driven by retail investors and (2) it is occurring amid very underwhelming corporate profits. That said, if global stocks and commodities prices break out and the greenback breaks down, we will close our remaining short positions in EM currencies and upgrade our stance on EM fixed-income markets from neutral to bullish. We have been receiving rates in Mexico, Colombia, Russia, India, China, Korea, Pakistan, Ukraine and Egypt, but have been reluctant to take on currency risk. Also, we upgraded our stance on EM credit markets to neutral on June 4. We will likely upgrade EM local currency bonds and EM credit markets further to “buy” if the above-mentioned breakouts transpire. Upgrade Chinese, Downgrade Korean Stocks Chart I-15DRAM And Korean Tech Stocks We are moving China from neutral to overweight and downgrading Korea from overweight to neutral relative to the EM equity benchmark. Regarding Korean equities, the risks are as follows: First, rising threats of North Korea testing a strategic weapon is negative for South Korea’s equities and currency. Second, DRAM prices and volumes are dropping. Chart I-15 shows that the DRAM revenue proxy is falling, a bad omen for Korean tech stocks that derive a lot of operating profits from DRAM sales. Finally, the Korean bourse is heavy in old-economy stocks, which will experience a slow recovery in their profits from very low levels amid the enduring global trade downturn. The reasons to upgrade Chinese investable stocks relative to the EM equity benchmark include: As we discussed above, the medium-term growth outlook for China is mildly positive due to the credit and fiscal stimulus Beijing has unleashed. The outlook for domestic demand is worse in many other developing economies. The credit and money bubble in China will inflate further and will pose a major challenge in the years ahead. That said, another round of major credit/money expansion will likely stabilize the system in the medium term. If the FOMO-driven mania continues, FAANG stocks will likely outperform, which will spread to similar stocks around the world. The Chinese investable index includes Alibaba, Tencent and other new economy stocks that will likely outperform the EM benchmark. If global markets correct and EM currencies drop, the Chinese RMB will appreciate relative to most EM exchange rates. This will help China’s equity performance relative to other EM bourses. Finally, if US-China tensions escalate and EM markets sell off, Chinese authorities will support share prices by deploying the national team and other government proxies to buy Chinese stocks. This will help the broad universe of Chinese stocks to outperform the EM benchmark. Chart I-16Long Chinese Investable / Short Korean Equities Bottom Line: We are upgrading Chinese stocks from neutral to overweight and downgrading the Korean bourse from overweight to neutral within an EM equity portfolio. Market-neutral investors should consider the following trade: long Chinese / short Korean equities (Chart I-16). Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the following articles: Coronavirus spawns new generation of Japanese stock pickers Stuck at Home, More Filipinos Try Luck at Stock Investing Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
The South Korean economy is facing strong deflationary pressures, requiring significant and additional rate cuts. Meanwhile, 10-year government bonds yield are still at 1.4%, 75 basis points over 10-year US Treasurys (Chart II-1). Hence, Korea’s bond yields offer good value for fixed-income investors and have considerable downside. We have been receiving 10-year swap rates in Korea since 2011 and are reiterating this recommendation: Chart II-2 shows that the GDP deflator has been negative since 2018, and core and trimmed mean consumer prices are flirting with deflation. Chart II-1Korean Government Bonds Yields: More Room To Fall Chart II-2The Korean Economy Is Flirting With Deflation Falling prices amid elevated corporate and household debt levels – at 102% and 96% of GDP respectively – is toxic. The basis is price deflation increases real debt burdens. Notably, the debt service ratio for businesses and households is very high at 19.9% of GDP. Exports – which account for some 40% of GDP – are plunging. The business survey from Bank of Korea suggests exporters’ business sentiment plunged by a record in May and is close to 2008 levels, pointing to a dreadful export outlook. (Chart II-3) Domestic demand will remain weak, despite the large fiscal response to the COVID-19 outbreak. Business investment and hiring will be depressed for a while, undercutting consumer spending (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Exports In Freefall Chart II-4Less Investment Plan And Poor Employment Outlook Finally, residential investment was in the doldrums even before the COVID-19 outbreak. Chart II-5 illustrates that declining residential construction permits preclude lower residential construction for the rest of the year. The Bank of Korea will have to cut interest rates considerably this year. From a big-picture perspective, there is no reason why Korea’s policy rate should not be reduced close to zero as is the case in advanced economies. Korea’s economy shares many similarities with advanced economies like high debt levels and persistent deflationary pressures. On top of this, Korea is much more exposed to global trade, which makes its cyclical outlook worse, heralding substantial monetary easing. Exchange Rate Low interest rates could undermine the Korean won, even though the exchange rate has not historically been driven by interest rate differentials. The key driver of the won – shrinking global trade volumes and deflating tradable goods prices – warrants a cheaper currency to mitigate the negative impact on corporate profitability (Chart II-6). Chart II-5Falling Residential Construction Permits Chart II-6Deflating Export Prices Herald Currency Depreciation Besides, deflation in DRAM prices (Chart II-7) as well as DRAM sales point to further currency depreciation and lower Korean tech stock prices (Chart II-8). Chart II-7Deflating Semiconductor Prices... Chart II-8Semiconductor Prices Are Still Deflating ...Does Not Bode Well For Tech Stocks Overall, a weak currency is needed to alleviate deflationary pressures currently present in the economy. Stocks We are negative on the KOSPI in absolute terms but continue to recommend that EM-dedicated equity portfolio investors overweight this bourse. Despite being a highly cyclical market, we believe the KOSPI’s outperformance will be due to its large weight in tech stocks. The latter will benefit from China’s ambitious tech-related infrastructure plan in the coming years. The plan includes construction of Information Transmission, Software and Information Technology Services, such as 5G networks, industrial internet and data centers. We expect total investment will reach between US$182 billion and $266 billion by the end of 2020, an increase of 30-50% over last year. Importantly, 40% of Korea’s semiconductor exports are purchased by China. We have been playing the semiconductor theme via Korea rather than Taiwan because the latter is a wild card amid escalating geopolitical tensions between the US and China. Our geopolitical team expects a flare up in US-China tensions ahead of US elections this year, and Taiwan could become one of the focal points. Bottom Line: Continue receiving 10-year swap rates, shorting the won against the US dollar and overweighting the KOSPI within an EM dedicated equity portfolio. Lin Xiang, CFA Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com
Feature Analysis on Korea & South Africa are available on pages 6 and 10, respectively. Mexico: Balancing Pros And Cons We have been overweight Mexican sovereign credit and local currency bonds as well as equities relative to the respective EM benchmarks. Our rationale for this stance has been the fact that Mexico’s macro risk premium relative to other EMs has been, in our opinion, wider than it should have been. However, the COVID-19 outbreak has introduced new dimensions into this analysis. On one hand, there are a number of positives that still warrant a lower macro risk premium on Mexican assets: The nation’s public debt burden is rising sharply but is not yet at an unsustainable level. We estimate that assuming (1) a nominal GDP contraction of 7% in 2020, (2) an overall fiscal deficit of 4.7% of GDP this year, and (3) the peso’s exchange rate versus the US dollar at 26, the gross public debt-to-GDP ratio will rise to 49% from 37% currently (Table I-1). If we assume the government takes over all SOE debt, including that of Pemex, total gross public debt will rise to 62% of GDP (Table I-1). While non-trivial, Mexico’s public debt burden is considerably lower than those in large EM countries like Brazil and South Africa. Table I-1Mexico's Public Debt Burden Chart I-1Mexico: Real And Nominal Rates Are Too High Despite widespread investor concerns, President AMLO has been running a very tight fiscal policy. At the end of 2019, the government had a primary surplus of 1% of GDP, and the overall deficit stood at 1.6%. In fact, given AMLO’s ideological approach to fiscal frugality, his government’s fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic to date has actually been less than what it can or should be. Similarly, monetary policy has been very tight. This is positive for creditors but negative for growth. The central bank has erred on the hawkish side and has a lot of room to reduce interest rates. Nominal and real interest rates in Mexico are among the highest in the EM universe (Chart I-1). Very tight fiscal policy means that monetary policy can be relaxed considerably. Interest rates in Mexico have a lot of downside. Finally, the peso is reasonably cheap, according to the real effective exchange rate based on CPI and PPI measures (Chart I-2). Mexico’s macro risk premium relative to other EMs has been, in our opinion, wider than it should have been. On the other hand, there are considerable negatives, especially regarding the growth outlook: A year and a half into his mandate, president AMLO has not been able to secure the corporate sector’s confidence in his administration’s policies. The government was attempting to reverse this trend in the months leading up to the COVID-19 outbreak by announcing a public-private infrastructure package and improving relations with the US. Nevertheless, the decision to shun large corporations from the national fiscal response has once again weighed on business confidence. This will further reduce capital spending and hiring, prolonging the recession (Chart I-3). Chart I-2The Mexican Peso Is Cheap Chart I-3Business Confidence Plummets Again The government’s fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been insufficient. The central government announced measures to increase funding for social and infrastructure programs and loans for households as well as small and medium businesses, amounting to a mere 3% of GDP. This is one of the lowest stimulus packages among major economies worldwide (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Mexico's Fiscal Response Is Poor Mexico is highly levered to the US economy. A deep contraction in American demand for consumer discretionary goods and international travel will suffocate Mexico’s export revenues. Exports of automobiles and tourism revenues together account for 37% of total goods and services exports, and 13% of GDP (Chart I-5). Balancing pros and cons, we recommend the following strategy for Mexican markets: Continue to overweight local currency bonds and sovereign credit within their respective EM benchmarks (Chart I-6). Orthodox fiscal and monetary policies warrant an overweight stance on fixed-income plays. Chart I-5Autos And Tourism Revenues Are Significant Chart I-6Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit We reiterate our trade to receive Mexican 10-year swap rates. The only reason we are reluctant to be long cash domestic bonds is the potential for further currency depreciation. Finally, we are maintaining an overweight stance on equities, even though we acknowledge the very bad profit outlook. However, historically whenever Mexican interest rates have fallen relative to EM, Mexican stocks have typically outperformed the EM equity benchmark (Chart I-7). This is the primary rationale behind our equity overweight stance. Chart I-7Mexico vs. EM: Government Bond Yields Are Inversely Correlated To Stock Prices Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com South Korea: Bonds Offer Value Amid Looming Deflation The South Korean economy is facing strong deflationary pressures, requiring significant and additional rate cuts. Meanwhile, 10-year government bonds yield are still at 1.4%, 75 basis points over 10-year US Treasurys (Chart II-1). Hence, Korea’s bond yields offer good value for fixed-income investors and have considerable downside. We have been receiving 10-year swap rates in Korea since 2011 and are reiterating this recommendation: Chart II-2 shows that the GDP deflator has been negative since 2018, and core and trimmed mean consumer prices are flirting with deflation. Chart II-1Korean Government Bonds Yields: More Room To Fall Chart II-2The Korean Economy Is Flirting With Deflation Falling prices amid elevated corporate and household debt levels – at 102% and 96% of GDP respectively – is toxic. The basis is price deflation increases real debt burdens. Notably, the debt service ratio for businesses and households is very high at 19.9% of GDP. There is no reason why Korea’s policy rate should not be reduced close to zero as is the case in advanced economies. Exports – which account for some 40% of GDP – are plunging. The business survey from Bank of Korea suggests exporters’ business sentiment plunged by a record in May and is close to 2008 levels, pointing to a dreadful export outlook. (Chart II-3) Domestic demand will remain weak, despite the large fiscal response to the COVID-19 outbreak. Business investment and hiring will be depressed for a while, undercutting consumer spending (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Exports In Freefall Chart II-4Less Investment Plan And Poor Employment Outlook Chart II-5Falling Residential Construction Permits Finally, residential investment was in the doldrums even before the COVID-19 outbreak. Chart II-5 illustrates that declining residential construction permits preclude lower residential construction for the rest of the year. The Bank of Korea will have to cut interest rates considerably this year. From a big-picture perspective, there is no reason why Korea’s policy rate should not be reduced close to zero as is the case in advanced economies. Korea’s economy shares many similarities with advanced economies like high debt levels and persistent deflationary pressures. On top of this, Korea is much more exposed to global trade, which makes its cyclical outlook worse, heralding substantial monetary easing. Exchange Rate Low interest rates could undermine the Korean won, even though the exchange rate has not historically been driven by interest rate differentials. The key driver of the won – shrinking global trade volumes and deflating tradable goods prices – warrants a cheaper currency to mitigate the negative impact on corporate profitability (Chart II-6). Chart II-6Deflating Export Prices Herald Currency Depreciation Chart II-7Deflating Semiconductor Prices... Besides, deflation in DRAM prices (Chart II-7) as well as DRAM sales point to further currency depreciation and lower Korean tech stock prices (Chart II-8). Chart II-8...Does Not Bode Well For Tech Stocks Overall, a weak currency is needed to alleviate deflationary pressures currently present in the economy. Stocks We are negative on the KOSPI in absolute terms but continue to recommend that EM-dedicated equity portfolio investors overweight this bourse. Despite being a highly cyclical market, we believe the KOSPI’s outperformance will be due to its large weight in tech stocks. The latter will benefit from China’s ambitious tech-related infrastructure plan in the coming years. The plan includes construction of Information Transmission, Software and Information Technology Services, such as 5G networks, industrial internet and data centers. We expect total investment will reach between US$182 billion and $266 billion by the end of 2020, an increase of 30-50% over last year. Importantly, 40% of Korea’s semiconductor exports are purchased by China. We have been playing the semiconductor theme via Korea rather than Taiwan because the latter is a wild card amid escalating geopolitical tensions between the US and China. Our geopolitical team expects a flare up in US-China tensions ahead of US elections this year, and Taiwan could become one of the focal points. Bottom Line: Continue receiving 10-year swap rates, shorting the won against the US dollar and overweighting the KOSPI within an EM dedicated equity portfolio. Lin Xiang, CFA Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com South Africa: A Point Of No Return On Public Debt South Africa’s public debt is bound to surge to unsustainable levels: from 62% of GDP in 2019 to 95% of GDP by the end of 2021. If the government is forced to take over unsustainable debt from state-owned enterprises, which is very likely, it will push up the public debt-to-GDP ratio further by another nine percentage points to 104% of GDP. Table III-1 summarizes South Africa’s public debt projections using the following parameters and assumptions: To fight the COVID-19-induced economic crunch, President Cyril Ramaphosa recently announced a fiscal stimulus package of $26 billion (R500 billion), or 10% of GDP. Using recent government and central bank projections for 2020 and 2021, nominal GDP growth is expected to contract by 2.5% and expand 6.7%, respectively. Notably, fiscal revenue growth is expected to fall by 32% in nominal terms, according to recent comments by the Minister of Finance.1 Meanwhile, government spending will grow by 15%,2 and the primary fiscal deficit is expected to widen to 15.4% of GDP in 2020. Given that government forecasts often tend to be optimistic, chances are that both the primary deficit and public debt-to-GDP ratio will overshoot these forecasts. Finally, the sharp drop in domestic demand will increase the odds of a default among state-owned enterprises, with Eskom likely being a case in point. Current government guidelines require at least two thirds of Eskom’s R450 billion debt to be transferred to government balances in the event of default or anticipated default. In such a case, this increases the government debt-to-GDP ratio by an additional R350 billion, or 7% of GDP. Table III-1Projections For South Africa Fiscal Position And Public Debt Altogether, the public debt-to-GDP ratio will surge to 104% of GDP by the end of 2021 (Chart III-1). With public debt above 100% of GDP, interest rates well above nominal GDP and the government running large primary deficits, debt dynamics will become unsustainable. To avoid a public debt crisis, the government should either run large primary surpluses, which is unfeasible anytime soon, or bring down government borrowing costs to push up nominal GDP above interest rates (Chart III-2). Chart III-1Public Debt-To-GDP Will Balloon To 104%! Chart III-2Unsustainable Gap Between Local Yields And Nominal Growth The latter option is the only one that is politically feasible. But to do so, the central bank needs to resort to the monetization of public debt. The central bank (SARB) has already taken the first step to bring down bond yields by buying government bonds in the secondary market. While the rationale of that was to cover foreign investors’ selling of local currency bonds, it amounts to nothing else but quantitative easing, or public debt monetization. Ultimately, the outcome of large fiscal deficits and public debt monetization is a weaker currency. As such, debt monetization is a fait accompli in South Africa. Monetizing part of the government’s debt will help reduce real borrowing costs and at the same time reflate nominal GDP growth, thereby boosting government revenues. Ultimately, the outcome of large fiscal deficits and public debt monetization is a weaker currency. If foreigners continue to sell the local currency bond market, the SARB and commercial banks will need to buy more government debt, creating even more money. This is why we expect the rand to continue depreciating. Investment Recommendations Chart III-3The Rand Could Drop Further Given Public Debt Dynamics The currency will likely get cheaper provided the rising odds of outright public debt monetization (Chart III-3). Continue shorting the rand versus the US dollar. We are initiating a new position of receiving 2-year swap rates. Odds are that the central bank will cut rates further in the months to come. Remain underweight local currency bonds in an EM-dedicated portfolio. Even though local domestic rates will likely fall, South African bonds will not outperform the EM benchmark on a total return in US dollar basis, mostly due to chronic currency depreciation. Finally, investors should underweight sovereign credit (government US dollar bonds) due to the unsustainable public debt dynamics. Dedicated EM equity portfolio investors should maintain a below-benchmark allocation to this bourse. Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Minister of Finance made remarks about tax revenue falling by 32% in nominal terms. Tax revenues represent almost 100% of overall revenue. 2 Overall fiscal package is estimated to be 3% of GDP. This excludes reprioritization in 2020 around R130 billion & loan guarantee scheme of R200 billion. Overall total additional spending amounts to R170 billion in 2020 fiscal year. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Global semiconductor share prices have continued to hit new highs, even though there has not been any recovery (positive growth) in global semiconductor sales or in their corporate earnings (EPS). Global semiconductor sales bottomed on a rate-of-change basis in June, but their annual growth rate was still negative in December. In the meantime, global semi share prices have been rallying since January 2019. This divergence between stock prices and revenue of global semiconductor stocks is unprecedented (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Global Semiconductor Market: Sales & Share Prices Over-Hyped Global Semi Share Prices Odds are that global semi stocks in general, and Asian ones in particular, will experience a pullback in the coming weeks. The coronavirus outbreak will likely dampen expectations related to the speed of 5G adoption and penetration in China. Critically, China accounted for 35% of global semiconductor sales in 2019, versus 19% for the US and 10% for the whole of Europe. In brief, semiconductor demand from China is now greater than the US and European demand combined. Furthermore, the latest news that the US administration is considering changing its regulations to prevent shipments of semiconductor chips to China’s Huawei Technologies from global companies - including Taiwan's TSMC - could hurt chip stocks further. Since Huawei Technologies is the global leader in 5G networks and smartphones, the ban, if implemented, will instigate a sizable setback to 5G adoption in China and elsewhere. Our updated estimate of global 5G smartphone shipments is between 160 million and 180 million units in 2020, which is below the median of industry expectations of 210 million units (Table II-1). The key reasons why the industry’s expectations are unreasonably high, in our opinion, are as follows: Chinese demand for new smartphones will likely stay weak (Chart II-2). The mainland smartphone market has become extremely saturated, with 1.3 billion units having been sold in just the past three years – nearly equaling the entire Chinese population. Table II-1Industry Forecasts Of The 2020 Global 5G- Smartphone Shipments Chart II-2Chinese Smartphone Demand: Further Decline In 2020 Chinese official data show that each Chinese household owned 2.5 phones on average in 2018, and that the average household size was about three persons (Chart II-3). This suggests that going forward nearly all potential phone demand in China is for replacement phones, and that there is no urgent need for households to buy new phones. Chart II-3Chinese Households: No Urgent Need For A New Phone The Chinese government’s boost to 5G infrastructure investment will likely increase annual installed 5G base stations from 130,000 units last year to about 600,000 to 800,000 this year. However, the total number of 5G base stations will still only account for about 7-9% of total base stations in China in 2020. Hence, geographical coverage will not be sufficiently wide enough to warrant a very high rate of 5G smartphone adoption and penetration. From Chinese consumers’ perspectives, a 5G phone in 2020 will be a ‘nice-to-have,’ but not a ‘must-have.’ Given increasing economic uncertainty and many concerns related to the use of 5G phones, mainland consumers may delay their purchases into 2021 when 5G phone networks will have more geographic coverage. The number of 5G phone models on the market is expanding, but not that quickly. Consumers may take their time to wait for more models to hit the market before making a 5G phone purchase. For example, Apple will release four 5G phone models, but only in September 2020. Moreover, the price competition between 5G and 4G phones is getting increasingly intense. Smartphone producers have already started to cut prices of their 4G phones aggressively. For example, the price of Apple’s iPhone XS, released in September 2018, has already dropped by about 50% in China. Outside of China, 5G infrastructure development will be much slower. The majority of developed countries will likely give in to pressure from the US and limit their use of Huawei 5G equipment. This will delay infrastructure installation and adoption of 5G throughout the rest of the world because Huawei has the leading and cheapest 5G technology. In 2019, China accounted for about 70% of worldwide 5G smartphone shipments. We reckon that in 2020 Chinese 5G smartphone shipments will be between 120 million and 130 million units. Assuming this accounts for about 70-75% of the world shipment of 5G phones this year, we arrive at our estimate of global 5G smartphone shipments of between 160 million and 180 million units. Overall, investors are pricing global semi stocks using the pace and trajectory of 4G smartphones adoption. However, in 2020 the number and speed of 5G phone penetration will continue lagging that of 4G ones when the latter were introduced in December 2013 (Chart II-4). We agree that 5G technology is revolutionary, and its adoption and penetration will surge in the coming years. Nevertheless, we still believe global semi share prices are presently overhyped by unreasonably optimistic 2020 projections (Chart II-5). Chart II-4China 5G-Adoption Pace: Slower Than The Case With 4G Chart II-5Net Earnings Of Global Semi Sector: Too Optimistic? Investment Implications Global semi stocks’ valuations are very elevated, as shown in Chart II-6 and Chart II-7. Besides, semi stocks are overbought, suggesting they could correct meaningfully if lofty growth expectations currently baked into their prices do not materialize in the first half of this year. Chart II-6Global Semi Stocks Valuations: Very Elevated Chart II-7Global Semi Stocks’ Valuations: Very Elevated The coronavirus outbreak and the resulting delay in 5G phone sales in China in the first half of 2020, along with US pressure on global semi producers not to sell to Huawei, will likely trigger a pullback in semiconductor equities. We recommend patiently waiting for a better entry point for absolute return investors. Within the EM equity universe, we have not been underweight Asian semi stocks because of our negative outlook for the overall EM equity benchmark. We remain neutral on Taiwan and overweight Korea. The reason is that DRAM makers such as Samsung and Hynix have rallied much less than TSMC. Besides, geopolitical risks in relation to Taiwan in general and TSMC in particular are rising, warranting a more defensive stance on Taiwanese stocks relative to Korean equities. Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com
The USD/KRW is trading at a nearly 10% premium to its Purchasing Power Parity equilibrium. Historically, when investors exchange the won at such a discount, they often benefit from FX appreciation in addition to the yield. We do not think this time will be…
Highlights Since early this year, global semiconductor stock prices have been front-running a demand recovery that has not yet begun. There is strong industry optimism surrounding a potential demand boost for semiconductors from the rollout of 5G networks and phones in 2020. Yet we expect actual 2020 Chinese 5G smartphone shipments to fall considerably short of what industry observers expect, especially in the first half of the year. Global semiconductor stocks are over-hyped. Even though momentum could push them higher in the short term, we believe there will be a better entry point in the coming months. Given that Korean semiconductor stocks have lagged, we are upgrading Korean tech stocks and the KOSPI to overweight within the EM equity benchmark. Feature Global semiconductor stock prices have been rallying strongly, increasingly diverging from global semiconductor sales since early January. The former have risen to new highs, while the latter have remained in deep contraction (Chart 1). Chart 1A Puzzle: Semiconductors Stock Prices Skyrocketed When Sales Remain In A Deep Contraction We are puzzled by such a dramatic divergence between share prices and the industry’s top line. After all, the ongoing contraction in worldwide semiconductor sales has been broad-based across both regions and the majority of top 10 semiconductor companies (Charts 2 and 3). Chart 2A Broad-Based Contraction Across All Regions… Chart 3…And Most Top Semiconductor Companies In our June1 report, we argued that world semiconductor sales would continue to shrink through the remainder of 2019. This view has played out, but global semiconductor share prices have surged and outperformed the global equity benchmark. Global semiconductor stock prices have been front-running a demand recovery that has not yet begun. It seems the market has been looking beyond the current weakness. It currently expects a potential demand boost for semiconductors from 5G phones in 2020 on the back of rising hopes of a US-China trade conflict resolution. Is such hype about 5G network and corresponding shipments justified? Our research leads us to contend that global semiconductor sales will likely post only low- to middle-single-digit growth in 2020, with most of the recovery back loaded in the second half of the year. Hype over 5G phones among industry participants and investors may continue pushing semiconductor share prices higher in the near term. However, the odds are that the reality of tepid semiconductor sales growth will likely set in early next year, and semiconductor stocks will correct considerably. In short, we do not recommend chasing the rally. There will be a better entry point in the months ahead. 5G-Smartphones: The Savior Of Semiconductor Demand? Chart 4Semiconductor Sales Are Still Contracting At A Double-Digit Rate The primary driver behind the rally in semiconductor share prices is strong optimism among major semiconductor producers and investors about a rapid ramp-up of global 5G-smartphone adoption. In addition, the market is also holding onto a good amount of hope for a US-China trade conflict resolution, which will also facilitate the pace of global 5G deployment. Mobile phones account for the largest share (29%) of global semiconductor revenue. The industry expects strong global 5G-smartphone shipments in 2020 to spur a meaningful recovery in semiconductor demand (Chart 4). Table 1 shows a list of estimates for 2020 global 5G-smartphone shipments by major semiconductor companies, industry analysts and investors, ranging from 120 million to 225 million units, with a mean of 180 million units. Table 1Market Forecasts Of In 2020 Global 5G-Smartphone Shipments In particular, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest dedicated integrated circuit (IC) foundry, recently almost doubled its forecast for 5G smartphone penetration for 2020 to a mid-teen percentage from a single-digit percentage forecast made just six months ago. Given that global smartphone shipments currently stand at roughly 1.4 billion units per year, a 15% penetration rate would translate into 210 million units of 5G smartphone shipments in 2020. Meanwhile, Qualcomm, the world's largest maker of mobile application processors and baseband modems, last week predicted that 2020 global 5G smartphone shipments will range between 175 million units and 225 million units. We agree that 5G smartphone sales in 2020 will increase sharply from currently very low levels, but we also believe the penetration pace estimated by the industry is optimistic. The basis for our conclusion is as follows: Chart 5So Far, China 5G-Adoption Pace Has Been Much Slower Than Its 4G 5G-smartphone shipments in China will largely determine the pace of worldwide 5G-phone shipments. The country will be the world leader in the 5G smartphone market due to the government’s promotion of it and the advanced 5G technology held by China's largest telecom equipment producer, Huawei. China announced the debut of the 5G-era on June 6. Since then, total 5G-smartphone shipments have been only about 800,000 units through the end of September. In terms of the pace of penetration (5G-smartphone shipments as a share of total mobile phone shipments during the first three months of launch), the rate was a mere 0.3%. In comparison with the debut of the 4G-era in December 2013, shipments of 4G phones in China were significantly larger, and their adoption rate was much faster (Chart 5). During the first three months of the 4G launch, 4G phone shipments were 9.7 million units, reaching 10% of total smartphone shipments. Here are the most important reasons behind what will be a much slower penetration pace for 5G smartphones in China compared with the 4G rollout. We agree that 5G smartphone sales in 2020 will increase sharply from currently very low levels, but we also believe the penetration pace estimated by the industry is optimistic. Market saturation: The Chinese smartphone market has become much more saturated than it was six years ago when 4G was launched. Since then, there have been about 2.3 billion units of 4G smartphones sold, with 1.3 billion units sold in the past three years – nearly equaling the total Chinese population. This means the replacement need in China is low. High prices: 5G smartphones in China are currently much more expensive than 4G ones. 5G phone prices range from RMB 4000-7000 in China, while most of the 4G ones sell within the range of RMB 1000-3000. According to data from QuestMobile, a professional big data intelligence service provider in China's mobile internet market, in the first half of 2019, about 41% of smartphones were sold at RMB 1000-2000, about 30% at RMB 2000-3000, and only 10% at RMB 4000 and above. Functionality: At the moment, except for faster data download/upload speed, 5G smartphones do not offer much more functionality than 4G ones. Back in 2014, 4G phones had much more attractive features than 3G. For example, while 3G smartphones only allowed audio and picture transmission, those with 4G enabled video chatting and high-quality streaming video. In addition, for now, there are very few smartphone apps that can only be used for 5G phones. 5G Infrastructure: Presently, there is only very limited geographical coverage of 5G base stations. The number of 5G base stations is estimated to be 130 thousand units this year, only accounting for 1.6% of total base stations in China. In comparison, 65% of all Chinese base stations are 4G-enabled. Meanwhile, to cover the same region, the number of 5G base stations needs to at least double that of 4G ones. It will take at a minimum two or three years to develop decent coverage of 5G base stations. Besides, the cost of building 5G-enabled infrastructure is much more expensive than the deployment of the 4G ones. There are two types of 5G networks: Non-standalone (NSA) and Standalone (SA). The 5G data transmission speed is significantly faster in SA mode than in NSA mode. However, the deployment cost of the SA network is much higher than the cost for NSA networks, as the latter can be built from existing 4G networks, but the former cannot. Critically, the Chinese government recently announced only SA-compatible 5G smartphones will be allowed to have access to the 5G network in China, starting January 1, 2020. This signals that the focus of future 5G network development will be centered around SA mode instead of this year’s NSA mode. Over 90% of China’s 5G network was NSA mode in 2019. Building a 5G SA network will take longer and cost more. The market expects China to build as much as 1 million units of 5G base stations in 2020. Even if this goal is achieved, it only accounts for about 11% of total Chinese base stations. Chart 6Chinese Smartphone Sales: Still In Contraction Lack of variety of SA-compatible 5G-phone models. There are also limited options for SA-compatible 5G smartphones models. So far, even though Huawei, Xiaomi, Vivo, Oppo, ZTE and Samsung have all released 5G smartphones, only models from Huawei work under SA networks.2 All others only work under the NSA network. Hence, the variety of SA-compatible 5G phone models is very limited. This will likely delay sales of 5G phones in China. Many more models of SA-compatible 5G smartphones will likely be released only in the second half of next year, which may both drive down 5G smartphone prices and attract more buyers. Consumer spending slowdown: 4G smartphones can meet the needs of the majority of users, and most users have purchased a new phone within the past three years. With elevated economic uncertainty and slowing income growth, a larger proportion of people in China may decide to delay upgrading from 4G-phones to much more expensive 5G ones. This echoes a continuing decline in Chinese smartphone sales (Chart 6). Overall, from Chinese consumers’ perspective, a 5G phone in 2020 will be a nice-to-have, but not a must-have. Given all the aforementioned factors, our best guess for 2020 Chinese 5G smartphone shipments is 40-60 million units, with a larger proportion occurring in the second half of the year. From Chinese consumers’ perspective, a 5G phone in 2020 will be a nice-to-have, but not a must-have. As China is much more aggressive in moving to 5G network adaptation than other large economies, we share industry experts’ forecasts that China will account for 50% of total global 5G shipments. Provided our estimate for China is about 50 million units, our global forecast for 5G phone shipments in 2020 comes to about 100 million units worldwide. This is substantially lower than industry and analyst average estimates of 180 million units (see Table 1 on page 4). Notably, rising 5G smartphone sales will cannibalize some 4G-phone demand. Consequently, aggregate demand for semiconductors will not grow, but the share of high-valued-added chips in the overall product mix will rise. Bottom Line: The penetration pace of 5G smartphones will be meaningfully slower than both the semiconductor producers and analysts expect. Most likely, a meaningful recovery in global aggregate smartphone sales will not occur over the next six months. We suspect the positive impact of 5G phone sales will be felt by global semiconductor producers largely in the second half of 2020. Semiconductor Demand Beyond 5G In terms of end usage, except smartphones, the top five end uses for semiconductors are personal computers (PCs) (12%), servers (11%), diverse consumer products (12%), automotive (10%), and industrial electronics (9%). Structural PC demand is down, but sales have been more or less flat in the past three years (Chart 7). Next year, commercial demand may accelerate as enterprises work through the remainder of their Windows 10 migration. However, household demand is still facing strong competition from tablets. Overall, we expect PC demand to remain stagnant. Global server shipments sank deeper into contraction in the second quarter of this year due to a slowdown in purchasing from cloud providers and hyperscale customers. They may stay in moderate contraction over the next six months as global economic uncertainty remain elevated, which may discourage enterprises’ investment plans (Chart 8). Chart 7Structural PC Demand Is Stagnant And Will Remain So In 2020 Chart 8Global Server Shipments: A Moderate Contraction In 2020 Chart 9Automotive-Related Semiconductor Demand: A Moderate Growth Ahead Chinese auto sales – about 30% of the world total – will likely stage a rate-of-change improvement, moving from deep to mild contraction or stagnation over the next six months.3 Increasing penetration of new energy vehicles and continuing 5G deployment may still result in moderate growth in auto-related semiconductor demand (Chart 9). Semiconductor demand from diverse consumer products slightly declined in the third quarter, with robust growth in tablets, eReaders and portable navigation devices, and contraction in all other subsectors including TV sets, gaming, printers and images, cameras and set-top boxes (Chart 10). This may remain in slight contraction or stagnation over the next three to six months. Automation and 5G deployment will likely continue to increase semiconductor sales in the industrial sector (Chart 11). Chart 10Semiconductor Demand From Consumer Products: A Slight Contraction Or Stagnation Ahead Chart 11Industrial Semiconductor Demand: More Upside Ahead Chart 12Memory Prices Still Signal Sluggish Semiconductor Demand Overall, demand recovery has not yet begun. The lack of price recovery in DRAM prices after 18 months of declines and still-low NAND prices are also signaling sluggish semiconductor demand (Chart 12). Bottom Line: Odds are that global semiconductor demand in sectors other than smartphones will show improvement in terms of rate of change, but will still likely be flat in 2020. TSMC Sales: A Harbinger Of Industry Recovery? TSMC, the world’s biggest semiconductor company, posted a revival in sales over four consecutive months from June to September. Do TSMC sales lead global semiconductor sales? The answer is not always. TSMC sales do not always correlate well with global semiconductor sales (Chart 13). For example, TSMC sales diverged from global semiconductor sales in 2017-‘18 and 2013-‘14. So what are the reasons for strong increase in TSMC sales? First, it reflects market share rotation in the global smartphone market in favor of smartphone producers that use TSMC-fabricated chips. Chart 13TSMC Sales Do Not Always Lead Global Semiconductor Sales Demand from the global smartphone sector contributes to almost half of TSMC’s total revenue. Apple and Huawei are TSMC’s two top customers. The most recent report from market research firm Canalys shows that while Apple’s smartphone shipments declined 7% year-on-year last quarter, Huawei’s shipments soared 29%.4 Combined, smartphone shipments from these two companies still jumped nearly 12% year-on-year in the third quarter of the year. This has increased their market share in the global smartphone market to 31% now from 28% a year ago. Second, rising TSMC sales also reflect market share rotation in the global server market, in particular rising shipments and growing market share of servers using AMD high-performing-computing (HPC) chips instead of Intel ones. AMD’s 7nm Epyc CPU, launched this August and manufactured by TSMC, has been taking share from Intel in the global server market. This has driven the increase in TSMC’s revenue from the HPC sector. Third, the share of value-added products (high-end chips) in TSMC’s product mix has been rising rapidly. TSMC’s share of revenue from 7nm technology jumped from 21% to 27% in the third quarter, as most of Apple’s and Huawei’s chips and all of AMD’s Epyc CPUs are 7nm-based. Back in the third quarter of 2018, TSMC’s 7nm business only accounted for 11% of its total revenue. Chart 14Both TSMC Sales And Taiwanese PMI Could Continue To Improve While Global Semiconductor Sales Remain In Contraction Finally, although internet of things (IoT) and automotive chips only account for 9% and 4% of TSMC’s total share of revenue respectively, strong growth in both segments –33% year-on-year in IoT and 20% year-on-year in automotive – indeed shows exceptional demand in these two sectors in a weakening global economic environment. As IoT and automotive development will highly rely on global 5G infrastructure development, their impact will be meaningful once the global 5G network becomes well advanced and widely installed. To conclude, while a 40% boost in TSMC’s capital spending indeed paints a positive picture on global semiconductor demand over the longer term, rising TSMC sales do not mean an imminent and strong recovery in the global semiconductor sector is in the works. Huawei is the global 5G technology leader and the major supplier in both 5G-network equipment and 5G smartphones; the company will be a major revenue contributor to TSMC. As Huawei will likely place more orders to TSMC for chip fabrication, this will likely result in further improvement in TSMC’s sales (Chart 14). Bottom Line: Rising TSMC sales do not necessarily herald an imminent and robust cyclical recovery in the global semiconductor sector. Investment Conclusions Global semiconductor stock prices have been front running a recovery that has not yet begun. In addition, there is still uncertainty about the technology aspect of US-China trade negotiations. The US will likely continue to have Huawei and other Chinese high-tech companies on its trade-ban list – its so-called Entity List. TSMC sales do not always correlate well with global semiconductor sales. Notably, global semiconductor sales and profits are still in deep contraction, while share prices are at all-time highs (Chart 15). As a result, semiconductor stocks’ multiples have spiked to their previous highs (Chart 16). Chart 15Semiconductor Companies Profits: Still In Deep Contraction Chart 16Elevated Semiconductor Stocks Multiples While it is common for share prices to rally ahead of a business cycle/profit revival, we believe a true recovery will only emerge in spring 2020, and it will initially be much more subdued than industry watchers and investors expect. In the near term, strong momentum could still push semiconductor stock prices higher. However, the reality will then set in and there will be an air pocket before a more sustainable bull market emerges. Our US Equity Investment Strategy earlier this week downgraded S&P semiconductor equipment companies to underweight and put the S&P Semiconductors Index on a downgrade alert.5 Their newly created top-down semiconductor profit growth model warns that an earnings recovery is not yet imminent (Chart 17). For EM-dedicated equity managers, we have been neutral on Asian semiconductor sectors. We continue to recommend a market-weight allocation to Taiwan’s overall market, while we are upgrading the Korean technology sector from a neutral allocation to overweight. Korean semiconductor stocks have rallied much less than their global peers. Hence, the risk of a major relapse is lower. Given that we have been overweight non-tech Korean stocks, upgrading tech stocks to overweight means we will be overweight the KOSPI within the EM equity benchmark (Chart 18). Chart 17Semiconductor Earnings Recovery: Not Imminent Chart 18Upgrade Korean Tech Stocks And Overweight KOSPI Within EM Meanwhile, we remain long the Bloomberg Asia-Pacific Semiconductor Index and short the S&P 500 Semiconductor Index. This trade has produced a 7% gain since its initiation on June 13, 2019. The Bloomberg Asia-Pacific Semiconductor index has 12 stocks. Samsung and TSMC account for 38% and 37% of the index, respectively. The S&P 500 Semiconductor Index has 13 stocks. Intel, Broadcom, Texas Instruments and Qualcomm are the top five constituents, together accounting for nearly 77% of the index. Although the US and China may reach a temporary trade deal, the US will continue to restrict sales of tech products and high-end semiconductors to China. As a result, these US semiconductor companies, most of which are IC designing companies, will likely experience a more subdued than expected recovery in sales. Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "The Global Semiconductor Sector: Is A Cyclical Upturn Imminent?" dated June 13, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.guancha.cn/ChanJing/2019_09_21_518748.shtml http://www.cac.gov.cn/2019-10/23/c_1573361796389322.htm 3 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "Chinese Auto Demand: Time For A Recovery?" dated October 17, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 4 https://www.canalys.com/analysis/smartphone+analysis 5 Please see US Equity Strategy Special Report "Defying Gravity," dated November 4, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com