UK

Highlights The FOMC statement was somewhat more hawkish than expected. The Fed is on course to raise rates two to three times next year. Trump's policy views are squarely bearish for bonds, but more mixed for stocks. Investors are focusing too much on the positive aspects of Trump's agenda, while ignoring the glaringly negative ones. The 35-year bond bull market is over. Deep-seated political and economic forces will conspire to lift inflation over the coming years. For now, rising wages and prices are welcome news given that inflation remains below target in most economies. However, with productivity and labor force growth still weak around the world - and likely to stay that way - reflation will eventually morph into stagflation. Feature A Fork In The Road Charlie Wilson, the former CEO of General Motors, once famously declared that "what is good for GM is good for the country." There is little doubt that policies that boost economic growth can benefit both Wall Street and Main Street alike. On occasion, however, what is good for one may not be good for the other. Consider Donald Trump's campaign promise to curb illegal immigration and crack down on firms that move production abroad. Reduced immigration means fewer potential customers, and hence weaker sales growth. Fewer immigrant workers and less outsourcing also means higher wages for native-born workers. Bad news for Wall Street, but arguably good news for Main Street. Chart 1Diminished Labor Market Slack Boosting Wages The distinction between Wall Street and Main Street is critical for thinking about how various policies affect bonds and stocks. Bond prices tend to be more influenced by what happens to the broader economy (the key concern for Main Street), whereas equity prices tend to be more influenced by what happens to corporate earnings (the key concern for Wall Street). Corporate earnings have recovered much more briskly over the past eight years than the overall economy. Thus, it is no surprise that stock prices have surged while bond yields have tumbled. Things may be changing, however. A tighter U.S. labor market is pushing up wages, and this is starting to weigh on corporate profit margins (Chart 1). Meanwhile, bond yields are finally rebounding after hitting record low levels earlier this year. A Somewhat Hawkish Hike This week's FOMC statement reinforced the upward trajectory in yields. Both the median and modal "dot" in the Summary of Economic Projections shifted from two to three hikes next year. While Chair Yellen mentioned that a few participants "did incorporate some assumption about the change in fiscal policy," we suspect that many did not, reflecting the lack of clarity about the timing, composition, and magnitude of any fiscal package. As these details are fleshed out, it is probable that both growth and inflation assumptions will be revised up, helping to keep the Fed's tightening bias in place. The key question is whether U.S. growth will be strong enough next year to allow the Fed to keep raising rates. Our view is that it will. As we argued in October in "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen,"1 a recovery in business capex, a turn in the inventory cycle, a pick-up in spending at the state and local government level, and continued solid consumption growth driven by rising real wages will all support demand in 2017. Indeed, it is likely that the Fed will find itself a bit behind the curve, allowing inflation to drift higher. The Structural Case For Higher Inflation The cyclical acceleration in U.S. and global inflation that we will see over the next few years will be buttressed by structural trends. As we first spelled out in this year's Q3 Strategy Outlook entitled "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market,"2 a number of political and economic forces will conspire to lift inflation and nominal bond yields over time. Let us start with the politics. Here, three inflationary forces stand out: The retreat from globalization; The rejection of fiscal austerity; The continued will and growing ability of central banks to push up inflation. Globalization Under Attack Globalization is an inherently deflationary force. In a globalized world, if a country experiences an idiosyncratic shock which raises domestic demand, this can be met with more imports rather than higher prices. In addition, the entry of millions of workers from once labor-rich, but capital-poor economies such as China, has depressed the wages of less-skilled workers in developed economies.3 Poorer workers tend to spend a greater share of their incomes than richer workers (Chart 2). To the extent that globalization has exacerbated income inequality, it has also reduced aggregate demand. It is too early to know to what extent Donald Trump will try to roll back globalization. So far, his cabinet appointments - perhaps with the exception of immigration hawk Jeff Sessions - are little different from what a run-of-the-mill Republican like Jeb Bush would have made. Yet, as we noted last week, it will be difficult for Trump to backtrack from his protectionist views because his white working-class base will abandon him if he does.4 As Chart 3 shows, the share of Republican voters who support free trade has plummeted from over half to only one-third. For better or for worse, the Republican Party has become a populist party. Davos Man beware. Chart 2The Rich Save, The Poor Not So Much Chart 3Republican Voters Are Rejecting Free Trade In any case, even if populist pressures do not cause global trade to collapse over the coming years, the period of "hyperglobalization," as Arvind Subramanian has called it, is over. As we discussed three weeks ago,5 many of the things that facilitated globalization over the past 30 years were one-off developments: China cannot join the WTO more than once; tariffs in most developed countries cannot fall much more because they are already close to zero; there is nothing on the horizon that will match the breakthrough productivity gains in global shipping that stemmed from containerization; the global supply chain is already highly efficient, etc. Thus, at the margin, globalization will be less of a deflationary force than it once was. Back To Bread And Circuses After a brief burst of fiscal stimulus following the financial crisis, governments moved quickly to tighten their belts. Now, however, the pendulum is starting to swing back towards easier fiscal policy, as nervous politicians look for ways to thwart the populist backlash (Chart 4). The U.K. is a good example of this emerging trend. Prior to the Brexit vote, the Conservative government had planned to tighten fiscal policy by a further 3.3% of GDP over the remainder of this decade. This goal has been thrown out the window, with Theresa May now even hinting about the prospect of some fiscal stimulus. Elsewhere in Europe, governments continue to flout their fiscal targets. Not only has the European Commission turned a blind eye to this development, but a recent report by the Commission actually suggested that a "desirable fiscal orientation" would entail larger budget deficits next year than what member states are currently targeting (Chart 5). Chart 4The End Of Austerity Chart 5The European Commission Recommends Greater Fiscal Expansion In Japan, Prime Minister Abe has scrapped plans to raise the sales tax next year. The supplementary budget announced in August will boost annual spending by 0.5% of GDP over the next three years. Our geopolitical team thinks that further spending measures will be introduced, especially on defense. For his part, Donald Trump has pledged massive fiscal stimulus consisting of increased infrastructure and defense expenditures, along with a whopping $6.2 trillion in tax cuts over the next 10 years even before accounting for additional interest costs. Investors shouldn't rejoice too much, however. Effective tax rates for S&P 500 companies are already well below statutory levels on account of the numerous loopholes in the tax code (Chart 6). Small businesses rather than large corporations will disproportionately benefit from Trump's tax measures. Chart 6The U.S. Effective Corporate Tax Rate Is Already Quite Low Moreover, it is doubtful that the maximum fiscal thrust from Trump's policies will be reached before 2018. By that time, the economy is likely to have reached full employment. As such, much of the stimulus is likely to show up in the form of higher wages rather than increased real corporate sales. More Monetary Ammo The global financial crisis set off the biggest deflation scare the world has seen since the Great Depression. Eight years later, central banks are still struggling to raise inflation. The conventional wisdom is that central banks are "out of bullets." This view, however, is much too pessimistic. Even if one excludes the use of such radical measures as helicopter money, it is still the case that traditional monetary policy becomes more effective as spare capacity is reduced. Consider the case of forward guidance. If an economy has a large output gap, a central bank's promise to keep interest rates at zero, even after full employment has been reached, may hold little sway. After all, many things can happen between now and then: A change of central bank leadership, another adverse economic shock, etc. In contrast, if the output gap is already quite small, as is the case in the U.S. today, a promise to let the economy run hot is more likely to be taken seriously. Chart 7 shows that the level of the U.S. core PCE deflator, the Fed's preferred inflation gauge, is nearly 4% lower than it would have been if inflation had remained at its 2% target since 2008. Given that the Fed has a symmetric target - meaning that inflation overshoots should be just as common as undershoots - aiming for an inflation rate above 2% over the next few years makes some sense. If inflation does move up to the 2.5%-to-3% range, the Fed might be reluctant to bring it back down since this would require slower growth and higher unemployment. In fact, a case could be made that the Fed and other central banks should simply raise their inflation targets. Both private and public debt levels are still quite elevated all over the world (Chart 8). Higher inflation would be one way to reduce the real value of those liabilities. Chart 7Inflation Has Undershot the Fed's Target Chart 8Elevated Debt Levels The difficulty in pushing nominal short-term rates much below zero is another reason to aim for a higher inflation rate. Back in 1999 when the FOMC first broached the idea of introducing a 2% inflation target, the Fed's simulations suggested that the zero lower bound would only be reached once every 20 years, and even on these rare occurrences, interest rates would be pinned to zero for only four quarters (Table 1). In reality, the U.S. economy has spent more than half of the time since then either at the zero bound or close to it. While we do not expect any central bank to raise their inflation targets anytime soon, long-term investors should nevertheless prepare for this possibility. Table 1The Fed Underestimated The Probability Of Rates Being Stuck At Zero Slow Potential Growth: Deflationary At First, Inflationary Later On The narrowing of output gaps around the world has given central banks more traction over monetary policy. However, there has been a dark side to this development - and one that also leans in the direction of higher inflation. As Chart 9 shows, spare capacity has declined in every major economy not because demand has been strong, but because supply has been weak. Chart 9AWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Chart 9BWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps The decline in potential GDP growth reflects both slower productivity and labor force growth. As we have discussed in past reports, while cyclical factors have weighed on potential growth, structural factors also loom large.6 The former include falling birth rates, flat-lining labor participation, plateauing educational attainment, and a shift in technological innovation away from business productivity and towards consumer-centric applications such as social media. Chart 10A Decline In Productivity Growth Is Deflationary In The Short Run, But Inflationary In The Long Run Critically, slower potential GDP growth tends to be deflationary at the outset but becomes inflationary later on. Initially, lower productivity growth reduces investment, pushing down aggregate demand. Lower productivity growth also reduces consumption, as households react to the prospect of slower real wage gains. Eventually, however, economies that suffer from chronically weak productivity growth tend to find themselves rubbing up against supply-side constraints. This leads to higher inflation (Chart 10). One only needs to look at the history of low-productivity economies in Africa and Latin America to see this point - or, for that matter, the U.S. in the 1970s, a period when productivity growth slowed and inflation accelerated. Likewise, a slowdown in labor force growth tends to morph from being deflationary to inflationary over time. When labor force growth slows, two things happen. First, investment demand drops. Why build new factories, office towers, and shopping malls if the number of workers and potential consumers is set to grow more slowly? Second, savings rise, as spending on children declines and a rising share of the workforce moves into its peak saving years (ages 35-to-50). The result is a large excess of savings over investment, which generates downward pressure on inflation and interest rates. As time goes by, the deflationary impact of slower labor force growth tends to recede (Chart 11). Workers who once brought home paychecks start to retire en masse and begin drawing down their accumulated wealth. Since there are few young workers available to take their place, labor shortages emerge. At the same time, health care spending and pension expenditures rise as a larger fraction of the population enters its golden years. The result is less aggregate savings and higher interest rates. Chart 11An Aging Population Eventually Pushes Up Interest Rates Japan provides a good example of how this transition might occur. Chart 12 shows that the household savings rate has fallen from over 14% in the early 1990s to only 2% today. Meanwhile, the ratio of job openings-to-applicants has reached a 25-year high. Amazingly, the tightening in the labor market has occurred despite anemic GDP growth and a huge surge in female employment. Prime-age female labor participation has already risen above U.S. levels (Chart 13). As participation rates stabilize, labor force growth in Japan will decline from a cyclical high of around 0.8% at present to -0.2%. That may be enough to precipitate a sharp labor shortage, leading to higher wages and an end to deflation. Chart 12Japan: Declining Household Savings ##br## Rate And A Tightening Labor Market Chart 13Japan: Female Labor Force ##br## Participation Now Exceeds The U.S. What will the Bank of Japan do when this fateful day arrives? The answer is probably nothing. The BoJ would welcome a virtuous circle in which rising inflation pushes down real rates, leading to a weaker yen, a stronger stock market, and even higher inflation expectations. Such a virtuous circle almost emerged in 2012 had the Japanese government not short-circuited it by tightening fiscal policy by 3% of GDP. It won't make the same mistake again. Investment Conclusions Global assets have swung wildly in the weeks following the U.S. presidential election. The selloff in bonds and the rally in the dollar make perfect sense to us - indeed, we predicted as much in our September report entitled "Three Controversial Calls: Trump Wins, And The Dollar Rallies."7 In contrast, the surge in U.S. equities seems overdone. Yes, certain elements of Trump's political agenda such as deregulation and lower corporate tax rates are good news for stocks. But other aspects such as trade protectionism and tighter immigration controls are not. Others still, such as increased government spending, are good in theory but carry sizeable side-effects, the chief of which is that the stimulus may arrive at a time when the economy no longer needs it. Some commentators have argued that the good aspects of Trump's agenda will be implemented before the bad ones, giving investors a reason to focus on the positive. We are not so sure. If Trump gives the Republican establishment everything it wants on taxes and regulations, he will lose all his remaining leverage over trade and immigration. Rather than waiting to be stabbed in the back by Paul Ryan, strategically, Trump is likely to insist that Congress implement his populist platform before he hands it the keys to the economy. Even if one ignores the political intrigue, it is still the case that global stocks have tended to suffer following major spikes in bond yields such as the one we have just experienced (Table 2). We suspect that this time will not be any different. As such, investors would be wise to adopt a more defensive tactical posture over the next few months. Table 2Stocks Tend To Suffer When Bond Yields Spike Chart 14Global Growth Is Accelerating Things look better over a one-to-two year cyclical horizon. Outside of the U.S., much of the global economy continues to suffer from excess spare capacity. Recent data suggesting that global growth is accelerating is welcome news in that regard (Chart 14). Not only will stronger growth boost corporate earnings, but with the ECB, BoJ, and many other central banks firmly on hold, any increase in inflation expectations will translate into lower real rates, providing an additional fillip to spending. We continue to prefer European and Japanese stocks over their U.S. counterparts, on a currency-hedged basis. Emerging markets are a tougher call. The real trade-weighted dollar probably has another 5% or so of upside from current levels. Historically, a stronger greenback has been bad news for EM equities. On a more positive note, faster global growth should give some support to commodity prices. BCA's commodity strategists remain quite bullish on crude and natural gas, a view that has been further reinforced by both Saudi Arabia and Russia's announcements to restrict oil supply beginning in January. Still, on balance, we recommend a slightly underweight position in EM equities. Looking beyond the next two years, the outlook for global risk assets is likely to darken again. We are skeptical that Trump's much lauded supply-side policies will boost productivity to any great degree. Against a backdrop of rising budget deficits and brewing populist sentiment around the world, reflation may begin to give way to stagflation. In such an environment, bond yields could rise substantially from current levels, taking stocks down with them. Enjoy it while it lasts. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen," dated October 14, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Third Quarter 2016: End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 8, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "Trade Adjustment: Worker-Level Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2014). 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump And Trade," dated December 9, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Elusive Gains From Globalization," dated November 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Slower Potential Growth: Causes And Consequences," dated May 29, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Three (New) Controversial Calls," dated September 30, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Multipolarity will peak in 2017 - geopolitical risks are spiking; Globalization is giving way to zero-sum mercantilism; U.S.-China relations are the chief risk to global stability; Turkey is the most likely state to get in a shooting war; Position for an inflation comeback; Go long defense, USD/EUR, and U.S. small caps vs. large caps. Feature Before the world grew mad, the Somme was a placid stream of Picardy, flowing gently through a broad and winding valley northwards to the English Channel. It watered a country of simple beauty. A. D. Gristwood, British soldier, later novelist. The twentieth century did not begin on January 1, 1900. Not as far as geopolitics is concerned. It began 100 years ago, on July 1, 1916. That day, 35,000 soldiers of the British Empire, Germany, and France died fighting over a couple of miles of territory in a single day. The 1916 Anglo-French offensive, also known as the Battle of the Somme, ultimately cost the three great European powers over a million and a half men in total casualties, of which 310,862 were killed in action over the four months of fighting. British historian A. J. P. Taylor put it aptly: idealism perished on the Somme. How did that happen? Nineteenth-century geopolitical, economic, and social institutions - carefully nurtured by a century of British hegemony - broke on the banks of the Somme in waves of human slaughter. What does this have to do with asset allocation? Calendars are human constructs devised to keep track of time. But an epoch is a period with a distinctive set of norms, institutions, and rules that order human activity. This "order of things" matters to investors because we take it for granted. It is a set of "Newtonian Laws" we assume will not change, allowing us to extrapolate the historical record into future returns.1 Since inception, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has argued that the standard assumptions about our epoch no longer apply.2 Social orders are not linear, they are complex systems. And we are at the end of an epoch, one that defined the twentieth century by globalization, the spread of democracy, and American hegemony. Because the system is not linear, its break will cause non-linear outcomes. Since joining BCA's Editorial Team in 2011, we have argued that twentieth-century institutions are undergoing regime shifts. Our most critical themes have been: The rise of global multipolarity;3 The end of Sino-American symbiosis;4 The apex of globalization;5 The breakdown of laissez-faire economics;6 The passing of the emerging markets' "Goldilocks" era.7 Our view is that the world now stands at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The transition is not going to be pretty. Investors must stop talking themselves out of left-tail events by referring to twentieth-century institutions. Yes, the U.S. and China really could go to war in the next five years. No, their trade relationship will not prevent it. Was the slaughter at the Somme prevented by the U.K.-German economic relationship? In fact, our own strategy service may no longer make sense in the new epoch. "Geopolitics" is not some add-on to investor's asset-allocation process. It is as much a part of that process as are valuations, momentum, bottom-up analysis, and macroeconomics. To modify the infamous Milton Friedman quip, "We are all geopolitical strategists now." Five Decade Themes: We begin this Strategic Outlook by updating our old decade themes and introducing a few new ones. These will inform our strategic views over the next half-decade. Below, we also explain how they will impact investors in 2017. From Multipolarity To ... Making America Great Again Our central theme of global multipolarity will reach its dangerous apex in 2017. Multipolarity is the idea that the world has two or more "poles" of power - great nations - that pursue their interests independently. It heightens the risk of conflict. Since we identified this trend in 2012, the number of global conflicts has risen from 10 to 21, confirming our expectations (Chart 1). Political science theory is clear: a world without geopolitical leadership produces hegemonic instability. America's "hard power," declining in relative terms, created a vacuum that was filled by regional powers looking to pursue their own spheres of influence. Chart 1Frequency Of Geopolitical Conflicts Increases Under Multipolarity The investment implications of a multipolar world? The higher frequency of geopolitical crises has provided a tailwind to safe-haven assets such as U.S. Treasurys.8 Ironically, the relative decline of U.S. power is positive for U.S. assets.9 Although its geopolitical power has been in relative decline since 1990, the U.S. bond market has become more, not less, appealing over the same timeframe (Chart 2) Counterintuitively, it was American hegemony - i.e. global unipolarity after the Soviet collapse - that made the rise of China and other emerging markets possible. This created the conditions for globalization to flourish and for investors to leave the shores of developed markets in search of yield. It is the stated objective of President-elect Donald Trump, and a trend initiated under President Barack Obama, to reduce the United States' hegemonic responsibilities. As the U.S. withdraws, it leaves regional instability and geopolitical disequilibria in its wake, enhancing the value-proposition of holding on to low-beta American assets. We are now coming to the critical moment in this process, with neo-isolationist Trump doubling down on President Obama's aloof foreign policy. In 2017, therefore, multipolarity will reach its apex, leading several regional powers - from China to Turkey - to overextend themselves as they challenge the status quo. Chaos will ensue. (See below for more!) The inward shift in American policy will sow the seeds for the eventual reversal of multipolarity. America has always profited from geopolitical chaos. It benefits from being surrounded by two massive oceans, Canada, and the Sonora-Chihuahuan deserts. Following both the First and Second World Wars, the U.S.'s relative geopolitical power skyrocketed (Chart 3). Chart 2America Is A Safe-Haven,##br## Despite (Because Of?) Relative Decline Chart 3America Is Chaos-Proof Over the next 12-24 months, we expect the chief investment implications of multipolarity - volatility, tailwind to safe-haven assets, emerging-market underperformance, and de-globalization - to continue to bear fruit. However, as the U.S. comes to terms with multipolarity and withdraws support for critical twentieth-century institutions, it will create conditions that will ultimately reverse its relative decline and lead to a more unipolar tendency (or possibly bipolar, with China). Therefore, Donald Trump's curious mix of isolationism, anti-trade rhetoric, and domestic populism may, in the end, Make America Great Again. But not for the reasons he has promised-- not because the U.S. will outperform the rest of the world in an absolute sense. Rather, America will become great again in a relative sense, as the rest of the world drifts towards a much scarier, darker place without American hegemony. Bottom Line: For long-term investors, the apex of multipolarity means that investing in China and broader EM is generally a mistake. Europe and Japan make sense in the interim due to overstated political risks, relatively easy monetary policy, and valuations, but even there risks will mount due to their high-beta qualities. The U.S. will own the twenty-first century. From Globalization To ... Mercantilism "The industrial glory of England is departing, and England does not know it. There are spasmodic outcries against foreign competition, but the impression they leave is fleeting and vague ... German manufacturers ... are undeniably superiour to those produced by British houses. It is very dangerous for men to ignore facts that they may the better vaunt their theories ... This is poor patriotism." Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (1896) The seventy years of British hegemony that followed the 1815 Treaty of Paris ending the Napoleonic Wars were marked by an unprecedented level of global stability. Britain's cajoled enemies and budding rivals swallowed their wounded pride and geopolitical appetites and took advantage of the peace to focus inwards, industrialize, and eventually catch up to the U.K.'s economy. Britain, by providing expensive global public goods - security of sea lanes, off-shore balancing,10 a reserve currency, and financial capital - resolved the global collective-action dilemma and ushered in an era of dramatic economic globalization. Sound familiar? It should. As Chart 4 shows, we are at the conclusion of a similar period of tranquility. Pax Americana underpinned globalization as much as Pax Britannica before it. There are other forces at work, such as pernicious wage deflation that has soured the West's middle class on free trade and immigration. But the main threat to globalization is at heart geopolitical. The breakdown of twentieth-century institutions, norms, and rules will encourage regional powers to set up their own spheres of influence and to see the global economy as a zero-sum game instead of a cooperative one.11 Chart 4Multipolarity And De-Globalization Go Hand-In-Hand At the heart of this geopolitical process is the end of Sino-American symbiosis. We posited in February that Charts 5 and 6 are geopolitically unsustainable.12 China cannot keep capturing an ever-increasing global market share for exports while exporting deflation; particularly now that its exports are rising in complexity and encroaching on the markets of developed economies (Chart 7). China's economic policy might have been acceptable in an era of robust global growth and American geopolitical confidence, but we live in a world that is, for the time being, devoid of both. Chart 5China's Share Of Global##br## Exports Has Skyrocketed... Chart 6And Now China ##br##Is Exporting Deflation China and the U.S. are no longer in a symbiotic relationship. The close embrace between U.S. household leverage and Chinese export-led growth is over (Chart 8). Today the Chinese economy is domestically driven, with government stimulus and skyrocketing leverage playing a much more important role than external demand. Exports make up only 19% of China's GDP and 12% of U.S. GDP. The two leading economies are far less leveraged to globalization than the conventional wisdom would have it. Chart 7China's Steady Climb Up ##br##The Value Ladder Continues Chart 8Sino-American ##br##Symbiosis Is Over Chinese policymakers have a choice. They can double down on globalization and use competition and creative destruction to drive up productivity growth, moving the economy up the value chain. Or they can use protectionism - particularly non-tariff barriers, as they have been doing - to defend their domestic market from competition.13 We expect that they will do the latter, especially in an environment where anti-globalization rhetoric is rising in the West and protectionism is already on the march (Chart 9). Chart 9Protectionism On The March The problem with this likely choice, however, is that it breaks up the post-1979 quid-pro-quo between Washington and Beijing. The "quid" was the Chinese entry into the international economic order (including the WTO in 2001), which the U.S. supported; the "quo" was that Beijing would open its economy as it became wealthy. Today, 45% of China's population is middle-class, which makes China potentially the world's second-largest market after the EU. If China decides not to share its middle class with the rest of the world, then the world will quickly move towards mercantilism - particularly with regard to Chinese imports. Mercantilism was a long-dominant economic theory, in Europe and elsewhere, that perceived global trade to be a zero-sum game and economic policy to be an extension of the geopolitical "Great Game" between major powers. As such, net export growth was the only way to prosperity and spheres of influence were jealously guarded via trade barriers and gunboat diplomacy. What should investors do if mercantilism is back? In a recent joint report with the BCA's Global Alpha Sector Strategy, we argued that investors should pursue three broad strategies: Buy small caps (or microcaps) at the expense of large caps (or mega caps) across equity markets as the former are almost universally domestically focused; Favor closed economies levered on domestic consumption, both within DM and EM universes; Stay long global defense stocks; mercantilism will lead to more geopolitical risk (Chart 10). Chart 10Defense Stocks Are A No-Brainer Investors should also expect a more inflationary environment over the next decade. De-globalization will mean marginally less trade, less migration, and less free movement of capital across borders. These are all inflationary. Bottom Line: Mercantilism is back. Sino-American tensions and peak multipolarity will impair coordination. It will harden the zero-sum game that erodes globalization and deepens geopolitical tensions between the world's two largest economies.14 One way to play this theme is to go long domestic sectors and domestically-oriented economies relative to export sectors and globally-exposed economies. The real risk of mercantilism is that it is bedfellows with nationalism and jingoism. We began this section with a quote from an 1896 pamphlet titled "Made in Germany." In it, British writer E.E. Williams argued that the U.K. should abandon free trade policies due to industrial competition from Germany. Twenty years later, 350,000 men died in the inferno of the Somme. From Legal To ... Charismatic Authority Legal authority, the bedrock of modern democracy, is a critical pillar of civilization that investors take for granted. The concept was defined in 1922 by German sociologist Max Weber. Weber's seminal essay, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule," argues that legal-rational authority flows from the institutions and laws that define it, not the individuals holding the office.15 This form of authority is investor-friendly because it reduces uncertainty. Investors can predict the behavior of policymakers and business leaders by learning the laws that govern their behavior. Developed markets are almost universally made up of countries with such norms of "good governance." Investors can largely ignore day-to-day politics in these systems, other than the occasional policy shift or regulatory push that affects sector performance. Weber's original essay outlined three forms of authority, however. The other two were "traditional" and "charismatic."16 Today we are witnessing the revival of charismatic authority, which is derived from the extraordinary characteristics of an individual. From Russia and the U.S. to Turkey, Hungary, the Philippines, and soon perhaps Italy, politicians are winning elections on the back of their messianic qualities. The reason for the decline of legal-rational authority is threefold: Elites that manage governing institutions have been discredited by the 2008 Great Recession and subsequent low-growth recovery. Discontent with governing institutions is widespread in the developed world (Chart 11). Elite corruption is on the rise. Francis Fukuyama, perhaps America's greatest political theorist, argues that American political institutions have devolved into a "system of legalized gift exchange, in which politicians respond to organized interest groups that are collectively unrepresentative of the public as a whole."17 Political gridlock across developed and emerging markets has forced legal-rational policymakers to perform like charismatic ones. European policymakers have broken laws throughout the euro-area crisis, with the intention of keeping the currency union alive. President Obama has issued numerous executive orders due to congressional gridlock. While the numbers of executive orders have declined under Obama, their economic significance has increased (Chart 12). Each time these policymakers reached around established rules and institutions in the name of contingencies and crises, they opened the door wider for future charismatic leaders to eschew the institutions entirely. Chart 11As Institutional Trust Declines, ##br##Voters Turn To Charismatic Leaders Chart 12Obama ##br##The Regulator Furthermore, a generational shift is underway. Millennials do not understand the value of legal-rational institutions and are beginning to doubt the benefits of democracy itself (Chart 13). The trend appears to be the most pronounced in the U.S. and U.K., perhaps because neither experienced the disastrous effects of populism and extremism of the 1930s. In fact, millennials in China appear to view democracy as more essential to the "good life" than their Anglo-Saxon peers. Chart 13Who Needs Democracy When You Have Tinder? Charismatic leaders can certainly outperform expectations. Donald Trump may end up being FDR. The problem for investors is that it is much more difficult to predict the behavior of a charismatic authority than a legal-rational one.18 For example, President-elect Trump has said that he will intervene in the U.S. economy throughout his four-year term, as he did with Carrier in Indiana. Whether these deals are good or bad, in a normative sense, is irrelevant. The point is that bottom-up investment analysis becomes useless when analysts must consider Trump's tweets, as well as company fundamentals, in their earnings projections! We suspect that the revival of charismatic leadership - and the danger that it might succeed in upcoming European elections - at least partly explains the record high levels of global policy uncertainty (Chart 14). Markets do not seem to have priced in the danger fully yet. Global bond spreads are particularely muted despite the high levels of uncertainty. This is unsustainable. Chart 14Are Assets Fully Pricing In Global Uncertainty? Bottom Line: The twenty-first century is witnessing the return of charismatic authority and erosion of legal-rational authority. This should be synonymous with uncertainty and market volatility over the next decade. In 2017, expect a rise in EuroStoxx volatility. From Laissez-Faire To ... Dirigisme The two economic pillars of the late twentieth century have been globalization and laissez-faire capitalism, or neo-liberalism. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the communist challenge, anointing the U.S.-led "Washington Consensus" as the global "law of the land." The tenets of this epoch are free trade, fiscal discipline, low tax burden, and withdrawal of the state from the free market. Not all countries approached the new "order of things" with equal zeal, but most of them at least rhetorically committed themselves to asymptotically approaching the American ideal. Chart 15Debt Replaced Wages##br## In Laissez-Faire Economies The 2008 Great Recession put an end to the bull market in neo-liberal ideology. The main culprit has been the low-growth recovery, but that is not the full story. Tepid growth would have been digested without a political crisis had it not followed decades of stagnating wages. With no wage growth, households in the most laissez-faire economies of the West gorged themselves on debt (Chart 15) to keep up with rising cost of housing, education, healthcare, and childcare -- all staples of a middle-class lifestyle. As such, the low-growth context after 2008 has combined with a deflationary environment to produce the most pernicious of economic conditions: debt-deflation, which Irving Fisher warned of in 1933.19 It is unsurprising that globalization became the target of middle-class angst in this context. Globalization was one of the greatest supply-side shocks in recent history: it exerted a strong deflationary force on wages (Chart 16). While it certainly lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in developing nations, globalization undermined those low-income and middle-class workers in the developed world whose jobs were most easily exported. World Bank economist Branko Milanovic's infamous "elephant trunk" shows the stagnation of real incomes since 1988 for the 75-95 percentile of the global income distribution - essentially the West's middle class (Chart 17).20 It is this section of the elephant trunk that increasingly supports populism and anti-globalization policies, while eschewing laissez faire liberalism. In our April report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy," we posited that the pivot away from laissez-faire capitalism would be most pronounced in the economies of its greatest adherents, the U.S. and U.K. We warned that Brexit and the candidacy of Donald Trump should be taken seriously, while the populist movements in Europe would surprise to the downside. Why the gap between Europe and the U.S. and U.K.? Because Europe's cumbersome, expensive, inefficient, and onerous social-welfare state finally came through when it mattered: it mitigated the pernicious effects of globalization and redistributed enough of the gains to temper populist angst. Chart 16Globalization: A Deflationary Shock Chart 17Globalization: No Friend To DM Middle Class This view was prescient in 2016. The U.K. voted to leave the EU, Trump triumphed, while European populists stumbled in both the Spanish and Austrian elections. The Anglo-Saxon median voter has essentially moved to the left of the economic spectrum (Diagram 1).21 The Median Voter Theorem holds that policymakers will follow the shift to the left in order to capture as many voters as possible under the proverbial curve. In other words, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders are not political price-makers but price-takers. Diagram 1The Median Voter Is Moving To The Left In The U.S. And U.K. How does laissez-faire capitalism end? In socialism or communism? No, the institutions that underpin capitalism in the West - private property, rule of law, representative government, and enforcement of contracts - remain strong. Instead, we expect to see more dirigisme, a form of capitalism where the state adopts a "directing" rather than merely regulatory role. In the U.S., Donald Trump unabashedly campaigned on dirigisme. We do not expand on the investment implications of American dirigisme in this report (we encourage clients to read our post-election treatment of Trump's domestic politics).22 But investors can clearly see the writing on the wall: a late-cycle fiscal stimulus will be positive for economic growth in the short term, but most likely more positive for inflation in the long term. Donald Trump's policies therefore are a risk to bonds, positive for equities (in the near term), and potentially negative for both in the long term if stagflation results from late-cycle stimulus. What about Europe? Is it not already quite dirigiste? It is! But in Europe, we see a marginal change towards the right, not the left. In Spain, the supply-side reforms of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy will remain in place, as he won a second term this year. In France, right-wing reformer - and self-professed "Thatcherite" - François Fillon is likely to emerge victorious in the April-May presidential election. And in Germany, the status-quo Grand Coalition will likely prevail. Only in Italy are there risks, but even there we expect financial markets to force the country - kicking and screaming - down the path of reforms. Bottom Line: In 2017, the market will be shocked to find itself face-to-face with a marginally more laissez-faire Europe and a marginally more dirigiste America and Britain. Investors should overweight European assets in a global portfolio given valuations, relative monetary policy (which will remain accommodative in Europe), a weak euro, and economic fundamentals (Chart 18), and upcoming political surprises. For clients with low tolerance of risk and volatility, a better entry point may exist following the French presidential elections in the spring. From Bias To ... Conspiracies As with the printing press, the radio, film, and television before it, the Internet has created a super-cyclical boom in the supply and dissemination of information. The result of the sudden surge is that quality and accountability are declining. The mainstream media has dubbed this the "fake news" phenomenon, no doubt to differentiate the conspiracy theories coursing through Facebook and Twitter from the "real news" of CNN and MSNBC. The reality is that mainstream media has fallen far short of its own vaunted journalistic standards (Chart 19). Chart 18Europe's Economy Is Holding Up Chart 19 We are not interested in this debate, nor are we buying the media narrative that "fake news" delivered Trump the presidency. Instead, we are focused on how geopolitical and political information is disseminated to voters, investors, and ultimately priced by the market. We fear that markets will struggle to price information correctly due to three factors: Low barriers to entry: The Internet makes publishing easy. Information entrepreneurs - i.e. hack writers - and non-traditional publications ("rags") are proliferating. The result is greater output but a decrease in quality control. For example, Facebook is now the second most trusted source of news for Americans (Chart 20). Cost-cutting: The boom in supply has squeezed the media industry's finances. Newspapers have died in droves; news websites and social-media giants have mushroomed (Chart 21). News companies are pulling back on things like investigative reporting, editorial oversight, and foreign correspondent desks. Foreign meddling: In this context, governments have gained a new advantage because they can bring superior financial resources and command-and-control to an industry that is chaotic and cash-strapped. Russian news outlets like RT and Sputnik have mastered this game - attracting "clicks" around the world from users who are not aware they are reading Russian propaganda. China has also raised its media profile through Western-accessible propaganda like the Global Times, but more importantly it has grown more aggressive at monitoring, censoring, and manipulating foreign and domestic media. Chart 20Facebook Is The New Cronkite? Chart 21The Internet Has Killed Journalism The above points would be disruptive enough alone. But we know that technology is not the root cause of today's disruptions. Income inequality, the plight of the middle class, elite corruption, unchecked migration, and misguided foreign policy have combined to create a toxic mix of distrust and angst. In the West, the decline of the middle class has produced a lack of socio-political consensus that is fueling demand for media of a kind that traditional outlets can no longer satisfy. Media producers are scrambling to meet this demand while struggling with intense competition from all the new entrants and new platforms. What is missing is investment in downstream refining and processing to convert the oversupply of crude information into valuable product for voters and investors.23 Otherwise, the public loses access to "transparent" or baseline information. Obviously the baseline was never perfect. Both the Vietnam and Iraq wars began as gross impositions on the public's credulity: the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. But there was a shared reference point across society. The difference today, as we see it, is that mass opinion will swing even more wildly during a crisis as a result of the poor quality of information that spreads online and mobilizes social networks more rapidly than ever before. We could have "flash mobs" in the voting booth - or on the steps of the Supreme Court - just like "flash crashes" in financial markets, i.e. mass movements borne of passing misconceptions rather than persistent misrule. Election results are more likely to strain the limits of the margin of error, while anti-establishment candidates are more likely to remain viable despite dubious platforms. What does this mean for investors? Fundamental analysis of a country's political and geopolitical risk is now an essential tool in the investor toolkit. If investors rely on the media, and the market prices what the media reports, then the same investors will continue to get blindsided by misleading probabilities, as with Brexit and Trump (Chart 22). While we did not predict these final outcomes, we consistently advised clients, for months in advance, that the market probabilities were too low and serious hedging was necessary. Those who heeded our advice cheered their returns, even as some lamented the electoral returns. Chart 22Get Used To Tail-Risk Events Bottom Line: Keep reading BCA's Geopolitical Strategy! Final Thoughts On The Next Decade The nineteenth century ended in the human carnage that was the Battle of the Somme. The First World War ushered in social, economic, political, geopolitical, demographic, and technological changes that drove the evolution of twentieth-century institutions, rules, and norms. It created the "order of things" that we all take for granted today. The coming decade will be the dawn of the new geopolitical century. We can begin to discern the ordering of this new epoch. It will see peak multipolarity lead to global conflict and disequilibrium, with globalization and laissez-faire economic consensus giving way to mercantilism and dirigisme. Investors will see the benevolent deflationary impulse of globalization evolve into state intervention in the domestic economy and the return of inflation. Globally oriented economies and sectors will underperform domestic ones. Developed markets will continue to outperform emerging markets, particularly as populism spreads to developing economies that fail to meet expectations of their rising middle classes. Over the next ten years, these changes will leave the U.S. as the most powerful country in the world. China and wider EM will struggle to adapt to a less globalized world, while Europe and Japan will focus inward. The U.S. is essentially a low-beta Great Power: its economy, markets, demographics, natural resources, and security are the least exposed to the vagaries of the rest of the world. As such, when the rest of the world descends into chaos, the U.S. will hide behind its Oceans, and Canada, and the deserts of Mexico, and flourish. Five Themes For 2017: Our decade themes inform our view of cyclical geopolitical events and crises, such as elections and geopolitical tensions. As such, they form our "net assessment" of the world and provide a prism through which we refract geopolitical events. Below we address five geopolitical themes that we expect to drive the news flow, and thus the markets, in 2017. Some themes are Red Herrings (overstated risks) and thus present investment opportunities, others are Black Swans (understated risks) and are therefore genuine risks. Europe In 2017: A Trophy Red Herring? Europe's electoral calendar is ominously packed (Table 1). Four of the euro area's five largest economies are likely to have elections in 2017. Another election could occur if Spain's shaky minority government collapses. Table 1 Europe In 2017 Will Be A Headline Risk We expect market volatility to be elevated throughout the year due to the busy calendar. In this context, we advise readers to follow our colleague Dhaval Joshi at BCA's European Investment Strategy. Dhaval recommends that BCA clients combine every €1 of equity exposure with 40 cents of exposure to VIX term-structure, which means going long the nearest-month VIX futures and equally short the subsequent month's contract. The logic is that the term structure will invert sharply if risks spike.24 While we expect elevated uncertainty and lots of headline risk, we do not believe the elections in 2017 will transform Europe's future. As we have posited since 2011, global multipolarity increases the logic for European integration.25 Crises driven by Russian assertiveness, Islamic terrorism, and the migration wave are not dealt with more effectively or easily by nation states acting on their own. Thus far, it appears that Europeans agree with this assessment: polling suggests that few are genuinely antagonistic towards the euro (Chart 23) or the EU (Chart 24). In our July report called "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" we posited that the euro area will likely persevere over at least the next five years.26 Chart 23Support For The Euro Remains Stable Chart 24Few Europeans Want Out Of The EU Take the Spanish and Austrian elections in 2016. In Spain, Mariano Rajoy's right-wing People's Party managed to hold onto power despite four years of painful internal devaluations and supply-side reforms. In Austria, the establishment candidate for president, Alexander Van der Bellen, won the election despite Austria's elevated level of Euroskepticism (Chart 24), its central role in the migration crisis, and the almost comically unenthusiastic campaign of the out-of-touch Van der Bellen. In both cases, the centrist candidates survived because voters hesitated when confronted with an anti-establishment choice. Next year, we expect more of the same in three crucial elections: The Netherlands: The anti-establishment and Euroskeptic Party for Freedom (PVV) will likely perform better than it did in the last election, perhaps even doubling its 15% result in 2012. However, it has no chance of forming a government, given that all the other parties contesting the election are centrist and opposed to its Euroskeptic agenda (Chart 25). Furthermore, support for the euro remains at a very high level in the country (Chart 26). This is a reality that the PVV will have to confront if it wants to rule the Netherlands. Chart 25No Government For Dutch Euroskeptics Chart 26The Netherlands & Euro: Love Affair France: Our high conviction view is that Marine Le Pen, leader of the Euroskeptic National Front (FN), will be defeated in the second round of the presidential election.27 Despite three major terrorist attacks in the country, unchecked migration crisis, and tepid economic growth, Le Pen's popularity peaked in 2013 (Chart 27). She continues to poll poorly against her most likely opponents in the second round, François Fillon and Emmanuel Macron (Chart 28). Investors who doubt the polls should consider the FN's poor performance in the December 2015 regional elections, a critical case study for Le Pen's viability in 2017.28 Chart 27Le Pen's Polling: ##br##Head And Shoulder Formation? Chart 28Le Pen Will Not Be##br## Next French President Germany: Chancellor Angela Merkel's popularity is holding up (Chart 29), the migration crisis has abated (Chart 30), and there remains a lot of daylight between the German establishment and populist parties (Chart 31). The anti-establishment Alternative für Deutschland will enter parliament, but remain isolated. Chart 29Merkel's Approval Rating Has Stabilized Chart 30Migration Crisis Is Abating Chart 31There Is A Lot Of Daylight... The real risk in 2017 remains Italy. The country has failed to enact any structural reforms, being a laggard behind the reform poster-child Spain (Chart 32). Meanwhile, support for the euro remains in the high 50s, which is low compared to the euro-area average (Chart 33). Polls show that if elections were held today, the ruling Democratic Party would gain a narrow victory (Chart 34). However, it is not clear what electoral laws would apply to the contest. The reformed electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies remains under review by the Constitutional Court until at least February. This will make all the difference between further gridlock and a viable government. Chart 32Italy Is Europe's Chart 33Italy Lags Peers On Euro Support Chart 34Italy's Next Election Is Too Close To Call Investors should consider three factors when thinking about Italy in 2017: The December constitutional referendum was not a vote on the euro and thus cannot serve as a proxy for a future referendum.29 The market will punish Italy the moment it sniffs out even a whiff of a potential Itexit referendum. This will bring forward the future pain of redenomination, influencing voter choices. Benefits of the EU membership for Italy are considerable, especially as they allow the country to integrate its unproductive, poor, and expensive southern regions.30 Sans Europe, the Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy) is Rome's problem, and it is a big one. The larger question is whether the rest of Italy's euro-area peers will allow the country to remain mired in its unsustainable status quo. We think the answer is yes. First, Italy is too big to fail given the size of its economy and sovereign debt market. Second, how unsustainable is the Italian status quo? OECD projections for Italy's debt-to-GDP ratio are not ominous. Chart 35 shows four scenarios, the most likely one charting Italy's debt-to-GDP rise from 133% today to about 150% by 2060. Italy's GDP growth would essentially approximate 0%, but its impressive budget discipline would ensure that its debt load would only rise marginally (Chart 36). Chart 35So What If Italy's Debt-To-GDP Ends Up At 170%? Chart 36Italy Has Learned To Live With Its Debt This may seem like a dire prospect for Italy, but it ensures that the ECB has to maintain its accommodative stance in Europe even as the Fed continues its tightening cycle, a boon for euro-area equities as a whole. In other words, Italy's predicament would be unsustainable if the country were on its own. Its "sick man" status would be terminal if left to its own devices. But as a patient in the euro-area hospital, it can survive. And what happens to the euro area beyond our five-year forecasting horizon? We are not sure. Defeat of anti-establishment forces in 2017 will give centrist policymakers another electoral cycle to resolve the currency union's built-in flaws. If the Germans do not budge on greater fiscal integration over the next half-decade, then the future of the currency union will become murkier. Bottom Line: Remain long the nearest-month VIX futures and equally short the subsequent month's contract. We have held this position since September 14 and it has returned -0.84%. The advantage of this strategy is that it is a near-perfect hedge when risk assets sell off, but pays a low price for insurance. Investors with high risk tolerance who can stomach some volatility should take the plunge and overweight euro-area equities in a global equity portfolio. Solid global growth prospects, accommodative monetary policy, euro weakness, and valuations augur a solid year for euro-area equities. Politics will be a red herring as euro-area stocks climb the proverbial wall of worry in 2017. U.S.-Russia Détente: A Genuine Investment Opportunity Trump's election is good news for Russia. Over the past 16 years, Russia has methodically attempted to collect the pieces from the Soviet collapse. Putin sought to defend the Russian sphere of influence from outside powers (Ukraine and Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia). Putin also needed to rally popular support at various times by distracting the public. We view Ukraine and Syria through this prism. Lastly, Russia acted aggressively because it needed to reassure its allies that it would stand up for them.31 And yet the U.S. can live with a "strong" Russia. It can make a deal if the Trump administration recognizes some core interests (e.g. Crimea) and calls off the promotion of democracy in Russia's sphere, which Putin considers an attempt to undermine his rule. As we argued during the Ukraine invasion, it is the U.S., not Russia, which poses the greatest risk of destabilization.32 The U.S. lacks constraints in this theater. It can be aggressive towards Russia and face zero consequences: it has no economic relationship with Russia and does not stand directly in the way of any Russian reprisals, unlike Europe. That is why we think Trump and Putin will reset relations. Trump's team may be comfortable with Russia having a sphere of influence, unlike the Obama administration, which explicitly rejected this idea. The U.S. could even pledge not to expand NATO further, given that it has already expanded as far as it can feasibly and credibly go. Note, however, that a Russo-American truce may not last long. George W. Bush famously "looked into Putin's eyes and ... saw his soul," but relations soured nonetheless. Obama went further with his "Russian reset," removing European missile defense plans from Poland and the Czech Republic. These are avowed NATO allies, and this occurred merely one year after Russian troops marched on Georgia. And yet Moscow and Washington ended up rattling sabers and meddling in each other's internal affairs anyway. Chart 37Thaw In Russian-West##br## Cold War Is Bullish Europe Ultimately, U.S. resets fail because Russia is in structural decline and attempting to hold onto a very large sphere of influence whose citizens are not entirely willing participants.33 Because Moscow must often use blunt force to prevent the revolt of its vassal states (e.g. Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014), it periodically revives tensions with the West. Unless Russia strengthens significantly in the next few years, which we do not expect, then the cycle of tensions will continue. On the horizon may be Ukraine-like incidents in neighboring Belarus and Kazakhstan, both key components of the Russian sphere of influence. Bottom Line: Russia will get a reprieve from U.S. pressure. While we expect Europe to extend sanctions through 2017, a rapprochement with Washington will ultimately thaw relations between Europe and Russia by the end of that year. Europe will benefit from resuming business as usual. It will face less of a risk of Russian provocations via the Middle East and cybersecurity. The ebbing of the Russian geopolitical risk premium will have a positive effect on Europe, given its close correlation with European risk assets since the crisis in Ukraine (Chart 37). Investors who want exposure to Russia may consider overweighing Russian equities to Malaysian. BCA's Emerging Market Strategy has initiated this position for a 55.6% gain since March 2016 and our EM strategists believe there is more room to run for this trade. We recommend that investors simply go long Russia relative to the broad basket of EM equities. The rally in oil prices, easing of the geopolitical risk premium, and hints of pro-market reforms from the Kremlin will buoy Russian equities further in 2017. Middle East: ISIS Defeat Is A Black Swan In February 2016, we made two bold predictions about the Middle East: Iran-Saudi tensions had peaked;34 The defeat of ISIS would entice Turkey to intervene militarily in both Iraq and Syria.35 The first prediction was based on a simple maxim: sustained geopolitical conflict requires resources and thus Saudi military expenditures are unsustainable when a barrel of oil costs less than $100. Saudi Arabia overtook Russia in 2015 as the globe's third-largest defense spender (Chart 38)! Chart 38Saudi Arabia: Lock And Load The mini-détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia concluded in 2016 with the announced OPEC production cut and freeze. While we continue to see the OPEC deal as more of a recognition of the status quo than an actual cut (because OPEC production has most likely reached its limits), nevertheless it is significant as it will slightly hasten the pace of oil-market rebalancing. On the margin, the OPEC deal is therefore bullish for oil prices. Our second prediction, that ISIS is more of a risk to the region in defeat than in glory, was highly controversial. However, it has since become consensus, with several Western intelligence agencies essentially making the same claim. But while our peers in the intelligence community have focused on the risk posed by returning militants to Europe and elsewhere, our focus remains on the Middle East. In particular, we fear that Turkey will become embroiled in conflicts in Syria and Iraq, potentially in a proxy war with Iran and Russia. The reason for this concern is that the defeat of the Islamic State will create a vacuum in the Middle East that the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds are most likely to fill. This is unacceptable to Turkey, which has intervened militarily to counter Kurdish gains and may do so in the future. We are particularly concerned about three potential dynamics: Direct intervention in Syria and Iraq: The Turkish military entered Syria in August, launching operation "Euphrates Shield." Turkey also reinforced a small military base in Bashiqa, Iraq, only 15 kilometers north of Mosul. Both operations were ostensibly undertaken against the Islamic State, but the real intention is to limit the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds. As Map 1 illustrates, Kurds have expanded their territorial control in both countries. Map 1Kurdish Gains In Syria & Iraq Conflict with Russia and Iran: President Recep Erdogan has stated that Turkey's objective in Syria is to remove President Bashar al-Assad from power.36 Yet Russia and Iran are both involved militarily in the country - the latter with regular ground troops - to keep Assad in power. Russia and Turkey did manage to cool tensions recently. Yet the Turkish ground incursion into Syria increases the probability that tensions will re-emerge. Meanwhile, in Iraq, Erdogan has cast himself as a defender of Sunni Arabs and has suggested that Turkey still has a territorial claim to northern Iraq. This stance would put Ankara in direct confrontation with the Shia-dominated Iraqi government, allied with Iran. Turkey-NATO/EU tensions: Tensions have increased between Turkey and the EU over the migration deal they signed in March 2016. Turkey claims that the deal has stemmed the flow of migrants to Europe, which is dubious given that the flow abated well before the deal was struck. Since then, Turkey has threatened to open the spigot and let millions of Syrian refugees into Europe. This is likely a bluff as Turkey depends on European tourists, import demand, and FDI for hard currency (Chart 39). If Erdogan acted on his threat and unleashed Syrian refugees into Europe, the EU could abrogate the 1995 EU-Turkey customs union agreement and impose economic sanctions. The Turkish foray into the Middle East poses the chief risk of a "shooting war" that could impact global investors in 2017. While there are much greater geopolitical games afoot - such as increasing Sino-American tensions - this one is the most likely to produce military conflict between serious powers. It would be disastrous for Turkey. The broader point is that the redrawing of the Middle East map is not yet complete. As the Islamic State is defeated, the Sunni population of Iraq and Syria will remain at risk of Shia domination. As such, countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia could be drawn into renewed proxy conflicts to prevent complete marginalization of the Sunni population. While tensions between Turkey, Russia, and Iran will not spill over into oil-producing regions of the Middle East, they may cloud Iraq's future. Since 2010, Iraq has increased oil production by 1.6 million barrels per day. This is about half of the U.S. shale production increase over the same time frame. As such, Iraq's production "surprise" has been a major contributor to the 2014-2015 oil-supply glut. However, Iraq needs a steady inflow of FDI in order to boost production further (Chart 40). Proxy warfare between Turkey, Russia, and Iran - all major conventional military powers - on its territory will go a long way to sour potential investors interested in Iraqi production. Chart 39Turkey Is Heavily Dependent On The EU Chart 40Iraq Is The Big, And Cheap, Hope This is a real problem for global oil supply. The International Energy Agency sees Iraq as a critical source of future global oil production. Chart 41 shows that Iraq is expected to contribute the second-largest increase in oil production by 2020. And given Iraq's low breakeven production cost, it may be the last piece of real estate - along with Iran - where the world can get a brand-new barrel of oil for under $13. In addition to the risk of expanding Turkish involvement in the region, investors will also have to deal with the headline risk of a hawkish U.S. administration pursuing diplomatic brinkmanship against Iran. We do not expect the Trump administration to abrogate the Iran nuclear deal due to several constraints. First, American allies will not go along with new sanctions. Second, Trump's focus is squarely on China. Third, the U.S. does not have alternatives to diplomacy, since bombing Iran would be an exceedingly complex operation that would bog down American forces in the Middle East. When we put all the risks together, a geopolitical risk premium will likely seep into oil markets in 2017. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy argues that the physical oil market is already balanced (Chart 42) and that the OPEC deal will help draw down bloated inventories in 2017. This means that global oil spare capacity will be very low next year, with essentially no margin of safety in case of a major supply loss. Given the political risks of major oil producers like Nigeria and Venezuela, this is a precarious situation for the oil markets. Chart 41Iraq Really Matters For Global Oil Production Chart 42Oil Supply Glut Is Gone In 2017 Bottom Line: Given our geopolitical view of risks in the Middle East, balanced oil markets, lack of global spare capacity, the OPEC production cut, and ongoing capex reductions, we recommend clients to follow BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy view of expecting widening backwardation in the new year.37 U.S.-China: From Rivalry To Proxy Wars President-elect Trump has called into question the U.S.'s adherence to the "One China policy," which holds that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China" and that the U.S. recognizes only the People's Republic of China as the legitimate Chinese government. There is widespread alarm about Trump's willingness to use this policy, the very premise of U.S.-China relations since 1978, as a negotiating tool. And indeed, Sino-U.S. relations are very alarming, as we have warned our readers since 2012.38 Trump is a dramatic new agent reinforcing this trend. Trump's suggestion that the policy could be discarded - and his break with convention in speaking to the Taiwanese president - are very deliberate. Observe that in the same diplomatic document that establishes the One China policy, the United States and China also agreed that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region." Trump is initiating a change in U.S. policy by which the U.S. accuses China of seeking hegemony in Asia, a violation of the foundation of their relationship. The U.S. is not seeking unilaterally to cancel the One China policy, but asking China to give new and durable assurances that it does not seek hegemony and will play by international rules. Otherwise, the U.S. is saying, the entire relationship will have to be revisited and nothing (not even Taiwan) will be off limits. The assurances that China is expected to give relate not only to trade, but also, as Trump signaled, to the South China Sea and North Korea. Therefore we are entering a new era in U.S-China relations. China Is Toast Asia Pacific is a region of frozen conflicts. Russia and Japan never signed a peace treaty. Nor did China and Taiwan. Nor did the Koreas. Why have these conflicts lain dormant over the past seventy years? Need we ask? Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have seen their GDP per capita rise 14 times since 1950. China has seen its own rise 21 times (Chart 43). Since the wars in Vietnam over forty years ago, no manner of conflict, terrorism, or geopolitical crisis has fundamentally disrupted this manifestly beneficial status quo. As a result, Asia has been a region synonymous with economics - not geopolitics. It developed this reputation because its various large economies all followed Japan's path of dirigisme: export-oriented, state-backed, investment-led capitalism. This era of stability is over. The region has become the chief source of geopolitical risk and potential "Black Swan" events.39 The reason is deteriorating U.S.-China relations and the decline in China's integration with other economies. The Asian state-led economic model was underpinned by the Pax Americana. Two factors were foundational: America's commitment to free trade and its military supremacy. China was not technically an ally, like Japan and Korea, but after 1979 it sure looked like one in terms of trade surpluses and military spending (Chart 44).40 For the sake of containing the Soviet Union, the U.S. wrapped East Asia under its aegis. Chart 43The Twentieth Century Was Kind To East Asia Chart 44Asia Sells, America Rules It is well known, however, that Japan's economic model led it smack into a confrontation with the U.S. in the 1980s over its suppressed currency and giant trade surpluses. President Ronald Reagan's economic team forced Japan to reform, but the result was ultimately financial crisis as the artificial supports of its economic model fell away (Chart 45). Astute investors have always suspected that a similar fate awaited China. It is unsustainable for China to seize ever greater market share and drive down manufacturing prices without reforming its economy to match G7 standards, especially if it denies the U.S. access to its vast consumer market. Today there are signs that the time for confrontation is upon us: Since the Great Recession, U.S. household debt and Chinese exports have declined as a share of GDP, falling harder in the latter than the former, in a sign of shattered symbiosis (see Chart 8 above). Chinese holdings of U.S. Treasurys have begun to decline (Chart 46). China's exports to the U.S., both as a share of total exports and of GDP, have rolled over, and are at levels comparable to Japan's 1980s peaks (Chart 47). China is wading into high-tech and advanced industries, threatening the core advantages of the developed markets. The U.S. just elected a populist president whose platform included aggressive trade protectionism against China. Protectionist "Rust Belt" voters were pivotal to Trump's win and will remain so in future elections. China is apparently reneging on every major economic promise it has made in recent years: the RMB is depreciating, not appreciating, whatever the reason; China is closing, not opening, its capital account; it is reinforcing, not reforming, its state-owned companies; and it is shutting, not widening, access to its domestic market (Chart 48). Chart 45Japan's Crisis Followed Currency Spike Chart 46China Backing Away From U.S. Treasuries There is a critical difference between the "Japan bashing" of the 1980s-90s and the increasingly potent "China bashing" of today. Japan and the U.S. had established a strategic hierarchy in World War II. That is not the case for the U.S. and China in 2017. Unlike Japan, Korea, or any of the other Asian tigers, China cannot trust the United States to preserve its security. Far from it - China has no greater security threat than the United States. The American navy threatens Chinese access to critical commodities and export markets via the South China Sea. In a world that is evolving into a zero-sum game, these things suddenly matter. Chart 47The U.S. Will Get Tougher On China Trade Chart 48China Is De-Globalizing That means that when the Trump administration tries to "get tough" on longstanding American demands, these demands will not be taken as well-intentioned or trustworthy. We see Sino-American rivalry as the chief geopolitical risk to investors in 2017: Trump will initiate a more assertive U.S. policy toward China;41 It will begin with symbolic or minor punitive actions - a "shot across the bow" like charging China with currency manipulation or imposing duties on specific goods.42 It will be critical to see whether Trump acts arbitrarily through executive power, or systematically through procedures laid out by Congress. The two countries will proceed to a series of high-level, bilateral negotiations through which the Trump administration will aim to get a "better deal" from the Xi administration on trade, investment, and other issues. The key to the negotiations will be whether the Trump team settles for technical concessions or instead demands progress on long-delayed structural issues that are more difficult and risky for China to undertake. Too much pressure on the latter could trigger a confrontation and broader economic instability. Chart 49China's Demographic Dividend Is Gone The coming year may see U.S.-China relations start with a bang and end with a whimper, as Trump's initial combativeness gives way to talks. But make no mistake: Sino-U.S. rivalry and distrust will worsen over the long run. That is because China faces a confluence of negative trends: The U.S. is turning against it. Geopolitical problems with its periphery are worsening. It is at high risk of a financial crisis due to excessive leverage. The middle class is a growing political constraint on the regime. Demographics are now a long-term headwind (Chart 49). The Chinese regime will be especially sensitive to these trends because the Xi administration will want stability in the lead up to the CCP's National Party Congress in the fall, which promises to see at least some factional trouble.43 It no longer appears as if the rotation of party leaders will leave Xi in the minority on the Politburo Standing Committee for 2017-22, as it did in 2012.44 More likely, he will solidify power within the highest decision-making body. This removes an impediment to his policy agenda in 2017-22, though any reforms will still take a back seat to stability, since leadership changes and policy debates will absorb a great deal of policymakers' attention at all levels for most of the year.45 Xi will also put in place his successors for 2022, putting a cap on rumors that he intends to eschew informal term limits. Failing this, market uncertainty over China's future will explode upward. The midterm party congress will thus reaffirm the fact that China's ruling party and regime are relatively unified and centralized, and hence that China has relatively strong political capabilities for dealing with crises. Evidence does not support the popular belief that China massively stimulates the economy prior to five-year party congresses (Chart 50), but we would expect all means to be employed to prevent a major downturn. Chart 50Not Much Evidence Of Aggressive Stimulus Ahead Of Five-Year Party Congresses What this means is that the real risks of the U.S.-China relationship in 2017 will emanate from China's periphery. Asia's Frozen Conflicts Are Thawing Today the Trump administration seems willing to allow China to carve a sphere of influence - but it is entirely unclear whether and where existing boundaries would be redrawn. Here are the key regional dynamics:46 The Koreas: The U.S. and Japan are increasingly concerned about North Korea's missile advances but will find their attempts to deal with the problem blocked by China and likely by the new government in South Korea.47 U.S. threats of sanctioning China over North Korea will increase market uncertainty, as will South Korea's political turmoil and (likely) souring relations with the U.S. Taiwan: Taiwan's ruling party has very few domestic political constraints and therefore could make a mistake, especially when emboldened by an audacious U.S. leadership.48 The same combination could convince China that it has to abandon the post-2000 policy of playing "nice" with Taiwan.49 China will employ discrete sanctions against Taiwan. Hong Kong: Mainland forces will bring down the hammer on the pro-independence movement. The election of a new chief executive will appear to reinforce the status quo but in reality Beijing will tighten its legal, political, and security grip. Large protests are likely; political uncertainty will remain high.50 Japan: Japan will effectively receive a waiver from Trump's protectionism and will benefit from U.S. stimulus efforts; it will continue reflating at home in order to generate enough popular support to pass constitutional revisions in 2018; and it will not shy away from regional confrontations, since these will enhance the need for the hawkish defense component of the same revisions. Vietnam: The above issues may provide Vietnam with a chance to improve its strategic position at China's expense, whether by courting U.S. market access or improving its position in the South China Sea. But the absence of an alliance with the U.S. leaves it highly exposed to Chinese reprisals if it pushes too far. Russia: Russia will become more important to the region because its relations with the U.S. are improving and it may forge a peace deal with Japan, giving it more leverage in energy negotiations with China.51 This may also reinforce the view in Beijing that the U.S. is circling the wagons around China. What these dynamics have in common is the emergence of U.S.-China proxy conflicts. China has long suspected that the Obama administration's "Pivot to Asia" was a Cold War "containment" strategy. The fear is well-grounded but the reality takes time to materialize, which is what we will see playing out in the coming years. The reason we say "proxy wars" is because several American allies are conspicuously warming up to China: Thailand, the Philippines, and soon South Korea. They are not abandoning the U.S. but keeping their options open. The other ASEAN states also stand to benefit as the U.S. seeks economic substitutes for China while the latter courts their allegiance.52 The problem is that as U.S.-China tensions rise, these small states run greater risks in playing both sides. Bottom Line: The overarching investment implications of U.S.-China proxy wars all derive from de-globalization. China was by far the biggest winner of globalization and will suffer accordingly (Chart 51). But it will not be the biggest loser, since it is politically unified, its economy is domestically driven, and it has room to maneuver on policy. Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore are all chiefly at risk from de-globalization over the long run. Chart 51Globalization's Winners Will Be De-Globalization's Losers Japan is best situated to prosper in 2017. We have argued since well before the Bank of Japan's September monetary policy shift that unconventional reflation will continue, with geopolitics as the primary motivation for the country's "pedal to the metal" strategy.53 We will look to re-initiate our long Japanese equities position in early 2017. ASEAN countries offer an opportunity, though country-by-country fundamentals are essential. Brexit: The Three Kingdoms The striking thing about the Brexit vote's aftermath is that no recession followed the spike in uncertainty, no infighting debilitated the Tory party, and no reversal occurred in popular opinion. The authorities stimulated the economy, the people rallied around the flag (and ruling party), and the media's "Bregret" narrative flopped. That said, Brexit also hasn't happened yet.54 Formal negotiations with Europe begin in March, which means uncertainty will persist for much of the year as the U.K. and EU posture around their demands for a post-exit deal. However, improving growth prospects for Britain, Europe, and the U.S. all suggest that the negotiations are less likely to take place in an atmosphere of crisis. That does not mean that EU negotiators will be soft. With each successive electoral victory for the political establishment in 2017, the European negotiating position will harden. This will create a collision of Triumphant Tories and Triumphant Brussels. Still, the tide is not turning much further against the U.K. than was already the case, given how badly the U.K. needs a decent deal. Tightercontrol over the movement of people will be the core demand of Westminster, but it is not necessarily mutually exclusive with access to the common market. The major EU states have an incentive to compromise on immigration with the U.K. because they would benefit from tighter immigration controls that send highly qualified EU nationals away from the U.K. labor market and into their own. But the EU will exact a steep price for granting the U.K. the gist of what it wants on immigration and market access. This could be a hefty fee or - more troublingly for Britain - curbs on British financial-service access to euro markets. Though other EU states are not likely to exit, the European Council will not want to leave any doubt about the pain of doing so. The Tories may have to accept this outcome. Tory strength is now the Brexit voter base. That base is uncompromising on cutting immigration, and it is indifferent, or even hostile, to the City. So it stands to reason that Prime Minister Theresa May will sacrifice the U.K.'s financial sector in the coming negotiations. The bigger question is what happens to the U.K. economy in the medium and long term. First, it is unclear how the U.K. will revive productivity as lower labor-force growth and FDI, and higher inflation, take shape. Government "guidance" of the economy - dirigisme again - is clearly the Tory answer. But it remains to be seen how effectively it will be done. Second, what happens to the United Kingdom as a nation? Another Scottish independence referendum is likely after the contours of the exit deal take shape, especially as oil prices gin up Scottish courage to revisit the issue. The entire question of Scotland and Northern Ireland (both of which voted to stay in the EU) puts deeper constitutional and governmental restructuring on the horizon. Westminster is facing a situation where it drastically loses influence on the global stage as it not only exits the European "superstate" but also struggles to maintain a semblance of order among the "three kingdoms." Bottom Line: The two-year timeframe for exit negotiations ensures that posturing will ratchet up tensions and uncertainty throughout the year - invoking the abyss of a no-deal exit - but our optimistic outlook on the end-game (eventual "soft Brexit") suggests that investors should fade the various crisis points. That said, the pound is no longer a buy as it rises to around 1.30. Investment Views De-globalization, dirigisme, and the ascendancy of charismatic authority will all prove to be inflationary. On the margin, we expect less trade, less free movement of people, and more direct intervention in the economy. Given that these are all marginally more inflationary, it makes sense to expect the "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," as our colleague Peter Berezin argued in July.55 That said, Peter does not expect the bond bull market to end in a crash - and neither do we. There are many macroeconomic factors that will continue to suppress global yields: the savings glut, search for yield, and economic secular stagnation. In addition, we expect peak multipolarity in 2017 and thus a rise in geopolitical conflict. This geopolitical context will keep the U.S. Treasury market well bid. However, clients may want to begin switching their safe-haven exposure to gold. In a recent research report on safe havens, we showed that gold and Treasurys have changed places as safe havens in the past.56 Only after 2000 did Treasurys start providing a good hedge to equity corrections due to geopolitical and financial risks. The contrary is true for gold - it acted as one of the most secure investments during corrections until that time, but has since become correlated with S&P 500 total returns. As deflationary risks abate in the future, we suspect that gold will return to its safe-haven status. In addition to safe havens, U.S. and global defense stocks will be well bid due to global multipolarity. We recommend that clients go long S&P 500 aerospace and defense relative to global equities on a strategic basis. We are also sticking with our tactical trade of long U.S. defense / short U.S. aerospace. On the equity front, we have closed our post-election bullish trade of long S&P 500 / short gold position for an 11.53% gain in just 22 days of trading. We are also closing our long S&P 600 / short S&P 100 position - a play on de-globalization - for an 8.4% gain. Instead, we are initiating a strategic long U.S. small caps / short U.S. large caps, recommended jointly with our colleague Anastasios Avgeriou of the BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy. We are keeping our EuroStoxx VIX term-structure hedge due to mounting political risk in Europe. However, we are looking for an opening into European stocks in early 2017. For now, we are maintaining our long USD/EUR - return 4.2% since July - and long USD/SEK - return 2.25% since November. The first is a strategic play on our view that the ECB has to remain accommodative due to political risks in the European periphery. The latter is a way to articulate de-globalization via currencies, given that Sweden is one of the most open economies in the world. We are converting it from a tactical to a strategic recommendation. Finally, we are keeping our RMB short in place - via 12-month NDF. We do not think that Beijing will "blink" and defend its currency more aggressively just because Donald Trump is in charge of America. China is a much more powerful country than in the past, and cannot allow RMB appreciation at America's bidding. Our trade has returned 7.14% since December 2015. With the dollar bull market expected to continue and RMB depreciating, the biggest loser will be emerging markets. We are therefore keeping our strategic long DM / short EM recommendation, which has returned 56.5% since November 2012. We are particularly fond of shorting Brazilian and Turkish equities and are keeping both trades in place. However, we are initiating a long Russian equities / short EM equities. As an oil producer, Russia will benefit from the OPEC deal and the ongoing risks to Iraqi stability. In addition, we expect that removing sanctions against Russia will be on table for 2017. Europe will likely extend the sanctions for another six months, but beyond that the unity of the European position will be in question. And the United States is looking at a different approach. We wish our clients all the best in health, family, and investing in 2017. Thank you for your confidence in BCA's Geopolitical Strategy. Marko Papic Senior Vice President Matt Gertken Associate Editor Jesse Anak Kurri Research Analyst 1 In Michel Foucault's famous The Order of Things (1966), he argues that each period of human history has its own "episteme," or set of ordering conditions that define that epoch's "truth" and discourse. The premise is comparable to Thomas Kuhn's notion of "paradigms," which we have referenced in previous Strategic Outlooks. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2012," dated January 27, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2013," dated January 16, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Underestimating Sino-American Tensions," dated November 6, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here," dated November 12, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, and "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2014 - Stay The Course: EM Risk - DM Reward," dated January 23, 2014, and Special Report, "The Coming Bloodbath In Emerging Markets," dated August 12, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 A military-security strategy necessary for British self-defense that also preserved peace on the European continent by undermining potential aggressors. 11 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Trump And Trade," dated December 8, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see Max Weber, "The Three Types Of Legitimate Rule," Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions 4 (1): 1-11 (1958). Translated by Hans Gerth. Originally published in German in the journal Preussische Jahrbücher 182, 1-2 (1922). 16 We do not concern ourselves with traditional authority here, but the obvious examples are Persian Gulf monarchies. 17 Please see Francis Fukuyama, Political Order And Political Decay (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014). See also our review of this book, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Transformative Vs. Transactional Leadership," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see Irving Fisher, "The Debt-deflation Theory of Great Depressions," Econometrica 1(4) (1933): 337-357, available at fraser.stlouisfed.org. 20 Please see Milanovic, Branko, "Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: in History and Now," dated November 2012, Policy Research Working Paper 6250, World Bank, available at worldbank.org. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints And Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 In some way, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy was designed precisely to fill this role. It is difficult to see what would be the point of this service if our clients could get unbiased, investment-relevant, prescient, high-quality geopolitical news and analysis from the press. 24 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Roller Coaster," dated March 31, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 25 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Europe's Geopolitical Gambit: Relevance Through Integration," dated November 2011, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 26 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 27 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Will Marine Le Pen Win?" dated November 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 28 Despite winning an extraordinary six of the 13 continental regions in France in the first round, FN ended up winning zero in the second round. This even though the election occurred after the November 13 terrorist attack that ought to have buoyed the anti-migration, law and order, anti-establishment FN. The regional election is an instructive case of how the French two-round electoral system enables the establishment to remain in power. 29 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Italy: Asking The Wrong Question," dated December 1, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 30 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 31 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Cold War Redux?" dated March 12, 2014, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Russia: To Buy Or Not To Buy?" dated March 20, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 32 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Russia-West Showdown: The West, Not Putin, Is The 'Wild Card,'" dated July 31, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 33 Please see BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Russia's Trilemma And The Coming Power Paralysis," dated February 21, 2012, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 34 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Middle East: Saudi-Iranian Tensions Have Peaked," in Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 35 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Scared Yet? Five Black Swans For 2016," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 36 President Erdogan, speaking at the first Inter-Parliamentary Jerusalem Platform Symposium in Istanbul in November 2016, said that Turkey "entered [Syria] to end the rule of the tyrant al-Assad who terrorizes with state terror... We do not have an eye on Syrian soil. The issue is to provide lands to their real owners. That is to say we are there for the establishment of justice." 37 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," dated December 8, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 38 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 39 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, and "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 40 In recent years, however, China's "official" defense budget statistics have understated its real spending, possibly by as much as half. 41 Please see "U.S. Election Update: Trump, Presidential Powers, And Investment Implications" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Socialism Put," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 42 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 43 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 44 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "China: Two Factions, One Party - Part II," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 45 The National Financial Work Conference will be one key event to watch for an updated reform agenda. 46 Please see "East Asia: Tensions Simmer ... Will They Boil?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Partem Mirabilis," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 47 Please see "North Korea: A Red Herring No More?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Partem Mirabilis," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 48 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Scared Yet? Five Black Swans For 2016," dated February 10, 2016, and "Taiwan's Election: How Dire Will The Straits Get?" dated January 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 49 The Trump administration has signaled a policy shift through Trump's phone conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. The "One China policy" is the foundation of China-Taiwan relations, and U.S.-China relations depend on Washington's acceptance of it. The risk, then, is not so much an overt change to One China, a sure path to conflict, but the dynamic described above. 50 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Hong Kong: From Politics To Political Economy," dated September 8, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 51 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Can Russia Import Productivity From China?" dated June 29, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 52 Please see "Thailand: Upgrade Stocks To Overweight And Go Long THB Versus KRW" in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "The EM Rally: Running Out Of Steam?" dated October 19, 2016, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 53 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Japan: The Emperor's Act Of Grace," dated June 8, 2016, and "Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics," dated September 26, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 54 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "BREXIT Update: Brexit Means Brexit, Until Brexit," dated September 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 55 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 56 Please see Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 15, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Global Duration: Global bond yields, pushed higher since July on the back of improving global growth and rising inflation, have now overshot to the upside on excessive expectations of U.S. fiscal stimulus. Take profits on bearish bond positions and increase portfolio duration exposure to at-benchmark on a tactical basis until the oversold conditions unwind. 2017 Global Yield Curve Expectations: The recent steepening of government bond yield curves across the developed markets should soon begin to fade, leading to a more diverse evolution of curves during the course of 2017: steeper in the U.S., core Europe and in Japan (at the long end), flatter in the U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. U.K. Inflation Protection: Take profits on our recommended U.K. inflation trades (overweight inflation-linked bonds and CPI swaps), in response to the recent stability of the Pound and signs that the Bank of England is shifting in a more hawkish direction. Feature Time To Tactically Take Profits On Short Duration Positions Investors have been reminded over the past few months that boring old bonds, just like equities, can generate painful losses when prices disconnect from fundamentals. Back on July 19, we moved to a below-benchmark stance on overall portfolio duration, as we noted that government bonds across the developed markets had reached an overbought extreme despite improving trends in global growth and inflation (Chart of the Week).1 Bonds have sold off smartly since, with benchmark 10-year government yields in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan rising +88bps, +60bps, +36bps, +27bps respectively. The popular market narrative is that the latest leg of the bond selloff is a direct result of Donald Trump winning the White House. This raised investor awareness to the bond-bearish implications of a protectionist U.S. president looking to provide a fiscal kick to an economy already at full employment. The reality, however, is that global bond yields troughed a full four months before the U.S. elections on the back of a better global growth picture. It is quite possible that the latest bump in yields would have happened even if Trump did not win the election. Rising industrial commodity prices, happening in the face of a strengthening U.S. dollar that typically dampens prices, also suggest that bond yields have been responding more to faster realized growth and inflation and less to future expected fiscal stimulus (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekGlobal Bonds##br## Are Oversold Chart 2Stronger Growth Has ##br## Pushed Yields Higher Looking ahead, if the global economy evolves as we expect, with growth continuing to look relatively robust and inflation continuing to grind higher, then yields have even more upside in 2017. However, bonds now appear deeply oversold amid highly bearish sentiment. U.S. Treasury yields, in particular, have overshot the fair value estimates from our models (Chart 3). Also, this week's ECB meeting is unlikely to provide any bearish surprises for bond investors, as the ECB will likely extend the current QE program (at the current pace of buying) until at least next September. This should act to cap the recent widening of global bond term premia (Chart 4) and prevent a "Fifth Tantrum" from unfolding in global bond markets, as we discussed last week.2 Therefore, we are taking profits today on our bearish bond call and moving back to a tactical at-benchmark portfolio duration stance. However, we still expect yields to rise over the next year to levels beyond current forward rates.3 Thus, we would look to reinstate a below-benchmark duration posture if the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield were to fall to the 2-2.2% range. We will also look for signs of oversold momentum fading and a reduction in short positioning in U.S. Treasuries before re-establishing a below-benchmark duration tilt (Chart 5). The next leg of pressure on global bond yields should come from the U.S., given our optimistic view on U.S. growth and inflation for next year (see below). Chart 3UST Yields Are##br## A Bit Too High Chart 4A Big Adjustment In##br## Term Premia & Expectations Chart 5Taking Profits On##br## Our Bearish Bond Call Bottom Line: Global bond yields, pushed higher since July on the back of improving global growth and rising inflation, have now overshot to the upside on excessive expectations of U.S. fiscal stimulus. Take profits on bearish bond positions and increase portfolio duration exposure to at-benchmark on a tactical basis until the oversold conditions unwind. Some Initial Thoughts On Developed Market Yield Curves In 2017 With only a handful of trading days remaining in 2016, it is time to peer ahead to how markets could perform in the New Year. We will be publishing our full 2017 Outlook report on December 20th, but this week we are presenting some preliminary ideas on how government bond yield curves could evolve over the course of next year. United States - Eventual Bear Steepening In Excess Of The Forwards We see U.S. growth accelerating to a 2.8% pace next year, an above-potential pace that is stronger than current consensus forecasts.4 Combined with a steady grind higher in realized inflation (both headline and core), this will generate a nominal growth outcome over 5% in 2017. This will help push the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield to the 2.8-3.0% area by the end of 2017 as the Fed will likely continue to raise rates but not as fast as nominal growth will accelerate (i.e. will remain accommodative). This move will be led by rising inflation expectations, which we see rising to a level consistent with the Fed's inflation target.5 This will put steepening pressure on the U.S. Treasury curve, at a pace that will easily exceed the flattening currently priced into the forwards (Chart 6, top panel). We see the potential for curve steepening pressure to come both from growth, which will push up longer-dated real yields and steepen the "real" yield curve, and from inflation, with a tight labor market putting upward pressure on wage and price inflation even with a stronger U.S. dollar (Chart 7). Chart 6A Steeper UST Curve,##br## Led By Rising Real Yields Chart 7Will UST Yields Pause##br## After A Rate Hike Next Week? For now, however, we are keeping a "neutral" stance on U.S. yield curve exposure until we see signs that oversold conditions in the Treasury market have corrected. One final point: the Treasury market likely moved too quickly in recent weeks to discount a fiscal ease under the new Trump administration. However, any impetus to growth from the government sector, coming at a time when the U.S. economy is running near full employment, will be another structural factor putting steepening pressure on the yield curve in the next year through more Treasury issuance and stronger inflation pressures. Core Euro Area - Very Modest Steepening In Line With The Forwards As we discussed in a recent Weekly Report, the ECB will most likely continue with its current bond-buying program, with no tapering of the size of the purchases, until at least September 2017.6 European inflation remains too low relative to the ECB's target (Chart 8) and the central bank will be wary about reducing monetary stimulus anytime soon. The overriding presence of ECB buying will act to limit the upside in longer-dated European bond yields, even in an environment where U.S. Treasury yields rise over the course of 2017. The core European government bond yield curves (Germany, France) will likely still see some modest steepening pressure, led by upward pressure on real yields, as global growth continues to improve. Combined with the lagged impact of the weakening Euro and the rise in commodity prices, there should be some mild additional steepening pressure coming from inflation expectations, as well. The forward curves are currently pricing in a very modest steepening over the next year, and we do not see a case for the curve to steepen much beyond the forwards (Chart 9). We continue to favor core Europe as a recommended overweight in our global Developed Market bond allocation. Favoring the longer-end of the curve (10 years and longer) in Germany and France - the higher yielding parts of these low-yielding bond markets - makes the most sense against the backdrop of subdued Euro Area inflation. Chart 8No Threat To Global Bonds##br## From The ECB This Week Chart 9ECB QE Will Limit##br## Any Curve Moves In Europe Japan - Expect Long-End Steepening, Even With Bank Of Japan Curve Targeting The Japanese yield curve is now fairly straightforward to predict, with the Bank of Japan (BoJ) now explicitly targeting the level of JGB yields. The BoJ has committed to keep the 10yr JGB yield at 0% until Japanese inflation expectations overshoot the 2% BoJ target. With inflation expectations currently sitting just above 0%, that goal is now far from being realized. We see very little movement in the 2-10 year part of the JGB curve next year, but we expect the curve beyond 10 years to be more influenced by trends in global bond yields, with the BoJ providing no guidance on the desired level of longer-dated JGB yields. Given our views on a potential bear-steepening of the U.S. Treasury curve in 2017, we expect that the 10/30 JGB curve will also steepen (Chart 10). Focusing Japanese bond exposure on the 10-year point makes the most sense in this environment, although at a yield of 0% the return prospects are hardly inviting. U.K. - Steepening Will Turn To Flattening The Bank of England (BoE) took out a very large insurance policy on the U.K. economy by cutting interest rates and re-starting quantitative easing (QE) after the shocking Brexit vote. This has appeared to work, as U.K. economic growth has been surprisingly strong in the months since the June referendum. But the ramifications of the BoE's aggressive easing was a massive depreciation of the Pound and a subsequent rise in U.K. inflation (Chart 11). Chart 10BoJ Is Not Worrying About##br## The Long End For JGBs Chart 11The Post-Brexit ##br## Adjustment Is Nearly Complete This has set up a situation where the Gilt market is behaving much like the U.S. Treasury market did after the Fed introduced its own QE programs between 2008 & 2012. The result was as rise in nominal bond yields led by rising inflation expectations and stronger economic growth, both of which were a function of a weaker currency. In the case of the U.K. now, the rise in inflation has been strong enough to force the BoE to back off its promise to deliver an additional rate cut before the end of 2016. The BoE will likely not extend the latest QE program beyond the March 2017 expiry, as well. There is even a chance that the BoE could be forced to hike rates sometime in the first half of 2017. Against this backdrop where the BoE has to play a bit of monetary catchup to rising nominal growth, the Gilt curve is likely to see some flattening pressure after the recent steepening. With the forwards pricing in no change in the slope of the curve next year (Chart 12), curve flattening positions that limit exposure to the front-end of the Gilt curve could offer opportunities in 2017 after global bond yields consolidate the recent rise in yields. While we believe it is too early to reposition our Gilt curve allocation this week, we are taking profits on our recommended U.K. inflation protection trades given the recent stability of the Pound and growing evidence that the Bank of England is turning more hawkish (Chart 13). Specifically, we are closing our Overlay Trade favoring index-linked Gilts versus nominals at a profit of +59bps. We also advise closing our "Brexit hedge" trade suggested in June before the referendum, which was a long position in U.K. CPI swaps versus U.S. equivalents. Chart 12Nearing The End Of ##br## Gilt Curve Steepening? Chart 13Take Profit On U.K.##br## Inflation Protection Trades Canada - The Steepening Is Over A modest steepening of the Canadian government bond yield curve in 2017 is currently priced into the forwards. We think even this small move is unlikely to be realized. The short-end of the yield curve should stay well-anchored around current levels. Probabilities extracted from the Canadian Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve currently show a 4% market-implied chance of a rate cut, and 40% odds of a rate hike, by December 6th 2017. Of the two, the probability of a rate hike looks too high. The Bank of Canada (BoC) has rarely increased policy rates when our BCA Canadian Central Bank Monitor was in "easy money required" territory (Chart 14). More likely, the Bank of Canada will stay on hold throughout 2017 due to a lack of inflationary pressures. The Canadian unemployment rate remains far higher than the full employment level, while a wide gap has developed between the growth rates of core CPI and weekly earnings; low wage inflation usually drags core CPI inflation lower. Already, the Canadian CPI less the most volatile components - one of the core inflation measures monitored by the BoC - has rolled over. In the longer part of the curve, the weakening economic cycle will keep yields well contained. While the rebound in energy prices seen this year is a positive for the beaten-up Alberta economy, even higher prices will be needed for Canadian energy producers to rekindle investments in that sector given the high cost of oil extraction in Western Canada. Without a meaningful recovery in Alberta, the Canadian economy will be unable to expand at an above-trend pace; growth will be slower than the general consensus forecast of 2.0% in 2017.7 To profit from that view, we are opening a new butterfly spread trade on the Canadian curve: going long the 2-year/10-year barbell versus a short position in the 5-year bullet. This trade should generate positive excess returns if the 2-year/10-year slope of the Canadian curve flattens, as we expect (Chart 15). Chart 14Canadian Short Rates##br## To Remain Well-Anchored Chart 15Go Long A Canadian 2/10 ##br## Barbell Vs. The 5yr Bullet Australia - Flattening Phase Ahead A small flattening of the Australian yield curve over the next 12 months is currently priced into the forwards. This expectation seems reasonable to us, but the bulk of the flattening should come from the short end where yields will drift higher over the course of the year. Australian inflation prospects are improving, with the Melbourne Institute Inflation Gauge having stabilized of late. As the negative impact of imported goods price deflation recedes going forward, domestic inflation should rise. In addition, our model is calling for core CPI inflation to grind higher in 2017 (Chart 16). Chart 16Australian Inflation Is Bottoming... Chart 17...Even As Australian Growth Is Starting To Cool Because of this, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) will progressively become less dovish and greater odds of a rate hike will be priced into the yield curve. This is already starting to happen, on the margin; since October, the probability of a rate cut by December 5th, 2017 has decreased substantially, from 65% to 5%. As we have been pointing out over the past several months, the Australian economy has been humming along. China's policy reflation seen earlier in 2016 had a direct positive impact on Australian export demand, while a rising terms of trade fueled by higher base metals prices has provided a boost to domestic income. However, the upward pressure on yields from accelerating domestic growth has become milder of late. Employment growth, motor vehicle sales and aggregate private sector credit growth are now all trending to the downside (Chart 17). This might be an indication that the boom from the first half of this year is starting to dissipate. This tames, to some extent, our optimism over the Australian economy. If economic activity continues to slow modestly, corporate bond supply, i.e. demand for credit and liquidity, should ease. In turn, this should also alleviate the recent upside pressure on the longer part of the Australian government bond yield curve. Chart 18The NZ Curve Will Follow##br## The Forwards In 2017 In sum, on a 3-6 month horizon, the short end of the Aussie curve could edge higher as the market prices in a less dovish RBA that will need to begin worrying about rising inflation once again. While at the same time, longer-term bond yields might have seen their highs given some cooling of economic growth. We already have a recommended position on the Australian curve to benefit from these trends, as we are short the 4-year government bond bullet versus a long position in the 2-year/6-year barbell. This trade was initiated earlier this year, has generated +13bps of profits so far, and remains valid.8 As an exit strategy, we will re-evaluate this trade if high-frequency cyclical Australian data disappoint further or the current expansion of Australia's terms of trade starts to reverse. New Zealand - Following The Forwards The New Zealand forward yield curve is currently pricing a 12bps flattening over the next 12 months, with the 2-year/10-year slope expected to move from 107bps to 95bps (Chart 18). This move seems reasonable to us. As we discussed in a recent report, inflation will re-surface in New Zealand in 2017.9 The upside surprise will be due to those factors: Narrowing global output gaps that will bring about a more inflationary global backdrop. A boost from China, most notably through higher producer prices. A weakening of the Kiwi dollar in response to a more hawkish Fed. A stronger dairy sector, which should help New Zealand's exports and reflate domestic wages. A potential reversal of migration inflows, which should shrink the supply of workers and tighten the labor market, boosting wage growth and pressuring price inflation higher. If this view materializes, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) will become more hawkish. This should push short term yields higher and flatten the New Zealand government bond yield curve. Like everywhere else, the New Zealand yield curve has steepened over the last month as global bond markets have priced in faster growth and the potential impact of Trump-ian fiscal stimulus in the U.S. As this external impact dissipates in the next few months, the main factor driving the shape of the New Zealand curve will swing back to expectations of future RBNZ policy. Bottom Line: The recent consistent steepening of government bond yield curves across the developed markets should soon begin to fade, leading to a more diverse evolution of curves during the course of 2017: steeper in the U.S., core Europe and in the long end in Japan; flatter in the U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Jean-Laurent Gagnon, Editor/Strategist jeang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy/U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Six Reasons To Tactically Reduce Duration Exposure Now", dated July 19, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com & usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy/U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fourth Tantrum", dated November 29, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com & usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 The current 1-year forward rate for the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury is 2.67% 4 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen", dated October 14, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5 The Fed targets headline PCE inflation, while inflation compensation in U.S. TIPS is priced off headline CPI inflation. The historical gap between the two measures is about 40bps, thus a level of breakeven inflation in TIPS that is consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target is 2.4% (2% PCE inflation + 0.4%). 6 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The ECB's Next Move: Extend & Pretend", dated October 25, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 7 Both the Bank of Canada and the median economist surveyed by Bloomberg forecast 2.0% real GDP growth in 2017. For further details, please http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2016/10/mpr-2016-10-19/ 8 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Five Yield Curve Trades For The Rest Of The Year", dated May 24, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "A Post-Trump Update Of Our Overlay Trades", dated November 22, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of November 30, 2016. The model further augmented the overweight to the U.S. despite the fact that the U.S. had already been the largest overweight, at the expenses of the Euro Area. Japan's underweight is reduced again, albeit slightly. The model continues to dislike Canada and Australia even though the two countries have outperformed year to date. U.K. remains the largest underweight (Table 1). Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the large overweight of the U.S. versus the non-U.S. (Level 1 model) worked well in November with 49 bps of outperformance versus the MSCI World benchmark, the level 2 (allocation within the 11 non-U.S. countries), however, underperformed significantly, resulting the overall model to underperform by 16 bps. Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of November 30, 2016. Table 3AllocationsTable 4Performance Since Going Live Chart 4Overall Model Performance The momentum component has shifted Consumer Discretionary from underweight to overweight. For mode details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Senior Analyst patrick@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com

Highlights The 50bps spike in the JPM global government bond yield since August constitutes one of the most aggressive tightenings since the Great Recession. Higher bond yields weaken credit growth, and weaker credit growth almost always depresses subsequent GDP growth. Maintain at most a neutral weighting to equities. Lean against the aggressive sell-offs in Healthcare, Consumer Goods, Telecoms and government bonds. Lean against the aggressive rally in Financials. Feature November 9 is an important date in the annals of history. November 9, 1989 was the day that the Berlin Wall came down. Chart of the WeekGlobalization Has Been Good For Profits, Bad For Wages Through 1961-89, the Berlin Wall divided a city. More significantly, it symbolized a divided world. So when the wall came down on November 9, 1989, it marked a new era of globalization. Goods, services, capital and people started to move around the world much more freely, resulting in greater efficiencies and lower costs. In developed economies, profits surged. Using the United States as an example, in the 27 years since the Berlin Wall came down, stock market real earnings per share have gone up 200% (Chart I-2). Chart I-2The Backdrop For Populism But globalization has exacted a heavy price: the pressure on wages means that in the 27 years since the Berlin Wall came down, U.S. median household real income has gone up just 10%. By comparison, in the 28 years that the Berlin Wall stood, the median household real income went up 60% (Chart of the Week). November 9 is also the date that Donald Trump won the presidency of the United States. So exactly 27 years after one symbolic wall fell, is another one about to go up? Will Mr. Trump's promised wall with Mexico symbolize a new era of anti-globalization, and a reversal of the economic and financial trends since the Berlin Wall came down? Flaws In The Trump Plan Economists are almost unanimous that protectionism, trade barriers and tariffs - in other words, "building walls" - depresses long-term global growth. It is conceivable that protectionism could help some parts of the U.S. economy, though other parts might lose out as trading partners retaliated. It is inconceivable that protectionism would be good for the world economy as a whole. Chart I-3One Of The Most Aggressive Tightenings ##br##Since The Great Recession But what about Trump's noise about fiscal stimulus, and specifically infrastructure spending - why would anybody not get excited about that? The two word answer is: crowding out. If a dollar that is borrowed and spent by the government (or even forecast to be borrowed and spent by the government) pushes up the bond yield (Chart I-3), it makes it more expensive for the private sector to borrow and spend. If, as a result, the private sector scales back its borrowing by a dollar, the dollar of government spending would have no impact on GDP. This is because the dollar of government spending has crowded out a dollar of private sector spending. The fiscal multiplier would be zero. But doesn't the euro area debt crisis provide compelling evidence of the power of fiscal thrust and a very high fiscal multiplier? No, not exactly. The fiscal multiplier was high through the debt crisis because euro area austerity - a fiscal tightening - very unusually coincided with sharply rising bond yields - which killed private sector borrowing. In other words, fiscal tightening and private sector tightening were reinforcing each other. Through 2009-12, when the euro area debt crisis escalated, the relationship between fiscal tightening and growth in GDP per capita in 13 sampled economies had a near-perfect explanatory power (r-squared of 0.9); and its slope of 1.5 indicated an extremely high average fiscal multiplier (Chart I-4). But through 2012-15, after Mario Draghi "did whatever it takes" the unusual combination of fiscal tightening and higher bond yields no longer existed, and both the explanatory power of the relationship and fiscal multiplier collapsed (Chart I-5). Chart I-4A Very Strong Connection Between Fiscal Policy And Growth Through 2009-12... Chart I-5...But No Connection Between Fiscal Policy And Growth Through 2012-15 The lesson is that the efficacy of fiscal stimulus and infrastructure spending crucially depends on its impact on the bond yield - and thereby on private sector borrowing. Now note that the 6-month increase in the U.S. (and global) 10-year bond yield constitutes one of the sharpest tightenings since the Great Recession. Higher borrowing costs depress credit growth as captured in the 6-month credit impulse (Chart I-6). A weaker 6-month credit impulse then almost always depresses subsequent 6-month GDP growth (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Higher Borrowing Costs Depress##br## Credit Growth... Chart I-7...And Weaker Credit Growth Depresses ##br##Subsequent GDP Growth So yes, fiscal stimulus and infrastructure spending could be effective as long as the bond yield is anchored, as it is in Japan. But if the bond yield goes up sharply, the consequent drag from the private sector will partly or entirely negate any putative boost from the government. Explaining Market Shocks And Electoral Shocks In his seminal book Thinking, Fast And Slow psychologist and Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman1 proposed that the human brain has evolved two separate and independent systems for decision making: a fast, rapid-response, associative way of thinking which he calls "System 1" and a slow, analytical, measured way of thinking which he calls "System 2". The two ways of thinking, fast and slow, have evolved to protect us from two types of threat to our survival: immediate, and long-term. Thousands of years ago, the immediate threat to survival might have been a sudden noise in the bushes suggesting that a predator was stalking. Today, for a bond investor, the immediate threat might be a sudden noise about aggressive U.S. fiscal stimulus, suggesting that the end of deflationary pressures is nigh. Faced with this immediate but uncertain threat, using the slow and measured thinking of System 2 could be fatal. So we obey the fast-thinking, associative, emotional System 1 and run for cover - or sell bonds. Thousands of years ago, a long-term threat might have been a war of attrition against an enemy tribe. Today, for the bond investor, the long-term threat might be the end of the debt super cycle, suggesting that deflationary pressures will persist. Faced with this long war of attrition, an over-reliance on the impulsive decisions of System 1 could also be fatal. We must use the measured analysis and strategies of slow-thinking System 2. Kahneman's System 1 and 2 is also an excellent framework to help explain how the simple messages of the Brexiteers and Donald Trump led to stunning success at the ballot box. Faced with job destruction and stagnant real wages, many people intuitively believe that less globalization, less competition and less immigration must mean more jobs and a better standard of living. Associative and emotional System 1 immediately identifies with simple messages such as "take back control" or "build a wall". The success of the Brexiteers and Donald Trump was to acknowledge the deep malaise that many people are feeling and offer simple and intuitive cures. To be absolutely clear, this is neither an endorsement nor a criticism of the Brexiteers or Donald Trump, but simply an explanation of why their message hit home. Still, as we have argued, the more analytical and measured System 2 will find that the simple and intuitive cures that the Brexiteers and Donald Trump offer are not the panaceas that they might first seem. The Immediate Investment Decision Short-term traders generally use the rapid-response, associative, emotional System 1 for their decision making. Long-term investors generally use the slow, analytical, measured System 2. But after a shock, disoriented long-term investors may also switch from System 2 to System 1 and just follow the herd. Eventually though, System 2 switches back on, and the excessive herding and trend-following reverses. At the moment, several sector trends are at or near such a point of reversal according to our excessive groupthink indicator (Chart I-8, Chart I-9, Chart I-10, Chart I-11, Chart I-12). Chart I-8Healthcare Reversals After Excessive Trend-Following Chart I-9Consumer Goods Reversals After Excessive Trend-Following Chart I-10Telecoms Reversals After Excessive Trend-Following Chart I-11Financials Reversals After Excessive Trend-Following Chart I-12Government Bond Reversals After Excessive Trend-Following Specifically, on a 3-month trading view, we would lean against the aggressive sell-offs in Healthcare, Consumer Goods, Telecoms and government bonds; and we would lean against the aggressive rally in Financials. More generally, what does the Trump victory mean for European equities? In today's highly-connected financial markets, mainstream investments in Europe overwhelmingly depend on global developments, and not on parochial issues. The dominant components of the Eurostoxx600, FTSE100, DAX30, CAC40, AEX, SMI, and other major indices, are multinationals with a truly global footprint. So the answer rests on two subsidiary questions: What does the Trump victory mean for global monetary conditions? What does the Trump victory mean for global growth? As already mentioned, global monetary conditions have tightened significantly in recent months, and in accelerated fashion after the Trump victory. The 50bps tightening in the JPM global government bond yield since August constitutes one of the sharpest 3-month spikes since the Great Recession. But as in previous cases, the spike may be self-limiting given its squeeze on credit sensitive sectors and emerging markets. Since August, the dividend yield on equities is little changed - meaning that equities have become more expensive relative to bonds. But this is hard to justify as short-term growth prospects have, if anything, worsened. To repeat the powerful messages from Chart 6 and Chart 7, higher bond yields weaken credit growth; and weaker credit growth almost always depresses subsequent GDP growth. Putting all this together, asset allocators should maintain at most a neutral weighting to equities. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002 for his work on decision making. Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. After the big recent moves in markets, four open positions were closed at their trading-rule limits, two at profit targets, two at stop-losses. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart 1-13 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

BCA will be holding the Dubai session of the BCA Academy seminar on November 28 & 29. This two-day course teaches investment professionals how to examine the economy, policy, and markets; and also makes links between these important factors. Moreover, it represents a great networking opportunity for all attendees. I look forward to seeing you there. Best regards, Mathieu Savary Highlights Donald Trump's victory represents a sea-change for U.S. politics as well as the economy. His expansionary fiscal policy, to be implemented as the labor market's slack evaporates, will boost demand, wages, and will prove inflationary. The Fed will respond with higher rates, boosting the dollar. EM Asian currencies will bear the brunt of the pain. Commodity currencies, especially the AUD, will also be significant casualties. EUR/USD will weaken in the face of a strong greenback, but should outperform most currencies. Key risks involve gauging whether the Fed genuinely wants to create a "high-pressure", economy as well as the potential for Chinese fiscal stimulus. Feature Trump's electoral victory only re-enforces our bullish stance on the dollar. A Trump presidency implies much more fiscal stimulus than originally anticipated. Therefore, the Fed will not be the only game in town to support growth. This strengthens our view that, on a cyclical basis, the OIS curve still underprices the potential for higher U.S. interest rates. In a Mundell-Fleming world, this suggests a much higher exchange rate for the greenback. Additionally, Trump's protectionist views are likely to hit EM economies - China in particular - harder than DM economies. We continue to prefer expressing our bullish dollar view by shorting EM and commodity currencies. Is Trump Handcuffed? Trump's victory reflects a tidal wave of anger and dissatisfaction with the current state of the U.S. economy. Most profoundly, his candidacy was a rallying cry against an increasingly unequal distribution of economic opportunities and outcomes for the U.S. population. As we highlighted last week, since 1981, the top 1% of households have seen their share of income grow by 11%. In fact, while 90% of households have seen their real income contract by 1% since 1980, the top 0.01% of households have seen their real income increase more than five-fold (Chart I-1). Chart I-1The (Really) Rich Got Richer In this context, Trump's appeal, more than his often-distasteful racial or gender rhetoric, has been his talk of protecting the middle class. But, by losing the popular vote, are his hands tied? Marko Papic, BCA's Chief Geopolitical Strategist, surmises in a Special Report1 sent to all BCA's clients that it is not the case. First, Trump's victory speech emphasized infrastructure spending, indicating that this is likely to be his first priority. As Chart I-2 illustrates, there is a lot of room for the government to spend on this front. At 1.4% of GDP, government investment is at its lowest level since World War II. Furthermore, according to the Tax Policy Institute, Trump's current plan includes $6.2 trillion in tax cuts over the next 10 years. Second, the Republican Party now controls Congress as well as the White House. Not only has the GOP historically rallied around the president when all the levers of power are in the party's hands, but also, the Tea party has been one of Trump's most ardent supporters. Hence, Trump's program is unlikely to be completely squelched by Congress. Third, the GOP is most opposed to government spending when Democrats control the White House. When Republicans are in charge of the executive, the GOP is a much less ardent advocate of government stringency, having increased the deficit in the opening years of the Reagan, Bush I, and Bush II administrations (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Room To Increase##br## Infrastructure Spending Chart I-3Republicans Are Fiscally Responsible ##br##When It Suits them Finally, international relations are the president's prerogative. While there are legal hurdles to renegotiate treaties like NAFTA, Trump can slap tariffs easily, rendering previous arrangements quite impotent. Though protectionism has not been highlighted in Trump's victory speech, the topic's popularity with his core electorate highlights the risk that trade policies could be impacted. Bottom Line: Trump has a mandate to spend and got elected because of his policies that support the middle class. His surprise victory represents a sea-change, a move the rest of the Republican establishment will not ignore. Therefore, we expect Trump to be able to implement large-scale fiscal stimulus. Economic Implications To begin with, Trump is a populist politician. While populism ultimately ends badly, it can generate a growth dividend for many years. Nowhere was this clearer than in 1930s Germany, where Hitler's reign yielded a major economic outperformance of Germany relative to its regional competitors (Chart I-4).2 Government infrastructure spending played a large role in this phenomenon. Also, the Reagan era shows how fiscal stimulus can lead to a boost to growth. From the end of the 1981-82 recession to 1987, U.S. real GDP per capita outperformed that of Europe and Japan, despite the dollar's strength in the first half of the decade. Fascinatingly, the U.S. GDP per capita even outperformed that of the U.K., a country in the midst of the supply-side Thatcherite revolution (Chart I-5). This suggests that the U.S's economic outperformance was not just a reflection of Reagan's deregulatory instincts. Chart I-4Populism Can Boost Growth Chart I-5Reagan Deficits Boosted Growth Too Unemployment is close to its long-term equilibrium, and the hidden labor-market slack has greatly dissipated. Additionally, one of the biggest hurdles facing small businesses is finding qualified labor. In the context of a tight labor market, we anticipate that Trump's fiscal stimulus will not only boost aggregate demand directly, but will also exert significant pressures on already rising wages (Chart I-6). Compounding this effect, if Trump does indeed focus on infrastructure spending, work by BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy service shows that this type of stimulus offers the highest fiscal multiplier (Table I-1).3 Chart I-6Stimulating Now Will Feed Wage Growth Table I-1Ranges For U.S. Fiscal Multipliers Additionally, a retreat away from globalization, and a move toward slapping more tariffs and quotas on Asia and China would be inflationary. Historically, falling inflation has coincided with falling tariffs as competitive forces increase. This time, with the output gap closing, and the tightening labor market, decreasing the trade deficit could arithmetically push GDP above trend, accentuating wage and inflationary pressures. Finally, for households, a combination of rising wages, elevated consumer confidence, and low financial obligations relative to disposable income could prompt a period of re-leveraging (Chart I-7). Moreover, the median FICO score for new mortgages has fallen from more than 780 in 2013 to 756 today, an easing in lending standard for mortgages. All the factors above suggest that U.S. growth is likely to improve over the next two years, driven by the government and households. It also points towards rising inflationary pressures. As we have highlighted before, the more the economy can generate wage growth to support domestic consumption, the more it becomes resilient in the face of a stronger dollar. The tyranny of the feedback loop between the dollar and growth will loosen. This environment would be one propitious for the Fed to hike interest rates as the economy becomes less dependent on lower rates for support. In the long-run, the Trump growth dividend is likely to require a payback, but this discussion is for another day. Bottom Line: Trump is likely to boost U.S. economic activity through fiscal stimulus, especially infrastructure spending. Since the slack in the economy is now small, especially in the labor market, this increases the likelihood that the Fed will finally be able to durably push up interest rates (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Household Debt Load Can Grow Again Chart I-8Vanishing Slack = Higher Rates Currency Market Implications The one obvious effect from a Trump victory is that it re-enforces our core theme that the dollar will strengthen on a 12 to 18-months basis as the market reprices the Fed's path. However, we expect Asian currencies to be viciously hit by this new round of dollar strength. For one, compared to the drubbing LatAm currencies received, KRW, TWD, and SGD are only trading 13%, 9%, and 15% below their post 2010 highs. Most importantly though, EM Asia has been the main beneficiary of 35 years of expanding globalization. Countries like China or the Asian tigers have registered world-beating growth rates thanks to a growth strategy largely driven by exports (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Former Winners Become Losers Under Trump We expect these economies and currencies to suffer the most from Trump's retribution and from a continued structural underperformance of global trade. China, Korea, and co. are likely to be hit by tariffs under a Trump administration. Also, under a Trump administration, the likelihood of implementation of new international trade treaties is near zero. Therefore, the continuous expansion of globalization of the previous decades is over, and may even somewhat reverse. Furthermore, a move toward a more multipolar world, like the interwar period, tends to be associated with falling trade engagement. Trump's desire to diminish the global deployment of U.S. troops would only add to such worries. Regarding the RMB, the picture is murky. On the one hand, the RMB is trading 4% below fair value and does not need much devaluation from a competitiveness perspective. However, Chinese internal deflationary pressures, courtesy of much overcapacity, remain strong (Chart I-10). Easing these pressures requires a lower RMB. Moreover, the offshore yuan weakened substantially in the wake of Trump's victory, yet the onshore one did not, suggesting that the PBoC is depleting its reserves to support the currency. This tightens domestic liquidity conditions, exacerbating the deflationary forces in the country. Chart I-10Plenty Of Excess Capacity In China This means that China is in a bind as a depreciating currency will elicit the wrath of president Trump. The risk is currently growing that China will let the RMB fall substantially between now and January 20. Such a move would magnify any devaluating pressures on other Asian exchange rates. While it is difficult to be bullish MXN outright on a cyclical basis when expecting a broad dollar rally, the recent weakness in MXN is overdone. Mexico has not benefited nearly as much from globalization as Asian nations. Also, after a 60% appreciation in USD/MXN since June 2014, even after the imposition of tariffs, Mexico will still be competitive. Even then, the likelihood and severity of any tariffs enacted on Mexico might be exaggerated by markets. In fact, President Nieto's invitation to Trump last summer may prove to have been a particularly uncanny political move. Investors interested in buying the peso may want to consider doing it against the won, potentially one of the biggest losers from a Trump presidency. Outside of EM, the AUD is at risk. Australia sits in the middle of the pack in terms of economic and export growth during the globalization era, but it is very exposed to Asian economic activity. Historically, the AUD has been tightly correlated with Asian currencies (Chart I-11). Adding insult to injury, Australia is a large metals producer, which means that Australia's terms of trade are highly levered to the Chinese investment cycle, the main source of demand for iron ore, copper, etc. (Chart I-12). With China already swimming in over capacity, unless the government enacts a new infrastructure package, Chinese imports of raw materials will remain weak. Chart I-11AUD Will Suffer If Asian Currencies Fall Chart I-12China Is The Giant In The Room The NZD is also likely to suffer against the USD. The currency's sensitivity to the dollar strength and EM spreads is very high. However, we expect AUD/NZD to remain depressed. The outlook for relative terms of trades supports the kiwi as ag-prices will be less impacted by a slowdown in Chinese capex than metals. Additionally, on most metrics, the New Zealand economy is outperforming that of Australia (Chart I-13). The CAD should beat both antipodean currencies. First, it is less sensitive to the U.S. dollar or EM spreads than both the AUD and the NZD, reflecting its tighter economic link with the U.S. We also expect some softer rhetoric and actions from Trump when it comes to implementing trade restrictions with Canada than with Asia. Finally, while we are very concerned for the outlook for metals, the outlook for energy is superior. Yes, a strong greenback is a headwind for oil prices, but a Trump presidency is likely to result in strong household consumption. Vehicle-miles-driven growth would remain elevated, suggesting healthy oil demand from the U.S. Meanwhile, our Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects the drawdown in global oil inventories to accelerate, particularly if Saudi Arabia and Russia can agree on a 1mm b/d production cut at the upcoming OPEC meeting at the end of the month, which is bullish for oil (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Stronger Kiwi Domestic Fundamentals Chart I-14Better Supply/Demand Backdrop For Oil We also remain yen bears. The isolationist stance of Trump is likely to incentivize Abe to double down on fiscal stimulus, especially on the military. Japan is currently massively outspent on that front by China (Chart I-15). With the BoJ pegging policy rates at 0% for the foreseeable future, the yen will swoon on the back of falling real yields. Moreover, if our bearish stance on Asian currencies materializes itself, this will put competitive pressures on the yen, creating an additional negative. For the euro, the picture is less clear. The euro remains the mirror image of the dollar, so a strong greenback and a weak euro are synonymous. Additionally, Trump stimulus, if enacted, will ultimately result in higher nominal and real yields in the U.S. relative to Europe, especially as the euro area does not display any signs of being at full employment (Chart I-16). That being said, the euro is currently very cheap, supported by a current account surplus, and the ECB might begin tapering asset purchases in the second half of 2017. Combining these factors together, while we remain cyclically bearish on EUR/USD - a move below parity over the next 12-18 months is a growing possibility - the euro will outperform EM currencies, commodity currencies, and even the yen. We are looking to buy EUR/JPY, especially considering the skew in positioning (Chart I-17). Chart I-15Japan Will Spend More On Its ##br##Military With Or Without Trump Chart I-16European Labor Market##br## Slack Is Evident Chart I-17EUR/JPY Has##br## Room To Rally Finally, the outlook for the pound remains clouded until we get a better sense of the High Court's decision on the government's appeal regarding the need for a Parliamentary vote on Brexit. We expect the court's decision to re-inforce the previous ruling, which means that the pound could strengthen as the probability of a "soft Brexit" grows. The resilience of the pound in the face of the recent dollar's strength points to such an outcome. Risk To Our View And Short-Term Dynamics The biggest risk to our view is obviously that Trump's fiscal plans never pan out. However, since our bullish stance on the dollar predates Trump's electoral victory, we would therefore remain dollar bulls, albeit less so. Nonetheless, limited fiscal stimulus would likely cause a temporary pullback in the dollar. Chart I-18A Mispricing Or A Signal? Another short-term risk is the Fed. Currently, inflation expectations in the U.S. have shot up. If the Fed does not increase rates in December - this publication currently thinks the FOMC will increase rates then - the dollar will fall as this move will put downward pressures on U.S. real rates. This is especially relevant as the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield stands at 2.8%, in line with the Fed's estimate of the long-term equilibrium Fed funds rates as per the "dots". A big risk for our EM / commodity currency view is China. China may not respond to Trump by aggressively bidding down the CNY before January 20. Instead, to counteract the negative effect of Trump on Chinese export growth, China might instigate more fiscal stimulus, plans that always have a large infrastructure component. The recent parabolic move in copper needs monitoring (Chart I-18). Bottom Line: A Trump victory is a massive boon for the dollar. However, because Trump represents a move away from globalization, the main casualties of the Trump-dollar rally will be Asian currencies and the AUD. The CAD and the NZD will also undergo downward pressures, but less so. Finally, while EUR/USD is likely to fall, the euro will outperform EM currencies, commodity currencies, and the yen. As a risk, in the short-term, an absence of Fed hike in December would represent the biggest source of weakness for the dollar. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: Outcomes And Investment Implications", dated November 9, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 To be clear, while we do find some of Trump comments over the past year highly distasteful, we are not suggesting that he is a re-incarnation of Hitler or that his presidency is doomed to end in a massive global conflict. It is only an economic parallel. 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Policy, Polls, Probability", dated November 7, available at usis.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "We are going to fix our inner cities and rebuild our highways, bridges, tunnels, airports, schools, hospitals. We're going to rebuild our infrastructure, which will become, by the way, second to none. And we will put millions of our people to work as we rebuild it." - U.S. President Elect Donald Trump (November 9, 2016) Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "I'm very skeptical as far as further interest rate cuts or additional expansionary monetary policy measures are concerned -- over time, the benefits of these measures decrease, while the risks increase" - ECB Executive Board Member Sabine Lautenschlaeger (November 7,2016) Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "In order for long-term interest rate control to work effectively, it is important to maintain the credibility in the JGB market through the government's efforts toward establishing sustainable fiscal structures" - BoJ Minutes (November 10, 2016) Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "[The impact of a weak pound on inflation]... will ultimately prove temporary, and attempting to offset it fully with tighter monetary policy would be excessively costly in terms of foregone output and employment growth. However, there are limits to the extent to which above-target inflation can be tolerated" - BOE Monetary Policy Summary (November 3, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Inflation remains quite low...Subdued growth in labor costs and very low cost pressures elsewhere in the world mean that inflation is expected to remain low for some time" - RBA Monetary Policy Statement (October 31, 2016) Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Weak global conditions and low interest rates relative to New Zealand are keeping upward pressure on the New Zealand dollar exchange rate. The exchange rate remains higher than is sustainable for balanced economic growth and, together with low global inflation, continues to generate negative inflation in the tradables sector. A decline in the exchange rate is needed" - RBNZ Governor Graeme Wheeler (November 10, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 The Fed is Trapped Under Ice - September 9, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "We have studied the research and the theory behind frameworks such as price-level targeting and targeting the growth of nominal gross domestic product. But, to date, we have not seen convincing evidence that there is an approach that is better than our inflation targets" - BoC Governor Stephen Poloz (November 1, 2016) Report Links: When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "We don't have a fixed limit for growing the balance sheet; it's a corollary of our foreign exchange market interventions - which we conduct to fulfill our price stability mandate" - SNB Vice-President Fritz Zurbruegg (October 25, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Clashing Forces - July 29, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "Banks' capital ratios have doubled since the financial crisis and liquidity has improved. At the same time, some aspects of the Norwegian economy make the financial system vulnerable. This primarily relates to high property price inflation combined with high household indebtedness" - Norges Bank Deputy Governor Jon Nicolaisen (November 2, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "...the weak inflation outcomes in recent months illustrate the uncertainty over how quickly inflation will rise. The Riksbank now assesses that it will take longer for inflation to reach 2 per cent. The upturn in inflation therefore needs continued strong support" - Riksbank Minutes (November 9, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Dazed And Confused - July 1, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights The credibility of ECB QE is set to diminish, one way or another. Stay long euro/dollar. Expect a continued compression in the German Bund yield spread versus the U.S. T-bond. Until the U.K. Supreme Court provides further legal clarity about the Brexit process, expectations for a softer Brexit should prop up the pound. In which case, the Eurostoxx600 will outperform the FTSE100 and the FTSE250 will outperform the FTSE100. Feature Nobody saw Brexit coming on June 23, and few saw a President Trump coming on November 8. Just as in the days after June 23, financial markets are trying to regain a footing after another political earthquake. The dust will settle. Our geopolitical strategists will provide a post-election analysis in a separate report. In this report, we would like to look through the immediate haze and focus on three major institutions whose policy options and degrees of freedom were becoming constrained, irrespective of the U.S. election shock. The institutions are: the ECB, the Federal Reserve, and the U.K. government. Chart of the WeekExpected Policy Rate Differential Drives ##br##The German Bund Yield Spread Versus The U.S. T-Bond The ECB Is Facing A Lose-Lose Decision Central bank quantitative easing (QE) remains one of the most misunderstood concepts within economics and finance. Contrary to the popular myth, it is not the central bank's asset purchases per se that matter. If the central bank's act of buying assets works at all, it is because QE signals a long period of ultra-low interest rates ahead.1 This then reduces the yields on other financial assets through the so-called "portfolio balance channel." Chart I-2Through 2011-13 Markets Interpreted A Lower ##br##Flow Of QE As A Monetary Tightening As Fed Chair Janet Yellen succinctly explains, once there is ample liquidity in the banking system: "QE has no discernible economic effects aside from those associated with communicating the central bank's commitment to the zero interest rate policy" The fundamental point is that the precise amount and asset-class composition of a QE program does not matter. The program just has to be large enough to demonstrate a credible commitment to ultra-low rates. But once a central bank establishes a monthly purchase amount, for example, the current €80bn for the ECB, the flow becomes an anchor. Financial markets then interpret a decrease in that monthly flow as a weakening commitment to ultra-low rates: in effect, a monetary tightening (Chart I-2). On the other hand, if the monthly asset-purchase promise goes on indefinitely, it also loses credibility. The financial markets know full well that there is only a finite pool of safe-assets that the central bank can buy, as the recent experience of the Bank of Japan testifies. For the ECB, the so-called "degrees of freedom" are even more limited than for the Bank of Japan. Asset purchases are constrained by politically determined upper-limits to individual euro area country exposure and by liquidity determined upper-limits to individual financial asset exposure. Hence, the ECB now faces a lose-lose decision. If it signals an intention - even a delayed intention - to taper its €80bn monthly flow of QE, the financial markets will interpret it as a de facto tightening. But if it does not signal an intention to taper it will have to use more and more smoke, mirrors, and chicanery to justify how it can keep delivering on its promise to buy. Bottom Line: one way or another, the credibility of ECB QE is set to diminish. The Federal Reserve's Track Record In Predicting Its Own Policy Is Abysmal To take a position on the euro/dollar exchange rate or the yield differential between German Bunds and U.S. T-bonds, we must now consider the other central bank in the equation: the U.S. Federal Reserve. When it comes to predicting the stance of its own monetary policy, the track record of the Federal Reserve is nothing short of abysmal. The Federal Reserve's famous dot forecasts have consistently missed the mark. In fact, they have not even come close to the mark. Just two years ago, the median Fed dot was predicting ten rate hikes by now (Chart I-3). Yes, seriously - ten! Chart I-3Two Years Ago, The Median Fed Dot Was Predicting Ten Rate Hikes By Now In its own defence, the Fed might respond that its monetary policy is "data-dependent" or even "events-dependent", and that this contingency prevented it from hiking the ten times that it had forecast. That's fine. But it then raises a bigger question about credibility. If central bank policy is contingent, then is it really possible to give credible forward guidance on the level of interest rates stretching out years ahead? We think not. Indeed, by publishing dots that turn out to be so consistently and deeply wrong, the central bank is seriously damaging its own credibility and authority. Rather than relying on Federal Reserve dots or market forecasts, investors must make up their own minds about the likely path of the Fed funds rate. For bond investors, the medium-term question is: at what level will the policy rate peak in this tightening cycle? This is because at the peak of the tightening cycle, the 0-10 year yield curve tends to be more or less flat (Chart I-4). In other words, the 10-year bond yield ends up eventually trading at the same level at which the policy rate peaks. After the election shock, the knee-jerk response has been a higher 10-year T-bond yield, and this direction may continue in the near-term. But further out, the question is: will the Fed funds rate peak above or below where today's 10-year T-bond yield of 1.9% implies that it will peak? We think below. Note that a first and second interest rate hike interspersed by a full year is unprecedented in modern economic history. And now, even the intended second hike in December might be in jeopardy. Given that the Fed has struggled to get two 25bps hikes through in two years, the idea that it will succeed in hiking another four or five times in this tightening cycle really does not seem credible to us. Bottom Line: Combined with the diminishing credibility of ECB QE, stay long euro/dollar (Chart I-5); and expect a continued compression in the German Bund yield spread versus the U.S. T-bond. In other words, maintain the pair-trade: long T-bonds, short German bunds (currency hedged) (Chart of the Week). Chart I-4At The Peak Of A Tightening Cycle, ##br##The 0-10 Year Yield Curve Is Flat Chart I-5Expected Policy Rate Differential##br## Drives Euro/Dollar The U.K. Government Has Had Its Wings Clipped The U.K. Government is another institution that has suffered a huge blow to its credibility and authority. Prime Minister Theresa May brazenly thought that she could start the legal process to exit the EU using the so-called 'royal prerogative', the power granted to governments to make certain decisions without a vote from parliament. But as we presciently warned two weeks ago in The Pound: Next Stop $1.10 Or $1.35,2 the U.K. High Court has judged the government does not have the authority to overturn domestic law - in this case, the European Communities Act (1972) and European Union Act (2011) - without obtaining parliamentary approval. The irony is that the sovereignty of the U.K. Parliament is the very thing that Brexiteers supposedly are fighting for. The High Court has clipped the U.K. Government's wings by deferring the Article 50 trigger to parliament. The government is appealing the High Court decision at the Supreme Court whose verdict is expected in January. But given that the government itself concedes that the Article 50 trigger will irrevocably change domestic law, it is hard to see how the government will win the appeal. Hence, there is a high likelihood that Members of Parliament will get to scrutinise the government's negotiating hand before it is allowed to fire the Brexit starting gun. Given that the precise form of Brexit has huge implications for British people's economic future and legal rights, parliament could water down or delay Brexit before voting it through. Bottom Line: Until the Supreme Court provides further legal clarity3 in January, expectations for a softer Brexit should prop up the pound. In which case: the Eurostoxx600 will outperform the FTSE100; the FTSE250 will outperform the FTSE100; U.K. retailers, travel and real estate equities will outperform the U.K. market; but U.K. goods exporters will underperform (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6A Soft Or Hard ##br##Brexit... Chart I-7...Determines The Prospects ##br##For Most U.K. Assets Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Because while an asset-purchase program is underway, it would be difficult to raise rates. 2 Published on October 27 2016 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com 3 The Supreme Court will judge the government's appeal against the High Court decision. If the appeal is lost, it may also judge what type of parliamentary approval is required to trigger Article 50: a full Bill or a simple Resolution. Fractal Trading Model* This week's recommended trade is to go long U.K. healthcare versus the market. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-8 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights De-globalization is accelerating. Europe is holding together, with populism in check. China power consolidation reflects extreme risks. Brexit is more likely, not less, after court ruling. Feature Chart I-1America Has Soured On Globalization The world woke up on Wednesday to President-elect Donald J. Trump. It will take time for the markets to digest the new regime in Washington D.C., but something tells us that it will not be business-as-usual over the next four years. We give our post-mortem assessment in the enclosed In Focus Special Report, starting on page 28. The divisive campaign reached epic lows in decorum and polarization, but both candidates did have one major thing in common: They shared a negative view of globalization, representing a paradigm shift in geopolitics and macroeconomics. Investors often take policymakers to be agents of political supply. Political rhetoric is taken seriously, analyzed, and its implications for various assets are discussed with confidence. But this approach gets the causality all wrong. Politicians are merely supplying what the political marketplace is demanding. In those terms, Donald Trump was not an agent of change. He was merely a product of his environment. So what is the American median voter demanding? Judging by the success of Donald Trump - and Senator Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primary race - the answer is less free trade, more government spending, and a promise to keep entitlement spending at current, largely unsustainable levels. Americans empirically support globalization at a lower level than the average of advanced, emerging, or developing economies (Chart I-1). What is the problem with globalization? In our 2014 report titled "The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here," we argued that globalization was under assault due to three dynamics:1 Deflation is politically pernicious: Globalization was one of the greatest supply-side shocks in recent history and thus exerted a strong deflationary force (Chart I-2). A persistently low growth environment that flirts with deflation is unacceptable for the majority of the population in advanced economies. Citizens have already experienced a combination of wage suppression and debt escalation. And while globalization produced disinflationary forces on the price of labor and tradeable goods, it has done little to check the rising costs of education, health care, child care, and housing (Chart I-3), which cannot be outsourced to China or Mexico. Chart I-2Globalization Was A Major Supply-Side Shock Chart I-3You Can't Ship Daycare To China The death of the Debt Supercycle: The 2008 Great Recession shifted the demand curve inward. BCA coined the "debt supercycle" framework in the 1970s to characterize the overarching trend of rising debt in a world where political leaders, with the Great Depression and Second World War in the back of their mind, continually resorted to reflationary policies to overcome each new recession. However, the 2008 economic shock permanently shifted household preferences in the West, reducing demand by turning consumers into savers (Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B). This contributes to the global savings glut and reinforces the deflationary environment. Chart I-4AGlobal Demand Engine ... Chart I-4B...Is Not Coming Back Multipolarity: Global leadership by a dominant superpower can overcome ideological challenges and demand deficiencies by providing a consumer of last resort. In game-theory terms, such a global hegemon acts as an exogenous coordinator, turning a non-cooperative game into a cooperative one. But in today's world, geopolitical and economic power is becoming more diffuse. We know from history that intense competition between a number of leading nations imperils globalization (Chart I-5). This is particularly the case in a low-growth environment. Geopolitical and economic multipolarity increase market risk premiums. Chart I-5Multipolarity Imperils Globalization These factors imperiled globalization well before Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn, and Nigel Farage came to dominate the news flow in 2016. The macroeconomic and geopolitical context guaranteed that anti-globalization rhetoric would prove successful at the ballot box. Chart I-6Sino-American Macroeconomic Symbiosis Ended##br## In 2008 Sino-American Symbiosis Is Over In addition to these structural challenges to globalization, the next U.S. administration will also have to handle the increasingly complex Sino-American relationship. The future of the post-Bretton Woods macroeconomic and geopolitical system will be decided by these two great powers. And we fear that both economic and geopolitical tensions will worsen.2 China and the U.S. are no longer in a symbiotic relationship. The close embrace between U.S. household leverage and Chinese export-led growth is over (Chart I-6). Today the Chinese economy is domestically driven, with government stimulus and skyrocketing leverage playing a much more important role than external demand. Chinese policymakers have a choice. They can double down on globalization and use competition and creative destruction to drive up productivity growth - moving the economy up the value chain. Or, they can use protectionism - particularly non-tariff barriers to trade - to defend their domestic market from competition.3 We expect that they will do the latter, especially in an environment where anti-globalization rhetoric is rising in the West. The problem with this choice, however, is that it breaks up the post-1979 quid-pro-quo between Washington and Beijing. The "quid" was the Chinese entry into global trade (including the WTO in 2001), which the U.S. supported; the "quo" was that Beijing would open up its economy as it became wealthy. Today, 45% of China's population is middle class, which makes China potentially the world's second largest market after the EU. If China decides not to share its middle class with the rest of the world, then the world will quickly move towards mercantilism.4 What should investors expect in a world that has less globalization, more populism, and rising Sino-American tensions? We think there are five structural investment themes afoot: Chart I-7Globalization And MNCs: A Tight Embrace Inflation is back: Globalization has been one of the most important pillars of a multi-decade deflationary era. If it is imperiled, political capital will swing from capitalists to the owners of labor. Sovereign bonds are not pricing in this paradigm shift, which is why investors should position themselves for the "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market."5 We are long German 10-year CPI swaps as a strategic play on this theme. USD strength: The market got the USD wrong. Trump is not bad for the greenback. More government spending and higher inflation will allow U.S. monetary policy to be tighter than that of its global peers. Furthermore, U.S. policymakers will not look to arrest the dollar bull market. "Main street" loves a strong dollar, particularly U.S. households and consumers. King Dollar will be the righteous agent of plebeian retribution against the patrician corporations used to getting their way on Capitol Hill. And finally, more geopolitical risk will mean more safe haven demand. RMB weakness: China needs to depreciate its currency in order to ease domestic monetary policy and is therefore constrained by its slowing and over-leveraged economy. But in doing so, it will export deflation and ensure that a trade war with the U.S. ensues. In addition, China's EM peers will suffer as their competitiveness vis-à-vis their main export market - China - declines. We expect that China will hasten its ongoing turn towards protectionism itself. This means that if investors want to take advantage of China's rise, they should buy Chinese companies, not the foreign firms looking to grab a share of China's middle-class market. Long defense stocks: Global multipolarity is correlated with armed conflict. We have played this theme by being long U.S. defense / short aerospace equities. Our colleague Anastasios Avgeriou, Chief Strategist of BCA's Global Alpha Sector Strategy, recommends investors initiate a structural overweight in the global defense index.6 Long SMEs / Short MNCs: A world with marginally less free trade, and marginally more populism, will favor domestically oriented sectors. Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the U.S., for example. Multinational corporations (MNCs) have particularly benefited from free trade and laissez faire economics. The relationship between globalization and S&P 500 operating earnings has been tight for the past 50 years (Chart I-7). Not anymore. In the new environment, investors will want to be long domestically-oriented sectors and economies against externally-oriented ones. These are structural themes supported by structural trends. We would have recommended these five investment themes irrespective of who won the U.S. election. In this Monthly Report, we focus on leadership races around the world. Our In Focus section gives a post-mortem on the U.S. presidential election. The rest of this Global Overview focuses on upcoming elections in Europe (as well as the December 4 Italian constitutional referendum) and the impending Chinese leadership rotation in 2017. We also give our two cents on recent developments related to Brexit in the U.K. Europe: Election Fever Continues Chart I-8Italian Referendum: Likely A 'No' The Netherlands, France, Germany, and potentially, Italy could all hold elections over the next 12 months, a recipe for market volatility. These four countries are part of the EMU-5 and account for 71% of the currency union's GDP and 66% of its population. Should investors expect a paradigm shift? We think the answer is yes, but surprisingly, not towards more Euroskepticism. Our view is that continental Europe - unlike its Anglo-Saxon peers, the U.K. and the U.S. - is actually moving marginally towards the center.7 The median voter in Europe is not becoming more Euroskeptic and even appears to support modest, pro-business, structural reforms! Wait... what? Indeed. Read on. Italy The constitutional referendum being held on December 4 remains too close to call, although we suspect that it will fail (Chart I-8). However, we doubt very much that the defeat of the government's position will initiate a sequence of events that takes Italy out of the euro area. As we argued in a recent Special Report titled "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," Italian policymakers are using Euroskepticism to extract concessions from Europe. But Italy is structurally constrained from exiting European institutions because of its bifurcated economy.8 Moreover, a failed referendum outcome is not a strategic risk to Europe: Euro support: Italians continue to support euro area membership, albeit at a lower level than in the past (Chart I-9). As such, the Euroskeptic Five Star Movement (M5S) has political reasons to become less opposed to euro area membership, as its anti-establishment peers have done in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Bicameralism: If the constitutional referendum fails, then the Senate will remain a fully empowered chamber in the Italian Parliament. Given Italy's complicated electoral laws, M5S will be unable to capture both houses in Italy's notoriously bicameral legislative body, unless it does very well in the next election. But M5S has consistently trailed the incumbent, pro-establishment Democratic Party (PD) in the polls (Chart I-10). Sequence: As Diagram I-1 shows, the contingent probability of the December constitutional referendum leading to an Italian exit from the euro area is 1.2%. Chart I-9Italy & Euro: OK (For Now) Chart I-10Italy: Euroskeptics Peaking? Diagram I-1From Referendum To Referendum: Contingent Probability Of Italy ##br##Leaving The Euro Area Following The Constitutional Referendum Vote Investors should not translate our sanguine view into a positive view of Italy. As we outlined in the above-cited Special Report, we remain skeptical that Italy can improve its potential growth rate by boosting productivity. But there is a big leap between more-of-the-same in Italy and a euro area collapse. The Netherlands The anti-establishment and Euroskeptic Party for Freedom (PVV) is set to perform poorly in the upcoming March 15 Dutch election. Polls suggest that it will roughly repeat its 10% performance from the 2012 election (Chart I-11). This is extremely disappointing given its polling earlier in the year. PVV's support has collapsed recently, most likely the result of the immigration crisis abating (Chart I-12) and the Brexit referendum in June. Many Dutch may be interested in casting a protest vote against the establishment, but a large majority still support euro area membership (Chart I-13). As such, they are put off by the vociferous Euroskepticism represented by the PVV. Chart I-11The Netherlands: Euroskeptics Collapsing Chart I-12Read Our Chart: Migration Crisis Is Over Chart I-13The Netherlands & Euro: Love Affair The Netherlands is a very important euro area member state. Its economy is large enough that its views matter, despite its small population. Euroskepticism in the Netherlands is notable, but it does not mean that the country's leadership will contemplate a referendum on membership. More likely, the establishment will seek to counter the populist PVV by becoming stricter on immigration and looser on budget discipline. Investors can live with both. France The French election is a two-round affair that will be held on April 23 and May 7. The key question is who will win the November 20 primary of the center-right party, Les Républicains, formerly known as the Union for a Popular Movement. According to the latest polls, former Prime Minister (1995-1997) Alain Juppé is set to win the primary over former President Nicolas Sarkozy (Chart I-14). Who is Alain Juppé? The 70-year old has been the mayor of Bordeaux since 2006, but he is better remembered for the failed social welfare reforms (the Juppé Plan) that caused epic strikes in France back in 1995. He is pro-euro, pro-EU, and pro-economic reforms. In other words, he is everything that Brexit and Trump/Sanders/Corbyn are not. According to the latest polls, Juppé is a heavy favorite against the anti-establishment candidate Marine Le Pen (Chart I-15). This is unsurprising as Le Pen's popularity peaked in 2013, as we have been stressing to clients for years (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Please Google Alain Juppe... Chart I-15...The Next President Of France Chart I-16Le Pen's Popularity In A Secular Decline Why has Le Pen struggled to gain traction in an era of terrorism, migration crises, and the success of anti-establishment peers such as Brexiters and Donald Trump? There are two major reasons. First, she continues to oppose France's membership in the euro area, despite very large support levels for the common currency in the country (Chart I-17). Second, she is holding together a coalition of northern and southern National Front (FN) members. This coalition pins together a diverse group. Northern right-wing FN members are more akin to their Dutch peers, or the "alt-right" movement in the U.S. They are anti-globalization, anti-political correctness (PC), and anti-immigration - specifically, further immigration of Muslims to France. However, this northern FN faction is ambivalent on social issues such as homosexuality (in fact, many of Le Pen's closest advisors from the north of France are openly gay), and they oppose Islam from a position that Muslim immigrants are incompatible with French liberal values. The southern FN faction is far more traditionally conservative, drawing their roots from the old anti-Gaullist, staunchly Catholic right wing. When Le Pen loses the 2017 presidential election, it will spell doom for the National Front. The only thing holding the two factions together is her leadership. Therefore, not only is France likely to elect a pro-reform president from the political establishment, but also its anti-establishment, Euroskeptic movement may be facing an internal struggle. Germany The German federal election is expected to be held sometime after August 2017. Chancellor Angela Merkel faces a decline in popularity (Chart I-18) and a challenge from the populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which performed well in two Lander (state) elections this year. Nonetheless, the migration crisis that rocked Merkel's hold on power has abated. As Chart I-12 shows, migrant flows into Europe peaked at 220,000 last October and began to plummet well before the EU-Turkey deal that the press continues to erroneously cite as the reason for the reduction in migrant flows. As we controversially explained at the height of the crisis, every migration crisis ultimately abates as border enforcement strengthens, liberal attitudes towards refugees wane, and the civil wars prompting the flow exhaust themselves.9 Germany's centrist parties maintain a massive lead over the upstart AfD and Die Linke, the left-wing successor of East Germany's Communist establishment (Chart I-19). However, AfD's successes in Mecklenburg West Pomerania and Berlin have prompted investors to ask whether it will garner greater national support in the general election. Chart I-17France & Euro: Loveless Marriage,##br## But Together For The Kids Chart I-18Merkel's Popularity Has Suffered,##br## But Stabilized Chart I-19There Is A##br## Lot Of Daylight... We doubt it. Both states are sort of oddballs in German politics. For example, Mecklenburg West Pomerania is known for a strong anti-establishment sentiment. AfD largely took votes away from the National Democratic Party (ultra-far-right, neo-Nazis) and Die Linke. These two parties won a combined 25% of the vote in 2011. In 2016, the combined anti-establishment vote, including AfD, was 33%. Clearly this is a notable gain for the non-centrist parties, but it is hardly a paradigm shift. In Berlin, the AfD gained a solid 14% of the vote, but the sensationalist media conveniently avoided mentioning that it came in fifth in the final count. By our "back-of-the-envelope" calculation, AfD managed to take only about 8% of the vote from establishment parties. The bulk of its success once again came from taking votes from other populist parties. For example, Berlin's Pirate Party - yes, "pirates" - took 8% of the vote in the last election and none in 2016. Nonetheless, we suspect that time may be running out for Angela Merkel. She has been in power since 2005 and many voters have lost confidence in her. Merkel may choose not to contest the election at the CDU party conference in early December, or she may step aside as the leader following the election. Why? Because polls suggest that Merkel's CDU will have to once again rely on a Grand Coalition with its center-left opponent, the SPD, to govern. Politically, this is a failure for Merkel as the Grand Coalition was always intended to be a one-term arrangement. If Merkel decides to retire, how will the ruling CDU choose its successor? The process is relatively closed off and dominated by the party elites. The Federal Executive Board of the CDU selects the candidates for chairperson and the party delegates must choose the leader with a majority. The outcome is largely preordained, and Merkel has typically won above 90% of the party congress delegate vote. The possibility of a chancellor from the CDU's Bavarian sister-party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), is also decided by the elites. Therefore, the likelihood of an anti-establishment candidate hijacking the CDU/CSU leadership is minimal. How will the markets react to Merkel's resignation? Investors are overstating Merkel's role as the "anchor" of euro area stability. She has, in fact, dithered multiple times throughout the crisis. In 2011, for example, Merkel delayed the decision on whether to set up a permanent euro area fiscal backstop mechanism due to upcoming Lander elections in Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden Württemberg. In addition, her likely successor will not mark a paradigm shift in terms of Germany's pro-euro outlook (Box I-1). Bottom Line: Investors may wake up in mid-2017 to find that the U.K. is firmly on its way out of the EU and that the U.S. is embroiled in deepening political polarization. Meanwhile, France and Spain will be led by reformist governments, Italy will remain in the euro area, and Germany will be mid-way through a rather boring electoral campaign featuring pro-euro establishment parties. What is keeping the European establishment in power? In early 2016, we argued that it was its large social welfare state. Unlike the laissez-faire economies of the U.S. and the U.K., European "socialism" has managed to redistribute the gains of globalization sufficiently to keep the populists at bay. As such, European voters are not flocking to populist alternatives, despite considerable challenges such as the migration crisis and terrorism. Populists are gaining votes in Europe nonetheless. To counter that trend, we should expect to see Europe's establishment parties turn more negative towards immigration, positive on fiscal activism, and more assertive towards security and defense policy. But on the key investment-relevant issue of euro area membership and European integration, we see the consensus remaining with the status quo. China: Xi Is A "Core" Leader... So What? Chinese President Xi Jinping's recent designation as the "core" of the Chinese leadership should be seen as a marginally market-positive event in an otherwise bleak outlook. Not because the president has a new title, but because of the underlying reality that he is consolidating power ahead of the 19th National Party Congress. Set for the fall of 2017, the Congress will feature a major rotation of top Communist Party leaders and mark the halfway point of his 10-year administration. The new title was not a surprise when it trickled out of the Chinese Communist Party's Sixth Plenary meeting on October 24-27. But the media took the opportunity once again to decry President Xi's "ever-expanding power."10 As our readers know, we do not think there has been a palace coup in China. That is, we do not think Xi has overthrown the "collective leadership" model, i.e. rule by the Politburo Standing Committee, established after the death of Chairman Mao.11 Instead, we think he is presiding over a major centralization phase in Chinese politics. Xi's status as the "core" feeds into the broader idea of re-centralization that we identified as a key theme for this administration when it began its term back in 2012.12 The Sixth Plenum reinforced this view in various ways:13 Xi is clearly in charge: A smattering of local party officials started calling him the core leader earlier this year, but now it has been endorsed in official documents at the highest level. Again, it is not the title itself that matters, but the fact that Xi compelled the whole party to give him the title. This distinguishes him from his two predecessors, Presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, and in this way he resembles his mighty predecessor Deng Xiaoping. Xi already developed a strong track record for re-centralizing the political system prior to receiving the new title.14 Collective leadership persists: Deng invented the idea of the "core" leader specifically as a way to assert the need for a top leader or chief executive without reverting to Maoist absolutism. The core leader is the supreme leader within a collective leadership system. This interpretation was expressly reaffirmed by the communique issued at the Sixth Plenum, which denounced ruling by a single person and praised the current system.15 Corruption purge has not split the party: The focus of the plenum was the Communist Party's rules for disciplining its own members. This specifically highlighted Xi's harsh anti-corruption campaign, which has netted numerous party officials, and has not yet concluded (Chart I-20). The fact that this campaign has continued longer than expected without prompting significant resistance shows that centralization is acceptable to the party (and anti-corruption is positive for the party's public image). Policy coherence could improve: A rash of rumors suggest that Xi will not only promote his allies but also tweak party rules and norms in order to ensure he retains a factional majority on the Politburo Standing Committee after 2017. This should be positive for policymaking since the cohort of leaders ready to rise up the ranks is weighted against his faction as a result of the previous administration's appointments. These developments would be negative if Xi avoids appointing successors next year and thus appears ready to cling to power beyond 2022.16 Unified government is a plus amid crisis: Deng initiated the "core leader" concept in the dark days after the Tiananmen massacre, when the party faced internal rifts and potential regime collapse. In other words, it is in times of crisis that the party needs to reaffirm that rule-by-committee still requires a final arbiter at the top. This latter point is the most relevant for investors. It suggests that China's party leadership perceives itself to be in the midst, or on the brink, of a crisis. Why should this be the case? There has been an improvement in China's economic situation in 2016 - stimulus efforts have stabilized the economy and growth momentum is picking up (Chart I-21). Economic relations with Asian nations are also improving. All of this information has supported the China bulls, who argue that China is not particularly overleveraged, still has a long way to go in terms of economic development, and needs to stimulate demand in order to outgrow any problems it faces from debt and overcapacity (Chart I-22). Chart I-20Anti-Corruption ##br##Campaign Reaccelerating Chart I-21Chinese Economy##br## Improved This Year Chart I-22Chinese Capacity Utilization: ##br##A Historical Perspective Nevertheless, the latest reflation efforts have peaked (Chart I-23), and there are clear warning signs for what lies ahead. The RMB continues to weaken, capital outflows may reaccelerate as a result, the yield curve is flattening, and economic policy uncertainty remains markedly elevated (Chart I-24). As such, the China bears argue that exorbitant credit growth cannot continue indefinitely (Chart I-25). When credit growth slows, the credit-reliant economy will slow too, and China will face a cascade of bad loans and insolvent companies and banks. Chart I-23Latest Mini-Stimulus##br## Is Over Chart I-24China:##br## Who Is Driving This Bus? Chart I-25China's Corporate And Household Credit: ##br##The Sky's The Limit? While economists can argue over the nature of things, politicians do not have that luxury: China's government must be prepared for the worst-case scenario. The China bears may be right even if their economic analysis proves overly pessimistic or poorly timed, because policymakers may eventually decide they must do more to tackle excessive leverage and overcapacity. Chart I-26Rebalancing Is Slowing Down An optimistic long-term assumption about Xi's consolidation of power has been that he eventually intends to use that power to pursue painful structural reforms, as outlined at the Third Plenum in 2013.17 However, the intervening three years have shown that he is pragmatic and does not want to impose aggressive reforms that would undercut an already weak and slowing economy (Chart I-26). Thus, deep reforms are only going to occur if they are forced upon the leaders as a result of an intense bout of instability, uncertainty, and market riots. The implication of this is that Xi is concentrating power in preparation for further crisis points that may be thrust upon his administration. For instance, if recent efforts to tamp down on property prices end up bursting the bubble, then eventually China could be plunged into socio-political (as well as financial) turmoil. By that time, the party would not be able to re-centralize and consolidate power carefully and gradually. It would either have loyal tools at its disposal already, or would lose precious time (and likely make mistakes) trying to assemble them. Thus Xi's moves to consolidate power are marginally market-positive in an overall negative climate. He is making himself and the Politburo Standing Committee better prepared to handle a crisis, which suggests that he believes that a crisis is either occurring or close at hand. In short, the Communist Party is girding for war; a war for regime stability if and when the massive credit risks materialize. What about the 19th National Party Congress, set to take place next fall? We will revisit this topic in the future, but for now the key point is this: It would require a surprise and/or a new political dynamic to prevent Xi from getting his way in forming the Politburo Standing Committee next year. While there is a mixed record of policy stimulus for the years preceding the Chinese midterm leadership reshuffle, we certainly do not expect aggressive structural reforms to occur before then (Chart I-27). Policy tightening in the real estate sector and SOE restructuring efforts will be gradual. Chart I-27Unimpressive Record Of Stimulus Before Five-Year Party Congresses Only around the time of the party congress will it be possible to find out whether Xi wants his administration to be remembered for anything other than power consolidation - such as ambitious reforms. One reform effort we are confident will continue amid rising centralization, however, is tougher government policy against pollution. Pollution threatens social stability, especially among the restless new middle class, and stimulus efforts perpetuate the heavily polluting industries. Environmental spending has been the biggest growth category in government spending under Premier Li Keqiang.18 To capitalize on the darkening short-term outlook for stocks and Xi's policy momentum, we suggest shorting Chinese utilities, whose profit margins and share prices trade inversely with rising environmental spending (Chart I-28). Bottom Line: We remain overweight China relative to EM: The government has resources and is unified. However, the long-term outlook is mixed. Investors should steer clear of Chinese risk assets in absolute terms. Short utilities as a play on rising environmental spending and regulation, and stay short the RMB. Brexit Update: The "Legion Memorial" Is Alive And Well Chart I-28Anti-Pollution Push Hurts Utilities The Brexit movement encountered its first apparent setback last week when the country's High Court ruled that parliament must vote on invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to initiate the withdrawal from the European Union. We have always held a high-conviction view that parliament approval would ultimately be necessary, as we wrote in July.19 But, politically, it matters a great deal whether parliament votes before or after the exit negotiations. The High Court ruling is an obstacle to the government's Brexit plan because it could result in (1) the parliament's outright blocking Brexit, though this outcome is highly unlikely; (2) the parliament's insisting on a "soft Brexit" that leaves U.K.-EU relations substantially the same as before the referendum on matters like immigration and market access. However, the saga is nowhere near finished. The government is appealing the ruling, the Welsh assembly is contesting the appeal, and the Supreme Court will decide the matter in December. Until then, we expect U.K. markets to benefit marginally, ceteris paribus, from the belief that the odds of a soft Brexit are rising. Investors could be encouraged by the continuation of monetary stimulus and a new blast of fiscal stimulus, which we think will surprise to the upside on November 23 when the annual Autumn Statement is released by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The High Court-prompted rebound in U.K. assets will remain vulnerable for the following reasons: The Supreme Court has not yet ruled: It is not certain that the Supreme Court will uphold the High Court's insistence on a parliamentary role. Both views have legitimate arguments and the issue is not settled until the Supreme Court rules. Parliament's role is political, not merely legal: Assuming parliament gets to vote on whether to trigger the process of leaving the EU, the decision will depend on politics. For instance, it is highly unlikely that the Commons will flatly reject the popular referendum, and the House of Lords can at best delay it. Yes, parliament is sovereign, but that is because it represents the people. While the 1689 Glorious Revolution established the Bill of Rights and parliamentary supremacy, in as early as 1701 there was a crisis over whether parliament should flatly overrule popular will. At that time, the writer Daniel Defoe, representing "the people," delivered the so-called Legion Memorial directly to the Speaker of the Commons. It read: "Our name is Legion, for we are Many."20 Parliament backed down. The politics of the moment favor the government: Polling shows a stark divergence in popular opinion since the referendum in favor of the Tories (Chart I-29). This is a clear signal - on top of the referendum outcome and the sweeping Tory election win in 2015 - that the popular will favors leaving the European Union. It is also a clear signal that Prime Minister Theresa May has the mandate to do it her way. Her approval rating has waned a bit (Chart I-30), but she is still supported by nearly half the population. If the government fails to win parliamentary support on Brexit, it would likely lead to a vote of no confidence and early elections. Yet the current dynamics suggest an early election would return a Conservative majority with a clear mandate to vote for Brexit. Until those dynamics undergo a change, "Brexit means Brexit." Economics favor the government: One danger for the anti-Brexit coalition is that the Supreme Court may compel a parliamentary vote in the near future. The economy has not yet suffered much from Brexit, whatever it may do in future, so there is little motivation for widespread "Bregret," i.e. the desire to reverse course and stay in the EU. By contrast, in two years' time, the negative economic consequences and uncertainties of the actual exit plan, combined with ebbing popular enthusiasm, would likely give parliament a stronger position from which to soften or reverse Brexit. Although Article 50 is arguably irrevocable, it seems hard to believe that the EU would not find a way to allow the U.K. to stay in the union if its domestic politics shifted in favor of staying, since that is clearly in the EU's interest. The President of the European Council Donald Tusk has implied as much.21 Chart I-29Brexit Helped Tories, Hurt Labour Chart I-30Prime Minister May's Popularity Still Strong From the arguments above we can draw three conclusions. First, parliament will not simply repudiate the popular referendum. Second, if parliament must vote, the political context suggests it will vote on a bill that substantially favors the government's approach toward Brexit. If that happens, the High Court ruling this week will be only a pyrrhic victory for the Bremain camp. However, parliamentary involvement does imply a softer Brexit than otherwise, and it is possible that parliament could extract major concessions. Third, the High Court ruling makes Brexit more, not less, likely. This is because it is forcing parliamentarians to vote on Brexit so early in the process, when Brexit's negative consequences are yet not evident. What do the latest Brexit twists and turns portend for European and global growth? We do not see them as particularly damaging. The British turn toward greater fiscal spending adds yet another to the list of those countries supporting one of our key investment themes: "The Return of G," or government spending.22 As we predicted, Canada is overshooting its budget deficits, Japan is engaging in coordinated monetary and fiscal stimulus, and Italy is expanding spending and daring Germany and the European Council to stop it, especially in the face of badly needed earthquake reconstruction and the ongoing immigration crisis (Chart I-31). Chart I-31G7 Fiscal Thrust Is Going Up This leaves the United States and Germany as two outstanding questions. The U.S. election means that Trump will launch potentially large spending increases with a GOP-held Congress. As for Germany, the CDU/CSU appears to be shifting toward more government spending, but the direction will not be clear until the election in the fall of 2017. Bottom Line: The High Court ruling has made Brexit more rather than less likely. By forcing the parliament to make a ruling on Brexit before the economic damage is clear, the High Court has put parliamentarians in the difficult position of going against the public. We are closing our long FTSE 100 / short FTSE 250 Brexit hedge in the meantime. The market may, incorrectly, price a lower probability of Brexit, while domestic stimulus will aid the home-biased FTSE 250. Nonetheless, we remain short U.K. REITs to capitalize on the long-term uncertainty, as well as negative cyclical and structural factors that are affecting commercial real estate. We also expect the GBP/USD to remain relatively weak and vulnerable relative to the pre-Brexit period. We would expect the GBP/USD to retest its mid-October-low of 1.184 over the next two years. BOX I-1 Likely Successors To German Chancellor Angela Merkel If Merkel decides to retire, who are her potential successors? Wolfgang Schäuble, Finance Minister (CDU): The bane of the financial community, Schäuble is seen as the least market-friendly option due to his hardline position on bailouts and the euro area. In our view, this is an incorrect interpretation of Schäuble's heavy-handedness. He is by all accounts a genuine Europhile who believes in the integrationist project. At 74 years old, he comes from a generation of policymakers who consider European integration a national security issue for Germany. He has pursued a tough negotiating position in order to ensure that the German population does not sour on European integration. Nonetheless, we doubt that he will chose to take on the chancellorship if Merkel retires. He suffered an assassination attempt in 1990 that left him paralyzed and he has occasionally had to be hospitalized due to health complications left from this injury. As such, it is unlikely that he would replace Merkel, but he may stay on as Finance Minister and thus be as close to a "Vice President" role as Germany has. Ursula von der Leyen, Defense Minister (CDU): Most often cited as the likely replacement for Merkel, Leyen nonetheless is not seen favorably by most of the population. She is a strong advocate of further European integration and has supported the creation of a "United States of Europe." Leyen has gone so far as to say that the refugee crisis and the debt crisis are similar in that they will ultimately force Europe to integrate further. As a defense minister, she has promoted the creation of a robust EU army. She has also been a hardliner on Brexit, saying that the U.K. will not re-enter the EU in her lifetime. While the markets and pro-EU elites in Europe would love Leyen, the problem is that her Europhile profile may disqualify her from chancellorship at a time when most CDU politicians are focusing on the Euroskeptic challenge from the right. Thomas De Maizière, Interior Minster (CDU): Maizière is a former Defense Minister and a close confidant of Chancellor Merkel. He was her chief of staff from 2005 to 2009. Like Schäuble, he is somewhat of a hawk on euro area issues (he drove a hard bargain during negotiations to set up a fiscal backstop, the European Financial Stability Fund, in 2010) and as such could be a compromise candidate between the Europhiles and Eurohawks within the CDU ranks. However, he has also been implicated in scandals as Defense Minister and may be tainted by the immigration crisis due to his position as the Interior Minister. Julia Klöckner, Executive Committee Member, Deputy Chair (CDU): A CDU politician from Rhineland-Palatinate, Klöckner is a socially conservative protégé of Merkel. While she has taken a more right-wing stance on the immigration crisis, she has remained loyal to Merkel otherwise. She is a staunch Europhile who has portrayed the Euroskeptic AfD as "dangerous, sometimes racist." We think that she would be a very pro-market choice as she combines the market-irrelevant populism of anti-immigration rhetoric with market-relevant centrism of favoring further European integration. Hermann Gröhe, Minister of Health (CDU): Gröhe is a former CDU secretary general and very close to Merkel. He is a staunch supporter of the euro and European integration. Markets would have no problem with Grohe, although they may take some time to get to know who he is! Volker Bouffier, Minister President of Hesse (CDU): As Minister President of Hesse, home of Germany's financial center Frankfurt, Bouffier may be disqualified from leadership due to his apparent close links with Deutsche Bank. Nonetheless, he is a heavyweight within the CDU's leadership and a staunch Europhile. Fritz Von Zusammenbruch, Hardline Euroskeptic (CDU): This person does not exist! Section II: U.S. Election: Outcomes & Investment Implications Highlights Trump won by stealing votes from Democrats in the Midwest. His victory implies a national shift to the left on economic policy. Checks and balances on Trump are not substantial in the short term. U.S. political polarization will continue. Trump is good for the USD, bad for bonds, neutral for equities. Favor SMEs over MNCs. Close long alternative energy / short coal. Feature "Most Americans do not find themselves actually alienated from their fellow Americans or truly fearful if the other party wins power. Unlike in Bosnia, Northern Ireland or Rwanda, competition for power in the U.S. remains largely a debate between people who can work together once the election is over." — Newt Gingrich, January 2, 2001 Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (and a potential Secretary of State pick), was asked on NBC's Meet the Press two days before the U.S. election whether he still thought that "competition for power in the U.S. remains largely a debate between people who can work together once the election is over." Gingrich made the original statement in January 2001, merely weeks after one of the most contentious presidential elections in U.S. history was resolved by the Supreme Court. Gingrich's answer in 2016? "I think, tragically, we have drifted into an environment where ... it will be a continuing fight for who controls the country." Despite an extraordinary victory - a revolution really - by Donald J. Trump, the fact of the matter remains that the U.S. is a polarized country between Republican and Democratic voters. As of publication time of this report, Trump lost the popular vote to Secretary Hillary Clinton. His is a narrower victory than either the epic Richard Nixon win in 1968 or George W. Bush squeaker in 2000. Over the next two years, the only thing that matters for the markets is that the U.S. has a unified government behind a Republican president-elect and a GOP-controlled Congress. We discuss the investment implications of this scenario below and caution clients to not over-despair. On the other hand, we also see this election as more evidence that America remains a deeply polarized country where identity politics continue to play a key role. What concerns us is that these identity politics appear to transcend the country's many cultural, ethical, political, and economic commonalities. Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. are fusing into almost ethnic-like groupings. To bring it back to Gingrich's quote at the top, that would suggest that the U.S. is no longer that much different from Bosnia or Northern Ireland.23 Election Post-Mortem Chart II-1Election Polls Usually##br## Miss By A Few Points Donald Trump has won an upset over Hillary Clinton, but his campaign was not as much of a long-shot as the consensus believed. U.S. presidential polls have frequently missed the final tally by +/- 3% of the vote, which was precisely the end result of the 2016 election (Chart II-1). Therefore, as we pointed out in our last missive on the election, Trump's victory was not a "wild mathematical oddity."24 Why Did Trump Win The White House? Where Trump really did beat expectations was in the Midwest, and Wisconsin in particular. He ended up outperforming the poll-of-polls by a near-incredible 10%!25 His victories in Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania were well within the range of expectations. For example, the last poll-of-polls had Trump leading in both Florida (by a narrow 0.2%) and Ohio (by a solid 3.5%), whereas Clinton was up in Pennsylvania by the slightest of margins (just 1.9% lead). He ended up exceeding poll expectations in all three (by 2% in Florida, 6% in Ohio, and 3% in Pennsylvania), but not by the same wild margin as in Wisconsin. When all is said and done, Trump won the 2016 election by stealing votes away from the Democrats in the traditionally "blue" Midwest states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. This was a far more significant result than his resounding victories in Ohio (which Obama won in 2012) or Florida (where Obama won only narrowly in 2012). Our colleague Peter Berezin, Chief Strategist of the Global Investment Strategy, correctly forecast that Trump would be competitive in all three Midwest states back in September 2015! We highly encourage our clients to read his "Trumponomics: What Investors Need To Know," as it is one of the best geopolitical calls made by BCA in recent history.26 As Peter had originally thought, Trump cleaned up the white, less-educated, male vote in all of the three crucial Midwest states. He won 68% of this vote in Michigan, 71% in Pennsylvania, and 69% in Wisconsin. To do so, Trump campaigned as an unorthodox Republican, appealing to the blue-collar white voter by blaming globalization for their job losses and low wages, and by refusing to accept Republican orthodoxy on fiscal austerity or entitlement spending. Instead, Trump promised to outspend Clinton and protect entitlements at their current levels. This mix of an outsider, anti-establishment, image combined with a left-of-center economic message allowed Trump to win an extraordinary number of former Obama voters. Exit polls showed that Obama had a positive image in all three Midwest states, including with Trump voters! For example, 30% of Trump voters in Michigan approved of the job Obama was doing as president, 25% in Pennsylvania, and 27% in Wisconsin. That's between a quarter and a third of eventual people who cast their vote for Trump. These are the voters that Republicans lost in 2012 because they nominated a former private equity "corporate raider" Mitt Romney as their candidate. Romney had famously argued in a 2008 New York Times op-ed that he would have "Let Detroit go bankrupt." Obama repeatedly attacked Romney during the 2011-2012 campaign on this point. Back in late 2011, we suspected that this message, and this message alone, would win President Obama his re-election.27 Why is the issue of the Midwest Obama voters so important? Because investors have to know precisely why Donald Trump won the election. It wasn't his messages on immigration, law and order, race relations, and especially not the tax cuts he added to his message late in the game. It was his left-of-center policy position on trade and fiscal spending. Trump is beholden to his voters on these policies, particularly in the Midwest states that won him the election. Final word on race. Donald Trump actually improved on Mitt Romney's performance with African-American and Hispanic voters (Table II-1). This was a surprise, given his often racially-charged rhetoric. Meanwhile, Trump failed to improve on the white voter turnout (as percent of overall electorate) or on Romney's performance with white voters in terms of the share of the vote. To be clear, Republicans are still in the proverbial hole with minority voters and are yet to match George Bush's performance in 2004. But with 70% of the U.S. electorate still white in 2016, this did not matter. Table II-1Exit Polls: Trump's Win Was Not Merely About Race Congress: No Gridlock Ahead Republicans exceeded their expectations in the Senate, losing only one seat (Illinois) to Democrats. This means that the GOP control of the Senate will remain quite comfortable and is likely to grow in the 2018 mid-term elections when the Democrats have to defend 25 of 33 seats. Of the 25 Senate seats they will defend, five are in hostile territory: North Dakota, West Virginia, Ohio, Montana, and Missouri. In addition, Florida is always a tough contest. Republicans, on the other hand, have only one Senate seat that will require defense in a Democrat-leaning state: Nevada (and in that case, it will be a Republican incumbent contesting the race). Their other seven seats are all in Republican voting states. As such, expect Republicans to hold on to the Senate well into the 2020 general election. In the House of Representatives, the GOP will retain its comfortable majority. The Tea Party affiliated caucuses (Tea Party Caucus and the House Freedom Caucus) performed well in the election. The Tea Party Caucus members won 35 seats out of 38 they contested and the House Freedom Caucus won 34 seats out of 37 it contested. The race to watch now is for the Speaker of the House position. Paul Ryan, the Speaker of the incumbent House, is likely to contest the election again and win. Even though his support for Donald Trump was lukewarm, we expect Republicans to unify the party behind Trump and Ryan. A challenge from the right could emerge, but we doubt it will materialize given Trump's victory. The campaign for the election will begin immediately, with Republicans selecting their candidate by December (the official election will be in the first week of January, but it is a formality as Republicans hold the majority). Bottom Line: Trump's victory was largely the product of former Obama voters in the Midwest switching to the GOP candidate. This happened because of Trump's unorthodox, left-of-center, message. Trump will have a friendly Congress to work with for the next four years. How friendly? That question will determine the investment significance of the Trump presidency. Investment Relevance Of A United Government Most clients we have spoken to over the past several months believe that Donald Trump will be constrained on economic policies by a right-leaning Congress. His more ambitious fiscal spending plans - such as the $550 billion infrastructure plan and $150 billion net defense spending plan - will therefore be either "dead on arrival" in Congress, or will be significantly watered down by the legislature. Focus will instead shift to tax cuts and traditional Republican policies. We could not disagree more. GOP is not fiscally conservative: There is no empirical evidence that the GOP is actually fiscally conservative. First, the track record of the Bush and Reagan administrations do not support the adage that Republicans keep fiscal spending in check when they are in power (Chart II-2). Second, Republican voters themselves only want "small government" when the Democrats are in charge of the White House (Chart II-3). When a Republican President is in charge, Republicans forget their "small government" leanings. Chart II-2Republicans Are##br## Not Fiscally Responsible Chart II-3Big Government Is Only ##br##A Problem For Opposition Presidents get their way: Over the past 28 years, each new president has generally succeeded in passing their signature items. Congress can block some but probably not all of president's plans. Clinton, Bush, and Obama each began with their own party controlling the legislature, which gave an early advantage that was later reversed in their second term. Clinton lost on healthcare, but achieved bipartisan welfare reform. For Obama, legislative obstructionism halted various initiatives, but his core objectives were either already met (healthcare), not reliant on Congress (foreign policy), or achieved through compromise after his reelection (expiration of Bush tax cuts for upper income levels). Median voter has moved to the left: Donald Trump won both the GOP primary and the general election by preaching an unorthodox, left-of-center sermon. He understood correctly that the American voter preferences on economic policies have moved away from Republican laissez-faire orthodoxies.28 Yes, he is also calling for significant lowering of both income and corporate tax rates. However, tax cuts were never a focal point of his campaign, and he only introduced the policy later in the race when he was trying to get traditional Republicans on board with his campaign. Newsflash: traditional Republicans did not get Trump over the hump, Obama voters in the Midwest did! Investors should make no mistake, the key pillars of Trump's campaign are de-globalization, higher fiscal spending, and protecting entitlements at current levels. And he will pursue all three with GOP allies in Congress. What are the investment implications of this policy mix? USD: More government spending, marginally less global trade, and pressure on multi-national corporations (MNCs) to scale back their global operations should be positive for inflation. If growth surprises to the upside due to fiscal spending, it will allow the Fed to hike more than the current 57 bps expected by the market by the end of 2018. Given easy monetary stance of central banks around the world, and lack of significant fiscal stimulus elsewhere, economic growth surprise in the U.S. should be positive for the dollar in the long term. At the moment, the market is reacting to the Trump victory with ambivalence on the USD. In fact, the dollar suffered as Trump's probability of victory rose in late October. We believe that this is a temporary reaction. We see both Trump's fiscal and trade policies as bullish. BCA's currency strategist Mathieu Savary believes that the dollar could therefore move in a bifurcated fashion in the near term. On the one hand, the dollar could rise against EM currencies and commodity producers, but suffer - or remain flat - against DM currencies such as the EUR, CHF, and JPY.29 Bonds: More inflation and growth should also mean that the bond selloff continues. In addition, if our view on globalization is correct, then the deflationary effects of the last three decades should begin to reverse over the next several years. BCA thesis that we are at the "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market" should therefore remain cogent.30 As one of our "Trump hedges," our colleague Rob Robis, Chief Strategist of the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy, suggested a 2-year / 30-year Treasury curve steepener. This hedge is now up 18.7 bps and we suggest clients continue to hold it. Fed policy: Trump's statements about monetary policy have been inconsistent. Early on in his campaign he described himself as "a low interest rate guy", but he has more recently become critical of current Federal Reserve policy - and Fed Chair Janet Yellen in particular - claiming that while higher interest rates are justified, the Fed is keeping them low for "political reasons." What seems certain is that Janet Yellen will be replaced as Fed Chair when her term expires in February 2018. Yellen is unlikely to resign of her own volition before then and it would be legally difficult for the President to remove a sitting Fed Chair prior to the end of her term. But Trump will get the opportunity to re-shape the composition of the Fed's Board of Governors as soon as he is sworn in. There are currently two empty seats on the Board need to be filled and given that many of Trump's economic advisers have "hard money" leanings, it is very likely that both appointments will go to inflation hawks. Equities: In terms of equities, Trump will be a source of uncertainty for U.S. stocks as the market deals with the unknown of his presidency. In addition, markets tend to not like united government in the U.S. as it raises the specter of big policy moves (Table II-2). However, Trump should be positive for sectors that sold off in anticipation of a Clinton victory, such as healthcare and financials. We also suspect that he will continue the outperformance of defense stocks, although that would have been the case with Clinton as well. Table II-2Election: Industry Implications In the long term, Trump's proposal for major corporate tax cuts should be good for U.S. equities. However, we are not entirely sure that this is the case. First, the effective corporate tax rate in the U.S. is already at its multi-decade lows (Chart II-4). As such, any corporate tax reform that lowers the marginal rate will not really affect the effective rate. Why does this matter? Because major corporations already have low effective tax rates. Any lowering of the marginal rate will therefore benefit the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the domestic oriented S&P 500 corporations. If corporate tax reform also includes closing loopholes that benefit the major multi-national corporations (MNCs), then Trump's policy will not necessarily benefit all firms in the U.S. equally. Chart II-4How Low Can It Go? Investors have to keep in mind that Trump has not run a pro-corporate campaign. He has accused American manufacturing firms of taking jobs outside the U.S. and tech companies of skirting taxes. It is not clear to us that his corporate tax reform will therefore necessarily be a boon for the stock market. In the long term, we like to play Trump's populist message by favoring America's SMEs over MNCs. If we are ultimately correct on the USD and growth, then export-oriented S&P 500 companies should suffer in the face of a USD bull market and marginally less globalization. Meanwhile, lowering of the marginal corporate tax rate will benefit the SMEs that do not get the benefit of K-street lobbyist negotiated tax loopholes. Global Assets: The global asset to watch over the next several weeks is the USD/RMB cross. China is forced by domestic economic conditions to continue to slowly depreciate its currency. We have expected this since 2015, which is why we have shorted the RMB via 12-month non-deliverable forwards (NDF). Risk to global assets, particularly EM currencies and equities, would be that Beijing decides to depreciate the RMB before Trump is inaugurated on January 20. This could re-visit the late 2015 panic over China, particularly the narrative that it is exporting deflation. Our view is that even if China does not undertake such actions over the next two months, Sino-American tensions are set to escalate. It is much easier for Trump to fulfill his de-globalization policies with China - a geopolitical rival with which the U.S. has no free trade agreement - than with NAFTA trade partners Canada and Mexico. This will only deepen geopolitical tensions between the two major global powers, which has been our secular view since 2011. Finally, a quick note on the Mexican peso. The Mexican peso has already collapsed half of its value in the past 18 months and we believe the trade is overdone. Investors have used the currency cross as a way to articulate Trump's victory probability. It is no longer cogent. We believe that the U.S. will focus on trade relations with China under a Trump presidency, rather than NAFTA trade partners. Our Emerging Markets Strategy believes that it is time to consider going long MXN versus other EM currencies, such as ZAR and BRL. Investors should also watch carefully the Cabinet appointments that Trump makes over the next two months. Since Carter's administration, cabinet announcements have occurred in early to mid-December. Almost all of these appointments were confirmed on Inauguration Day (usually January 20 of the year after election, including in 2017) or shortly thereafter. Only one major nomination since Carter was disapproved. These appointments will tell us how willing Trump is to reach to traditional Republicans who have served on previous administrations. We suspect that he will go with picks that will execute his fiscal, trade, and tax policies. Bottom Line: After the dust settles over the next several weeks, we suspect that Trump will signal that he intends to pursue his fiscal, trade, immigration, and tax policies. These will be, in the long term, positive for the USD, negative for bonds (including Munis, which will lose their tax-break appeal if income taxes are reduced), and likely neutral for equities. Within the equity space, Trump will be positive for U.S. SMEs and negative for MNCs. This means being long S&P 600 over S&P 100. Lastly, close our long alternative energy / short coal trade for a loss of -26.8%. Constraints: Don't Bet On Them Domestically, the American president can take significant action without congressional support through executive directives. Lincoln raised an army and navy by proclamation and freed the slaves; Franklin Roosevelt interned the Japanese; Truman tried to seize steel factories to keep production up during the Korean War. Truman's case is almost the only one of a major executive order being rebuffed by the Supreme Court. The Reagan and Clinton administrations have shown that a president thwarted by a divided or adverse congress will often use executive directives to achieve policy aims and satisfy particular interest groups and sectors. Though the number of executive orders has gone down in recent administrations (Chart II-5), the economic significance has increased along with the size and penetration of the bureaucracy (Chart II-6). The economic impact of executive orders is always debatable, but the key point is that the president's word tends to carry the day.31 Chart II-5Rule By Decree Chart II-6Executive Branch Is Growing Trade is a major area where Trump would have considerable sway. He has repeatedly signaled his intention to restrict American openness to international trade. The U.S. president can revoke international treaties solely on their own authority. Congressionally approved agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) cannot be revoked by the president, but Trump could obstruct its ongoing implementation.32 He would also have considerable powers to levy tariffs, as Nixon showed with his 10% "surcharge" on most imports in 1971.33 Bottom Line: Presidential authority is formidable in the areas Trump has made the focus of his campaign: immigration and trade. Without a two-thirds majority in Congress to override him, or an activist federal court, Trump would be able to enact significant policies simply by issuing orders to his subordinates in the executive branch. Long-Term Implications: Polarization In The U.S. Does the Republican control of Congress and the White House signal that polarization in America will subside? We began this analysis by focusing on the investment implications when Republicans control the three houses of the American government. But long-term implications of polarization will not dissipate. Investors may overstate the importance of a Republican-controlled government and thus understate the relevance of continued polarization. We doubt that Donald Trump is a uniting figure who can transcend America's polarized politics, especially given his weak popular mandate (he lost the popular vote as Bush did in 2000) and the sub-50% vote share. And, our favorite chart of the year remains the same: both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton have entered the history books as the most disliked presidential candidates ever on the day of the election (Chart II-7). Chart II-7Clinton And Trump Are Making (The Wrong Kind Of) History According to empirical work by political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, polarization in Congress is at its highest level since World War II (Chart II-8). Their research shows that the liberal-conservative dimension explains approximately 93% of all roll-call voting choices and that the two parties are drifting further apart on this crucial dimension.34 Chart II-8The Widening Ideological Gulf In The U.S. Congress Meanwhile, a 2014 Pew Research study has shown that Republicans and Democrats are moving further to the right and left, respectively. Chart II-9 shows the distribution of Republicans and Democrats on a 10-item scale of political values across the last three decades. In addition, "very unfavorable" views of the opposing party have skyrocketed since 2004 (Chart II-10), with 45% of Republicans and 41% of Democrats now seeing the other party as a "threat to the nation's well-being"! Chart II-9U.S. Political Polarization: Growing Apart Chart II-10Live And Let Die Much ink has been spilled trying to explain the mounting polarization in America.35 Our view remains that politics in a democracy operates on its own supply-demand dynamic. If there was no demand for polarized politics, especially at the congressional level, American politicians would not be so eager to supply it. We believe that five main factors - in our subjective order of importance - explain polarization in the U.S. today: Income Inequality and Immobility The increase in political polarization parallels rising income inequality in the U.S. (Chart II-11). The U.S. is a clear and distant outlier on both factors compared to its OECD peers (Chart II-12). However, Americans are not being divided neatly along income levels. This is because Republicans and Democrats disagree on how to fix income inequality. For Donald Trump voters, the solutions are to put up barriers to free trade and immigration while reducing income taxes for all income levels. For Hillary Clinton voters, it means more taxes on the wealthy and large corporations, while putting up some trade barriers and expanding entitlements. This means that the correlation between polarization and income inequality is misleading as there is no causality. Rather, rising income inequality, especially when combined with a low-growth environment, shifts the political narrative from the "politics of plenty" towards "politics of scarcity." It hardens interest and identity groups and makes them less generous towards the "other." Chart II-11Inequality Breeds Polarization Chart II-12Opportunity And Income: Americans Are Outliers Generational Warfare The political age gap is increasing (Chart II-13). This remains the case following the 2016 election, with 55% Millennials (18-29 year olds) having voted for Hillary Clinton. The problem for older voters, who tend to identify far more with the Republican Party, is that the Millennials are already the largest voting bloc in America (Chart II-14). And as Millennial voters start increasing their turnout, and as Baby Boomers naturally decline, the urgency to vote for Republican policymakers' increases. Chart II-13The Age Gap In American Politics Chart II-14Millennials Are The Biggest Bloc Geographical Segregation Noted political scientist Robert Putnam first cautioned that increasing geographic segregation into clusters of like-minded communities was leading to rising polarization.36 This explains, in large part, how liberal elites have completely missed the rise of Donald Trump. Left-leaning Americans tend to live in a left-leaning community. They share their morning cup-of-Joe with Liberals and rarely mix with the plebs supporting Trump. And of course vice-versa. University of Toronto professors Richard Florida and Charlotta Mellander have more recently shown in their "Segregated City" research that "America's cities and metropolitan areas have cleaved into clusters of wealth, college education, and highly-paid knowledge-based occupations."37 Their research shows that American neighborhoods are increasingly made up of people of the same income level, across all metropolitan areas. Florida and Mellander also show that educational and occupational segregation follows economic segregation. Meanwhile, the same research shows that Canada's most segregated metropolitan area, Montreal, would be the 227th most segregated city if it were in the U.S.! This form of geographic social distance fosters increasing polarization by allowing voters to remain aloof of their fellow Americans, their plight, needs, and concerns. The extreme urban-rural divide of the 2016 election confirms this thesis. Immigration Much as with income inequality, there is a close correlation between political polarization and immigration. The U.S. is on its way to becoming a minority-majority country, with the percent of the white population expected to dip below 50% in 2045 (Chart II-15). Hispanic and Asian populations are expected to continue rising for the rest of the century. For many Americans facing the pernicious effects of low-growth, high debt, and elevated income inequality, the rising impact of immigration is anathema. Not only is the country changing its ethnic and cultural make-up, but the incoming immigrants tend to be less educated and thus lower-income than the median American. They therefore favor - or will favor, when they can vote - redistributive policies. Many Americans feel - fairly or unfairly - that the costs of these policies will have to be shouldered by white middle-class taxpayers, who are not wealthy enough to be indifferent to tax increases, and may be unskillful enough to face competition from immigrants. There is also a security component to the rising concern about immigration. Although Muslims are only 1% of the U.S. population, many voters perceive radical Islam to be a vital security threat to the nation. As such, immigration and radical Islamic terrorism are seen as close bedfellows. Media Polarization The 2016 election has been particularly devastating for mainstream media. According to the latest Gallup poll, only 32% of Americans trust the mass media "to report the news fully, accurately and fairly." This is the lowest level in Gallup polling history. The decline is particularly concentrated among Independent and Republican respondents (Chart II-16). With mainstream media falling out of favor for many Americans, voters are turning towards social media and the Internet. Facebook is now as important for political news coverage as local TV for Americans who get their news from the Internet (Chart II-17). Chart II-15Racial Composition Is Changing Chart II-16A War Of Words Chart II-17New Sources Of News Not Always Credible The problem with getting your news coverage from Facebook is that it often means getting news coverage from "fake" sources. A recent experiment by BuzzFeed showed that three big right-wing Facebook pages published false or misleading information 38% of the time while three large left-wing pages did so in nearly 20% of posts.38 The Internet allows voters to self-select what ideological lens colors their daily intake of information and it transcends geography. Two American families, living next to each other in the same neighborhood, can literally perceive reality from completely different perspectives by customizing their sources of information. Chart II-18Gerrymandering Reduces Competitive Seats In addition to these five factors, one should also reaffirm the role of redistricting, or "gerrymandering." Over the last two decades, both the Democrats and Republicans (but mainly the latter) have redrawn geographical boundaries to create "ideologically pure" electoral districts. Of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives, only about 56 are truly competitive (Chart II-18). This improves job security for incumbent politicians and legislative-seat security for the party; but it also discourages legislators from reaching across the ideological aisle in order to ensure re-election. Instead, the main electoral challenge now comes from the member's own party during the primary election. For Republicans, this means that the challenge is most often coming from a candidate that is further to the right. Incumbent GOP politicians in Congress therefore have an incentive to maintain highly conservative records lest a challenge from the far-right emerges in a primary election. Given that the frequency of elections is high in the House of Representatives (every two years), legislators cannot take even a short break from partisanship. Redistricting deepens polarization, therefore, by changing the political calculus for legislators facing ideologically pure electorates in their home districts. Bottom Line: Polarization in the U.S. is a product of structural factors that are here to stay. Trump's narrow victory will in no way change that. But How Much Worse? Chart II-19Party Is The Chief Source Of Identity Political polarization is not new. Older readers will remember 1968, when social unrest over the Vietnam War was at its height. Richard Nixon barely got over the finish line that year, beating Vice-President Hubert Humphrey by around 500,000 votes.39 Another contested election in a contested era. Our concern is that the Republican and Democrat "labels" - or perhaps conservative and liberal labels - appear to be ossifying. For example, Pew Research showed in 2012 that the difference between Americans on 48 values is the greatest between Republicans and Democrats. This has not always been the case, as Chart II-19 shows. We suspect that the data would be even starker today, especially after the divisive 2016 campaign that has bordered on hysterical. This means that "Republican" and "Democrat" labels have become real and almost "sectarian" in nature. In fact, one's values are now determined more by one's party identification than race, education, income, religiosity, or gender! This is incredible, given America's history of racial and religious divisions. Why is this happening? We suspect that the shift in urgency and tone is motivated at least in part by the changing demographics of America. Two demographic groups that identify the most with the Republican Party - Baby Boomers and rural or suburban white voters - are in a structural decline (the first in absolute terms and the second in relative terms). Both see the writing on the political wall. Given America's democratic system of government, their declining numbers (or, in the case of suburban whites, declining majorities) will mean significant future policy decisions that go against their preferences. America is set to become more left-leaning, favor more redistribution, and become less culturally homogenous. Not only are Millennials more socially liberal and economically left-leaning, but they are also "browner" than the rest of the U.S. As we pointed out early this year, 2016 was an election that the GOP could reasonably attempt to win by appealing exclusively to white and older voters. The "White Hype" strategy was mathematically cogent ... at least in 2016.40 It will get a lot more difficult to pursue this strategy in 2020 and beyond. Not impossible, but difficult. We suspect that conservative voters know this. As such, there was an urgency this year to lock-in structural changes to key policies before it is too late. Donald Trump may have been a flawed messenger for many voters, but it did not matter. The clock is ticking for a large segment of America and therefore Trump was an acceptable vehicle of their fears and anger. Bottom Line: Polarization in the U.S. is likely to increase. Two key Republican/conservative constituencies - Baby Boomers and rural or suburban white voters - are backed into the corner by demographic trends. But it also means that a left counter-revolution is just around the corner. And we doubt that the Democratic Party will chose as centrist of a candidate the next time around. Final Thoughts: What Have We Learned 1. Economics trump PC: Civil rights remain a major category of the American public's policy concerns. However, the Democratic Party's prioritization of social issues on the margins of the civil rights debate has not galvanized voters in the face of persistent negative attitudes about the economy. More specifically, the surge in cheap credit since 2000 that covered up the steady decline of wages as a share of GDP has ended, leaving households exposed to deleveraging and reduced purchasing power (Chart II-20). American households have lost patience with the slow, grinding pace of economic recovery, they reject the debt consequences of low inflation with deflationary tail risks, and they resent disappointed expectations in terms of job security and quality. Concerns about certain social preferences - as opposed to basic rights - pale in comparison to these economic grievances. Chart II-20Credit No Longer Hides Stagnant Income 2. Polls are OK, but beware the quant models that use them: On two grave political decisions this year, in two advanced markets with the "best" quality of polling, political modeling turned out to be grossly erroneous. To be fair, the polls themselves prior to both Brexit and the U.S. election were within a margin of error. However, quantitative models relying on these polls were overconfident, leading investors to ignore the risks of a non-consensus outcome. As we warned in mid-October - with Clinton ahead with a robust lead - the problem with quantitative political models is that they rely on polling data for their input.41 To iron-out the noise of an occasional bad poll, political analysts aggregate the polls to create a "poll-of-polls." But combining polls is mathematically the same as combining bad mortgages into securities. The philosophy behind the methodology is that each individual object (mortgage or poll) may be flawed, but if you get enough of them together, the problems will all average out and you have a very low risk of something bad happening. Well, something bad did happen. The quantitative models were massively wrong! We tried to avoid this problem by heavily modifying our polls-based-model with structural factors. Many of these structural variables - economic context, political momentum, Obama's approval rating - actually did not favor Clinton. Our model therefore consistently gave Donald Trump between 35-45% probability of winning the election, on average three and four times higher than other popular quant models. This caused us to warn clients that our view on the election was extremely cautious and recommend hedges. In fact, Donald Trump had 41% chance of winning the race on election night, according to the last iteration of our model, a very high probability.42 3. Professor Lichtman was right: Political science professor Allan Lichtman has once again accurately called the election - for the ninth time. The result on Nov. 8 strongly supports his life's work that presidential elections in the United States are popular referendums on the incumbent party of the last four years. Structural factors undid the Democrats (Table II-3), and none of the campaign rhetoric, cross-country barnstorming, or "horse race" polling mattered a whit. The Republicans had momentum from previous midterm elections, Clinton had suffered a strong challenge in her primary, the Obama administration's achievements over the past four years were negligible (the Affordable Care Act passed in his first term). These factors, along with the political cycle itself, favored the Republicans. Trump's lack of charisma did not negate the structural support for a change of ruling party. Investors should take note: no amount of mathematical horsepower, big data, or Silicon Valley acumen was able to beat the qualitative, informed, contemplative work of a single historian. Table II-3Lichtman's Thirteen Keys To The White House* 4. Non-linearity of politics: Lichtman's method calls attention to the danger of linear assumptions and quantitative modeling in attempting the art of political prediction. Big data and quantitative econometric and polling models have notched up key failures this year. They cannot make subjective judgments regarding whether a president has had a major foreign policy success or failure or a major policy innovation - on all three of those counts, the Democrats failed from 2012-16. There really is no way to quantify political risk because human and social organizations often experience paradigm shifts that are characterized by non-linearity. Newtonian Laws will always work on planet earth and as such we are not concerned about what will happen to us if we board an airplane. Laws of physics will not simply stop working while we are mid-air. However, social interactions and political narratives do experience paradigm shifts. We have identified several since 2011: geopolitical multipolarity, de-globalization, end of laissez-faire consensus, end of Chimerica, and global loss of confidence in elites and institutions.43 5. No country is immune to decaying institutions: The United States has, with few exceptions, the oldest written constitution among major states, and it ensures checks and balances. But recent decades have shown that the executive branch has expanded its power at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches. Moreover, executives have responded to major crisis - like the September 11 attacks and the 2008 financial crisis - with policy responses that were formulated haphazardly, ideologically divisive, and difficult to implement: the Iraq War and the Affordable Care Act. The result is that the jarring events that have blindsided America over the past sixteen years have resulted in wasted political capital and deeper polarization. The failure of institutions has opened the way for political parties to pursue short-term gains at the expense of their "partners" across the aisle, and to bend and manipulate procedural rules to achieve ends that cannot be achieved through consensus and compromise. 6. U.S. is shifting leftward when it comes to markets: Inequality and social immobility have, with Trump's election, entered the conservative agenda, after having long sat on the liberals' list of concerns. The shift in white blue-collar Midwestern voters toward Trump reflects the fact that voters are non-partisan in demanding what they want: they want to retain their existing rights, privileges, and entitlements, and to expand their wages and social protections. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here," dated November 12, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report, "Brothers In Arms," dated October 28, 2016, available at gss.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Great Migration - Europe, Refuges, And Investment Implications," dated September 23, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 The BBC is exemplary of the mainstream Western press on this point. Please see Stephen McDonell, "The Ever-Growing Power Of China's Xi Jinping," BBC News, China Blog, dated October 29, 2016, available at www.bbc.com. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Two Factions, One Party - Part II," dated September 12, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see the "Eighteenth Communist Party Of China Central Committee Sixth Plenary Session Communique," dated October 27, 2016, available at cpc.people.com.cn. 14 Jiang Zemin, China's ruler from roughly 1993 to 2002, was also referred to as the "core" leader, but he received this moniker from Deng Xiaoping. Xi is following in Deng's footsteps by declaring himself to be the core and winning support from the party. As for his centralizing efforts, prior to being named the "core leader," Xi had already waged a sweeping crackdown on political opponents and dissidents. He had used his position as head of the party, the state bureaucracy, and the armed forces to reshuffle personnel in these bodies extensively. He had already created new organizational bodies, including the National Security Commission, and initiated plans to restructure the military to emphasize joint-operations under regional battle commands. A weak leader would not have advanced so quickly. 15 Deng named Mao the "core" of the first generation of leaders, but it was evident that he sought a different leadership model. 16 Specifically, Xi could prevent the preferment of successors for 2022, he could reduce the size of the Politburo Standing Committee further to five members, or he could modify or make exceptions to the informal rule that top officials must not be promoted if they are 68 or older. Please see Minxin Pei, "A Looming Power Struggle For China?" dated October 28, 2016, available at www.cfr.org. 17 Please see "Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," dated January 15, 2014 [adopted November 12, 2013], available at www.china.org.cn. 18 Please see "China: The Socialist Put And Rising Government Leverage," in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Brexit Update: Does Brexit Really Mean Brexit?" dated July 15, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. For the High Court ruling, please see the U.K. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, "R (Miller) -V- Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union," dated November 3, 2016, available at www.judiciary.gov.uk. 20 At that time a Tory majority in the House of Commons had enraged the populace by imprisoning a group of petitioners from Kent. Both the Kentish Petition and the Legion Memorial demanded that parliament heed the will of the populace. 21 Presumably, the European Council could vote unanimously under Article 50 to extend the negotiation period for a very long time. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Nuthin' But A G Thang," dated August 12, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Except that it is better armed. 24 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "U.S. Election: Trump's Arrested Development," dated November 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 25 However, Wisconsin polling was rather poor as most pollsters assumed that it was a shoe-in for Democrats. One problem with polling in Midwest states is that they were, other than Pennsylvania and Ohio, assumed to be safe Democratic states. Note for example the extremely tight result in Minnesota and the absolute dearth of polling out of that state throughout the last several months. 26 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Trumponomics: What Investors Need To Know," dated September 4, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 27 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. General Elections And Scenarios: Implications," dated July 11, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 28 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 29 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It," dated November 4, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 30 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 31 Only a two-thirds majority of Congress, or a ruling by a federal court, can undo an executive action, and that is exceedingly rare. The real check on executive orders is the rotation of office: a president can undo with the stroke of a pen whatever his predecessor enacted. Congress has the power of the purse, but it is sporadic in its oversight and has challenged less than 5% of executive orders, even though those orders often re-direct the way the executive branch uses funds Congress has allocated. More often, Congress votes to codify executive orders rather than nullify them. 32 Trump is not alone in calling for renegotiating or even abandoning NAFTA. Clinton called for renegotiation in 2008, and Senator Bernie Sanders has done so in 2016. 33 In Proclamation 4074, dated August 15, 1971, Nixon suspended all previous presidential proclamations implementing trade agreements insofar as was required to impose a new 10% surcharge on all dutiable goods entering the United States. He justified it in domestic law by invoking the president's authority and previous congressional acts authorizing the president to act on behalf of Congress with regard to trade agreement negotiation and implementation (including tariff levels). He justified the proclamation in international law by referring to international allowances during balance-of-payments emergencies. 34 The "primary dimension" of Chart II-8 is represented by the x-axis and is the liberal-conservative spectrum on the basic role of the government in the economy. The "second dimension" (y-axis) depends on the era and is picking up regional differences on a number of social issues such as the civil rights movement (which famously split Democrats between northern Liberals and southern Dixiecrats). 35 We have penned two such efforts ourselves. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Polarization In America: Transient Or Structural Risk?," dated October 9, 2013, and "A House Divided Cannot Stand: America's Polarization," dated July 11, 2012," available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 36 Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone. New York: Simon and Schuster. 37 Please see Martin Prosperity Institute, "Segregated City," dated February 23, 2015, available at martinprosperity.org. 38 Please see BuzzFeedNews, "Hyperpartisan Facebook Pages Are Publishing False And Misleading Information At An Alarming Rate," dated October 20, 2016, available at buzzfeed.com. 39 Nonetheless, due to the third-party candidate George Wallace carrying the then traditionally-Democratic South, Nixon managed to win the Electoral College in a landslide. 40 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: The Great White Hype," dated March 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 41 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "You've Been Trumped!," dated October 21, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 42 For comparison, Steph Curry, the greatest three-point shooter in basketball history, and a two-time NBA MVP, has a career three-point shooting average of 44%. With that average, he is encouraged to take every three-pointer he can by his team. In other words, despite being less than 50%, this is a very high percentage. 43 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategy Outlook 2015 - Paradigm Shifts," dated January 21, 2015, and "Strategy Outlook 2016 - Multipolarity & Markets," dated December 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Despite a tough week, the dollar bull market is intact. The U.S. economy's resilience to a strong dollar is growing. But, if Trump wins, the dollar could temporarily sell off against EUR, CHF, and JPY. Favor these currencies against EM and commodity currencies. Thanks to the High Court's Brexit ruling, the outlook for the pound is brightening. Wait for the appeal procedure to be over before implementing directional bets. Feature Despite this week's violent correction in the dollar, we remain dollar bulls. However, the recent reaction of the greenback to the rising probability of a Trump victory raises the need to hedge such an outcome. Still Bullish On The Dollar... The U.S. is unlikely to fall from its perch at the top of the distribution of G10 interest rates, a historically dollar-bullish environment (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Dollar Tailwinds The hidden slack in the U.S. labor market has dissipated. The amount of workers outside of the labor force who do want a job is at 6.2%, a level in line with the readings recorded between 2000 and 2007, when hidden slack was low (Chart I-2). Moreover, wages and salary continue to grow in the national income. Skewing the income distribution away from profits and rents is akin to a redistribution of income away from the top 1% of households, who derive nearly 50% of their income from profits. Importantly, middle-class households have a much higher marginal propensity to consume than rich ones. So great is the difference that since 1981, the 10% increase in the share of national income accruing to the top 1% of households has helped depress consumption by 3%. As a result, income redistribution will depress the U.S. savings rates going forward (Chart I-3). Since 70% of household consumption is geared toward the service sector, a component of the economy where productivity growth is hard to come by, increasing consumption is likely to directly result in job creation. Chart I-2U.S. Wages Can Rise Chart I-3The U.S. Savings Rate Has Downside With the unemployment gap being closed, consumption growth will cause wage growth to accelerate, further supporting consumption. Hence, the Fed can increase rates more aggressively than the 70 basis points priced into the OIS curve until the end of 2019. These kinds of dynamics have historically been very dollar bullish (Chart I-4). Moreover, the feedback loop linking the dollar and financial conditions to the economy is weakening. Not only is the economy increasingly driven by household expenditures, but the weight of commodity and manufacturing capex in the economy has collapsed in response to the dollar's strength (Chart I-5). Even if the sensitivity of these sectors to the dollar and financial conditions is unchanged, their impact on the broad economy has diminished. Chart I-4A Virtuous Circle##br## For The Dollar Chart I-5Lower Impact Of Manufacturing ##br##And Commodities Outside of the U.S. some key factors will prevent a normalization of policy rates in the major economies. Euro area rates will stay depressed for much longer. Conditions to generate inflation are absent. The output gap remains wide and negative, unemployment is significantly above NAIRU, and fiscal austerity, while diminished, is still de rigueur (Chart I-6). While the IMF pegs the output gap at 1.2% of GDP, the ECB estimates it to stand at 6% of GDP. Additionally, the European credit impulse is likely to roll-over. European bank stock prices have led European credit growth. They now point to slowing loan growth (Chart I-7). Even if loan growth were only to stabilize, this would imply a fall in the impulse. Chart I-6Inflationary Pressures##br## In Europe Chart I-7Downside Risk To The##br## Euro Area Credit Impulse These forces will weigh on the euro. The SNB floor under EUR/CHF remains credible and exercised. Therefore, USD/CHF will mostly stay a function of EUR/USD. For Japan, as we highlighted in the September 23 and October 28 reports, conditions are falling into place to see rising wages and inflation expectations. Rates being pegged at 0% until inflation greatly overshoots 2% will lower Japanese real rates along with the yen. Bottom Line: The 12-18 months outlook for the dollar remains bright. The resilience of U.S households will lead to stronger wage growth and an economy powered by consumption. The Fed will surprise markets with more rate hikes than anticipated. Meanwhile, European and Japanese real rates are unlikely to rise much if at all. ...But The Short-Term Outlook Is Bifurcated Yet, the short-term outlook is murky. BCA believes that a Trump presidency is likely to supercharge any dollar rally. Not only would his presidency imply huge infrastructure projects, his trade tactics should put upward pressure on wages and inflation, prompting an even more hawkish Fed than we anticipate. However, if recent dynamics are any clue, a Trump victory next week could also cause an immediate but temporary knee-jerk sell-off in the dollar. Since the FBI announced a re-examination of the Clinton emails affair, Trump's probability of winning has skyrocketed. While USD/MXN has rallied, so has EUR/USD, driven by a favorable move in interest rate differentials (Chart I-8). This raises the specter of a bifurcated move in the dollar over the next month or so. On the one hand, the dollar could rise against EM currencies and commodity producers, but suffer against EUR, CHF, and JPY. Why would the dollar rise against EM and commodity currencies? Cyclically and tactically, the stars are lining up against this set of currencies. The economic situation in EM and China is as good as it gets right now. The Keqiang index is near cyclical highs, suggesting that the upswing in Chinese industrial activity is unlikely to strengthen further, especially as loan demand remains tepid (Chart I-9). Chart I-8A Trump Indigestion Chart I-9China: As Good As It Gets Worryingly, Chinese fiscal stimulus is dissipating, which will act as a drag on the nation's investment and industrial activity. Chinese authorities panicked in 2015 as the Chinese economy was moving toward a hard landing. The government direct fiscal spending impulse surged (Chart I-10). Also, private-public partnerships originally expected to invest $1.2 trillion in infrastructure over three years were deployed in six months. As these tactics caused the economy to deviate from Beijing's stated goal to rebalance China away from investment, they are now being rolled back. Additionally, Chinese deflationary pressures are likely to resurface. Our bullish stance on the dollar implies a negative view on commodity prices. PPI will suffer if the dollar rallies given that Chinese producer prices are highly correlated with commodity prices (Chart I-11). This increases the likelihood that industrial activity in China will slow again. Chart I-10Vanishing Fiscal##br## Support Chart I-11Chinese PPI And Commodity Prices:##br## Brothers In Arms These risks are not priced in by EM assets and related plays. Risk reversals on EM currencies are priced in for perfection. Slowing Chinese growth would represent a negative surprise for EM debt, EM currencies, and commodity currencies (Chart I-12). An additional worry for EM currencies is momentum. A paper by the BIS shows that momentum continuation strategies are very profitable in EM FX.1 Hence, if EM currencies begin to fall, this fall will prompt further weaknesses. Finally, a Trump presidency is another headwind for EM and commodity currencies. In an earlier Special Report, we argued that a key factor that boosted the profitability of FX carry strategies was the rise of globalization (Chart I-13).2 This growing global trade mostly benefited small open economies, EM economies, and commodity producers, the so-called "carry-currencies". Trump's rhetoric promises a roll-back of this trend, a move that will disproportionally hurt such currencies. Compounding this risk, this cycle, the performance of FX carry trades has been inversely correlated to global bond yields (Chart I-14). BCA's underweight duration represents another problem for EM and commodity currencies. Chart I-12EM Plays Are Priced For Perfection Chart I-13Carry Trades Love Globalization Chart I-14Rising Yields Hurt Carry Currencies However, what could temporarily lift the euro, the Swiss franc, and the yen despite a negative cyclical outlook? Risk aversion and a global equity market correction prompted by a Trump victory. In short, a flight to safety amid uncertain times. These currencies are underpinned by current account surpluses ranging from 3% of GDP for the euro area to 10% for Switzerland. They therefore export investments abroad. This capital usually displays a strong home bias when global risks spike, and EUR, CHF, and JPY strengthen when global equities weaken. Finally, our current negative predisposition toward carry trades would also support funding currencies, currencies with deeply negative rates like EUR, CHF, or JPY. Bottom Line: In the direct aftermath of a Trump victory, the dollar could suffer from some temporary downward pressure against the EUR, CHF, and JPY. However, it will strengthen against EM and commodity currencies. On a cyclical basis, the USD will be stronger against these latter currencies than against European currencies. Key Investment Recommendations We are opening long EUR/AUD and short CAD/JPY positions. The EUR is less sensitive to EM downside than the AUD. Deteriorating EM currencies' risk reversals often coincide with a stronger EUR/AUD (Chart I-15). Also, the euro is cheaper than the Aussie, trading at a 5% discount to PPP. Additionally, EUR/USD could appreciate in the event of a Trump presidency, but its negative impact on EM economies and global trade will drag down AUD. The CAD/JPY position is primarily a Trump hedge. CAD will sell off if Trump wins as investors ponder the future of NAFTA. Meanwhile, the yen will benefit from safe-haven flows and from the eradication of any probability of MoF interventions (Chart I-16). Japan already meets two of the three criteria to be labeled a currency manipulator by the U.S. Treasury. Under a Trump presidency, such a label will have very real consequences. Chart I-15A Fall In EM Assets Would##br## Support EUR/AUD Chart I-16If Trump Wins, The MoF ##br##Will Not Intervene Moreover, CAD/JPY is also negatively affected by a deterioration of EM risk reversals. However, we are more worried for the JPY's long-term outlook than the EUR's. This is because of the more aggressive policy stance taken by the BoJ. Thus, this trade is more tactical than the EUR/AUD bet. Finally, investors wanting to play a Trump victory using European currencies should consider going long CHF/SEK. Sweden, a small open economy with deep trade links with EM, has been a key beneficiary of globalization. It will be a big loser if global trade shrinks. Meanwhile, CHF is likely to rally. Critically, this trade is for very nimble traders. At EUR/CHF 1.06, the SNB will intervene with all its might. The U.K.'s Über Thursday Yesterday, not only did the Bank of England announce its monetary policy decision and economic forecasts, but also, the High Court ruled that the Article 50 process preceding Brexit requires a vote from Parliament. While we expect Parliament to follow the popular vote and engage in Brexit, a parliamentary vote is much more likely to result in negotiating a "soft Brexit" rather than a "hard Brexit". In a "soft Brexit", the U.K. would retain access to the common market, and passporting of financial services would be allowed. However, freedom of movement would have to be maintained and the U.K. would have to contribute to the EU's purse. Unsurprisingly, the government is appealing the decision. Practically, this means it is still too early to aggressively bid up the pound. If the government wins its appeal, GBP/USD will move toward 1.10. If the government loses its appeal, FDI flows in the U.K. could regain some composure and help finance the large British current account deficit. This would lift GBP/USD toward 1.30 - 1.40. Probabilities are skewed toward the government losing its appeal. Economics, too, warrants caution. While the household sector's resilience has been a surprise to the Bank of England, it is unlikely to continue for long. First, the U.K. household credit impulse has rolled over and is now contracting at a GBP 1 billion pace, pointing to slowing growth. Second, in line with falling capex intentions, employers are paring their hiring intentions (Chart I-17). A slowdown in household nominal income growth should ensue. British households' real income will soon be squeezed, especially as the BoE increased it inflation forecast to 2.7% for 2018 due to the pass-through from the 15% fall in the trade-weighted GBP (Chart I-18). Additionally, the RICS survey points to further weakness in house prices. Chart I-17Deteriorating U.K. Labor Market Outlook Chart I-18Mechanics Of A Real Income Squeeze Hence, the BoE is on hold for a longer time than was anticipated in August. Moreover, Chancellor Hammond has made it clear that while the fall budget will loosen the fiscal austerity penciled in under the Osborne budgets, it is too early for investors to expect a large fiscal easing from the government. This suggests that risks remain tilted toward further easing by the "Old Lady." Bottom Line: Until we get clarity on the results of the government's appeal of yesterday's High Court Brexit ruling, we are inclined to fade strength in the pound. Any move above GBP/USD 1.25 would create a tactical shorting opportunity. A strangle with strikes at 1.27 and 1.15 and a January maturity makes sense for investors wanting to play the volatility around the ultimate ruling on the government's appeal. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Lukas Menkhoff, Lucio Sarno, Maik Schmeling and Andreas Schrimpf, "Currency Momentum Strategies", BIS Working Papers (2011). 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Carry Trades: More than Pennies And Steamrollers", dated May 6, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "The Committee judges that the case for an increase in the federal funds rate has continued to strengthen but decided, for the time being, to wait for some further evidence of continued progress toward its objectives" - FOMC Statement (November 2, 2016) Report Links: USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "[On ECB Stimulus]...the initial date set to end the buying program is March, but the most advisable action is that it be a process that's as slow as possible" - ECB Governing Council Member Luis Maria Linde (October 28, 2016) Report Links: Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "[On wether the BOJ would buy regional domestic bonds]..Regional domestic bonds are issued by the various local governments, and are traded separately. There are various factors that would make it difficult to consider them for monetary policy, but we will give the suggestion due consideration" - BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda (November 2, 2016) Report Links: USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "...indicators of activity and business sentiment have recovered from their lows immediately following the referendum and the preliminary estimate of GDP growth in Q3 was above expectations. These data suggest that the near-term outlook for activity is stronger than expected three months ago" - BOE Monetary Policy Report (November 3, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "In Australia, the economy is growing at a moderate rate. The large decline in mining investment is being offset by growth in other areas, including residential construction, public demand and exports. Household consumption has been growing at a reasonable pace, but appears to have slowed a little recently" - RBA Statement (November 1, 2016) Report Links: USD, JPY, AUD: Where Do We Stand - October 28, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "There are several reasons for low inflation - both here and abroad. In New Zealand, tradable inflation, which accounts for almost half of the CPI regimen, has been negative for the past four years. Much of the weakness in inflation can be attributed to global developments that have been reflected in the high New Zealand dollar and low inflation in our import prices" - RBNZ Assistant Governor John McDermott (October 11, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 The Fed is Trapped Under Ice - September 9, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "There are unconventional monetary policies that give us more room to maneuver than previously believed...These include pushing interest rates below zero or buying longer-term bonds to compress long-term yields" - BoC Governor Stephen Poloz (November 1, 2016) Report Links: Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "In Switzerland the negative interest rate is currently indispensable, owing to the overvaluation of the Swiss franc and the globally low level of interest rates" - SNB President Thomas Jordan (October 24, 2016) Report Links: Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Clashing Forces - July 29, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "A period of low interest rates can engender financial imbalances. The risk that growth in property prices and debt will become unsustainably high over time is increasing. With high debt ratios, households are more vulnerable to cyclical downturns" - Norges Bank Governor Oystein Olsen (October 11, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Policy Commentary: "[On Sweden's financial stability]...it remains an issue because we are mismanaging out housing market. Our housing market isn't under control in my view" - Riksbank Governor Stefan Ingves (October 17, 2016) Report Links: The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Dazed And Confused - July 1, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights With inflation probably having bottomed, especially in the U.S., investors are starting to worry about inflation tail-risk and wonder whether inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) are an efficient way to hedge this risk. This Special Report explains how ILBs work in different countries and analyzes their performance characteristics over time. We find that ILBs, a rapid growing asset class, can be a beneficial addition to a balanced global portfolio even though recent history does not show as strong portfolio diversification benefits as a longer history. The lower nominal duration of ILBs is a useful feature for portfolio duration management. ILBs have proven to be a good inflation hedge in a rising inflationary environment, but they underperform nominal bonds in a disinflationary environment. As such, the balance between ILBs and nominal bonds should be managed tactically based on an investor's views on inflation dynamics and valuation. Overweight U.S. TIPS; avoid U.K. linkers. Australian TIBS are a cheap yield enhancer, but higher yielding Mexican Udibonos are a dangerous yield trap. Feature BCA's view is that the 35-year bull market in bonds is ending and that the path of least resistance for bond yields globally is up.1 Even though the level of inflation in the U.S. is still below the Fed's target of 2%, we think it's clear that U.S. inflation has bottomed for this cycle. Globally, loose monetary policy together with the likelihood of more fiscal stimulus, present the risk of higher inflation down the road. Global Asset Allocation has recommended investors to overweight U.S. TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Securities) relative to nominal U.S. government bonds throughout 2016. Many clients have asked for details on how TIPS work, whether there are similar securities in other countries, and how ILBs fit into a balanced global portfolio. In this Special Report, we take a detailed look at inflation-linked bond markets globally and recommend some strategies for asset allocators to use them to help navigate a world of low returns and possibly higher inflation. 1. What Are Inflation-Linked bonds (ILBs)? Inflation Protection: Inflation-linked bonds are designed to hedge inflation risk by indexing the bonds' principal to the official inflation index in the issuer country. While the methodology and what the bonds are called differ from country to country, the underlying concept is the same: the holders of ILBs will get the stated real return even in an inflationary environment since both the nominal face value and the nominal coupon payments change based on an official inflation measure. Deflation Floor: In the case of sustained deflation such that the final nominal face value falls below the initial face value, however, the repayment of principal at maturity is guaranteed in the majority of the countries, but not, for example, in the U.K., Canada, Brazil, or Mexico (Table 1). Table 1Basic Information Of Global ILB Markets Inflation Measure: ILBs are linked to actual inflation with a time lag. As shown in Table 1, the inflation measure used varies slightly by country: in the U.S. it's the non-seasonally adjusted CPI; in the U.K. it's the retail price index (RPI); while in the euro area, France and Italy both have ILBs linked to local CPI ex tobacco and EU HICP ex tobacco, with the former primarily for domestic retail investors. The time lag is three months in most countries, but can vary from one to eight months as shown in Table 1. A Rapidly Growing Asset Class: The earliest recorded ILBs were issued by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 17802 during the Revolutionary War. Finland introduced indexed bonds in 1945, Israel and Iceland in 1955. Brazil introduced its indexed bonds in 1964 and has become the largest ILB market in the emerging markets and the third largest globally. When the U.K. issued its first "linkers", it originally used eight months of inflation lag to make sure the next coupon payment is known at the current coupon payment date. In 1991 Canada issued its first ILBs and the "Canadian Model", which uses a three-month lag to the inflation index and calculates a daily index ratio using linear extrapolation, has been adopted widely since; even the U.K. adopted it in 2005. The largest ILB market now is the U.S. TIPS with a market cap of USD 1.2 trillion. TIPS were first issued in 1997, using the Canadian model. Chart 1 shows the evolution of the ILB markets globally. Since the Bloomberg Barclays Universal Government Inflation-linked Bond Index was constructed in July 1997, the market cap has increased to over USD 3.2 trillion from a mere USD 145 million at the end of 1997. It's worth noting that the actual amount of ILBs outstanding globally is slightly larger than this because not all debts are included in the index.3 Even though many countries have issued ILBs, and emerging markets (EM) grew very fast in the 2000s, the global market is still dominated by the top three countries (the U.S., U.K., and Brazil) with a combined share of 70% of global market cap. Chart 1ILBs: A Fast Growing Asset Class Chart 2U.S. BEI Vs. Inflation Expectations Country Differentiation: Nominal government bonds come with different features in different countries, and the same is true with ILBs. Table 2 shows that even though the U.S. accounts for 43.6% of the developed markets (DM) index in terms of market cap, it contributes only 28.8% to overall duration while the U.K. accounts for 53% of the overall duration, because the U.K. linkers have much longer duration than the U.S. TIPS. The Canadian real return bonds (RRBs) have the second longest average duration at 16 years. Table 2Key Features of the Bloomberg Barclays Government ILB Indexes* 2. How Do ILBs Compare To Nominal Bonds? Break-Even Inflation (BEI) And Inflation Expectations: The difference between the yield on a nominal bond and the yield on a comparable ILB (a comparator) is defined as the BEI, the market-based inflation rate at which an investor is indifferent between holding a real or a nominal bond. If realized inflation over an ILB's life turns out to be higher than the BEI at purchase, then holding the ILB is better than holding its nominal counterpart. BEI on its own is not an accurate gauge of inflation expectations, because it is the sum of inflation expectations, the inflation risk premium, and the liquidity premium. One of the long-term inflation expectation measures that the U.S. Fed keeps track of is the five-year forward five-year inflation calculated using the Fed's own fitted yield curves.4 Even this measure, however, contains the inflation term premium and the relative supply/demand of 10-year BEI vs 5-year BEI. Three important observations from Chart 2 for investors to pay attention to when assessing the inflation outlook are: U.S. breakeven inflation rates have been consistently below the Fed's inflation target of 2% since 2014 (panel 4); The CPI swaps markets priced in a much higher inflation rate than the TIPS market and the Fed's measure derived from fitted curves (panels 2 & 3), largely caused by the supply and demand imbalance in the inflation swaps market: there is excess demand to receive inflation, but no natural regular payer of inflation other than the U.S. Treasury via TIPS, therefore a higher fixed rate has to be paid to receive inflation; The 10-year inflation expectation from the Cleveland Fed's model5 (panel 1), exhibits very different behavior from the other measures. It has been below the 2% target since 2011. This model attempts to combine survey-based inflation expectations and that derived from the CPI swaps market. It's intended to be a "superior" measure of inflation expectations from a monetary policy perspective.6 For investors, however, it's advisable to take into account all these measures when assessing inflation dynamics. Duration and Yield Beta: Duration is measured as the bond price change in relation to the yield change. Chart 3 shows that ILBs have higher duration than their nominal counterparts. These two durations, however, are not directly comparable because ILB duration is related to "real yield" while nominal bond duration is related to "nominal yield". The conversion from one to another is not straightforward because the relationship between real and nominal yields can be complex.7 In practice, however, we can run a simple regression to get ILB's yield beta to change in nominal yield.8 Some practitioners simply assume 0.5 in the emerging market.9 Our research shows that in the developed market the relationship between real yield and nominal yield can vary over different time periods and in different countries, but the moving 3-year and 5-year yield betas are always less than 1 and mostly above 0.5, which is the full sample average.(Chart 4). This is a useful feature for duration management and curve positioning. For example, everything else being equal, 1) replacing nominal government bonds with comparable ILBs can reduce portfolio duration, and 2) replacing a short-dated nominal bond with a longer-dated ILB could maintain the same duration. Chart 3Average Government Bond Duration Chart 4ILBs' Yield Beta Total Return: By design, ILBs should do well in an inflationary environment and they should outperform their nominal bonds when realized inflation is higher than the break-even inflation rate. How have ILBs performed in the real world? Unfortunately, we do not have a long enough data history to cover different inflation cycles. Chart 5 confirms that in nominal terms ILBs outperform their nominal counterparts when inflation rate trends higher. What's interesting, however, is that it is disinflation, rather than deflation, that hurts ILBs the most. Within the available data history, only 2009 experienced a brief deflation scare globally, yet the rebound in ILBs actually led economies out of the deflationary environment. Over the long run, U.K. linkers have underperformed nominal gilts since their first issuance in 1981 when inflation was running at 12%. Since 1997 when the Bloomberg/Barclays ILB indexes were constructed, however, ILBs have performed slightly better than their nominal comparable bonds in most countries, with the exception of the euro area where ILBs have fared slightly worse (Chart 5). Risk-Adjusted Return: On a risk-adjusted basis, the available data history shows that ILBs performed slightly better in the U.S. and Australia, and also the DM aggregate on a hedged basis, but slightly worse in the euro area, the U.K. and Canada. It's worth emphasizing, however, that in either case the difference is not significant (Table 3). Chart 5ILB Performance Vs Inflation Table 3ILBs Approximately Equal To Nominal Bonds 3. What's The Role Of ILBs In A Balanced Portfolio? Bridgewater Associate showed that adding ILBs to a balanced euro zone stock/bond portfolio significantly improved the efficient frontier over the very long run, from 1926 to 2010.10 Since there were no ILBs in the early part of that history, ILB returns were calculated based on inflation. Our research, based on data from the Bloomberg/Barclays Inflation-Linked Government Bond Index with a much shorter history, however, does not yield the same results, probably because the much shorter recent history does not include any highly inflationary periods from which ILBs benefit the most. Table 4 shows the statistics of replacing a certain portion of the nominal bonds with comparable ILBs in a DM 60/40 stocks/bonds portfolio. On a standalone basis, the hedged USD DM ILBs are less volatile and have the best risk-adjusted return of 1.3 in the sample period (Portfolio 8). When combined with equities, however, the nominal bonds are a slightly better diversifier than the ILBs. Why? The answer lies in the correlation. Chart 6 shows that the ILBs have much higher correlation with equities than the nominal bonds do with equities. This makes sense because equities could rise in an inflationary environment if the higher inflation were driven by stronger growth, while inflation is always bad for nominal bonds. Again, the differences in risk-adjusted returns are not significant, varying from 0.77 to 0.7 (Portfolios 2-6) in line with the findings in Section 2. Table 4Balanced Global Portfolio Statistics* Chart 6Global Stocks-Bonds Correlations 4. Inflation Has Bottomed BCA's Fixed Income Strategy team has written extensively about the outlook for U.S. and global inflation.11 We concur with their view that, even though inflation in most DM countries is still below the targets set by their central banks (Chart 7), in most countries it has probably bottomed (top three panels in Chart 7), and especially in the U.S., where all indicators point to rising wage pressures as labor market slack diminishes (Chart 8). Chart 7Inflation Still Below Target Chart 8Accelerating Wage Pressure 5. Investment Implications Overweight U.S. TIPS Over Nominal Treasuries: We have shown that ILBs outperform comparable nominal bonds in a rising inflation environment and have argued that inflation has bottomed in the U.S. These views support our recommendation to overweight U.S. TIPS relative to nominal U.S. Treasuries. In addition, our TIPS valuation models (Chart 9) show that breakeven inflation rates in the U.S. are still below fair values based on underlying economic and financial drivers. Being the largest ILB market with a market cap of over USD 1.2 trillion, TIPS are very easy to trade. Currently, only five-year TIPS have a negative yield, so there are plenty of opportunities for investors to preserve real purchasing power by holding longer maturity TIPS. Avoid U.K. Linkers: The U.K. linkers market is the second largest after the U.S., with a market cap of about USD 810 billion. Unfortunately, these linkers are among the most expensively priced real return bonds, with negative yields at all maturities (Chart 10, panel 3). For example, 10-year linkers are currently yielding -1.98%, which means that investors are guaranteed to lose 18% of real purchasing power in 10 years by holding the bonds to maturity. Granted, the U.K. linkers have always traded at a premium to U.S. TIPS and many other ILB markets due to the nature of the U.K. pension schemes which link pension liabilities to inflation (CPI or RPI). With insatiable appetite from pension funds, demand greatly exceeds what the linkers and inflation swaps markets can supply. U.K. real yields have been driven lower and lower, causing an increasing funding gap which in turns drives yield further down.12 In addition, our fair value model (Chart 10, panels 1 and 2) shows that the U.K. linkers' current breakeven rates are above fair value. The collapse in the linkers' yields after the Brexit vote is also consistent with a skyrocketing in the CPI swaps rate, indicating that the probable rise in inflation due to the collapse of the GBP has now largely been priced in (panel 4). Investors who are not constrained by U.K. pension regulations should avoid U.K. linkers. Chart 9Overweight U.S. TIPS Chart 10Avoid U.K. Linkers Yield Enhancement From Australia, Not From Mexico: The U.S. TIPS market is liquid but yields are low, albeit higher than U.K. linkers. Among the smaller markets with higher yields, we prefer Australian Treasury Indexed Bonds (TIBS) over Mexican Udibonos, even though the 10-year Udibonos have a higher yield of 2.8% compared to the 10-year TIBS yield of 0.62%. As shown in Chart 11 and Chart 12, the Australian TIBS are very cheap while the Mexican Udibonos are very expensive. The BEI in Mexico is above the central bank's target of 3% while in Australia it's still at the lower end of the target range of 2-3%. Chart 11 Australian TIBS: A Cheap Yield Enhancer Chart 12 Mexico ILBS: Too Expensive 6. ETFs Some of our clients always want to know if there are ETFs for the asset classes we cover. For ILBs, the most liquid ETF is the iShares TIPS Bond ETF with an AUM of USD 19 billion and an expense ratio (ER) of 20 bps. For non-U.S. global ILBs, the SPDR Citi International Government Inflation-Protected Bond ETF has an AUM of USD 620 million and an expense ratio of 50bps. The Appendix on page 14 gives a sample list of the exchange traded ILB funds. For more information about ETFs, please see BCA's newly launched Global ETF Strategy service. AppendixSample List Of ILB ETFs*** Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaolit@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The End of the 35-year Bond Bull Market," July 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Robert Shiller, "The Invention of Inflation-Linked Bonds in Early America," NBER Working Paper 10183, December 2003. 3 Barclays Index Methodology, July 17, 2014. 4 Refet S. Gurkaynak et al., "The TIPS Yield Curve and Inflation Compensation," May 2008, Federal Reserve publication. 5 Joseph G Haubrich et al., "Inflation Expectations, Real Rates, and Risk Premia: Evidence from Inflation Swaps," Working Paper 11-07, March 2011, Federal Reserve Bank Of Cleveland. 6 Joseph G. Haubrich And Timothy Bianco, "Inflation: Nose, Risk, and Expectations," Economic Commentary, June 28, 2010, Federal Reserve Bank Of Cleveland. 7 Francis E. Laatsch and Daniel P. Klein, "The nominal duration of TIPS bonds," Review of Financial Economics 14 (2005). 8 Mattheu Gocci, "Understanding the TIPS Beta," University of Pennsylvania, 2013. 9 Thor Schultz Christensena and Eva Kobeja, "Inflation-Linked Bond from emerging markets provide attractive yield opportunities," Danske Capital, May 2015. 10 Werner Kramer, "Introduction to Inflation-Linked Bonds," Lazard Asset Management, 2012.