Asia

Highlights US-China tensions are escalating over the Taiwan Strait as Beijing tests the new Biden administration, yet financial markets are flying high and unprepared for a resumption of structurally elevated geopolitical risk. US restrictions on Chinese tech and arms sales, US internal political divisions, Taiwanese independence activists, China’s power grab in Hong Kong, and aggressive foreign policy from Xi Jinping create what could become a perfect storm. The rattling of sabers can escalate further as a “fourth Taiwan Strait crisis” has been a long time coming – though “gun to head” we do not think China’s civilian leadership is ready to initiate a war over Taiwan. Biden’s shift to a more defensive US strategy on tech offers Beijing the far less risky alternative of continuing its current (very successful) long game. We are closing most of our risk-on, cyclical trades and shifting to a neutral position until we can get a better read on how far the crisis will escalate. Maintain hedges and safe-haven trades: gold, yen, health stocks, an Indian overweight in EM, and defense stocks relative to others. Feature President Joe Biden faces his first crisis as the US and China rattle sabers over the Taiwan Strait. The crisis does not come at a surprise to watchers of geopolitics but it could produce further negative surprises for financial markets that are just starting to take note of it. This premier geopolitical risk combined with vaccine rollout problems, weak economic data releases, and signs of froth sent global equities down 2% over the past five days. The US 10-year Treasury yield fell to 1%, the USD-CNY rose by 0.03%, gold fell by 0.6%, and copper fell by 2%. As things stand today, we are prepared to buy on the dip but we are closing most of our long bets and positioning for a big dip now that our premier geopolitical risk in the Taiwan Strait shows signs of materializing. A series of Chinese air force drills have cut across the far southwestern corner of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the past week, giving alarm to the Taiwanese military (Map 1). Beijing is sending a clear warning to the Biden administration that Taiwan is its “red line” – namely Taiwanese independence but also Beijing’s access to Taiwanese-made semiconductors. There is not yet a clear signal that China is about to attack or invade Taiwan but an attack is possible. Investors should not underrate the significance of a show of force over Taiwan at this juncture. Map 1Flight Paths Of People’s Liberation Army Aircraft, January 24, 2021 Chart 1Global Trade Troubles We are also taking this opportunity to book a 37% gain on our long US energy trade. Global politics are fundamentally anarchic in the context of the US’s relative geopolitical decline, and internal divisions and distractions, and the simultaneous economic shocks that have knocked global trade off course (Chart 1), jeopardizing the newfound success and stability of the ambitious emerging market challengers to the United States. Geopolitical Risk Is Back (Already) Chart 2US And China Lead Global Growth Recovery The US and China have snapped back more rapidly than other economies from the COVID-19 pandemic despite their entirely different experiences (Chart 2). The virus erupted in China but its draconian lockdowns halted the outbreak while it unleashed a wave of monetary and fiscal stimulus to reboot the economy. The US showed itself unwilling and unable to maintain strict lockdowns, leaving its economy freer to operate, and yet also unleashed a wave of stimulus. The US stimulus is the biggest in the world yet China’s is underrated in Chart 3 due to its reliance on quasi-fiscal credit expansion, which amounted to 8.5% of GDP. That goes on top of the 5.6% of GDP fiscal expansion shown here. For most of the past year financial markets have priced the positive side of this stimulus – the fact that it prevented larger layoffs, bankruptcies, and defaults and launched a new economic cycle. Going forward they will face the negative side, which includes financial instability and foreign policy assertiveness. Countries that are domestically unstable yet fueled by government spending can take risks that they would not otherwise take if their economy depended on private or foreign sentiment. The checks and balances that prevent conflict during normal times have been reduced. Chart 3US Leads Stimulus Blowout This Time, Though China Stimulus Larger Than Appears Global economic policy uncertainty has fallen from recent peaks around the world but it remains elevated in the US, China, and Russia, which are engaged in a great power struggle that will continue in the coming years (Chart 4). This struggle has escalated with each new crisis point, from 2001 to 2008 to 2015 to 2020, and shows no sign of abating in 2021. Chart 4APolicy Uncertainty Still Rising Here ... Chart 4B... And Can Easily Revive Here   Chart 5Terrorism Falling In World Ex-US (For Now) Europe, the UK, Australia, and various emerging markets will suffer spillover effects from this geopolitical struggle as well as from their own domestic turmoil in the wake of the global recession. Immigration and terrorism have dropped off in recent years but will revive in the Middle East and elsewhere when the aftershocks of the global crisis lead to new state failures, weakened governments, and militant extremism (Chart 5). In many countries, domestic political risks appear contained today but the reality is that social unrest and political opposition will mount over time if unemployment is not dealt with and inflation starts to climb. These two factors combine form the “Misery Index,” a useful indicator of socio-political discontent. India, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Mexico, and Indonesia are just a few of the major emerging markets that face high or rising misery indexes and hence persistent forces for political change (Chart 6). Chart 6AMore Social And Political Unrest To Come Chart 6BMore Social And Political Unrest To Come So far there have not been many changes in government – the US is the major exception. But change will accelerate from here. It is not hard to see that weakening popular support for national leaders and their ruling coalitions will result in more snap elections, election upsets, and surprise events in the coming months and years (Chart 7). Chart 7Changing Of The Guard Under Way In Global Politics Chart 8Italian Elections Heighten Sovereign Spread For example, Italian voters likely face an early election even though Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte saw some of the best opinion polling of any first-world leader since COVID emerged. Last year we identified Italy as a leading candidate for an early snap election and we still maintain that an election is the likeliest outcome of the crumbling ruling coalition. The pandemic has created havoc in the country and now the ruling parties want to take advantage of the situation to strengthen their hand in distributing the $254 billion in European recovery funds destined for Italy. A new electoral law was passed in the fall, enabling an election to go forward, and the leading parties all hope to have control of parliament when the next presidential election occurs in early 2022, since the president is a key player in government and cabinet formation. Political risk is therefore set to increase and boost the risk premium in Italian bonds, producing a counter-trend spread widening for the coming 12 months or so (Chart 8). Anti-establishment right-wing parties, which taken together lead in public opinion, threaten to blow out the Italian budget. It is not a foregone conclusion that they will prevail – and these parties have moderated their rhetoric on the euro and monetary union – but it is an understated risk at present and has some staying power, even if moderate by the standards of geopolitical risks in other regions. Russia also faces rising political and geopolitical risk in the aftermath of the pandemic, which has had an outsized effect on a population that is disproportionately old and unhealthy (Chart 9). Moscow is now witnessing the most serious outpouring of government opposition since 2011 despite the fact that its cyclical economic conditions are not the worst among the emerging markets. The economic recovery is likely to be stunted by the new US administration’s efforts to extend and expand sanctions and any geopolitical conflicts that ensue. We remain negative on Russian equities as we have for the past two years and look at other emerging market oil plays as offering the same value without the geopolitical risk (Chart 10). Chart 9Russian Social Unrest Aggravated By Pandemic Chart 10Russian Equities Face Persistent Geopolitical Risk Investors do not need to care about social unrest in itself but do need to pay attention when it leads to a change in government or the overall policy setting. This is what we will monitor for the countries highlighted in these charts as being especially at risk. Italy and Spain are the most likely to see government change in the developed world, though we should note that however stable Germany’s ruling Christian Democrats appear as Chancellor Angela Merkel steps down, there could still be an upset this fall (Chart 11). France’s Emmanuel Macron is still positioned for re-election next year but his legislative control is clearly in jeopardy – and it is at least worth noting that the right-wing anti-establishment leader Marine Le Pen has started to move up in the polls for the first time since 2017, even though she has a very low chance of actually taking power (Chart 12). Chart 11German Election Not A Foregone Conclusion Chart 12Signs Of Life For Marine Le Pen? Chart 13UK Now Turns To Keeping Scotland Even the UK, which has found the “middle way” solution to the Brexit imbroglio, in true British form, faces a significant increase in political risk beginning with local elections in May. If these produce a resounding victory for the Scottish National Party then it will interpret the vote as a mandate to pursue a second independence referendum, which will be a narrow affair even if Prime Minister Boris Johnson is tentatively favored to head it off (Chart 13). Bottom Line: Financial markets have been preoccupied with the pandemic and global stimulus. But now political and geopolitical risks are underrated once again. They are starting to rear their heads, not only in the US-China-Russia power struggle but also in the domestic politics of countries that face high policy uncertainty and high or rising misery indexes. Biden And Xi Bound To Collide It is too soon to identify the “Biden Doctrine” in American foreign policy, as the new president has not yet taken significant action, but the all-too-predictable showdown in the Taiwan Strait could provide the occasion. Since the fall of 2019 we have warned that US-China great power competition would intensify despite any “phase one” trade deal. President Trump undertook a flurry of significant punitive measures on China during his lame duck months in office and now Beijing is pressuring the Biden administration to reverse these measures or at least call a halt to them. The fundamental premise of Biden’s campaign against President Trump was that he would restore America’s active role in international affairs against the supposed isolationism of Trump. Of course, the fact that the Democrats gained full control of Congress means that Biden will not be restricted to foreign policy over his four-year term but will be consumed with trying to cut deals on Capitol Hill to pass his domestic agenda. Nevertheless Biden’s foreign policy schedule is already packed as he is rattling sabers with China, issuing warnings to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and cutting off arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE to signal that he intends to reformulate the Iranian nuclear deal. Americans broadly favor an active role in the world, which is clear from opinion polling in the wake of Trump’s challenge to the status quo – they are weary of wars in the Middle East but are not showing appetite for a broader withdrawal from global affairs (Chart 14). Similarly polling on global trade shows that Trump, if anything, roused the public’s support for trade despite French or Japanese levels of skepticism about it. Chart 14Americans Still Favor Global Engagement The implication is that the US budget deficit will remain larger for longer and that the US trade deficit will balloon amidst a surge in domestic demand. Trump’s attempt to shrink trade deficits without shrinking the budget deficit (or overall demand) proved economically impossible. Chart 15Biden And The US Role In The World The Biden administration is opting for expanding the twin deficits albeit at a much greater risk to the dollar’s value. Markets have already discounted this shift to the point that the dollar is experiencing a bounce from having reached oversold levels. The bounce will continue but it is against the grain, the fall will resume later, as indicated by these policies. Another implication is that defense spending will not fall much due to the geopolitical pressures facing the Biden administration. Non-defense spending will go up but defense spending will remain at least flat as a share of overall output (Chart 15). With this policy setting in the US, policy developments in China made it inevitable that US-China strategic tensions would resume where Trump left off despite Biden’s campaign platform of de-emphasizing the China threat. In the long run, Biden’s push for renewed engagement with China runs up against the fact that Beijing’s overarching political and economic strategy is focused on import substitution and technological acquisition, as outlined in the fourteenth five-year plan. China’s share of global exports has grown even larger despite the pandemic and yet China is weaning itself off of global imports in pursuit of strategic self-sufficiency. The US will be left with less global export share, less market access in China, and ongoing dependency on trade surplus nations to buy its debt (Chart 16). Unless, that is, the Biden administration engages in very robust diplomacy and is willing to take geopolitical risks not unlike those that Trump took. Chart 16China's Role In The World Motivates Opposition Chart 17China Plays Are Getting Stretched One of the clear takeaways from the above is that industrial metals and China plays, like the Australian dollar and Swedish equities, are facing a pullback. Though Chinese policymakers will ultimately accommodate the economy, the combination of a domestic policy tug-of-war and a renewal of US-China tensions will take the air out of these recent outperformers (Chart 17). Bottom Line: The Biden administration faces a resumption in strategic tensions with China. First, the immediate crisis over the Taiwan Strait can escalate from here (see below). Second, the US-China economic conflict is set to escalate over the long run with the US pursuing an unsustainable policy of maximum reflation while China turns away from the liberal “reform and opening” agenda that enabled positive US-China ties since 1979. This combination points to a large increase in the US trade dependency on China even as China grows more independent of the US and technologically capable. This result ensures that tensions will persist over the long run. Is The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis Already Here? Biden may be forced into significant foreign policy action right away in the Taiwan Strait, where General Secretary Xi Jinping has put his fledgling administration to the test. Over the past week Beijing has sent a large squadron of nuclear-capable bombers and fighter jets to cut across the far southwest corner of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (Map 2). This activity is a continuation of an upgraded tempo of military drills around the island, including a flight across the median line last year, and follows an alleged army build-up across from the island last year.1 The US for its part has upgraded its freedom of navigation operations over the past several years, including in the Taiwan Strait (though not yet putting an aircraft carrier group into the strait as in the 1990s). Map 2Flight Paths Of People’s Liberation Army Aircraft, January 25-28, 2021 In response to China’s sorties on January 23, the US State Department urged the People’s Republic to stop “attempts to intimidate its neighbors, including Taiwan,” called for mainland dialogue with Taiwan’s “elected representatives” (albeit not naming anyone), declared that the US would deepen ties with Taiwan, and pledged a “rock-solid” commitment to the island. Not coincidentally the USS Roosevelt aircraft carrier arrived in the South China Sea on the same day as China’s largest sortie, January 24. Meanwhile a Chinese government spokesman said the military drills should be seen as a “solemn warning” to the Biden administration that China will reunify the island by force if necessary. China is not only concerned about Taiwanese secession and US-Taiwan defense relations, as always, but is specifically concerned that the Biden administration will persist with the technological “blockade” that the Trump administration imposed on Huawei, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), their suppliers, and a range of other Chinese state-owned enterprises and tech firms. Neither the US nor Chinese statements have yet made a definitive break with the longstanding policy framework on Taiwan that first enabled US-China détente and engagement. The US State Department reiterated its commitment to the diplomatic documents that frame the relationship with the People’s Republic and the Republic of China, namely the Three Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. It did not make explicit mention of the One China Policy although the US version of that policy is incorporated in the first of the three communiques (the 1972 Shanghai Communique). However, China may not be appeased by this statement. Xi Jinping has gradually shifted the language in major Communist Party policy statements over the past several years to indicate a greater willingness to use force against Taiwan, even suggesting that he envisions the reunification of China by 2035.2 The Trump administration’s offensives have accelerated this security dilemma. In addition to export controls on high tech, Trump signed several significant bills on Taiwan into law over the course of his term that aim to upgrade the relationship. These include the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 at the end of last year, which calls for deeper US-Taiwan relations, greater Taiwanese involvement in international institutions, larger US arms sales to support Taiwan’s defense strategy, and more diplomatic exchanges.3 Separately, the US and Taiwan also signed a science-and-technology cooperation agreement on December 15 and the Biden administration is interested in negotiating a free trade agreement.4 A few additional points: The struggle over access to Taiwan’s state-of-the-art semiconductor production continues to escalate. The Trump administration concluded its tenure by cutting off American exports of chips, parts, designs, and knowhow to Chinese telecom giant Huawei, thus putting Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) into the position of having to halt sales of certain goods to the mainland. TSMC accounts for one-fifth of global semiconductor capacity and produces the smallest, fastest, and most efficient chips. China’s SMIC has been hamstrung by these controls as well as Huawei and other Chinese tech champions. This issue remains unresolved and is the primary immediate driver of conflict between the US and China since both economies would suffer if semiconductor supplies were severed. The US’s capability of imposing a tech blockade on China threatens its long-term productivity and hence potentially regime survival, while China’s capability of attacking Taiwan threatens the critical supply lines of the US and its northeast Asian allies, including essential computer chips for US military needs (the main reason the US has tried to strong-arm TSMC into building a fabrication plant in Arizona).5 US arms sales en route to Taiwan. While there are rumors that the Biden administration will delay these sales, the Taiwanese government claims they have been assured that the transfers will go forward. This arms package does not include the most provocative weapons systems, such as F-35 fighter jets, but it does contain advanced weapons systems and weapons that can be seen as offensive rather than defensive. These include truck-mounted rocket launchers, precision strike missiles, 66 F-16 fighter jets, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, subsea mines, and advanced drones. So it is possible that Beijing will put its foot down to prevent the transfer, just as it tried to halt the less-sensitive transfer of THAAD missiles to South Korea during the last US presidential transition. If this should be the case then it will cause a major escalation in tensions until the US either halts the arms transfer or completes it – and completing the transfer, if China issues an ultimatum, will lead to conflict. Growth of “secessionist forces” in Taiwan. Chinese media have specifically cited a political “alliance” that formed on January 24 and aims to revise the island’s democratic constitution. The Taiwanese public no longer sees itself primarily as Chinese but as Taiwanese and is increasingly opposed to eventual reunification. What is the end-game? First, as stated, the current escalation in tensions can go much further in the coming weeks and months. We are not prepared to sound the “all clear” as a confrontation has been building for years and could conceivably amount to Cuban Missile Crisis proportions, which would likely trigger a bear market. Second, we do not yet see China staging a full-scale attack or invasion on Taiwan. China’s goal is to continue expanding its economy and technology, its economic heft in Asia and the world, and thus its global influence and military power. It cannot achieve this goal if it is utterly severed from Taiwan, but it also cannot achieve this goal if it precipitates a war with not only Taiwan but also the US, Japan, other US allies, and a devastation of the very semiconductor foundries upon which Taiwan’s critical importance stands. Playing the long game of growing its economy and taking incremental steps of imposing its political supremacy has paid off so far, including in Hong Kong and the South China Sea. Both Russia’s and China’s gradual slices of regional power have demonstrated that the US does not have the appetite, focus, and resolve to fight small wars at present – whereas Washington is untested on its commitment to major wars such as an invasion of Taiwan would precipitate. At very least China needs to determine whether the Biden administration intends to impose a technological blockade, as the Trump administration looked to do. Biden has so far outlined a “defensive game” of securing US networks, preventing US trade in dual-use technologies that strengthen China’s military, on-shoring semiconductor production, and accelerating US research and development. This leaves open the possibility of issuing waivers for trade in US-made or US-designed items that do not have military purposes, albeit with the US retaining the possibility of removing the waivers if China does not reciprocate. This strategy amounts to what Biden’s “Asia Tsar,” Kurt Campbell, has called “stable competition.” Therefore the earliest indications from the Biden administration suggest that it will seek a lowering of temperature while defending the US’s red lines – and this should prevent a full-scale Taiwan war in the short run, though it does not prevent a major diplomatic crisis at any time. If Biden does in fact pursue this more accommodative approach, and seeks to reengage China, then that Beijing has a much lower-cost strategy that is immediately available, as opposed to an all-or-nothing gambit to stage the largest amphibious assault since D-Day, which is by no means assured to succeed and could in the worst case provoke a nuclear war. This strategy includes negotiating waivers on US tech restrictions, accelerating its high-tech import substitution strategy, and continuing to poach the talent from Taiwan and steal the technology needed to circumvent US restrictions. As long as Washington does not make a dash for a total blockade, Beijing should be expected to pursue this alternate strategy. Investment Takeaways The market is not priced for a serious escalation in US-China-Taiwan tensions. If there is a 17% chance of a 30%-40% drawdown in equities on jitters over a major war, then equities should suffer a full 7%+ correction to discount the possibility. While the prospects of full-scale war are much lower, at say 5%, these odds could escalate rapidly if the two sides fail to mitigate a diplomatic or military crisis through red telephone communications. Chart 18China/Taiwan Policy Uncertainty Will Converge To Upside While Chinese policy uncertainty remains elevated, it still has plenty of room to rise. It has diverged unsustainably from Taiwanese uncertainty, which only recently showed signs of ticking up in response to manifest strategic dangers. This gap will converge to the upside as US-China tensions persist and the global news media gradually turns its spotlight away from Donald Trump, alerting financial markets to the persistence of the world’s single most important geopolitical risk right under their nose (Chart 18). Inverting our market-based Geopolitical Risk Indicators, so that falling risk is shown as a rising green line, it becomes apparent that Chinese equities and Taiwanese equities have gone vertical, have only started to correct, and are highly exposed to exogenous events stemming from their fundamentally unstable political relationship. Hong Kong stocks, by contrast, have performed in line with the market’s perception of their political risk, so that there is less discrepancy between market sentiment and reality – even though they will also sell off in the event that this week’s events escalate into a larger confrontation (Chart 19). Chart 19Geopolitical Risks Lurking In Asian Equities Chart 20Stay Long Korea / Short Taiwan Due To Geopolitical Risk South Korean stocks were also overstretched and due for correction. We have long advocated a pair trade favoring Korean over Taiwanese stocks to capture the relative geopolitical risk as well as more favorable valuations in Korea (Chart 20). The ingredients for a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis are all present. This week’s showdown could escalate further. Global and East Asian equities are overbought and vulnerable to a larger correction, especially Taiwanese stocks. US equities are also sky-high and vulnerable to a larger correction, although they would be favored relative to the rest of the world in the event of a full-fledged crisis. Chart 21Geopolitical Flare-Up Would Upset This Trend We maintain our various geopolitical longs and hedges, including gold, Japanese yen, an Indian overweight within EM, and health stocks. We remain long global defense stocks as well. Because our base case is that the current crisis will not result in war, but rather high diplomatic tensions, we are inclined to buy on the dips. But we expect a big dip even in the event of a merely diplomatic crisis that involves no jets shot down or ships sunk. Therefore for now we are closing long municipal bonds versus Treasuries, long international stocks versus American, long GBP-EUR, long Trans-Pacific Partnership countries, and long value versus growth stocks. These trades should be reinitiated once we have clarity on the magnitude of the US-China crisis, given the extremely accommodative economic and policy backdrop, which will, if anything, become more accommodative if geopolitical risks materialize yet fall short of total war. Oil and copper would suffer relative to gold in the meantime (Chart 21). Our remaining strategic portfolio still favors stocks that would ultimately benefit from instability in Greater China, such as European industrials relative to global, Indian equities relative to Chinese, and South Korean equities relative to Taiwanese. While the spike in tensions reinforces our conclusion in last week’s report that long-dated Chinese government bonds should rally on Taiwan risk, this recommendation was made in the context of discussing domestic Chinese markets and is primarily intended for mainland investors or those with a mandate to invest in Chinese assets. Foreign investors could conceivably be exposed to sanctions or capital controls in the event of a major crisis – as we have long flagged is also a risk with foreign holders of Russian ruble-denominated bonds. We have made a note in our trade table accordingly.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Brad Lendon, "Almost 40 Chinese warplanes breach Taiwan Strait median line; Taiwan President calls it a 'threat of force,'" CNN, September 21, 2020, cnn.com. 2 Richard C. Bush, "8 key things to notice from Xi Jinping’s New Year speech on Taiwan," Brookings Institute, January 7, 2019, brookings.com. 3 Trump also signed the Taiwan Travel Act on March 16, 2018 and the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act on March 26, 2019. For the Taiwan Assurance Act, see Kelvin Chen, "Trump Signs Taiwan Assurance Act Into Law," Taiwan News, December 28, 2020, taiwannews.com. 4 Jason Pan, "Alliance formed to draft Taiwanese constitution," Taipei Times, January 24, 2021, taipeitimes.com; Emerson Lim and Matt Yu, "Taiwan, U.S. sign agreement on scientific cooperation," Focus Taiwan, December 18, 2020, focustaiwan.tw; Ryan Hass, "A case for optimism on US-Taiwan relations," Brookings Institute, November 30, 2020, brookings.com. 5 Thomas J. Shattuck, "Stuck in the Middle: Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry, the U.S.-China Tech Fight, and Cross-Strait Stability," Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis (65:1) 2021, pp. 101-17, www.fpri.org. Section II: GeoRisk Indicators China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Pandemic uncertainty is keeping the USD well bid by raising global economic policy uncertainty. When this breaks – i.e., as higher vaccination rates push contagion rates down – the USD will resume its bear market. Renewable-energy output surpassed fossil-fuel generation in Europe for the first time in 2020. With the Biden administration re-committing to renewables, and China and Europe continuing their build-outs, copper demand will rise to meet grid-expansion needs. Copper mine output fell 0.5% in Jan-Oct 2020. Treatment and refining charges – already at 10-year lows – will remain depressed as supplies tighten. Major exchanges’ refined copper inventories were down 17% y/y in December, suggesting weak mine output continued into end-2020. Stocks will continue to fall this year, backwardating the COMEX's copper forward curve (Chart of the Week). Based on the World Bank’s forecast for real global GDP growth of 4% this year, and our expectation for a weaker USD, COMEX copper prices will likely breach $4.00/lb by 2H21. COVID-19 uncertainty drives metals: If infection and hospitalization rates outpace vaccinations, additional lockdowns in the US and Europe will stymie the recovery. Success in expanding vaccinations will push economic activity higher. We expect the latter outcome. Feature Pandemic uncertainty is driving global economic policy uncertainty, which is keeping a safe-haven bid under the USD (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekPhysical Copper Deficit Signals Continued Inventory Draws This continues to stymie the recovery in industrial commodity prices, particularly oil and base metals.1 The uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic feeds directly into global economic policy uncertainty, which drives USD safe-haven demand. Chart 2USD Remains In The Thrall Of Pandemic Uncertainty Pandemic uncertainty will not abate until vaccination distribution is sufficient to put infection, hospitalization and death rates on a clear downward trajectory, and remove the threat of widespread lockdowns, which once again are required to deal with rampant contagion rates and the possible spread of vaccine-resistant COVID-19 mutations locally and globally. As markets see empirical evidence of falling COVID-19-related infection, hospitalization and mortality, safe-haven demand for USD will weaken. Massive fiscal and monetary support will continue to support GDP globally, until organic growth takes off after sufficient populations are vaccinated, per the World Bank’s assumptions (Chart 3).2 Fiscal stimulus in the US exceeds 25% of GDP, and will continue to expand as the Biden administration rolls out additional spending measures. With the Fed remaining willing and able to accommodate this massive fiscal profligacy in the US, the USD will face increasing pressure on the downside as normalcy returns. Chart 3Massive Fiscal Support Globally Will Be Replaced By Organic Growth A weaker USD and stronger economic growth would boost copper prices this year and the next. A 5% decline in the broad trade-weighted USD this year would push spot COMEX copper prices above $4.30/lb, all else equal, while a 4% boost in world GDP – in line with the World Bank’s forecast for real growth this year – would lift prices to just under $4.05/lb, based on our modeling (Chart 4).3 Chart 4Lower USD, Stronger GDP Bullish For Copper Prices Renewable Generation Will Boost Copper Demand In addition to these stronger fundamentals, base metals demand – particularly for copper – will continue to benefit from the build-out of renewable-energy electricity generation globally, particularly in Europe and China. The return of the US to the Paris Agreement to combat climate change, and a renewed effort by the Biden administration to fund expanded renewable-energy resources will add to the increase in base-metals demand accompanying this global build-out (Chart 5).4 Europe is moving out ahead of the US in its deployment of renewable electricity generation, which, for the first time ever, surpassed fossil-fuel generation in 2020.5 S&P Global Market Intelligence this week reported renewable energy sources accounted for 38% of electricity generation in the EU vs 37% for fossil fuels. Renewables also surpassed fossil-fuel generation in the UK last year. Wind, solar and hydro all saw strong gains. Chart 5Copper Is Indispensible For A Low-Carbon Future Copper Supply Continues To Tighten It is important to once again note that all of these, and other renewable technologies, will require higher base metals output, none moreso than copper, which spans all renewable technologies. With copper-mining capex still weak and ore qualities falling in the mines that are producing, the supply side remains challenged (Chart 6). Over the past two years, p.a. supply growth on the mining side has been close to flat. The International Copper Study Group (ICSG) this week reported copper mine output fell 0.5% in the first 10 months of 2020. Refined copper output was up 1.5% over the same interval. Treatment and refining charges – already at 10-year lows – will remain depressed as supplies tighten. We expect full-year mined and refined output to fall on either side of zero growth for 2020, and 2021 (Chart 7).6 Major exchanges’ refined copper inventories were down 17% y/y in December, according to the ICSG, suggesting weak mine output continued into end-2020. An apparent increase in refined copper consumption of 2% noted by the ICSG also contributed to lower inventories. The Group estimates global refined copper balances adjusted for changes in Chinese bonded stocks, which are believed to have increased 105k tons y/y in the Jan-Dec 2020 interval, posted a physical deficit of ~ 380k tons. Chart 6Weak Capex, Lower Copper Ore Quality Remain Chief Supply-Side Challenges Chart 7Mined, Refined Copper Supply Growth Remains WeakWe expect inventories will continue to fall this year – as seen in the Chart of the Week – as demand strengthens and supply growth remains weak, which will backwardate the COMEX copper forward curve. Metal Ox Year Brings Short-Term Uncertainties The approach of the Chinese New Year beginning 12 February 2021 normally would herald massive travel and celebration, which, all else equal, would dampen economic growth until festivities ended. This year, however, reports of a re-emergence of COVID-19 infections is casting doubt on this year’s celebrations. In addition, winter industrial curtailments to reduce pollution also should reduce short-term demand for metals generally. These transitory factors should show up in lower levels of economic activity on the industrial side. For this reason, we expect seasonal weakness to show up in 1Q21 activity, to be followed in 2Q21 by higher growth y/y. Bottom Line: Copper fundamentals continue to paint a bullish price picture, particularly on the supply side. Although risks abound on both sides of the market, we expect the massive support being provided by fiscal and monetary policy globally to transition to organic growth in 2H21, in line with the World Bank’s expectations. The enormous fiscal stimulus being unleashed by the US – coupled with an ultra-accommodative Fed – will result in a weakening of the USD that will provide a tailwind to copper prices in 2H21 and next year. We remain long the PICK ETF, expecting copper miners and traders to benefit from this bullish backdrop, which we expect to persist for the next decade. The recommendation is up 6.4% since inception December 10, 2020. We also remain long December 2021 copper, which is up 19.6% since it was recommended on September 10, 2020.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish After falling 11% in 2020 due to COVID-19-induced demand destruction, US energy-related CO2 emissions will rebound this year and next, according to the Energy Information Administration (Chart 8).  The EIA forecasts US energy-related CO2 emissions this year and next will be 4.8 and 4.9 billion MT, which would amount to a 4.7% and 3.2% gains, respectively.  The EIA tracks emissions from coal, petroleum and natural gas usage in the US in its estimates.  Petroleum accounts for ~ 46% of total emissions in 2021 and 2022, while natgas contributes ~ 33% of all energy-related emissions in both years, on average.  Reflecting its market-share loss in the power-generation market, coal accounts for ~ 21% of total US energy-related CO2 emissions in 2021 and 2022. Base Metals: Bullish Globally, crude steel production was down 0.9% y/y at 1.864 billion MT, the World Steel Association reported this week.  China’s steel production was up 5.2% last year, to 1.053 billion MT, the country a market share of 56.5%, up from 2019’s level of 53.3%.  Output in all of Asia totalled 1.375 billion MT, up 1.5% y/y, with India’s production falling close to 11% to 99.6 billion MT.  China’s iron-ore imports set a record last year on the back of its strong steel-making performance, reaching 1.2 billion tonnes, a 9.5% increase y/y.  Higher infrastructure spending was the primary driver of increased steel demand last year.  Iron ore delivered to the Chinese port of Tianjin (62% Fe) closed just above $169/MT on Tuesday, up ~ 9% YTD. Precious Metals: Bullish Gold continues to trade ~ $1,850/oz, down more than $100/oz from its highs earlier this month on the back of persistent USD strength (Chart 9).  The pandemic uncertainty feeding into global economic policy uncertainty is the proximate cause of dollar strength.  COVID-19 vaccine rates are increasing, and governments remain committed to widespread distribution, which likely will be visible to markets during 1H21.  Once this occurs, we expect gold to rally along with other commodities, as the safe-have bid is priced out of the USD. Ags/Softs: Neutral US corn prices rallied on the back of stronger China purchases of the grain on Tuesday.  Farm Futures reported a 53.5mm-bushel order out of China on Tuesday was responsible for the gain earlier this week.  Farmers continue to expect Chinese buying to remain strong, given falling corn stocks in China. Chart 8 Chart 9   Footnotes 1     At the margin, this increases the cost of purchasing commodities and lowers the cost of producing them ex-US in local-currency terms, both of which depress prices. Pandemic uncertainty and global economic policy uncertainty (GEPU) are cointegrated; the USD and GEPU also are cointegrated. We discussed the effects of pandemic uncertainty on the USD and its impact on oil prices in last week’s balances and price forecast update entitled Brent Forecast: $63 This Year, $71 Next Year. This report is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see the Bank's Global Economic Prospects released 5 January 2021 entitled Subdued Global Economic Recovery. The IMF upgraded its global growth outlook to 5.5% this year and 4.2% next year, in its World Economic Outlook Update released this week. We continue to use the more conservative World Bank forecasts. The Israeli economy is providing something of a natural experiment vis-à-vis the rate of COVID-19 vaccination and economic growth. According to reuters.com, the country got an early start on vaccinations, and has one of the highest rates in the world. If maintained, this will result in GDP growth of 6.3% in 2021 and 5.8% next year. Without these early and intensive vaccination rates, 2021 growth likely would be 3.5%. 3    The models in Chart 4 use the broad trade-weighted USD and global copper stocks as common regressors, and estimate copper prices given the World Bank estimates for World, EM ex-China, China and DM real GDPs. In the discussion above, we use elasticities from the World GDP model to highlight the impact of changes in copper prices from the different variables. 4    Please see Renewables, China's FYP Underpin Metals Demand, which we published 26 November 2020. We discuss the implications of essentially rebuilding the global electric-generation grid to accommodate more renewable energy resources vis-à-vis base metals demand. Copper, in particular, spans all technologies that will be deployed to achieve a low-carbon generation pool globally, as Chart 5 illustrates. 5    Please see For 1st time, renewables surpass fossil fuels in EU power mix published by S&P Global Market Intelligence 25 January 2021. 6    Benchmark treatment and refining fees charged by smelters to refine raw ore fell to 5.9 cent/lb this year, down from 6.2 cent/lb last year, according to reuters.com. This 10-year low reflects an abundance of smelting capacity relative to concentrates on the supply side needing to be refined.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights A positive backdrop still supports a cyclical bull market in Chinese stocks, but the upside in prices could be quickly exhausted. Investors may be overlooking emerging negative signs in China’s onshore equity market.  The breadth of the A-share price rally has sharply declined since the beginning of this year; historically, a rapid narrowing in breadth has been a reliable indicator for pullbacks in the onshore market. Recent stock price rallies in some high-flying sectors of the onshore market are due to earnings multiples rather than earnings growth. Overstretched stock prices relative to earnings risk a snapback. We remain cautious on short-term prospects for China’s onshore equity markets.  Feature Market commentators remain sharply divided about whether Chinese stocks will continue on their cyclical bull run or are in a speculative frenzy ready to capitulate. Stock prices picked up further in the first three weeks of 2021, extending their rallies in 2020. The positives that support a bull market, such as China’s economic recovery and improving profit growth, are at odds with the negatives. The downside is that the intensity of post-pandemic stimulus in China has likely peaked and monetary conditions have tightened. In addition, China’s stock markets may be showing signs of fatigue. While aggregate indexes have recorded new highs, the breadth of the rally—the percentage of stocks for which prices are rising versus falling—has been rapidly deteriorating. In the past, a sharp narrowing in breadth led to corrections and major setbacks in Chinese stock prices. Timing the eventual correction in stock prices will be tricky in an environment where plentiful cash on the sidelines from stimulus invites risk-taking. For now, there is little near-term benefit for investors to chase the rally in Chinese stocks. While we are not yet negative on Chinese stocks on a cyclical basis, the risks for a near-term price correction are significant. Investors looking to allocate more cash to Chinese stocks should wait until a correction occurs. Positive Backdrop On a cyclical basis, there are still some aspects that could push Chinese stocks even higher. The question is the speed of the rally. The more earnings multiples expand in the near term, the more earnings will have to do the heavy lifting in the rest of the year to pull Chinese stocks higher. The following factors have provided tailwinds to Chinese stocks, but may have already been discounted by investors: Chart 1Chinas Economic Recovery Continues China’s economic recovery continues. China was the only major world economy to record growth in 2020. The massive stimulus rolled out last year should continue to work its way through the economy and support the ongoing uptrend in the business cycle (Chart 1). China’s relative success containing domestic COVID-19 outbreaks also provides confidence for the country’s consumers, businesses and investors. Chinese consumers have saved money—a lot of it. Although the household sector has been a laggard in China’s aggregate economy, much of the consumption weakness has been due to a slower recovery in service activities, such as tourism and catering (Chart 2). More importantly, Chinese households have accumulated substantial savings in the past two years. Unlike investors in the US, Chinese households have limited investment choices. Historically, sharp increases in household savings growth led to property booms (Chart 3, top panel). Given that Chinese authorities have become more vigilant in preventing further price inflation in the property market, Chinese households have been increasingly investing in the domestic equity market (Chart 3, middle and bottom panels). Reportedly, there has been a sharp jump in demand for investment products from households; mutual funds in China have raised money at a record pace, bringing in over 2 trillion yuan ($308 billion) in 2020, which is more than the total amount for the previous four years. The equity investment penetration remains low in China compared with developed nations such as the US.1 Thus, there is still room for Chinese households to deploy their savings into domestic stock markets. Chart 2Consumption Has Been A Laggard In Chinas Economic Recovery Chart 3But Chinese Households Have Saved A Lot Of Dry Powder   Global growth and the liquidity backdrop remain positive. The combination of extremely easy monetary policy worldwide and a new round of fiscal support in the US will provide a supportive backdrop for both global economic growth and liquidity conditions. Foreign investment has flocked into China’s financial markets since last year and has picked up speed since the New Year (Chart 4). On a monthly basis, portfolio inflows account for less than 1% of the onshore equity market trading volume, but in recent years foreign portfolio inflows have increasingly influenced China’s onshore equity market sentiment and prices (Chart 5). Chart 4Foreign Investors Are Piling Into The Chinese Equity Market Chart 5And Have Become A More Influential Player In The Chinese Onshore Market Geopolitical risks are abating somewhat. We do not expect that the Biden administration will be quick to unwind Trump’s existing trade policies on China. However, in the near term, the two nations will likely embark on a less confrontational track than in the past two and a half years. Slightly eased Sino-US tensions will provide global investors with more confidence for buying Chinese risk assets. Lastly, localized COVID-19 outbreaks have flared up in several Chinese cities, prompting local authorities to take aggressive measures, including community lockdowns and stepping up travel restrictions. A deterioration in the situation could delay the recovery of household consumption; however, any negative impact on China’s aggregate economy will more than likely be offset by market expectations that policymakers will delay monetary policy normalization. Domestic liquidity conditions could improve, possibly providing a short-term boost to the rally in Chinese stocks. Bottom Line: Much of the positive news may already be priced into Chinese stocks. Non-Negligible Downside Risks There is a consensus that Chinese authorities will dial back their stimulus efforts this year and continue to tighten regulations in sectors such as real estate. Investors may disagree on the pace and magnitude of policy tightening, but the policy direction has been explicit from recent government announcements. However, the market may have ignored the following factors and their implications on stock performance: Deteriorating equity market breadth. In the past three weeks, the rally in Chinese stocks has been supported by a handful of blue-chip companies. The CSI 300 Index, which aggregates the largest 300 companies listed on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (i.e. the A-share market) outperformed the broader A-share market by a large margin (Chart 6). Crucially, stock market breadth has declined rapidly (Chart 7). In short, the majority of Chinese stocks have relapsed. Chart 6Large Cap Stocks Outperform The Rest By A Sizable Margin Chart 7The Breadth Of Onshore Stock Price Rally Has Narrowed Sharply   Chart 8Narrowing Market Breadth Has Historically Led To Price Pullbacks Previously, Chinese stocks experienced either price corrections or a major setback as the breadth of the rally narrowed (Chart 8). However, the relationship has broken down since October last year; the number of stocks with ascending prices has fallen, while the aggregate A-share prices have risen. In other words, breadth has narrowed and the rally in the benchmark has been due to a handful of large-cap stocks.   Top performers do not have enough weight to support the broad market. An overconcentration of returns in itself may not necessarily lead to an imminent price pullback in the aggregate equity index. The five tech titans in the S&P 500 index have been dominating returns since 2015, whereas the rest of the 495 stocks in the index barely made any gains. Yet the overconcentration in just a few stocks has not stopped the S&P 500 from reaching new highs in the past five years. Unlike the tech titans which represent more than 20% of the S&P index, the overconcentration in the Chinese onshore market has been more on the sector leaders rather than on a particular sector. China’s own tech giants such as Alibaba, Tencent, and Meituan, represent 35% of China’s offshore market, but most of the sector leaders in China’s onshore market account for only two to three percent of the total equity market cap (Table 1). Given their relatively small weight in the Shanghai and Shenzhen composite indexes, it is difficult for these stocks to lift the entire A-share market if prices in all the other stocks decline sharply.  The CSI 300 Index, which aggregates some of China’s largest blue-chip companies and industry leaders, including Kweichow Moutai, Midea Group, and Ping An Insurance, is not insulated from gyrations in the aggregate A-share market. Historically, when investors crowded into those top performers, the weight from underperforming companies in the broader onshore market would create a domino effect and drag down the CSI 300 Index. In other words, the magnitude of returns on the CSI 300 Index can deviate from the broader onshore market, but not the direction of returns.  Table 1Top 10 Constituents And Their Weights In The CSI 300, Shanghai Composite, And Shenzhen Composite Indexes Chinese “groupthinkers” are pushing the overconcentration. With the explosive growth in mutual fund sales, Chinese institutional investors and asset managers have started to play important roles in the bull market. Unlike their Western counterparts, Chinese fund managers’ performances are ranked on a quarterly or even monthly basis by asset owners, including retail investors. As such, they face intense and constant pressure to outperform the benchmarks and their peers, and have great incentive to chase rallies in well-known companies. In a late-state bull market when uncertainties emerge and assets with higher returns are sparse, fund managers tend to group up in chasing fewer “sector winners,” driving up their share prices. Chart 9Forward Earnings Growth Has Stalled Earnings outlook fails to keep up with multiple expansions. Despite the massive stimulus last year and improving industrial profits, forward earnings growth in both the onshore and offshore equity markets rolled over by the end of last year (Chart 9). Earnings from some of China’s high-flying sectors have been mediocre (Chart 10). Even though the ROEs in the food & beverage, healthcare and aerospace sectors remain above the domestic industry benchmarks, the sharp upticks in their share prices are largely due to an expansion of forward earnings multiples rather than earnings growth (Chart 11). The stretched valuation measures suggest that investors have priced in significant earnings growth, which may be more than these industries can deliver in 2021. Chart 10Other Than Healthcare, High-Flying Sectors Have Seen Mediocre Earnings Chart 11Too Much Growth Priced In Cyclical stocks may be sniffing out a peak in the market. The performance in cyclical stocks relative to defensives in both the onshore and offshore equity markets has started to falter, after outperforming throughout 2020 (Chart 12). Historically, the strength in cyclical stocks relative to defensives corresponds with improving economic activity (and vice versa). Therefore, the recent rollover in the outperformance of cyclical stocks versus defensives indicates that China’s economic recovery and the equity rally could soon peak.   An IPO mania. New IPOs in China reached a record high last year, jumping by more than 100% from 2019. IPOs on the Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong stock exchanges together were more than half of all global IPOs in 2020. The previous rounds of explosive IPOs in China occurred in 2007, 2010/11, and 2014/15, most followed by stock market riots (Chart 13). Chart 12Cyclical Stocks May Be Sniffing Out A Peak In The Market Chart 13IPO Manias In The Past Have Led To Market Riots Bottom Line: Investors may be neglecting some risks and pitfalls in the Chinese equity markets, which could lead to near-term price corrections. Investment Conclusions We still hold a constructive view on Chinese stocks in the next 6 to 12 months. Yet the equity market rally has been on overdrive for the past several weeks. The higher Chinese stock prices climb in the near term, the more it will eat into upside potentials and thus push down expected returns. The divergence between forward earnings and PE expansions in Chinese stocks is reminiscent of the massive stock market boom-bust cycle in 2014/15 (Chart 14A and 14B). This is in stark contrast with the picture at the beginning of the last policy tightening cycle, which started in late 2016 (Chart 15A and 15B). Valuation is a poor timing indicator and investor sentiment is hard to pin down. Nevertheless, the wide divergence between the earnings outlook and multiples indicates that Chinese stock prices are overstretched and at risk of price setbacks. Chart 14AA Picture Looking Too Familiar Chart 14BA Picture Looking Too Familiar Chart 15AAnd A Sharp Contrast From The Last Policy Tightening Cycle Chart 15BAnd A Sharp Contrast From The Last Policy Tightening Cycle We remain cautious on the short-term prospects for the broad equity market. Investors looking to allocate more cash to Chinese stocks should wait until a price correction occurs. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1Only 20.4% of Chinese households’ total net worth is in financial assets versus the US, where the share is 42.5%. PBoC, “2019 Chinese Urban Households Assets And Liabilities Survey.” Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights Chinese equities have rallied enthusiastically since the COVID-19 outbreak and are now exposed to underlying political and geopolitical risks. Xi Jinping’s intention is to push forward reform and restructuring, creating a significant risk of policy overtightening over the coming two years. In the first half of 2021, the lingering pandemic and fragile global environment suggest that overtightening will be avoided. But the risk will persist throughout the year. Beijing’s fourteenth five-year plan and new focus on import substitution will exacerbate growing distrust with the US. We still doubt that the Biden administration will reduce tensions substantially or for very long. Chinese equities are vulnerable to a near-term correction. The renminbi is at fair value. Go long Chinese government bonds on the basis that political and geopolitical risks are now underrated again. Feature The financial community tends to view China’s political leadership as nearly infallible, handling each new crisis with aplomb. In 2013-15 Chinese leaders avoided a hard landing amid financial turmoil, in 2018-20 they blocked former President Trump’s trade war, and in 2020 they contained the COVID-19 pandemic faster than other countries. COVID was especially extraordinary because it first emerged in China and yet China recovered faster than others – even expanding its global export market share as the world ordered more medical supplies and electronic gadgets (Chart 1). COVID-19 cases are spiking as we go to press but there is little doubt that China will use drastic measures to curb the virus’s spread. It produced two vaccines, even if less effective than its western counterparts (Chart 2). Monetary and fiscal policy will be utilized to prevent any disruptions to the Chinese New Year from pulling the rug out from under the economic recovery. Chart 1China Grew Global Market Share, Despite COVID Chart 2China Has A Vaccine, Albeit Less Effective In short, China is seen as a geopolitical juggernaut that poses no major risk to the global bull market in equities, corporate bonds, and commodities – the sole backstop for global growth during times of crisis (Chart 3). The problem with this view is that it is priced into markets already, the crisis era is fading (despite lingering near-term risks), and Beijing’s various risks are piling up. Chart 3China Backstopped Global Growth Again First, as potential GDP growth slows, China faces greater difficulty managing the various socioeconomic imbalances and excesses created by its success – namely the tug of war between growth and reform. The crisis shattered China’s attempt to ensure a smooth transition to lower growth rates, leaving it with higher unemployment and industrial restructuring that will produce long-term challenges (Chart 4). Chart 4China's Unemployment Problem The shock also forced China to engage in another blowout credit surge, worsening the problem of excessive leverage and reversing the progress that was made on corporate deleveraging in previous years. Second, foreign strategic opposition and trade protectionism are rising. China’s global image suffered across the world in 2020 as a result of COVID, despite the fact that President Trump’s antics largely distracted from China. Going forward there will be recriminations from Beijing’s handling of the pandemic and its power grab in Hong Kong yet Trump will not be there to deflect. By contrast, the Biden administration holds out a much greater prospect of aligning liberal democracies against China in a coalition that could ultimately prove effective in constraining its international behavior. China’s turn inward, toward import substitution and self-sufficiency, will reinforce this conflict. In the current global rebound, in which China will likely be able to secure its economic recovery while the US is supercharging its own, readers should expect global equity markets and China/EM stocks to perform well on a 12-month time frame. We would not deny all the positive news that has occurred. But Chinese equities have largely priced in the positives, meaning that Chinese politics and geopolitics are underrated again and will be a source of negative surprises going forward. The Centennial Of 1921 The Communist Party will hold a general conference to celebrate its 100th birthday on July 1, just as it did in 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011. These meetings are ceremonial and have no impact on economic policy. We examined nominal growth, bank loans, fixed asset investment, industrial output, and inflation and observed no reliable pattern as an outcome of these once-per-decade celebrations. In 2011, for example, General Secretary Hu Jintao gave a speech about the party’s triumphs since 1921, reiterated the goals of the twelfth five-year plan launched in March 2011, and reminded his audience of the two centennial goals of becoming a “moderately prosperous society” by 2021 and a “modern socialist country” by 2049 (the hundredth anniversary of the People’s Republic). China is now transitioning from the 2021 goals to the 2049 goals and the policy consequences will be determined by the Xi Jinping administration. Xi will give a speech on July 1 recapitulating the fourteenth five-year plan’s goals and his vision for 2035 and 2049, which will be formalized in March at the National People’s Congress, China’s rubber-stamp parliament. As such any truly new announcements relating to the economy should come over the next couple of months, though the broad outlines are already set. There would need to be another major shock to the system, comparable to the US trade war and COVID-19, to produce a significant change in the economic policy outlook from where it stands today. Hence the Communist Party’s 100th birthday is not a driver of policy – and certainly not a reason for authorities to inject another dose of massive monetary and credit stimulus following the country’s massive 12% of GDP credit-and-fiscal impulse from trough to peak since 2018 (Chart 5). The overarching goal is stability around this event, which means policy will largely be held steady. Chart 5China's Big Stimulus Already Occurred Far more important than the centenary of the Communist Party is the political leadership rotation that will begin on the local level in early 2022, culminating in the twentieth National Party Congress in the fall of 2022.1 This was supposed to be the date of Xi’s stepping down, according to the old schedule, but he will instead further consolidate power – and may even name himself Chairman Xi, as the next logical step in his Maoist propaganda campaign. This important political rotation will enable Xi to elevate his followers to higher positions and cement his influence over the so-called seventh generation of Chinese leaders, pushing his policy agenda far into the future. Ahead of these events, Beijing has been mounting a new battle against systemic risks, as it did in late 2016 and throughout 2017 ahead of the nineteenth National Party Congress. The purpose is to prevent the economic and financial excesses of the latest stimulus from destabilizing the country, to make progress on Xi’s policy agenda, and to expose and punish any adversaries. This new effort will face limitations based on the pandemic and fragile economy but it will nevertheless constitute the default setting for the next two years – and it is a drag on growth rather than a boost. The importance of the centenary and the twentieth party congress will not prevent various risks from exploding between now and the fall of 2022. Some political scandals will likely emerge as foreign or domestic opposition attempts to undermine Xi’s power consolidation – and at least one high-level official will inevitably fall from grace as Xi demonstrates his supremacy and puts his followers in place for higher office. But any market reaction to these kinds of events will be fleeting compared to the reaction to Xi’s economic management. The economic risk boils down to the implementation of Xi’s structural reform agenda and his threshold for suffering political pain in pursuit of this agenda. For now the risk is fairly well contained, as the pandemic is still somewhat relevant, but going forward the tension between growth and reform will grow. Bottom Line: The hundredth birthday of the Communist Party is overrated but the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022 is of critical importance to the governance of China over the next ten years. These events will not prompt a major new dose of stimulus and they will not prevent a major reform push or crackdown on financial excesses. But as always in China there will still be an overriding emphasis on economic and social stability above all. For now, this is supportive of the new global business cycle, commodity prices, and emerging market equities. The Fourteenth Five-Year Plan (2021-25) The draft proposal of China’s fourteenth five-year plan (2021-25) will be ratified at the annual “two sessions” in March (Table 1). The key themes are familiar from previous five-year plans, which focused on China’s economic transition from “quantity” to “quality” in economic development. Table 1China’s 14th Five Year Plan China is seen as having entered the “high quality” phase of development – and the word quality is used 40 times in the draft. As with the past five years, the Xi administration is highlighting “supply-side structural reform” as a means of achieving this economic upgrade and promoting innovation. But Xi has shifted his rhetoric to highlight a new concept, “dual circulation,” which will now take center stage. Dual circulation marks a dramatic shift in Chinese policy: away from the “opening up and reform” of the liberal 1980s-2000s and toward a new era of import substitution and revanchism that will dominate the 2020s. Xi Jinping first brought it up in May 2020 and re-emphasized it at the July Politburo meeting and other meetings thereafter. It is essentially a “China First” policy that describes a development path in which the main economic activity occurs within the domestic market. Foreign trade and investment are there to improve this primary domestic activity. Dual circulation is better understood as a way of promoting import substitution, or self-reliance – themes that emerged after the Great Recession but became more explicit during the trade war with the US from 2018-20. The gist is to strengthen domestic demand and private consumption, improve domestic rather than foreign supply options, attract foreign investment, and build more infrastructure to remove internal bottlenecks and improve cross-regional activity (e.g. the Sichuan-Tibet railway, the national power grid, the navigation satellite system). China has greatly reduced its reliance on global trade already, though it is still fairly reliant when Hong Kong is included (Chart 6). The goals of the fourteenth five-year plan are also consistent with the “Made in China 2025” plan that aroused so much controversy with the Trump administration, leading China to de-emphasize it in official communications. Just like dual circulation, the 2025 plan was supposed to reduce China’s dependency on foreign technology and catapult China into the lead in areas like medical devices, supercomputers, robotics, electric vehicles, semiconductors, new materials, and other emerging technologies. This plan was only one of several state-led initiatives to boost indigenous innovation and domestic high-tech production. The response to American pressure was to drop the name but maintain the focus. Some of the initiatives will fall under new innovation and technology guidelines while others will fall under the category of “new types of infrastructure,” such as 5G networks, electric vehicles, big data centers, artificial intelligence operations, and ultra-high voltage electricity grids. With innovation and technology as the overarching goals, China is highly likely to increase research and development spending and aim for an overall level of above 3% of GDP (Chart 7). In previous five-year plans the government did not set a specific target. Nor did it set targets for the share of basic research spending within research and development, which is around 6% but is believed to need to be around 15%-20% to compete with the most innovative countries. While Beijing is already a leader in producing new patents, it will attempt to double its output while trying to lift the overall contribution of technology advancement to the economy. Chart 6China Seeks To Reduce Foreign Dependency Dual circulation will become a major priority affecting other areas of policy. Reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for example, will take place under this rubric. The Xi administration has dabbled in SOE reform all along, for instance by injecting private capital to create mixed ownership, but progress has been debatable. Chart 7China Will Surge R&D Spending The new five-year plan will incorporate elements of an existing three-year action plan approved last June. The intention is to raise the competitiveness of China’s notoriously bloated SOEs, making them “market entities” that play a role in leading innovation and strengthening domestic supply chains. However, there is no question that SOEs will still be expected to serve an extra-economic function of supporting employment and social stability. So the reform is not really a broad liberalization and SOEs will continue to be a large sector dominated by the state and directed by the state, with difficulties relating to efficiency and competitiveness. Notwithstanding the focus on quality, China still aims to have GDP per capita reach $12,500 by 2025, implying 5%-5.5% annual growth from 2021-25, which is consistent with estimates of the International Monetary Fund (Chart 8). This kind of goal will require policy support at any given time to ensure that there is no major shortfall due to economic shocks like COVID-19. Thus any attempts at reform will be contained within the traditional context of a policy “floor” beneath growth rates – which itself is one of the biggest hindrances to deep reform. Chart 8China's Growth Target Through 2025 Chart 9Stimulus Correlates With Carbon Emissions As the economy’s potential growth slows the Communist Party has been shifting its focus to improving the quality of life, as opposed to the previous decades-long priority of meeting the basic material needs of the society. The new five-year plan aims to increase disposable income per capita as part of the transition to a domestic consumption-driven economy. The implied target will be 5%-5.5% growth per year, down from 6.5%+ previously, but the official commitment will be put in vague qualitative terms to allow for disappointments in the slower growing environment. The point is to expand the middle-income population and redistribute wealth more effectively, especially in the face of stark rural disparity. In addition the government aims to increase education levels, expand pension coverage, and, in the midst of the pandemic, increase public health investment and the number of doctors and hospital beds relative to the population. Beijing seems increasingly wary of too rapid of a shift away from manufacturing – which makes sense in light of the steep drop in the manufacturing share of employment amid China’s shift away from export-dependency. In the thirteenth five-year plan, Beijing aimed to increase the service sector share of GDP from 50.5% to 56%. But in the latest draft plan it sets no target for growing services. Any implicit goal of 60% would be soft rather than hard. Given that manufacturing and services combined make up 93% of the economy, there is not much room to grow services further unless policymakers want to allow even faster de-industrialization. But the social and political risks of rapid de-industrialization are well known – both from the liquidation of the SOEs in the late 1990s and from the populist eruptions in the UK and US more recently. Beijing is likely to want to take a pause in shifting away from manufacturing. But this means that China’s exporting of deflation and large market share will persist and hence foreign protectionist sentiment will continue to grow. The fourteenth five-year plan ostensibly maintains the same ambitious targets for environmental improvement as in its predecessor, in terms of water and energy consumption, carbon emissions, pollution levels, renewable energy quotas, and quotas for arable land and forest coverage. But in reality some of these targets are likely to be set higher as Beijing has intensified its green policy agenda and is now aiming to hit peak carbon emissions by 2030. China aims to be a “net zero” carbon country by 2060. Doubling down on the shift away from fossil fuels will require an extraordinary policy push, given that China is still a heavily industrial economy and predominantly reliant on coal power. So environmental policy will be a critical area to watch when the final five-year plan is approved in March, as well as in future plans for the 2026-30 period. As was witnessed in recent years, ambitious environmental goals will be suspended when the economy slumps, which means that achieving carbon emissions goals will not be straightforward (Chart 9), but it is nevertheless a powerful economic policy theme and investment theme. Xi Jinping’s Vision: 2035 On The Way To 2049 At the nineteenth National Party Congress, the critical leadership rotation in 2017, Xi Jinping made it clear that he would stay in power beyond 2022 – eschewing the nascent attempt of his predecessors to set up a ten-year term limit – and establish 2035 as a midway point leading to the 2049 anniversary of the People’s Republic. There are strategic and political goals relevant to this 2035 vision – including speculation that it could be Xi’s target for succession or for reunification with Taiwan – but the most explicit goals are, as usual, economic. Chart 10Xi Jinping’s 2035 Goals Officially China is committing to descriptive rather than numerical targets. GDP per capita is to reach the level of “moderately developed countries.” However, in a separate explanation statement, Xi Jinping declares, “it is completely possible for China to double its total economy or per capita income by 2035.” In other words, China’s GDP is supposed to reach 200 trillion renminbi, while GDP per capita should surpass $20,000 by 2035, implying an annual growth rate of at least 4.73% (Chart 10). There is little reason to believe that Beijing will succeed as much in meeting future targets as it has in the past. In the past China faced steady final demand from the United States and the West and its task was to bring a known quantity of basic factors of production into operation, after lying underutilized for decades, which made for high growth rates and fairly predictable outcomes. In the future the sources of demand are not as reliable and China’s ability to grow will be more dependent on productivity enhancements and innovation that cannot be as easily created or predicted. The fourteenth five-year plan and Xi’s 2035 vision will attempt to tackle this productivity challenge head on. But restructuring and reform will advance intermittently, as Xi is unquestionably maintaining his predecessors’ commitment to stability above all. Outlook 2021: Back To The Tug Of War Of Stimulus And Reform The tug of war between economic stimulus and reform is on full display already in 2021 and will become by far the most important investment theme this year. If China tightens monetary and fiscal policy excessively in 2021, in the name of reform, it will undermine its own and the global economic recovery, dealing a huge negative surprise to the consensus in global financial markets that 2021 will be a year of strong growth, rebounding trade, a falling US dollar, and ebullient commodity prices. Our view is that Chinese policy tightening is a significant risk this year – it is not overrated – but that the government will ultimately ease policy as necessary and avoid what would be a colossal policy mistake of undercutting the economic recovery. We articulated this view late last year and have already seen it confirmed both in the Politburo’s conclusions at the annual economic meeting in December, and in the reemergence of COVID-19, which will delay further policy tightening for the time being. The pattern of the Xi administration thus far is to push forward domestic reforms until they run up against the limits of economic stability, and then to moderate and ease policy for the sake of recovery, before reinitiating the attack. Two key developments initially encouraged Xi to push forward with a new “assault phase of reform” in 2021: First, a new global business cycle is beginning, fueled by massive monetary and fiscal stimulus across the world (not only in China), which enables Xi to take actions that would drag on growth. Second, Xi Jinping has emerged from the US trade war stronger than ever at home. President Trump lost the election, giving warning to any future US president who would confront China with a frontal assault. The Biden administration’s priority is economic recovery, for the sake of the Democratic Party’s future as well as for the nation, and this limits Biden’s ability to escalate the confrontation with China, even though he will not revoke most of Trump’s actions. Biden’s predicament gives Beijing a window to pursue difficult domestic initiatives before the Biden administration is capable of turning its full attention to the strategic confrontation with China. The fact that Biden seeks to build a coalition of states first, and thus must spend a great deal of time on diplomacy with Europe and other allies, is another advantageous circumstance. China is courting and strengthening relations with Europe and those very allies so as to delay the formation of any effective coalition (Chart 11). Chart 11China Courts EU As Substitute For US Thus, prior to the latest COVID-19 spike, Beijing was clearly moving to tighten monetary and fiscal policy and avoid a longer stimulus overshoot that would heighten the country’s long-term financial risks and debt woes. This policy preference will continue to be a risk in 2021: Central government spending down: Emergency fiscal spending to deal with the pandemic will be reduced from 2020 levels and the budget deficit will be reined in. The Politburo’s chief economic planning event, the Central Economic Work Conference in December, resulted in a decision to maintain fiscal support but to a lesser degree. Fiscal policy will be “effective and sustainable,” i.e. still proactive but lower in magnitude (Chart 12). Local government spending down: The central government will try to tighten control of local government bond issuance. The issuance of new bonds will fall closer to 2019 levels after a 55% increase in 2020. New bonds provide funds for infrastructure and investment projects meant to soak up idle labor and boost aggregate demand. A cut back in these projects and new bonds will drag on the economy relative to last year (Chart 13). Chart 12China Pares Government Spending On The Margin Chart 13China Pares Local Government Spending Too Monetary policy tightening up: The People’s Bank of China aims to maintain a “prudent monetary policy” that is stable and targeted in 2021. The intention is to avoid any sharp change in policy. However, PBoC Governor Yi Gang admits that there will be some “reasonable adjustments” to monetary policy so that the growth of broad money (M2) and total social financing (total private credit) do not wildly exceed nominal GDP growth (which should be around 8%-10% in 2021). The risk is that excessive easiness in the current context will create asset bubbles. The implication is that credit growth will slow to 11%-12%. This is not slamming on the brakes but it is a tightening of credit policy. Macro-prudential regulation up: The People’s Bank is reasserting its intention to implement the new Macro-Prudential Assessment (MPA) framework designed to tackle systemic financial risk. The rollout of this reform paused last year due to the pandemic. A detailed plan of how the country’s various major financial institutions will adopt this new mechanism is expected in March. The implication is that Beijing is turning its attention back to mitigating systemic financial risks. This includes closer supervision of bank capital adequacy ratios and cross-border financing flows. New macro-prudential tools are also targeting real estate investment and potentially other areas. Larger established banks will have a greater allowance for property loans than smaller, riskier banks. At the same time, it is equally clear that Beijing will try to avoid over-tightening policy: The COVID outbreak discourages tightening: This outbreak has already been mentioned and will pressure leaders to pause further policy tightening at least until they have greater confidence in containment. The vaccine rollout process also discourages economic activity at first since nobody wants to go out and contract the disease when a cure is in sight. Local government financial support is still robust: Local governments will still need to issue refinancing bonds to deal with the mountain of debt coming into maturity and reduce the risk of widespread insolvency. In 2020, they issued more than 1.8 trillion yuan of refinancing bonds to cover about 88% of the 2 trillion in bonds coming due. In 2021, they will have to issue about 2.2 trillion of refinancing bonds to maintain the same refinancing rate for a larger 2.6 trillion yuan in bonds coming due (Table 2). Thus while Beijing is paring back its issuance of new bonds to fund new investment projects, it will maintain a high level of refinancing bonds to prevent insolvency from cascading and undermining the recovery. Table 2Local Government Debt Maturity Schedule Monetary policy will not be too tight: The People’s Bank’s open market operations in January so far suggest that it is starting to fine-tune its policies but that it is doing so in an exceedingly measured way so as not to create a liquidity squeeze around the traditionally tight-money period of Chinese New Year. The seven-day repo rate, the de facto policy interest rate, has already rolled over from last year’s peak. The takeaway is that while Beijing clearly intended to cut back on emergency monetary and fiscal support this year – and while Xi Jinping is clearly willing to impose greater discipline on the economy and financial system prior to the big political events of 2021-22 – nevertheless the lingering pandemic and fragile global environment will ensure a relatively accommodative policy for the first half of 2021 in order to secure the economic recovery. The underlying risk of policy tightening is still significant, especially in the second half of 2021 and in 2022, due to the underlying policy setting. Investment Takeaways The CNY-USD has experienced a tremendous rally in the wake of the US-China phase one trade deal last year and Beijing’s rapid bounce-back from the pandemic. The trade weighted renminbi is now trading just about at fair value (Chart 14). We closed our CNY-USD short recommendation and would stand aside for now. China’s current account surplus is still robust, real reform requires a fairly strong yuan, and the Biden administration will also expect China not to depreciate the currency competitively. Thus while we anticipate the CNY-USD to suffer a surprise setback when the market realizes that the US and China will continue to clash despite the end of the Trump administration, nevertheless we are no longer outright short the currency. Chinese investable stocks have rallied furiously on the stimulus last year as well as robust foreign portfolio inflows. The rally is likely overstretched at the moment as the COVID outbreak and policy uncertainties come to the fore. This is also true for Chinese stocks other than the high-flying technology, media, and telecom stocks (Chart 15). Domestic A-shares have rallied on the back of Alibaba executive Jack Ma’s reappearance even though the clear implication is that in the new era, the Communist Party will crack down on entrepreneurs – and companies like fintech firm Ant Group – that accumulate too much power (Chart 16). Chart 14Renminbi Fairly Valued Chart 15China: Investable Stocks Overbought Chart 16Communist Party, Jack Ma's Boss Chart 17Go Long Chinese Government Bonds Chinese government bond yields are back near their pre-COVID highs (though not their pre-trade war highs). Given the negative near-term backdrop – and the longer term challenges of restructuring and geopolitical risks over Taiwan and other issues that we expect to revive – these bonds present an attractive investment (Chart 17). Housekeeping: In addition to going long Chinese 10-year government bonds on a strategic time frame, we are closing our long Mexican industrials versus EM trade for a loss of 9.1%. We are still bullish on the Mexican peso and macro/policy backdrop but this trade was premature. We are also closing our long S&P health care tactical hedge for a loss of 1.8%. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Yushu Ma Research Associate yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Indeed the 2022 political reshuffle has already begun with several recent appointments of provincial Communist Party secretaries.

Special Report

Highlights Both the massive inventory accumulation and robust underlying consumption have been driving Chinese crude imports in recent years. Chinese crude oil import growth will decelerate in 2021 due to a slower pace in the country’s oil inventory accumulation. The country’s underlying crude oil consumption growth will remain robust this year, which will support a still positive growth in Chinese crude oil imports this year. Strong Chinese crude oil imports are positive to global oil prices this year. Feature The gap between China’s total crude oil supply and its domestic crude oil consumption has been widening in recent years, due to a massive buildup in Chinese crude oil inventory (Chart 1A and 1B). In fact, China’s crude oil inventories have quadrupled in the past five years, exceeding two billion barrels as of November 2020 and are equal to about 70% of OECD total inventory (Chart 2). Chart 1AA Massive Buildup In Chinese Crude Oil Inventory Chart 1BChina: Total Crude Oil Supply Growth Has Exceeded Its Domestic Consumption Growth In addition, China’s crude oil import growth has been outpacing domestic oil consumption growth, while domestic production remains stagnant (Chart 3). Chart 2Crude Oil Inventories In China Have Quadrupled In The Past Five Years Chart 3China: Crude Oil Import Growth Has Been Stronger Than Its Domestic Consumption Growth Will China maintain its strong crude oil import growth this year? How will the interplay between domestic consumption and imports evolve in 2021? We expect China’s crude oil consumption growth to remain solid in 2021, growing at an annual rate of about 6-7% and up from the 4.5% growth rate reached in 2020. However, China’s crude oil imports are likely to increase by 4-6% in 2021 from the previous year, slower than the 7.2% growth seen in 2020. The moderation in Chinese oil imports in 2021 will mainly be due to a slower pace of crude oil inventory buildup. Understanding The Surge In Crude Oil Inventory Chart 4China's Crude Oil Inventory Buildup: One Major Driver Behind Its Strong Imports Since 2016 The massive buildup in domestic crude oil inventory has been one major driving force behind the strong growth in China's crude oil imports since 2016 (Chart 4). As oil prices continue to rebound, and given China’s existing large oil inventories, we think the pace of inventory accumulation in China will slow in 2021. Therefore, growth in Chinese oil imports this year will likely moderate. China’s crude oil imports currently account for about 75% of the country’s total crude oil supply. Since China’s domestic crude oil production has been stagnant in the last decade, the fluctuations in Chinese crude oil imports are largely driven by the change in the country’s total demand, which includes both domestic consumption and changes in inventories. China’s crude oil import growth has significantly outpaced domestic consumption growth in the past five years, leading to a buildup in inventory. China’s crude oil inventory includes Commercial Petroleum Reserves (CPR), which are held by refiners and traders; and Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR), which are held by the government. Our Chinese crude oil inventory proxy1 was constructed based on the crude oil flow diagram shown in Chart 5.  Chart 5How Did We Derive Our Chinese Crude Oil Inventory Proxy? Our research has suggested that since 2016, most of the buildup has occurred in CPR. This is due to the following: The government in 2015 required refiners to keep their inventory level at no less than their 15-days requirement for operation use. Chinese refinery capacity had been expanded at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.8% during 2016-2019. These existing and new refineries have been building their inventories to meet government regulations in the past several years.  In addition, the government started to allow independent refineries to import crude oil by setting a quota in mid-2015, and the import quotas have been increased every year. In 2020, the quota reached 184.6 million tons, equaling to about 3,700 kbpd, nearly five times the quota in 2015. The total increase in imports of these independent refiners over the past five years was about 2,950 kbpd, accounting for 70% of the increase in the country’s total crude oil imports during the same period. Chart 6China: Rising Run Rates For Its Independent Refineries Independent refiners import crude oil for both refinery purposes and to meet the new inventory requirement. Over the last several years, the increased amount of quota has improved Chinese independent refiners’ profitability and refinery capacity run rate, as the import quota allows these private sector refiners to save operating costs by cutting out the “middleman” and by actively managing their own feedstocks. For example, Shandong has the largest number of independent refineries among all provinces. Chart 6 shows that the run rate of the region’s independent refineries has surged since 2016, from about 40% in that year to 75% this year. In addition, since 2016, the fluctuations in their run rates have become much more closely correlated with global oil prices.   Commercial crude oil users have much larger physical reserve space than the SPR. Notably, they tend to sharply increase their imports when crude oil prices are low.  In addition, inventory accumulation often occurs when credit/financing is available with low costs and refiners expect higher prices ahead. Meanwhile, our research shows the SPR development has been slowing considerably in recent years, resulting in little inventory buildup in SPR. The last time the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported the SPR data was December 29, 2017. It showed the SPR was about 37.73 million tons by mid-2017, not far from the country’s target of 40 million tons for the first two phases2 of SPR. This suggests that the country was at least close to finishing its second phase of the SPR in 2017. Since then, there has been little information about the third phase of the SPR progress. We have only been able to find two pieces of news on that subject, and both suggest the construction of the third phase of SPR has been stagnant, and the planning of two sites only started in 2019. As the average construction time for projects in the second phase of SPR was about four years, we do not think these sites were completed in 2020. The NBS data shows that even during the period of mid-2015 and mid-2017, the SPR had only increased by 234 kbpd, about 117 kbpd per year. In comparison, the Chinese total crude oil inventory increased by 600-700 kbpd per year in 2016 and 2017. Clearly, SPR only accounted for a small share of the Chinese total crude oil inventory. Looking forward, we expect a much slower pace of crude oil inventory buildup in China in 2021. Our forecast is based on the following factors: Current Chinese crude oil inventories (CPR and SPR combined) are already in the upper range when comparing the OECD countries (Chart 7). Although the IEA data shows that Japan and Korea have oil stocks of 200 days and 193 days of their respective crude oil net imports, Chinese oil inventories are currently equivalent to 195 days of crude oil net imports and much higher than the 90 days the IEA requires OECD countries to hold. With Brent oil prices having risen by a lot from the April 2020 trough and elevated domestic crude oil inventories, both government and commercial users will likely slow their purchases of overseas oil for inventory accumulation. In comparison, Chinese crude oil inventory accumulation growth slowed sharply in 2018 when Brent oil prices rose by 95% from their trough in mid-2017 (Chart 8), A significant portion of Chinese oil inventory buildup was accumulated over the past five years. At 1,170 kbpd, the largest annual accumulation was in 2020, higher than the 700-900 kbpd fill per year during 2017-2019. Chart 7China's Crude Oil Inventory: No Longer Low Chart 8China: Rising Oil Prices Will Likely Slow Down Its Pace Of Crude Oil Inventory Accumulation We do not expect the fast inventory accumulation of 2020 to repeat in 2021. Instead, a mean-reversal in the inventory accumulation pace will likely occur. Table 1Our Estimates Of The Scale Of Chinese Crude Oil Inventory In 2021 Our baseline estimate based on China’s 2021 import quota and refinery capacity3 is that Chinese crude oil inventory will increase to 207-210 days of Chinese crude oil imports by this year-end, up from 192 days at last year-end (Table 1). With already-elevated crude oil inventory, the pace of the inventory accumulation in China will be slower than last year. Bottom Line: After a massive buildup over recent years, the pace of inventory accumulation in China will slow in 2021 and probably onwards as well. As a result, Chinese oil import growth will converge with the pace of domestic consumption growth. China’s Robust Crude Oil Consumption Growth In 2021 Chart 9China: Resilient Domestic Crude Oil Consumption Growth In 2020 Despite the pandemic outbreak, last year’s underlying consumption of crude oil in China was resilient at a year-on-year growth of 4.5%, even though the rate was smaller than the average growth of 6-7% in 2018-2019 (Chart 9).  The growth in oil consumption last year was mainly from the non-transportation sector. The output of non-transportation fuels, including fuel oil, naphtha, petroleum coke, and petroleum pitch, are mostly having impressive growth, suggesting strong consumption in sectors like chemical products, steel sector and infrastructure (Chart 10). For example, naphtha is the primary feedstock for ethylene production. Ethylene is the building block for a vast range of chemicals from plastics to antifreeze solutions and solvents. Transportation fuel consumption was weak in 2020, with the output of major transportation fuels including gasoline, diesel oil and kerosene in contraction (Chart 11). Chart 10Strong Consumption In Non-Transportation Sectors in 2020 Last Year Chart 11Transportation Fuel Consumption Was Weak In 2020 In 2021, we expect the underlying consumption growth of crude oil in China to increase to 6-7% from last year’s 4.5%. This will be in line with its growth in both 2018 and 2019 (Chart 9 on page 7). First, the consumption of transportation fuels will likely recover this year. Transportation fuels are the largest consuming sector for Chinese petroleum products. Based on British Petroleum data, gasoline, diesel and kerosene accounted for 55% of total Chinese oil consumption in 2019. We expect the transportation fuel consumption growth to be stronger (i.e., 6-7%) than its five-year compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.1% during 2015-2019. Chart 12China's Automobile Sales Correlated Well With Its Crude Oil Imports Automobile sales in China correlated well with the country’s crude oil imports (Chart 12, top panel). Despite a year-on-year contraction of 2% for the whole year of 2020, automobile sales had been strong with a double-digit growth nearly every month since May. Only 5% of these automobiles are new energy vehicles (NEV). About 80% of them are gasoline cars and 15% are diesel automobiles. Annual total car sales still account for about 9% of total existing automobiles (Chart 12, bottom panel). This means a 6-7% growth in the transportation consumption of passenger cars and commercial cars is very possible in 2021. The number of airports and airplanes are still on the uptrend in China. The CAGR of Chinese kerosene consumption rose from 10.1% during 2010-2014 to 10.6% during 2015-2019. This suggests that the kerosene consumption growth in China could reach 11% in 2021. Domestic gasoline and diesel prices are near decade lows (Chart 13). This will encourage consumption of these fuels. Second, the oil consumption growth in the industry sector will likely be larger than the 5% in the recent years (Chart 14). Based on the NBS data, the industry sector accounts for about 36% of China’s petroleum product consumption. Chart 13Low Domestic Gasoline And Diesel Prices Encourage Fuel Consumption This Year Chart 14Robust Oil Consumption Growth In The Industry Sector In 2021 Third, infrastructure spending and property market construction will slow in 2H2021 given the credit, fiscal, and regulatory tightening that has been taking place. However, construction only accounts for about 6% of Chinese petroleum product consumption.  Given all of this, achieving a 6-7% underlying consumption growth of crude oil in China this year is possible. Taking into consideration the slower pace of inventory buildup, we expect China’s crude oil imports to increase by 4-6% in 2021 over the previous year, slower than last year’s 7.2% growth. Bottom Line: The underlying consumption growth of crude oil in China is likely to increase to 6-7% in 2021 from last year’s 4.5%, providing solid support to China’s crude oil imports. What About Other Factors Affecting Chinese Crude Oil Imports? Currently, both domestic crude oil production and net exports of Chinese petroleum products exports are small contributors to the growth of Chinese crude oil imports. However, as the Chinese petroleum export sector becomes more competitive in the global market, it will likely take a bigger share of China’s crude oil imports going forward. Chart 15Net Exports Of Chinese Petroleum Products Are On The Uptrend We expect domestic crude oil output to be stagnant in 2021. The breakeven prices for most domestic oil fields are US$50-60 per barrel. Without a considerable rally in oil prices, the total domestic crude oil output is unlikely to pick up. Moreover, due to the massive crude oil inventory buildup in recent years, Chinese oil producers may constrain their output. In this scenario, a reduction in domestic crude oil output by 1-2% in 2021 from 2020 is possible. Nonetheless, this will only increase China’s oil imports by a small amount of about 40-80 kbpd. The net exports of Chinese petroleum products are on the uptrend (Chart 15). Currently net exports of Chinese petroleum products account for only about 6% of Chinese crude oil imports.  However, Chinese refineries are increasingly competitive in global gasoline and diesel markets, since most of the new refineries in the country are high technology equipped and highly efficient. In addition, last July, China started issuing export licenses to private refiners, and we expect the trend to continue. According to Bloomberg, China is set to surpass the US to become the world’s largest oil refiner in 2021. As such, in the coming years we expect rising Chinese exports of petroleum products will demand more imports of crude oil.  We expect Chinese petroleum products net exports to rise by 100-150 kbpd in 2021 15-20% growth from last year), which may increase our estimate of China’s year-on-year crude oil import growth from 4-6% to 5-7% in 2021. However, increasing Chinese petroleum product exports does not increase global final demand for oil. It cannot be viewed as a fundamentally bullish factor for oil prices. Bottom Line: Stagnant domestic crude oil output and rising net exports of Chinese petroleum products will also lead to an increase of China’s crude oil imports.  Investment Implications Chart 16China: An Increasingly Important Factor For Global Oil Demand Strong crude oil imports by China have supported global oil prices in recent years. China has become an increasingly important driving force of global oil demand. Its oil imports currently make up about 12% of global oil demand, more than doubled from a decade ago (Chart 16). The country’s crude oil imports will continue expanding this year. Even at a slower rate, the robust oil consumption and imports from China will remain a positive factor for global oil prices in 2021. Beyond 2021, however, the country’s crude oil import growth outlook is facing increasing downside risks. Demand that is due to inventory accumulation is ultimately finite and non-recurring. Moreover, more oil accumulations in 2021 on top of China’s already elevated oil inventories may weigh on Chinese oil imports beyond 2021. In the meantime, US crude oil producers may benefit from continuing strong purchases from China. In 2020, China significantly ramped up its crude oil imports from the US, as the country has pledged to boost purchases of US energy products under the phase one trade deal signed with President Trump in January 2020. Chart 17Chinese Imports Of US Crude Oil May Continue To Rise In 2021 In 2020, Chinese imports of US crude oil in volume terms were 155% higher from a year before (Chart 17, top panel). Its share of total Chinese crude oil imports also spiked from 1-2% in late 2019 to 7-8% in the past several months (Chart 17, bottom panel). In the meantime, China’s share of US crude oil export also jumped from 4.6% in 2019 to 14.7% last year. In 2021, our baseline view is that China will want to show goodwill to the newly elected Biden administration by continuing to boost its crude oil purchase from the US. This will benefit US crude oil producers. However, if China buys more from the US, it may buy less from other countries.   Ellen JingYuan He  Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1By deducting crude oil used in refineries and in direct final consumption from the total supply, we derived the flow of inventory and the level of changes in inventory. By using the cumulative value of the flow inventory data, we were able to derive the stock of inventory. We assume the initial inventory in 2006 was zero. This assumption is reasonable as the first fill of the SPR was in 2007 and the stock of CPR was extremely low at that time as well. In addition, based on the data from the National Bureau of Statistics, we found out that the direct final consumption of crude oil without any transformation only accounted for about 1-2% of total supply. 2 In 2004, the government planned three phases of SPR construction, targeting 10-12 million tons of crude oil SPR for the first phase, 28 million tons for the second phase, and another 28 million tons for the third phase. 3The import quota for independent refiners in 2021 has been increased by 20% (about 823 kbpd), and the country’s refinery capacity will expand at about 500 kbpd per year over 2021-2025. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations