Asia

Executive Summary China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic A greater-than-expected contraction in manufacturing and construction in China – evidenced by the latest PMI and home sales data – will keep pressure on copper prices. Higher inflation will continue to drive the cost of labor, fuels and materials higher. Lower copper prices and higher input costs will weaken margins, leading to reduced capex. This also will put pressure on the rate of spending on projects already sanctioned. Payouts to shareholders – buybacks and dividends – will fall, reducing the appeal of miners’ equities. Debt-service costs will rise as interest rates are pushed higher by central banks. Civil unrest in critically important metals-producing provinces is forcing some miners to suspend production guidance. This will be exacerbated in Chile by changing tax regimes, which likely will reduce capex as well. Bottom Line: As global demand for copper increases with the renewable-energy transition and higher arms spending in Europe, miners’ ability to expand supply is being seriously challenged. Falling prices and rising costs – along with higher tax burdens and civil unrest in key mining provinces – are forcing copper miners to lower production and capex guidance, which will redound to the detriment of supply growth. With demand expected to double by 2030-35, copper prices will have to move higher to keep capex flowing to support supply growth. We remain long the XME ETF as the best way to express our bullish, decade-long view. Feature Just as the world is scrambling to develop additional energy supplies in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, copper supplies – the critical element of the renewable-energy buildout – are being squeezed by an unusual convergence of fundamental, financial and social factors. Chart 1China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic Firstly, copper demand is weak, which, all else equal, is suppressing prices. This is largely down to China’s zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy, and uncertainty over whether the EU will be pushed into a massive recession, following the cutoff of its natural gas supplies from Russia. These are two of the three major pillars of the global economy, and their economies are entwined via trade in goods. China’s COVID-19 policy is hammering its critically important property market – sales were down almost 40% y/y in July – and forcing a contraction in manufacturing. Construction represents ~ 30% of total copper demand in China. Manufacturing is contracting, based on China’s official July PMI report, which showed the index fell below 50 to 49.0 for July.1 Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyOne Hot Mess: EU Energy Policy China accounts for more than half of global copper demand, and, because of its zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy, was the only major economy to register a year-on-year contractions in copper demand throughout the pandemic up to the present (Chart 1). The EU accounts for ~ 12.5% of global copper demand, which we expect will continue to be supported by the bloc’s renewable-energy and defense buildouts.2 We noted in earlier research the odds of the EU going into recession remain high as the bloc scrambles to prepare for winter, in the wake of its attempts to replace its dependence on Russian natural gas supplies.3 We continue to expect the EU will avoid a major recession, and that it will be able to navigate this transition, leaving it on a better energy footing in subsequent years.4 Lower Copper Prices Will Hurt Capex Chart 2Copper Price Rally Fades Copper Price Rally Fades Copper Price Rally Fades After bottoming in March 2020 at $2.12/lb on the COMEX, copper prices staged a 125% rally that ended in March of this year. This was due to the post-pandemic reopening of most economies ex-China, which was accompanied by massive fiscal and monetary stimulus that super-charged consumer demand. Copper prices have since fallen ~33% from their March highs on the back of a substantial weakening of demand resulting from China’s zero-tolerance COVID policy and a concerted global effort to rein in the inflation caused by governments’ largess (Chart 2). Most year-end 2021 capex expectations for 2022 and into the future among copper miners were drawn up prior to the price collapse in June. After that, fear of central-bank policy mistakes – chiefly over-tightening of monetary policy that pushes the global economy into recession – and weak EM demand took prices from ~ $4.55/lb down to less than $3.20/lb by mid-July. A strong USD also pushed demand lower during this time. Chart 3DRC Offsets Chile, Peru Weakness Copper Capex Under Pressure Copper Capex Under Pressure Following the copper-price rout, miners are re-thinking production goals, dividend policy and capex. Social and governance issues also are contributing to weaker copper output. Rio Tinto, for example, notified markets it would shave $500mm from its $8 billion 2022 capex budget. For 1H22, Rio cut its dividend to $2.67/share from $5.61/share in 1H21. Elsewhere, Glencore said copper output from its Katanga mine in the DRC now is expected to come in 15% lower this year, at 1.06mm MT, owing to geological difficulties. Separately, output guidance for Chinese miner MMG Ltd’s Las Bambas mine in Peru has been suspended, following a 60% drop in production. The company expected it would be producing up to 320k tons this year. Civil unrest at Las Bambas has been ongoing since production started in 2016, according to Reuters. Big producers like Chile and Peru – accounting for ~ 35% of global ore production – along with the DRC face multiple challenges. Chile accounts for ~ 25% of global copper ore production. Its output fell ~ 6% in 2Q22 vs year-earlier output due to falling ore quality, water-supply constraints, and rising input costs (Chart 3). Chile’s government expects copper ore output to decline 3.4% y/y in 2022, with many of the country’s premier mines faltering (Chart 4). Chart 4Chile Expecting Lower Copper Output Copper Capex Under Pressure Copper Capex Under Pressure Chile also is proposing to increase taxes and royalties, to raise money for its budget. However, this may have the effect of driving away investment in the country’s copper mining industry. Fitch notes, “Increased costs will decrease mining cash flows and discourage new mining investments in Chile, favoring the migration of investors to other copper mining districts.”5 BHP Billiton, on que, said it will reconsider further investment in Chile, if the new legislation is approved. Renewables Buildout Will Widen Copper Deficit Markets appear to be trading without regard for the huge increase in copper supply that will be required for the global renewable-energy transition, to say nothing of the upcoming re-arming of the EU and continued military spending by the US and China. In our modeling of supply-demand balances, we move beyond our usual real GDP-based estimates of demand, which estimates the cyclical copper demand, and include assumptions for the demand the green-energy transition will contribute. Hence, this additional copper demand for green energy needs to be added to the copper demand forecast generated by the model. Using projections for global supply taken from the Resource and Energy Quarterly published by the Australian Government’s Department of Industry, Science and Resources, we estimate there will be a physical refined copper deficit of 224k tons in 2022 and 135K tons next year (Chart 5). Among other things, we are assuming refined copper demand will double by 2030 and reach 50mm tons/yr by then. This is a somewhat more aggressive assumption than S&P Global’s estimate of demand doubling by 2035. If we assume refined copper production is 2% lower than the REQ’s estimate, we expect the physical deficit in the refined copper market rise to a ~ 532k-ton deficit in 2022 and ~ 677k-ton deficit in 2023. These results including renewables demand highlight the need to not only account for cyclical demand but also the new demand that will be apparent as the EU, the US and China kick their renewables investments into high gear. Importantly, this kick-off is occurring with global commodity-exchange inventories still more than ~ 35% below year-ago levels (Chart 6). Chart 5Coppers Deficit Will Narrow On Lower Demand Coppers Deficit Will Narrow On Lower Demand Coppers Deficit Will Narrow On Lower Demand ​​​​​​ Chart 6Exchange Inventories Remain Exceptionally Low Exchange Inventories Remain Exceptionally Low Exchange Inventories Remain Exceptionally Low ​​​​​​ Investment Implications Copper prices will have to move higher to keep capex flowing to support supply growth normal cyclical demand and renewable-energy demand will require over coming decades. Falling prices and rising costs – along with higher tax burdens and civil unrest in key mining provinces – are forcing copper miners to lower production and capex guidance, which will redound to the detriment of supply growth. This situation cannot persist unless governments call off their renewable-energy transition, and, in the case of the EU, their efforts to re-arm Europe’s militaries following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. We remain bullish base metals, particularly copper. We remain long the XME ETF as the best way to express this decade-long view. Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish OPEC 2.0 agreed a token increase in oil production Wednesday of 100k b/d, partly as a sop to the US following President Biden’s visit to the Kingdom last month. KSA will be producing close to 11mm b/d in 2H22. We have argued this is about all KSA will be willing to put on the market, in order to maintain some spare capacity in the event of another exogenous shock. OPEC 2.0 spare capacity likely falls close to 1.5mm b/d in 2023 vs. an average of 3mm b/d this year, which will limit the capacity of core OPEC 2.0 – KSA and the UAE – to backstop unforeseen production losses. Separately, the US EIA reported total US stocks of crude oil and refined products rose 3.5mm barrels (ex SPR inventory). Demand for refined products in the US was down 28mm barrels in the week ended 29 July, or 4mm b/d. We continue to expect prices to average $110/bbl this year and $117/bbl next year (Chart 7). Base Metals: Bullish China flipped from a net importer of refined zinc in 2021 to a net exporter for the first half of 2022, despite a high export tax on the metal. This is indicative of the premium Western zinc prices are commanding over the domestic price. Chinese zinc demand has fallen, following reduced manufacturing activity and an ailing property sector. Thursday’s Politburo meeting did little to encourage markets of a Chinese rebound later this year. A subdued Chinese recovery, along with European zinc smelters operating at reduced capacity, if at all, could see this reversal in trade flow perpetuate for the rest of the year. Precious Metals: Bullish As BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy highlighted, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan will increase tensions between the US and China but will not lead to war. For now. Increased uncertainty normally is good for gold and its rival, the USD. While geopolitical uncertainty from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine initially buoyed the yellow metal, gold has since dropped below the USD 1800/oz level. The greenback was the main beneficiary from the war (Chart 8). It is yet to be seen how this round of geopolitical risk will impact gold and USD, with the backdrop of increasing odds of a US recession and a hawkish Fed. Chart 7 Brent Backwardation Will Steepen Brent Backwardation Will Steepen Chart 8 Gold Prices Going Down Along With USD Gold Prices Going Down Along With USD   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see China’s factory activity contracts unexpectedly in July as Covid flares up published by cnbc.com on July 31, 2022. The PMI summary noted contractions in oil, coal and metals smelting industries led the index’s decline. 2     Please see One Hot Mess: EU Energy Policy, which we published on May 26, 2022, for additional discussion. 3     Please see Copper Prices Decouple From Fundamentals, which we published on July 7, 2022. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4     Please see Energy Security Rolls Over EU's ESG Agenda published on July 28, 2022. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5     Please see Proposed Tax Reform Weakens Cost Positions for Chilean Miners (fitchratings.com), published by Fitch Ratings on July 7, 2022.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022

Executive Summary Non-Commodity Enterprises: No Profit Expansion For 12 Years Flat Profits For Non-Commodity Enterprises Flat Profits For Non-Commodity Enterprises The past decade has seen a deterioration in the financial performance metrics of industrial Chinese companies. Declining efficiency of investments, rising labor compensation and slowing productivity growth will constitute formidable headwinds to the long-term profitability of China’s industrial sector. Potential deleveraging by local governments, companies and households will cap revenue growth for enterprises and, hence, weigh on their profitability. High commodity prices in the past 18 months have improved profitability and financial metrics for commodity producers. These strengths will reverse as commodity prices sink in the coming months. Corporate earnings are set to disappoint in 2H. Bottom Line: We maintain a neutral stance on Chinese onshore stocks and an underweight stance on investable stocks in a global equity portfolio. In absolute terms, risks to Chinese shares prices are to the downside. ​​​​Among Chinese industrial companies, underweight commodity producers and overweight food & beverage, autos and utilities.   The data for this report for industrial enterprises, which are sourced from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), encompass state-owned and holding enterprises (SOEs) and other forms of ownership, including private ones. It covers both listed and non-listed companies. The sectors included are construction materials, steel, non-ferrous metals, energy, coal, machinery, auto, tech hardware, food & beverage and utilities. An analysis based on this dataset shows that China’s corporate profitability and efficiency ratios have experienced a prolonged structural downturn since the early 2010s (Chart 1 and 2). Chart 1Chinese Industrial Companies: Structural Deterioration in Productivity... Chinese Industrial Companies: Structural Deterioration in Productivity... Chinese Industrial Companies: Structural Deterioration in Productivity... Chart 2… And Operational Efficiency ...And Operational Efficiency ...And Operational Efficiency Chart 3Cyclical Improvements Within Structural Downtrend Cyclical Improvements Within Structural Downtrend Cyclical Improvements Within Structural Downtrend In the past 10 years, these measures improved only modestly during recovery periods and stumbled during downturns (Chart 3). The structural deterioration in corporate profitability from 2011 onward has followed structural improvements from the late 1990s to 2010. Beyond cyclical upswings, China's corporate profitability will likely continue to face structural headwinds. Declining efficiency of investments, rising labor compensation and slowing productivity growth will constitute formidable headwinds to the long run profitability of China’s industrial sector. Furthermore, potential deleveraging by local governments, companies and households will curtail revenue growth for enterprises and, hence, weigh on profitability. Investigating The Financial Performance Of Industrial Enterprises Our analysis of corporates’ financial ratios shows the following: Corporate leverage: The total liabilities (debt)-to-sales ratio rose sharply from 2011 until 2021. However, the leverage ratio has declined in the past 18 months. A close examination suggests that the descent in the debt-to-sales ratio has been due to surging revenues of resource producing companies propelled by rising commodity prices. Chart 4 illustrates that the debt-to-sales ratio has dropped substantially for commodity producers, but much less so for other industrial companies. In the case of non-commodity industrial enterprises, the leverage ratio has not declined much because nominal sales have been lackluster. As resource prices continue to drop, revenues of commodity companies will be devastated, and their debt-to-sales ratios will spike. The thesis that corporate leverage has not yet dropped in China is corroborated by data on all companies. The country’s corporate leverage remains the highest worldwide (Chart 5). Chart 4The Decline In Debt-To-Sales Ratio For Commodity Producers Was Largely Due to Surging Commodity Prices The Decline In Debt-To-Sales Ratio For Commodity Producers Was Largely Due to Surging Commodity Prices The Decline In Debt-To-Sales Ratio For Commodity Producers Was Largely Due to Surging Commodity Prices Chart 5China's Corporate Leverage Remains The Highest In the World China's Corporate Leverage Remains The Highest In the World China's Corporate Leverage Remains The Highest In the World Chart 6Corporates' Debt servicing Ability Has Been propelled by falling interest rates Corporates' Debt Servicing Ability Has Improved Due To Lower Interest Rates Corporates' Debt Servicing Ability Has Improved Due To Lower Interest Rates Debt servicing: Even though debt levels of industrial companies remain elevated, their interest coverage ratios – operating profits-to-interest expense – have improved since late 2020. For all industries, interest expenses have dropped substantially because of falling interest rates (Chart 6). On the margin, this has also helped industrials’ profit margins.   Efficiency: Asset turnover (sales/assets), inventory turnover (sales/inventory) and receivables turnover (sales/receivables), have all have sunk in the past 10 years, as shown in Chart 2. Lower turnover indicates falling efficiency. Coal, steel and non-ferrous metals have been the only sectors experiencing an improvement in inventory turnover due to China’s capacity reduction campaign. Meanwhile, there has been no improvement in inventory turnover for non-commodity enterprises.   Profit margins: Net profit margins for industrial corporates have recently risen slightly. However, the entire improvement in industrial profit margins is attributable to commodity producers. With the exception of commodity producing sectors, there has not been any upturn in operating profit margins and/or net profit margins (Chart 7). Rising corporate income taxes from 2011 to 2020 were one of the reasons worsening profitability (Chart 8). Chart 7Improvement In Industrial Profit Margins Is Attributable To Commodity Producers Improvement In Industrial Profit Margins Is Attributable To Commodity Producers Improvement In Industrial Profit Margins Is Attributable To Commodity Producers Chart 8Rising Corporate Income Taxes Have Contributed The Divergency Between GPM And Net Profit Margin Corporate Tax Burden Rose From 2010 To 2020 Corporate Tax Burden Rose From 2010 To 2020 Profitability: The return on assets (RoA) and the return on equity (RoE) for industrial corporates have dwindled during the past decade (Chart 1 above). The spike in commodity prices in the past two years has helped profitability of commodity producers, but this is about to reverse. A DuPont analysis1 illustrates that the downturn in corporate profitability was driven by poor operating efficiency and a lack of improvement in net profit margins. Chart 9 shows that the profitability of non-commodity producers has worsened dramatically during the past 10 years. After more than a decade-long structural downturn, the RoA and RoE for commodity producers have recently strengthened along with asset turnovers and net profit margins (Chart 10). However, the commodity bonanza is over for now and profitability measures of resource companies are set to worsen significantly.2 Chart 9A DuPont Analysis: Non-Commodity Enterprises A DuPont Analysis: Non-Commodity Enterprises A DuPont Analysis: Non-Commodity Enterprises Chart 10A DuPont Analysis: Commodity Enterprises A DuPont Analysis: Commodity Enterprises A DuPont Analysis: Commodity Enterprises Bottom Line: The past decade has seen a deterioration in the financial performance metrics of industrial companies. The profitability of corporates has undergone a structural decline along with a prolonged slump in operating efficiency.  High commodity prices in the past 18 months have ameliorated profitability and efficiency parameters for commodity producers. Nevertheless, these improvements will vanish as commodity prices fall materially in the coming months. Structural Headwinds To Corporate Profitability The following factors will weigh on China’s corporate profitability in the long term: 1. Demographics and rising labor costs: A shrinking workforce since mid-2010s has led to higher wages that have weighed on the corporate sector’s profitability (Chart 11). This dynamic is also confirmed by rising labor compensation as a share of non-financial corporates’ value added, as illustrated in Chart 12. Chart 11China: Shrinking Labor Force China: Shrinking Labor Force China: Shrinking Labor Force Chart 12Labor Compensation As A Share Of Corporate Revenues Labor Compensation As A Share Of Corporate Revenues Labor Compensation As A Share Of Corporate Revenues In China, blue-collar labor shortages and upward pressures on wages will likely intensify in the coming decade. A rapid decline in the population’s natural growth rate with the third lowest fertility rate in the world (below Japan) foreshadows a decline in China’s working age population which started in 2015.  2. Common prosperity policies: The share of labor compensation in GDP has risen since 2011 at the expense of the share of corporate profits (Chart 13). China’s common prosperity policies will only reinforce this trend. These policies will encourage enterprises to assume more social duties, distributing a larger share of profits to society at the expense of shareholders. Chart 13Labor's Share Will Continue Rising In China's National Income Labor's Share Will Continue Rising In China's National Income Labor's Share Will Continue Rising In China's National Income Chart 14Output Per Unit Of Capex Is Falling Output Per Unit Of Capex Is Falling Output Per Unit Of Capex Is Falling 3. Declining efficiency of investments: A deteriorating output-to-capital ratio  indicates capital misallocation or falling efficiency (Chart 14). When a nation attempts to invest substantially for a long time, capital will likely be misallocated and the return on new investment will be low. This will drag down the overall return on capital. Falling efficiency ultimately entails lower productivity. 4. Slowing productivity growth: China’s productivity growth has downshifted, and total factor productivity growth slipped again recently. Notably, total factor productivity – a measure of productivity calculated by dividing economy-wide total production by the weighted average of inputs – has contributed less and less to China’s real GDP growth in the past decade. It is unrealistic to expect that China will reverse the downward trend in productivity growth in the next few years. 5. Deleveraging by companies and households: China’s corporate sector continues to face deleveraging pressures. Although some industrial enterprises underwent deleveraging in recent years, the country’s overall corporate debt is still very elevated. Remarkably, Chinese corporate debt as a share of nominal GDP is the highest in the world, as shown in Chart 5. China’s households are reducing debt. Depressed household income growth and deflating home prices have curbed borrowing. Deleveraging by households heralds weaker consumption, which is negative for corporates revenues. Bottom Line: Rising labor compensation and declining efficiency of investments constitute formidable headwinds to the profitability of China’s industrial sector. Moreover, the secular outlook of corporates’ profitability is also vulnerable to lower productivity growth and weaker top-line growth due deleveraging among companies and households. The Cyclical Outlook In our report two weeks ago, we discussed how China’s business cycle recovery in the second half of this year will be more U rather than V shaped. Both sluggish domestic demand and contracting external demand for Chinese exports will curb the rebound of the industrial sector in 2H. Industrial earnings are set to disappoint.  Chart 15Non-Commodity Enterprises: No Profit Expansion For 12 Years Flat Profits For Non-Commodity Enterprises Flat Profits For Non-Commodity Enterprises Manufacturing producers have not been able to fully pass on higher input prices to consumers given weak demand. This weakness together with elevated commodity prices has led to a substantial profit divergence between upstream and mid- and downstream industries since late 2020 (Chart 15).  However, upstream commodity producers face the headwind of commodity price deflation. At the margin, weakening resource prices will benefit mid- and downstream industries that use commodities. However, their revenue growth will remain fragile due to subdued domestic and external demand and a lack of pricing power. The tight correlation between industrial profits and raw material prices reinforces the importance of commodity prices as a driver of China’s industrial profit cycles Therefore, if commodity prices drop meaningfully in the second half of this year, then overall industrial profits in China will suffer markedly. Chart 16The share of loss-making industrial enterprise ventures has Rocketed The Share of Loss-Making Industrial Enterprises Has Been Surging The Share of Loss-Making Industrial Enterprises Has Been Surging Furthermore, overcapacity and operational inefficiencies persist despite supply-side reforms and a capacity reduction campaign implemented by China’s authorities. Chart 16 demonstrates that the share of loss-making industrial enterprise ventures has soared to 24%, implying capital misallocation.  With a further rising share of enterprises making losses as commodity prices plunge, the ability of companies to service debt will deteriorate and hence banks will experience climbing non-performing loans. Bottom Line: China’s recovery in the second half of this year will be more U than V shaped. Corporate earnings are set to disappoint in 2H. Investment Strategy The gloomy outlook for corporate profitability does not bode well for the performance of Chinese stocks. Chinese A-shares are struggling to bottom on the back of shaky economic fundamentals, while investable stocks are cheap for a reason. We maintain a neutral stance on Chinese onshore stocks and an underweight stance on investable stocks in a global equity portfolio. Lower profitability and return on equity have ramifications for the valuations of China’s industrial companies. Remarkably, China’s industrial profits have been flat in the past 12 years (Chart 15 above). That is a reason why many Chinese stocks have been de-rated. Among A-share industrial companies, sectors with higher profitability are coal, non-ferrous metals, auto, construction materials and food & beverage. However, coal, non-ferrous metals and construction materials are pro-cyclical sectors, and their profit growth is positively correlated with economic growth, which is facing downward pressure at least through the end of this year. In addition, resources and commodity plays are vulnerable in the next 6 to 12 months. We recommend to underweight these sectors.  Within the Chinese equity universe, we recommend overweighting autos, food & beverage, and utilities sectors. Food & beverage and utilities are interest rate-sensitive sectors, which will continue to benefit from lower onshore bond yields. In addition, utilities sector’s profit margin and earnings will improve as coal prices decline. The auto sector will gain an advantage from China’s stimulus for auto purchases, especially for new energy vehicles.   Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 The DuPont analysis breaks down return on equity in three distinct elements: net profit margin, operational efficiency, and leverage. This analysis enables to identify how various drivers impact return on equity. 2Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Global Copper Market: No Bottom Yet," dated July 27, 2022, and Emerging Markets Strategy Report "A Cocktail Of Falling Oil Prices And Surging US Wages," dated July 21, 2022, available at bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations

Executive Summary Biden Can Take Risks Ahead Of Midterms The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis News reports suggest House Speaker Nancy Pelosi will travel to Taiwan and meet with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in the coming days. China has promised military counter-measures if she visits. Structural factors suggest US-China tensions over Taiwan could explode: China’s reversion to autocracy and hawkish foreign policy, Taiwan’s assertion of autonomy, and the US’s political instability and foreign policy reactiveness. Cyclical factors also suggest that tensions could escalate: China’s instability in the wake of Covid-19, the ramifications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the budding Russo-Chinese alliance, the Biden administration’s domestic political vulnerability, and the Xi administration’s domestic political vulnerability. In particular, Xi cannot back down. A diplomatic crisis or military showdown is likely in the short run but not yet a full-scale war. Taiwan is harder to invade than Ukraine, the US is not attempting a radical boost to Taiwan’s military, Taiwan is not moving toward formal independence, and the Chinese economy is not yet collapsing beyond all hope. However, over the long run we fear that a Taiwan war is more likely than not. Tactically investors should prefer government bonds to equities, US equities to global, defensive sectors to cyclicals, and safe havens to risky assets. Investors should short Chinese and Taiwanese currencies and assets. Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG US SEMICONDUCTOR & SEMI EQUIPMENT / TAIWAN EQUITIES 2022-06-23 14.6% LONG KOREA/ SHORT TAIWAN EQUITIES 2020-03-27 -23.5% Bottom Line: Tactically investors should buy safe-haven assets and await a resolution of the US-China confrontation over Taiwan, which could cause a dramatic escalation in strategic tensions. Feature A fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is likely upon us. Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi will visit Taiwan during her travel around Asia Pacific this week, according to the Wall Street Journal on August 1. Chinese President Xi Jinping warned US President Joe Biden in a phone conversation on July 28 that “those who play with fire will eventually get burned,” referring specifically to US relations with Taiwan. Chinese foreign ministry officials have threatened “forceful” countermeasures if Pelosi visits the island, explicitly saying that the People’s Liberation Army would respond in some way.   There is still some uncertainty over whether Pelosi will go. She delayed the trip in April. Rumors emerged over July that she would resume but President Joe Biden suggested on July 20 that US military officials opposed the trip, believed the timing to be inappropriate. Taiwan was not mentioned in Pelosi’s official itinerary published on July 31, which includes Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and Malaysia. But the Wall Street Journal report has been corroborated by US and Taiwanese officials. Assuming Pelosi goes, China will respond with some military show of force. The US may pretend that one hand (the White House, the Department of Defense) does not know what the other hand is doing (the House of Representatives). But China will not be convinced. There are three major reasons that we have predicted a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis: 1.   China’s reversion to autocracy and foreign policy hawkishness: After the Great Recession, China was forced into a painful downshift in potential economic growth, stemming from a contracting labor force, excessive debt, and changes in the international economy (Chart 1). As economic growth has slowed, China has pursued political centralization, economic mercantilism, military modernization, and foreign policy assertiveness, offering nationalism as a distraction from the disappointments of the new middle class. While China may not be ready to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, it is willing to do so if the Communist Party regime’s survival is at stake. Chart 1China's Slowdown Leads To Hawkishness China's Slowdown Leads To Hawkishness China's Slowdown Leads To Hawkishness 2.   Taiwan’s reassertion of autonomy: Taiwanese people began to sour on mainland China with the Great Recession and increasingly developed an independent identity (Chart 2). China’s growing economic influence, combined with Xi Jinping’s re-centralization of power across Greater China, provoked a backlash in Taiwan beginning in 2013 that culminated in the nominally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party gaining full control of the island in 2016. The US-China trade war, China’s imposition of control over critical buffer spaces (including the South China Sea and Hong Kong), and US export controls on advanced technologies thrust Taiwan into the middle of a strategic confrontation. While Taiwan is not seeking war or formal political independence, it is seeking closer ties with the US and democratic allies to protect against Beijing’s encroachment.     3.   US political instability and foreign policy reaction: The Great Recession brought the US’s latent political instability from a simmer to a boil. The Washington establishment withdrew from the war on terrorism only to face discontent at home and strategic competition from China and Russia. China intensified its acquisition of US technology while North Korea obtained a nuclear arsenal under China’s watch. A surge in populism led the US to initiate a trade war against China and to impose restrictions on critical technologies to slow China’s modernization. While the US political factions bickered over domestic policy, they both tapped into a popular consensus on economic nationalism and hawkishness toward China (Chart 3). While the US is struggling to curb Russia and Iran, its greatest long-term challenge stems from China and it is increasingly focused on containing China’s economy and strategic ambitions. Chart 2Taiwanese Souring On China The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis Chart 3US Hawkish Consensus On China The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis In addition, there are important cyclical reasons why investors should take very seriously the risk of a major geopolitical crisis emanating from Taiwan in the short run: The Covid-19 pandemic intensified US (and global) distrust of China and accelerated the divorce of the US and Chinese economies. It also threw the Chinese economy into a downward spin, threatening Xi Jinping’s personal security and the Communist Party’s regime security. Hypo-globalization reduces critical economic constraints on military conflict. The Ukraine war highlighted the willingness of ambitious strongman regimes to go to war to prevent neighboring countries from allying with the United States. Taiwan is critical to Chinese security just as Ukraine is critical to Russian. Taiwan, like Ukraine, lacks a mutual defense treaty with the US and yet is attempting to create a de facto treaty through political, economic, and military cooperation – a scenario that will incentivize Chinese military action if it ever believes the US will take irrevocable steps to increase its commitment to defend Taiwan. At the same time, the US will try to deter China more effectively, since its deterrence failed in the case of Ukraine, which entails upgrading the Taiwanese relationship. Hence China will feel threatened and accuse the US of altering the status quo. Russo-Chinese alliance prevents US-China reengagement. Russia threw itself into China’s arms by cutting off natural gas to Europe. China cannot reject Russia’s overture because it needs Russia’s alliance to break through American strategic containment in the coming years. China needs Russia’s natural resources and its cooperation in gaining economic access to Central Asia and the Middle East. The US cannot pursue strategic détente with China if China is allying with Russia, since a Russo-Chinese alliance poses an unprecedented threat to American global influence and security (Chart 4). The Democratic Party is desperate to mitigate looming election losses. President Biden’s approval rating has fallen to 39%, while headline inflation hits 9% and the economy slips into a technical recession. The Republican Party is lined up for a victory in the midterm elections, yet Democrats view the populist Republicans as an existential threat. Hence Biden and Democratic leaders like Pelosi are willing to take significant risks to salvage the election, including provoking foreign rivals. The administration is contemplating tougher export controls on China’s access to semiconductor manufacturing equipment and Congress is passing bipartisan legislation to make the US more competitive against China. Any major confrontation abroad would generate a patriotic rally among voters, as did the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, which saved the Democrats from heavy losses in the midterms that year (Chart 5). China’s domestic politics support a foreign confrontation. As Xi attempts to cement another five-to-ten years in power at the twentieth national party congress this fall, the pandemic restrictions, political repression, property bust, and economic slowdown ensure that he has little good news to celebrate at home. He could benefit from taking an aggressive stance against the imperialist Americans over Taiwan – and he cannot afford to back down or lose face. Ultimately China’s regime legitimacy is at stake in Taiwan so it is willing to take greater risks than the United States.   Chart 4US Cannot Engage With Russo-Chinese Behemoth US Cannot Engage With Russo-Chinese Behemoth US Cannot Engage With Russo-Chinese Behemoth Chart 5Biden Can Take Risks Ahead Of Midterms The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis All of the above demonstrates that investors should not be complacent but should take risk off the table until the Pelosi trip blows over. A major diplomatic or geopolitical crisis will occur if Pelosi indeed visits Taiwan, for China will be required to react to uphold the credibility of its warnings, and Beijing will have a national and political interest in overreacting rather than underreacting. The Americans will then have a national and political interest in preserving their own credibility. This dynamic could lead to a major escalation in strategic tensions. Could a crisis lead to full-scale war? Yes it could but most likely it will not – at least not yet. Here are some important limitations, which investors should monitor closely. If these are reduced or overcome, then a larger conflict becomes more probable: Taiwan is harder to invade than Ukraine. Taiwan is an island and islands that are politically unified can only be subdued with enormous cost of blood and treasure even by the most powerful armies. Taiwan is critical to the global economy, unlike Ukraine. While it lacks defense treaties, it has stronger strategic partnerships than Ukraine did. The Chinese military has not fought an expeditionary war since Vietnam in 1979. The US sent aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait in each of the previous three crises since the 1950s, signaling that it is willing to defend Taiwan, and currently has at least two aircraft carriers in Asia Pacific (Map 1). China needs to be prepared for potential American and Japanese intervention if it is to attack Taiwan, which requires an advanced triad of nuclear arms.    Map 1US Aircraft Carriers Suggest Taiwan Risk Is Substantial The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis The US is not sending any game-changing offensive weapon systems. Instead the US is sending a mere politician. China opposes anything resembling state-to-state relations but Taiwan’s defensive capability would not be improved. Hence China would not be forced to take aggressive military action. Instead China is attempting to set a very low bar for intervening in US-Taiwan political relations. Beijing can intervene in a way that enforces the new line but remains beneath the threshold of war. Going forward, US arms sales to Taiwan will be a much riskier affair and the delivery of a weapons system could trigger conflict (Chart 6). Chinese economy is not (yet) beyond help. China still has authoritarian powers to manipulate the domestic economy, suggesting that policy makers will intervene to slow down the property bust and stimulate activity. After Xi Jinping consolidates power, we expect a pro-growth strategy to be unveiled that will lead to a stabilization of growth in 2023. This is necessary for Xi to maintain domestic stability, which is existential to the regime and its long-term security. If stimulus and interventions fail utterly and China collapses into a full-blown financial crisis, then China will lose the ability to improve its security over the long run and the risk of conflict with foreign powers will rise. But as long as China’s economy is not collapsing, China maintains the prospect of building its influence and power over time and conquering Taiwan through absorption rather than extremely risky armed conflict (Chart 7). Chart 6US Arms Sales Could Trigger A Real Conflict US Arms Sales Could Trigger A Real Conflict US Arms Sales Could Trigger A Real Conflict Chart 7More Economic Stimulus Is Coming More Economic Stimulus Is Coming More Economic Stimulus Is Coming Taiwan is not moving toward formal independence. The Tsai Ing-wen administration is nominally in favor of independence but has chosen rhetorical sleight of hand over any formal change to Taiwan’s status. Taiwanese people support the status quo knowing that they will live in a war zone if they declare independence. The long-term problem stems from the fact that a clear majority opposes unification with the mainland (Chart 8). Taiwan and the US face elections in 2022 and 2024. If the Kuomintang stages a comeback in Taiwanese politics, or the Democrats win reelection in 2024, then China still has the ability to pursue its aims through diplomacy. Whereas if the Democratic Progressive Party remains in full control of Taiwan, and the Republicans regain the White House, Beijing may conclude that little can be gained through diplomacy. Especially if these US and Taiwanese parties proceed to press their interests aggressively. Chart 8Taiwanese Not Declaring Independence The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis Hence the most likely outcome if Pelosi visits Taiwan is a US-China geopolitical crisis of some sort but not a full-scale war. A crisis short of war could establish a new set of red lines over Taiwan that could govern the US-China relationship in the medium term with reduced uncertainty. But it would bring very bad news in the short run and lead to a permanent deterioration in US-China relations and global stability over the long run, which markets must price first.   Bottom Line: Tactically investors should prefer government bonds to equities, US equities to global, defensive sectors to cyclicals, and safe havens to risky assets. Stay short Chinese and Taiwanese currencies and assets. While semiconductor stocks stand at risk, investors should favor US semiconductor companies over Chinese and Taiwanese (Chart 9). Chart 9Investors Should Seek Safe Havens Investors Should Seek Safe Havens Investors Should Seek Safe Havens Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary US Lead On Mega-Sized Firms: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? The US has been the star protagonist of global equity markets for decades. It offers investors the rare combination of a big economy and a large universe of mega-sized listed companies. In fact, the overwhelming majority of the top 20 largest firms globally by revenue today are American. But can the US maintain this degree of presence on this list over the next decade? We think that this is unlikely. For starters, a decline in the US’s footprint could be driven by the fact that there is a peculiar stagnation in the works in the middle tier of American firms. Given that this tier acts as a talent pool for big firms, a stagnation here could mean that the US spawns fewer super-sized firms. The high market share commanded by big American firms could also end up being a liability. This dominance could bait regulatory attention, thereby affecting these firms’ growth prospects. Finally, slowing GDP growth in the US, as compared to its Asian peers, will prove to be another headwind that American firms must contend with. What should strategic investors do to prepare for this tectonic shift? We recommend reducing allocations to US equities over the long run since the US’s weight in global indices will peak soon (or may have already peaked). Bottom Line: Irrespective of what the Fed does (or does not do), the US’s footprint in the global league tables of big firms by revenue will weaken over the next decade. Strategic investors can profit from this change by reducing allocations to US equities while increasing allocations to China as well as a basket of countries including Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Germany.   Dear Client, This week, we are sending you a Special Report by Ritika Mankar, CFA, who will be writing occasional special reports for the Global Investment Strategy service on a variety of topical issues. Ritika makes the case that the US economy’s ability to spawn mega-sized companies may become increasingly compromised over the next decade. We will return to our regular publishing schedule next week. Best Regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist US: Home To The Largest Number Of Big Listed Firms 2022 has been a turbulent year for US markets so far. But it is worth bearing in mind that the US has been the star protagonist of global equity markets for decades. This is because the US has offered investors a near-perfect trifecta constituting of: (1) A mega-sized economy; (2) A large universe of mega-sized listed companies; and (3) A track record of market outperformance. Specifically: Largest Economy: For over a century now, the US has been the largest economy in the world – a title it is expected to defend over the next few years (Chart 1). Large Listed Companies: The US’s high nominal GDP has also translated into high sales growth for its listed space. This, in turn, powered a great rise in the American equity market’s capitalization (Chart 2). In fact, the US’s market cap is so large today that it exceeds the cumulative market cap of the next four largest economies in the world, by a wide margin. So unlike Germany or China (which have large economies but small markets), the US has a large economy and is also home to some of the largest, most liquid stocks globally. Chart 1The US Will Remain The World’s Largest Economy For The Next Few Years America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Chart 2The Listed Universe In The US Has Grown From Strength To Strength America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Chart 3Growing Sales In The US Have Powered Its Outperformance Over The Past Decade Growing Sales In The US Have Powered Its Outperformance Over The Past Decade Growing Sales In The US Have Powered Its Outperformance Over The Past Decade Long History of Outperformance: And most importantly, the US market has a strong track record of outperformance. US markets have outperformed global benchmarks over the past decade thanks largely to the rapid sales growth seen by American firms (Chart 3). Notwithstanding the US’s star role in global markets thus far, in this report we highlight that the US’s heft will likely decline over the next decade. The Fed may or may not administer recession-inducing rate hikes in 2022. But irrespective of what the Fed does over the next 12-to-24 months, the US’s loss of influence in global equity markets appears certain because it will be driven by structural forces. Chart 4US Lead On Mega-Sized Firms: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Firstly, while behemoths such as Apple and Amazon have been attracting record investor attention, it is worth noting that the next tier of mid-sized American companies is no longer thriving as it used to. The reason why this matters is because history suggests that the pool of mid-sized companies acts as a superset for the big companies of tomorrow. So, if this talent pool is not booming today in the US, then there is likely to be repercussions tomorrow. Secondly, the US’s largest firms will have to contend with two structural headwinds over the next decade, namely increased regulatory attention and slowing growth. To complicate matters for American firms, competitors in Asia will not have this albatross around their neck. Hence, the US may remain the largest economy of the world a few years from now but is unlikely to be home to as many big, listed companies as it is today (Chart 4). The rest of this report quantifies the strength of these forces, and then concludes with actionable investment ideas.   Trouble In The Talent Pool Chart 5The US Is Home To Nearly A Dozen Mega-Sized Firms Today America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? 2021 produced a special milestone for the American economy. This was the first year that ten listed American firms1 surpassed $200 billion in annual revenues (firms we refer to as ‘Big Shots’ from here on) (Chart 5). The US has been a global leader when it came to the size of its economy for decades, but last year it also became home to the largest number of big, listed corporations (Table 1). American Big Shots were striking both in terms of their number as well as their scale. In fact, such was their scale that the combined revenue of these ten Big Shots now exceeded the nominal GDP of major economies like India (Chart 6). Table 1The US Today Dominates The Global List Of Top 20 Firms America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Chart 6The Revenues Of US Big Shot Firms Are Comparable To India’s Nominal GDP! America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? While the world has been captivated by the size that the US’s Big Shots have achieved (as well as the ideas of their unconventional founders), few have noticed that the talent pool for tomorrow’s Big Shots is no longer burgeoning. History suggests that most Big Shot firms tend to emerge from firms belonging to a lower revenue tier.  For instance, Amazon and Apple, which have revenues in the range of $350-to-$500 billion today, were mid-sized firms a decade ago with revenues in the vicinity of $50-to-$100 billion (Chart 7). Chart 7Most Big Shots Today Were The Mid-Sized Firms Of Yesterday America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? This is why it is worrying that all is not well in the US’s ecosystem of mid-sized firms. If we define firms with annual revenues of $50-to-$200 billion as ‘core’ firms, then their share in the total number of American firms has stagnated over the past decade (Chart 8). Even the revenue share accounted for by core firms has been fading (Chart 9). This phenomenon contrasts with the situation in China, where the mid-sized firms’ cohort has been growing over the last decade (Charts 10 and 11). Chart 8Share Of Mid-Sized Firms In The US Has Stagnated America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Chart 9The Revenue Share Of US Mid-Sized Firms Is Also Falling America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Chart 10Share Of Mid-Sized Firms In China Is Expanding America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Chart 11The Revenue Share Of Chinese Mid-Sized Firms Is Rising America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Japan’s experience also suggests that when the mid-sized firms’ ecosystem weakens, the pipeline of future potential mega-cap companies get affected. In Japan, the proportion of core firms (Chart 12), as well as their revenue share (Chart 13), has not been growing as is the case, say, in China. And this is perhaps why, despite being the third-largest economy in the world today, Japan is home to only one listed mega-sized corporation with revenues of over $200 billion (Toyota). Image Chart 13The Revenue Share Of Japanese Mid-Sized Firms Has Plateaued America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? The US May Have Hit Peak Oligopolization The fact that ten Big Shot firms (i.e., firms with annual revenues of over $200 billion) exist in the US today is remarkable. After all, the number of Big Shot firms in the US today exceeds the total number of Big Shots in the next four largest economies of the world combined (Chart 14). Chart 14The US Today Is The Global Hub For Mega-Sized Companies America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? So why will the US’s leadership in this area come under pressure going forward? One reason is that the large size of American firms could itself become a liability. Specifically: Public Backlash Against The US’s Big Shots: The ten Big Shot firms of the US today account for more than a fifth of the revenue generated by all firms that constitute the MSCI US index (Chart 15). Also, the number of Big Shot firms, as a share of total firms, is high in the US (Chart 16). Chart 15Big Shots Account For More Than A Fifth Of Revenues Generated By The US Listed Space America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Chart 16A Large Proportion Of Firms In The US Are Very Big America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Notably, market leaders across a range of key sectors in the US account for an unusually large chunk of the sector’s revenues. Financials, Information Technology, and Consumer Discretionary together account for about half of the US equity market index’s weight. The dominant firm in each of these three sectors (as defined by MSCI) accounts for 15%-to-25% of that sector’s revenue (Chart 17). Market power usually benefits investors. But too much market power can be a problem. The growing oligopolization of the US economy has caused public dissatisfaction over the influence of corporations in the US to hit a multi-year high (Chart 18). Over 60% of Americans want major US corporations to have less influence. It is for this reason that the record scale acquired by American firms could prove to be an issue. American mega-scaled firms’ high market shares will provide them with pricing power, but this very power will end up baiting regulatory attention and anti-trust lawsuits which, in turn, will restrict their future growth rates. The fact that the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) today is headed by a leader who wants to return the FTC to its trust-busting origins, and made her name by writing a paper arguing for Amazon to be broken up,2 is indicative of which way the wind is blowing. Chart 17Market Leaders In The US Are Too Big America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Chart 18Public Dissatisfaction With US Big Shot Firms Is High And Rising America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Interestingly, the speed at which the US restricts the market power of big firms will determine how quickly the US’s mid-sized firms begin to flourish again, thereby setting the stage for the US to spawn a new generation of big firms. Besides the growing regulatory risks for the US’s big firms, three other technical factors will end up slowing the pace at which the US can generate large firms, namely: Slowing GDP Growth: Since the US is a large and mature economy, the pace of its growth is bound to slow (Chart 19). Besides the deceleration in the US’s growth rate relative to its own past, it is projected to end up being lower than that of major economies like China. Chart 19US GDP Growth Is Set To Slow America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Big Business ≠ Big GDP Growth: While GDP growth receives a fillip when small firms grow, the high pricing power that very large firms command can end up constraining an economy’s growth rate. This is because large firms can charge monopolistic prices, thereby restraining demand. Secondly, mega-sized firms may actively invest in manipulating institutions to block upstarts,3 a dynamic that can restrict productivity growth as well. Chart 20The Revenue-To-Nominal GDP Ratio Is Already Elevated In The US America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Approaching Revenue Saturation: A cross-country comparison suggests that the revenue-to-nominal GDP ratio in the US is high1 (Chart 20). Only Japan has a superior ratio, which is likely to be an aberration rather than the norm (owing to Japanese firms’ unique tendency to prioritize revenues over profitability). Given that the US revenue-to-nominal GDP ratio is already elevated, it is likely that even as the US’s nominal GDP keeps growing, the pace of conversion of this GDP into revenues will stay the same or may even diminish over the coming decade.   Prepare For A Brave New World “German judges…first read a description of a woman who had been caught shoplifting, then rolled a pair of dice that were loaded so every roll resulted in either a 3 or a 9. As soon as the dice came to a stop, the judges were asked whether they would sentence the woman to a term in prison greater or lesser, in months, than the number showing on the dice…On average, those who had rolled a 9 said they would sentence her to 8 months; those who rolled a 3 said they would sentence her to 5 months; the anchoring effect was 50%.” – Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011)   The US has been the largest economy in the world and has also been able to nurture some of the largest mega-scaled companies of today. Such is the might and size of these firms that it is impossible to imagine a world where American firms’ leadership could be disrupted. Moreover, it is mentally easier to extrapolate the US’s lead today into the future. It may even seem like there is no other alternative to the US since Japan’s economy has been stagnating, Europe lacks innovation, and the political environment in China is contentious. Also, it is true that the US today is the undisputed leader when it comes to qualitative factors such as the ability to attract top global talent, its education system, and its legal system. However, the case can be made that this belief (that the US’s lead on mega-sized companies will spill into the next decade) runs the risk of becoming a Kahneman-esque anchoring bias. This is because: History Suggests That Upsets Are The Norm: History suggests that the evolution of the top 20 global firms (by revenue) has been a story of upsets. For instance, Europe’s hold over this list in the 2000s was striking by all accounts (Chart 21). Back then, it would have been almost blasphemous to question Europe’s lead (Chart 22). But today firms from three Asian island-countries account for more companies on this list than all of pre-Brexit Europe put together. Chart 21In The 2000s, Europe Was The Epicenter Of Global Mega-Sized Firms America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Chart 22How The Mighty Can, And Do, Fall America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? ​​​​​​​China’s Disadvantages < Its Competitive Advantages: Despite its political baggage, China has the most formidable capability today to displace the US’s leadership position on the league tables of top 20 global firms by revenue. This is because China has a thriving ecosystem of core firms (Chart 11) and is set to grow at a faster clip than the US over the next five years (Chart 19). Moreover, while the Chinese government’s tolerance for large tech giants could remain low, the establishment could be keen to grow firms in the industrials as well as financials space for the sake of common prosperity. EM Listed Space Can Catch Up: The listed space in the US has developed at an exceptionally fast pace relative to its peers. The gap between US nominal GDP and listed space parameters is low (Chart 20), while the gap is wider for countries like Germany, China, and several other EMs. Even in a ceteris paribus situation where nominal GDPs were to stay static, an increase in the size of the listed universe in other countries can adversely affect the US’s current footprint. So, what can investors do to prepare for this coming tectonic shift? We recommend reducing allocations to US equities since the US’s weight in global indices will peak soon. It is worth noting that this strategic investment recommendation dovetails nicely with our earlier view that strategic investors should rotate out of US stocks. Currently, about half of the 20 largest firms globally by revenue are American (Map 1). Owing to the dynamics listed above, the number of American firms in the global league of top 20 could fall from this high level to 7 or 8 over the coming decade. Given that this change is indicative of things to come, we would urge investors to reduce allocations to US equities in a global portfolio over a strategic horizon. A confluence of micro and macro factors is likely to result in the US’s weight in global indices to crest sooner rather than later. Map 1Could The Global Epicenter Of Big Firms Drift Eastwards Over The Next Decade? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? In fact, US equities’ weight in a global index like the MSCI ACWI could have already peaked (Chart 23) and could fall by 500-to-600bps over the next decade if the last year’s trend is extrapolated into the future. As regards to sectors, health care appears to be the key industry where the US’s footprint could weaken (Table 2). Chart 23Loss Of US Influence Will Create Space For Underrepresented Markets To Grow America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? Table 2China’s Weight In Top 20 Firms Is Set To Grow America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? As the US cedes its leadership position, we expect the global epicenter of mega-sized listed corporates to drift eastwards (Map 1). Specifically: China: Currently, less than a quarter of the 20 largest firms globally by revenue are Chinese (Map 1). It is highly likely that the number of Chinese firms in the global list of top 20 firms will increase. China should be able to spawn more mega-sized companies since it already has a cache of promising large and mid-sized companies. Chinese companies will also benefit from the high growth rate of China’s domestic economy. From a sectoral perspective, financials and industrials appear to be two sectors where China’s footprint could grow the most (Table 2). Asia Ex-China: Asian countries like Korea, Taiwan, and Japan could potentially end up growing their weight in global equity indices by becoming home to more than one company that makes it to the global league tables of large companies. Besides the high GDP growth rate on offer in their domestic markets (Chart 20), firms in these countries could increase scale by feeding a stimulus-fueled industrial boom in the US. Additionally, these Asian countries have a competitive advantage when it comes to high-tech manufacturing capabilities (Chart 24). This will ensure that they will accrue any offshore opportunities that arise. Taiwan has the potential to grow its presence in the Information Technology space, given its innate competitive advantages (Chart 24) and the positive structural outlook for global semiconductor demand. In the case of India, it is worth noting that the country’s influence in the world economy will be ascendant over the next decade as its growing middle class flexes its muscles. Despite this, the probability of an Indian firm making an appearance among the largest firms of the world is low given the unusually small size of Indian companies today. Europe: Distinct from the Asian countries listed above, Germany could benefit from the industrial boom in the US given its capabilities when it comes to high-end manufacturing (Chart 24). ​​​​​​​Even as we believe that oil faces a bleak future on a structural basis, if a commodities supercycle were to take hold over the next decade, then the UK and France could improve their presence in global equity benchmarks given that Europe is home to some large firms in the energy sector. A commodities supercycle will also end up benefiting China and the US, since some large energy producers are also located in these countries. Chart 24Korea, Japan, And Germany Have An Edge In Manufacturing, While Taiwan, Japan, And China Have An Edge In Semiconductors America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? America's Lead On Mega-Sized Companies: Is A Peak Nigh? ​​​​​​​Appendix The Methodology The starting point for most country-level economic analyses tends to be a country’s nominal GDP. But as market economists we realized that some key advantages could be unlocked by focusing on ‘revenues’ generated by the listed universe of a country. These advantages include: Investment Focus: As compared to nominal GDP which ends up picking up signals about the health of the listed ‘and’ unlisted firms in any country, focusing on listed firms’ revenues allows us to home-in on the health of the listed space. This is a valuable merit since the listed space is what public equity investors can buy into. For example, India is the fifth largest economy of the world and is also one of the fastest growing economies globally. But India is also characterized by a listed space where the largest companies have revenues of only around $100 billion. This makes India less investable than countries like Taiwan or South Korea that have far smaller nominal GDPs as compared to India but are home to firms with revenue of around $200 billion. Taking note of this difference - between the size of a country’s nominal GDP and the size of investable firms in a country - is key for our clients. Focus On Cause, Not Effect: It is fashionable today in the financial press to focus on the daily changes in market capitalization of assets (and non-assets too). But it is critical to note that the market cap of a stock or the price of a security is a dependent variable. Revenue, on the other hand, is a key independent variable that influences prices. So, a focus on forecasting movement in revenues of companies in a country ten years down the line, can be a more fruitful exercise for strategic investors. Steady And Stable: Revenue generated by a firm, is also a superior measure as compared to the market capitalization of a firm because the latter can be volatile. Whilst it could be argued that earnings of a company as a variable also offer stability and influence prices, earnings suffer from one drawback which is that it is a function of revenues as well as costs. Revenues of companies on the other hand have a direct theoretical link to the nominal GDP of a country. So, to rephrase a popular adage - market cap is vanity, nominal GDP is sanity, but revenue is king. This is the reason why in this Special Report, we analyze investment opportunities through the lens of revenues generated by listed firms in some of the largest economies of the world. We do so by focusing on the constituents of MSCI Country Indices (Equity) for major world economies in 2021. ​​​​​​​ Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Based on MSCI ACWI data for 2021. 2  Kiran Stacey, “Washington vs Big Tech: Lina Khan’s battle to transform US antitrust,” ft.com, August 2021. 3  Kathy Fogel, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung, “Big Business Stability And Economic Growth: Is What’s Good For General Motors Good For US?”, NBER Working Paper No. 12394, nber.org, July 2006.

Executive Summary Italy’s right-wing alliance, led by Brothers of Italy, will likely outperform in  the upcoming election. The new government will prioritize the economy, posing a risk to the EU’s united front against Russia. It is conducive to an eventual ceasefire, which is marginally positive for risk assets in 2023. We recommend investors underweight Italian assets on a tactical basis. China’s political risks will remain elevated until Xi consolidates power this fall, positive news will come after, if at all. Geopolitical risk in the Taiwan Strait will remain high and persistent until China and the US reach a new understanding. Separately, we are booking a 9% gain on our long US equities relative to UAE equities trade. Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG US / UAE EQUITIES (CLOSED) 2022-03-11 9.0% Bottom Line: Italy’s political turmoil suggests a more pragmatic policy toward Russia going forward. Europe’s energy cutoff will also motivate governments to negotiate with Russia. Feature In this report we update our GeoRisk Indicators, with a special focus on Italy’s newest political turmoil. Italy Over the past several months, we have argued that Italy was a source of political risk within the European Union and that the market underestimated the probability of an early Italian election. In the past two weeks, this forecast has become a reality (Chart 1). Chart 1Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator The grand coalition under Prime Minister Mario Draghi had fulfilled its two main purposes – to distribute EU recovery funds and secure an establishment politician in the Italian presidency. At the same time, headline inflation hit 8.5% in June, the highest since 1986, even as the Italian and global economy slowed down, Italian government bonds sold off, and Russia induced an energy crisis. The stagflationary economic environment is biting hard and the different coalition members are looking to their individual interests ahead of election season. On July 14, Giuseppe Conte, the former prime minister, pulled its populist Five Star Movement (M5S) out of Mario Draghi’s national unity government, triggering a new round of political turmoil in Italy. Draghi’s first resignation was rejected by Italian President Mattarella later that day. However, on July 21, the League and Forza Italia also defected from the grand coalition. After Draghi’s plan of reviving the coalition collapsed, President Mattarella accepted his resignation and called for a snap election to be held on September 25, ten months ahead of the original schedule. Based on the latest public opinion polls, right-wing political parties are well-positioned for the upcoming election. The far-right Brothers of Italy is now the front runner in the election race and is expected to win around 23% of the votes. Another far-right party, the League, is the third most popular party, with nearly 15% support despite a drop in support during its time within the grand coalition. In addition, the center-right Forza Italia receives 8.5% of the support. Together, the right-wing conservative bloc amounts to 46.5% of voting intentions. There is still positive momentum for Brothers of Italy to harvest more support given that they are the flag-bearer for anti-incumbent sentiment amid the stagflationary economy. By contrast, the left-wing parties – the Democrats, the Left, and the Greens – only command about 27%. The possibility of an extended left-wing coalition, even with the inclusion of the M5S, is looking slim. On July 25, Enrico Letta, the leader of the Democratic Party, publicly expressed his anger against party leader Giuseppe Conte and ruled out any electoral pact with the M5S because of the recent political chaos they caused. He stressed that the Democratic Party would seek ties with parties that had remained loyal to Draghi’s national unity. However, there are not many parties left for the Democrats to partner with. Apart from the Left and the Greens, the Democrats’ best chance would be the center-left Action Party and Italia Viva, which is led by Matteo Renzi, who served as the secretary of the Democratic Party from 2013 to 2018. However, these four parties are small and will not enable the Democrats to form a government. Courting M5S is the Democrats’ only chance to set up an alternative to the right-wing bloc, but that will require the election to force the two parties together. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyLe Pen And Other Hurdles (GeoRisk Update) The Democratic Party was the biggest supporter of Draghi’s government, while the Brothers of Italy were the sole major opposition. Thus the September 25 election will be a race between these two major parties. Both are expected to outperform current polling, as they will attract the most supporters from each side. The other right-wing parties, Forza Italia and the League, will at least perform in line with their polling, while the other left-wing parties will underperform. In the meantime, M5S’ popularity will continue to decline – the party is bruised over its role in Draghi’s coalition and divided over how to respond to the Ukraine war. Foreign policy is a major factor in this election. Italy has the highest share of citizens in the Eurozone who support solving the Russia-Ukraine conflict through peaceful dialogue (52% versus the Eurozone average of 35%). Italy has long maintained pragmatic relations with Russia, including the Putin administration, as it imported 40% of its natural gas from there prior to 2022. The EU is struggling to maintain a united front against Russia, and war policy will be a key focal point among the different parties. Draghi and the Democratic Party are the strongest supporters of the EU’s oil embargo on Russia and decision to send arms to support Ukraine. On the other side, the right-wing Forza Italia and the League have been more equivocal due to their traditional friendship with Russia. What’s more important is the stance of the Brothers of Italy on Russia, as it is the largest party now and will probably lead a right-wing government after the election. On July 27, the three right-wing parties struck a deal to officially form an alliance in the upcoming election and whichever party wins the most votes would determine the next prime minister if the alliance wins. This deal puts Giorgia Meloni, the leader of Brothers of Italy, one step closer to becoming Italy’s first female PM. Giorgia Meloni, unlike her right-wing peers, has endorsed Draghi’s hawkish stance towards Russia. Recently, she stressed that Italy would keep sending arms to Ukraine if her party forms a government after the election. However, Meloni’s speech could be a tactical move to win the election more than an unshakeable policy position. First, like the other two right-wing parties, the Brothers of Italy have had close connections with Russia. After the 2018 Russian presidential election, Meloni congratulated Putin and claimed his victory was “the unequivocal will of Russians.” In addition, she is close to Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary and National Rally leader Marine Le Pen of France, both of whom have criticized the EU’s decision to provide military support to Kyiv. Hence her sharp change of stance this year seems calculated to avoid accusations of being pro-Russian. But that does not preclude a more pragmatic approach to Russia once in office. Second, Meloni has compromised other far-right positions to broaden her voter base. She has reversed the party’s original anti-EU stance and claimed it does not seek to leave the EU, as most European anti-establishment parties have had to do in order to make themselves electable. Being the only female in the election race, Meloni also pledged to protect women’s access to safe abortions in Italy, also a softer stance than before. Even if the Brothers of Italy distance themselves from some unpopular right-wing positions, including on Ukraine, they probably cannot form a government on their own. They will need to court Forza Italia and the League. These two parties prefer a more pragmatic approach to Russia and a peaceful resolution to the war. Thus while it will be hard to find a middle ground on the issue of Ukraine, the election will likely prevent Italy from taking a more confrontational stance toward Russia. It will probably do the opposite. Consider the context in which the next Italian government will operate. Russia declared on July 25 that it will further reduce natural gas supplies to Europe through Nord Stream 1, as we expected, bringing pipeline flows to 20% of its full capacity.  Energy prices will go up even as European economic activity and industry will suffer greater strains. If Meloni is elected as the new prime minister this September, she will have to keep talking tough on Russia while simultaneously seeking a solution to soaring energy prices and economic crisis. This solution will be diplomacy – unless Russia seeks to expand its invasion all the way to Moldova. A right-wing victory is the most likely outcome based on opinion polling, the negative cyclical economy, and the underlying structural factors supporting populism in Italy that we have monitored for years. Such a coalition will not be pro-Russian but it will be pragmatic and focused on salvaging Italy’s economy, which means it will be highly inclined toward diplomacy. If Russia halts its military advance – does not attempt to conquer southwestern Ukraine to Moldova – then this point will be greatly reinforced. Italy will become a new veto player within the European Union when it comes to any major new sanctions on Russia. While Europeans will continue diversifying their energy mix away from Russia, it will be much harder for the EU to implement a natural gas embargo in the coming years if Italy as well as Hungary oppose it. Even if we are wrong, and the Democratic Party or other left-wing parties surprise to the upside in the election, the new coalition will most likely have to focus on mitigating the economic crisis and thus pursuing diplomacy with Russia. That is, as long as Russia pushes for a ceasefire after it achieves its military aims in Donetsk, the last holdout within the south-southeastern territories Russia is trying to conquer. Bottom Line: Due to persistent political uncertainty, we recommend investors underweight Italian stocks and bonds at least until a new government takes shape, which could take months even after the election. However, government bonds will remain vulnerable if a right-wing coalition assumes power, since it will pursue loose fiscal policies and will eschew structural reforms. Overall Italy’s early elections will lead to a new government that is focused on short-term economic growth, likely including pragmatism toward Russia. From an investment point of view that will not be a negative development, though much depends on whether Russia expands its invasion or declares victory after Donetsk. Russia Market-based measures of Russian geopolitical risk are rebounding after subsiding from peak levels hit during the invasion of Ukraine in February (Chart 2). Chart 2Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia’s continued tightening of natural gas supplies (and food exports) this week is precisely what we predicted would happen despite a wave of wishful thinking from investors over the past month. The optimists claimed that Russia would resume Nord Stream 1 pipeline flows after a regular “maintenance” period. They also said that Canada’s cooperation in resolving some “technical” issues around turbines would stabilize natural gas supply. The truth is that Russia is seeking to achieve its war aims in Ukraine. Until it has achieved its aims, it will use a range of leverage, including tightening food and energy supplies. Most likely Russia will halt the advance after completing the conquest of the Donbas region and land-bridge to Crimea. Then it will seek to legitimize its conquests through a ceasefire agreement. However, it could launch a new phase of the war to try to take Odessa and Transniestria, which would cement European resolve, even in Italy, and trigger a new round of sanctions. Bottom Line: Russia faces a fork in the road once it completes the conquest of Donetsk. Most likely it will declare victory and start pushing for a ceasefire late this year or early next year. Movement toward a ceasefire would reduce geopolitical risk for global financial markets in 2023. But there is still a substantial risk that Russia could expand the invasion to eastern Moldova, which would escalate the overarching Russia-West conflict and sustain the high level of geopolitical risk for markets. China Chinese political and geopolitical risk will continue to rise and the bounce in Chinese relative equity performance is faltering as we expected (Chart 3). Chart 3China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator China’s leaders will hold their secretive annual meeting at Beidaihe in August ahead of the critical Communist Party national congress this fall. General Secretary Xi Jinping is attempting to cement himself as the paramount leader in China, comparable to Chairman Mao Zedong, transforming China’s governance from that of single-party rule to single-person rule. The reversion to autocratic government is coinciding with a historic economic slowdown consisting of cyclical factors (weak domestic demand, weakening foreign demand, draconian Covid-19 restrictions) and structural factors (labor force contraction, property sector bust, social change and unrest). Both Xi and US President Biden face major domestic political challenges in the coming months with the party congress and the US midterm election. Hence they are holding talks to try to stabilize relations. But we do not think they will succeed. China cannot reject Russia’s strategic overture, while the US cannot afford to re-engage with a China that is partnering with Russia in a challenge to the liberal-democratic world order. In addition, US policies are erratic and the US cannot credibly promise China that it will not pursue a containment strategy even if China offers trade concessions. Bottom Line: China-related political and geopolitical risks will remain very high until at least after the twentieth party congress. At that point we expect President Xi to loosen a range of policies to stabilize the economy and foreign trade relations. These policies may bring positive news in 2023, though China’s biggest macroeconomic and geopolitical problems remain structural in nature and we remain underweight Chinese assets. Taiwan For many years we have warned of a “fourth Taiwan Strait crisis” due to the unsustainable geopolitical situation between China, Taiwan, and the United States. After the war in Ukraine we argued that the US would try to boost its strategic deterrence around Taiwan, since it failed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine, but that the increased commitment to Taiwan would in fact provoke China (Chart 4). Chart 4Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Until the US and China reach a new understanding over Taiwan, we argued that the region would be susceptible to rising tensions and crisis points that would send investors fleeing from risky assets, especially risky regional assets. It is possible that we have arrived at this crisis now, with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi making preparations to visit Taiwan, China pledging “forceful” countermeasures if she does, President Biden suggesting that the US military thinks Pelosi should not visit, and Biden and Xi preparing for a phone conversation. In essence China is giving an ultimatum and setting a new bar, and a very low bar, for taking some kind of action on Taiwan, i.e. the mere visit of a US House speaker, which has happened before (House Speaker Newt Gingrich in 1997). China’s purpose is to lay the groundwork for preventing the US from upgrading Taiwan relations in any more substantial way, whether political or military. If the Biden administration calls off the Pelosi visit, then American relations with Taiwan will have been curtailed, at least for this administration. If Biden goes forward with the visit, then Beijing will need to respond with an aggressive show of force to prevent any future president from repeating the exercise or building on it. And if this show threatens US personnel or security, a full-blown diplomatic or military crisis could ensue. While we doubt it would lead to full-scale war, it could lead to a frightening confrontation. Biden may want to stabilize relations with China, since he is primarily focused on countering Russia, but his options are limited. China cannot save him from inflation but it can solidify the public perception that he is weak. Hence he is more likely to maintain his administration’s hawkish approach. Biden’s approval rating is 38% and his party faces a drubbing in the midterm elections. A confrontation with Russia, China, Iran, or anyone else would likely help his party by producing a public rally around the flag. Any unilateral concessions will merely strengthen Xi’s power consolidation at the party congress, which is detrimental to US interests. Only if the Biden administration pursues a dovish policy of re-engagement that is subsequently confirmed by the 2024 presidential election will there be potential for a substantial US-China economic re-engagement. We are pessimistic. Bottom Line: Taiwan-related geopolitical risk will rise in the short run. If there is a new US-China understanding over Taiwan, then regional and global geopolitical risk will decline over the medium term. But we remain short Taiwanese assets. Investment Takeaways Investors should remain defensively positioned until the US midterm election ends with congressional gridlock; the Chinese party congress is over and Xi Jinping launches a broad pro-growth policy; and Russia starts pushing for a ceasefire in Ukraine. We also expect that markets will need to get over new, unexpected oil supply shocks arising from the failure of US-Iran nuclear negotiations, which remains off the radar and therefore a source of negative surprises. Any US-Iran nuclear deal would be a major positive surprise that postpones this risk for a few years. Having said that, we are booking a 9% gain on our long US versus UAE equity trade for technical reasons. Democrats have reached a deal to pass a budget reconciliation bill in an effort to mitigate midterm election losses. This development reinforces the 65% odds of passage that we have maintained for this bill’s passage in our US Political Strategy reports since last year.   Yushu Ma Research Analyst yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix UK Chart 5UK: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Chart 6Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France Chart 7France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Chart 8Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Chart 9Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Chart 10Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Chart 11Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Chart 12Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Chart 13Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa Chart 14South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix "Batting Average": Geopolitical Strategy Trades Geopolitical Calendar