Asset Allocation

Dear Client, We are sending you our Strategy Outlook today where we outline our thoughts on the global economy and the direction of financial markets for 2022 and beyond. Next week, please join me for a webcast on Friday, December 10th at 10:00 AM EST (3:00 PM GMT, 4:00 PM CET, 11:00 PM HKT) to discuss the outlook. Also, we published a report this week transcribing our annual conversation with Mr. X, a long-standing BCA client. Please join my fellow BCA strategists and me on Tuesday, December 7th for a follow-up discussion hosted by my colleague, Jonathan LaBerge. Finally, you will receive a Special Report prepared by our Global Asset Allocation service on Monday, December 13th. Similarly to previous years, Garry Evans and his team have prepared a list of books and articles to read over the holiday period. This year they recommend reading materials on key themes of the moment, such as climate change, cryptocurrencies, supply-chain disruption, and gene technology. Included in this report are my team’s recommendations on what to read to understand the underlying causes of inflation. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist   Highlights Macroeconomic Outlook: Despite the risks posed by the Omicron variant, global growth should remain above trend in 2022. Inflation will temporarily dip next year as goods prices come off the boil. However, the structural trend for inflation is to the upside, especially in the US. Equities: Remain overweight stocks in 2022, favoring cyclicals, small caps, value stocks, and non-US equities. Look to turn more defensive in mid-2023 in advance of a stagflationary recession in 2024 or 2025. Fixed income: Maintain below-average interest rate duration exposure. The US 10-year Treasury yield will rise to 2%-to-2.25% by the end of 2022. Underweight the US, UK, Canada, and New Zealand in a global bond portfolio. Credit: Corporate debt will outperform high-quality government bonds next year. Favor HY over IG. Spreads will widen again in 2023. Currencies: As a momentum currency, the US dollar could strengthen some more over the next month or two. Over a 12-month horizon, however, the trade-weighted dollar will weaken. The Canadian dollar will be the best performing G10 currency next year. Commodities: Oil prices will rise, with Brent crude averaging $80/bbl in 2022. Metals prices will remain resilient thanks to tight supply and Chinese stimulus. We prefer gold over cryptos. I. Macroeconomic Outlook   Running out of Greek Letters Just as the world was looking forward to “life as normal”, a new variant of the virus has surfaced. While little is known about the Omicron variant, preliminary indications suggest that it is more transmissible than Delta. The emergence of the Omicron variant is coming in the midst of yet another Covid wave. The number of new cases has skyrocketed across parts of northern and central Europe, prompting governments to re-introduce stricter social distancing measures (Chart 1). New cases have also been trending higher in many parts of the US and Canada since the start of November. Chart 1 Despite the risks posed by Omicron, there are reasons for hope. BioNTech has said that its vaccine, jointly developed with Pfizer, will provide at least partial immunity against the new strain. At present, 55% of the world’s population has had at least one vaccine shot; 44% is fully vaccinated (Chart 2). China is close to launching its own mRNA vaccine next year, which it intends to administer as a booster shot. Chart 2 In a worst-case scenario, BioNTech has said that it could produce a new version of its vaccine within six weeks, with initial shipments beginning in about three months. New antiviral medications are also set to hit the market. Pfizer claims its newly developed pill cuts the risk of hospitalization by nearly 90% if taken within three days from the onset of symptoms. The drug-maker has announced its intention to produce enough of the medication to treat 50 million people in 2022. In addition, it is allowing generic versions to be manufactured in developing countries. The company has indicated that its antiviral pills will be effective in treating the new strain.   Global Growth: Slowing but from a High Level Assuming the vaccines and antiviral drugs are able to keep the new strain at bay, global growth should remain solidly above trend in 2022. Table 1 shows consensus GDP growth projections for the major economies. G7 growth is expected to tick up from 3.6% in 2021Q3 to 4.5% in 2021Q4. Growth is set to cool to 4.1% in 2022Q1, 3.6% in 2022Q2, 2.9% in 2022Q3, 2.3% in 2022Q4, and 2.1% in 2023Q1. Table 1Growth Is Slowing, But From Very High Levels Strategy Outlook - 2022 Key Views: The Beginning Of The End Strategy Outlook - 2022 Key Views: The Beginning Of The End Chart 3 According to the OECD, potential real GDP growth in the G7 is about 1.4% (Chart 3). Thus, while growth in developed economies will slow next year, it is unlikely to return to trend until the second half of 2023. Emerging markets face a more daunting outlook. The Chinese property market is weakening, and the recent collapse of the Turkish lira highlights the structural problems that some EMs face. Nevertheless, the combination of elevated commodity prices, forthcoming Chinese stimulus, and the resumption of the US dollar bear market starting next year should support EM growth. Relative to consensus, we think the risks to growth in both developed and emerging markets are tilted to the upside in 2022. Growth will likely start surprising to the downside in late 2023, however.   The United States: No Shortage of Demand US growth slowed to only 2.1% in the third quarter, reflecting the impact of the Delta variant wave and supply-chain bottlenecks. The semiconductor shortage hit the auto sector especially hard. The decline in vehicle spending alone shaved 2.2 percentage points off Q3 GDP growth. Chart 4Durable Goods Spending Is Still Above Pre-Pandemic Trend, While Services Spending Is Catching Up Durable Goods Spending Is Still Above Pre-Pandemic Trend, While Services Spending Is Catching Up Durable Goods Spending Is Still Above Pre-Pandemic Trend, While Services Spending Is Catching Up The fourth quarter is shaping up to be much stronger. The Bloomberg consensus estimate is for real GDP to expand by 4.9%. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model is even more optimistic. It sees growth hitting 9.7%. The demand for goods will moderate in 2022. As of October, real goods spending was still 10% above its pre-pandemic trendline (Chart 4). In contrast, the demand for services will continue to rebound. While restaurant sales have recovered all their lost ground, spending on movie theaters, amusement parks, and live entertainment in October was still down 46% on a seasonally-adjusted basis compared to January 2020. Hotel spending was down 23%. Spending on public transport was down 25%. Spending on dental services was down 16% (Chart 5).   Chart 5 US households have accumulated $2.3 trillion in excess savings over the course of the pandemic. Some of this money will be spent over the course of 2022 (Chart 6). Increased borrowing should also help. After initially plunging during the pandemic, credit card balances are rising again (Chart 7). Banks are eager to make consumer loans (Chart 8). Chart 6Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Chart 7Credit Card Spending Is Recovering Following The Pandemic Slump Credit Card Spending Is Recovering Following The Pandemic Slump Credit Card Spending Is Recovering Following The Pandemic Slump Household net worth has risen by over 100% of GDP since the start of the pandemic (Chart 9). In an earlier report, we estimated that the wealth effect alone could boost annual consumer spending by up to 4% of GDP. Chart 8Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumer Loans Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumer Loans Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumer Loans Chart 9A Record Rise In Household Net Worth A Record Rise In Household Net Worth A Record Rise In Household Net Worth   Business investment will rebound in 2022, as firms seek to build out capacity, rebuild inventories, and automate more production in the face of growing labor shortages. After moving sideways for the better part of two decades, core capital goods orders have broken out to the upside. Surveys of capex intentions have improved sharply (Chart 10). Nonresidential investment was 6% below trend in Q3 – an even bigger gap than for consumer services spending – so there is plenty of scope for capex to increase. Residential investment should also remain strong in 2022 (Chart 11). The homeowner vacancy rate has dropped to a record low, as have inventories of new and existing homes for sale. Homebuilder sentiment rose to a 6-month high in November. Building permits are 7% above pre-pandemic levels. Chart 10Business Investment Should Be Strong In 2022 Business Investment Should Be Strong In 2022 Business Investment Should Be Strong In 2022 Chart 11Residential Construction Will Be Well Supported Residential Construction Will Be Well Supported Residential Construction Will Be Well Supported   US Monetary and Fiscal Policy: Baby Steps Towards Tightening Policy is unlikely to curb US aggregate demand by very much next year. While the Federal Reserve will expedite the tapering of asset purchases and begin raising rates next summer, the Fed is unlikely to raise rates significantly until inflation gets out of hand. As we discuss in the Feature section later in this report, the next leg in inflation will be to the downside, even if the long-term trend for inflation is to the upside. The respite from inflation next year will give the Fed some breathing space. A major tightening campaign is unlikely until mid-2023. Reflecting the Fed’s dovish posture, long-term real bond yields hit record low levels in November (Chart 12). Despite giving up some of its gains in recent days, Goldman’s US Financial Conditions Index stands near its easiest level in history (Chart 13). Chart 12US Real Bond Yields Hitting Record Lows US Real Bond Yields Hitting Record Lows US Real Bond Yields Hitting Record Lows Chart 13Easy Financial Conditions In The US Easy Financial Conditions In The US Easy Financial Conditions In The US US fiscal policy will get tighter next year, but not by very much. In November, President Biden signed a $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill into law, containing $550 billion in new spending. BCA’s geopolitical strategists expect Congress to pass a $1.5-to-$2 trillion social spending bill using the reconciliation process. The emergence of the Omicron strain will facilitate passage of the bill because it will allow the Democrats to add some “indispensable” pandemic relief to the package. All in all, the IMF foresees the US cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit averaging 4.9% of GDP between 2022 and 2026, compared to 2.0% of GDP between 2014 and 2019 (Chart 14). Chart 14 It should also be noted that government spending on goods and services has been quite weak over the past two years (Chart 15). The budget deficit surged because transfer payments exploded. Unlike direct government spending, which is set to accelerate over the next few years, households saved a large share of transfer payments. Thus, the fiscal multiplier will increase next year, even as the budget deficit shrinks. Chart 15While Overall Consumption Has Recovered, Business Spending and Direct Government Expenditures Remain Below Trend While Overall Consumption Has Recovered, Business Spending and Direct Government Expenditures Remain Below Trend While Overall Consumption Has Recovered, Business Spending and Direct Government Expenditures Remain Below Trend Chart 16European Banks Have Cleaned Up Their Act European Banks Have Cleaned Up Their Act European Banks Have Cleaned Up Their Act Europe: Room to Grow The European economy faces near-term growth pressures. In addition to Covid-related lockdowns, high energy costs will take a bite out of growth. After having dipped in October, natural gas prices have jumped again due to delays in the opening of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, strong Chinese gas demand, and rising risks of a colder winter due to La Niña. The majority of Germans are in favor of opening the pipeline, suggesting that it will ultimately be approved. This should help reduce gas prices. Meanwhile, the winter will pass and Chinese demand for gas should abate as domestic coal production increases. The combination of increased energy supplies, easing supply-chain bottlenecks, and hopefully some relief on the pandemic front, should all pave the way for better-than-expected growth across the euro area next year. After a decade of housecleaning, European banks are in much better shape (Chart 16). Capex intentions have risen (Chart 17). Consumer confidence is even stronger in the euro area than in the US (Chart 18). Chart 17 Chart 18Consumer Confidence Is At Pre-Pandemic Levels In The Euro Area, Unlike In The US Consumer Confidence Is At Pre-Pandemic Levels In The Euro Area, Unlike In The US Consumer Confidence Is At Pre-Pandemic Levels In The Euro Area, Unlike In The US Euro area fiscal policy should remain supportive. Infrastructure spending is set to increase as the Next Generation EU fund begins operations. Germany’s “Traffic Light” coalition will pursue a more expansionary fiscal stance. The IMF expects the euro area to run a cyclically-adjusted primary deficit of 1.2% of GDP between 2022 and 2026, compared to a surplus of 1.2% of GDP between 2014 and 2019. For its part, the ECB will maintain a highly accommodative monetary policy. While net asset purchases under the PEPP will end next March, the ECB is unlikely to raise rates until 2023 at the earliest. In contrast to the US, trimmed-mean inflation has barely risen in the euro area (Chart 19). Moreover, unlike their US counterparts, European firms are reporting few difficulties in finding qualified workers (Chart 20). In fact, euro area wage growth slowed to an all-time low of 1.35% in Q3 (Chart 21). Chart 19Trimmed-Mean Inflation: Higher In The US Than In The Euro Area And Japan Trimmed-Mean Inflation: Higher In The US Than In The Euro Area And Japan Trimmed-Mean Inflation: Higher In The US Than In The Euro Area And Japan Chart 20   Chart 21Wage Growth Remains Contained Across The Euro Area Wage Growth Remains Contained Across The Euro Area Wage Growth Remains Contained Across The Euro Area The UK finds itself somewhere between the US and the euro area. Trimmed-mean inflation is running above euro area levels, but below that of the US. UK labor market data remains very strong, as evidenced by robust employment gains, firm wage growth, and a record number of job vacancies. The PMIs stand at elevated levels, with the new orders component of November’s manufacturing PMI rising to the highest level since June. While worries about the impact of the Omicron variant will likely cause the Bank of England to postpone December’s rate hike, we expect the BoE to begin raising rates in February.   Japan: Short-Term Stimulus Boost A major Covid wave during the summer curbed Japanese growth. Consumer spending rebounded after the government removed the state of emergency on October 1 but could falter again if the Omicron variant spreads. The government has already told airlines to halt reservations for all incoming international flights for at least one month. On the positive side, the economy will benefit from new fiscal measures. Following the election on October 31, the new government led by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced a stimulus package worth 5.6% of GDP. As with most Japanese stimulus packages, the true magnitude of fiscal support will be much lower than the headline figure. Nevertheless, the combination of increased cash payments to households, support for small businesses, and subsidies for domestic travel should spur consumption in 2022. The capex recovery in Japan has lagged other major economies. This is partly due to the outsized role of the auto sector in Japan’s industrial base. Motor vehicle shipments fell 37% year-over-year in October, dragging down export growth with it. As automotive chip supplies increase, Japan’s manufacturing sector should gain some momentum. Despite the prospect of stronger growth next year, the Bank of Japan will stand pat. Core inflation remains close to zero, while long-term inflation expectations remain far below the BOJ’s 2% target. We do not expect the BOJ to raise rates until 2024 at the earliest.   China: Crosswinds The Chinese economy faces crosswinds going into 2022. On the one hand, the energy crisis should abate, helping to boost growth. China has reopened 170 coal mines and will probably begin re-importing Australian coal. Chinese coal prices have fallen drastically over the past 6 weeks (Chart 22). Coal accounts for about two-thirds of Chinese electricity generation. Chart 22Coal Prices Are Renormalizing In China Coal Prices Are Renormalizing In China Coal Prices Are Renormalizing In China Chart 23China's Property Market Has Weakened China's Property Market Has Weakened China's Property Market Has Weakened   The US may also trim tariffs on Chinese goods, as Treasury Secretary Yellen hinted this week. This will help Chinese manufacturers. On the other hand, the property market remains under stress. Housing starts, sales, and land purchases were down 34%, 21%, and 24%, respectively, in October relative to the same period last year. The proportion of households planning to buy a home has plummeted. Loan growth to real estate developers has decelerated to the lowest level on record (Chart 23). Nearly half of their offshore bonds are trading at less than 70 cents on the dollar. The authorities have taken steps to stabilize the property market. They have relaxed restrictions on mortgage lending and land sales, cut mortgage rates in some cities, and have allowed some developers to issue asset backed securities to repay outstanding debt. Most Chinese property is bought “off-plan”. The government does not want angry buyers to be deprived of their property. Thus, the existing stock of planned projects will be built. Chart 24 shows that this is a large number; in past years, developers have started more than twice as many projects as they have completed. The longer-term problem is that China builds too many homes. Like Japan in the early 1990s, China’s working-age population has peaked (Chart 25). According to the UN, it will decline by over 400 million by the end of the century. China simply does not need to construct as many new homes as it once did. Chart 24Chinese Construction: Halfway Done Chinese Construction: Halfway Done Chinese Construction: Halfway Done Chart 25Demographic Parallels Between China And Japan Demographic Parallels Between China And Japan Demographic Parallels Between China And Japan Chart 26 Japan was unable to fill the gap that a shrinking property sector left in aggregate demand in the early 1990s. As a result, the economy fell into a deflationary trap. China is likely to have more success. Unlike Japan, which waited too long to pursue large-scale fiscal stimulus, China will be more aggressive. The authorities will raise infrastructure spending next year with a focus on clean energy. They will also boost social spending. A frayed social safety net has forced Chinese households to save more than they would otherwise for precautionary reasons. This has weighed on consumption.  The fact that China is a middle-income country helps. In 1990, Japan’s output-per-worker was nearly 70% of US levels; China’s output-per-worker is still 20% of US levels (Chart 26). If Chinese incomes continue to grow at a reasonably brisk pace, this will make it easier to improve home affordability. It will also allow China to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio without a painful deleveraging campaign. II. Feature: The Long-Term Inflation Outlook   Two Steps Up, One Step Down We expect inflation in the US, and to a lesser degree abroad, to follow a “two steps up, one step down” trajectory of higher highs and higher lows. The US is currently near the top of those two steps. Inflation should dip over the next 6-to-9 months as the demand for goods moderates and supply-chain disruptions abate. Chart 27 shows that container shipping costs have started to come down. The number of ships anchored off the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach is falling. US semiconductor firms are working overtime (Chart 28). Chip production in Japan and Korea is rising swiftly. DRAM chip prices have already started to decline. Chart 27Signs Of Easing Supply Issues On The Rough Seas Signs Of Easing Supply Issues On The Rough Seas Signs Of Easing Supply Issues On The Rough Seas Chart 28Semiconductor Manufacturers Are Stepping Up Their Game Semiconductor Manufacturers Are Stepping Up Their Game Semiconductor Manufacturers Are Stepping Up Their Game Reflecting the easing of supply-chain bottlenecks, both the “prices paid” and “supplier delivery” components of the manufacturing ISM declined in November.  The respite from inflation will not last long, however. The US labor market is heating up. So far, most of the wage growth has been at the bottom end of the income distribution (Chart 29). Wage growth will broaden out over the course of 2022, pushing up service price inflation in the process. Chart 29Wage Growth Has Picked Up, But Mainly At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution Wage Growth Has Picked Up, But Mainly At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution (I) Wage Growth Has Picked Up, But Mainly At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution (I) Chart 30Rent Inflation Has Increased Rent Inflation Has Increased Rent Inflation Has Increased Rent inflation will also rise, as the unemployment rate falls further. The Zillow rent index has spiked 14% (Chart 30). Rents account for 8% of the US CPI basket and 4% of the PCE basket.   Biased About Neutral? Investors are assuming that the Fed will step in to extinguish any inflationary fires before they get out of hand. The widely-followed 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate has fallen back below the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 31). Chart 31Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not A Source Of Worry For The Fed Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not A Source Of Worry For The Fed (II) Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not A Source Of Worry For The Fed (II) Chart 32Both The Fed And Investors Have Lowered Their Estimate Of The Neutral Rate Both The Fed And Investors Have Lowered Their Estimate Of The Neutral Rate Both The Fed And Investors Have Lowered Their Estimate Of The Neutral Rate This may be wishful thinking. Back in 2012, when the Fed began publishing its “dots”, it thought the neutral rate of interest was 4.25%. Today, it considers it to be around 2.5% (Chart 32). Market participants broadly agree. Both investors and policymakers have bought into the secular stagnation thesis hook, line, and sinker. If the neutral rate turns out to be higher than widely believed, the Fed could find itself woefully behind the curve. Given the “long and variable” lags between changes in monetary policy and the resulting impact on the economy, inflation is liable to greatly overshoot the Fed’s target.   Structural Forces Turning More Inflationary Meanwhile, the forces that have underpinned low inflation over the past few decades are starting to fray: Globalization is in retreat: The ratio of global trade-to-manufacturing output has been flat for over a decade (Chart 33). Looking out, the ratio could decline as geopolitical tensions between China and the rest of the world continue to simmer, and more companies shift production back home in order to gain greater control over the supply chains of essential goods. Baby boomers are leaving the labor force en masse: As a group, baby boomers hold more than half of US household wealth (Chart 34). They will continue to run down their wealth once they retire. However, since they will no longer be working, they will no longer contribute to national output. Spending that is not matched by output tends to drive up inflation. Chart 33Globalization Plateaued Over a Decade Ago Globalization Plateaued Over a Decade Ago Globalization Plateaued Over a Decade Ago Chart 34 Social stability is in peril: The US homicide rate increased by 27% in 2020, the biggest one-year jump on record. All indications suggest that crime has continued to rise in 2021, coinciding with the ongoing decline in the incarceration rate (Chart 35). Amazingly, the murder rate and inflation are highly correlated (Chart 36). If the government cannot credibly commit to keeping people safe, how can it credibly commit to keeping inflation low? Without trust in government, inflation expectations could quickly become unmoored. Chart 35The Homicide Rate Has Tended To Rise When The Institutionalization Rate Has Declined The Homicide Rate Has Tended To Rise When The Institutionalization Rate Has Declined The Homicide Rate Has Tended To Rise When The Institutionalization Rate Has Declined Chart 36Bouts Of Inflation Tend To Coincide With Rising Crime Bouts Of Inflation Tend To Coincide With Rising Crime Bouts Of Inflation Tend To Coincide With Rising Crime The temptation to monetize debt will rise: Public-sector debt levels have soared to levels last seen during World War II. If bond yields rise as the Congressional Budget Office expects, debt-servicing costs will triple by the end of the decade (Chart 37). Faced with the prospect of having to divert funds from social programs to pay off bondholders, the government may apply political pressure on the Fed to keep rates low.​​​​​​ Chart 37   A Post-Pandemic Productivity Boom? Chart 38 Might faster productivity growth bail out the economy just like it did following the Second World War? Don’t bet on it. US labor productivity did increase sharply during the initial stages of the pandemic. However, that appears to have been largely driven by composition effects that saw many low-skilled, poorly-paid service workers lose their jobs. As these low-skilled workers have returned to the labor force, productivity growth has dropped. The absolute level of productivity declined by 5.0% at an annualized rate in the third quarter, leading to an 8.3% increase in labor costs. Productivity growth has been extremely weak outside the US (Chart 38). This gives weight to the view that the pandemic-induced changes in business practices have not contributed to higher productivity, at least so far. It is worth noting that a recent study of 10,000 skilled professionals at a major IT company revealed that work-from-home policies decreased productivity by 8%-to-19%, mainly because people ended up working longer. Increased investment spending should eventually boost productivity. However, the near-term impact of higher capex will be to boost aggregate demand, stoking inflation in the process. III. Financial Markets   A. Portfolio Strategy Above-Trend Global Growth Will Support Equities Our golden rule of investing is about as simple as they come: Don’t bet against stocks unless you think that there is a recession around the corner. As Chart 39 shows, recessions and equity bear markets almost always overlap. Chart 39 Chart 40Sentiment Towards Equities Is Already Bearish Sentiment Towards Equities Is Already Bearish Sentiment Towards Equities Is Already Bearish Equity corrections can occur outside of recessionary periods. In fact, we are experiencing such a correction right now. Yet, with the percentage of bearish investors reaching the highest level in over 12 months in this week’s AAII survey, chances are that the correction will not last much longer (Chart 40). A sustained decline in stock prices requires a sustained decline in corporate earnings; the latter normally only happens during economic downturns. Admittedly, it is impossible to know for sure if a recession is lurking around the corner. If the Omicron variant is able to completely evade the vaccines, growth will slow considerably over the coming months. Yet, even in that case, the global economy is unlikely to experience a sudden-stop of the sort that occurred last March. As noted at the outset of this report, pharma companies have the tools to tweak the vaccines, and most experts believe that the soon-to-be-released antivirals will be effective against the new strain. If economic growth remains above trend, earnings will rise (Chart 41). S&P 500 companies generated $53.82 per share in profits in Q3. The bottom-up consensus is for these companies to generate an average of $54.01 in quarterly profits between 2021Q4 and 2022Q3, implying almost no growth from 2021Q3 levels. This is a very low bar to clear. We expect global equities to produce high single-digit returns next year. Chart 41Analysts Increased Earnings Estimates This Year Analysts Increased Earnings Estimates This Year Analysts Increased Earnings Estimates This Year The Beginning of the End Our guess is that 2022 will be the last year of the secular equity bull market that began in 2009. In mid-2023 or so, the Fed will come around to the view that the neutral rate is higher than it once thought. Unfortunately, by then, it will be too late; a wage-price spiral will have already emerged. A nasty bear flattening of the yield curve will ensue: Long-term bond yields will rise but short-term rate expectations will increase even more. A recession will follow in 2024 or 2025. The most important real-time indicator we are focusing on to gauge when to turn more bearish on stocks is the 5y/5y forward TIPS breakeven rate. As noted earlier, it is still at the bottom end of the Fed’s comfort zone. If it were to rise above 3%, all hell could break loose, especially if this happened without a corresponding increase in crude oil prices. The Fed takes great pride in the success it has had in anchoring long-term expectations. Any evidence that expectations are becoming unmoored would cause the FOMC to panic.   B. Equity Sectors, Regions, And Styles Favor Value, Small Caps, and Non-US Markets in 2022 Until the Fed takes away the punch bowl, a modestly procyclical stance towards equity sectors, styles, and regional equity allocation is warranted. Chart 42The Relative Performance Of Value Stocks Has Closely Tracked Bond Yields This Year The Relative Performance Of Value Stocks Has Closely Tracked Bond Yields This Year The Relative Performance Of Value Stocks Has Closely Tracked Bond Yields This Year The relative performance of value versus growth stocks has broadly followed the trajectory of the 30-year Treasury yield this year (Chart 42). Rising yields should buoy value stocks, with banks being the biggest beneficiaries (Chart 43). In contrast, rising yields will weigh on tech stocks. Chart 43Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Shares But Hurt Tech Stocks Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Shares But Hurt Tech Stocks Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Shares But Hurt Tech Stocks   Chart 44The Winners And Losers Of Covid Waves The Winners And Losers Of Covid Waves The Winners And Losers Of Covid Waves If we receive some good news on the pandemic front, this should disproportionately help value. As Chart 44 illustrates, the relative performance of value versus growth stocks has tracked the number of new Covid cases globally. The correlation between new cases and the relative performance of IT and energy has been particularly strong. Rising capex spending will buoy industrial stocks. Industrials are overrepresented in value indices both in the US and abroad (Table 2). Along with financials, industrials are also overrepresented in small cap indices (Table 3). US small caps trade at 15-times forward earnings compared to 21-times for the S&P 500. Table 2Breaking Down Growth And Value By Sector Strategy Outlook - 2022 Key Views: The Beginning Of The End Strategy Outlook - 2022 Key Views: The Beginning Of The End Table 3Financials And Industrials Have A Larger Weight In US Small Caps Strategy Outlook - 2022 Key Views: The Beginning Of The End Strategy Outlook - 2022 Key Views: The Beginning Of The End Time to Look Abroad? Given our preference for cyclicals and value in 2022, it stands to reason that we should also favor non-US markets. Table 4 shows that non-US stock markets have more exposure to cyclical and value sectors. Table 4Cyclicals Are Overrepresented Outside The US Strategy Outlook - 2022 Key Views: The Beginning Of The End Strategy Outlook - 2022 Key Views: The Beginning Of The End Admittedly, favoring non-US stock markets has been a losing proposition for the past 12 years. US earnings have grown much faster than earnings abroad over this period (Chart 45). US stock returns have also benefited from rising relative valuations. Chart 45The US Has Been The Earnings Leader In Recent Years The US Has Been The Earnings Leader In Recent Years The US Has Been The Earnings Leader In Recent Years At this point, however, US stocks are trading at a significant premium to their overseas peers, whether measured by the P/E ratio, price-to-book, or price-to-sales (Chart 46). US profit margins are also more stretched than elsewhere (Chart 47).   Chart 46 Chart 47US Profit Margins Look Stretched US Profit Margins Look Stretched US Profit Margins Look Stretched Chart 48Non-US Stocks Tend To Do Best When The US Dollar Is Weakening Non-US Stocks Tend To Do Best When The US Dollar Is Weakening Non-US Stocks Tend To Do Best When The US Dollar Is Weakening The US dollar may be the ultimate arbiter of whether the US or international stock markets outperform in the 2022. Historically, there has been a close correlation between the trade-weighted dollar and the relative performance of US versus non-US equities (Chart 48). In general, non-US stocks do best when the dollar is weakening. The usual relationship between the dollar and the relative performance of US and non-US stocks broke down in 2020 when the dollar weakened but the tech-heavy US stock market nonetheless outperformed. However, if “reopening plays” gain the upper hand over “pandemic plays” in 2022, the historic relationship between the dollar and US/non-US returns will reassert itself. As we discuss later on, while near-term momentum favors the dollar, the greenback is likely to weaken over a 12-month horizon. This suggests that investors should look to increase exposure to non-US stocks in a month or two. Around that time, the energy shortage gripping Europe will begin to abate, China will be undertaking more stimulus, and investors will start to focus more on the prospect of higher US corporate taxes.    C. Fixed Income Maintain Below-Benchmark Duration The yield on a government bond equals the expected path of policy rates over the duration of the bond plus a term premium that compensates investors for locking in their savings at a fixed rate rather than rolling them over at the prevailing short-term rate. While expected policy rates have moved up in the US over the past 2 months, the market’s expectations of where policy rates will be in the second half of the decade have not changed much (Chart 49). Investors remain convinced of the secular stagnation thesis which postulates that the neutral rate of interest is very low. Chart 49 As for the term premium, it remains stuck in negative territory, much where it has been for the past 10 years (Chart 50). Chart 50Negative Term Premium Across The Board Negative Term Premium Across The Board Negative Term Premium Across The Board The Term Premium Will Increase The notion of a negative term premium may seem odd, as it implies that investors are willing to pay to take on duration risk. However, there is a good reason for why the term premium has been negative: The correlation between bond yields and stock prices has been positive (Chart 51). Chart 51Stocks And Bond Yields Have Not Always Been Positively Correlated Stocks And Bond Yields Have Not Always Been Positively Correlated Stocks And Bond Yields Have Not Always Been Positively Correlated When bond yields are positively correlated with stock prices, bonds are a hedge against bad economic news. If the economy falls into recession, equity prices will drop; the value of your home will go down; you may not get a bonus, or even worse, you may lose your job. But at least the value of your bond portfolio will go up! There is a catch, however: Bonds are a hedge against bad economic news only if that news is deflationary in nature. The 2001 and 2008-09 recessions all saw bond yields drop as the economy headed south. Both recessions were due to deflationary shocks: first the dotcom bust, and later, the bursting of the housing bubble. In contrast, bond yields rose in the lead up to the recession in the 1970s and early 80s. Bonds were not a good hedge against falling stock prices back then because it was surging inflation and rising bond yields that caused stocks to fall in the first place. This raises a worrying possibility that investors have largely overlooked: The term premium may increase as it becomes increasingly clear that the next recession will be caused not by inadequate demand but by Fed tightening in response to an overheated economy. A rising term premium would exacerbate the upward pressure on bond yields stemming from higher-than-expected inflation as well as upward revisions to estimates of the real neutral rate of interest. Again, we do not think that a “term premium explosion” is a significant risk for 2022. However, it is a major risk for 2023 and beyond. Investors should maintain a modestly below-benchmark duration stance for now but look to go maximally underweight duration towards the end of next year.   Global Bond Allocation BCA’s global fixed-income strategists recommend underweighting the US, Canada, the UK, and New Zealand in 2022. They suggest overweighting Japan, the euro area, and Australia. US Treasuries trade with a higher beta than most other government bond markets (Chart 52). Our bond strategists expect the US 10-year Treasury yield to hit 2%-to-2.25% by the end of next year. Chart 52High-And Low-Beta Bond Yields High-And Low-Beta Bond Yields High-And Low-Beta Bond Yields As discussed earlier, neither the ECB nor the BoJ are in a hurry to raise rates. Both euro area and Japanese bonds have outperformed the global benchmark when Treasury yields have risen (Chart 53). Chart 53 Chart 54UK Inflation Expectations Are Higher Than In Other Major Developed Economies UK Inflation Expectations Are Higher Than In Other Major Developed Economies UK Inflation Expectations Are Higher Than In Other Major Developed Economies While rate expectations in Australia have come down on the Omicron news, the markets are still pricing in four hikes next year. With wage growth still below the RBA’s target, our fixed-income strategists think the central bank will pursue a fairly dovish path next year. In contrast, they think New Zealand will continue its hiking cycle. Like Canada, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has become increasingly concerned about soaring home prices and household indebtedness.  Inflation expectations are higher in the UK than elsewhere (Chart 54). With the BoE set to raise rates early next year, gilts will underperform the global benchmark.   Overweight High-Yield Corporate Bonds… For Now Chart 55High-Yield Spreads Are Pricing In A Default Rate Of Close To 4% High-Yield Spreads Are Pricing In A Default Rate Of Close To 4% High-Yield Spreads Are Pricing In A Default Rate Of Close To 4% The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy will provide support for corporate bonds in 2022. For now, we prefer high yield over investment grade. According to our bond strategists, while high-yield spreads are quite tight, they are still pricing in a default rate of 3.8% (Chart 55). This is more than their fair value default estimate of 2.3%-to-2.8%. It is also above the year-to-date realized default rate of 1.7%.   As with equities, the bull market in corporate credit will end in 2023 as the Fed is forced to accelerate the pace of rate hikes in the face of an overheated economy and rising long-term inflation expectations.   D. Currencies and Commodities Dollar Strength Will Reverse in Early 2022 Since bottoming in May, the US dollar has been trending higher. The US dollar is a high momentum currency: When the greenback starts rising, it usually keeps rising (Chart 56). A simple trading rule that buys the dollar when it is trading above its various moving averages has delivered positive returns (Chart 57). This suggests that the greenback could very well strengthen further over the next month or two. Chart 56 Chart 57 Over a 12-month horizon, however, we think the trade-weighted dollar will weaken. Both speculators and asset managers are net long the dollar (Chart 58). Current positioning suggests we are nearing a dollar peak. Rising US rate expectations have helped the dollar this year. Chart 59 shows that both USD/EUR and USD/JPY have tracked the spread between the yield on the December 2022 Eurodollar and Euribor/Euroyen contracts, respectively. While the Fed will expedite the pace of tapering, the overall approach will still be one of “baby-steps” towards tightening next year. BCA’s bond strategists do not expect US rate expectations for end-2022 to rise from current levels. Chart 58Long Dollar Positions Are Getting Crowded Long Dollar Positions Are Getting Crowded Long Dollar Positions Are Getting Crowded Chart 59Interest Rates Have Played A Major Role On The Dollar's Performance This Year Interest Rates Have Played A Major Role On The Dollar's Performance This Year Interest Rates Have Played A Major Role On The Dollar's Performance This Year   The present level of real interest rate differentials is consistent with a much weaker dollar (Chart 60). Using CPI swaps as a proxy for expected inflation, 2-year real rates in the US are 42 basis points below other developed economies. This is similar to where real spreads were in 2013/14, when the trade-weighted dollar was 16% weaker than it is today. Chart 60AThe Dollar And Interest Rate Differentials (I) The Dollar And Interest Rate Differentials (I) The Dollar And Interest Rate Differentials (I) Chart 60BThe Dollar And Interest Rate Differentials (II) The Dollar And Interest Rate Differentials (II) The Dollar And Interest Rate Differentials (II) Meanwhile, growth outside the US will pick up next year as Europe’s energy crisis abates and China ramps up stimulus. If history is any guide, firmer growth abroad will put downward pressure on the dollar (Chart 61). Chart 61The Dollar Will Weaken As Global Growth Rotates From The US To The Rest Of The World The Dollar Will Weaken As Global Growth Rotates From The US To The Rest Of The World The Dollar Will Weaken As Global Growth Rotates From The US To The Rest Of The World Chart 62Dollar Headwinds Dollar Headwinds Dollar Headwinds Pricey Greenback The dollar’s lofty valuation has left it overvalued by nearly 20% on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis. The PPP exchange rate equalizes the price of a representative basket of goods and services between the US and other economies. Reflecting the dollar’s overvaluation, the US trade deficit has widened sharply. Excluding energy exports, the US trade deficit as a share of GDP is now the largest on record. Equity inflows have helped finance America’s burgeoning current account deficit (Chart 62). However, these inflows are starting to abate, and could drop further if global investors abandon their infatuation with US tech stocks.   Favor Commodity Currencies We favor commodity currencies for 2022, especially the Canadian dollar, which we expect to be the best performing G10 currency. Canadian real GDP growth will average nearly 5% in Q4 and the first half of next year. The Bank of Canada will start hiking rates next April. Oil prices should remain reasonably firm next year, helping the loonie and other petrocurrencies. Bob Ryan, BCA’s chief Commodity Strategist, expects the price of Brent crude to average $80/bbl in 2022 and 81$/bbl in 2023, which is well above the forwards (Chart 63). Years of underinvestment in crude oil production have led to tight supply conditions (Chart 64). Proven global oil reserves increased by only 6% between 2010 and 2020, having risen by 26% over the preceding decade. Chart 63 Chart 64   As with oil, there has been little investment in mining capacity in recent years. While a weaker property market in China will weigh on metals prices, this will be partly offset by Chinese fiscal stimulus. Looking further ahead, the outlook for metals remains bright. Whereas the proliferation of electric vehicles is bad news for oil demand over the long haul, it is good news for many metals. The typical electric vehicle requires about four times as much copper as a typical gasoline-powered vehicle. Huge amounts of copper will also be necessary to expand electrical grids.   The RMB Will Be Stable in 2022 It is striking that despite the appreciation in the trade-weighted dollar since June and escalating concerns about the health of the Chinese economy, the RMB has managed to strengthen by 0.3% against the US dollar. Chinese export growth will moderate in 2022 as global consumption shifts from goods to services. Rising global bond yields may also narrow the yield differential between China and the rest of the world. Nevertheless, we doubt the RMB will weaken very much. China wants the RMB to be a global reserve currency. A weak RMB would run counter to that goal. Rather than weakening the yuan, the Chinese authorities will use fiscal stimulus to support growth.   Gold Versus Cryptos? Gold prices tend to move closely with real bond yields (Chart 65). Since August 2020, however, the price of gold has slumped from a high of $2,067/oz to $1,768/oz, even though real yields remain near record lows. The divergence between real yields and gold prices may partly reflect growing demand for cryptocurrencies. Investors increasingly see cryptos as not just a disruptive economic force, but as the premier “anti-fiat” hedge. Whether that view pans out remains to be seen. So far, the vast majority of the demand for cryptocurrencies has stemmed from people hoping to get rich by buying cryptos. To the extent that people are using cryptos for online purchases, it is usually for illegal goods (Chart 66).  Chart 65Gold Prices Tend To Correlate Closely With Real Interest Rates Gold Prices Tend To Correlate Closely With Real Interest Rates Gold Prices Tend To Correlate Closely With Real Interest Rates Chart 66 Crypto proponents like to say that the supply of cryptos is finite. While this may be true for individual cryptocurrencies, it is not true for the sector as a whole. Over the past 8 years, the number of cryptocurrencies has swollen from 26 in 2013 to 7,877 (Chart 67). At least with gold, they are not adding any new elements to the periodic table. Chart 67 At any rate, the easy money in the crypto space has already been made. Bitcoin has doubled in price seven times since the start of 2016. If it were to double just one more time to $120,000, it would be worth $2.2 trillion, equal to the entire stock of US dollars in circulation. Investors looking to hedge long-term inflation risk should shift back into gold. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Image Special Trade Recommendations Image Current MacroQuant Model Scores Image

Highlights Indonesian domestic demand is struggling to recover in the face of a very tight policy settings. Exceptionally high real borrowing costs continue to hurt non-financial sectors. This will hurt banks too as credit is stymied and NPLs rise. Equity investors should fade the rebound and stay underweight Indonesia in an EM equity portfolio. Indonesia’s external accounts will deteriorate, as the Chinese slowdown weighs on resource prices. Softening commodity prices will herald a weakness in the rupiah. Currency investors should consider going short the rupiah versus the US dollar. Domestic bond investors should tactically downgrade Indonesia from neutral to underweight within an EM bond portfolio. Sovereign EM credit investors, however, should stay overweight Indonesia. Feature Chart 1Indonesian Stock Rebound Will Be Short-Lived Indonesian Stock Rebound Will Be Short-Lived Indonesian Stock Rebound Will Be Short-Lived After years of underperformance, Indonesian stocks have rebounded in absolute terms and inched up relative to the EM benchmark (Chart 1). Could this be the beginning of a sustainable outperformance? Our research indicates that the answer is no. The Indonesian economy is still struggling. Domestic demand remains lackluster, hamstrung as it is by very high real interest rates and a tight fiscal stance. A flexing export sector, the sole source of strength so far, is set to dissipate as well. Weaker exports will weigh on the nation's financial markets. A budding softness in EM financial markets – emanating from a slowing China and rising US bond yields – will be yet another headwind for Indonesian assets over the next several months. Investors therefore should fade the current rebound and remain underweight this bourse in EM equity portfolios. EM domestic bond portfolios should consider downgrading this market from neutral to underweight relative to its EM peers. Currency investors may consider shorting the rupiah versus the US dollar. Sovereign EM credit investors, however, should stay overweight Indonesia in an EM US dollar bond portfolio. Straightjacketed The main drag to Indonesia’s economic recovery is coming from prohibitively high interest rates in the country. Real borrowing costs for the private sector, of the order of 10% (Chart 2, top panel), are extremely restrictive for any economy to handle, let alone one trying to recover from a debilitating recession. The real rates in Indonesia are also much higher than anywhere else in Asia – for both the private sector as well as for the government (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2The Economy Is Struggling In the Face Of Very High Real Interest Rates The Economy Is Struggling In the Face Of Very High Real Interest Rates The Economy Is Struggling In the Face Of Very High Real Interest Rates Chart 3Absence Of Fiscal Support Is Making The Recovery Harder Absence Of Fiscal Support Is Making The Recovery Harder Absence Of Fiscal Support Is Making The Recovery Harder The fiscal stance does not appear to be very supportive either. The government is planning to rein in the fiscal deficit next year to 4.8% of GDP from an expected 5.7% this year. The IMF projects that the cyclically- adjusted fiscal thrust in 2022 will be a negative 0.8% of potential GDP, and a further negative 1.5% in 2023 (Chart 3). The consequence of such restrictive settings is that domestic consumption and consumer confidence are languishing well below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 4). Consistently, loan demand is also very weak. Bank credit for both consumption and production purposes (both working capital and term loans) have barely risen after having shrunk outright last year (Chart 5). Chart 4Domestic Demand Is Soft As Consumer Confidence Remains Low Domestic Demand Is Soft As Consumer Confidence Remains Low Domestic Demand Is Soft As Consumer Confidence Remains Low Chart 5All Types Of Bank Credit Are Weak All Types Of Bank Credit Are Weak All Types Of Bank Credit Are Weak Chart 6Disinflationary Pressures Are Entrenched In The Economy Disinflationary Pressures Are Entrenched In The Economy Disinflationary Pressures Are Entrenched In The Economy Weak domestic demand is reinforcing deflationary forces. Inflation has been undershooting the lower band of the central bank target for almost two years now. Core and trimmed mean CPI measures have been averaging below 1% over the past year. Headline CPI is below the lower target band despite high oil and food prices (Chart 6, top panel). At the same time, nominal wages are barely rising (Chart 6, bottom panel). Hence, household income growth is subdued, which is sapping consumer demand. Notably, the very high real interest rates in Indonesia today are an outcome of monetary policy falling behind the disinflation curve. In the 2000s, the country’s consumer price inflation would often flare up to double digits, and the central bank used to keep interest rates consistently high. Over the past 10 years or so, however, inflationary pressures have gradually given way to deflationary forces. Even though the central bank has reduced its policy rate, it has not reduced it sufficiently enough to offset the drop in inflation. As a result, real interest rates have risen. Banks, on their part, also refused to fully pass along the rate cuts accorded by the central bank. As such, banks’ lending rates to the private sector, in both nominal and real terms, remained much higher compared to their peers elsewhere in Asia (Chart 2, above).  Part of the reason why the central bank has fallen behind the disinflation curve has to do with the exchange rate stability and Indonesia’s dependence on foreign debt capital inflows. The country needs to offer high real rates to continue to attract enough foreign capital so that it can finance the current account deficit. As long as the central bank has rupiah stability (as a means for price stability) as its mandate, it will not reduce real interest rates. Incidentally, a bill to include economic growth and employment within the central bank’s mandate was submitted to Parliament earlier this year. Discussion over the bill, however, has been delayed. This means that elevated real interest rates will prevail for now in Indonesia, hampering economic growth. Fading Bright Spot Chart 7The Surge In Exports Has Been All About Commodity Prices, Not Increasing Volumes The Surge In Exports Has Been All About Commodity Prices, Not Increasing Volumes The Surge In Exports Has Been All About Commodity Prices, Not Increasing Volumes In contrast to domestic demand, Indonesia’s exports did phenomenally well over the past few quarters. That said, there are signs that those heady days are coming to an end: The main reason exports did so well is that commodity prices went vertically up. Export volumes, on the other hand, stayed quite low. This is also evident in the case of coal and palm oil – Indonesia’s two main export items (Chart 7). Since it’s not the volume that drove up the export revenues, the latter is vulnerable to the whims of global commodity prices – of which Indonesia is a price-taker. And commodity prices, in general, have already begun to soften. China is by far the largest destination for Indonesian exports (22% of total), and demand in the Middle Kingdom has been among main reasons behind the recent surge in Indonesian exports. Yet, the fact that China’s credit and money impulses have turned negative is a major concern for Indonesian exports going forward. If history is of any guide, negative impulses will cause a contraction in Indonesian exports over the next year or so (Chart 8). Odds are therefore that the country’s trade surplus will roll over and the current account balance will slip back to a deficit (Chart 9, top panel). Chart 8Negative Chinese Credit And Money Impulses Will Cause Indonesian Exports To Shrink Negative Chinese Credit And Money Impulses Will Cause Indonesian Exports To Shrink Negative Chinese Credit And Money Impulses Will Cause Indonesian Exports To Shrink Chart 9Indonesia's Trade And Current Account Balances Have Peaked Indonesia's Trade And Current Account Balances Have Peaked Indonesia's Trade And Current Account Balances Have Peaked Chart 10A Slowing Chinese Credit & Fiscal Impulse Is Always A Bad Omen For The Rupiah A Slowing Chinese Credit & Fiscal Impulse Is Always A Bad Omen For The Rupiah A Slowing Chinese Credit & Fiscal Impulse Is Always A Bad Omen For The Rupiah Meanwhile, Indonesia’s financial account is struggling to stay in surplus as capital inflows have dwindled significantly over the past couple of years (Chart 9, middle panel). FDI inflows are also showing few signs of revival (Chart 9, bottom panel). This indicates that Indonesia’s envisioned reforms, under the ‘Omnibus bill’, are yet to gain much traction and produce meaningful improvements in the economy’s structural backdrop. All in all, the outlook for the country’s external accounts is much less sanguine in the months ahead. That will not bode well for the rupiah, which has benefitted from robust external accounts so far. A material drop in Chinese credit and fiscal impulse has never been positive for the Indonesian currency. In the months ahead, therefore, the path of least resistance for the rupiah appears to be down (Chart 10, top panel). The link is via commodity prices (Chart 10, bottom panel). Notably, most capital inflows into Indonesia are in the form of debt capital inflows. Equity inflows are paltry. The reason is straightforward: foreign bond investors like the extremely high real rates that the country has been offering, whereas the equity investors do not. Yet, in the past couple of years, even debt capital inflows have subsided (Chart 9, middle panel). Should foreign investors turn nervous about the rupiah outlook due to falling commodity prices and/or rising US interest rates, those debt inflows would further subside. Deteriorating capital inflows would cause further weakness in the rupiah in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Domestic Bonds Chart 11Indonesian Domestic Bonds' Outperformance Is Late Indonesian Domestic Bonds' Outperformance Is Late Indonesian Domestic Bonds' Outperformance Is Late Indonesian local currency bonds have significantly outperformed their EM counterparts over the past several months (Chart 11, top panel). We have been positive on Indonesian domestic bonds. Going forward, however, the nation’s local bonds will find it difficult to rally in absolute terms and will likely underperform their EM peers. One reason for this is that, given Indonesian yields are already close to post-pandemic lows, it will be harder for them to fall much more. The relative performance of domestic bonds versus their EM peers will also be beset by a vulnerable rupiah – as explained above. The bottom panel of Chart 11 shows that periods of a weaker rupiah are usually associated with Indonesia underperforming overall EM domestic bonds. This is because foreign investors (who hold 21% of Indonesian local bonds) usually head for the exit once the rupiah begins to depreciate. Finally, as was explained in our report last week, various EM assets classes are in for a period of volatility – prompted by a deepening slowdown in China and rising US bond yields. Periods of EM stress do not augur well for Indonesian local bonds’ relative performance vis-à-vis their EM brethren. This is because the relative yield differential of Indonesia with that of EM widens in such periods – as occurred during the 2013 taper tantrum, the 2015 EM slowdown, and the 2020 pandemic (Chart 11, bottom panel). Since another EM risk-off period is around the corner, investors will be well advised to book profits on Indonesian domestic bonds’ recent outperformance and tactically downgrade this market to underweight in an EM domestic bond portfolio. Sovereign Credit Unlike the case of local currency bonds, Indonesia's sovereign credit has metamorphosed into a defensive market over the past several years. Investors now consider Indonesian sovereign credit to be among the safest within EM. This is an upshot of low public debt, including very low foreign currency public indebtedness, and years of orthodox fiscal and monetary policies. Chart 12Indonesian Sovereign Bonds Now Outperform During Risk-Off Periods Indonesian Sovereign Bonds Now Outperform During Risk-Off Periods Indonesian Sovereign Bonds Now Outperform During Risk-Off Periods In previous risk-off periods (such as the GFC in 2008 and the taper tantrum in 2013), Indonesian sovereign credit would typically underperform their EM counterparts. Yet, in more recent episodes (such as the EM slowdown in 2015 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020), Indonesian sovereign credit massively outperformed the EM benchmark. These recent instances suggest that during the oncoming risk-off period investors should stay overweight Indonesian sovereign credit in an EM basket.  Notably, the regime change in Indonesia’s sovereign credit characteristics has led to its relative performance (versus overall EM) being decoupled from the rupiah (Chart 12). While the rupiah remains a cyclical currency, the significant improvement in sovereign creditworthiness has turned Indonesian credit markets into a defensive play within EM. Therefore, a weakness in the rupiah in the months ahead will not jeopardize its relative performance. Share Prices Chart 13Indonesian Bank Stocks Failed To Break Out, While Non-Banks Keep Falling Indonesian Bank Stocks Failed To Break Out, While Non-Banks Keep Falling Indonesian Bank Stocks Failed To Break Out, While Non-Banks Keep Falling The Indonesian equity market is structurally beset by an uneven playing field, where the country’s banking sector has benefitted at the expense of all others. This is a consequence of banks maintaining high real lending rates as well as very wide net interest rate margins for far too long. The outcome is evident in financial and non-financial sectors’ diverging performance over the past decade (Chart 13). Given that the bull market in bank stocks has been contingent on banks’ net interest margins (NIM), any reduction therein will hurt bank stocks (Chart 14). At the same time, maintaining current lending rates and net interest margins will continue to hurt non-financial sectors (i.e., borrowers). In other words, for non-financial sectors to benefit, it will have to come at the expense of banking sector. Since banks and the rest of the stock market have very similar weights in this bourse, this dynamic will make it hard for this market to rally overall in a sustainable manner. Notably, bank stocks have failed to breach their pre-pandemic highs. This is despite net interest margins being quite elevated. The reason is that high real borrowing costs in a weak economy not only discourage credit off-take, but also threaten to raise NPLs further. Indonesian bank stocks are quite expensive as well: their ‘price/book value’ ratio is 2.6 while that of their EM counterparts is 1.1. As such, they will be hard pressed to have another sustainable rally. The other half of Indonesian equity markets, non-financials, are expectedly doing worse in the face of persistently high borrowing costs. So are the small cap stocks – where non-financial firms make up 85% of the market cap (Chart 13, bottom two panels). Notably, since Indonesia is a commodity producer, Indonesian stock prices usually do well during periods of rising commodity prices. Yet, headwinds emanating from weak domestic demand prevented Indonesia from benefitting much from high commodity prices this past year (Chart 15). Going forward, with the dissipating commodity tailwind, the Indonesian market will likely falter anew. Chart 14Any Fall In The Elevated Net Interest Margins Will Hurt Bank Stocks Any Fall In The Elevated Net Interest Margins Will Hurt Bank Stocks Any Fall In The Elevated Net Interest Margins Will Hurt Bank Stocks Chart 15Extremely Restrictive Real Rates Prevented Indonesia From Benefitting From High Commodity Prices Extremely Restrictive Real Rates Prevented Indonesia From Benefitting From High Commodity Prices Extremely Restrictive Real Rates Prevented Indonesia From Benefitting From High Commodity Prices Furthermore, a period of overall EM volatility is also a negative for Indonesian stocks’ absolute and relative performances. Investment Conclusions An impending relapse in commodity prices will herald a weakness in the rupiah. Currency investors should consider going short the rupiah versus the US dollar. In view of the likely weakness in the rupiah, dedicated EM local currency bond portfolios should pare back their exposure to Indonesia and tactically downgrade this market from neutral to underweight. Expected softness in domestic demand in the face of high real rates, faltering commodity prices and an impending volatility in EM assets - all entail that investors should stay underweight this bourse in an EM equity portfolio.   Finally, given the new defensive stature of Indonesian sovereign credit, asset allocators should stay overweight Indonesia in dedicated EM US dollar bond portfolios. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes

Highlights Why have Value stocks underperformed so much during the past decade? The rise in intangible assets is likely the most important reason since traditional valuation metrics are no longer an accurate measure of intrinsic value. Value stocks today have a larger negative tilt to Quality than they did in the past. This has hurt Value due to Quality's outperformance. Value's underperformance is not just the result of the relative performance of a few sectors or industries, although this has played a role. Falling interest rates have not been the main driver of Value’s underperformance as they can only account for a small portion of returns. “Migration”, or mean-reversion in and out of value buckets, has declined since the Great Financial Crisis, possibly because of an increase in monopoly power. But even this cannot fully account for the underperformance since 2012. We propose that investors who wish to invest in Value screen for Quality. They should also express their Value tilts in sectors with few intangibles, such as Energy or Materials. More sophisticated stock pickers can adjust earnings and book values for intangibles. Asset allocators who invest only in indices should stay away from a structural allocation to Value. Feature Chart 1No Premium From Value Stocks Over The Last Four Decades No Premium From Value Stocks Over The Last Four Decades No Premium From Value Stocks Over The Last Four Decades Betting on cheap stocks has been a cornerstone of equity investing for decades. The rationale is simple: Stocks which are undervalued, according to some measure of intrinsic value, will eventually converge up to their fair value, on average, while stocks that are overvalued will converge down, on average. Historically, this bet on mean-reversion has proven successful – low price-to-book stocks have outperformed high price-to-book stocks by more than 3% per annum since 1927. However, the recent decades have put Value investing to the test. The Value factor, as defined by Fama and French, has not provided a structural premium in the US large cap space since the late 1970s (Chart 1, panel 1). Commercial Value indices haven’t been any more successful: Value aggregates by MSCI, Russell, and S&P have either underperformed or performed in line with the market benchmark over the same time frame (Chart 1, panel 2). The current situation presents a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, buying Value could be a tremendous opportunity. By several measures, Value stocks are the most undervalued they have been since the end of the tech bubble, right before they went on a historic run (Chart 2). Academic work has argued that these deep value spreads tend to be positively correlated with long-term outperformance of Value stocks.1 In a world of sky-high valuations and with equities and bonds projected to deliver very low returns over the next decade, a cheap return stream would be a fantastic addition to most portfolios. Chart 2Value Stocks Are Really Cheap Value Stocks Are Really Cheap Value Stocks Are Really Cheap Chart 3   And yet, Value has become so popular, that many investors are now worried that the Value premium may no longer exist. This worry is not without merit. Several studies have shown that factors lose a sizable portion of their premium once they appear in academic literature2  (Chart 3). Other issues, such as the inability of valuation metrics to properly account for intrinsic value in the modern economy, have also led some investors to seriously question whether buying Value indices will deliver excess returns in the future. So what is the right answer? Why has Value underperformed so much? Is the beaten down Value factor a generational buying opportunity? Or will it continue its decline going forward? In this report we try to answer these questions. Using a company-level dataset from our BCA Research Equity Analyzer (EA), as well as drawing on the latest academic research, we assess the evidence behind Five Theories On Value’s Underperformance. Once we determine which explanations have merit and which do not, we conclude by providing some guidelines on how investors should consider the Value factor going forward in our Investment Implications section. A word of caution: We have constructed our sample of companies to roughly resemble the sample used by MSCI World. Thus, the conclusions from our analysis based on the EA dataset should be relevant to Value indices in general. However, be advised that the methodology that EA uses is different from other commercial Value indices. Specifically, the EA methodology is more aggressive in its positioning and uses a wider array of metrics. For clarity, Table 1 shows the metrics used by EA compared to other Value indices. If you wish to know more on how the methodology works, please refer to the Appendix. Table 1Value Factor Methodologies Mythbusting The Value Factor Mythbusting The Value Factor Also, please note that our report will not deal with the cyclical outlook for Value. While it is entirely possible that a period of cyclical growth could help Value stocks outperform, the question we are trying to answer is whether buying cheap versus expensive stocks still provides a structural premium over the long term. While the Global Asset Allocation service does not use the Value versus Growth framework for equity allocation, our colleagues from our Global Investment Strategy service have written extensively on why they believe investors should pivot to Value on a cyclical basis.3 Five Theories On Value’s Underperformance Chart 4More To The Underperformance Of Value Than Sector Tilts More To The Underperformance Of Value Than Sector Tilts More To The Underperformance Of Value Than Sector Tilts Theory #1: The underperformance of Value indices is purely a result of their sector composition Some investors suggest that Value stocks’ large underweight of mega-cap tech, as well as their overweight in Financials and Energy, have been responsible for Value’s woes over the past decade. However, our research suggests that this theory is not entirely correct. A Value index with the same sector and industry weightings as the Developed Markets (DM) benchmark has still underperformed by more than 15% since 2010 (Chart 4, panel 1). Sector and industry composition have been responsible for about a third of the underperformance of the DM Value index. What about excluding the FAANGM stocks? Again, the story is similar. Even when omitting these stocks from our investment universe, Value stocks have still underperformed by almost the same amount as a regular Value composite (Chart 4, panel 2). Finally, we can also look at the performance of cheap versus expensive stocks within each industry. Chart 5A shows that cheap stocks have underperformed expensive stocks in 18 and 17 out the 24 GICS Level 2 industries in DM and in the US, respectively, since 2012 (roughly corresponding to the peak in relative performance in the EA Value index). Even on an equally-weighted basis, which eliminates the effects of large companies, cheap stocks have underperformed expensive stocks in both the average and median industry (Chart 5B). Chart 5 Chart 5 Verdict: Myth. The underperformance of cheap versus expensive stocks has been broad. While sector and industry dynamics have certainly been an important factor, Value's underperformance is not just the result of a few companies, sectors, or industries. Chart 6Value Likes Rising Yields... Value Likes Rising Yields... Value Likes Rising Yields... Theory #2: The decline in interest rates is to blame for the underperformance of Value Another reason used to explain the underperformance of Value is the secular decline in interest rates. The reasoning goes as follows: Cash flows from growth stocks are set to be received further into the future, while cash flows from Value stocks are closer to the present. Using a Discounted Cash Flow model, one can show that all else being equal, a decline in the discount rate should result in a relatively higher increase in the present value for Growth stocks versus Value stocks. There is some evidence in support of this theory. While prior to 2010, Value and interest rates had an inconsistent relationship, the beta of cheap stocks to the monthly change in the 10-year US Treasury yield has increased markedly over the past 10 years (Chart 6, panel 1). On the other hand, the beta of expensive stocks to yields has become increasingly more negative. A similar situation occurs when we use the yield curve. Cheap stocks tend to exhibit higher excess returns whenever it steepens, while expensive stocks do so when it flattens (Chart 6, panel 2). Importantly, these relationships are not purely a result of Value’s exposure to banks. Value stocks excluding financials also show a strong positive relationship to both the 10-year yield and yield curve slope versus their growth counterparts (Chart 7). But while this relationship is statistically significant, it fails to be economically significant. Our analysis shows that the betas to either interest rates or the slope of the yield curve only explain a small fraction of the performance of cheap or expensive stocks (Chart 8). This result is in line with the research from Maloney and Moskowitz, which showed that the vast majority of the decline in Value in recent years could not be explained by interest rates.4 Chart 7...Even When Excluding Financials... ...Even When Excluding Financials... ...Even When Excluding Financials... Chart 8...But Yields Don't Explain Much ...But Yields Don't Explain Much ...But Yields Don't Explain Much   Verdict: Myth. Cheap stocks have an increasingly positive beta to both the 10-year yield and the slope of the yield curve, whereas expensive stocks have an increasingly negative beta. However, while these betas are statistically significant, they can only account for a small portion of Value's underperformance. Theory #3: A decline in market mean-reversion is responsible for the underperformance of Value In a seminal paper, Fama and French describe the process of migration.5 Migration is when stocks move across different value buckets: For example, when stocks in the cheap bucket migrate to the neutral and expensive buckets, and when stocks in the expensive bucket migrate to the neutral or cheap buckets. Historically, this process of mean-reversion has provided a significant share of the Value premium. However, migration has declined significantly over the past decade (Chart 9, panel 1). The amount of market cap migrating each month as a percentage of total market cap has declined from over 12% before the GFC to less than 8% currently. Importantly, this decline in migration has been broad-based. Neither cheap, neutral, nor expensive stocks are moving to other valuation cohorts at the same rates that prevailed in the past (Chart 9, panel 2). The market has become much more ossified: Value stocks remain Value stocks, Neutral stocks remain Neutral stocks, and Growth stocks remain Growth stocks.5 Chart 9What Happens In Value Now Stays In Value What Happens In Value Now Stays In Value What Happens In Value Now Stays In Value Chart 10Market Concentration Could Be The Reason Why Migration Has Declined Market Concentration Could Be The Reason Why Migration Has Declined Market Concentration Could Be The Reason Why Migration Has Declined Why has migration declined? One theory is that industries have increasingly become more monopolistic, which means that it has become harder for new entrants to gain market share (Chart 10). Meanwhile market leaders are able to grow at an above-average pace thanks to their large network effects.6 What has been the role of this decreased migration in the performance of Value? A paper written by Arnott, Harvey, Kalesnik, and Linainmaa showed that while the returns attributable to migration have decreased over the past 15 years, this change is still not strong enough to explain the deep underperformance in Value.7 Our own research assigns it a relatively larger weight, with migration accounting for a little less than half of the underperformance of Value since 20128 (Table 2). Table 2Return Attribution Of Cheap And Expensive Stocks Mythbusting The Value Factor Mythbusting The Value Factor Verdict: Somewhat True. Migration has declined since the GFC, possibly because of an increase in monopoly power. While this decline has certainly played a role in the underperformance of Value, it explains, at most, less than half of the drawdown since 2012. Theory #4: Value has underperformed because it is increasingly a play on junk stocks Chart 11 It is a well-known empirical fact that cheap stocks tend to have lower Quality than expensive stocks. Conceptually this makes sense: Companies with higher profitability, more stability, and less leverage should trade at a valuation premium, whereas low income, high-debt companies should trade at a discount. However, this gap in Quality between cheap and expensive stocks is not always the same. Consider the composition of cheap and expensive stocks in 2000 – the eve of the tech bubble crash. About a third of expensive stocks were also junk (low quality), whereas 36% were quality stocks (Chart 11). Today, this composition is much different: Only about a fifth of the market capitalization of expensive stocks is junk, whereas quality stocks now make up 44% of the overall expensive cohort. On the other hand, the Quality of cheap stocks has deteriorated: Cheap junk stocks are now 37% of the cheap cohort versus 29% in 2000. Importantly, the difference in Quality between cheap and expensive stocks tends to be a good predictor for value returns (Chart 12). A big gap in the Quality factor often implies lower returns of cheap versus expensive stocks, whereas a small gap implies higher returns. These results are in line with similar research which has shown that Quality, or Quality proxies like profitability, can be used to enhance the Value factor.9 Chart 12Value Does Well When The Quality Gap Is Small Value Does Well When The Quality Gap Is Small Value Does Well When The Quality Gap Is Small Why is this the case? As we have discussed in the past, Quality has been one of the best performing factors over the past 30 years - likely driven by powerful behavioral biases as well as by the incentives in the money management industry.10 As a result, taking an overly negative position on this factor over a long enough period eventually eats away at the Value premium. Verdict: True. Value stocks today have a larger negative tilt to Quality than they did in the past. This negative tilt has hurt Value as excess returns of cheap stocks tend to be dependent on their Quality gap to expensive stocks. Theory #5: Value has underperformed because traditional valuation metrics are no longer a reliable indicator of intrinsic value How exactly to measure whether a company is cheap or expensive has been a matter of debate since the very beginnings of Value investing. Benjamin Graham famously cautioned against using book value as a measure of intrinsic value, preferring a more holistic approach. Today most index providers use a combination of traditional valuation metrics like price-to-book and price-to-earnings to build Value indices. It is fair to ask if these measures are still relevant for today’s companies. Intangible investment has become a much larger part of the economy, having surpassed tangible investment in the US in the late 1990s (Chart 13). However, both US GAAP and IFRS are very restrictive on the capitalization of R&D activities, which are known to originate valuable intangible assets.11 Other types of intangible capital such as unique production processes or customer lists are normally also expensed within SG&A expenses and are never capitalized unless there is an acquisition. This means that both the book value and earnings of intangible-heavy companies could be inadequate estimates of their true intrinsic value. Chart 13 Is there any evidence that this is the case? Using our EA dataset, we confirm that expensive companies generally have higher R&D expenditures as a percent of sales than cheap companies (Chart 14). Importantly, we see that the performance of Value within low R&D stocks is much better than the performance within high R&D stocks (Chart 15). This is line with the work of Dugar and Pozharny, who found that the value relevance for both earnings and book values has declined for high intangible companies, while it has stayed stable for low-intangible companies.12 This suggests that traditional valuation measures are losing their relevance as intangible-heavy companies become a larger part of the economy.13 Chart 14Growth Stocks Spend More On Intangibles Growth Stocks Spend More On Intangibles Growth Stocks Spend More On Intangibles Chart 15Are Traditional Metrics Underestimating Intrinsic Value In High-Intangible Companies? Are Traditional Metrics Underestimating Intrinsic Value In High-Intangible Companies? Are Traditional Metrics Underestimating Intrinsic Value In High-Intangible Companies? The effect of intangibles on traditional valuation metrics can also give us a clue as to why Value has performed well in some industries but not in others. Using a measure of intangible intensity derived by Dugar and Pozharny14 – which includes identifiable intangible assets, intellectual capital (as proxied by R&D spending), and organizational capital (as proxied by SG&A spending) – we can see that Value has done relatively better in industries with lower intangible intensity while it has performed relatively worse in industries with higher intangible intensity (Chart 16). Chart 16 Verdict: True. Value performs better when considering only companies with low R&D expenses or industries with low-intangible intensity. This suggests that the rise in intangible assets might be responsible for the underperformance of cheap stocks, as traditional valuation metrics may no longer be an accurate measure of intrinsic value in intangible-heavy companies or industries. Investment Implications Chart 17Investors Can Invest In Value Within Low-Intangible Sectors Investors Can Invest In Value Within Low-Intangible Sectors Investors Can Invest In Value Within Low-Intangible Sectors What does our analysis mean for investors? Aside from the most well-known practices to improve the performance of Value – for example, using a wide array of valuation metrics, exploiting value in small stocks, or using equal-weighted indices to avoid the effect of sector weightings or large companies15 – we would recommend investors first screen cheap stocks for quality to avoid Value traps. Investors should also account for the failure of traditional metrics to measure intangible assets. This can be done in two ways: The first is to take Value tilts only on intangible-light sectors such as Energy and Materials – for example, allocating only to the cheapest oil and materials stocks. For the last decade, the cheapest Energy and Materials companies have outperformed their respective sectors, even while overall Value has cratered (Chart 17). Alternatively, more sophisticated stock pickers can adjust valuation ratios to account for intangibles. There is some promise to this approach. Arnott, Harvey, Kalesnik, and Linainmaa showed that even a crude adjustment to the HML (High-Minus-Low) index consistently outperforms the regular value factor16 (Chart 18). What about asset allocators who invest only in broad indices? We would recommend that they stay away from structural allocations to commercial Value indices altogether. While it is true that sector rotations or interest-rate movements could benefit value on a short-term basis, in the long term, the negative Quality tilt of Value stocks should be a drag on returns. Additionally, it remains a big risk that indices based on traditional measures are underestimating intangible value. This underestimation will only get worse as the economy becomes more digitalized. Investors who wish to take advantage of trends like higher inflation or rising interest rates should just bet on cyclical sectors. So far this has been the right approach. Just this year, even though interest rates have increased by more than 60 basis points, and both Financials and Energy have outperformed IT by 13% and 30% respectively, Value stocks have underperformed Growth stocks (Chart 19). Chart 18Adjusting For Intangibles Improves Value Adjusting For Intangibles Improves Value Adjusting For Intangibles Improves Value Chart 19Rates Rose, Financials And Energy Outperformed IT, And Yet Value Underperformed Growth Rates Rose, Financials And Energy Outperformed IT, And Yet Value Underperformed Growth Rates Rose, Financials And Energy Outperformed IT, And Yet Value Underperformed Growth Appendix A Note On Methodology The Equity Analyzer service is a stock picking tool that applies a top-down approach to bottom-up stock picking. The crux of the platform is the BCA Score, which is a weighted composite of 30 cross sectionally percentile ranked factors. Within this report we focus on the value (price-to-earnings, price-to-book, price-to-cash, price-to-cash flow and price-to-sales) and quality (accruals, profitability, asset growth, and return on equity) factors used in the BCA Score model. Each of the factors are cross sectionally-percentile ranked, within the specified universe, where a score of 100% is best ranked stock according to that particular score. From here, we create the value and quality scores used in this report by equal-weighting and combining the scores from each value and quality factors. It is important to note that a high score does not mean the underlying value is high, but that it exhibits a better characteristic for forecasting future excess returns. For example, the stock with the highest value score would be considered the cheapest. The scores are re-calculated each period and applied on a one-period forward basis when calculating returns. To keep the analysis comparable the MSCI Data and relevant to our clients, we limit the universe of stocks to only those with a market capitalization greater than 1 billion USD. Also, unless otherwise specified, the scores are market-cap weighted when aggregated and all returns are in US dollars.   Juan Correa-Ossa, CFA Editor/Strategist juanc@bcaresearch.com Lucas Laskey Senior Quantitative Analyst lucasl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Clifford Asness, John M. Liew, Lasse Heje Pedersen, and Ashwin K Thapar, “Deep Value,” The Journal of Portfolio Management, 47-64 (11-40), 2021.2   2  Please see Andrew Y. Chen and Mihail Velikov, “Zeroing in on the Expected Returns of Anomalies,” Finance and Economic Discussion Series 2020-039, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Report, “Pivot To Value,” dated September 18, 2020. 4 Please see Thomas Maloney and Tobias J. Moskowitz, “Value and Interest Rates: Are Rates to Blame for Value’s Torments?” The Journal of Portfolio Management, 47-6 (65-87), 2021. 5 Please see Eugene Fama and Kenneth French, “Migration,” Financial Analyst Journal, 63-3 (48-58), 2007. 6 Please see Robert D. Arnott, Campbell R. Harvey, Vitali Kalesnik and Juhani T. Linainmaa, “Reports of Value’s death May Be Greatly Exaggerated,” Financial Analyst Journal, 77-1 (44-67), 2021. 7  Please see Robert D. Arnott, Campbell R. Harvey, Vitali Kalesnik and Juhani T. Linainmaa (2021). 8  Much like us, Lev and Srivastava assign a relatively bigger role to the decline in migration. For more details, please see Baruch Lev and Anup Srivastava, “Explaining the Recent Failure of Value Investing,” NYU Stern School of Business (2019). 9  Please see Clifford Asness, Andrea Frazzini, Ronen Israel and Tobias Moskowitz, “Fact, Fiction, and Value Investing,” The Journal of Portfolio Management, 42-1 (34-52), 2015. 10 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets,” dated September 8, 2020. 11 US GAAP requires both Research and Development costs to be expensed. IFRS prohibits capitalization of Research cost but allows it for Development costs provided that some conditions are met. For a further discussion on the accounting treatment of intangibles, please see Amitabh Dugar and Jacob Pozharny, “Equity Investing in the Age of Intangibles,” Financial Analyst Journal, 77-2 (21-42), 2021. 12 Please see Amitabh Dugar and Jacob Pozharny (2021). 13This also follows from research from Lev and Srivastava which showed that while capitalizing intangibles did not improve the value factor in the 1970s, it increased returns substantially after the 1990s. For more details, please see Baruch Lev and Anup Srivastava (2019). 14This measure excludes Banks, Diversified Financials, and Insurance. For more details, please see Amitabh Dugar and Jacob Pozharny (2021). 15Please see Clifford Asness, Andrea Frazzini, Ronen Israel and Tobias Moskowitz (2015). 16Please see Robert D. Arnott, Campbell R. Harvey, Vitali Kalesnik and Juhani T. Linainmaa (2021).  

Highlights US growth will slow next year, not because demand will falter, but because supply-side constraints will prevent the economy from producing as much output as households and businesses want to buy. If aggregate demand exceeds aggregate supply, the price level will rise. We argue that the US aggregate demand curve is currently quite steep. This implies that the price level may need to rise a lot to restore balance to the economy. In fact, if the aggregate demand curve is not just steep but upward-sloping, which is quite possible, there may be no price level that brings aggregate demand in line with supply; the US economy could go supernova. When supply is the binding constraint to growth, investors need to throw the old playbook for dealing with growth slowdowns out the window. Rather than positioning for lower bond yields, investors should position for higher yields. Rather than expecting a stronger dollar, investors should expect a weaker one. Rather than favoring growth stocks, large caps, and defensives, investors should favor value stocks, small caps, and cyclicals. The Binding Constraint To Growth Is Now Supply After a post-Delta wave rebound in Q4, the US economy is expected to slow over the course of 2022. The Bloomberg consensus is for US growth to decelerate from 4.9% in 2021Q4 to 4.1% in 2022Q1, 3.9% in 2022Q2, 3.0% in 2022Q3, and 2.5% in 2022Q4. Growth in the first quarter of 2023 is expected to dip further to 2.3%. We agree that US growth will slow next year but think the market narrative around this slowdown is misguided. Chart 1Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand The standard market playbook for dealing with an economic slowdown is to position for lower bond yields, a stronger US dollar, and a decline in commodity prices. On the equity side, the playbook calls for shifting equity exposure from cyclicals to defensives, favoring large caps over small caps, and growth stocks over value stocks. There are two major problems with this narrative. First, growth is peaking at much higher levels than before and is unlikely to return to trend at least until the second half of 2023. Second, and more importantly, US growth will slow due to supply-side constraints rather than inadequate demand. US final demand will remain robust for the foreseeable future. Households are sitting on $2.3 trillion in excess savings, equivalent to 15% of annual consumption (Chart 1). The household deleveraging cycle is over. After initially plunging during the pandemic, credit card balances are rising (Chart 2). Banks are falling over themselves to make consumer loans (Chart 3). Chart 2Revolving Credit On The Rise Again Revolving Credit On The Rise Again Revolving Credit On The Rise Again Chart 3Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumers Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumers Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumers Chart 4A Record Rise In Household Net Worth A Record Rise In Household Net Worth A Record Rise In Household Net Worth Household net worth has risen by over 100% of GDP since the start of the pandemic (Chart 4). As we discussed two weeks ago, the wealth effect alone could boost annual consumer spending by up to 4% of GDP. Investment demand should remain strong. Business inventories are near record low levels (Chart 5). Core capital goods orders, a leading indicator for corporate capex, have soared (Chart 6). Chart 5Business Inventories Are Near Record Low Levels Business Inventories Are Near Record Low Levels Business Inventories Are Near Record Low Levels Chart 6Rise In Durable Goods Orders Bodes Well For Capex Rise In Durable Goods Orders Bodes Well For Capex Rise In Durable Goods Orders Bodes Well For Capex Chart 7The Homeowner Vacancy Rate Is Signaling The Need For More Homebuilding The Homeowner Vacancy Rate Is Signaling The Need For More Homebuilding The Homeowner Vacancy Rate Is Signaling The Need For More Homebuilding The Dodge Momentum Index, which tracks planned nonresidential construction, rose to a 13-year high in October. The home­owner vacancy rate is at multi-decade lows, signifying the need for more homebuilding (Chart 7). While increased investment will augment the nation’s capital stock down the road, the short-to-medium term effect will be to inflate demand. Policy Won’t Tighten Enough To Cool The Economy What is the mechanism that will push down aggregate demand growth towards potential GDP growth? It is unlikely to be policy. While budget deficits will narrow over the next few years, the IMF still expects the US cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit to be nearly 3% of GDP larger between 2022 and 2026 than it was between 2014 and 2019 (Chart 8). Chart 8 Chart 9The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation   As Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, writes in this week’s US Political Strategy report, the passage of the $550 billion infrastructure bill has increased, not decreased, the odds of President Biden and the Democrats passing their social spending bill via the partisan budget reconciliation process. On the monetary side, the Federal Reserve will finish tapering asset purchases next June and begin raising rates shortly thereafter. However, the Fed has no intention of raising rates aggressively. Most FOMC members see the Fed funds rate rising to only 2.5% this cycle (Chart 9). The “dots” call for only one rate hike in 2022 and three rate hikes in both 2023 and 2024. Investors expect rates to rise even less by end-2024 than the Fed foresees (Chart 10).   Chart 10 The Inflation Outlook Hinges On The Slope Of The Aggregate Demand Curve If policy tightening will not suffice in cooling demand, the economy will overheat and inflation will rise. But by how much will inflation increase? The answer is of great importance to investors. It also hinges on a seemingly technical question: What is the slope of the aggregate demand curve? As Chart 11 illustrates, prices will rise more if the aggregate demand curve is steep than if it is flat. Chart 11 Chart 12Wages Rose Faster Than Prices During The Inflationary Late-60s and 70s Wages Rose Faster Than Prices During The Inflationary Late-60s and 70s Wages Rose Faster Than Prices During The Inflationary Late-60s and 70s It is tempting to think of the aggregate demand curve in the same way one might think of the demand curve for, say, apples. When the price of apples rises, there is both a substitution and an income effect. An increase in the price of apples will cause shoppers to substitute away from apples towards oranges. In addition, if apples are so-called “normal goods,” shoppers will buy fewer apples in response to lower real incomes. This chain of reasoning breaks down at the aggregate level. When economists say the price level has risen, they are referring to all prices; hence, there is no substitution effect. Moreover, since one person’s spending is another’s income, rising prices do not necessarily translate into lower overall real incomes. Granted, if nominal wages are sticky, as they usually are in the short run, an unanticipated increase in prices will reduce real wage income. However, this will be offset by higher business income. Over time, wages tend to catch up with prices. In fact, wage growth usually outstrips price growth during inflationary periods. For example, real wages rose during the late-1960s and 70s but fell during the disinflationary 1980s (Chart 12). Textbook Reasons For A Downward-Sloping Aggregate Demand Curve According to standard economic theory, there are three main reasons why aggregate demand curves are downward-sloping: The Pigou Effect: Higher prices erode the purchasing power of money, resulting in a negative wealth effect. The Keynes Effect: Higher prices reduce the real money supply. This pushes up real interest rates, leading to lower investment spending. The Mundell-Fleming Effect: Higher real rates push up the value of the currency, causing net exports to decline. None of these three factors are particularly important for the US these days. Chart 13Base Money Has Swollen Since The Subprime Crisis Base Money Has Swollen Since The Subprime Crisis Base Money Has Swollen Since The Subprime Crisis Strictly speaking, the Pigou wealth effect applies only to “base money,” also known as “outside money.” Outside money includes cash notes, coins, and bank reserves. Inside money such as bank deposits are not included in the Pigou effect because while an increase in consumer prices decreases the real value of bank deposits, it also decreases the real value of commercial bank liabilities.1  In the US, the monetary base has swollen from 6% of GDP in 2008 to 28% of GDP as a result of the Fed’s QE programs (Chart 13). Nevertheless, even if one were to generously assume a wealth effect of 10% from changes in monetary holdings, this would still imply that a 1% increase in consumer prices would reduce spending by only 0.03% of GDP. Simply put, the Pigou effect is just not all that big. Chart 14 In contrast to the Pigou effect, the Keynes effect has historically had a significant impact on the business cycle. However, the importance of the Keynes effect faded following the Global Financial Crisis as the Fed found itself up against the zero lower bound on interest rates. When interest rates are very low, there is little to distinguish money from bonds. Rather than holding money as a medium of exchange (i.e., for financing transactions), households and businesses end up holding money mainly as a store of wealth. In the presence of the zero bound, the demand for money becomes perfectly elastic with respect to the interest rate (Chart 14). As a result, changes in the real money supply have no effect on interest rates, and by extension, interest-rate sensitive spending. And if a decline in the real money supply does not push up interest rates, this undermines the Mundell-Fleming effect as well. Could The Aggregate Demand Curve Be Upward-Sloping? The discussion above, though rather theoretical in nature, highlights an important practical point: The aggregate demand curve may be quite steep. This means that the price level might need to rise a lot to equalize aggregate demand with aggregate supply. Chart 15US Real Bond Yields Hitting Record Lows US Real Bond Yields Hitting Record Lows US Real Bond Yields Hitting Record Lows In fact, one can easily envision a scenario where a rising price level boosts spending; that is, where the demand curve is not just steep but upward-sloping. One normally assumes that higher inflation will prompt central banks to raise rates by more than inflation has risen, leading to higher real rates. However, if the Fed drags its feet in hiking rates, as it is wont to do given its concerns about the zero bound, rising inflation will translate into a decline in real rates. Lower rates will boost demand, leading to higher inflation, and even lower real rates. In addition, lower real rates will benefit debtors, who tend to have a higher marginal propensity to spend than creditors. This, too, will also boost aggregate demand. It is striking in this regard that real bond yields hit a record low this week, with the 10-year TIPS yield falling to -1.17% and the 30-year yield drooping to -0.57% (Chart 15). Black Holes Vs. Supernovas Chart 16 In the case where the aggregate demand curve is upward-sloping, there is no stable equilibrium (Chart 16). If demand falls short of supply, demand will continue to shrink as the price level declines, leading to ever-rising unemployment. Unless policymakers intervene with stimulus, the economy will sink into a deflationary black hole. In contrast, if demand exceeds supply, demand will continue to rise as the price level increases exponentially. The economy will go supernova. Tick Tock Young stars fuse hydrogen into helium, releasing excess energy in the process. After the star has run out of hydrogen, if it is big enough, it will start fusing helium into heavier elements such as carbon and oxygen. The process of nucleosynthesis continues until it reaches iron. That is the end of the line. Fusing elements heavier than iron requires a net input of energy. Unable to generate enough external pressure through fusion, the star loses its battle to gravity. The core collapses, spewing material deep into interstellar space (a good thing since your body is mainly made from this stardust). Observing the star from afar, one would be hard-pressed to see anything abnormal until it explodes. The path to becoming a supernova is highly non-linear. The same is true for inflation. Just like a star with an ample supply of hydrogen, the Fed can burn through its credibility for a while longer. During the 1960s, it took four years for inflation to take off after the economy had reached full employment (Chart 17). By that time, the unemployment rate was two percentage points below NAIRU. Most of today’s inflation is confined to durable goods. This is not a sustainable source of inflation. The durable goods sector is the only part of the CPI where prices usually fall over time (Chart 18). Chart 17Inflation Spiked In The 1960s Only Once The Unemployment Rate Had Fallen Far Below Equilibrium Inflation Spiked In The 1960s Only Once The Unemployment Rate Had Fallen Far Below Equilibrium Inflation Spiked In The 1960s Only Once The Unemployment Rate Had Fallen Far Below Equilibrium Chart 18Inflation Has Been Concentrated In Durable Goods, A Sector Where Prices Usually Fall Over Time Inflation Has Been Concentrated In Durable Goods, A Sector Where Prices Usually Fall Over Time Inflation Has Been Concentrated In Durable Goods, A Sector Where Prices Usually Fall Over Time To get inflation to go up and stay up in modern service-based economies, wages need to rise briskly. While US wage growth has picked up, the bulk of the increase has been among low-wage workers, particularly in the services and hospitality sector (Chart 19). Chart 19Wage Growth Has Picked Up, But Mainly At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution Wage Growth Has Picked Up, But Mainly At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution Wage Growth Has Picked Up, But Mainly At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution The most likely scenario for next year is that firms will simply ration output, fearful that raising prices too quickly will hurt brand loyalty and trigger accusations of price gouging. Shortages will persist, but this time they will be increasingly concentrated in the service sector. Such a state of affairs will not last, however. Competition for workers will cause wages to rise much more than they have so far. Keen to protect profit margins, firms will start jacking up prices. A wage-price spiral will develop. The US economy could go supernova. Investment Conclusions Chart 20Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Near The Bottom End Of The Fed's Comfort Zone Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Near The Bottom End Of The Fed's Comfort Zone Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Near The Bottom End Of The Fed's Comfort Zone US growth will slow next year, not because demand will falter, but because supply-side constraints will prevent the economy from producing as much output as households and businesses want to buy. This means that the old playbook for dealing with growth slowdowns needs to be thrown out the window. Rather than positioning for lower bond yields, investors should position for higher yields. Rather than expecting a stronger dollar, investors should expect a weaker one. Rather than favoring growth stocks, large caps, and defensives, investors should favor value stocks, small caps, and cyclicals. While inflation expectations have recovered from their pandemic lows, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is still near the bottom end of the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 20). Rising inflation expectations will lift long-term bond yields, justifying a short duration stance in fixed-income portfolios. Higher bond yields will benefit value stocks. Chart 21 shows that there has been a strong correlation between the relative performance of growth and value stocks and the 30-year bond yield this year. Rising input prices will make the US export sector less competitive, leading to a weaker dollar. Historically, non-US stocks have done well when the dollar has been weakening (Chart 22). Chart 21The Relative Performance of Value Stocks Has Closely Tracked Bond Yields This Year The Relative Performance of Value Stocks Has Closely Tracked Bond Yields This Year The Relative Performance of Value Stocks Has Closely Tracked Bond Yields This Year Chart 22Non-US Stocks Tend To Do Best When The US Dollar Is Weakening Non-US Stocks Tend To Do Best When The US Dollar Is Weakening Non-US Stocks Tend To Do Best When The US Dollar Is Weakening As for the overall stock market, with the Fed still in the dovish camp, it is too early to turn negative on equities. An equity bear market is coming, but not until rising inflation forces the Fed to step up the pace of rate hikes. That will probably not happen until mid-2023. Short Gilt Trade Activated We noted last week that we would go short the 10-year UK Gilt if the yield broke below 0.85%. Our limit order was activated on November 5th and we are now short this security.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  To distinguish between inside and outside money, one should ask where the liability resides. If the liability resides within the private sector, it is inside money. By convention, central bank reserves are classified as outside money. However, one could argue that since taxpayers ultimately own the central bank, an increase in the price level will benefit taxpayers by eroding the real value of the central bank’s liability. If one were to take this view, the Pigou effect would be even weaker. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Image Special Trade Recommendations Image Current MacroQuant Model Scores Image

Highlights Equity valuations are extremely stretched versus bonds, so there is little wiggle room for bonds to sell off before pulling down large tracts of the stock market. We estimate that bond yields can rise by no more than 30 bps, before the Fed is forced to talk them back down again. Starting from an earnings yield that is extreme versus its history, we should prudently assume that the prospective long-term real return from equities will be far below the current earnings yield of 4.6 percent, and closer to zero, even if not actually negative. In capitalist economies, gluts may or may not lead to shortages; but shortages always lead to gluts. In other words, the current inflation is sowing the seeds of its own destruction. Hence, we reiterate our structural recommendation to overweight US T-bonds versus US TIPS. Fractal analysis: Cotton, and Polish equities. Feature Chart of the WeekTech Stocks Have Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price One-For-One Tech Stocks Have Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price One-For-One Tech Stocks Have Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price One-For-One Equity valuations are extremely stretched versus bonds. The upshot is that there is little wiggle room for bonds to sell off before pulling down large tracts of the stock market. This is not just an abstract hypothesis – it is an empirical fact, as recent market action is making painfully clear. Since February, the global tech sector has tracked the 30-year T-bond price almost one-for-one. The near perfect fit proves that the tech (and broader growth stock) rally has been entirely premised on the bond market rally. Hence, on the three occasions that bonds have sold off sharply – including in the last couple of weeks – tech stocks have sold off sharply too (Chart of the Week). Put simply, the performance of the tech sector is being driven by the change in its valuation, and the change in its valuation is being driven by the change in the bond yield (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Tech Stock Valuations Are Being Driven By The Bond Yield Tech Stock Valuations Are Being Driven By The Bond Yield Tech Stock Valuations Are Being Driven By The Bond Yield Of course, stock prices are also premised on earnings. So, given enough time, rising earnings can make valuations less stretched, adding more wiggle room for bonds to sell off. The trouble is that a change in earnings happens much more gradually than can a change in valuation – a 10 percent rise in earnings can take a year, whereas a 10 percent fall in valuation can happen in a week. Bond Yields Remain The Dominant Driver Of The Stock Market For the next few months at least, the movement in bond yields will remain the dominant driver of the most stretched parts of the stock market and, by extension, the overall market itself. This is especially true for the growth-heavy S&P 500 which, since March, has been tracking the 30-year T-bond price one-for-one (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The S&P 500 Has Also Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price One-For-One The S&P 500 Has Also Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price One-For-One The S&P 500 Has Also Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price One-For-One The key question for investors is, what is the upper limit to bond yields before stock market damage causes the Federal Reserve to talk them down again? To answer this question, our working assumption is that a 15 percent drawdown in growth stocks would damage the growth-heavy S&P 500 enough – and thereby worsen ‘financial conditions’ enough – for the Fed to change its tone. Based on this year’s very tight relationship between tech stocks and the 30-year T-bond yield, a 15 percent drawdown would occur if the 30-year T-bond yield increased to 2.4 percent from 2.1 percent today (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Fed's 'Pain Point' Is Only 30 Basis Points Away The Fed's 'Pain Point' Is Only 30 Basis Points Away The Fed's 'Pain Point' Is Only 30 Basis Points Away This confirms our view that the resistance level to long-duration bond yields is around 30 bps above current levels, equivalent to around 1.8 percent on the 10-year T-bond yield. More About The ‘Negative Equity Risk Premium’ Our recent report The Equity Risk Premium Turns Negative For The First Time Since 2002 caused quite a stir. So, let’s elaborate and clarify the arguments we made about the equity risk premium (ERP) – the estimated excess return that stocks will deliver over bonds over a long investment horizon, such as 10 years. Many investors estimate the ERP by taking the stock market’s earnings yield – currently 4.6 percent in the US1 – and subtracting the real 10-year bond yield – currently -0.9 percent on US Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). At first glance, this presents a very generous ERP of 5.5 percent. So, equities are attractively valued versus bonds, right? Wrong. The glaring error is that the earnings yield estimates the stock market’s prospective return only if the earnings yield starts and ends at the same level. If it does not, then the prospective return could be very different to the earnings yield. For example, imagine that the stock market was trading at a bubble price-to-earnings multiple of 100, meaning an earnings yield of 1 percent. Clearly, from such a bubble valuation, nobody would expect the market to return 1 percent. Instead, as the bubble burst, and valuations normalised, the prospective return would be deeply negative. It follows that when, as now, the earnings yield is extreme versus its history, we must build in some prudent normalisation to estimate the prospective return. The question is, how? One approach is to use history to inform us of the likely normalisation. Chart I-5 does this using the ‘best-fit’ relationship between the earnings yield at each point through 1990-2011 and subsequent 10-year real return from each starting point. Using the best-fit for this specific episode, the current earnings yield of 4.6 percent implies a prospective 10-year real return not of 4.6 percent, but of -1.1 percent. Chart I-5Based On History, The Current Earnings Yield Implies A Prospective 10-Year Real Return Much Less Than 4.6 Percent Based On History, The Current Earnings Yield Implies A Prospective 10-year Real Return Much Less Than 4.6 Percent Based On History, The Current Earnings Yield Implies A Prospective 10-year Real Return Much Less Than 4.6 Percent Yet this best-fit approach meets a common reproach – that the best-fit for this specific episode is massively distorted by the dot com bubble peak and the global financial crisis (GFC) trough occurring (by coincidence) almost 10 years apart. We can counter this reproach in two ways. First, the best-fit relationship is much better than the raw earnings yield even for undistorted 10-year periods such as 1995-2005 or 2011-2021. Better still, we can change the prospective return from 10 years to 7 years and thereby remove the dot com bubble peak to GFC trough distortion. Chart I-6 shows that this 7-year best-fit relationship also works much better than the raw earnings yield. Chart I-6Based On History, The Current Earnings Yield Implies A Prospective 7-Year Real Return Much Less Than 4.6 Percent Based On History, The Current Earnings Yield Implies A Prospective 7-year Real Return Much Less Than 4.6 Percent Based On History, The Current Earnings Yield Implies A Prospective 7-year Real Return Much Less Than 4.6 Percent Admittedly, the best-fit comes from just one episode in history, and there is no certainty that the 10-year and 7-year relationships that applied during that one episode should apply through 2021-31 and 2021-28 respectively. Nevertheless, starting from an earnings yield that is extreme versus its history, as is the case now, we should prudently assume that the prospective long-term real return from equities will be far below 4.6 percent, and closer to zero, even if not actually negative. Will The ‘Real’ Real Yield Please Stand Up Measuring the ERP also requires an estimate of the prospective real return on bonds. This part should be easy because the yield on the US 10-year TIPS – currently -0.9 percent – is the guaranteed 10-year real return of buying and holding that investment. It is derived by taking the yield on the 10-year T-bond – currently 1.5 percent – and subtracting the market’s expected rate of inflation over the next 10 years – currently 2.4 percent. But the equivalent real return on the much larger conventional bond market could be quite different. In this case, it will be the 10-year T-bond yield minus the actual rate of inflation over the next 10 years. To the extent that the actual rate of inflation turns out less than the expected rate of 2.4 percent, the real return on the T-bond will turn out higher than that on the TIPS. In fact, this has consistently turned out to be the case. The market has consistently overestimated the inflation rate over the subsequent 10 years, meaning that the real return on T-bonds has been around 1 percent higher than that on TIPS (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Will The 'Real' Real Yield Please Stand Up Will The 'Real' Real Yield Please Stand Up Will The 'Real' Real Yield Please Stand Up Yet given the current surge in inflation, and no end in sight for supply chain disruptions and bottlenecks, is it plausible that the next ten years’ rate of inflation will be lower than 2.4 percent? The answer is yes. Because, as my colleague Peter Berezin points out: in capitalist economies, gluts may or may not lead to shortages; but shortages always lead to gluts. And gluts always cause prices to collapse. In other words, the current inflation is sowing the seeds of its own destruction. Hence, we reiterate our structural recommendation to overweight US T-bonds versus US TIPS. The Cotton Is Stretched, And So Are Polish Equities Talking of shortages, cotton now adds to the list of commodities in which supply bottlenecks have raised prices to extremes. Cotton prices have reached a 10-year high due to weather conditions in the US (the world’s biggest cotton producer) combined with shipping disruptions. However, with cotton now exhibiting extreme fragility on its combined 130/260-day fractal structure, there is a high likelihood of a price reversal in the coming months when the shortage turns into a glut (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Cotton Is Stretched The Cotton Is Stretched The Cotton Is Stretched Meanwhile, the bank-heavy Polish equity market has surged on the back of the spectacular outperformance of its banks sector. This strong uptrend has now reached the point of fragility on its 130-day fractal structure that has indicated several previous reversals (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Poland's Outperformance Is Stretched Poland's Outperformance Is Stretched Poland's Outperformance Is Stretched Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is to underweight the Warsaw General Index versus the Eurostoxx 600, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 6 percent.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Based on the 12-month forward earnings yield. Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural And Thematic Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades     Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area   Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations   Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations      

Highlights Recommended Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify  The global economy will continue to grow at an above-trend rate over the next 12 months and central banks will remove accommodation only slowly.But the second year of a bull market is often tricky: Growth slows after its initial rebound, and monetary policy starts to be tightened, amid rising inflation.Equities are likely to outperform bonds over the next 12 months, driven by improving earnings, but at a slower pace than over the past year and with higher volatility.We continue to recommend only a cautiously optimistic stance on equities, with an overweight in US equities, and underweight in Europe. Our sector overweights are a mix of cyclicals (Industrials), plays on higher rates (Financials), and selective defensives (Health Care).China is likely to announce a stimulus to cushion the impact from Evergrande, which might push up oversold Chinese stocks. We close our underweight on Chinese equities, but raise them only to neutral as the real estate sector looks vulnerable. That could be bad news for commodities and the rest of Emerging Markets, which we cut to underweight.The Fed is likely to announce tapering this quarter, and raise rates in December 2022. This is likely to push up 10-year Treasury yields to 2-2.25% by then, and so we remain underweight duration.Investment-grade credit is expensive, but B-rated high-yield bonds still look attractive as defaults continue to decline. EM corporate debt is riskier post-Evergrande, but higher-rated sovereign dollar debt offers a good spread pickup.OverviewThe second year of a bull market is often tricky. Growth starts to slow after its initial rebound, and central banks move towards tightening policy. This does not signal the end of the bull market, but equity returns in Year 2 are typically lacklustre (Table 1).That is exactly the situation markets face now. Growth has been surprising on the downside, and inflation on the upside over the past few months (Chart 1). Table 1Year 2 Of Bull Markets Often Has Only Weak Returns Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify   Chart 1Growth Surprising On The Downside, Inflation On The Upside Growth Surprising On The Downside, Inflation On The Upside Growth Surprising On The Downside, Inflation On The Upside  Our basic investment stance remains that the global economy will continue to grow at an above-trend rate over the next 12 months (as the consensus forecasts – Chart 2), and that central banks will remove accommodation only slowly. We can see no signs of a recession on the 18-to-24-month horizon and, as Chart 3 shows, equities almost always outperform bonds except during and in the run-up to recessions. Chart 2But Growth Will Continue To Be Above Trend But Growth Will Continue To Be Above Trend But Growth Will Continue To Be Above Trend   Chart 3Equities Outpeform Bonds Except Around Recessions Equities Outpeform Bonds Except Around Recessions Equities Outpeform Bonds Except Around Recessions  This justifies a moderately pro-risk stance, with overweights in equities and (selectively) credit, and a big underweight in government bonds. But the risks to this sanguine view are rising, and the next few months could be choppy. Stay bullish, but keep a close eye on what could go wrong.The slowdown in growth is largely because manufacturing boomed last year and now simply the pace of growth is decelerating. Manufacturing PMIs are (mostly) still above 50, but have fallen from their peaks (Chart 4). Supply-chain bottlenecks have also dented production. And consumers will spend less on durables and more on services, as lockdowns are eased.We have emphasized that the $2.5 trillion of excess savings in the US will boost spending over coming quarters. But enhanced unemployment benefits have now ended and most of the savings left are with richer households who have a lower propensity to spend (see page 9 for more on this). Covid also remains a risk: Cases are stickily high in some countries and consumers are still not 100% confident about going out to dine and for entertainment (Chart 5). Chart 4PMIs Falling But Mostly Still Above 50 PMIs Falling But Mostly Still Above 50 PMIs Falling But Mostly Still Above 50   Chart 5Consumers Still A Bit Wary About Going Out Consumers Still A Bit Wary About Going Out Consumers Still A Bit Wary About Going Out  China is an increasing risk to growth. Its economy has been slowing all year as a result of monetary tightening (Chart 6) and this may be exacerbated by the fallout from Evergrande. The Chinese authorities are likely to announce a stimulus package to offset the slowdown (which is why we are neutralizing our underweight on Chinese equities). But the stimulus will probably be only moderate and targeted, and they will not allow a renewed boom in real estate (as we explain on page 11), which has been a significant driver of Chinese growth in recent years (Chart 7). This could hurt the economies of Emerging Markets and other commodity producers, which depend on Chinese demand. Chart 6China Has Been Slowing All Year China Has Been Slowing All Year China Has Been Slowing All Year   Chart 7Real Estate Has Been A Big Driver Of Chinese Growth Real Estate Has Been A Big Driver Of Chinese Growth Real Estate Has Been A Big Driver Of Chinese Growth  At the same time that growth is slowing, inflation is proving a little stickier and broader-based than was expected. Measures of underlying inflation pressure, such as trimmed-mean CPIs, suggest that it is no longer only pandemic-related prices that are rising in the US and some other countries (Chart 8). Rising shipping charges (container rates are up 228% this year) are pushing up the cost of imported goods. And the first signs are emerging that labor shortages, especially in restaurants and shops, are causing wage rises (Chart 9). Chart 8Inflation Is Broadening Out In Some Countries Inflation Is Broadening Out In Some Countries Inflation Is Broadening Out In Some Countries   Chart 9The First Signs Of Wage Rises? The First Signs Of Wage Rises? The First Signs Of Wage Rises?  Unsurprisingly, then, central banks are starting to wind down their asset purchases and even raise rates. Norges Bank was the first developed central bank to hike this cycle in September. New Zealand may follow in Q4. And the Fed has pretty clearly signaled that it, too, will announce tapering before year-end. And this is not to mention Emerging Market central banks, many of which have had to raise rates sharply in the face of soaring inflation (Chart 10).A shrinking of excess liquidity is another common phenomenon of the second stage of expansions, as monetary policy starts to be tightened and liquidity is directed more towards the real economy and less towards speculation. This, too, often caps the upside for risk assets, though it doesn’t usually cause them to collapse (Chart 11). Chart 10EM Central Banks Raising Rates Sharply EM Central Banks Raising Rates Sharply EM Central Banks Raising Rates Sharply   Chart 11Excess Liquidity Is Drying Up Excess Liquidity Is Drying Up Excess Liquidity Is Drying Up   Table 2Who Will Raise Rates When? Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify  While there are many factors that might cause market jitters over the coming months, the underlying picture is that robust growth is likely to continue and central banks will remain cautious about tightening too quickly. Excess savings will propel consumption, companies will need to increase capex to fulfill that demand, and the impact of fiscal stimulus is still coming through (Chart 12). The big central banks won’t raise rates for some time: The Fed perhaps in late-2022, but the ECB and the Bank of Japan not over the forecast horizon (Table 2). Decent growth and easy policy remains a positive backdrop for risk assets over the 12-month horizon. Chart 12Fiscal Stimulus Is Still Coming Through Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify   Garry Evans, Senior Vice PresidentChief Global Asset Allocation Strategistgarry@bcaresearch.comWhat Our Clients Are AskingHow Worried Should We Be About Inflation?Since the beginning of the year, we have argued that the current period of high inflation will be transitory. The market has adopted this view, with 5-year/5-year forward inflation expectations remaining at 2.2%. Chart 13Growing Signs That Inflation Might Not Be Transitory Growing Signs That Inflation Might Not Be Transitory Growing Signs That Inflation Might Not Be Transitory  However, we have grown worried about the possibility that inflation might be stickier at a higher level than we initially expected. Specifically, while it is true that prices of supply-constrained items – such as used cars – have started to ease, there are signs that higher inflation has began to broaden. Core CPI excluding pandemic-related items and cars has started to pick up, with its 6-month rate of change reaching its highest level in more than a decade (Chart 13, panel 1). Meanwhile 42% of the PCE basket grew at an annual rate of more than 5% in July, compared to just 24% in March.Currently, we are watching the behavior of prices in the housing and labor markets to check if our worries are justified. We pay particular attention to these sectors because price pressures in housing and labor can be self-sustaining, giving rise to inflationary spirals if left unchecked.What is happening to inflation in these areas? So far, the signals are mixed. Even though wage growth remains within the historical norm for now, any further advance in wages will take us to a decade high (Chart 13, panel 2). Likewise, annual growth of shelter cost remains low, though its 6-month change suggests that it will soon begin to rise to its pre-pandemic levels (Chart 13,  panel 3).Our base case continues to be that high inflation is transitory. That being said, we have positioned our portfolio to hedge for the risk that this view is wrong. We have given an overweight to real estate in our alternatives portfolio and within equities. Will Consumers Really Spend All Those Savings? Chart 14Low-Income Households Did Not Save Much Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify  Generous unemployment benefits and the year-long lockdown have pushed up US excess savings over the past 18 months to an estimated $2.5 trillion, and the household savings ratio to 9.6% (Chart 14, panel 1). The consensus is that these savings will bolster consumer spending and support broad economic growth over the coming quarters. However, this expectation is based on the assumption that all consumers have accumulated savings, whereas the reality is a bit different.Survey results from the US Census Bureau show that households earning under $75,000, which have the highest propensity to consume, have almost entirely spent their first stimulus checks and three-quarters of their second and third checks on expenses and paying off debt. Even for those earning over $75,000, only 50% of those stimulus receipts have gone into savings (Chart 14, panel 2).With the labor market still not back to full employment (albeit mostly because of labor supply issues), enhanced unemployment benefits coming to an end, fears of further Covid variants and lockdowns, and higher inflation, could precautionary savings rise? The years following the Global Financial Crisis suggest that they might: The savings rate rose from 3% at the onset of the GFC to 8% five years after it (Chart 14, panel 3). A similar attitude among consumers this time could put a dent in US growth, given that consumption makes up about 70% of GDP.This raises the risk that consumption might slow over the coming quarters. In our latest Monthly Portfolio Outlook, we highlighted that consumption is shifting away from goods towards services. While value added from manufacturing is only 11% of GDP, the effect on markets might be bigger, since goods producers make up about 40% of US market cap. What Is The Risk Of A Big Upside Surprise In US Employment?The recovery of the labor market remains at the center of investors’ and Fed officials’ attention. The reluctance to return to the workforce mostly reflects overly generous unemployment benefits and fears of getting infected. With the fourth wave of the pandemic showing signs of cresting and benefits expiring, the consensus is that the unemployment gap will soon shrink. We would, however, question whether the labor market can surprise significantly to the upside and recover faster than the market currently implies. A swift recovery would push up bond yields and bring forward the Fed’s liftoff date, which could hurt the outlook for risk assets. Chart 15The Labor Market Could Surprise To The Upside The Labor Market Could Surprise To The Upside The Labor Market Could Surprise To The Upside  The number of men not in the labor force but who want a job has fallen back to the pre-pandemic level (Chart 15, panel 1). The sharp decline in this indicator in August coincided with the expiration of unemployment benefits in some Republican states. The overall Federal pandemic benefits program expired in early September. This should push even more people to return to the workforce (Chart 15, panel 2).However, there are still close to 3.5 million women (almost half a million above the pre-pandemic level) who are not in the labor force but would like a job: Some of these are keen to return to the workplace once they deem it safe for their children to get vaccinated and return to school. With governments eager to speed up vaccination rollouts and Pfizer’s recent announcement showing positive results of its Covid vaccine in trials on children under the age of 12, more women should return to the workforce.It is also worth noting that some of the most hard-hit sectors – such as leisure & hospitality – have already recovered over 80% of the jobs lost since February 2020. For sectors yet to reach such a high recovery rate, for example education & health services, returning workers have room to choose from jobs. For every job lost since the onset of the pandemic, there are now 2.1 job openings (Chart 15, panel 3). What Is The Risk Of Contagion From Evergrande?In September, Chinese property developer Evergrande failed to make an interest payment on an overseas bond issue. What would be the consequences for the Chinese and global economy if it went bankrupt? Chart 16Chinese Companies Are Highly Indebted Chinese Companies Are Highly Indebted Chinese Companies Are Highly Indebted  Evergrande is big. Its debts are $306 billion, 2% of Chinese GDP. It has yet to build 1 million units that have already been paid for. It employs 200,000 people. And the issue is bigger. For years, investors have worried about China’s corporate debt, which is 160% of GDP (Chart 16). Chinese companies have issued almost $1 trillion of bonds in foreign currencies. The property market plays an outsized role in the economy: It comprises 66% of household wealth (versus 24% in the US); real estate and related industries amount to some 30% of GDP.The government will likely rescue Evergrande. But it faces a dilemma: For years it has been trying to reduce bad debt and stabilize house prices. It cannot bail out Evergrande’s creditors without undermining those efforts.It will probably aid apartment buyers, who have paid upfront for Evergrande properties, and make arrangements for domestic banks to swap their debt for equity or land holdings. But it won’t bail out equity owners or foreign bond holders. It will also not ease real-estate market restrictions, such as the “three red line” rules on property companies’ leverage. Such a package could damage Chinese individuals’ confidence in property, and foreigners willingness to provide capital to the industry.China may also announce a stimulus package to bolster the economy. But local governments are dependent on land sales for around a third of their income (Chart 17). If the property market is weak, the transmission mechanism of stimulus may be damaged. Finally, Chinese housing sales are highly correlated to global commodities prices, which may fall as a result (Chart 18). Chart 17Local Governments Depend On Land Sales Local Governments Depend On Land Sales Local Governments Depend On Land Sales   Chart 18A Slowdown In Housing Would Hurt Commodities A Slowdown In Housing Would Hurt Commodities A Slowdown In Housing Would Hurt Commodities  BCA Research’s EM and China strategists do not see Evergrande as  likely to trigger a systemic crisis or crash, but it will reinforce the chronic credit tightening that has been underway in China.1Is It Time To Overweight Japanese Equities?Japanese equities staged a strong rally in the third quarter, outperforming the MSCI global equity index by about 5% in US dollar total return terms. On an absolute basis, the MSCI Japan price index in USD is near its 1989 historical high, even though the local-currency index is still more than 30% below its 1989 all-time high.We have been underweight Japanese equities in our global equity portfolio since July 2019, mainly due to unfavorable structural forces such as the aging population and chronic deflationary pressures. Japanese equities have tended to stage counter-trend bounces, some of which were quite significant in magnitude (Chart 19, panel 1). We therefore recommend clients move to the sidelines to avoid the potentially short-lived but sharp upside risk, supported by the following two considerations:First, foreign investors play a significant role in the Japanese equity market. The fact that MSCI Japan in USD terms is near its all-time high could trigger more foreign buying, given the positive correlation between the price index and price momentum (Chart 19, panels 3 and 5).Second, Japanese equities are among the cheapest globally, trading at a large discount to the global index. Currently, the discount is larger than its 3-year moving average, making it risky to underweight Japan.So why not overweight Japanese equities?The Japanese equity index is dominated by Industrials. It should benefit from our favorable view on this sector. However, Japan’s machinery and machine tool industries have heavy reliance on Asia, especially China. Orders from China have already rolled over with the Chinese PMI now in contractionary territory. In the meantime, the rolling-over of the US and European PMIs also does not bode well for orders from the other two large regions (Chart 20). Chart 19Upgrade Japanese Equities To Neutral Upgrade Japanese Equities To Neutral Upgrade Japanese Equities To Neutral   Chart 20Japan's Heavy External Reliance Japan's Heavy External Reliance Japan's Heavy External Reliance  We expect that China will eventually inject stimulus into its economy in a measured fashion such that the negative spillover to Japan and Europe may be limited. That’s why we are also taking profit in our underweight position on China after the recent sharp selloff in the offshore Chinese equity index (see page 18).Global EconomyOverview: The developed world continues to see strong growth, albeit at a slower pace than nine months ago. This is causing a more persistent – and more broad-based – rise in inflation, especially in the US, than was previously expected. However, the Fed is unlikely to raise rates for at least another 12 months, and the ECB and BOJ not on the forecast horizon. The biggest risk to global economic growth is the slowdown in China and now the troubles at Evergrande. We assume that the Chinese government will launch a stimulus to cushion the slowdown, but it may be less effective than the market expects. Chart 21US Growth Has Slowed But Remains Above Trend US Growth Has Slowed But Remains Above Trend US Growth Has Slowed But Remains Above Trend  US: Growth has been slowing relative to expectations all year (Chart 21, panel 1). Nonetheless, it is still well above trend. The September Markit PMIs remained high at 60.5 for manufacturing and 54.4 for services. Although consumer confidence has fallen back a little because of the third Covid wave in some southern states, retail sales in August were still up 15% year-on-year and 1.8% (ex autos) month-on-month. Growth seems set to remain above trend, as consumers spend their $2.5 trillion of excess savings, companies increase capex to ease supply-chain bottlenecks, and the government rolls out more fiscal spending. The IMF forecasts 4.9% real GDP growth in 2022, after 7.0% this year. Euro Area growth also remains robust, with the manufacturing and services PMIs at 58.7 and 56.3 respectively in September. Vaccination levels have risen (more quickly than in the US) and, as a consequence, lockdowns and international travel restrictions have been largely eased. Inflation pressures remain more restrained than in the US, with core CPI at only 1.6% (mainly pushed up by pandemic-related shortages) and the trimmed-mean CPI barely above zero. The ECB persuaded the market that its tapering, announced in September, is very dovish, and it is certainly true that – with its new 2% symmetrical inflation target – the ECB is not set to raise rates any time soon. The IMF’s forecasts are for 4.6% real GDP growth this year, and 4.3% next.Japan has generally lagged the recovery in the rest of the world, due to its structural headwinds, but it is now seeing some more robust data. Industrial production is up 12% year-on-year and exports 26%, although the PMIs still remain somewhat depressed at 51.2 for manufacturing and 47.4 for services in September. Japan’s initial slow vaccine rollout has recently accelerated and the percent of double-vaccinated adults now exceeds the US. This suggests that sluggish consumption (with retail sales up only 2% year-on-year) might start to recover. Markets got excited about the prospects for fiscal stimulus ahead of the general election, which has to be held by the end of November. We do not see new LDP leader Fumio Kishida, who is likely to win that election, making any significant change in policy. Chart 22China Is The One Market Where Growth Is Slowing Sharply China Is The One Market Where Growth Is Slowing Sharply China Is The One Market Where Growth Is Slowing Sharply  Emerging Markets: China’s slowdown – and the government’s possible reaction to it with a large stimulus – dominate the outlook for Emerging Markets. Both China’s manufacturing and services PMIs are now below 50 (Chart 22, panel 3), and retail sales, industrial production and fixed-asset investment all surprised sharply on the downside last month. We expect an easing of policy, but only a moderate one. Elsewhere in Emerging Markets, central banks continue to struggle with the puzzle of whether they need to raise rates (as Russia, Brazil and Mexico have done) in the face of rising inflation and falling currencies, despite continuing underlying weakness in their economies. Interest Rates: US inflation looks stickier than believed three months ago, with a broadening of inflation away from just pandemic-affected items (see “How Worried Should We Be About Inflation?" on page 8). But inflation expectations are still well under control (Chart 22, panel 4) and so the Fed is likely to begin tapering only in December and not raise rates until end-2022. This will most likely cause a moderate rise in long-term rates with the 10-year US Treasury yield rising to 1.7% by year-end and 2-2.25% by the time of the first Fed rate hike. Inflation elsewhere in developed economies looks more subdued (except in the UK and Canada), and so long-term rates are likely to rise somewhat more slowly there.Global Equities Chart 23Watch Earning Revisions Watch Earning Revisions Watch Earning Revisions  Global equities ended the quarter more or less flat after a very strong performance in the first eight months of the year and a volatile September. Earnings growth continued its strong trend from the first half, powered by margin improvement in both the DM and EM universes. Consequently, the forward PE multiple contracted further (Chart 23).Going forward, despite worries about the potential spillover to the global economy and global financial markets from China’s Evergrande fiasco, the “earnings-driven” theme will likely continue. BCA’s global earnings model points to over 40% earnings growth for the next 12 months, and all sectors have positive forward earnings estimates. However, net revisions by analysts seem to be cresting as the global manufacturing PMI has rolled over from a very high level. Even though valuation is less stretched than at the beginning of the year, equities are still expensive by historical standards. In addition, central banks are preparing for an eventual withdrawal of their massive liquidity injections and there is still plenty of uncertainty concerning Covid variants. GAA has been cautiously optimistic so far this year with overweights on equities and cash relative to bonds, and overweight US equities relative to Japan, Europe and China. These positions have panned out well. After adjustments made in April and July, our sector portfolio has been well positioned by overweighting Industrials, Financials, Real Estate and Healthcare, underweighting Materials, Utilities and Consumer Staples, and being neutral on Tech, Consumer Discretionary and Communication Services. We have not made any changes to our sector recommendations this quarter.In accordance with our long-held belief of “taking risk where risk will likely be rewarded the most,” we make the following adjustments to our country allocations: close the underweights in China and Japan and the overweight in the UK; and initiate one new position: Underweight EM-ex-China. Overall, our country portfolio has a defensive tilt with an overweight in the US (defensive) and underweights in the euro area and EM-ex China (cyclical), while being neutral on the UK, Japan, Australia and Canada.  Country Allocation: Upgrade MSCI China And Japan, Downgrade UK And EM-ex-China. We have been underweight MSCI China and overweight the UK since April 2021, and underweight Japan since July 2019.The China underweight generated outperformance of 23% and the UK overweight -2%, while the Japanese position produced an outperformance of 7%. Chart 24Favor China vs The Rest of The EM Favor China vs The Rest of The EM Favor China vs The Rest of The EM  While the fate of Evergrande Group, China’s second largest property developer, remains uncertain, our view is that the government will come up with a restructuring plan to minimize damaging ripple effects on the Chinese economy. This view is supported by the behavior of the domestic A-share market and also the CNY/USD, which has diverged from the offshore equity market (Chart 24, Panel 5).BCA Research’s house view is that China will now stimulate its economy, but only at a measured pace. This means that further underperformance of MSCI China is likely to be limited relative to the global benchmark, as shown in Chart 24, panel 1. The ongoing deleveraging in the Chinese real estate sector, however, means that activity in the sector will probably slow further, reducing demand for construction materials. This may put a dent on the strength of metal prices, therefore negatively impacting the ex-China EM equity index, as shown in panel 2.Moreover, the relative performance of China vs non-China EM is approaching a very oversold level while the relative valuation measure is at an extreme (Chart 24, panels 3 and 4). As such, we switch our positioning by upgrading Chinese equities to neutral from underweight and downgrade EM ex China to underweight from neutral. This implies an overall underweight to Emerging Markets.We also close the UK overweight to support an upgrade in Japan (see more details on page 13). The UK overweight was largely based on a positive view of the GBP, which has now risen to fair value.Government Bonds Chart 25Watch Inflation In 2022 Watch Inflation in 2022 Watch Inflation in 2022  Maintain Below-Benchmark Duration. Global bond yields ignored the sharp rise in core inflation in Q3. The US 10-year Treasury yield actually declined in the first two months of the quarter in response to the muted inflation readings in non-Covid related segments of the economy. Even with the fast run-up in yields in September, the US 10-year yield finished the quarter at 1.52%, only about 5 bps higher than the level on June 30th (Chart 25).We have advised clients to focus on the jobs market to determine when the Fed will lift the Fed Funds Rate off its zero bound because of the Fed’s emphasis on “maximum employment” as a pre-condition for this. However, the Fed has not clearly defined what “maximum employment” means. According to calculations by our US bond strategists, the US unemployment rate will fall to 3.8%, with a 63% participation rate, by the end of 2022 if job creation averages a reasonably achievable 414,000 per month until then. Our bond strategists think that the Fed will be forced to clarify its definition of “maximum unemployment” over the coming months and, as we get close to it next year, the key indicator to watch will shift back to inflation. If inflation remains high, then the Fed will be quicker to declare that the labor market is at “maximum employment”, and vice versa.Currently, the overnight index swap curve indicates the first rate hike will be in January 2023 with a total rate increase of 123 bps by the end of 2024. BCA Research’s house view is that the Fed will announce its first hike in December 2022 and will hike at a faster pace than what is priced in by the market. This is based on our view that unemployment will likely reach 3.5% by end-2022 with inflation above the Fed’s target. This would suggest that long-term rates will rise too, and so bond investors should remain below benchmark duration.Corporate BondsSince the beginning of the year, investment-grade credit has provided roughly 200 basis points of excess return over duration-matched Treasurys, while high-yield bonds have generated almost 600 basis points. Chart 26Continue to Favor High-Yield Credit Continue to Favor High-Yield Credit Continue to Favor High-Yield Credit  We continue to have a neutral allocation to investment-grade credits within the fixed-income category. While supportive monetary policy should generally favor spread product, we believe there is much better value to be found outside investment-grade bonds, since these bonds are currently trading at historically high valuation levels (Chart 26, panel 1).We think valuations look much more attractive in the high-yield space, and as a result remain overweight within the fixed-income category. Our US Bond Strategy service expects the share of defaults in the space to fall to between 2.3% and 2.8% – below the default rate currently priced in by the market (Chart 26, panel 2). Within high yield, we prefer B-rated bonds since they offer the most attractive spread pickup on a risk-adjusted basis.What about EM debt? Currently we are cautious on EM corporate debt. The default of Chinese real estate developer Evergrande is likely to have ripple effects throughout EM credit markets and currencies. There are already signs of considerable strains, with EM corporate spreads starting to rise (Chart 26, panel 3).  We recommend that investors focus on EM sovereign issuers such as Mexico, Russia, and Malaysia, given that they provide a significant yield pickup over US bonds with comparable credit ratings, and are less likely to default than their corporate counterparts.CommoditiesEnergy (Overweight): Oil prices are likely to remain close to current levels for the remainder of this year. However, recovering demand – particularly from Emerging Markets – and production discipline by the OPEC 2.0 coalition should support prices over the next two years. Given this backdrop, our Commodity & Energy strategists expect the price of Brent crude to average $75 and $80 per barrel in 2022 and 2023 respectively, with WTI trading $2-$4/bbl lower. Chart 27Limited Upside For Oil And Metals In The Short-Term Limited Upside For Oil And Metals In The Short-Term Limited Upside For Oil And Metals In The Short-Term  Industrial Metals (Neutral): Industrial metals’ prices have bifurcated. Those relating to alternative energy, such as copper, nickel and cobalt, continue to rise and are up 30% on average since the beginning of the year. Iron ore on the other hand has taken a colossal hit, falling over 53% from its May high. The knock-on effects of accelerating Chinese production cuts and softening economic activity, as well as Evergrande’s debt woes, will continue to put downward pressure on prices. In the short-term, we do not expect a significant rebound. However, in the longer-term, demand will recover – particularly if China implements significant stimulus – and supply will remain tight, which will help metal prices to recover.Precious Metals (Neutral): Gold prices did not react positively to the decline in US real rates over the past quarter. In fact, gold prices are slightly down, by ~1.5% since the start of July (Chart 27, panel 4). We expect real rates to rise as economic growth and the labor market recover and the Fed turns slightly more hawkish, while inflation moderates as base and pandemic effects abate. Rising real rates are a negative factor for the gold price. Nevertheless, inflation is likely to be a bit stickier than the market is currently pricing in, and we therefore maintain a neutral exposure to gold, since it is a good inflation hedge.CurrenciesUS Dollar Chart 28Do Not Underweight The Dollar Yet Do Not Underweight The Dollar Yet Do Not Underweight The Dollar Yet  Since we went from underweight to neutral on the dollar in April, the DXY has risen by only 1%. Our position remains the same for this quarter. On the one hand, momentum – one of the most reliable indicators for cyclical movements in the dollar – has turned firmly positive. Moreover, pain in the Chinese real-estate sector should weight on commodities and emerging markets – a development which historically has been bullish for the USD (Chart 28, panel 1). However, not all is good news for the greenback. Relative growth and inflation trends are starting to rebound in the rest of the world vis-à-vis the US (Chart 28, panel 2). Additionally, speculators are now firmly overweight the USD, and it remains expensive by 11% relative to PPP fair value. We believe that these forces could eventually be strong enough for the dollar bear market to resume. As a result, we are putting the US dollar on downgrade watch. Canadian DollarWe believe that there is upside to the Canadian dollar. Canada’s employment market is recovering faster than in the US, which should prompt the BoC to normalize interest rates before the Fed. Additionally, while many commodities are likely to suffer as China’s real estate market slows, oil should hold up relatively well since its demand is not as dependent on the Chinese economy. As a result, we are upgrading the CAD from neutral to overweight. Australian DollarWe remain underweight the AUD. While it is true that the AUD is now cheap on a PPP basis, weakness in iron ore from a slowing Chinese real-estate market should continue to weigh on the Aussie dollar. Chinese YuanWe are negative on the yuan on a cyclical basis. Interest-rate differentials should start moving against this currency (Chart 28, panel 3). While the Fed is likely to tighten policy as the labor market enters full employment, Chinese authorities will ease monetary policy to avert a full-blown crisis in their real-estate market.Alternatives Chart 29Outlook Remains Favorable For Private Equity And Real Estate Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Stay Bullish But Verify  Return Enhancers: With public markets expensive and unlikely to provide investors with more than single-digit returns, the focus has shifted to alternative assets, particularly private equity (PE). Performance continues to be impressive, with an annualized return of 59% in Q4 2020 (Chart 29, panel 1). This supports our previous research that funds raised during recessions and early in expansions tend to outperform those raised late-cycle. Distributions from existing positions should allow limited partners (LPs – the investors who provide capital to PE funds) to commit to newer funds. Data from Preqin shows that more than $610 billion has been raised so far during 2021 (Chart 29, panel 2). We continue to favor Private Equity over Hedge Funds.Inflation Hedges: Last year’s inflationary pressures should moderate over the coming months as base effects and supply chain bottlenecks abate. Given this backdrop, we maintain our positive view on real estate versus commodity futures. Commodity prices have already shot up over the past 18 months and have limited upside from current levels: Energy prices are up by 61% since the beginning of the year, industrial metals 24%, and agriculture 17%. Over the past 15 years, REITs outperformed commodity futures when inflation was between 0% and 3% (Chart 29, panel 3). There are opportunities within the real-estate sector, despite our concerns about weaknesses in some segments of commercial real estate such as prime office property in major cities.Volatility Dampeners: We continue to favor farmland and timberland over structured products, particularly mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Farmland offers attractive yields and should continue to provide the best portfolio protection in the event of any market distress. MBS spreads, on the other hand, while wider than the pre-pandemic level, remain tight compared to the pace of mortgage refinancing (Chart 29, panel 4).Risks To Our ViewOur main scenario is based on a Goldilocks-like view of the world: That growth will be robust, but not so strong as to push up inflation further and cause central banks to turn hawkish. The risks, therefore, are that the environment turns out to be either too hot or too cold. Chart 30A Resurgence Of Covid A Resurgence Of Covid A Resurgence Of Covid  What could cause growth to slow? Covid remains the biggest risk. Cases are still high in many countries, and could rise again as people socialize indoors during the colder months (Chart 30). A more virulent strain is not inconceivable. Governments will be reluctant to impose lockdowns again, but consumers might become wary about going out.We have written elsewhere (see page 11) about the risks coming from a China slowdown and the aftermath of the Evergrande affair. A policy mistake is not improbable: The Chinese authorities want to stimulate the economy, but at the same time keep a lid on property prices. That will be a hard balance to achieve. Slower Chinese growth would hurt commodity producers and many Emerging Markets. Other risks to growth include fiscal tightening as employment-support schemes end and countries look to repair their budget positions (Chart 31), consumers building up precautionary savings and not spending their excess cash (see page 9), and problems caused by rising energy prices.Our view remains that the currently high inflation is transitory. But it is proving quite sticky and could remain high for a while. Inflation expectations are well anchored for the moment (Chart 32) but could rise above central banks’ comfort-zones if recorded core inflation in the US, for example, currently 3.6%, stays above 3% for another 12 months. This could bring forward the date of the first Fed rate hike (currently priced in for January 2023), raise long-term rates and, in turn, push up the dollar. A combination of rising US rates and a stronger dollar would have very negative consequences for heavily indebted Emerging Market economies. Chart 31Fiscal Drag Fiscal Drag Fiscal Drag   Chart 32Deanchoring Of Inflation Expectations Deanchoring Of Inflation Expectations Deanchoring Of Inflation Expectations   Footnotes1 Please see China Investment Strategy Report "The Evergrande Saga Continues," dated September 29, 2021 and Emerging Markets Strategy Report "On Chinese Internet Stocks, Real Estate And Overall EM," dated September 16, 2021,  available at https://www.bcaresearch.com/GAA Asset Allocation