Asset Allocation

Highlights Portfolio Strategy We opt to stay patient and refrain from deploying fresh capital especially in the tech sector in the near-term; a better entry point will likely materialize between now and the end of the year. The softening demand backdrop that is weighing on selling prices, the rekindling of the US/China tech-related trade war and the risk of a reflex rebound in the US dollar, all warn to shy away from semi cap stocks. A balanced outlook keeps us on the sidelines in the S&P home improvement retail (HIR) index. Recent Changes There are no changes to the portfolio this week. Table 1 Churning Churning Feature Equities tried to regain their footing last week, but risks still lingering on the (geo)political front should sustain the tug of war between bulls and bears and rekindle volatility. While monetary and fiscal policies will remain loose, the intensity of easing is waning as both the Fed’s impulse (i.e. second derivative) of asset purchases has ground to a halt and Congress has hit a stalemate over the next round of stimulus. Crudely put, the thrust of monetary and fiscal policies is at heightened risk of shifting from stimulative to contractive (Chart 1). As a result, we remain patient with fresh capital and will wait to deploy it when the dust settles hopefully by the end of the year. Turning to equity market internals and other high frequency financial market data is instructive in order to get a clearer picture of the direction of the broad equity market. The value line arithmetic and geometric indexes and small cap stocks that led the March 23 SPX trough are emitting a distress signal (Chart 2). Chart 1Running Out Of Thrust Running Out Of Thrust Running Out Of Thrust Chart 2Market Internals... Market Internals... Market Internals... Drilling deeper on a sector basis, hypersensitive chip stocks, energy shares, and discretionary versus staples equities will likely weigh on the prospects of the broad equity market (Chart 3). The VIX index, the vol curve and the yield curve, all excellent leading indicators of the S&P 500, have crested and warn that the shakeout phase has yet to run its course (VIX shown inverted ,Chart 4). Chart 3...Say It Is Prudent... ...Say It Is Prudent... ...Say It Is Prudent... Chart 4...To Remain On The Sidelines ...To Remain On The Sidelines ...To Remain On The Sidelines Trying to quantify the SPX drawdown, we turn to CBOE’s equity put/call (EPC) ratio. The EPC ratio is nowhere near recent extreme readings. SPX pullbacks since the early-2018 “Volmageddon” have corresponded to significantly higher EPC ratio readings. In the past 10 such iterations, the median EPC ratio has been 0.86, the mean 0.93, with a range of 0.77 to 1.28 (Table 2). Currently, the EPC ratio is hovering near 0.58 suggesting that downside risks persist (EPC ratio shown inverted, Chart 5). Chart 5Downside Risks Persist Downside Risks Persist Downside Risks Persist Table 2Equity Put/Call (EPC) Ratio During Pullbacks Since 2018 Churning Churning Finally, the commodity complex is also firing warnings shots. Lumber has collapsed nearly $300/tbf from the recent peak, oil is trailing gold bullion and silver is also cresting versus the yellow metal, iron ore is petering out and the Baltic dry index is wobbling. True, copper and materials stocks are holding their own, but overwhelmingly commodity market internals are waving a yellow flag (Chart 6). Chart 6Commodity Yellow Flags Commodity Yellow Flags Commodity Yellow Flags Netting it all out, we opt to stay patient and refrain from deploying fresh capital especially in the tech space in the near-term; a better entry point will likely materialize between now and the end of the year. This week we reiterate our underweight stance in a niche technology index and shed more light on our recent downgrade to neutral of a key consumer discretionary subgroup. Chip Equipment Update: Tangled Up In The Trade War We remain committed to our intra-tech strategy of preferring defensive software and services tech names to aggressive hardware and equipment tech stocks. In that light, we reiterate our underweight stance in the niche S&P semi equipment index. Recent news of the Trump administration’s potential tightening of the noose on Chinese chip company SMIC (the country’s largest foundry) was a net negative for US semi cap names, similar to export restrictions of American technology to Huawei was a net negative for US semi cap names. As a reminder, these manufacturers count China as one of their largest export market alongside Taiwan and South Korea. Thus, this flare up in the US/Sino trade war bodes ill for semi cap companies’ future sales and profit growth projections (Chart 7). There are high odds that relative share prices have plateaued earlier this month and a fresh down cycle has commenced. Under such a backdrop, this hyper-sensitive manufacturing group will likely overshoot to the down side as is evident in the historical tight correlation with the ISM manufacturing survey: these violent oscillations are warning that a cooling off in the ISM will be severely felt in this niche manufacturing intense index (Chart 8). Chart 7Lofty Expectations Lofty Expectations Lofty Expectations Chart 8Violent Oscillations Violent Oscillations Violent Oscillations On the global demand front, there is an element that COVID-19 is stealing sales from the future and bringing demand forward. Already global semi sales are rolling over, and a couple of industry pricing power proxies are deflating at an accelerating pace: Asian DRAM prices are topping out in the contraction zone and Taiwanese export prices are sinking like a stone, warning that a deficient demand down cycle will squeeze semi cap profit margins (Chart 9). Importantly, Taiwanese tech capex, which TSMC dominates, has crested, warning that all the euphoria behind 5G deployment and uptake is likely baked in the relative share price ratio. The implication is that semi cap names remain vulnerable to any global 5G-related hiccups (top panel, Chart 10). Chart 9Waning Selling Price Backdrop Waning Selling Price Backdrop Waning Selling Price Backdrop Chart 10Cresting Cresting Cresting Finally, the tight positive correlation between Bitcoin prices and the relative share price ratio remains intact. Were a knee-jerk rebound in the US dollar to knock down Bitcoin, at least temporarily, it would serve as a catalyst to shed chip equipment stocks (bottom panel, Chart 10). Moreover, 90% of the industry’s sales originate abroad, thus a rise in the greenback would eat into their P&L via FX translation losses. Adding it all up, a softening demand backdrop that is weighing on selling prices, the rekindling of the US/China tech-related trade war and a reflex rebound in the US dollar, all warn to shy away from semi cap stocks. Bottom Line: Stay underweight the S&P semiconductor equipment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S5SEEQ – AMAT, KLAC, LRCX. Home Improvement Retailers: Stay On The Sidelines Two weeks ago our trailing stop was triggered in the S&P home improvement retail index (HIR) and we monetized gains of 15% since the mid-April inception and moved to the sidelines. Today we reiterate our benchmark allocation in this consumer discretionary sub group. Clearly, HIR was a major beneficiary of the lockdown as the US and Canadian governments deemed these retailers “essential” and allowed them to stay open during the peak of the pandemic. These Big Box retailers saw their sales soar as the fiscal easing package replenished consumers’ wallets, and coupled with the lockdown, caused a surge in DIY remodeling activity. Our portfolio also greatly benefited from the stellar performance of the S&P HIR index, as existing home sales staged a significant comeback and inventories of homes for sale receded substantially thus further tightening the residential real estate market (top & middle panels, Chart 11). As reminder, historically a vibrant housing market is synonymous with handsome returns in relative share prices and vice versa. But now a number of stiff headwinds, which our HIR model encapsulates, signal that a lateral digestive move is in store in the coming months (Chart 12). Chart 11Unsustainable Front Running Unsustainable Front Running Unsustainable Front Running Chart 12Stiff Headwinds Stiff Headwinds Stiff Headwinds First, a repeat of the spike in demand for home improvement projects is highly unlikely, especially given that demand was brought forward. Also during the autumn and winter months there is a natural slowdown in the take-up of remodeling projects until the spring home selling season arrives. Second, the industry’s sales-to-inventories (S/I) ratio is literally off the charts (bottom panel, Chart 11). An inventory build-up and easing in demand will bring back the S/I ratio back to a more reasonable level. Lastly, lumber prices have taken a beating of late collapsing from over $900/tbf to below $600/tbf. This drubbing of this economically hypersensitive commodity directly cuts into HIR earnings. These Big Box retailers make a set margin on lumber sales so as prices fall they take a big bite out of profits (bottom panel, Chart 13). Nevertheless, a few offsets prevent us from turning outright bearish in this early cyclical retailers. Namely, the industry’s profit growth bar is on a par with the broad market and thus does not pose a large hurdle to overcome. Importantly, given that HIR earnings have kept pace with the massive run-up in stock prices (second panel, Chart 14), they have kept relative valuations at bay. While, the S&P HIR 12-month forward P/E trades at a market multiple, the relative forward P/E changes hands at a 20% discount to the historical mean. Thus, HIR enjoy a significant valuation cushion (bottom panel, Chart 14). Chart 13Timber! Timber! Timber! Chart 14But There Are Powerful Offsets But There Are Powerful Offsets But There Are Powerful Offsets Finally, the Fed just explicitly committed to stay on the zero interest rate line until 2023! This easy monetary policy as far as the eye can see is a powerful tonic to early cyclical and interest rate-sensitive home improvement retailers (fed funds rate shown inverted, top panel, Chart 14). Netting it all out, a balanced outlook keeps us on the sidelines in the S&P HIR index.  Bottom Line: Stick with a benchmark allocation in the S&P home improvement retail index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S5HOMI – HD, LOW.     Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Drilling Deeper Into Earnings Drilling Deeper Into Earnings Size And Style Views July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives April 28, 2020  Stay neutral large over small caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth

Highlights In a world with low expected returns from various asset classes and still-elevated target returns among largely underfunded pension funds, asset allocators may have to consider the use of leverage to meet liability requirements. Canadian pension funds have been more open to using leverage than their US counterparts, but even the very conservative Japanese Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) has an allocation to levered asset classes such as private equity, albeit at a very low weight. Retail investors do not have access to low-cost financing as institutional investors do. Still, they too can add leverage via ETFs and Liquid Alts mutual funds. When leverage is used at the asset-class level such as in alternative asset classes, financing costs play an important role in investment decisions. For pension funds with access to low-cost financing, “direct investing” in alternative assets is more advantageous than indirect investment via alternative funds. When leverage is used at the portfolio level, such as via a risk-parity structure, the financing cost impacts mostly just the return, but the leverage constraints impact both return and volatility. Risk-parity strategy is more advantageous when it’s used as one of the strategies in a total portfolio, rather than at the total-fund level because usually a sub-portfolio can have a much higher leverage ratio than the total fund. Leverage should be managed in a centralized risk-management system at the total-fund level, together with all other risk exposures. 1. Why Should Leverage Be Considered? In a Global Asset Allocation Special Report on long-term return assumptions,1 the key conclusion was that, for the next decade, investors would not be able to achieve the kind of return targets they were used to over the previous two decades because all asset classes would see much lower returns going forward, with the largest reductions coming from fixed-income and alternative assets such as farmland, REITs, and commodities. This is bad news for investors, especially pension fund investors with long-term liabilities to match. For example, according to Wilshire Consulting,2 at the end of 2018, the aggregate funded ratio (defined as the fund assets as a percentage of the fund obligations) of 134 US state retirement systems was 72.2%, which is better than the low at the end of 2016 (Chart 1). However, as shown in Chart 2, there were still about 11% of the funds with assets at less than 50% of liabilities. Chart 1US Pensions' Funded Status* Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Chart 2US Pensions' Funded Ratio Distribution* Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Over the past two decades, the risk-return profile of traditional assets like equities and government bonds has already been much less attractive than historical averages, as shown in Chart 3, but investors have diversified into credit and alternative asset classes (which contain embedded leverage) to enhance their portfolios’ risk-return profile. Chart 3Future Risk-Return Profiles Less Attractive Than Historical Averages Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? According to the above-mentioned Global Asset Allocation Special Report, with a conventional 50/30/20 (equities/bonds/alts) allocation, a US investor could comfortably achieve a 7% annual return over the past two decades. Now, alternative asset classes have become mainstream, likely producing a much lower future return. The same 50/30/20 portfolio would currently generate only about 4.9% annually, much less than what’s required to match liabilities. In fact, alternatives’ future return expectations have been cut to 6.1% from their past 20-year average of 15.1% annually, meaning that even if 100% of assets are fully invested in alternatives, the expected return will still be lower than the 7% that’s still assumed by some US state pension funds.3 Not to mention that at the end of 2018, over 34% of US retirement pension funds had long-term rate-of-return expectations higher than 7.5%, as shown in Chart 4. Chart 4Challenging Long-Term Return Expectations Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Chart 5Why Should Leverage Be Considered? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? According to Modern Portfolio Theory, to achieve a higher return investors can take higher risk in three different ways, as shown in Chart 5:  1) Allocating more funds to higher-return/higher-risk assets, i.e. moving upwards to the right along the efficient frontier (red line) – for example, a 60-40 equity/bond portfolio is well to the upper-right side of the “optimal” allocation; 2) Levering up one or more assets to alter the shape of the frontier (grey line) – for instance, incorporating private-equity and infrastructure funds that contain embedded leverage; and 3) Levering up the “optimal” (in terms of return per unit of risk) risky portfolio with funds borrowed at the total-fund level (green line). Risk parity is a close proximation. For more detail about the basics of leverage, please see Appendix 1 on pages 21-22. Chart 5 illustrates three different frontiers based on the assumed risk-return forecast for US equities, US Treasurys, and alternative assets.4 We can observe the following: When the target return is low (at target 1), leverage does not provide significant benefit no matter which form is used; As the return target moves up relative to what the underlying assets can provide (target 2), direct leverage produces a better return/risk profile than embedded leverage, which in turn is better than the portfolio without any leverage; When the target return is higher than what any efficient combination from the available asset classes can achieve (target 3), investors must consider the use of direct leverage. In theory, investors should always prefer to use leverage at the total-fund level to lever up the “optimal” portfolio. In reality, however, some investors are constrained from borrowing. In addition, some investors do not have the expertise or infrastructure to manage the additional complexity that results from the use of direct leverage. In fact, direct leverage has typically been considered dangerous by many investors. Misuse of leverage was attributed to some high-profile failures, such as Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 and Lehman Brothers in 2008. So how has leverage been used by asset allocators? What are the key factors that determine if and how leverage should be used? What are the key risks associated with the use of leverage, and how should leverage be managed? In the sections below, we first review how some pension funds and retail investors have been using leverage (we ignore hedge funds, even though they are the most obvious users of leverage, because they are a part of the “alternative” asset class with embedded leverage). From there, we attempt to address, 1) How does financing cost impact leverage at the asset-class level? and 2) How does financing cost impact the decision to use leverage at the portfolio level if investors are constrained by the amount of leverage that can be used? Finally, we suggest a centralized leverage management framework to monitor and manage leverage at the total-portfolio level. 2. Use of Leverage By Pension Funds Leverage can be applied in many different ways. In general, the use of leverage by pension funds can be grouped into four categories: First, with a focus on return-seeking. This is achieved mainly by using alternative asset funds such as private-equity funds, hedge funds, real-estate funds, and infrastructure funds. These funds have embedded leverage, but with much higher costs. They provide diversification and higher risk-adjusted returns, partly because of their embedded leverage and lock-up advantages. Large pension funds, especially the Canadian pension funds which all have excellent credit ratings and strong in-house talent, have also taken advantage of their solid balance sheets to acquire low-cost financing to invest directly in alternatives. For example, the first bond issued by the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) in 2001 was $600 million at 5.7%, while the Canada Public Pension Investment Board (CPPIB) even issued euro-denominated bonds in both 2017 (2 billion euros, 7-year, 0.375% coupon) and 2018 (1 billion euros, 15-year, 1.5% coupon).5 Proceeds from these bond issues have mostly been used to invest in alternative assets, which now account for a large proportion of the major Canadian pension funds’ assets under management (Table 1). Table 1“Alternatives” Have Become Mainstream For The Canadians Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage?                     Most US state pension funds are more conservative than their Canadian peers. They too have been gradually adding exposure to alternatives with embedded leverage such as private equity, real estate, and hedge funds, as shown in Chart 6. Even Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), the very conservative Japanese sovereign wealth fund, in its current operating guideline has a 5% allocation to alternatives such as private equity, real estate, and infrastructure.6 That’s an impressive amount considering its first investment in the space was in 2013, as shown in Chart 7. Chart 6The Americans Are Catching Up On Alternatives Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Chart 7GPIF’s Push Into Alternatives* Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? However, the push into alternative asset classes by large pension funds has made it increasingly difficult to allocate funds to alternative assets. For example, CalPERS has only an 8% allocation to private equity,7  yet its most recent exposure as of June 2019 stood at only 7.1% – because it could not find enough suitable private-equity investments to build the asset class to the desired scale.8 Second, with a focus on liability matching. Pension funds who follow the liability-driven investing (LDI) approach often construct two portfolios. One is the liability-matching portfolio and the other is the active portfolio. The former matches the liabilities, while the latter generates alpha to cover management fees and to provide a cushion for estimation errors. Since most pension liabilities are indexed to inflation, liabilities are often modelled as a combination of nominal bonds and inflation-linked bonds with leverage. The leverage ratio can often be higher than two or three times because of the ultra-long duration of the liabilities versus the available bond instruments. For example, the Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP) uses an LDI approach, which is why its leverage ratio is much higher than some other pension plans, as shown in Chart 8.  Chart 8Use Of Leverage By Some Pension Funds Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Third, with a focus on risk diversification. Risk-based strategies such as risk parity generate a more diversified portfolio with lower absolute returns compared to a conventional 60/40 equity/bond portfolio, but in general have a much higher Sharpe ratio, and therefore require leverage to achieve the required return/risk objective.9 Even though most risk-parity believers dedicate a portion of their assets to risk-parity strategies (either internally with direct leverage or externally with embedded leverage), some pension funds have adopted such a risk-diversification approach at the total-fund level. Danish pension fund ATP and the Missouri State Employees Retirement System (MOSERS) are two examples. As shown in Chart 8, as of June 2019, MOSERS’ leverage was about 50%,10 a lot higher than CalPERS’ newly augmented total-fund leverage limit of 20% (from 5% previously),11 because CalPERS does not use the same approach to apply leverage. Fourth, with a focus on more tactical moves, such as tail-risk hedging, revenue generation, and opportunistic strategies to take advantage of short-term dislocations in the marketplace. These tactics are achieved mostly using derivatives such as futures, options, and swaps. For example, equity and bond futures or swaps are often used to tactically adjust asset allocation at the total-fund level without impacting the underlying asset-class management. 3. Use of Leverage By Retail Investors Retail investors do not enjoy low-cost financing as large institutions do. They can use lines of credit or margin accounts to invest, and they can also use derivatives if they are qualified to do so. For those who are not qualified or not comfortable using leverage themselves, there are two types of retail products with embedded leverage: Levered or inverse ETFs and “Liquid Alts” mutual funds or ETFs. Levered or Inverse ETFs: These products are rebalanced daily to a fixed leverage multiple, often -3X, -2X, -1X, 2X, and 3X of the underlying assets. As such, only daily performance matches the intended performance objective. Because of the daily realization of gain and loss, they are not suitable for long-term buy-and-hold investors because the longer the holding period, the larger the drift due to the compounding effect. For example, Chart 9 shows the Nasdaq-100 ETF (QQQ) and the associated levered ETFs. It’s interesting to note that in several annual periods ending in 2011, 2016, 2018 and 2019, QQQ’s one-year return was slightly positive, yet 3X ETF’s corresponding returns were negative! This is due to the “negative diversification return” effect as defined by Qian.12 Chart 9NASDAQ-100 Linked ETF Performances* NASDAQ-100 Linked ETF Performances* NASDAQ-100 Linked ETF Performances* Liquid Alternative Mutual Funds/ETFs: These are the “liquid” version of alternative investment strategies aimed at retail investors. They are easy to buy and sell. In Canada, since National Instrument 81-102 became effective in January 2019, retail investors who do not have the sophistication to directly invest in alternatives now have access to such investments via mutual funds and ETFs. As shown in Table 2,13 these funds can utilize leverage up to 3X based on gross aggregate exposure by borrowing or short-selling. In the US, liquid alts have been available to retail investors since 2013, and the market has grown rapidly to over US$225 billion.14 Now there are signs emerging that even some institutional investors are starting to look into liquid alts ETFs.15 Table 2Canadian Regulation On Liquid Alts Mutual Funds Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? 4. Leverage At Asset-Class Level Alternative funds, such as funds that invest in private equity, private debt, and infrastructure, typically use leverage. These funds carry a high cost because 1) investors in these funds must pay a premium for not managing leverage, and 2) these funds often have much higher financing costs. For example, the average financing cost for leveraged buyouts in 2014 was more than 5%,16 while the average risk-free rate in 2014 was 0.03%. Research has shown that private-asset performance can be proxied by using leverage and the corresponding public asset. In Table 3, the base case is based on the forecast for US equities and Treasurys without leverage, and a risk-free rate of 2.6%.17 Then equities are leveraged by 1.5 times to proximate private equity. The low-cost case has a financing cost of 1.57% (which is what the average 3-month T-Bill rate was in 2019), while the high-cost case with a financing cost of 3.92%, which is 2.5 times the low-cost rate. Table 3Assumed Returns/Risks* Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Chart 10Financing-Cost Impact On The Use Of Embedded Leverage Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Chart 10 shows the corresponding frontiers of the three cases. It’s clear that leverage expands the frontier to the right, meaning that leverage helps to achieve a higher return with better diversification, albeit with higher volatility. However, the financing cost plays a very important role in the feasibility of the leverage decision. When the financing cost is low, leverage is better than the base case at any return-target level. When the financing cost is high, however, leverage is worse – so long as the return target is lower than what the underlying assets can achieve without leverage. This supports the shift to “direct investing” by some institutional investors with access to lower financing when investing in alternative asset classes. 5. Leverage At Portfolio Level Risk parity is an obvious example of using leverage at the portfolio level. As shown in our previous report on risk parity, there are different approaches to implementing risk parity, and they can generate different results – especially when there are more than two assets.18 To analyze the impact of leverage constraints and financing costs, we use a two-asset (US equity/Treasury) risk-parity portfolio as the basis of our analysis. One definitive conclusion we arrived at in our previous report was that risk-parity approach historically always outperforms in recessions. This conclusion has passed the real-time test in the most recent pandemic-induced recession. As shown in Chart 11A, risk-parity portfolios that target the same volatility as a 60/40 US equity/Treasury portfolio have outperformed the latter significantly. The same holds true for the portfolios that target the same volatility as an equity portfolio (Chart 11B).   Chart 11AUS Risk Parity With Same Vol As US 60/40 US Risk Parity With Same Vol As US 60/40 US Risk Parity With Same Vol As US 60/40 Chart 11BUS Risk Parity With Same Vol As US Stocks US Risk Parity With Same Vol As US Stocks US Risk Parity With Same Vol As US Stocks However, as described in the previous Special Report on risk parity, we did not impose any cap on the use ofleverage. As such, some strategies that use a relatively short lookback period to calculate historical statistics required very high leverage ratios at some time periods in our back-tests. What would happen if we set a cap on the leverage ratio? And what if the financing cost is higher than the 3-month T-bill rate assumed in most academic research, and also in our previous report? Chart 12A and Chart 12B show the results when leverage is capped at three times and the financing cost is Libor +25 basis points. It’s clear that Chart 12A looks the same as Chart 11A because the leverage cap is higher than the required leverage employed, while the cost impact is negligible for such a short period. But Chart 12B shows that, even though the risk-parity portfolio still outperformed, the outperformance has been much less so far this year because the required leverage was a lot higher than three times. Chart 12AImpact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Low-Vol Target Risk-Parity Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Low-Vol Target Risk-Parity Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Low-Vol Target Risk-Parity Chart 12BImpact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On High-Vol Target Risk-Parity Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On High-Vol Target Risk-Parity Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On High-Vol Target Risk-Parity The impact of financing costs in Chart 12A is barely seen because the time period was short and the interest rate was low. What is the long-run impact of leverage restrictions and financing costs then? Chart 13A and Chart 13B show the long-run statistics from April 1945 to July 2020 based on a 180-month look-back period for two portfolios: RPL1, the risk-parity portfolio with the same volatility target as a 60/40 US equity/Treasury portfolio; and RPL2, the risk-parity portfolio with the same volatility as MSCI US equity index. Chart 13C shows the risk-adjusted returns for three portfolios with constant volatility targets at 10%, 12%, and 15%, respectively. Chart 13ALong-Term Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Risk-Parity With Low Vol Target* Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Chart 13BLong-Term Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Risk-Parity With High Vol Target* Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage?     Chart 13CLong-Tem Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Risk-Parity Portfolio* Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Some observations are worth highlighting: Financing costs mainly impact average return, but have very little impact on volatility. As such, higher financing costs reduce risk-adjusted returns. When there is no financing cost, all risk-parity portfolios with different volatility targets should have the same risk-adjusted return as the underlying unlevered risk-parity portfolio. When financing costs are present, however, this is no longer the case. Leverage constraints impact both returns and volatility in the same direction – i.e., stricter constraints on leverage reduce both return and volatility, and vice versa. The magnitude of the impact from leverage constraints, however, varies because the target volatility of the portfolio plays a key role in the required leverage. For a constant-volatility target, a tighter control on leverage will reduce volatility more than return, resulting in a higher risk-adjusted return (Chart 13C); for a variable-volatility target such as RPL1 and RPL2, however, the same conclusion cannot be drawn (Charts 13A and 13B) Long-run statistics do not tell the full story because they really depend on the period chosen. Chart 14A shows the dynamic impact of financing when there were no constraints on leverage, and Chart 14B shows the dynamic impact of leverage when there were no additional financing costs. Chart 15 shows the combined impact when leverage is capped at three times and the financing cost at Libor+25 basis points. They are for five different risk-parity portfolios with different volatility targets with a lookback window length of 180 months. (For different lookback window, please see Appendix 2 on pages 23-25). Chart 14ADynamic Impact Of Financing On Risk Parity Without Leverage Constraint* Dynamic Impact Of Financing On Risk Parity Without Leverage Constraint* Dynamic Impact Of Financing On Risk Parity Without Leverage Constraint* Chart14BDynamic Impact Of Leverage Cap On Risk Parity Without Extra Financing * Dynamic Impact Of Leverage Cap On Risk Parity Without Extra Financing * Dynamic Impact Of Leverage Cap On Risk Parity Without Extra Financing * Chart 15Dynamic Impact Of Financing On Risk Parity With Leverage Being Capped At 3X Dynamic Impact Of Financing On Risk Parity With Leverage Being Capped At 3X Dynamic Impact Of Financing On Risk Parity With Leverage Being Capped At 3X It is interesting to note the following: When there is no restriction on leverage, additional financing cost eats away cumulative total return in a much more significant way when an risk parity portfolio has a higher-volatility target than a lower-volatility target (Chart 14A). This is simply because a higher-volatility target requires higher leverage. When there was no additional cost of financing, constraint on leverage ate away total returns – mostly in the early years of the back-test when required leverage was often very high. In recent years, the impact was significant only when the leverage cap dropped to three times or lower. Also, the higher the volatility target, the more reduction in return risk-parity portfolio would suffer compared to its base case (Chart 14B). When the lookback window length is changed, the impact of leverage and financing cost also changes. The shorter the window length, the larger the impact (Charts in Appendix 2). A 180-month lookback period was the preferred choice in our previous report, and it is still more appropriate to use than 36 months or 360 months. Since additional cost and restriction on leverage eat away total return so much, is it really worthwhile to even consider using a risk-parity approach at all? Charts 16A and 16B show that overall total returns were worse during the entire period from April 1945 to July 2020, when additional cost and leverage constraints are applied. Since the burst of the tech bubble, however, risk-parity portfolios with the same volatility target as US 60/40 and also MSCI US have generated higher total returns than US 60/40 and MSCI US, respectively.  Chart16ADoes Risk-Parity With Same Vol As US 60/40 Outperform US 60/40? Does Risk-Parity With Same Vol As US 60/40 Outperforms US 60/40? Does Risk-Parity With Same Vol As US 60/40 Outperforms US 60/40? Chart 16BDoes Risk-Parity With Same Vol As MSCI USI Outperform MSCI US? Does Risk-Parity With Same Vol As MSCI US Outperforms MSCI US? Does Risk-Parity With Same Vol As MSCI US Outperforms MSCI US? We are in a low interest-rate environment, and rates may stay low for a long time to come. In addition, when futures contracts are used to implement leverage, the implied cost is very close to 3-month T-Bills; Libor or Libor + may be present mostly when swaps are used due to factors such as supply/demand and counterparty risk. As such, financing costs will likely play less of a role than leverage constraints until interest rates rise significantly. Given that total-fund leverage is much lower than individual strategy/portfolio leverage, the implication is that risk-parity is more advantageous when it is used as a strategy in a sub-portfolio other than at the total fund level. 6. Suggestion For Leverage Management In a low-return environment, asset allocators face more challenges to meet return targets than in the past. Unless return targets are lowered to what the underlying assets can reasonably provide, asset allocators may have to consider the use of leverage to beef up overall portfolio returns. However, leverage is also a double-edged sword because it also increases portfolio volatility. As such, we suggest a centralized risk-management system to monitor and manage all risks, including risks associated with leverage, in line with our suggestion on currency hedging outlined in our 2017 Special Report. Appendix 1: Leverage Basics Leverage is an investment strategy of using borrowed money – specifically, the use of various financial instruments or borrowed capital – to increase the potential return of an investment. It also amplifies the loss potential if the levered investment does not work out as expected. This is why it is also often called a “double-edged sword.” Leverage has many different forms and is used in many different places. For example, residential home mortgages are a form of leverage that the general public understands very well, yet the leverage embedded in a futures contract may sound alien to some retail investors. For asset allocators, the most important decision on leverage is whether to apply leverage directly at the total-portfolio level or use assets with embedded leverage. For example, issuing bonds to lever up a diversified portfolio (a mean-variance optimal portfolio or a suboptimal risk-parity portfolio) is an example of the former. On the other hand, investing in a private equity fund is an example of the latter. Research has shown that for large pension funds with excellent credit ratings, the latter is less efficient than the former due to the much higher cost of financing.1  For example, in 2014, the average cost of financing for leveraged buyouts was in excess of 5% when the short-term interest rate was close to zero.2 It’s not surprising that pension investors have formed joint ventures to invest in alternative assets directly instead of relying on specialty funds. In terms of financing, there is on-balance-sheet leverage and off-balance-sheet leverage. On-balance-sheet leverage raises liabilities, such as via bond issuance. Off-balance-sheet leverage uses the balance sheet of a counterparty, such as OTC financial derivatives. A repo agreement is a repurchase agreement that involves selling a security (often a government bond) to a counterparty (a lender) with the promise of buying it back after a pre-defined period at a pre-defined price. It’s often used for short-term liquidity management.  Depending on the form of financing, the measurement of leverage differs. Accounting leverage or balance-sheet leverage is calculated as total assets divided by net assets. This measurement is accurate only if on-balance-sheet leverage is used for long-only investments. When off-balance-sheet leverage is used or when shorting is involved, then accounting leverage severely understates the actual leverage. For example, Appendix Table A1 below is a snapshot from the 2018 annual report of Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP). The notional value of its derivatives was $333 billion, which is over 10 times the fair value of these instruments, and over four times the fund’s net asset value. Appendix Table A1HOOPP's Use Of Derivatives* Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? So, when derivatives are used, accounting leverage is often adjusted for derivative exposure by taking the delta-adjusted notional value of derivative contracts.3 When there are short positions, leverage can be measured as Gross and Net Leverage after derivatives exposure is delta-adjusted. Gross Leverage is defined as the total exposure of long and short positions divided by net assets. This is accurate when the long and short positions are totally separate active bets. Net Leverage, is defined as the net exposure between long and short positions, divided by net assets. This is an accurate measure of leverage when the long and short positions are taken as hedges for one another. 1  Dr. Serguei Zernov, “Leverage to Meet the Pension Promise,” Global Risk Institute, Jan 24, 2019. 2  L’her, J.F., Stoyanova, R., Shaw, K., Scott, W. and Lai, C, “A bottom-up approach to the risk-adjusted performance of the buyout fund market”, Financial Analysts Journal, July/August 2016. 3  Andrew Ang, Sergiy Gorovyy and Gregoty B. van Inwegen, “Hedge Fund Leverage,” Journal of Financial Economics, January 25, 2011. Appendix 2: Impact Of Leverage Caps And Financing Costs With Different Lookback Window Lengths In Section 5, Chart 14A, Chart 14B and Chart 15 were presented using a lookback window of 180 months, a prefered window length based on our previous research on risk parity. However, practioners have been using different lookback windows. Below are the corresponding charts showing lookback windows of 360 months and 36 months, respectively. It’s easy to see that, the shorter the lookback window, the more significant the impact of  both financing costs and leverage constraints. The reason is simple: a shorter lookback window generates much higher leverage compared to a longer lookback window. APPENDIX 2 Chart 1AImpact Of Financing With 360-Month Lookback Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? APPENDIX 2 Chart 1BImpact Of Financing With 36-Month Lookback Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage?   APPENDIX 2 Chart 2AImpact Of Leverage Cap With 360-Month Lookback Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? APPENDIX 2 Chart 2BImpact Of Leverage Cap with 36-Month Lookback Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage?   APPENDIX 2 Chart 3AImpact Of Financing When Leverage Capped At 3X With 360-Month Lookback Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? APPENDIX 2 Chart 3BImpact Of Financing When Leverage Capped At 3X With 36-Month Lookback Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage? Can Asset Allocators Afford Not To Use Leverage?   Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Return Assumptions – Refreshed And Refined,” dated June 25, 2019. 2 Ned McGuire and Brice Shirimbere, "2019 Wilshire Consulting Report on State Retirement Systems: Funding Levels and Asset Allocation," Wilshire Associates, March 2019. 3 “State Pension Funds adjust to ‘New Normal’ of Lower Returns,” Chief Investment Officer, January 2, 2020, 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Return Assumptions – Refreshed And Refined,” dated June 25, 2019. 5 Martha Porado, “A look at how Canadian pension funds are using leverage,” dated Aug 10, 2018. 6GPIF (Government Pension Investment Fund) 2018 annual report. 7 "2017-18 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report,"CalPERS. p106, 2018 annual report. 8 "CalPERS Falling Short of Private Equity Goals," dated November 18, 2019. 9 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Demystifying Risk Parity," dated May 8, 2019. 10 https://www.mosers.org/funding/annual-reports 11 Arleen Jacobius, "CalPERS shifts $150 billion as part of new strategic asset allocation," Pensions And Investments, dated August 20, 2019. 12 Edward Qian, “Rebalance and Diversification Returns of Leveraged Portfolios,” Investment Insight, Panagora, December 2011. 13https://www.mackenzieinvestments.com/content/dam/mackenzie/en/2019/03/mm-investing-in-liquid-alternatives-en.pdf 14 https://perspectives.scotiabank.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Liquid-A… 15 "5 Use Cases for Liquid Alt ETFs," Institutional Investor dated November 18, 2019. 16 L’ her et al, “A bottom-up approach to the risk-adjusted performance of the buyout fund market,” Financial Analysts Journal, 72(4), 2016. 17 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Return Assumptions – Refreshed And Refined,” dated June 25, 2019. 18 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, Demystifying Risk Parity," dated May 8, 2019.

Highlights Along with momentum, quality has been the best performing factor over the past 30 years. It has also been less volatile and has exhibited milder drawdowns than other factors. There are multiple traits that are considered as signs of quality. However, profitability explains the lion’s share of the quality premium, though accounting quality and payout dilution also play a role. The reason why quality stocks outperform remains a mystery, though the preference for lottery stocks as well as the failure to account for the persistence of quality are plausible explanations. Both small caps and value stocks have negative tilts to quality. Adjusting for this tilt by buying small-cap quality indices or value indices with quality filters, can help investors exploit these factors more effectively. Feature “Investment must always consider the price as well as the quality of the security” – Benjamin Graham & David Dodd, Security Analysis, Principles and Technique, 1934 Legendary investor Benjamin Graham is one of the most significant figures in the history of finance. His two books, The Intelligent Investor and Security Analysis, stand as foundational pillars in the field of fundamental analysis. Moreover, as the mentor of the most famous investor ever, Warren Buffet, he has influenced a generation of investors into caring deeply about not overpaying for stocks. Thanks to these feats, Graham has come to be known as the “father of value investing”. And yet this moniker, though well-deserved, ignores a substantial portion of his legacy. Graham was not solely concerned with valuations.1 In fact, out of the seven criteria that he used to pick securities, only two of them focused on valuation measures. The rest, focused on metrics like profitability, leverage, and stability. These attributes encompass what is broadly known today as quality. But what exactly is quality? While certain traits have historically been associated with this factor, quality was not seen until more recently as something that you could easily define. Instead, a more holistic approach to quality was preferred.2 It wasn’t until the work of Robert Novy-Marx in the early 2010s, and US investment firm AQR thereafter, that the possibility of measuring quality, as well as systematically exploiting it, became prominent within the factor literature. Since then, quality has become a more popular strategy, with various commercial providers offering quality indices in recent years. However, much remains unknown about this newly discovered factor. Thus, in this report we take a deep dive into quality with the intent of providing some clarity on the following three issues: Definition of quality: What metrics are used to determine if a stock is a “quality” stock? Which of the many quality traits have the best track record? Characteristics of quality: What has been the historical performance of quality? What is its sector exposure? Why does it work? Implementation of quality: How can the quality factor be used in conjunction with other factors to increase returns? In order to answer these questions, we explore the historical performance of the MSCI Quality indices – though we also touch on quality indices by other providers. Moreover, we survey the academic literature around quality, and we propose a couple of ways by which investors can use this factor to exploit the value and small-cap premia more effectively. Definition Of Quality There is no universal agreement on how to measure quality, though there are some general traits that are agreed upon by the academic literature. An often used definition of quality is the “Quality Minus Junk” (QMJ) factor by AQR. In their research, Assness et al. use three traits, each of which is measured by five to six different metrics3 (Table 1). All the metrics are standardized and then averaged to arrive at a single quality measure. This quality measure is then used to build a quality portfolio. Table 1Metrics Used In AQR's Quality Minus Junk Factor (QMJ) Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets However, not all quality indices take so many measures into account. In fact, most commercial providers limit themselves to three or four variables to construct their quality indices. As an example, MSCI determines quality using three criteria: Return on equity, earnings variability, and leverage. All three variables are then winsorized,4 standardized, and then averaged to create a quality score. This quality score determines the weight of each stock within the index. Table 2 expands on the methodology of the quality benchmarks offered by various index providers. Table 2Quality Metrics For Popular Index Providers Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets The lack of a homogenous definition for quality makes performance evaluation of quality problematic. After all, the outperformance of quality could simply be a function of data mining by optimizing for a group of variables that produce excess returns in a backtest. This approach can lead to a large outperformance in-sample, but which might not necessarily replicate when applied in a real-world portfolio.5 To address this issue, some academics have tried to pinpoint which among the many quality traits truly add value in order to build a simpler and more parsimonious factor. In “What is Quality?”, Hsu et al. found that profitability is the most important quality characteristic, having a large and significant multifactor alpha6 (Table 3). Accounting quality and payout dilution have also been relatively reliable sources of excess returns. On the other hand, there is little evidence that most metrics for capital structure, profitability growth, or earnings stability, provide a premium that is not captured by other factors. Table 3Drivers Of The Quality Premium Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets Given the preponderance that profitability has in the overall performance of the quality factor, some academics have suggested that the quality factor should be reduced to profitability.7 However, not everybody agrees with this approach. In fact, other researchers have advocated for including more metrics such as ESG or corporate governance, in an effort to bring back the more holistic approach that Graham practiced.8 Overall, much disagreement about how to measure quality remains, and the subject is still an open debate. Characteristics Of Quality Historical Performance, Composition And Valuation Over the past 30 years, the MSCI Quality Index has, along with momentum, been the best performing factor in the equity markets (Chart 1, top panel). During this time frame, quality stocks have outperformed minimum volatility stocks by 2.6% per year, the global benchmark by 3.5% per year, and value stocks by 4% per year. The performance of quality has also been relatively robust, though the factor has performed better in some countries than others (Chart 1, bottom panel). Quality has performed best in European countries and Canada, while its outperformance has been more muted in Australia and Japan. Historically, quality has been the second most defensive factor after minimum volatility (Chart 2, panels 1 and 2). Moreover, it has exhibited lower volatility, and smaller drawdowns than the overall market. The defensive tilt of quality seems to arise because of the “flight to quality” phenomenon, where investors flock to higher quality assets during periods of markets stress. Interestingly, quality tends to outperform in equity markets and bond markets at the same time (Chart 2, bottom panel). This suggests that quality might be a common risk factor that is captured across asset classes. Chart 1Quality Has Outperformed Most Other Factors Quality Has Outperformed Most Other Factors Quality Has Outperformed Most Other Factors Chart 2Quality Is A Defensive Factor Quality Is A Defensive Factor Quality Is A Defensive Factor Chart 3Quality Overweights Expensive Sectors Quality Overweights Expensive Sectors Quality Overweights Expensive Sectors What about composition? Within the global index, the quality factor currently has a large country bias to defensive markets like the US and Switzerland. This is mostly the result of its overweight to Information Technology, Consumer Staples and Health Care, and a large underweight position in Financials (Chart 3, top panel). This sector positioning also results in quality having high valuations relative to the overall market (Chart 3, bottom panel). It must be noted that valuations for quality stocks have risen significantly over the past few years. It is hard to know how this valuation compares to the past for the MSCI indices, given that valuation measures for MSCI Quality are only available starting in 2013. However, research by AQR has shown that relatively high prices for quality tend to result in lower returns.9 Thus, high valuations could pose a risk for quality going forward. Explanations For The Quality Anomaly Using a dividend-discount framework, one can show that, in theory, high-quality companies should trade at higher price-to-book values than low quality ones (for more details please see Appendix 1). Asness et at have shown that this is the case empirically – high-quality stocks trade at a valuation premium to low-quality stocks (Chart 4, top panel). Chart 4Analysts Are Most Optimistic On Low Quality Stocks Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets However, the mystery of quality lies in the fact that this premium does not appear to be as large as it should be. In other words, while analyst and market participants correctly assign higher multiples to high-quality stocks, this multiple is not large enough, and results in high-quality stocks being undervalued. Ultimately, this leads to the outperformance of high-quality stocks versus low-quality ones (Chart 4, bottom panel). Why do market participants overvalue low quality/junk stocks and undervalue high quality stocks? One reason could be a preference for lottery-like stocks. As we discussed in our January report on the low- volatility anomaly, investors tend to prefer “home-run” stocks – a result of behavioral biases as well as the incentives in the money management industry.10 Thus, distressed companies with low levels of profitability and large levels of debt, may attract some investors betting on a turnaround in the hope of a large windfall if the company survives.11 On the flip side, investors might perceive that high-quality companies – which are usually stable, profitable, and more expensive – cannot produce the same type of extreme payoff, and may even be prone to mean reversion, given that their success is evident and well known.  But this last assumption is a mistake. Quality is a highly persistent characteristic, which means that a high-quality stock today is very likely to remain a high-quality stock in the future (Table 4). It is easy to see why this is the case. A company with very high levels of profitability has likely achieved this by building a moat around its business through a strong brand, proprietary technology, or network effects. It is possible that failure to take this into account results in an undervaluation of high-quality stocks.  Table 4Quality Is Persistent Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets BOX 1 The Behavior Of Quality In Equity And Credit Markets Chart 5Quality Delivers A Different Premium In Different Asset Classes Quality Delivers A Different Premium In Different Asset Classes Quality Delivers A Different Premium In Different Asset Classes While there is a very tight correlation between the performance of quality in credit and equity markets, the structural premium obtained from this factor in each market is very different. Over a long period, investors are rewarded for investing in high-quality equities, while the opposite occurs when investing in high-quality credit issues (Chart 5). Why would the same risk factor provide a positive premium in one market but provide a negative one in another? The exact reason remains unclear, but the behavioral explanations for the quality factor might provide a clue. As opposed to equity markets, returns in credit markets – even if very high – are naturally capped. As an example: An investor who buys a low-quality issue with a 20% yield-to-maturity, knows that in the absence of a default, the most he or she can earn from holding the issue to maturity is 20%. The fact that the maximum return is well established beforehand might prevent investors from displaying behavioral biases. Specifically, a well-defined upside might cause investors to think more rationally and mechanically about an investment. In contrast, securities where the upside is high but not well-defined might make it more likely for investors to see a very risky investment as a lottery, since extraordinary returns are technically within the realm of possibility. Whatever the reason is, the different premium that this factor offers in these two asset classes presents a potentially attractive opportunity for asset allocators. We will explore how investors could take advantage of this discrepancy in future reports on factor allocation.   Implementation Of Quality Using Quality And Size Chart 6The Small-Cap Premium Is Higher When Adjusted For Quality The Small-Cap Premium Is Higher When Adjusted For Quality The Small-Cap Premium Is Higher When Adjusted For Quality Historically, small-cap stocks have delivered excess returns over large cap-stocks – a well-documented phenomenon known as the size premium. However, this premium has been very unstable and extremely seasonal, occurring mostly in the month of January, and providing no excess returns in all other months. Moreover, some research has suggested that the size premium cannot be harvested easily in practice, since most of the premium is concentrated in the very smallest stocks (microcaps), which are highly illiquid.12 The issues surrounding the size premium have prompted some academics to question its existence. However, recent research on the interaction of quality and size has brought back interest to this topic. In the paper “Size Matters, If You Control Your Junk”, Assness et al show that many of the problems with the size premium are caused by the bias that small caps have to low quality. Once this low-quality bias is accounted for, the size premium becomes much larger and stable – a result that also holds when controlling for a quality proxy like profitability (Chart 6). Notably, the concentration of returns in January and in microcaps also disappears when the bias is removed.13 This bias to low quality is a significant problem in most popular small-cap indices. The profitability of indices like the S&P 600 has historically been lower than its large-cap counterparts (Chart 7,  top panel). Moreover, a similar story holds for leverage: While the much maligned increase in corporate debt is evident in small-cap indices, it is virtually nonexistent when looking at large-cap indices like the S&P 500, where leverage measures stand barely above 30- year lows (Chart 7, bottom panel). How can this bias be removed? Stock-level filters for quality might be difficult to implement for many investors. Instead, an easier solution is to exploit the size premium through a small-cap quality index. S&P currently offers the S&P 600 Quality Index, which selects the 120 highest-quality stocks out of the S&P 600. Importantly, since this quality adjustment removes some of the low-quality bias from the S&P 600, the S&P 600 Quality index is able to maintain performance on the upside, while also limiting the sharp periods of underperformance that usually affect small caps during bear markets (Chart 8). Chart 7Small-Cap Stocks Have A Lot Of Junk Small-Cap Stocks Have A Lot Of Junk Small-Cap Stocks Have A Lot Of Junk Chart 8Small-Cap Quality Is A Better Way To Exploit The Size Anomaly Small-Cap Quality Is A Better Way To Exploit The Size Anomaly Small-Cap Quality Is A Better Way To Exploit The Size Anomaly   Using Quality And Value The intersection between value and quality – a pair of factors that have a negative correlation – has been a topic of interest since quality was first discovered.14 They stand as perfect complements of each other: The value factor tries to find cheap stocks, regardless of their quality, while the quality factor tries to find quality stocks regardless of their price. Together they make for a powerful combination: Quality stocks at affordable prices. Some research has suggested that this combination of value and quality lies behind the success of Graham’s greatest student. According to the seminal paper titled “Buffet’s Alpha”, the biggest factor exposures of the Berkshire Hathaway portfolio from 1980 to 2011, outside of overall market risk, were quality and value15 (Chart 9). Exposure to these factors, along with low beta, as well as the ability of Berkshire Hathaway to obtain cheap leverage thanks to its insurance business, explained most of the excess returns that Warren Buffet was able to achieve. Chart 9Buffett's Motto: High Quality, Cheap, And Low Risk Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets Commercial providers have started to offer indices which combine value and quality. As an example, MSCI offers the Prime Value indices, where stocks are first screened for quality and then ranked according to a value score. This methodology has outperformed its normal value counterparts in both the euro area and the US (Chart 10). Chart 10Quality Adjustments By MSCI Improve Value In The Euro Area Quality Adjustments By MSCI Improve Value In The Euro Area Quality Adjustments By MSCI Improve Value In The Euro Area Chart 11Stronger Quality Filters Are Needed In The US To Enhance Value Stronger Quality Filters Are Needed In The US To Enhance Value Stronger Quality Filters Are Needed In The US To Enhance Value   Interestingly, despite value’s recent doldrums, the quality adjustment done in the Prime Value index has helped value perform relatively well in the euro area for the past couple years. However, the same cannot be said in the US where performance of Value and Prime Value has been almost identical since 2003. This suggest a couple of options: It could be that, even when adjusting for quality, value behaves fundamentally differently in different countries. Alternatively, it could also mean that the US market is more efficient at pricing quality, which would imply that a simple quality filter would not do much, since quality at an attractive valuation would be harder to find. We suspect the reason might be the latter. In this case a stronger quality filter might be needed to substantially enhance the performance of value. The newly released Russell 1000 QARP (Quality At A Reasonable Price) Index follows this methodology. It applies a double quality filter and then compounds it by a value score. This index has substantially enhanced performance relatively to the Russell 1000 Value index (Chart 11). Moreover, it has also been able to fare better relative to the broad market and has avoided the large underperformance that value has undergone since 2018. Bottom Line Quality has been one of the most successful factors over the past three decades. But will this performance continue? While the exact reason behind the quality anomaly remains unclear, the evidence suggests that institutional incentives and behavioral biases, which are likely to persist in the future, might be responsible for the outperformance of quality in the market. Thus, investors should consider adding quality stocks to their portfolios. Moreover, quality can also be used to enhance the performance of other popular factors in the following ways: Correcting for the low-quality bias of small caps, makes the small-cap premium larger and much more stable over the long term. A practical way to correct for this low-quality bias is to buy small-cap quality portfolios such as the S&P 600 Quality Index. Value stocks also tend to have low quality. Investors can improve the performance of the value factor by using quality filters to find quality stocks that are also cheap. The quality filters in the MSCI Prime Value Index has significantly improved the performance of value in the euro area. Meanwhile, the Russell 1000 QARP index, which selects for value stocks using a stronger quality filter than MSCI, has kept pace with the overall market even amidst value’s collapse.   Juan Correa Ossa, CFA  Associate Editor juanc@bcaresearch.com Appendix 1 Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets Footnotes 1  Robert Novy-Marx, “Quality Investing,” Working Paper, 1-28 (2014) 2  In Graham’s own words: “An indefinite and approximate measure of the intrinsic value may be sufficient. To use a homely simile, it is quite possible to decide by inspection that a woman is old enough to vote without knowing her age or that a man is heavier than he should be without knowing his exact weight.” 3  Asness, C.S., Frazzini, A. & Pedersen, L.H. “Quality minus junk,” Rev Account Stud 24, 34–112 (2019). 4 Winsorization is a way to remove the effects of outliers in the data. In this case all the values above the 95th percentile are set to the 95th percentile value and all the values below the 5th percentile are set to the 5th percentile value. 5 Robert Novy-Marx, “Backtesting Strategies Based on Multiple Signals,” NBER Working Paper No. w21329 (2015). 6 Jason Hsu, Vitali Kalesnik, Engin Kose, “What Is Quality?” Financial Analysts Journal, 75:2, 44-61 (2019). 7 Amanda White, “Quality is Explained by Profitability,” Top1000funds.com, (2015). 8 Dan Hanson and Rohan Dhanuka, “The ‘Science’ and ‘Art’ of High Quality Investing,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 27:2 (2015). 9 C.S. Asness, A. Frazzini, and L.H. Pedersen, “Quality minus junk,” Rev Account Stud 24, 34–112 (2019). 10 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Less Risk And More Reward? The Low-Volatility Factor In Equity Markets”, dated January 29, 2020. 11 This theory on the quality anomaly might explain the different performance of quality in credit and equity markets. For more details, please see Box 1. 12 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Small Cap Outperformance: Fact Or Myth?” dated April 7, 2020. 13 Cliff S. Asness, Andrea Frazzini, Ronen Israel, and Lasse Heje Pedersen, “Size Matters, If You Control Your Junk,” CEPR Discussion Paper, No. DP12684 (2018). 14 Robert Novy - Marx, “The Other Side of Value: The Gross Profitability Premium,” Journal of Financial Economics, 108(1) , 1 - 28, (2013) and “The Quality Dimension of Value Investing,” University of Rochester, Working Paper (2014). 15 Andrea Frazzini, David Kabiller, and Lasse Heje Pedersen,  "Buffett’s Alpha," Financial Analysts Journal, 74-4, 35-55 (2018).    

Highlights Chart 1Permanent Job Losses Still Rising Permanent Job Losses Still Rising Permanent Job Losses Still Rising The biggest event in bond markets last month was the Fed’s shift toward a regime of average inflation targeting. Treasuries sold off in the days following the announcement and, overall, the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index underperformed cash by 111 basis points in August (Chart 1). We view this market reaction as sensible, since it seems clear that the Fed’s new commitment to tolerate an overshoot of its 2% inflation target will be bearish for bonds in the long run. However, for this bond bear market to play out the US economy must first generate some inflation. This will take time. Despite the drop in the headline U3 unemployment rate, August’s employment report showed that permanent job losses continue to rise (bottom panel). This is a clear sign that the economic recovery is not yet on a solid footing. We advise bond investors to keep portfolio duration close to benchmark for the time being. We also recommend several yield curve trades across the nominal, real and inflation compensation curves (see pages 10 & 11). Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -356 bps. Spreads on Baa-rated corporate bonds continued their tightening trend through August, even as spreads were roughly flat for bonds rated A and above. As a result, Baa-rated bonds outperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 30 bps on the month while higher-rated credits underperformed. Valuation remains more attractive for the Baa space than for higher-rated credits (Chart 2), but spreads for all credit tiers look cheaper than they did near the end of 2019. Given the Fed’s strong support for the market through both its emergency lending facilities, and now, its extraordinarily dovish forward rate guidance, we see further room for spread compression across all credit tiers. At the sector level, we continue to recommend a focus on high-quality Baa-rated issuers. That is, Baa-rated bonds that are unlikely to face a ratings downgrade during the next 12 months. Subordinate bank bonds are a prime example of debt that falls into this sweet spot.1 We also recommend overweight allocations to Healthcare and Energy bonds2 and underweight allocations to Technology3 and Pharmaceutical bonds.4 Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 121 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -351 bps. All junk credit tiers delivered strong returns in August, but the lowest-rated credits performed best. Caa-rated & below junk bonds outperformed Treasuries by 255 bps on the month compared to 98 bps of outperformance for Ba-rated bonds (Chart 3). The recent strong performance of low-rated junk bonds makes us question whether our focus on the Ba-rated credit tier is overly conservative. If the economy is indeed on a quick road to recovery, then we are leaving some return on the table by avoiding the B-rated and lower credit tiers. However, we aren’t yet confident enough in the economic recovery to move down in quality. Last week’s employment report showed that permanent job losses continue to rise and Congress has still not passed a much needed follow-up to the CARES act. What’s more, current junk spreads imply a very rapid decline in the corporate default rate during the next 12 months, from its current level of 8.4% all the way to 4.4% (panel 3).5  In this regard, August’s steep drop in layoff announcements is a positive development (bottom panel), though job cuts are still running well above pre-pandemic levels. At the sector level, we advise overweight allocations to high-yield Technology6 and Energy7 bonds. We are underweight the Healthcare and Pharmaceutical sectors.8 MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 9 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -37 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS index option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 7 bps in August, but it still offers a small spread pick-up compared to other similarly risky sectors. The MBS OAS of 77 bps is greater than the 75 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds, the 67 bps offered by Agency CMBS and the 35 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. Despite the spread advantage, we are concerned that the elevated primary mortgage spread is a warning that refinancing risk could flare later this year  (Chart 4). Even if Treasury yields are unchanged, a further 50 bps drop in the mortgage rate due to spread compression cannot be ruled out. Such a move would lead to a significant increase in prepayment losses. With that in mind, we are concerned about the low level of expected prepayment losses (option cost) priced into the MBS index (panel 3). A fourth quarter refi wave would undoubtedly send that option cost higher, eating into the returns implied by the OAS. The recent spike in the mortgage delinquency rate does not pose a near-term risk to spreads as it is being driven by households that have been granted forbearance from the federal government (panel 4). The risk for MBS holders only comes into play if many households are unable to resume their regular mortgage payments when the forbearance period expires early next year. But even in that case, further government action to either support household incomes or extend the forbearance period could mitigate the risk. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 31 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -295 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 105 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -468 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 13 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -694 bps. Local Authority debt outperformed Treasuries by 33 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -337 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 8 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -54 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 5 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -9 bps. US dollar weakness is usually a boon for Sovereign and Foreign Agency returns. However, most of the dollar’s recent depreciation has occurred against other Developed Market currencies, not Emerging Markets (Chart 5). Added to that, dollar weakness against all trading partners helps US corporate sector profits, and Baa-rated corporate bonds continue to offer a spread pick-up versus EM sovereigns (panel 4). Within the Emerging Market Sovereign space: Turkey, South Africa, Mexico, Colombia and Russia all offer a spread pick-up relative to quality and duration-matched US corporate bonds. Of those attractively priced countries, Mexico stands out as particularly compelling on a risk/reward basis.9 Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -492 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads versus Treasuries have widened during the past month, more so at the long-end than at the short-end, and the entire Aaa muni curve remains above the Treasury curve, despite municipal debt’s tax-exempt status (Chart 6). Municipal bonds also remain attractively priced relative to corporate bonds across the entire investment grade credit spectrum, as we demonstrated in a recent report.10 The Fed reduced the pricing on its Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) by 50 basis points last month. Most likely, it felt pressure to act as Congress has still not passed a state & local government aid package. However, the Fed’s move will not have much impact on municipal bond spreads. Even after the reduction, municipal yields continue to run well below the cost offered by the MLF (panel 3). Extremely attractive valuation causes us to stick with our municipal bond overweight, though spreads will widen in the near-term if much needed stimulus doesn’t arrive soon. In the long-run, we remain optimistic that elevated state rainy day funds will help cushion the fiscal blow and lessen the risk of ratings downgrades (bottom panel).    Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-steepened in August. The 2/10 and 5/30 Treasury slopes steepened 14 bps and 22 bps, reaching 58 bps and 121 bps, respectively. One easy way to think about nominal Treasury yields is as the market’s expectation of future changes in the federal funds rate.11 With that in mind, the Fed’s recent shift toward a regime of average inflation targeting will likely lead to nominal yield curve steepening. That is, the Fed will keep a firm grip on the front-end of the curve, but long-maturity yields could rise as investors price-in the possibility that the Fed will have to eventually respond to high inflation by quickly tightening policy. For this reason, we retain a core position in nominal yield curve steepeners. Specifically, we recommend buying the 5-year bullet and shorting a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. This position is designed to profit from 2/10 Treasury curve steepening, which should play out over the next 6-12 months, assuming the economic recovery is sustained. Valuation is a concern with this recommended positioning. The 5-year yield is below the yield on the duration-matched 2/10 barbell (Chart 7), and the 5-year bullet looks expensive on our yield curve models (Appendix B).     However, the 5-year bullet traded at much more expensive levels during the last zero-lower-bound period between 2010 and 2013 (bottom panel). With short rates once again pinned at zero, we expect the 5-year to once again hit extreme levels of overvaluation. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 240 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -76 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose 25 bps and 22 bps on the month. They currently sit at 1.67% and 1.78%, respectively. TIPS breakeven inflation rates have moved up rapidly during the past couple months, a trend that was supercharged by the Fed’s Jackson Hole announcement. In fact, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is now right around fair value according to our Adaptive Expectations Model (Chart 8).12 TIPS will soon turn expensive if current trends continue. That is, unless stronger CPI inflation sends our model’s fair value reading higher. We place strong odds on the latter occurring during the next few months, with trimmed mean inflation measures still running well above core (panel 3). However, we cautioned in a recent report that inflation is likely to moderate in 2021 after core inflation re-converges with the trimmed mean.13 In addition to our overweight stance on TIPS, we continue to recommend real yield curve steepeners and inflation curve flatteners. With the Fed now officially targeting an overshoot of its 2% inflation goal, we would expect the cost of 2-year inflation protection to rise above the cost of 10-year inflation protection (panel 4). With the Fed also keeping a firmer grip over short-dated nominal yields than over long-dated ones, this means that short-maturity real yields will come under downward pressure relative to the long end (bottom panel). ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 30 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +53 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 24 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +46 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 73 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +95 bps. Aaa ABS are a high conviction overweight, given that spreads remain elevated compared to historical levels and that the sector benefits from Fed support through the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF). However, spreads are even more attractive in non-Aaa ABS (Chart 9) and we recommend owning those securities as well. This is despite the fact that only Aaa-rated bonds are eligible for TALF. We explained our rationale for owning non-Aaa consumer ABS in a recent report.14  We noted that the stimulus received from the CARES act caused real disposable personal income to increase significantly between February and July and, faced with fewer spending opportunities, households used that windfall to pay down consumer debt (bottom panel). Granted, further income support from fiscal policymakers is needed now that the CARES act’s enhanced unemployment benefits have expired. But given the substantial boost to savings that has already occurred, we are confident that more stimulus will arrive in time to prevent a wave of consumer bankruptcies.  Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 77 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -320 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 57 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -108 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed by 160 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -1008 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa non-agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Our reasoning is simple. Aaa CMBS are eligible for TALF, meaning that spreads can still tighten even as the hardship in commercial real estate continues. Without Fed support, non-Aaa CMBS will struggle to deal with a climbing delinquency rate (panel 3).15 Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 38 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -4 bps. The average index spread tightened 6 bps on the month to 66 bps, still well above typical historical levels (bottom panel). The Fed is supporting the Agency CMBS market by directly purchasing the securities as part of its Agency MBS purchase program. The combination of strong Fed support and elevated spreads makes the sector a high conviction overweight. Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. TablePerformance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet ​​​​​​​ Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of September 3, 2020) The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of September 3, 2020) The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 72 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 72 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of September 3, 2020) The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish … But Not Yet   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Case Against The Money Supply”, dated June 30, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 1: A Model Of Energy Bond Excess Returns”, dated July 14, 2020 and US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy”, dated July 21, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Assessing Healthcare & Pharma Bonds In A Pandemic”, dated June 9, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 We assume a 25% recovery rate and target a spread of 150 bps in excess of default losses. For more details on this calculation please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 1: A Model Of Energy Bond Excess Returns”, dated July 14, 2020, and US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy”, dated July 21, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Assessing Healthcare & Pharma Bonds In A Pandemic”, dated June 9, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply”, dated May 12, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Bonds Are Vulnerable As North America Re-Opens”, dated May 26, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 For more details on this forecasting framework please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Positioning For Reflation And Avoiding Deflation”, dated August 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 12 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 13 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Positioning For Reflation And Avoiding Deflation”, dated August 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 14 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 15 For a deeper dive into the outlook for US commercial real estate please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get?”, dated August 28, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update: Can Monetary Policy Alone Propel The Market? Monthly Portfolio Update: Can Monetary Policy Alone Propel The Market? Chart 1Only Internet Stocks Have Kept On Rising Only Internet Stocks Have Kept On Rising Only Internet Stocks Have Kept On Rising It has been a very strange bull market. Although global equities are up 52% since their bottom on March 23rd, the rally has been limited largely to internet-related stocks. Excluding the three sectors (IT, Consumer Discretionary, and Communications) which house the internet names, equities have moved only sideways since May (Chart 1). Moreover, the rally comes amid sporadic serious new outbreaks of COVID-19 cases, most recently in Europe (Chart 2). Fears of the pandemic and much-reduced business activity in leisure-related industries have caused consumer confidence to diverge from the stock market in an unprecedented way (Chart 3).  Chart 2New Outbreaks Of COVID-19 In Europe New Outbreaks Of COVID-19 In Europe New Outbreaks Of COVID-19 In Europe Chart 3Why Are Stocks Rising When Consumers Are So Wary? Why Are Stocks Rising When Consumers Are So Wary? Why Are Stocks Rising When Consumers Are So Wary? The only explanation for these phenomena is the unprecedented amount of monetary stimulus, which is causing excess liquidity to flow into risk assets. Since March, the balance-sheets of major central banks have increased by $7 trillion (Chart 4), and M2 money supply growth has soared (Chart 5). Chart 4Central Banks Have Grown Their Balance-Sheets... Central Banks Have Grown Their Balance-Sheets... Central Banks Have Grown Their Balance-Sheets... Chart 5...Leading To A Big Rise in Money Growth ...Leading To A Big Rise in Money Growth ...Leading To A Big Rise in Money Growth Moreover, the Fed’s new strategic framework announced in late August represents a commitment to keep monetary policy loose even when the economy begins to overheat. The Fed will (1) target 2% inflation on average over time which means that, after a period of low inflation, it will “aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time”; and (2) treat its employment mandate as asymmetrical, so that when employment is below potential the Fed will be accommodative, but that a rise in employment above its “maximum level” will not necessarily trigger tightening. Historically the Fed has raised rates when unemployment approached its natural rate (Chart 6). The new policy implies it will no longer do so. The aim of the policy is to raise inflation expectations which have become unanchored, with headline PCE inflation above the Fed’s 2% target for only 14 out of 102 months since the target was introduced in February 2012 (Chart 6, panel 3).  Chart 6The Fed's Behavior Will Be Different In Future The Fed's Behavior Will Be Different In Future The Fed's Behavior Will Be Different In Future Chart 7More Permanent Job Losses To Come More Permanent Job Losses To Come More Permanent Job Losses To Come This commitment to easier monetary policy for longer will certainly help risk assets. But will it be enough? The global economic environment remains weak. Permanent job losses continue to increase, as workers initially put on furlough or dismissed temporarily, are fired (Chart 7). A second wave of COVID-19 cases in the Northern Hemisphere winter would worsen the situation. While central banks everywhere remain committed to aggressive policy, fiscal policy decision-makers are getting cold feet, with the UK’s wage-replacement scheme due to end in October, and government support in the US set to decline absent a big new fiscal package agreed by Congress (Chart 8). Credit risks are beginning to emerge, with bankruptcies surging (Chart 9), and mortgage delinquencies starting to rise (Chart 10). As a result, banks are becoming significantly more reluctant to lend (Chart 11). Chart 8Fiscal Support Is Starting To Slide Fiscal Support Is Starting To Slide Fiscal Support Is Starting To Slide   Chart 9Bankruptcies Are Surging… Monthly Portfolio Update: Can Monetary Policy Alone Propel The Market? Monthly Portfolio Update: Can Monetary Policy Alone Propel The Market?   Chart 10...Along With Mortgage Delinquencies ...Along With Mortgage Delinquencies ...Along With Mortgage Delinquencies Chart 11Banks Turning Increasingly Cautious Banks Turning Increasingly Cautious Banks Turning Increasingly Cautious To those concerns, we should add political risk ahead of the US presidential election. President Trump is probably not as far behind as the 7-percentage point gap in opinion polls suggests: After the Republican National Convention, online betting sites give him a 46% probability of being reelected (Chart 12). Over the next two months, he could be aggressive in foreign policy, particularly towards China. A disputed election is not unlikely. Investors might be wise to hedge against that possibility: BCA Research’s Geopolitical service recommends buying December VIX futures, which are still cheaply priced, and selling January VIX futures (Chart 13). 1 Chart 12Trump Could Still Pull It Off Trump Could Still Pull It Off Trump Could Still Pull It Off   Chart 13Hedge Against A Disputed Election Result Monthly Portfolio Update: Can Monetary Policy Alone Propel The Market? Monthly Portfolio Update: Can Monetary Policy Alone Propel The Market? Given the power of monetary stimulus, we are reluctant to bet against equities – not least since the yield on fixed-incomes assets is so low. Nonetheless, we see the risk of a sharp correction over the coming six months, driven by a second pandemic wave, a renewed downturn in the global economy, or political events. We continue to recommend, therefore, only a neutral position on global equities. We would hold a large overweight in cash, to keep powder dry for when a better buying opportunity for risk assets arises. But a warning: The long-run return from all asset classes will be poor. The global bond index is unlikely to produce a nominal return much above zero over the coming decade. While equities look more attractive, our valuation indicator points to a nominal annual return of only around 3% (Chart 14). For the US, valuation suggests a return of zero. Investors will need to become more realistic about their return assumptions. The 7% annual return still assumed by the average US pension fund might have made sense when the yield on BBB-rated corporate bonds was 8%, but it no longer does when it has fallen to 2.3% (Chart 15). Chart 14Long-Term Equity Returns Will Be Poor Long-Term Equity Returns Will Be Poor Long-Term Equity Returns Will Be Poor Chart 15Investors' Return Assumptions Are Unrealistic Investors' Return Assumptions Are Unrealistic Investors' Return Assumptions Are Unrealistic   Chart 16Value Sectors' Profits Have Been Terrible Value Sectors' Profits Have Been Terrible Value Sectors' Profits Have Been Terrible Equities: The most vigorous debate among BCA Research strategists currently is over whether growth stocks will continue to outperform, or whether value will take over leadership. The Global Asset Allocation service is on the side of growth. The poor performance of value stocks (concentrated in Financials, Energy, and Materials) is explained by the structural decline in their profits for the past 12 years (Chart 16). With the yield curve unlikely to steepen and non-performing loans set to rise, we do not see Financials’ earnings recovering. China’s economic shifts represent a long-term headwind for Materials. Internet stocks are expensively valued, but we do not see them underperforming until (1) their earnings’ growth slows sharply, (2) regulation on them is significantly tightened, or (3) long-term bond yields rise, lowering the NPV of their future earnings. This view drives our Overweight on US equities versus Europe and Japan. US stocks have continued to outperform even in the risk-on rally since March (Chart 17). We are a little more enthusiastic (with a Neutral recommendation) about Emerging Market stocks, which are very cheaply valued (Chart 18). Chart 17US Stocks Have Outperformed Even In A Risk-On Market US Stocks Have Outperformed Even In A Risk-On Market US Stocks Have Outperformed Even In A Risk-On Market   Chart 18EM Stocks Are Cheap EM Stocks Are Cheap EM Stocks Are Cheap   Chart 19Short USD Is Now A Consensus Trade Monthly Portfolio Update: Can Monetary Policy Alone Propel The Market? Monthly Portfolio Update: Can Monetary Policy Alone Propel The Market? Currencies: The US dollar has depreciated by 10% since mid-March. Over the next 12 months, the trend for the USD is likely to continue to be down. The new Fed policy emphasizes that real rates will stay low, and US inflation will probably be higher than in other developed economies. Nonetheless, short-USD/long-euro positions have become consensus (Chart 19) and, given the safe-haven nature of the dollar, a period of risk-off could push the dollar back up temporarily. Chart 20IG Spreads Are No Longer Attractive Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads IG Spreads Are No Longer Attractive Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads IG Spreads Are No Longer Attractive Fixed Income: We don’t expect to see a sustained rise in nominal US Treasury yields, despite the Fed’s new monetary policy framework. The Fed has an implicit yield curve control policy, and would react if yields showed signs of rising significantly. TIPS breakevens should eventually rise further to reflect the likelihood of higher inflation in the longer term, though the recent sharp rise in inflation (core CPI rose by 0.6% month-on-month in July, the largest increase since 1991) will likely subside and so the upside for breakeven yields might be limited over the next six months. We are becoming a little more cautious on credit. Investment-grade spreads are now close to historic lows and so returns are likely to be limited (Chart 20). We lower our recommendation to Neutral. Ba-rated bonds still offer attractive yields and are supported by Fed purchases. But we would not go further down the credit curve, and so stay Neutral on high yield. This by definition means that we must also be Neutral within fixed income on government bonds, which is compatible with our view that rates will not rise much. Note, though, that we remain Underweight the fixed-income asset class overall, but no longer have a preference for spread product within it. One exception is EM dollar-denominated debt, both sovereign and corporate, which offers spreads that are attractive in a world of low returns from fixed income. Chart 21Crude Prices Can Rise Further As Demand Recovers Crude Prices Can Rise Further As Demand Recovers Crude Prices Can Rise Further As Demand Recovers Commodities: Industrial metals prices have further to run up, as China continues its credit stimulus, which should lead to a rise in infrastructure investment and increased imports of commodities. The outlook for crude oil will be dominated by the demand side: OPEC forecasts demand destruction this year of 9 million barrels per day (compared to consensus expectations of 8 million) and so will be cautious about loosening its supply constraints. Demand should be boosted by increased driving, as people avoid using public transport for commuting and airlines for vacations. Based on a robust demand forecast (Chart 21), BCA Research’s energy strategists see Brent crude stable at around current levels through to the end of 2020 but averaging $65 a barrel next year. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “What Is The Risk Of A Contested US Election?” dated July 27, 2020. GAA Asset Allocation  

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of August 31, 2020.  The country allocation model still favors the US as its largest overweight. Despite Japan’s outstanding performance in August, the model still maintains its large underweight in Japanese equities, as shown in Table 1.  Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model slightly underperformed the MSCI World benchmark by 7 bps in August. The Level 1 model outperformed by 19 bps because of the overweight in the US, while the Level 2 model underperformed its benchmark by 104 bps partly because of its large underweight in Japan. August was a very strange month in the sense that only the US and Japan outperformed while the rest underperformed the MSCI World benchmark.  As such, except for the US and Japan bets, all other six underweight choices made positive contributions to the overall performance of the model, while all other four overweight bets made negative contributions. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its MSCI World benchmark by 404 bps, with 604 bps of outperformance from the Level 2 model, and 111 bps of outperformance from the Level 1 model. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %) GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1) GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1) GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1)   Chart 3GAA Non US Model (Level 2) GAA Non US Model (Level 2) GAA Non US Model (Level 2) For more on historical performance, please refer to our website https://www.bcaresearch.com/site/trades/allocation_performance/latest/G…. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, “Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model,” dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered as well when making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Model (Chart 4) is updated as of August 31, 2020. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance The model continues to maintain its pro-cyclical stance driven by an improvement in its global growth proxy, and remains exposed to cyclical sectors. Over the past month, the model outperformed its benchmark by 58 basis points. Year-to-date, the model has outperformed its benchmark by 212 basis points, and 227 basis points since going live. The model’s global growth proxy continues to signal a bullish stance – driven by its three components: Appreciating EM currencies, rising metal prices, and an improvement in broad business climate. The model therefore continues to remain positive on cyclical sectors. Global monetary easing for the coming years and low rates should keep the liquidity component favoring a mixed bag of cyclical and defensive sectors. The valuation component remains muted across all sectors except Energy. However, several sectors continue to be near the expensive and cheap zones – mainly Info Tech and Consumer Discretionary (expensive), and Real Estate and Consumer Staples (cheap). The model awaits confirming momentum signals to change recommendations for those sectors. The model upgraded Industrials this month based on an improvement in its momentum component. Table 3Overall Model Performance GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Table 4Current Model Allocations GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates     The model is now overweight five cyclical sectors in total. These are Information Technology, Consumer Discretionary, Communication Services, Materials, and Industrials. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report “Introducing the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model”, dated July 27, 2016, as well as the Sector Selection Model section in the Special Alert “GAA Quant Model Updates”, dated March 1, 2019 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com.   Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst amrh@bcaresearch.com

Highlights ‘Value’ sector profits are in terminal decline. Bank profits are in terminal decline, because private sector credit is now ‘maxed out’, and the intermediation between borrowers and savers can be done more cost-effectively by the blockchain. Oil and gas profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the energy stored in ‘chemical bonds’ of portable fossil fuels, and rely more on the energy of ‘moving electrons’ generated from unportable alternative energy sources. Basic resources profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the ‘physical stuff’ that requires basic resources. As such, structurally overweighting the value-heavy European market versus the growth-heavy US market is a ‘widow maker’ trade. The caveat is that a vicious snapback out of growth into value is possible when a universally accepted treatment for Covid-19 is found. Or if bond yields spike. This would create a burst of outperformance from Europe, but any such snapback would be a brief interruption to the mega downtrend. Fractal trade: Long RUB/CZK. Feature Chart of the WeekValue' Has Underperformed For 12 Years... But The Mega Downtrend Isn't Over Value' Has Underperformed For 12 Years... But The Mega Downtrend Isn't Over Value' Has Underperformed For 12 Years... But The Mega Downtrend Isn't Over I have just returned from a summer holiday, on which I took a clean break from the financial markets. A clean break that is highly recommended for anybody who looks at the markets day in, day out. Nevertheless, I made two market-relevant observations. First, that having to wear a face mask on an aeroplane was an unpleasant experience. Tolerable for a short-haul flight lasting a couple of hours, but something that would be unbearable for the duration of a long-haul flight. Second, that even the most popular bars and restaurants in the most popular places were operating at half capacity. They were fully booked, yet the requirements of physical distancing at the bar, and between tables, meant that their operating capacity and revenues had collapsed. Worse, the owners feared a further hit in the winter when eating and drinking in their outdoors spaces became impossible. The use of face masks and physical distancing cripples any economic activity that requires you to have your (uncovered) mouth and nose in proximity to others. These first-hand experiences simply confirm the message in An Economy Without Mouths Or Noses Will Lose 10 Percent Of Jobs.1 The use of face masks and physical distancing cripples any economic activity that requires you to have your (uncovered) mouth and nose in proximity to others – like flying, or drinking and eating out. Hence, if governments remove the financial incentives for employers to retain workers while the pandemic is still rampant, expect structural unemployment to rise sharply. In which case, expect bond yields to remain ultra-low, and where possible, go even lower. And expect ‘growth’ sectors to continue outperforming ‘value’ sectors. Explaining Recent Market Action Returning to the financial markets after a break, several things stood out. Apple has become America’s first $2 trillion company, while HSBC’s share price is within a whisker of its 2008 crisis low. This vignette encapsulates that growth sectors – broadly defined as tech and healthcare – have been roaring ahead, while value sectors – broadly defined as banks, oil and gas, and basic resources – have been struggling. Hence, the growth-heavy S&P500 has reached a new all-time high, while the value-heavy FTSE100 and other European indexes are still deeply in the red for 2020 and have recently drifted lower (Chart I-2). The combined effect is that the strong recovery in global stocks has taken a breather. Chart I-2US Market At All-Time High, But European Markets Still Deeply In The Red US Market At All-Time High, But European Markets Still Deeply In The Red US Market At All-Time High, But European Markets Still Deeply In The Red In turn, the breather in the stock market explains the recent support to the dollar. Significantly, the 2020 evolution of the dollar is a perfect mirror-image of the stock market. Nothing more, nothing less. If the stock market gives back some of its gains, expect the countertrend strengthening in the dollar to continue (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The Dollar Is A Mirror-Image Of The Stock Market The Dollar Is A Mirror-Image Of The Stock Market The Dollar Is A Mirror-Image Of The Stock Market Yet the best performing major asset-class in 2020 is not growth equities, nor is it gold. Instead, it is the US 30-year T-bond, which has returned a spectacular 32 percent (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Best Performing Major Asset-Class Is The 30-Year T-Bond The Best Performing Major Asset-Class Is The 30-Year T-Bond The Best Performing Major Asset-Class Is The 30-Year T-Bond Suddenly, everything becomes crystal clear. If the ultra-long bond has surged, then other ultra-long duration investments must also surge. Within equities, this means that growth sectors, whose profits are skewed to the very distant future, must receive a huge boost to their valuations. Whereas value sectors whose profits are not growing will receive a smaller (or no) valuation boost. In fact, the value sectors have a much bigger structural problem. Not only are their profits not growing. Their profits are in terminal decline. Since 2008, Overweighting Value Has Been A ‘Widow Maker’ In the 34 years through 1975-2008, value trebled relative to growth.2 Albeit, with the occasional vicious countertrend move, such as the dot com bubble. But through 2009-2020, the tables turned. For the past 12 years, value has structurally underperformed growth and given back around half of its 1975-2008 outperformance (Chart of the Week). This means that for the past 12 years ‘proxy’ value versus growth positions have also structurally underperformed. The best example of such a proxy position is overweighting the value-heavy European market or Emerging Markets versus the growth-heavy US market. Since 2008, underweighting the US market has been a ‘widow maker’ trade. A widow maker trade is when you are on the wrong side of a megatrend. A widow maker trade is when you are on the wrong side of a megatrend. It is a widow maker because it can kill your career, or your finances, or both. The big danger is that a widow maker trade can last for decades. As the uptrend in value versus growth lasted more than three decades, there is no reason to suppose that the downtrend cannot also last a very long time. What drove value’s outperformance for 34 years, and what is driving its underperformance for the past 12 years? The simple answer is the structural trend in profits. Until 2008, the profits of banks, oil and gas, and basic resources kept up with, or even beat, the profits of technology and healthcare. This, combined with the higher yield on these value sectors, resulted in the multi-decade 200 percent outperformance of value versus growth. But since 2008, while the profits of technology and healthcare have continued their strong uptrends, the profits of banks, oil and gas, and basic resources have entered major structural downtrends. It is our high conviction view that these declines are terminal, and the reasons are nothing to do with the pandemic (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Value Sector Profits Are In A Major Structural Downtrend Value Sector Profits Are In A Major Structural Downtrend Value Sector Profits Are In A Major Structural Downtrend Sector Profit Outlooks In One Sentence Each When a sector’s profits flip from a multi-decade uptrend to a multi-decade downtrend, it is almost unheard of for them to reflip into a new uptrend. Essentially, the sector has entered a terminal decline. As strong believers in brevity, we can summarise the reason for the terminal declines in one sentence per sector, as follows: When a sector’s profits flip from a multi-decade uptrend to a multi-decade downtrend, it is almost unheard of for them to reflip into a new uptrend. Bank profits are in terminal decline, because private sector credit is now ‘maxed out’, and the intermediation between borrowers and savers can be done more cost-effectively by the blockchain (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Bank Profits In Terminal Decline Bank Profits In Terminal Decline Bank Profits In Terminal Decline Oil and gas profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the energy stored in ‘chemical bonds’ of portable fossil fuels, and rely more on the energy of ‘moving electrons’ generated from unportable alternative energy sources (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Oil And Gas Profits In Terminal Decline Oil And Gas Profits In Terminal Decline Oil And Gas Profits In Terminal Decline Basic resources profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the ‘physical stuff’ that requires basic resources (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Basic Resources Profits In Terminal Decline Basic Resources Profits In Terminal Decline Basic Resources Profits In Terminal Decline Conversely: Technology profits can grow, because we now rely more on information, ideas, and advice, and over half of the world’s population is still not connected to the internet (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Technology Profits Continue To Grow Technology Profits Continue To Grow Technology Profits Continue To Grow Healthcare profits can grow, because as economies (and people) mature, they spend a much greater proportion of their income on healthcare to improve the quality and quantity of life (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Healthcare Profits Continue To Grow Healthcare Profits Continue To Grow Healthcare Profits Continue To Grow Nevertheless, a vicious snapback out of growth into value is possible. Indeed, it is to be expected when a universally accepted treatment for Covid-19 is found. Or if bond yields spike. But any such snapback, even if vicious, will be a brief countertrend rally in a terminal decline. This is because the megatrends driving down value sector profits were already in place long before the pandemic hit. The pandemic just gave the megatrends an extra nudge. This is our high conviction view. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is long RUB/CZK, with the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss set at 5 percent. In other trades, the explosive rallies in precious metals reached exhaustion as anticipated by their fragile fractal structures. This has taken our short gold versus lead position into profit. However, short silver was stopped out before its rally eventually ended. The rolling 1 year win ratio now stands at 60 percent. Chart I-11RUB/CZK RUB/CZK RUB/CZK When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "An Economy Without Mouths Or Noses Will Lose 10 Percent Of Jobs", dated July 30, 2020 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 In total return terms. Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights Negative Rates: The persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic is intensifying pressure on policymakers in many countries to provide more stimulus. The odds that a new central bank will join the negative policy interest rate club are increasing. UK vs. New Zealand: Recent comments from Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand officials have hinted at the possibility of a shift to negative policy rates, should conditions warrant. The odds are greater for such a move in New Zealand. Go long 10-year New Zealand government bonds versus 10-year UK Gilts (currency-hedged into GBP) on tactical (0-6 months) basis. Feature Policymakers around the world are, once again, under increasing pressure to contemplate new responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to rage through much of the US and emerging world and is flaring up again across Europe. Additional fiscal policy measures will likely be necessary, but it is increasingly politically difficult in many countries to ramp up government support measures – or even extend existing programs - after the massive increase in deficits and debt undertaken this past spring. Chart of the WeekA Bull Market In Negative-Yielding Debt A Bull Market In Negative-Yielding Debt A Bull Market In Negative-Yielding Debt An inadequate fiscal response will put even more pressure on monetary policy to give a boost to virus-stricken economies. Yet fresh options there are even more limited. Policy rates are already near 0% in all developed nations, with central banks promising to keep them there for at least the next couple of years. Central banks are also rapidly expanding their balance sheets to buy up assets via quantitative easing programs. A move to sub-0% policy rates may be the next option for central banks not already there like the ECB and the Bank of Japan. Although it remains questionable how much more stimulus monetary policy could hope to deliver. Government bond yields are at or near historic lows in most countries, while equity and credit markets continue to enjoy a spectacular recovery from the rout in February and March. The stock of global negative-yielding debt has risen to $16 trillion, according to Bloomberg, which remains close to the highs seen over the past few years (Chart of the Week). So who will be the next central bank to cross that bridge into negative rate territory? US Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, Bank of Canada Governor Tiff Macklem and Reserve Bank of Australia Governor Philip Lowe have all publicly dismissed the need for negative rates in their economies. Recent comments from Bank of England (BoE) Governor Andrew Bailey and Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Governor Adrian Orr, however, have suggested that negative rates could be a future policy choice, if needed. New Zealand looks like the more likely candidate to go to negative rates sometime in the next 3-6 months. Markets are increasingly discounting those outcomes. The UK Gilt yield curve is trading below 0% out to the 6-year maturity, while New Zealand nominal government bond yields are trading at or below a mere 0.3% out to 7-years (and where real yields on inflation-linked bonds have recently turned negative). Of the two, New Zealand looks like the more likely candidate to go to negative rates sometime in the next 3-6 months. A Negative Rates Checklist For The UK & New Zealand In a Special Report we published back in May, we looked back at the decisions that drove the move to negative policy rates by the ECB, Bank of Japan, Swiss National Bank and the Riksbank, with a goal of determining if such an outcome could happen elsewhere.1 We were motivated by the growing market chatter suggesting that the Fed would eventually be forced to cut the fed funds rate to sub-0% territory to fight the deep COVID-19 recession. Chart 2The Fundamental Case For Negative Rates The Fundamental Case For Negative Rates The Fundamental Case For Negative Rates We concluded in that report that such a move was unlikely, but could occur if there was a contraction in US credit growth and/or a spike in the US dollar to new cyclical highs, both outcomes that would result in a major drop in US inflation expectations. Such moves preceded the shift to negative rates in those other countries during 2014-16, as a way to lower borrowing costs and weaken currencies. Since that May report, the US dollar has depreciated and US credit growth has continued to expand amid very stimulative financial conditions, thus the odds of the Fed having to cut the funds rate below 0% are very low. The Fed is far more likely to dovishly alter its forward guidance, or even institute yield curve control to cap US Treasury yields, to deliver additional monetary easing, if necessary. (NOTE: next week, we will be discussing the Fed’s next possible policy moves, and the potential impact on financial markets, in a Special Report jointly published with our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy). The pressure to consider negative interest rates in the non-negative rate developed market countries remains strong, however, after the major increase in unemployment rates and sharp falls in inflation seen earlier this year (Chart 2). Putting current levels of both into a simple Taylor Rule formula suggests that the “appropriate” level of nominal policy rates is currently negative in the US and Canada, mainly because of the double-digit unemployment rates in those countries. Taylor Rules for the UK and New Zealand remain slightly positive, however, at 0.2% and 0.9%, respectively. Yet the forecasts for inflation and unemployment from the BoE and RBNZ suggest a diverging dynamic between the two over the next couple of years. The BoE is forecasting a very sharp recovery from the 2020 recession, with the UK unemployment rate projected to fall back to 4.7% by 2022 from the surge to 7.5% this year. At the same time, the RBNZ’s forecasts are more cautious, with the New Zealand unemployment rate expected to fall to only 6.1% in 2022 from the projected 8.1% peak at the end of this year. Thus, the implied Taylor Rules using those forecasts suggest a need for negative rates in New Zealand, but a rising path for UK policy rates over the next two years (Chart 3). Clearly, markets are taking the RBNZ’s open talk about negative interest rates to heart, while remaining skeptical that the BoE’s optimistic path for the post-virus UK economy will come to fruition. Despite the diverging trajectory in policy rates implied by the two central banks’ forecasts, markets are pricing in a more similar path for rates. Forward overnight index swap (OIS) rates are discounting slightly negative rates in the UK and New Zealand to the end of 2022 (Chart 4). Clearly, markets are taking the RBNZ’s open talk about negative interest rates to heart, while remaining skeptical that the BoE’s optimistic path for the post-virus UK economy will come to fruition. Chart 3Mapping Central Bank Projections Into The Taylor Rule Mapping Central Bank Projections Into The Taylor Rule Mapping Central Bank Projections Into The Taylor Rule Chart 4Markets Pricing Slightly Negative Rates In The UK & NZ Markets Pricing Slightly Negative Rates In The UK & NZ Markets Pricing Slightly Negative Rates In The UK & NZ The individual cases of the UK and New Zealand as current candidates for negative interest rates can help derive a list of factors to monitor to determine if negative rates would be a more likely policy outcome for any central bank. Based on our read of recent comments from BoE and RBNZ officials, combined with our assessment of what took place in other countries that moved to negative rates in the past, we would include the following in any Negative Rates Checklist: Policymaker perceptions on the effective lower bound (ELB) on policy rates For central bankers, the ELB (or “reversal rate”) is defined as the policy rate below which additional rate cuts are deemed counterproductive to stimulating the economy. For example, cutting rates too low could limit the ability of the banking system to earn interest income, thus hindering banks’ appetite to make new loans. Chart 5Could The Effective Lower Bound Be Negative In the UK & NZ? Could The Effective Lower Bound Be Negative In the UK & NZ? Could The Effective Lower Bound Be Negative In the UK & NZ? For most central banks, the belief is that the ELB is at or just above 0%. It is possible that because of a structural shift, a central bank could deem the ELB to be negative in that particular economy. That could be because of a sharp deterioration in trend economic growth or a rapid rise in debt or a belief that the banking system was strong enough to handle the income shock of negative rates. Currently, potential GDP growth rate estimates have been marked down in both the UK and New Zealand because of the 2020 COVID-19 recession (Chart 5). In New Zealand, taking the average of the RBNZ’s real GDP growth forecasts for the next three years as a proxy for trend growth suggests that trend growth is now around 1.2%, similar to the reduced estimates of UK potential GDP growth. In terms of debt levels, the ratio of total public and private non-financial debt to GDP is close to 400% in the UK, which is far greater than the 126% level of that same ratio in New Zealand. In terms of banking system health, banks in both countries are well capitalized. The Tier 1 capital ratio of the major UK banks is 14.5%, while the similar figure in New Zealand is 13.5%; both figures are provided by the BoE and RBNZ, respectively. Stress tests run by the central banks in recent months indicate that capital levels will remain adequate even after the likely hit from loan losses due to the severity of the 2020 economic downturn. Our assessment is that both the BoE and RBNZ can claim that the ELB is in fact below zero, based on the slow pace of trend economic growth in both. In the case of the UK, high debt levels also suggest that policy rates may have to go below 0% to generate any stimulus to growth via new borrowing activity. In both countries, the central banks can claim that the banking system can handle a period of negative rates, if policymakers go down that road to boost economic growth. Economic confidence is depressed An extended period of weak economic activity and depressed confidence can trigger a need to move to negative policy rates if rates were already at 0%. Currently, UK economic confidence is in tatters after the -20% decline in real GDP seen in the second quarter of 2020. The GfK consumer confidence index remains at recessionary low levels, while the BoE Agents’ survey of UK firms shows a collapse in plans for investment and hiring over the next year (Chart 6). Chart 6A Severe Hit To UK Growth & Confidence A Severe Hit To UK Growth & Confidence A Severe Hit To UK Growth & Confidence New Zealand, the economy contracted -1.6% in the first quarter of the year with consensus forecasts calling for a -20% collapse in the second quarter. Yet economic confidence is surprisingly resilient. The Westpac survey of consumer confidence is falling, but the July reading was still above typical recessionary lows (Chart 7). The ANZ survey of business investing and hiring intentions has been surprisingly upbeat of late, rebounding from the April trough but still below pre-virus levels. Our assessment here is that the BoE has a stronger case for moving to negative rates, based on the deeper collapse in confidence in the UK compared to New Zealand. Inflation expectations are too low If inflation expectations remain too low once rates have hit 0%, then inflation-targeting central banks must consider more extraordinary options to revive inflation expectations. That could take the form of extended forward guidance on future interest rate moves, expanding the size and scope of quantitative easing programs, or cutting policy rates into negative territory. Currently, inflation expectations remain elevated in the UK. 5-year CPI swaps, 5-years forward, are now at 3.6%, while the Citigroup/YouGov survey of household inflation expectations 5-10 years out sits at 3.3% (Chart 8). In New Zealand, the RBNZ inflation survey shows inflation expectations have fallen into the bottom half of the central bank’s 1-3% target band. Chart 7Only A Very Modest Downturn In NZ Only A Very Modest Downturn In NZ Only A Very Modest Downturn In NZ Chart 8Inflation Expectations Are Much Lower In NZ Inflation Expectations Are Much Lower In NZ Inflation Expectations Are Much Lower In NZ Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue for a move to negative rates because of weak inflation expectations. Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue for a move to negative rates because of weak inflation expectations. Financial conditions turning more restrictive Chart 9The News Is Mixed On UK & NZ Financial Conditions The News Is Mixed On UK & NZ Financial Conditions The News Is Mixed On UK & NZ Financial Conditions Another reason why a central bank could try negative rates is if asset prices were trading at depressed levels even after policy rates were at 0%. The current signals on financial conditions in the UK and New Zealand are generally stimulative, but more so in the latter. Currently, the MSCI equity index for New Zealand is nearing the all-time high reached in 1987, while the equivalent UK equity index is languishing near the lows of the past decade (Chart 9). The New Zealand dollar and British pound have both bounced off the cyclical lows seen earlier this year (more on that later). The annual growth rates of nominal house prices have started to pick up in both countries, but with a faster pace in New Zealand. Finally, corporate credit spreads have narrowed sharply since the end of the first quarter in both countries, with New Zealand spreads actually falling below the pre-virus levels seen this year. Our assessment here is that financial conditions in both countries remain generally stimulative, but more so in New Zealand. Neither central bank can point to restrictive financial conditions as a reason to move to negative rates. Signs of impairment of the transmission of policy interest rates to actual borrowing costs If bank lending growth was weakening and/or borrowing rates remained high relative to policy rates, this could be a sign that negative policy rates are necessary to induce greater loan demand by lowering borrowing costs. Chart 10NZ Lenders Are Not Passing On RBNZ Rate Cuts NZ Lenders Are Not Passing On RBNZ Rate Cuts NZ Lenders Are Not Passing On RBNZ Rate Cuts Currently, the annual growth rate of bank lending is slowing in New Zealand, but remains positive at 4.5% (Chart 10). Loan growth in the UK is now a much more robust 7.4%, but some of that growth is due to UK companies drawing down lines of credit with their banks to survive during the COVID-19 lockdowns. A bigger issue is the lack of the full pass-through of the RBNZ’s recent cuts into borrowing rates, especially for home loans. The spread between 5-year fixed mortgage rates and the RBNZ cash rate is now an elevated 387bps, while the equivalent spread in the UK is much lower at 160bps. Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue that an impaired transmission of policy rate cuts to actual borrowing rates could justify a move to negative rates. Scope For Currency Depreciation For any central bank, a benefit of a negative interest rate policy is that it can trigger more stimulus via a weaker currency. This can help boost economic growth by making exports more competitive, while also helping lift inflation by raising the cost of imports. On the growth side, a weaker currency would be somewhat more helpful for New Zealand where exports are 19% of GDP, compared to 16% in the UK. (Chart 11). That is an important distinction, as there is greater scope for the New Zealand dollar (NZD) to depreciate if the RBNZ went to negative rates than for the British pound (GBP) to weaken if the BoE did the same. Chart 11A New Experiment? Negative Rates With A Current Account Deficit A New Experiment? Negative Rates With A Current Account Deficit A New Experiment? Negative Rates With A Current Account Deficit Chart 12BoE Does Not Need To Go Negative To Weaken The Pound BoE Does Not Need To Go Negative To Weaken The Pound BoE Does Not Need To Go Negative To Weaken The Pound Perhaps the most interesting feature of this entire negative rates discussion is that, for the first time in the “negative rates era”, central banks of countries with current account deficits are considering pushing policy rates below 0%. For the first time in the “negative rates era”, central banks of countries with current account deficits are considering pushing policy rates below 0%. The UK and New Zealand both have similarly sized current account deficits, equal to -3.3% and -2.7% of GDP, respectively (middle panel). At the same time, both countries have net foreign direct investment surpluses roughly equal to those current account deficits, leaving their basic balances around 0 (bottom panel). In other words, both countries currently attract enough long-term foreign direct investment inflows to “fund” their current account deficits. Foreign investors may be less willing to continue buying as many New Zealand or UK financial assets if either country went to a negative interest rate to intentionally weaken the currency, as the RBNZ has publicly stated would be a desired outcome of such a move. Chart 13RBNZ Could Go Negative To Weaken The Kiwi RBNZ Could Go Negative To Weaken The Kiwi RBNZ Could Go Negative To Weaken The Kiwi Our colleagues at BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy estimate that, on purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, the GBP/USD exchange rate is now -20% below its long-run fair value (Chart 12). The level of the currency is also broadly in line with the current level of interest rate differentials between the UK and the US (bottom panel). In other words, the GBP is already cheap and additional rate cuts would have limited impact in driving the currency lower. It is a different story for NZD/USD, which is fairly valued on a PPP basis but remains elevated relative to New Zealand-US interest rate differentials (Chart 13). Therefore, our assessment is that only the RBNZ can credibly generate meaningful currency weakness from a move to negative rates. Summing it all up Based on the elements of our Negative Rates Checklist, we deem it more likely for the RBNZ to go negative than the BoE. In the UK, there is less evidence pointing to a significantly impaired credit channel that could be remedied by negative rates, inflation expectations are elevated, and the pound is already at undervalued levels. In New Zealand, previous RBNZ rate cuts have not fully flowed through into bank lending rates, inflation expectations are low, and the New Zealand dollar is at fair value (and, therefore, has room to become cheaper via negative rates). Based on the elements of our Negative Rates Checklist, we deem it more likely for the RBNZ to go negative than the BoE. Bottom Line: The persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic is intensifying pressure on policymakers in many countries to provide more stimulus. The odds that a new central bank will join the negative policy interest rate club are increasing. Recent comments from Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand officials have hinted at the possibility of a shift to negative policy rates, should conditions warrant. The odds are greater for such a move in New Zealand. A Negative Rates Trade Idea: Go Long New Zealand Government Bonds Vs. UK Gilts Chart 14Go Long 10yr NZ Govt. Bonds Vs 10yr UK Gilts Go Long 10yr NZ Govt. Bonds Vs 10yr UK Gilts Go Long 10yr NZ Govt. Bonds Vs 10yr UK Gilts Based on our analysis above, we are adding a new cross-country spread trade to our Tactical Overlay Trades list on page 18: going long 10-year New Zealand government bonds versus 10-year UK Gilts on a currency-hedged basis (i.e. hedging the NZD exposure into GBP). The trade is to be implemented using on-the-run cash bonds. The current unhedged NZ-UK 10-year yield spread is +36bps, but even on a hedged basis (using 3-month currency forwards) the yield differential is still positive at +23bps (Chart 14). We are targeting zero for the unhedged spread, to be realized sometime within the six months. We like this trade because it can win not only from a decline in New Zealand bond yields if the RBNZ goes to negative rates (as we think is increasingly likely), but also from a potential rise in Gilt yields if the BoE defies market pricing and does not go to negative rates. If both countries keep rates on hold, then the trade will earn a small positive spread over the current meagre level of Gilt yields.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Special Report, "Negative Rates: Coming Soon To A Bond Market Near You?", dated May 20, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Assessing The Leading Candidates To Join The Negative Rate Club Assessing The Leading Candidates To Join The Negative Rate Club Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights ESG-related equities have outperformed global benchmarks over the past two years, as well as during the recent equity selloff. Investor demand and institutional pressure will drive the financial industry to analyze nonfinancial disclosures more closely and take them more into account. The pathway to achieving that is not simple: Unification of reporting standards and improvement in the quality of disclosure are required. Governments can play a role by enforcing climate and sustainability disclosure for firms wanting bailout support. Key stakeholders in the financial system – especially asset managers and other providers of capital – will look to incorporate more sophisticated ESG analysis into their traditional frameworks. Introduction This report is an update to our Special Report published in late 2018 on the benefits of ESG investing. In that report we concluded that ESG indices have performed at least in line with, and may even have slightly outperformed, broad-market indices, while providing societal and environmental benefits.1 We can now also answer one of the questions we raised in that report: Whether ESG investing provides protection during recessions and bear markets. Since we published that report, the ESG space has continued to grow, with the number of new US “sustainable” fund launches, as tracked by Morningstar, increasing – albeit at a lower rate than in the previous two years (Chart 1).2  This can be attributed to an ever-increasing investor demand, predominantly from Europe, but growing rapidly in both the US and Asia, too. The Global Sustainable Investment Review estimates that ESG assets under management (using a relatively broad definition of ESG) totaled $30 trillion as of 2018.3 Chart 1The Industry Is Catering To Increasing Investor Demand ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff Our earlier report highlighted the increasing demand from investors to allocate capital based on environmental, social, and governance standards, or ESG. Simply put, we defined ESG investing as any investment activity that recognizes a certain set of principles, and screens securities based on those factors. While the term itself might be new, the core concept behind it is not. It encompasses a philosophy dating back hundreds of years, beginning with faith-based investing, to the more recent increased awareness of climate and governance issues. The COVID-19 pandemic – also considered an ESG risk – illustrated how quickly a health and environmental threat can turn into a social issue, as unemployment rates surged to new highs and economic activity came to a halt. In this report, we analyze how the performance of ESG indices has evolved since our last report, and in particular, during the recent February-March equity selloff. Additionally, we discuss the opportunities that governments, investors, and corporations can seize in the future. We also assess the various risks facing ESG investing, given that it is no longer a niche space. Performance Update Since we published our report in late 2018, ESG indices in most countries (with the exception of the US and Canada) have outperformed the broad market benchmarks.4  The global ESG index has outperformed the All-Country World (ACW) broad market index by 1% since (Chart 2). While this might not count as a remarkable outperformance, it answers some of the doubts cast on the merits of ESG investing. However, it is critical for investors to realize that ESG indices are not necessarily just another vehicle to invest in to try to outperform the market; rather, they are a sustainable alternative to traditional indices that do not detract from performance. Importantly, ESG indices either performed in line with or better than broad market indices during the equity selloff between February-March 2020. ESG indices in all major countries and regions, with the exception of the US, outperformed the benchmark during this period (Chart 2). Research by MSCI breaks down the active returns of various ESG country and region indices versus their corresponding broad market indices in Q1 2020. This analysis showed that the outperformance predominantly came from equity style tilts, followed by ESG-related factors and sector/industry tilts (Chart 3). Chart 2ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff ESG indices tilt towards higher-quality, low-beta, and high-yielding stocks relative to their benchmarks. As part of the index construction, some ESG indices exclude stocks not meeting the indices’ ESG eligibility criteria.  This would include various names in the oil & gas industry, for example (for environmental criteria), as well as some tech giants (for social and governance reasons). The exclusion of some tech names partly explains the US index’s underperformance. Chart 3 shows that stock selection for the US MSCI ESG Leaders index – the one shown in Chart 2 – had a negative contribution to active returns over the first quarter. Chart 3Breaking Down ESG Performance ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream Index methodology plays a big role in determining expected performance. The methodology of the MSCI ESG index suite generally aims to reduce sector differences relative to the broad indices, thereby limiting systematic risk. However, even within the MSCI ESG suite, methodologies differ between indices (Tables 1 & 2).5 Table 1Index Methodology Determines Sector Tilts ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream Table 2Methodology Differences Matter ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream However, it is critical for investors to realize that ESG indices are not necessarily just another vehicle to invest in to try to outperform the market; rather, they are a sustainable alternative to traditional indices that do not detract from performance. It is also important for investors to understand that sustainability is a long-term issue. For example, as economies shut down when COVID-19 infections and deaths rose, investors rushed to sell their risky exposures: The five largest “traditional” US equity ETFs saw cumulative net equity outflows of as high as $22 billion during the three-week period between February 19 and March 13. By contrast, the five largest ESG equity funds experienced small, yet positive, inflows over the same period (Chart 4). This was also true globally, where sustainable funds tracked by Morningstar recorded inflows close to $45 billion dollars during this period, whereas equity funds overall recorded over $380 billion of outflows.6 The most likely reason for this is that investors see ESG investing as a defensive play, given its sector and factor tilts. Chart 4Small, Yet Steady Inflows During The Equity Selloff ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream Institutional Pressure Chart 5Analyzing Nonfinancial Disclosures Is A Must... ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream Investors – particularly those with longer investment horizons, such as pension funds and endowments – are becoming more committed to evaluating their investments more rigorously from an ESG standpoint. This means putting pressure on asset managers to screen and assess company performance using ESG factors. A survey by EY in June 2020 shows that only 2% of respondents conduct little-to-no review of nonfinancial disclosures relating to a company’s environmental and social performance, down from 36% in 2013 (Chart 5). However, absent a formal governing body, standardized reporting, and proper regulation regarding what should be labeled ESG, as well as how metrics are evaluated, asset managers struggle to comply. One of the key points we highlighted in our previous report is that consideration of ESG factors in investment decisions must go beyond simple reliance on ESG scores. The various ESG rating agencies rely on different metrics, factors, and datasets to rank companies and therefore produce very different benchmarks and funds, even though they may have the same objectives. This means that different investors using different ESG indices could end up with different allocations to the same universe of stocks. Therefore, analysis and inclusion based on ESG scores may be misleading and yield dissimilar results. A research paper by the MIT Sloan School of Management showed that the sources of differentiation of ESG rankings by ratings agencies stem from: 1) Scope Divergence: Ratings rely on different attributes to capture ESG performance; 2) Measurement Divergence: Relying on different indicators to measure the same attribute; and 3) Weight Divergence: Ranking the attributes differently in terms of importance. Of these, the paper found that the measurement divergence was the most important.7  Chart 6...With More Companies Now Reporting ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream Asset managers are not necessarily to blame. They simply lack adequate tools. The problem is not the dearth of disclosure, but rather its quality and comparability. In fact, over the past few years, more companies have begun reporting on their sustainability and social performance (Chart 6). However, the fact that reporting is voluntary, and companies rely on different reporting frameworks and standards, makes cross-country and inter-firm comparisons difficult. On the bright side however, there is a growing pressure for collaboration between the various reporting frameworks in order to bring about a single reporting standard. For example, a recently announced partnership between the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) – two of the many organizations responsible for creating sustainability reports and reporting on governance data – is an important step in bringing the various standard-setters together. This should promote greater reporting consistency, and highlight the importance of key non financial disclosures. Improved reporting will affect not only investors, but also providers of capital, including banks. Incorporating ESG factors into conventional investing frameworks will become a core step in assessing risk for asset allocators. Providers of capital will have to assess not only borrowers’ fundamentals and growth prospects, but also understand their governance policies and environmental footprint. A recently published report by the Bank of England (BoE) highlighted the potential impact of climate change – both through transition8 and physical risks9 – on UK banks, insurers, and the entire financial system. To highlight the extent of “climate-related exposure,” the analysis found that almost 10% of England’s mortgage value is on properties in flood-risk zones, and that loan exposures to high emission-intensive sectors represent almost 70% of the common equity Tier 1 capital of the UK’s largest banks.10 If a climate event occurs, or new regulations are implemented, the impact will be severe. Incorporating ESG factors into conventional investing frameworks will become a core step in assessing risk for asset allocators. Governments can play a role. As COVID-19 stimulus plans are rolled out – mainly in developed economies – governments are requiring companies in need of support or bailouts to improve their environmental and climate disclosures. This will make it easier for private-sector investors to incorporate ESG analysis. Large Canadian firms, for example, that apply for government loans, must now publish annual climate disclosure reports as well as other releases relating to environmental and sustainability goals. Additionally, further rounds of stimulus could be given to those investing in ESG-related areas – known as “green stimulus.” Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, G20 countries have committed over $300 billion to support various energy initiatives, of which approximately $150 billion was aimed at clean energy policies and renewable energy programs.11 This could set a precedent for future government support to aid the transition to a greener economy. It can perhaps also serve as an indicator of which areas can present opportunities for investment. Monetary policy is set to remain accommodative for the next few years. It is not unimaginable, then, that central banks’ unconventional monetary easing methods could involve purchasing green bonds,12 issued by both corporations and governments. This is something ECB president Christine Lagarde has hinted at, to aid in the world’s fight against climate change.13 Chart 7The Green Bond Market Is Growing ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream The green bond market continues to grow, with bond issuance in 2019 up over 55% year-on-year. This growth, however, has fallen somewhat in 2020 due to the economic slowdown (Chart 7), despite overall bond issuance increasing in the second quarter of the year, as companies rushed to raise cash and refinance at lower rates.14 The fact that proceeds issued by green bonds must explicitly be used for environmental projects is the most likely reason for the decline. Green bond issuance, in 2020, has totaled $112 billion as of July, with the US, Germany, France, and the Netherlands being the top four issuers. China, the top issuer in 2018 and 2019, slipped to sixth place in 2020, with its green bond issuance shrinking from $27 billion in 2019 to $6 billion year-to-date. Risks & Headwinds Investors should be wary of various short-to-medium term risks to ESG investment. In the short-term, a delay of climate-change targets is possible. A second wave of COVID-19 infections that would trigger further lockdowns might lead to a rollback in environmental regulation and a refocus of stimulus packages on all-out growth rather than on ESG and climate initiatives. Over the coming years, as ESG investing becomes more mainstream, investors will need to take greater care to spot “greenwashing.”15 For example, this includes funds labeled as “sustainable”, but which hold securities that do not fit under that umbrella. It would also include companies taking advantage of the absence of reporting regulations to report misleading or incomplete information. Such care will be crucial until a unified reporting framework is established. According to calculations by Morningstar, over 500 funds expanded their prospectuses to include ESG factors in their investment analysis in 2019, up from the roughly 50 funds which did so in 2018.16,17 Indeed, this is a sign that funds are responding to investor demand and adding appropriate ESG analysis. However, whether these funds use sustainability as a core factor in their investing is unclear. Therefore, investors should continue to undertake their own proper due diligence. Conclusions The path to fully incorporating ESG analyses into a traditional investing framework is heading in the right direction, but is not yet clear-cut. A unified framework that allows for consistent and comparable disclosures would fix one of the biggest hurdles that investors face. ESG-related equity indices have outperformed in most countries and regions since late 2018, as well as during the recent equity selloff. The full advantage to be derived from incorporating ESG factors should be unlocked as more accurate and comprehensive data becomes available. Investor demand for ESG-related investments will remain the dominant force in driving the shift to integrating ESG disclosures into traditional financial analysis. Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst amrh@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “ESG Investing: No Harm, Some Benefit,” dated November 21, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see https://www.morningstar.com/articles/989209/esg-funds-setting-a-record-pace-for-launches-in-2020 3 "Global Sustainable Investment Review 2018," Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, gsi-alliance.org. 4 For the purpose of this analysis, we use the MSCI ESG Leaders index suite. 5 "MSCI ESG Indexes," MSCI, msci.com. 6 Please see https://www.morningstar.com/articles/984776/theres-ample-room-for-sustainable-investing-to-grow-in-the-us 7 Florian Bergand, Julian F Kölbel, and Roberto Rigobon, "Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings," May 17, 2020. 8 Transition risks can be defined as the risks of economic dislocation and financial losses associated with the transition to a lower-carbon economy. 9 Physicals risks can be defined as those arising from the interaction between climate-related events and human and natural systems. 10"The Bank of England’s climate-related financial disclosure 2020," Bank Of England. 11 "G20," energypolicytracker.org. 12 Green bonds are fixed income securities in which the proceeds are exclusively and explicitly assigned to projects or activities to finance and combat environmental issues – such as those relating to climate change and depletion of biodiversity and natural resources. 13 "Lagarde Puts Green Policy Top Of Agenda in ECB Bond Buying," Financial Times, July 8, 2020. 14 "Credit Trends: Global Financing Conditions: Bond Issuance Is Expected To Finish 2020 Up 6% After A Strong Second Quarter," S&P Global Ratings, July 27, 2020. 15Greenwashing is the process of relying on false claims and impressions to provide misleading information about how certain activities, investments, services, products, etc., are environmentally sound and friendly. 16 https://www.morningstar.com/articles/973432/the-number-of-funds-considering-esg-explodes-in-2019 17 As of March 2020, data by Morningstar show that 3,297 global sustainable funds exist.