Asset Allocation

Highlights IG Energy: Investors should overweight Energy bonds within an overweight allocation to investment grade corporate bonds overall. Within IG Energy, the Independent sub-sector should perform best, and we recommend avoiding the higher-rated Integrated space. HY Energy: Investors should overweight high-yield Energy relative to the overall junk index. In particular, investors should focus their exposure on the Independent sub-sector, while avoiding the distressed Oil Field Services space. Feature This week we present part 2 of our two-part Special Report on Energy bonds. Last week’s report showed how to develop a model for Energy bond excess returns (both investment grade and high-yield) based on overall corporate bond index spreads and the oil price.1 This week, we delve deeper into the characteristics of both the investment grade and high-yield Energy indexes to better understand how both are likely to trade in the coming months. Chart 1High-Yield Energy Bond Returns Have Bottomed High-Yield Energy Bond Returns Have Bottomed High-Yield Energy Bond Returns Have Bottomed Chart 2Energy Index Sub-Sector Composition* The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy In this week’s deep dive, we don’t limit ourselves to an examination of the overall Energy index. We also consider the outlooks for its five main sub-sectors: Integrated: Major oil firms that are present along the entire supply chain – from exploration and production all the way down to refined products for consumers. Independent: Exploration & production firms. Oil Field Services: Support services for the Independent sector – notably drilling. Midstream: Transportation (pipelines), storage and marketing of crude oil. Refining Chart 2 shows the share of each sub-sector in both the investment grade and high-yield Energy indexes. Midstream (46%) and Integrated (31%) are the largest sub-sectors in the investment grade index. Independent (48%) and Midstream (36%) are the heavyweights in the high-yield space. Investment Grade Energy Risk Profile Overall, investment grade Energy bonds are highly cyclical. That is, they tend to outperform the corporate benchmark during periods of spread tightening and underperform during periods of spread widening. This cyclical behavior is due to Energy’s lower credit rating compared to the Bloomberg Barclays Corporate index. Sixty five percent of Energy’s market cap carries a Baa rating compared to 59% for the overall index (Chart 3). The sector’s cyclical nature is confirmed by its duration-times-spread (DTS) ratio,2 which is well above 1.0 (Chart 4A). Interestingly, Energy has only been a highly cyclical sector since the 2014-2016 oil price crash. Prior to that, Energy mostly tracked the corporate index’s performance and only slightly underperformed the benchmark during the 2008/09 financial crisis. More recently, Energy underperformed the corporate index dramatically when spreads widened in March, but has outperformed by 936 bps since spreads peaked on March 23 (Chart 4A, panel 3). Energy has only been a highly cyclical sector since the 2014- 2016 oil price crash. Turning to the sub-sectors, the Integrated sub-sector immediately stands out as the only one with a higher average credit rating than the corporate benchmark. Ninety-two percent of Integrated issuers are rated A or Aa (Chart 3). The presence of the global oil majors (Total SA, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, Exxon Mobil and BP) is what gives the sub-sector its higher average credit quality and makes it the only defensive Energy sub-sector. Notice that Integrated even proved resilient during the 2014-16 Energy bond turmoil (Chart 4B). The remaining four sub-sectors (Independent, Oil Field Services, Midstream and Refining) all have lower average credit ratings than the corporate index (Chart 3) and all trade cyclically relative to the benchmark with Independent (Chart 4C) and Oil Field Services (Chart 4D) being more cyclical than Midstream (Chart 4E) and Refining (Chart 4F). Interestingly, Independent trades more cyclically than Midstream and Refining despite having a greater concentration of high-rated issuers. This is likely due the fact that Independent (aka Exploration & Production) firms are more dependent on the level of oil prices, and typically require a certain minimum oil price to support capital spending and growth. Meanwhile, crude oil is an input for Refining firms and lower oil prices can boost margins, helping offset some of the negative impact from growth downturns. Chart 3Investment Grade Credit Rating Distributions* The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy Chart 4AIG Energy Risk Profile IG Energy Risk Profile IG Energy Risk Profile Chart 4BIG Integrated Risk Profile IG Integrated Risk Profile IG Integrated Risk Profile Chart 4CIG Independent Risk Profile IG Independent Risk Profile IG Independent Risk Profile Chart 4DIG Oil Field Services Risk Profile IG Oil Field Services Risk Profile IG Oil Field Services Risk Profile Chart 4EIG Midstream Risk Profile IG Midstream Risk Profile IG Midstream Risk Profile Chart 4FIG Refining Risk Profile IG Refining Risk Profile IG Refining Risk Profile   Valuation In terms of value, we find that the Energy sector offers a spread advantage relative to the corporate index and its equivalently-rated (Baa) benchmark (Table 1). This advantage holds up after we control for duration differences by looking at the 12-month breakeven spread. The four cyclical sub-sectors (Independent, Oil Field Services, Midstream and Refining) all also look cheap, whether or not we control for duration differences. Integrated, the sole defensive sub-sector, is roughly fairly valued compared to the equivalently-rated (Aa) benchmark. Table 1IG Energy Valuation The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy Balance Sheet Health The par value of outstanding investment grade Energy debt jumped sharply as oil prices plunged in 2014. But the sector has barely issued any debt since the 2014-16 collapse. Instead, Energy firms have relied on capital spending reductions, asset sales, equity issuance and dividend cuts to raise cash. This shift toward austerity explains why Energy’s weight in the index fell from 11% in 2015 to 8% today (Chart 5A). The median Energy firm’s net debt-to-EBITDA consequently improved between 2017 and 2019, but has once again started to rise as earnings have struggled in recent quarters (Chart 5A, bottom panel). At the issuer level, 15 out of the investment grade index’s 56 Energy issuers currently have a negative ratings outlook from Moody’s (Appendix A). Of the 23 Energy sector ratings that Moody’s has reviewed in 2020, 12 have been affirmed with a stable outlook and 11 were assigned negative outlooks. At the sub-sector level, Integrated debt growth lagged that of the corporate index during the last recovery (Chart 5B). Though the sub-sector has an average credit rating of Aa, most issuers carry negative ratings outlooks, including four of the five global oil majors (Total SA, Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil and BP). Interestingly, Independent trades more cyclically than Midstream and Refining, despite having a greater concentration of high-rated issuers. The outstanding par value of investment grade Independent debt had been stagnant since 2015, it then plunged this year as three sizeable issuers were downgraded from investment grade to high-yield (Chart 5C). EQT Corp, Occidental Petroleum and Apache Corp were all downgraded during the past few months. They currently account for 21% of the high-yield Energy index’s market cap. Encouragingly, only two of the 16 remaining investment grade Independent issuers currently have negative ratings outlooks. The situation is less favorable for Oil Field Services. This sub-sector’s outstanding debt has remained low since the 2014-16 collapse (Chart 5D), but four of the six investment grade Oil Field Services issuers have negative ratings outlooks. Midstream (Chart 5E) and Refining (Chart 5F) both continued to grow their outstanding debt levels throughout the entirety of the last recovery, including during the 2014-16 period. At present, only three of the 23 investment grade Midstream issuers have negative ratings outlooks, while two of the four Refining issuers have negative outlooks. Chart 5AIG Energy Debt Growth IG Energy Debt Growth IG Energy Debt Growth Chart 5BIG Integrated Debt Growth IG Integrated Debt Growth IG Integrated Debt Growth Chart 5CIG Independent Debt Growth IG Independent Debt Growth IG Independent Debt Growth Chart 5DIG Oil Field Services Debt Growth IG Oil Field Services Debt Growth IG Oil Field Services Debt Growth Chart 5EIG Midstream Debt Growth IG Midstream Debt Growth IG Midstream Debt Growth Chart 5FIG Refining Debt Growth IG Refining Debt Growth IG Refining Debt Growth   Investment Conclusions As per last week’s report, we recommend that investors overweight Energy bonds within their investment grade corporate bond allocations. This recommendation stems from our view that corporate bond spreads will tighten during the next 12 months and that the oil price will rise. As such, we want to favor cyclical investment grade bond sectors that will outperform during periods of spread tightening. With that in mind, we would advise investors to focus their investment grade Energy allocations on the most cyclical sub-sector: Independent. Not only does the Independent sub-sector have the highest DTS ratio of the five sub-sectors, but its weakest credits have already been purged from the index and further downgrades are less likely. Oil Field Services offer less spread pick-up than Independent, and also have a higher proportion of issuers with negative ratings outlooks.  By similar logic, we would avoid the Integrated sub-sector. This sub-sector trades defensively relative to the corporate benchmark and a high proportion of its issuers have negative ratings outlooks. High-Yield Energy Bonds Risk Profile On average, the High-Yield Energy index and the overall High-Yield corporate index have very similar credit ratings. However, the Energy sector has a more barbelled credit rating distribution with a greater proportion of Ba-rated securities (64% versus 55%) and a greater proportion of Ca-C rated issuers (8% versus 1%) (Chart 6). Chart 6High-Yield Credit Rating Distributions* The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy Chart 7AHY Energy Risk Profile HY Energy Risk Profile HY Energy Risk Profile It is likely some combination of the larger presence of very low-rated credits and increased oil price volatility that has caused the sector to trade cyclically versus the junk benchmark since 2014 (Chart 7A). Notice that Energy outperformed the junk index during the 2008 sell off, but has since turned cyclical, underperforming in both the 2015/16 and 2020 risk-off episodes. At the sub-sector level, there is currently only one high-yield rated Integrated issuer (Cenovus Energy Inc., Ba-rated, negative outlook). Based on their DTS ratios, the Independent and Oil Field Services sub-sectors are the most cyclical (Charts 7B & 7C). This is because the lower-rated (Caa & below) issuers are concentrated in the these spaces. This is particularly true for Oil Field Services where 41% of the sub-sector’s market cap is rated Caa or below. The Midstream sub-sector also trades cyclically relative to the junk benchmark, but with somewhat less volatility than Independent and Oil Field Services, as evidenced by its DTS ratio of 1.2 (Chart 7D). Refining has traded like a cyclical sector so far this year, but that may not continue now that its DTS ratio has fallen close to 1.0 (Chart 7E). Chart 7BHY Independent Risk Profile HY Independent Risk Profile HY Independent Risk Profile Chart 7CHY Oil Field Services Risk Profile HY Oil Field Services Risk Profile HY Oil Field Services Risk Profile Chart 7DHY Midstream Risk Profile HY Midstream Risk Profile HY Midstream Risk Profile Chart 7EHY Refining Risk Profile HY Refining Risk Profile HY Refining Risk Profile   Valuation The Energy sector offers a significant spread advantage over the High-Yield index and also relative to other Ba-rated issuers (Table 2). Adjusting for duration differences by looking at the 12-month breakeven spread makes Energy look even more attractive. Energy spreads need to widen by 189 bps during the next 12 months to underperform duration-matched Treasuries. This compares to 93 bps for other Ba-rated issuers and 150 bps for the overall junk index. Table 2HY Energy Valuation The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy Four of the five Energy sub-sectors (Integrated being the exception) also offer attractive value relative to the overall index and their equivalently-rated benchmarks. This remains true after adjusting for duration differences. Balance Sheet Health The high-yield Energy sector has added much more debt than the overall junk index since 2010 (Chart 8A). But of greater concern is that Moody’s has already changed its ratings outlook from stable to negative for 58 Energy issuers since the start of the year. Meanwhile, only 17 high-yield Energy issuers have seen their ratings outlooks confirmed as stable in 2020. Nevertheless, we take some comfort knowing that the Energy sector should benefit from having a large number of issuers able to take advantage of the Federal Reserve’s Main Street Lending facilities. As a reminder, to be eligible for the Main Street facilities issuers must have fewer than 15000 employees or less than $5 billion in 2019 revenue. They must also be able to keep their Debt-to-EBITDA ratios below 6.0, including any new debt added through the Main Street programs. The Energy sector offers a significant spread advantage over the High-Yield index and also relative to other Barated issuers. Of the 61 US high-yield Energy issuers with available data (we exclude 23 foreign issuers that won’t have access to US programs), we estimate that at least 48 are eligible to receive support from the Main Street facilities (Appendix B). This not only includes 15 out of 20 B-rated issuers, but also 12 out of 15 Caa-rated issuers and 4 out of 7 issuers rated below Caa. This broad access is the result of deleveraging that has occurred since the 2014-16 bust (Chart 8A, bottom panel) and it should go a long way toward limiting defaults in the Energy space. The Independent sub-sector’s weight in the index jumped sharply this year, the result of adding three sizeable fallen angels (Chart 8B). Importantly, 24 out of the 28 US Independent issuers appear eligible for Fed support. In contrast, the Oil Field Services sector is in distress. Its weight in the index has been declining for more than a year (Chart 8C), and a large proportion of its issuers are concentrated in lower credit tiers. However, we estimate that out of 19 issuers with available data, 13 are eligible for the Fed’s Main Street Lending facilities. Both Midstream and Refining have high concentrations of Ba-rated issuers and neither has aggressively grown its presence in the index during the past decade (Charts 8D & 8E), though Midstream’s index weight did jump this year. The high credit quality of both indexes means that most issuers will have access to the Main Street facilities, though three of the five Refining issuers are not US based. Chart 8AHY Energy Debt Growth HY Energy Debt Growth HY Energy Debt Growth Chart 8BHY Independent Debt Growth HY Independent Debt Growth HY Independent Debt Growth Chart 8CHY Oil Field Services Debt Growth HY Oil Field Services Debt Growth HY Oil Field Services Debt Growth Chart 8DHY Midstream Debt Growth HY Midstream Debt Growth HY Midstream Debt Growth Chart 8EHY Refining Debt Growth HY Refining Debt Growth HY Refining Debt Growth   Investment Conclusions The conclusion from the model we presented in last week’s report was that high-yield Energy should outperform the junk index during the next 12 months, assuming that overall junk spreads tighten and the oil price rises. However, we remain concerned that, despite the nascent economic recovery, some low-rated Energy names will go bust during the next few months, weighing on index returns. The pattern from the 2014-16 default cycle argues that our concerns may be overblown. In February 2016, high-yield Energy started to outperform the overall junk index slightly after the trough in oil prices and eleven months before the peak in the 12-month trailing default rate (Chart 1 on page 1). If oil prices are indeed already past their cyclical trough, then it may already be a good time to bottom-fish in the high-yield Energy space. The fact that the bulk of high-yield Energy issuers are eligible for support through the Main Street lending facilities tips the scales, and we recommend that investors overweight high-yield Energy relative to the overall junk index. In particular, we think investors should focus on the Independent sub-sector where value is very attractive and most issuers can tap the Fed for help if needed. We would, however, avoid the Oil Field Services sector where the bulk of Energy defaults are likely to come from. Midstream and Refining should perform well, but are less cyclical and less attractively valued than the Independent sub-sector. Jeremie Peloso Senior Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 1: A Model Of Energy Bond Excess Returns”, dated July 14, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Duration-Times-Spread (DTS) is a simple measure that is highly correlated with excess return volatility for corporate bonds. The DTS ratio is the ratio of a sector’s DTS to that of the benchmark index. It can be thought of like the beta of a stock. A DTS ratio above 1.0 signals that the sector is cyclical (or “high beta”), a DTS ratio below 1.0 signals that the sector is defensive or (“low beta”). For more details on the DTS measure please see: Arik Ben Dor, Lev Dynkin, Jay Hyman, Patrick Houweling, Erik van Leeuwen & Olaf Penninga, “DTS (Duration-Times-Spread)”, Journal of Portfolio Management 33(2), January 2007.   Appendix A Investment Grade Energy Issuers The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy Appendix B High-Yield Energy Issuers The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy  

  Highlights Q2/2020 Performance Breakdown: Our recommended model bond portfolio outperformed the custom benchmark by +11bps during the second quarter of the year. Winners & Losers: The government bond side of the portfolio outperformed by +8bps, led by overweights in the US (+4bps), Canada (+4bps) and Italy (+3bps). Spread product generated a small outperformance (+3bps), with overweights in US investment grade (+43bps) offsetting underweights in emerging market debt (-35bps). Scenario Analysis For The Next Six Months: We are sticking close to benchmark on overall duration and spread product exposure, focusing more on relative value between countries and sectors to generate outperformance amid economic uncertainties caused by the growing spread of COVID-19. We continue favoring markets where there is direct buying from central banks, but we are also increasing our recommended exposure to EM USD-denominated debt versus US investment grade corporates. Feature The first half of 2020 has been one of rapid market moves and regime shifts for global fixed income markets. In the first quarter, developed market government debt provided the best returns as bond yields plunged with central banks racing to support collapsing economies through rate cuts and liquidity injections. In Q2, corporate credit delivered the top returns, as economies started to emerge from the COVID-19 lockdowns and, more importantly, the Fed and other major central banks delivered direct support to frozen credit markets through asset purchases. Now, even as an increasing number of global growth indicators are tracing out a "V"-shaped recovery, new cases of COVID-19 are surging though the southern US and major emerging economies like Brazil and India. This raises new challenges for investors for the second half of 2020. A second wave of the coronavirus could jeopardize the nascent global economic recovery, even after the massive easing of monetary and fiscal policies, at a time when valuations on many risk assets appear stretched. In this report, we review the performance of the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio during the second quarter of 2020. We also present our recommended portfolio positioning for the next six months. Given the lingering uncertainties from the renewed spread of COVID-19, we continue to take a more measured approach in our portfolio allocations. That means focusing more on relative value between countries and sectors while staying closer to benchmark on overall global duration and spread product exposure versus government bonds (Table 1). Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning For The Next Six Months GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism As a reminder to existing readers (and to new clients), the model portfolio is a part of our service that complements the usual macro analysis of global fixed income markets. The portfolio is how we communicate our opinion on the relative attractiveness between government bond and spread product sectors. We do this by applying actual percentage weightings to each of our recommendations within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. Q2/2020 Model Portfolio Performance Breakdown: Slight Outperformance For Both Sovereigns And Credits Chart 1Q2/2020 Performance: Modest Gains From Relative Positioning Q2/2020 Performance: Modest Gains From Relative Positioning Q2/2020 Performance: Modest Gains From Relative Positioning The total return for the GFIS model portfolio (hedged into US dollars) in the second quarter was 3.22%, modestly outperforming the custom benchmark index by +11bps (Chart 1).1 In terms of the specific breakdown between the government bond and spread product allocations in our model portfolio, the former generated +8bps of outperformance versus our custom benchmark index while the latter outperformed by +3bps. That government bond return includes the small gain (+2bps) from inflation-linked bonds, which we added as a new asset class in our model portfolio framework on June 23.2 In a world of very low bond yields (Table 2), our preference for the higher-yielding government bond markets in the US, Canada, the UK and Italy was the main source of outperformance, delivering a combined excess return of +13bps (including inflation-linked bonds). Our underweight in Japan delivered a surprising positive excess return of +4bps as longer-dated JGB yields – which do not fall under the Bank of Japan’s yield curve control policy – rose during the quarter. Underweights in the low-yielding core euro area countries of Germany and France were a drag on the portfolio (a combined -10bps), particularly the latter where longer-maturity French bonds enjoyed a very strong rally in Q2. Table 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Overall Return Attribution GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism In spread product, our overweights in US investment grade corporates (+43bps), UK investment grade corporates (+7bps) and US commercial MBS (+5bps) squeezed out a combined small gain versus underweights in emerging markets (EM) USD-denominated credit (-35bps), euro area high-yield (-8bps) and lower-rated US high-yield (-6bps). In a world of very low bond yields (Table 2), our preference for the higher-yielding government bond markets in the US, Canada, the UK and Italy was the main source of outperformance. That modest outperformance of the model bond portfolio versus the benchmark is in line with our cautious recommended stance on what are always the largest drivers of the portfolio returns: overall duration exposure and the relative allocation between government debt and spread product. We have stuck close to benchmark exposures on both, eschewing big directional bets on bond yields or credit spreads while focusing more on relative opportunities between countries and sectors. This conservative approach is how we are approaching what we have dubbed “The Battle of 2020” between the opposing forces of coronavirus contagion (which is bullish for government bonds and bearish for credit) and policy reflation (vice versa).3 The bar charts showing the total and relative returns for each individual government bond market and spread product sector are presented in Charts 2 & 3. Chart 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Government Bond Performance Attribution GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism Chart 3GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Spread Product Performance Attribution By Sector GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism The most significant movers were: Biggest Outperformers Overweight US investment grade industrials (+28bps) Overweight US investment grade financials (+12bps) Overweight UK investment grade corporates (+7bps) Overweight US CMBS (+5bps) Underweight Japanese government bonds with maturity greater than 10 years (+5 bps) Biggest Underperformers Underweight EM USD denominated corporates (-24bps) Underweight EM USD denominated sovereigns (-10bps) Underweight EUR high-yield corporates (-8bps) Underweight French government bonds with maturity greater than 10 years (-5bps) Underweight US B-rated high-yield corporates (-4bps) Chart 4 presents the ranked benchmark index returns of the individual countries and spread product sectors in the GFIS model bond portfolio for Q2/2020. Returns are hedged into US dollars (we do not take active currency risk in this portfolio) and adjusted to reflect duration differences between each country/sector and the overall custom benchmark index for the model portfolio. We have also color coded the bars in each chart to reflect our recommended investment stance for each market during Q2/2020 (red for underweight, dark green for overweight, gray for neutral).4 Ideally, we would look to see more green bars on the left side of the chart where market returns are highest, and more red bars on the right side of the chart were returns are lowest. Chart 4Ranking The Winners & Losers From The GFIS Model Bond Portfolio In Q2/2020 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism The top performing sectors in our model bond portfolio universe in Q2 were all spread product: EM USD-denominated sovereign (+12.9% in USD-hedged terms, duration-matched to the custom model portfolio benchmark index), EM USD-denominated corporate debt (+12.6%), UK investment grade corporates (+11.3%), US investment grade corporates (+10.9%), and high-yield corporates in the euro area (+6.7%) and US (+5.6%). The top performing sectors in our model bond portfolio universe in Q2 were all spread product. During the quarter, we maintained relative exposures to those sectors within an overall small above-benchmark allocation to global spread product – overweight US and UK investment grade versus underweight emerging market credit, neutral overall US high-yield (favoring Ba-rated debt) versus underweight euro area high-yield. Those allocations were motivated by our theme of “buying what the central banks are buying”, like the Fed purchasing US investment grade corporates. Importantly, we had limited exposure to the worst performing sectors during Q2: underweight government bonds in Japan (index return of -0.47% in USD-hedged, duration-matched terms) and Germany (+0.47%), a neutral allocation to Australian sovereign debt (-0.07%) and an underweight in US Agency MBS (+0.20%). The latter two positions came after we downgraded US MBS to underweight in early April and cut our long-held overweight in Australia to neutral in mid-May. Bottom Line: Our model bond portfolio modestly outperformed its benchmark index in the second quarter of the year by +11bps – a positive result driven by our relative positioning that favored higher yielding government debt and spread product sectors directly supported by central bank purchases. Future Drivers Of Portfolio Returns Chart 5Overall Portfolio Allocation: Slightly Overweight Credit Vs Governments GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism Typically, in these quarterly performance reviews of our model bond portfolio, we make return forecasts for the portfolio based off scenario analysis and quantitative predictions of various fixed income asset classes. However, the current environment is unprecedented because of the COVID-19 outbreak. Not only is there now elevated economic uncertainty, but central banks are running extreme monetary policies in response - including direct intervention in markets through purchases of both government bonds and spread product. Thus, we are reluctant to rely on historical model coefficients and correlations to estimate expected fixed income returns. Instead, we will focus on the logic behind our current model portfolio allocations and the expected contribution to overall portfolio performance over the next six months. At the moment, the main factors that will drive the performance of the model bond portfolio over the next six months are the following: Our recommended overweight stance on relatively higher-yielding sovereigns like the US, Canada and Italy versus low-yielders like Germany, France and Japan; Our allocation to inflation-linked bonds out of nominal government debt in the US, Italy and Canada; Our recommended overweight stance on spread product backstopped by central bank purchases - US investment grade corporates, US Agency CMBS, US Ba-rated high-yield, and UK investment grade corporates; Our recommended underweight stance on riskier spread product - euro area high-yield, US B-rated and Caa-rated high-yield, and EM USD-denominated corporates and sovereigns. The portfolio currently has a small aggregate overweight allocation to spread product relative to government bonds, equal to three percentage points (Chart 5). We feel that is an appropriate allocation to credit versus sovereigns in an environment that is still highly uncertain concerning the spread of COVID-19 and how global growth will evolve over the next 6-12 months. This also leaves room to increase the spread product allocation should the news on the virus and the global economy take a turn for the better. We also remain neutral on overall portfolio duration exposure. Our Global Duration Indicator, which contains growth data like our global leading economic indicator and the global ZEW expectations index, has rebounded sharply and is signaling that bond yields should bottom out in the second half of 2020 (Chart 6). A rise in yields will take longer to develop, however, with virtually all major central banks signaling that policy rates will stay near 0% for an extended period. Chart 6Our Global Duration Indicator Says Bond Yields Will Bottom Out In H2/2020 Our Global Duration Indicator Says Bond Yields Will Bottom Out In H2/2020 Our Global Duration Indicator Says Bond Yields Will Bottom Out In H2/2020 Chart 7Within Governments, Overweight Inflation-Linked Bonds Vs. Nominals Within Governments, Overweight Inflation-Linked Bonds Vs. Nominals Within Governments, Overweight Inflation-Linked Bonds Vs. Nominals The recent moves in developed market government bonds are interesting in terms of the underlying drivers of yields – real yields and inflation expectations. Longer-maturity inflation breakevens – the spread between the yields of nominal and inflation-linked government debt – have drifted higher since late March after major central banks began rapidly easing monetary conditions. At the same time, the actual yields on inflation-linked bonds, i.e. real yields, have moved lower and largely offset the gains in inflation breakevens (Chart 7). Nominal yields have been stuck in very narrow ranges as a result. We do not see that dynamic changing, at least in the near term. Inflation breakevens are too low on our models across all developed markets, and are likely to continue inching higher in the coming months on the back of a pickup in global growth and rising energy prices. At the same time, central banks will be staying on hold for longer while continuing to buy large quantities of nominal bonds, helping push real yields lower. Given these opposing forces on nominal government bond yields, we think it is far too soon to contemplate reducing overall duration – even with equity and credit markets having rallied sharply off the lows and global economic indicators rebounding. Thus, we are maintaining an overall duration exposure close to benchmark in the model portfolio (Chart 8). At the same time, we are playing for wider breakevens and lower real bond yields through allocations to markets where our models indicate better value in being long breakevens: US TIPS, Italian inflation-linked BTPs, and Canadian Real Return Bonds. Within the government bond side of the model bond portfolio, we continue to recommend focusing more on country allocation to generate outperformance. That means concentrating exposures in relatively higher yielding markets like the US, Canada and Italy while maintaining underweights in low-yielding core Europe and Japan. Turning to spread product allocations, we continue to recommend focusing more on policymaker responses to the COVID-19 recession, and its uncertain recovery, rather than the downturn itself. The now double-digit year-over-year growth in global central bank balance sheets - which has led global high-yield and investment grade excess returns by one year in the years after the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 9) – is pointing to additional global corporate bond market outperformance versus governments over the next 6-12 months. Chart 8Overall Portfolio Duration: Close To Benchmark Overall Portfolio Duration: Close To Benchmark Overall Portfolio Duration: Close To Benchmark In other words, we are focusing on global QE rather than global recession, while maintaining a modest recommended overall weighting on global spread product. That allocation could be larger, but we suggest picking the lowest hanging fruit in the credit universe rather than going for the highest beta credit markets like Caa-rated US high-yield that have already seen significant spread compression relative to higher-rated US junk bonds (bottom panel). Chart 9Global QE Supporting Credit Markets Global QE Supporting Credit Markets Global QE Supporting Credit Markets Chart 10Overall Credit Allocation: Keep Buying What The Central Banks Are Buying Overall Credit Allocation: Keep Buying What The Central Banks Are Buying Overall Credit Allocation: Keep Buying What The Central Banks Are Buying We continue to focus our recommended spread product allocations on the parts of global credit markets where central banks are directly buying. We continue to focus our recommended spread product allocations on the parts of global credit markets where central banks are directly buying (Chart 10). In the US, that means overweighting US investment grade corporate bonds (particularly those with maturities of less than five years), US Ba-rated high-yield that the Fed can hold in its corporate bond buying program, US Agency CMBS that is also supported by Fed programs, and UK investment grade corporate bonds that the Bank of England is buying. We also put Italian government bonds into this category, with the ECB buying greater amounts of BTPs as part of its COVID-19 monetary support efforts. What about emerging market debt? We have expressed reservations in recent months about upgrading EM USD-denominated sovereign and corporate debt, even within our portfolio theme of being “selectively opportunistic” about recommended spread product allocations. We have long felt that the time to buy those markets would be when the US dollar had clearly peaked and global growth had clearly bottomed. The latter condition now appears to be in place, and the strong upward momentum in the US dollar is starting to weaken. This forces us to reconsider our stance on EM debt in the model portfolio. Even after the powerful Q2 rally in EM corporate and sovereign debt, EM credit spreads still look relatively attractive using one of our favorite credit valuation metrics – the percentile rankings of 12-month breakeven spreads. Those breakeven spreads are calculated, as the amount of spread widening that would make the return of EM credit equal to duration-matched US Treasuries over a 12-month horizon. We then compare those spreads to their own history to determine how attractive current spread levels are now on a “spread volatility adjusted” basis. Current 12-month breakeven spreads for EM USD-denominated sovereigns and corporates are in the upper quartile of their own history. This compares favorably to other spread products in our model bond portfolio universe, particularly US investment grade corporates where the 12-month breakevens are now just below the long-run median (Chart 11). Chart 11A Comparison Of Credit Sectors Using 12-Month Breakeven Spreads GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism The current Bloomberg Barclays EM corporate benchmark index option-adjusted spread (OAS) is around 300bps above that of the US investment grade corporate index OAS. That spread still has room to compress further if global growth continues to rebound and the US dollar softens versus EM currencies. Leading growth indicators like the China credit impulse, which has picked up sharply as Chinese authorities have ramped up economic stimulus measures, are now back to levels last seen in 2016 when EM credit strongly outperformed US investment grade corporates (Chart 12). Chart 12Upgrade EM Credit Versus US Investment Grade Upgrade EM Credit Versus US Investment Grade Upgrade EM Credit Versus US Investment Grade Chart 13Overall Portfolio Yield: Close To Benchmark Overall Portfolio Yield: Close To Benchmark Overall Portfolio Yield: Close To Benchmark This week we are upgrading our weighting on EM USD-denominated corporates and sovereigns to neutral, from underweight, in our model bond portfolio. Although we acknowledge that the EM story has been made more complicated by the rapid spread of COVID-19 through the major EM economies, an underweight stance – particularly versus US investment grade credit – is increasingly unwarranted. Therefore, this week we are upgrading our weighting on EM USD-denominated corporates and sovereigns to neutral, from underweight, in our model bond portfolio (see the updated table on pages 17-18). That new allocation will be “funded” by reducing our overweight in US investment grade corporates. Model bond portfolio yield and tracking error considerations Importantly, the selective global government bond and credit allocations we have just outlined do not come at a cost in terms of forgone yield. The portfolio yield after our upgrade of EM debt will be slightly above that of the custom benchmark index (Chart 13), indicating no “negative carry” even when avoiding parts of the US and euro area high-yield markets. Chart 14Overall Portfolio Risk: Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk: Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk: Moderate Finally, turning to the risk budget of the model portfolio, we are aiming for a “moderate” overall tracking error, or the gap between the portfolio’s volatility and that of the benchmark index. The portfolio volatility has fallen dramatically from the surge seen during the global market rout in March, moving lower alongside realized market volatility. The tracking error now sits at 64bps, well below our self-imposed limit of 100bps and within the 50-70bps range we are targeting as a “moderate” level of overall portfolio risk (Chart 14). Bottom Line: We are sticking close to benchmark on overall duration and spread product exposure, focusing more on relative value between countries and sectors to generate outperformance amid economic uncertainties caused by the growing spread of COVID-19. We continue favoring markets where there is direct buying from central banks. We are also increasing our recommended exposure on EM USD-denominated debt to neutral, funded by a reduced allocation to US investment grade corporates where valuations are less attractive.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The GFIS model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt replacing very high quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectations'", dated June 23 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Contagion Vs. Reflation: The Battle Of 2020 Rages On", dated June 30, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Note that sectors where we made changes to our recommended weightings during Q2/2020 will have multiple colors in the respective bars in Chart 4. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights The underperformance of value versus growth has been a reason behind the dollar bull market rather than a consequence of it. The rationale is that the catalyst for any sector to outperform is return on capital rather than the cost of capital. The outperformance of health care and technology has been on the back of rising profits, rather than just investor exuberance and/or low bond yields. Cyclical currencies with a high concentration of value sectors have tracked the relative performance of their representative bourses. A reversal will require value sectors to start outperforming on a sustainable basis. It is encouraging that leadership changes in equity markets occur more often than not. Historically, these tend to take place every decade. Bombed-out valuations suggest some deep-value sectors have become sufficiently cheap to compensate for a pessimistic profit scenario. An outperformance of value versus growth will favor cyclical currencies. We are long a basket of petrocurrencies, the SEK, and GBP. We are also short USD/JPY as portfolio insurance (and as a play on the cyclical Japanese market). Feature The usual market narrative is that for non-US stocks to outperform, the dollar has to decline. This also applies to value stocks that have a higher weighting outside the US, compared to growth stocks. At the center of this premise is that the dollar is a reserve currency. As a result, three reasons emblem the view. First, a fall in the dollar eases financing costs for non-US corporations borrowing in dollars. Second, commodities tend to do well when the dollar declines, benefiting emerging market and commodity-producing countries. And finally, a lower dollar boosts the common-currency returns for US-based investors, leading to more capital deployment in offshore markets. On the surface, this makes sense. But digging deeper into the thesis, it appears that a lower US dollar is a necessary but not sufficient condition for non-US (or value) stocks to outperform. The reason is that profit growth (the ultimate driver of stock prices) is more contingent on productivity gains rather than translation effects. As such, the value-versus-growth debate is important, not only for the sectors involved, but for currency strategy as well. A Two-Decade Postmortem Chart I-1Value/Growth Turns Before The Dollar Value/Growth Turns Before The Dollar Value/Growth Turns Before The Dollar Chart I-1 plots the MSCI global value index versus its growth counterpart, superimposed against the US dollar. Two trends become apparent: The relative performance of value versus growth typically bottoms or peaks ahead of turns in the US dollar. The relationship between the value/growth ratio and the US dollar is not always in sync. There was a period of decoupling after the financial crisis, and, more recently, in 2015-2016. This was also the case in the ‘80s and around the Asian crisis in the late ‘90s. Flows tend to gravitate to capital markets with the highest expected returns, and this is certainly the case when value or growth style tilts are concerned. This is important for currency strategy, since sector composition can drive a country’s equity returns. Meanwhile, both equity and currency relative performances tend to be in sync (Chart I-2A and Chart I-2B). Chart I-2ACurrencies Follow Relative Equity Performance Currencies Follow Relative Equity Performance Currencies Follow Relative Equity Performance Chart I-2BCurrencies Follow Relative Equity Performance Currencies Follow Relative Equity Performance Currencies Follow Relative Equity Performance According to the MSCI classification, information technology and health care are the biggest components of the growth index – a whopping 49%. This is in stark contrast to financials and industrials, which make up 33% of the value index. Not surprisingly, currencies with a heavy value weighting in their domestic bourses (Table I-1) have suffered indiscriminately compared to their growth counterparts, over the last decade. Table I-1Sector Weights Across G10 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate Take the US and Switzerland, which have the highest equity concentration in traditional growth sectors, at over 60%. Both the US dollar and Swiss franc have held up remarkably well in trade-weighted terms since the onset of the dollar bull market (Chart I-3). Likewise, it would have been a miracle for petrocurrencies (CAD, NOK and AUD) to hold up amid the recent underperformance in energy and financials. Chart I-3Style Tilt Drives Currency Performance Style Tilt Drives Currency Performance Style Tilt Drives Currency Performance This suggests that at minimum, the underperformance of value versus growth has been a reason for the dollar bull market rather than a consequence of it. Chicken And Egg Problem? What about the narrative that a decline in the dollar greases the engine of non-US stocks? Yes, but not entirely. It is certainly the case that most global trade and financing is conducted in US dollars, and so a fall in the US dollar (commensurate with lower interest rates) leads to easier global financial conditions. As Chart I-4 clearly illustrates, corporate spreads abroad have been tightly correlated to dollar volatility. A lower dollar also eases repayment costs for non-US borrowers. Chart I-4The Dollar And Funding Stresses The Dollar And Funding Stresses The Dollar And Funding Stresses A lower dollar also boosts resource prices through the numeraire effect (Chart I-5). Meanwhile, rising commodity prices flatter industries tied to the resource value chain such as industrials, materials, and energy. Second-round economic effects also buffet other cyclical industries such as retail and hospitality, which help boost the domestic equity index. That said, the rally in commodities, value stocks, and emerging market share prices in 2016-2017 occurred despite a dollar that was flat-to-higher – so the causality versus effect link is not always trivial. Part of the reason is that, over the past few years, both emerging market and other non-US corporates have diversified their sources of debt funding. Euro- and yen-denominated debt have been surging (Chart I-6), which has kept their cost of capital low, even as the dollar has risen. Chart I-5Tied To The Hip Tied To The Hip Tied To The Hip Chart I-6Lots Of Non-US Debt Lots Of Non-US Debt Lots Of Non-US Debt It is also important to note that in commodity bull markets, prices tend to rise in all currencies, including domestically (Chart I-7). This is crucial for sector outperformance since the translation effect for profits will otherwise be negative, given local-currency fixed and variable costs. This suggests that demand is the driving force behind bull markets in commodity prices and cyclical stocks, rather than a lower greenback. Chart I-7Commodity Bull Markets In Different Currencies Commodity Bull Markets In Different Currencies Commodity Bull Markets In Different Currencies This demand has come in the form of Chinese stimulus. Chart I-8 shows a close correlation between excess liquidity in China (a measure of the centripetal force from Chinese credit) and resource share valuations. Ergo, a key barometer for value to outperform growth is that Chinese demand picks up, plugging the hole in exactly the sectors that have borne the brunt of deleveraging in recent years. Chart I-8China And Commodities China And Commodities China And Commodities A look at corporate balance sheets and income statements corroborates this view. Growth has outperformed value on the back of a re-rating, but also on profitability. Chart I-9A and Chart I-9B rank G10 equity bourses on the basis of return on equity and their corresponding price-to-book ratios. Not surprisingly, the winners of the last decade have had the biggest returns on equity, as was the case for the winners during the prior decade. Chart I-9AMarkets Bid Up High Returns To Capital Markets Bid Up High Returns To Capital Markets Bid Up High Returns To Capital Chart I-9BMarkets Bid Up High Returns To Capital Markets Bid Up High Returns To Capital Markets Bid Up High Returns To Capital As such, the catalyst for any sector to outperform is return on capital rather than the cost of capital. Structural Shift? There is some evidence that the underperformance of value versus growth could be structural. For one, being a value manager seems to be following the fate of telephone switchboard operators in the early 1900s. Perhaps the advent of computer trading systems has systematically eroded the value premium. As such it is becoming more and more difficult, even for the most skillful value managers, to beat their own index. An inability for value sectors to outperform will be a key risk to a dollar-bearish view. Work done on our in-house Equity Trading Strategy platform corroborates this view. Since about 2014, a long/short strategy based on the best value stocks relative to the worst in terms of a swath of fundamental valuation metrics has been flat compared to a more blended strategy (Chart I-10). According to our quantitative specialists, the best value can be found in European countries such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany (Chart I-11). Surprisingly, their proprietary value model rate Switzerland and New Zealand quite highly, despite a clear defensive bias in these equity markets. Unsurprisingly, some of the countries that have had the weakest currencies in the last decade such as Sweden and the Eurozone members have highly favored value sectors. Chart I-10A Dearth Of Value Managers A Dearth Of Value Managers A Dearth Of Value Managers Chart I-11Lots Of Value Outside The US Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate Going forward, a few things could change. One of the primary reasons why growth has outperformed value has been the drop in bond yields, which has increased the appeal of companies with low payout ratios and much more backdated cash flows (Chart I-12). But as countries from Japan to Australia implement yield-curve controls at the zero bound, the capitalized dividend from low yields is bound to be exhausted. Meanwhile, any rise in yields will favor deep-value sectors like banks (due to rising net interest margins) and commodities (due to inflation protection). Chart I-12A Lower Discount Favors Long-Duration Assets A Lower Discount Favors Long-Duration Assets A Lower Discount Favors Long-Duration Assets Second, falling global trade and the proliferation of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) investing has hammered traditional industries such as energy and autos. Part of this trend is structural, but there is also a cyclical component. For the auto industry in particular, auto sales are strongly (inversely) correlated to the unemployment rate, and as more economies reopen, car sales should pick up. Meanwhile, traditional auto and energy companies are stepping up their electric vehicle and alternative energy strategies, meaning the first-mover advantage for the avant-gardes like Tesla and Nikola could be eroded. Finally, valuation tends to be a key catalyst near recessions. Given that over the years, one of the more consistent drivers of long-term equity returns has been the valuation starting point, this favors non-US stocks (Chart I-13A, Chart I-13B, Chart I-13C, Chart I-13D). Not surprisingly, the currencies that are the most undervalued in our models1 also have cheap equity markets. Even if one focuses solely on growth sectors such as technology and health care, non-US companies are still more attractive, according to our Equity Trading Strategy platform (Chart I-14). This suggests some measure of convergence is due. Chart I-13AProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Prospective Returns Higher Outside The US Prospective Returns Higher Outside The US Chart I-13BProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Prospective Returns Higher Outside The US Prospective Returns Higher Outside The US Chart I-13CProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Prospective Returns Higher Outside The US Prospective Returns Higher Outside The US Chart I-13DProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Prospective Returns Higher Outside The US Prospective Returns Higher Outside The US Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate Chart I-14Attractive Growth Stocks Outside The US Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate It is encouraging that leadership changes in equity markets occur more often than not. Historically, these tend to occur every decade. Bombed-out valuations suggest some deep-value sectors have become sufficiently cheap to compensate for a pessimistic profit scenario. Portfolio Construction Chart I-15CAD/NZD And Relative Stocks CAD/NZD And Relative Stocks CAD/NZD And Relative Stocks An outperformance of value versus growth will favor cyclical currencies. The catalyst will have to be improving return on capital from value sectors, but the valuation starting point is already quite compelling. Meanwhile, even traditional growth sectors are still cheaper outside the US. We are already selectively long a basket of petrocurrencies, the SEK, and GBP. We are also short USD/JPY as portfolio insurance (and as a play on the cyclical Japanese market). Should value stocks gain more widespread appeal, we will add the Eurozone and emerging market currencies to this basket. Elsewhere, a tactical trading opportunity has also opened up to go short the NZD/CAD cross. Little known is that the New Zealand stock market is the most defensive in the world (previously referenced in Table I-1). This has helped keep the New Zealand dollar higher than would have otherwise been the case. Should value start to outperform growth, this will favor the CAD/NZD cross (Chart I-15). While we commend Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s efforts to limit the spread of COVID-19 in New Zealand, the economy will soon start to bump against supply-side constraints. More specifically, COVID-19 has accentuated the immigration cliff in New Zealand, an important hit to the labor dividend for the economy (Chart I-16). As such, the neutral rate of interest is bound to head lower. Chart I-16A Top For NZD/CAD? A Top For NZD/CAD? A Top For NZD/CAD? This is in stark contrast to Canada, where the current government was pro-immigration even before widespread lockdowns. Meanwhile, in the commodity space, our bias is that energy will fare better than agriculture, boosting relative Canadian terms of trade. Go short NZD/CAD for a trade.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report , "Updating Our Intermediate-Term Models", dated July 3, 2020. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been robust: The ISM non-manufacturing PMI jumped from 45.4 to 57.1 in June, with the new orders component surging from 41.9 to 61.6 and the employment component at 43.1 versus 31.8 earlier. JOLTS job openings increased from 5 million to 5.4 million in May. Initial jobless claims fell from 1413K to 1314K for the week ended July 3rd. The DXY index fell by 1% this week, alongside the outperformance of non-US equities, particularly emerging market stocks. Recent data have shown budding signs of a recovery as many countries gradually reopen their economies. As a counter-cyclical currency, this has pressured the dollar. Report Links: DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market? - June 5, 2020 Cycles And The US Dollar - May 15, 2020 Capitulation? - April 3, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mostly positive: The Markit services PMI increased from 47.3 to 48.3 in June. The Sentix investor confidence index rebounded from -24.8 to -18.2 in July. Retail sales fell by 5.1% year-on-year in May. However, this is a 17.8% increase on a month-on-month basis.  The euro increased by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. While recent data have been promising, the Summer 2020 Economic Forecast released by the European Union sounded quite pessimistic this week. The Summer Forecast projects that the euro area will contract by 8.7% in 2020 and grow by 6.1% in 2021, much worse than the spring forecast. That said, a mild second wave could trigger the European Union to revise these estimates higher. Meanwhile, the ECB remains committed to lowering the cost of capital for Eurozone countries. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mostly negative: The current account balance surged from ¥262.7 billion to ¥1176.8 billion in May, as imports fell faster than exports. The preliminary coincident index fell from 80.1 to 74.6 in May, while the leading economic index increased from 77.7 to 79.3. Machinery orders fell by 16.3% year-on-year in May, following a 17.7% decrease the previous month. Moreover, preliminary machine tool orders in June continued to fall by 32% year-on-year. USD/JPY fell by 0.5% this week. The June Eco Watchers Survey released this Wednesday shows that the current conditions index increased sharply from 15.5 to 38.8. Moreover, the outlook index rose to 44 in June from 36.5 the previous month. The Survey sounded cautiously optimistic and indicated that while COVID-19 continues to be a downside risk, activities are starting to pick up in recent months. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been positive: The Markit services PMI ticked up marginally from 47 to 47.1 in June. The construction PMI surged from 28.9 to 55.3. Halifax house prices increased by 2.5% year-on-year in June. The British pound jumped by 1.3% against the US dollar this week. The Bank of England chief economist, Andy Haldane, has warned about second, third or even fourth wave of COVID-19 infections. However, he also acknowledged that the UK economy has received a boost since restaurants and bars have reopened. We remain bullish on the pound as an undervalued currency, but are monitoring Brexit developments closely as they continue to add more volatility to trading patterns. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mostly negative: The AiG services performance index was flat at 31.5 in June. Home loans fell by 7.6% month-on-month in May, following a 4.4% decline the previous month. The Australian dollar rose by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. On Tuesday, the RBA held its interest rate unchanged at 0.25%, as widely expected. The Bank sounded optimistic about the recovery and the government’s effective measures to contain the virus. That said, with Melbourne returning into lockdown, a dose of skepticism is warranted. We continue to favor the Australian dollar as a key barometer for procyclical trades, but domestic factors could be a risk to this view. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: The ANZ preliminary business confidence index recovered from -34.4 to -29.8 in July. The New Zealand dollar rose by 0.9% against the US dollar this week. The Q2 NZIER Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion (QSBO) indicated that economic activities plunged sharply in Q2. According to the survey, a net 63% of businesses expect conditions to deteriorate, compared with 70% in the previous survey. While confidence has picked up slightly, business sentiment remains downbeat with less intensions to invest and hire, particularly in the subdued construction sector. As such, a tactical opportunity is opening for short NZD trades at the crosses. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been positive: The Ivey PMI surged from 39.1 to 58.2 in June. The Markit manufacturing PMI also increased from 40.6 to 47.8 in June. Bloomberg Nanos confidence increased from 46 to 46.2 for the week ended July 3rd. Housing starts picked up from 195.5K in May to 211.7K in June. The Canadian dollar appreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The BoC Business Outlook Survey was released this week and survey results suggest that “business sentiment is strongly negative in all regions and sectors” due falling energy prices. Most firms believe that production could pick up quickly but sales might take longer to recover. That said, both interest rate differentials and recovering oil prices are bullish for the Canadian dollar for now.  Report Links: More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been positive: FX reserves increased from CHF 817 billion to CHF 850 billion in June. The unemployment rate declined from 3.4% to 3.2% in June. Total sight deposits increased from CHF 683 billion to CHF 687 billion for the week ended July 3rd. The Swiss franc appreciated by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. The Swiss franc has been quite resilient recently despite the rebound in risk sentiment since the March lows. The expensive franc remains a headache for the SNB and the Swiss economy. We are looking to go long EUR/CHF at 1.055. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been negative: Manufacturing output fell by 3% month-on-month in May. The Norwegian krone surged by 1.3% against the US dollar this week. We remain bullish on the krone due to its cheap valuation and signs of a recovery in energy prices. Our Nordic Basket is now around 10% in the money and we also went long a petrocurrency basket including the Norwegian krone last week. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been negative: Industrial production fell by 15.5% year-on-year in May. Manufacturing new orders plunged by 18.4% year-on-year in May. The Swedish krona surged by 1.3% against the US dollar this week. Like the Norwegian krone, the Swedish krona is tremendously undervalued and remains one of our favorite G10 currencies at the moment. As a small open economy, Sweden relies heavily on exports and imports. While global trade was hit hard during COVID-19, signs of stabilization bode well for the Swedish krona. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Feature Over the last several years when I travelled to Europe, I would meet with Ms. Mea, an outspoken client of the Emerging Markets Strategy service. We have published our conversations with Ms. Mea in the past and this semi-annual series has complemented our regular reports. She has challenged our views and convictions, serving as a voice for many other clients. In addition, these conversations have highlighted nuances of our analysis, for her and to the benefit of our readers. With travel restrictions in force, this time we had to resort to an online meeting with Ms. Mea. Below are the key parts of our conversation from earlier this week. Ms. Mea: Let’s begin with your main thesis, which over the past several years has been as follows: China’s growth drives EM business cycles and financial markets overall. Indeed, as long as China’s growth dithers, EM growth and asset prices languish. However, since the pandemic started China has stimulated aggressively and there are clear signs that the economy is recovering. The latest surge in Chinese share prices confirms that a robust recovery is underway. Why do you not think China’s economy is on the upswing? Answer: True, we believe China’s business cycle is instrumental to EM economies’ growth and balance of payments. We upgraded our outlook for Chinese growth in our May 28 report as the National People’s Congress set the objective for monetary policy in 2020 to significantly accelerate the growth rate of broad money supply and total social financing relative to last year. Indeed, broad money growth as well as both private and public credit have accelerated since April and will continue to increase (Chart I-1). Domestic orders have also surged though export orders are still languishing (Chart I-2). Chart I-1China: Money And Credit Will Continue Accelerating China: Money And Credit Will Continue Accelerating China: Money And Credit Will Continue Accelerating Chart I-2China: Improvement In Domestic Orders But Not In Export Ones China: Improvement In Domestic Orders But Not In Export Ones China: Improvement In Domestic Orders But Not In Export Ones     That said, financial markets, including the ones leveraged to China, have run ahead of fundamentals and a pullback is overdue. We have been waiting for such a setback to turn more positive on EM risk assets and currencies. Further, the snapback in business activity following the lockdown should not be confused with an economic expansion. As economies around the world reopened, business activity was bound to improve. Were any asset markets priced to reflect months or a whole year of closures? Even at the nadir of the global equity selloff in late March, we do not think risk assets were priced for extended lockdowns. The Chinese economy will likely eventually experience a robust expansion later this year but the nearterm outlook for global risk assets and commodities remains risky. In our view, the rally in global stocks and commodities has been much stronger than is warranted by the near-term economic conditions in a majority of economies around the world. In short, we have not been surprised at all by the economic data that has emerged since economies have reopened, but we have been perplexed by the markets’ response to these data. Even in China, which is ahead of all other countries in regards to the reopening and normalization of business activity, the level and thrust of economic activity remains worrisome. Specifically: China's manufacturing PMI new orders and the backlog of orders sub-components remain below the neutral 50 line (Chart I-3). The imports subcomponent of the manufacturing PMI has shown signs of peaking below the 50 line, portending a risk to industrial metals prices (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China Manufacturing PMI: Measures Of Orders Are Still Below 50 China Manufacturing PMI: Measures Of Orders Are Still Below 50 China Manufacturing PMI: Measures Of Orders Are Still Below 50 Chart I-4A Yellow Flag For Commodities A Yellow Flag For Commodities A Yellow Flag For Commodities   Marginal propensity to spend for both enterprises and households continues to trend lower (Chart I-5). These gauge the willingness of consumers and companies to spend and, hence, reflect the multiplier effect of the stimulus. These indicators contend that the multiplier so far remains low/weak. Finally, with the exception of new economy stocks (such as Ali-Baba and Tencent) that have been exceptionally strong worldwide, Chinese share prices leveraged to capital expenditure and consumer discretionary spending had not been particularly strong before last week, as illustrated in Chart I-6.  Chart I-5Marginal Propensity To Spend Among Chinese Households And Enterprises Marginal Propensity To Spend Among Chinese Households And Enterprises Marginal Propensity To Spend Among Chinese Households And Enterprises Chart I-6Chinese Stocks Had Been Languishing Till Late Outside New Economy Ones Chinese Stocks Had Been Languishing Till Late Outside New Economy Ones Chinese Stocks Had Been Languishing Till Late Outside New Economy Ones In a nutshell, the Chinese economy will likely eventually experience a robust expansion later this year but the near-term outlook for global risk assets and commodities remains risky. As to EM risk assets, the key risk to our stance is a FOMO-driven rally buoyed by the “visible hand” of governments. Ms. Mea: What is your interpretation of the latest policy push in China for higher share prices? Is it also a part of the “visible hand” of government? Don’t you think this could create another strong multi-month run like it did in early 2015? Answer: Yes, this is one of many instances of the “visible hand” of governments around the world. It is not clear why Beijing is boosting investor sentiment and explicitly promoting higher share prices given how badly similar efforts in 2015 ultimately ended. At the moment, we can only speculate that one or several of the following reasons are behind this move: Beijing is preparing for an escalation in the US-China geopolitical confrontation ahead of the US presidential elections. This latter is highly probable in our opinion.1 To limit the impact of this confrontation on their economy, they want to ensure that the stock market remains in an uptrend. The same can be said for the US authorities. Apparently, the “visible hands” of both Washington and Beijing have and will continue to push share prices higher in their domestic markets. Robust equity markets will become a prominent feature of the geopolitical confrontation between the US and China. In the long run, however, this is a very negative phenomenon for the world because the two of the largest and most prominent stock markets could increasingly be driven by the “visible hand” of their governments rather than by fundamentals. As a result, equity markets could regularly send wrong price signals and will no longer serve as an efficient mechanism of capital allocation. Chart I-7Foreign Inflows Into China Have Accelerated This Year Foreign Inflows Into China Have Accelerated This Year Foreign Inflows Into China Have Accelerated This Year Beijing has been luring foreign investors to buy onshore stocks and bonds and this strategy has become more vital in expectation of an escalation in the US-China confrontation. Chart I-7 shows that net inflows into onshore stocks and bonds have been surging. The more US investors buy into mainland markets, the more these investors will exercise pressure on the current and future US administrations to go soft on China. Like those US companies relying on Chinese demand, large US investment funds will have a notable exposure to Chinese financial markets and will accordingly lobby the White House and Congress to take a less adversarial stance toward China. This will reduce the maneuvering room of US politicians in this geopolitical confrontation. Finally, it is also possible that these latest media reports encouraging a bull market in China were not initiated by leaders in Beijing but were in fact spurred by mid-level bureaucrats. If that is the case, a full-blown mania akin to the one in 2015 will not be repeated and the latest frenzy surrounding Chinese stocks could end up being the final surge before a correction sets in. In brief, Chinese stocks, like other bourses worldwide, are in a FOMO-driven mania that might last for a while. Nevertheless, regardless of the direction of Chinese stocks in absolute terms, we reiterate our overweight stance on Chinese equities within the EM benchmark. Also, we have a strong conviction with respect to the merits of a long Chinese/short Korean stocks trade. Both these positions were initiated on June 18 before the latest surge in Chinese stocks. The “visible hands” of both Washington and Beijing have and will continue to push share prices higher in their domestic markets. Ms. Mea: What will it take for you to go long EM risk assets and currencies in absolute terms? Answer: EM equities, credit markets and currencies are driven by three, or more recently four, factors. We need to witness or foresee an imminent improvement in three out of four of these to go outright long. These factors include: (1) China’s business cycle and its impact on EM via global trade; (2) each individual EM country’s domestic fundamentals (inflation/deflation, balance of payments, return on capital, domestic economic cycles, monetary and fiscal policies, health of the banking system, domestic politics, etc.); (3) global risk-on and risk-off cycles that drive portfolio flows into EM. The direction of the S&P500 is an important trendsetter for these risk-on and risk-off cycles; (4) swings in geopolitical confrontation between the US and China. The first element – China’s impact on EM – is becoming positive. There could be a minor setback in mainland business cycles in the near term, but this should be used as a buying opportunity. As to structural problems in China like credit/money and property bubbles as well as the misallocation of capital, ongoing money and credit growth acceleration will fill in holes and kick the can down the road. That said, those structural problems will become even more challenging in the years to come. In short, Beijing is making credit, money and property bubbles even bigger. The second factor – domestic fundamentals in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan – remain downbeat. The COVID-19 outbreak has been out of control in a number of EM economies (Chart I-8). In addition, outside of China, Korea and Taiwan, EM fiscal stimulus has not been as large as in DM economies. Critically, the monetary transmission mechanism has been broken in several developing economies. In particular, central banks’ rate cuts have not translated to lower lending rates in real terms (Chart I-9). Chart I-8The COVID-19 Pandemic Has Not Peaked In Several Major EM Economies The COVID-19 Pandemic Has Not Peaked In Several Major EM Economies The COVID-19 Pandemic Has Not Peaked In Several Major EM Economies Chart I-9Lending Rates Are Still High In EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan Lending Rates Are Still High In EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan Lending Rates Are Still High In EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan   The basis is two-fold: First, banks saddled with non-performing loans are reluctant to bring down their lending rates and lend more; and second, the considerable decline in EM inflation has pushed up real lending rates (Chart I-9). The third variable driving EM financial markets – the S&P 500 – remains at risk of a material setback. If the S&P drops more than 10 or 15%, EM stocks, currencies and credit markets will also sell off markedly. Finally, there is the fourth aspect of the EM view – geopolitics – which could be critical in the coming months. The US-China confrontation will likely heighten leading up to the US elections. This will likely involve North and South Korea and Taiwan. Chart I-10EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Stocks And Currencies EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Stocks And Currencies EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Stocks And Currencies Chinese investable stocks as well as Korean and Taiwanese equities altogether make up 65% of the MSCI EM benchmark. Hence, a flareup in geopolitical tensions will weigh on these three bourses. Outside these markets, EM share prices and currencies have already rolled over (Chart I-10). In sum, out of the four factors listed above only the Chinese business cycle warrants an upgrade on overall EM. The other three drivers of the EM view are still negative. This keeps us on the sidelines for now. Importantly, we have been gradually moving our investment strategy from bearish to neutral on EM. Specifically, we: Took profits on the long EM currencies volatility trade on March 5. Took large profits on the long gold / short oil and copper trade on March 11. Booked gains on the short position in EM stocks on March 19. Recommended receiving long-term (10-year) swap rates (or buying local currency bonds while hedging the exchange rate risk) in many EMs on April 23. Upgraded EM sovereign credit from underweight and booked profits on our short EM corporate and sovereign credit / long US investment grade bonds strategy on June 4. The only asset class where we have not yet closed our shorts is EM currencies. In fact, we now recommend shifting our short in EM currencies (BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, KRW, PHP and IDR) from the US dollar to an equal-weighted basket of the Swiss franc, the euro and the Japanese yen. Unlike the March selloff, the dollar could depreciate even if the S&P 500 and global stocks drop. Ms. Mea: What is the rationale behind switching your short positions in EM currencies against the US dollar to short positions versus the Swiss franc, the euro and Japanese yen? Wouldn’t the selloff in global stocks drive the greenback higher? Answer: We have been bullish on the US dollar since 2011, consistent with our negative view on EM and commodities prices and recommendation of favoring the S&P 500 versus EM. What is making us question this strategy are the following, in order of importance: First, the Federal Reserve is monetizing US public and some private debt. The amount of US dollars is surging. Meanwhile, the pace of broad money supply growth is much more timid in the euro area, Switzerland and Japan. Broad money growth is 23% in the US, 9% in the euro area, 2.5% in Switzerland, 5% in Japan and 11% in China. This will reduce investors’ willingness to hold dollars as a store of value, incentivizing them to switch to other DM currencies. Second, the pandemic is out of control in the US and this will damage its near-term growth outlook. More fiscal stimulus and more debt monetization will be required to revive the economy. Third, the Fed will not hike interest rates even if inflation rises well above their 2% target in the next several years. This implies that the Fed will prefer to be behind the inflation curve in the years to come, which is bearish for the greenback. Finally, the yen and the euro as well as EM currencies are cheaper than the US dollar (Chart I-11 and Chart I-12). Chart I-11The US Dollar Is Expensive, The Yen Is Cheap The US Dollar Is Expensive, The Yen Is Cheap The US Dollar Is Expensive, The Yen Is Cheap Chart I-12EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Currencies Are Cheap EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Currencies Are Cheap EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Currencies Are Cheap     The broad trade-weighted US dollar has yet to break down as per the top panel of Chart I-13, but we are becoming nervous about it. Unlike the March selloff, the dollar could depreciate even if the S&P 500 and global stocks drop. Ms. Mea: That is interesting. Has there ever been an episode where the US dollar depreciated while the S&P 500 sold off? Answer: Yes, it occurred in late 2007 and H1 2008. The 2007-08 bear market in global stocks can be split into two periods. During the initial phase of that bear market, the US dollar depreciated substantially despite the drawdowns in global equity and credit markets (Chart I-14, top and middle panels). Chart I-13Trade-Weighted Dollar And Asian Currencies: At A Critical Juncture Trade-Weighted Dollar And Asian Currencies: At A Critical Juncture Trade-Weighted Dollar And Asian Currencies: At A Critical Juncture Chart I-14In Late 2007 And H1 2008: The US Dollar Fell Amid An Equity Bear Market In Late 2007 And H1 2008: The US Dollar Fell Amid An Equity Bear Market In Late 2007 And H1 2008: The US Dollar Fell Amid An Equity Bear Market   EM stocks performed in line with DM ones during the first phase (Chart I-14, bottom panel). The economic backdrop was characterized by the US recession and US banks tightening credit. In fact, EM growth was still robust during that phase even though the US economy was shrinking. Remarkably, commodities prices were surging – oil reached $140 per a barrel and copper $4 per ton in June 2008. The second phase of that bear market commenced in autumn of 2008 when Lehman went bust. The orderly bear market in global stocks gave way to an acute phase – a crash in all global risk assets. Business activity collapsed worldwide and the US dollar surged. In the current cycle, the order will likely be the reverse of the 2007-08 bear market. March 2020 witnessed a crash in global risk assets and the global economy plunged similar to the second phase of the 2007-08 bear market while the US dollar surged. The second stage of this recession could resemble the first phase of the 2007-08 bear market. There will be neither worldwide lockdowns nor a crash in business activity. However, the level of activity might struggle to recover as rapidly as markets have priced in or there might be relapses in economic conditions in certain parts of the world. This is especially true for the US and other countries where the pandemic has not been effectively contained. On the whole, the second downleg in the S&P 500 and global stocks will be less dramatic but could last for a while and still be meaningful (more than 10-15%). Critically, unlike the March 2020 selloff, the greenback will likely struggle during this episode for the reasons we outlined above. Ms. Mea: What about overweighting EM equities and credit versus their DM peers? Will EM equities, credit and currencies underperform their DM peers in the potential selloff that you expect? Wouldn’t USD weakness help EM risk assets to outperform even in a broad risk selloff? Answer: Yes, we can see a scenario where EM stocks and credit markets perform in line or better than their DM peers in a potential selloff. The key is the dollar’s dynamics. If the dollar rebounds, EM stocks and credit markets will underperform their DM counterparts. If the dollar weakens during this selloff, EM stocks and credit will likely perform in line with or better than their DM peers. In sum, a technical breakdown in the broad trade-weighted dollar and a breakout in the emerging Asian currency index – both shown in Chart I-13 – would lead us to upgrade our EM allocation in both global equity and credit portfolios. For now, we are only switching our shorts in EM currencies from the US dollar to an equally-weighted basket of the Swiss franc, the euro and the Japanese yen. Ms. Mea: What are some of your other current observations on financial markets? Answer: The breadth and thrust of this global equity rally has already peaked and is weakening. It is just a matter of time before a narrowing breadth translates into lower aggregate stock indexes for both EM and DM equities as illustrated by our advance-decline lines in Chart I-15. Chart I-15EM and DM Equity Breadth Measures Have Rolled Over EM and DM Equity Breadth Measures Have Rolled Over EM and DM Equity Breadth Measures Have Rolled Over Chart I-16Cyclicals And High-Beta Stocks Have Been Struggling Cyclicals and High-Beta Stocks Have Been Struggling Cyclicals and High-Beta Stocks Have Been Struggling Consistently, there has already been a decoupling between various sectors and industries. The rally has been solely focused on tech and new economy stocks. Equity prices in China and Taiwan have been surging while the rest of the EM equity index has been languishing. In the DM equity space, global industrials, US high-beta stocks and micro caps have already rolled over (Chart I-16). Further, our Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency index is flashing red for EM equities (Chart I-17). Chart I-17A Red Flag For EM Equities? A Red Flag For EM Equities? A Red Flag For EM Equities? Chart I-18Long Gold / Short Stocks Long Gold / Short Stocks Long Gold / Short Stocks Finally, EM share prices have outperformed DM stocks since late May mostly due to the sharp rally in Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese stocks. Hence, the breadth of EM equity outperformance has been subdued. Ms. Mea: To wrap up our conversation, I want to ask you what is your strongest conviction trade for the coming months? Answer: Our strongest conviction trade is long gold / short global or EM stocks (Chart I-18). This trade will do well regardless of the direction of global share prices, the US dollar, and bond yields. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "Watch Out For A Second Wave (Of US-China Frictions)," dated June 10, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Please note that I will be hosting a webcast on Friday July 17 and that the webcast will replace next week’s report. Highlights Go tactically short stocks versus bonds. But express it as short DAX versus the US 10-year T-bond, given the greater scope for compression in US bond yields than in German bond yields. Target a profit of 10 percent but apply a stop-loss if stock versus bond outperformance continues for another 10 percent. There is now a strong incentive for short-term investing and a strong disincentive for long-term investing, forcing formerly long-term investors to think and behave like traders. Don’t obsess with the Covid-19 mortality rate. Focus instead on the morbidity, or hospitalization, rate. Covid-19 is unlikely to kill you, but it can make you ill and, in some unlucky cases, permanently ill. Feature Chart of the WeekA Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds A Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds A Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds Financial markets have reached an absurdity. It is now more rewarding to be a short-term trader who holds investments for just three months than it is to be a long-term investor who buys and holds them for ten years. And just to be clear, we are comparing cumulative returns over the entire holding period of three months versus one that is forty times longer at ten years. The case for buying and holding most mainstream investments has collapsed. Investors seeking attractive long-term returns can no longer rely on mainstream bond and stock markets. Nowadays, the long-term investment story is about sectors and themes, and we will continue to tell this story in our regular reports. However, this week we will focus on the implications of short-termism in the mainstream markets. Short-Term Returns Now Beat Long-Term Returns Through the past year, anybody who has bought the German 10-year bund, with the intention of holding it until it redeems in 2029 is guaranteed a deeply negative return. Yet there have been many three-month periods in which the bund has generated a high single-digit return (Chart I-2). Chart I-23-Month Returns Now Beat 10-Year Returns! 3-Month Returns Now Beat 10-Year Returns! 3-Month Returns Now Beat 10-Year Returns! Likewise, anybody who owns the US 10-year T-bond has made almost as much money in the first three months of this year as they mathematically can by holding it for ten years! By extension, the same principle also applies to mainstream stock markets which are priced for feeble long-term returns – yet can rally by 20-30 percent in the space of a few weeks. It is now more rewarding to be a short-term trader who holds investments for three months than it is to be a long-term investor who buys and holds them for ten years. Admittedly, these are nominal returns, and the long-term real returns could be boosted by deflation. Nevertheless, the economy would have to experience Great Depression levels of deflation to make the long-term real returns genuinely attractive. Yet it wasn’t always like this. Until recent years, the cumulative returns available from long-term investing were many multiples of those available from short-term investing – as they should be (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). But today, the incentive structure is back-to-front. There is a strong disincentive for long-term investing and a strong incentive for short-term investing, forcing formerly long-term investors to think and behave like traders. Albeit traders that must get their timing right. Chart I-3Today, There Is A Strong Disincentive For Long-Term Investing... Today, There Is A Strong Disincentive For Long-Term Investing... Today, There Is A Strong Disincentive For Long-Term Investing... Chart I-4...And A Strong Incentive For Short-Term Investing ...And A Strong Incentive For Short-Term Investing ...And A Strong Incentive For Short-Term Investing Unfortunately, when everybody behaves like traders there are worrying implications for financial market liquidity and stability. Short-Termism Destroys Market Liquidity We have been brought up to believe that agreement and consensus create peace and harmony, whereas disagreement and opposition create conflict and discord. Hence, it is natural to think that agreement and consensus also create calm and stability in the financial markets. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. A calm and stable market requires disagreement. Disagreement is the source of market liquidity and stability. Meaning, the ability to convert stocks into cash, or cash into stocks, quickly and in volume without destabilising the stock price. For an investor to convert a large amount of stocks into cash without destabilising the price, a mirror-image investor must be willing to take the opposite position. It follows that market liquidity comes from a disagreement about the attractiveness of the investment at a given price. As an aside, we often read comments such as ‘investors are moving out of stocks into cash’, or vice-versa. Such comments are nonsensical. If one investor is selling stocks, then a mirror-image investor must be buying stocks. The stocks cannot just vanish into thin air! A market which loses its variation of investment horizons loses its liquidity and stability. If institutional investors are selling, then a mirror-image investor must be buying. The mirror-image buyer could be less savvy retail investors, in which case we might interpret the institutional selling as a sell signal. Or the mirror-image buyer could be ‘smart money’ hedge funds, in which case we might interpret the institutional selling as a buy signal. It follows that unless we know the identity of both the seller and the buyer, the ‘flows’ information is useless. The much more useful information is the variation of investment horizons in the market. This is because a market which possesses a variation of investment horizons also possesses the disagreement required for liquidity and stability. Conversely, a market which lacks this variation of investment horizons could soon run out of liquidity and undergo a change in trend. Investors with different time horizons disagree about the attractiveness of an investment at a given price because they interpret the same facts and information differently. For example, a day-trader will interpret an outsized rally as a ‘momentum’ buy signal, whereas a value investor will interpret the same information as a ‘loss of value’ sell signal. Therefore, the market possesses liquidity and stability when its participants possess a variation of investment horizons. For example, both a 1-day horizon and a 3-month (65 business days) horizon. The corollary is that the market’s liquidity and stability disappear when its participants no longer possess this healthy variation in horizons. In technical terms, this occurs when the market’s fractal structure collapses. In the above example, it would be signalled by the 65-day fractal dimension collapsing to its lower limit (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Stock-To-Bond Fractal Structure Has Collapsed The Stock-To-Bond Fractal Structure Has Collapsed The Stock-To-Bond Fractal Structure Has Collapsed All of which brings us to our tactical stock-to-bond sell signal. A Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds Since 2015, a collapsed 65-day fractal structure of the German stock-to-bond ratio has reliably presaged a change in trend, implying either a sell or buy signal based on the direction of the preceding trend. The two most recent occurrences happened this year on January 2, a sell signal, and March 9, a buy signal (Chart of the Week). A collapsed 65-day fractal structure of the German stock-to-bond ratio has reliably presaged a change in trend. The 65-day fractal structure of the German stock-to-bond ratio has collapsed once again, reinforced by a similar observation in the US stock-to-bond ratio. This suggests that the recent 40 percent rally in stocks versus bonds is approaching exhaustion and is susceptible to a tactical reversal (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The 40 Percent Rally In Stocks Versus Bonds May Be Near Exhaustion The 40 Percent Rally In Stocks Versus Bonds May Be Near Exhaustion The 40 Percent Rally In Stocks Versus Bonds May Be Near Exhaustion Hence, go tactically short stocks versus bonds. But express it as short DAX versus the US 10-year T-bond, given the greater scope for compression in US bond yields than in German bond yields. Target a profit of 10 percent but apply a stop-loss if the outperformance continues for another 10 percent. One caveat is that bullish fundamentals can swamp fragile fractal structures. Hence, the strong outperformance of stocks versus bonds would persist if, for example, a breakthrough treatment or vaccine suddenly emerged for Covid-19. On the other hand, it is worth noting that US hospitalizations for the disease are rising once again, even if deaths, so far, are not (Chart I-7). Nevertheless, we reiterate that the Covid-19 morbidity (severe illness) rate is much more important than the mortality rate, for two reasons. Chart I-7US Hospitalizations For Covid-19 Are Rising Again A Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds A Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds First, it is morbidity rather than mortality that swamps the finite and limited intensive care unit (ICU) capacity in healthcare systems. Second, the evidence now suggests that many recovered Covid-19 victims suffer long-term damage to their lungs and/or other vital organs such as kidneys, the liver, and the brain. This is the case even for apparently mild cases of the disease that do not require hospitalization. Therefore, don’t obsess with the Covid-19 mortality rate. Focus instead on the morbidity, or hospitalization, rate. The threat from Covid-19 is not that it will kill you. It almost certainly won’t. The threat is that it will make you ill and, in some unlucky cases, permanently ill. Fractal Trading System* As discussed, this weeks recommended trade is short DAX versus 10-year T-bond, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 10 percent. Chart I-8GBP/RUB GBP/RUB GBP/RUB In other trades, long GBP/RUB is within a whisker of its 3 percent profit target. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 59 percent When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights Chart 1More Stimulus Required More Stimulus Required More Stimulus Required The unemployment rate fell for the second consecutive month in June, down to 11.1% from a peak of 14.7%. Bond markets shrugged off the news, and rightly so, as this recent pace of improvement is unlikely to continue through July and August. The main reason for pessimism is that the number of new COVID cases started rising again in late June, consistent with a pause in high-frequency economic indicators (Chart 1). This second wave of infections will slow the pace at which furloughed employees are returning to work, a development that has been responsible for all of the unemployment rate’s recent improvement. Beneath the surface, the number of permanently unemployed continues to rise (Chart 1, bottom panel). The implication for policymakers is that it is too early to back away from fiscal stimulus. In particular, expanded unemployment benefits must be extended, in some form, beyond the July 31 expiry date. We are confident that Congress will eventually pass another round of stimulus, though it may not make the July 31 deadline. For investors, bond yields are still biased higher on a 6-12 month horizon, but their near-term outlook is now in the hands of Congress. We continue to recommend benchmark portfolio duration, along with several tactical overlay trades designed to profit from higher yields. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 189 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -529 bps. The average index spread tightened 24 bps on the month. We still view investment grade corporates as attractively valued, with the index’s 12-month breakeven spread only just below its historical median (Chart 2). With the Fed providing strong backing for the market, we are confident that investment grade corporate bond spreads will continue to tighten. As such, we want to focus on cyclical segments of the market that tend to outperform during periods of spread tightening (panel 2). One caveat is that the Fed’s lending facilities can’t prevent ratings downgrades (bottom panel). Therefore, we also want to avoid sectors and issuers that are mostly likely to be downgraded. High-quality Baa-rated issues are the sweet spot that we want to target. Those securities will tend to outperform the overall index as spreads tighten, but are not likely to be downgraded. Subordinate bank bonds are a prime example of securities that exist within that sweet spot.1 In recent weeks we published deep dives into several different industry groups within the corporate bond market. In addition to our overweight recommendation for subordinate bank bonds, we also recommend an overweight allocation to investment grade Healthcare bonds.2 We advise underweight allocations to investment grade Technology and Pharmaceutical bonds.3 Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff High-Yield: Neutral High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 90 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -855 bps (Chart 3A). The average index spread tightened 11 bps on the month and has tightened 500 bps since the Fed unveiled its corporate bond purchase programs on March 23. We reiterated our call to overweight Ba-rated junk bonds and underweight bonds rated B and below in a recent report.4 In that report, we noted that high-yield spreads appear tight relative to fundamentals across the board, but that the Ba-rated credit tier will continue to perform well because most issuers are eligible for support through the Fed’s emergency lending facilities. Specifically, we showed that “moderate” and “severe” default scenarios for the next 12 months – defined as a 9% and 12% default rate, respectively, with a 25% recovery rate – would lead to a negative excess spread for B-rated bonds (Chart 3B). The same holds true for lower-rated credits. Chart 3AHigh-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview Chart 3BB-Rated Excess Return Scenarios Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff We appear to be on track for that sort of outcome. Moody’s recorded 20 defaults in May, matching the worst month of the 2015/16 commodity bust and bringing the trailing 12-month default rate up to 6.4%. Meanwhile, the trailing 12-month recovery rate is a meagre 22%. At the industry level, in recent reports we recommended an overweight allocation to high-yield Technology bonds5 and underweight allocations to high-yield Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals.6 MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 13 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -44 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS index option-adjusted spread (OAS) has tightened 5 bps since the end of May, but it still offers a pick-up relative to other comparable sectors. The MBS index OAS stands at 95 bps, greater than the 81 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds (Chart 4), the 54 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS and the 76 bps offered by Agency CMBS. At some point this spread advantage will present a buying opportunity, but we think it is still too soon. As we wrote in a recent report, we are concerned that the elevated primary mortgage spread is a warning that refinancing risk could flare in the second half of this year (bottom panel).7 The primary mortgage rate did not match the decline in Treasury yields seen earlier this year. Essentially, this means that even if Treasury yields are unchanged in 2020 H2, a further 50 bps drop in the mortgage rate cannot be ruled out. Such a move would lead to a significant increase in prepayment losses, one that is not priced into current index spreads. While the index OAS has widened lately, expected prepayment losses (aka option cost) have dropped (panels 2 & 3). We are concerned this decline in expected prepayment losses has gone too far and that, as a result, the current index OAS is overstated. Government-Related:  Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 78 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -399 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 112 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -828 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 37 bps in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -764 bps. Local Authority debt outperformed Treasuries by 268 bps in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -439 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 14 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -58 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 12 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -19 bps. We updated our outlook for USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign bonds in a recent report.8 In that report we posited that valuation and currency trends are the primary drivers of EM sovereign debt performance (Chart 5). On valuation, we noted that the USD sovereign bonds of: Mexico, Colombia, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Africa all offer a spread pick-up relative to US corporate bonds of the same credit rating and duration. However, of those countries that offer attractive spreads, most have currencies that look vulnerable based on the ratio of exports to foreign debt obligations. In general, we don’t see a compelling case for USD-denominated sovereigns based on value and currency outlook, although Mexican debt stands out as looking attractive on a risk/reward basis. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 68 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -582 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads versus Treasuries widened in June and continue to look attractive compared to typical historical levels. In fact, both the 2-year and 10-year Aaa Muni yields are higher than the same maturity Treasury yield, despite municipal debt’s tax exempt status (Chart 6). Municipal bonds are also attractively priced relative to corporate bonds across the entire investment grade credit spectrum, as we demonstrated in a recent report.9 In that report we also mentioned our concern about the less-than-generous pricing offered by the Fed’s Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF). At present, MLF funds are only available at a cost that is well above current market prices (panel 3). This means that the MLF won’t help push muni yields lower from current levels. Despite the MLF’s shortcomings, we aren’t yet ready to downgrade our muni allocation. For one thing, federal assistance to state & local governments will probably be the centerpiece of the forthcoming stimulus bill. The Fed could also feel pressure to reduce MLF pricing if the stimulus is delayed. Further, while the budget pressure facing municipal governments is immense, states are also holding very high rainy day fund balances (bottom panel). This will help cushion the blow and lessen the risk of ratings downgrades. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve was mostly unchanged in June. Both the 2-year/10-year and 5-year/30-year slopes steepened 1 bp on the month, reaching 50 bps and 112 bps, respectively. With no expectation – from either the Fed or market participants – that the fed funds rate will be lifted before the end of 2022, short-maturity yield volatility will stay low and the Treasury slope will trade directionally with the level of yields for the foreseeable future. The yield curve will steepen when yields rise and flatten when they fall. With that in mind, we continue to recommend duration-neutral yield curve steepeners that will profit from moderately higher yields, but that won’t decrease the average duration of your portfolio. Specifically, we recommend going long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell.10 In a recent report we noted that valuation is a concern with this recommended position.11 The 5-year yield is below the yield on the duration-matched 2/10 barbell (Chart 7), and the 5-year bullet also looks expensive on our yield curve models (Appendix B). However, we also noted that the 5-year bullet traded at much more expensive levels during the last zero-lower-bound period between 2010 and 2013 (bottom panel). With short rates once again pinned at zero, we expect the 5-year bullet will once again hit levels of extreme over-valuation. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 99 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -400 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 19 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.39%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 5 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.62%. TIPS breakevens have moved up rapidly during the past couple of months, but they remain low compared to average historical levels. Our own Adaptive Expectations Model suggests that the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate should rise to 1.53% during the next 12 months (Chart 8).12 On inflation, it also looks like we are past the cyclical trough. The WTI oil price is back up to $41 per barrel after having briefly turned negative (panel 4), and trimmed mean inflation measures suggest that the massive drop in core is overdone (panel 3). If inflation has indeed troughed, then the real yield curve will continue to steepen as near-term inflation expectations move higher. We have been advocating real yield curve steepeners since the oil price turned negative in April.13 The curve has steepened considerably since then, but still has upside relative to levels seen during the past few years (bottom panel). ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 103 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -2 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 8 bps in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +7 bps. Meanwhile, non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 233 bps in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -88 bps (Chart 9). Aaa ABS are a high conviction overweight, given that spreads remain elevated compared to historical levels and that the sector benefits from Fed support through the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). However, spreads are even more attractive in non-Aaa ABS and we recommend owning those securities as well. This is despite the fact that non-Aaa bonds are not eligible for TALF. We explained our rationale for owning non-Aaa consumer ABS in a recent report.14  We noted that the stimulus received from the CARES act caused real personal income to increase significantly during the past few months and, faced with fewer spending opportunities, households used that windfall to pay down consumer debt (bottom panel). Granted, further fiscal stimulus will be needed to sustain those recent income gains. But we are sufficiently confident that a follow-up stimulus bill will be passed that we advocate moving down in quality within consumer ABS. Non-Agency CMBS:  Overweight  Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 211 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -501 bps. Aaa CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 164 bps in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -233 bps. Non-Aaa CMBS outperformed by 407 bps in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -1451 bps (Chart 10). Our view of non-agency CMBS has not changed during the past month, but we realize that it is more accurately described as a “Neutral” allocation as opposed to “Overweight”. Our view is that we want an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated CMBS because that sector offers an attractive spread relative to history and benefits from Fed support through TALF. However, we advocate an underweight allocation to non-Aaa non-agency CMBS. Those securities are not eligible for TALF and, unlike consumer ABS, their fundamental credit outlook has deteriorated significantly as a result of the COVID recession.15  Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 104 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -58 bps. The average index spread tightened 19 bps on the month to 77 bps, still well above typical historical levels (bottom panel). The Fed is supporting the Agency CMBS market by directly purchasing the securities as part of its Agency MBS purchase program. The combination of strong Fed support and elevated spreads makes the sector a high conviction overweight. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of July 3, 2020) Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of July 3, 2020) Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 57 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 57 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of July 3, 2020) Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Watch Out For July’s Fiscal Cliff Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Case Against The Money Supply”, dated June 30, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Assessing Healthcare & Pharma Bonds In A Pandemic”, dated June 9, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Assessing Healthcare & Pharma Bonds In A Pandemic”, dated June 9, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply”, dated May 12, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Bonds Are Vulnerable As North America Re-Opens”, dated May 26, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 The rationale for why this position will profit from curve steepening is found in US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 12 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 13 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation”, dated April 28, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 14 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 15 We discussed our outlook for CMBS in more detail in US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Highlights Recommended Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections The coronavirus pandemic is not over. Enormous fiscal and monetary stimulus will soften the blow to the global economy, but there remain significant risks to growth over the next 12 months. The P/E ratio for global equities is near a record high. This suggests that the market is pricing in a V-shaped recovery, and ignoring the risks. We can, therefore, recommend no more than a neutral position on global equities. But government bonds are even more expensive, with yields having largely hit their lower bound. Stay underweight government bonds, and hedge downside risk via cash. The US dollar is likely to depreciate further: It is expensive, US liquidity has risen faster than elsewhere, interest-rate differentials no longer favor it, and momentum has swung against it. A weakening dollar – plus accelerating Chinese credit growth – should help commodities. We raise the Materials equity sector to neutral, and put Emerging Market equities on watch to upgrade from neutral. Corporate credit selectively remains attractive where central banks are providing a backstop. We prefer A-, Baa-, and Ba-rated credits, especially in the Financials and Energy sectors. Defensive illiquid alternative assets, such as macro hedge funds, have done well this year. But investors should start to think about rotating into private equity and distressed debt, where allocations are best made mid-recession. Overview Cash Injections Vs. COVID Infections The key to where markets will move over the next six-to-nine months is (1) whether there will be a second wave of COVID-19 cases and how serious it will be, and (2) how much appetite there is among central banks and fiscal authorities to ramp up stimulus to offset the damage the global economy will suffer even without a new spike in cases. A new wave of COVID-19 in the northern hemisphere this fall and winter is probable. It is not surprising, after such a sudden stop in global activity between February and May, that economic data is beginning to return to some sort of normality. PMIs have generally recovered to around 50, and in some cases moved above it (Chart 1). Economic data has surprised enormously to the upside in the US, although it is lagging in the euro zone and Japan (Chart 2). Chart 1Data Is Rebounding Sharply Data Is Rebounding Sharply Data Is Rebounding Sharply Chart 2US Data Well Above Expectations US Data Well Above Expectations US Data Well Above Expectations     New COVID-19 cases continue to rise alarmingly in some emerging economies and in parts of the US, but in Europe and Asia the pandemic is largely over (for now) and lockdown regulations are being eased, allowing economic activity to resume (Chart 3). Nonetheless, consumers remain cautious. Even where economies have reopened, people remain reluctant to eat in restaurants, to go on vacation, or to visit shopping malls (Chart 4). While shopping and entertainment activities are now no longer 70-80% below their pre-pandemic levels, as they were in April and May, they remain down 20% or more (Chart 5). Chart 3Few COVID-19 Cases Now In Europe And Asia Few COVID-19 Cases Now In Europe And Asia Few COVID-19 Cases Now In Europe And Asia Chart 4Consumers Still Reluctant To Go Out Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections Chart 5Spending Well Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections So how big is the risk of further spikes in COVID-19 cases? Speaking on a recent BCA Research webcast, the conclusion of Professor Peter Doherty, a Nobel prize-winning immunologist connected to the University of Melbourne, was that, “It’s not unlikely we’ll see a second wave.”1 But experts can’t be sure. It seems that the virus spreads most easily when people group together indoors. That is why US states where it is hot at this time of the year, such as Arizona, have seen rising infections. This suggests that a new wave in the northern hemisphere this fall and winter is probable. Offsetting the economic damage caused by the coronavirus has been the staggering amount of liquidity injected by central banks, and huge extra fiscal spending. Major central bank balance-sheets have grown by around 5% of global GDP since March, causing a spike in broad money growth everywhere (Chart 6). Fiscal spending programs also add up to around 5% of global GDP (Chart 7), with a further 5% or so in the form of loans and guarantees. Chart 6Remarkable Growth In Money Supply... Remarkable Growth In Money Supply... Remarkable Growth In Money Supply... Chart 7...And Unprecedented Fiscal Spending Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections   But is it enough? Considerable damage has been done by the collapse in activity. Bankruptcies are rising (Chart 8) and, with activity still down 20% in consuming-facing sectors, pressure on companies’ business models will not ease soon – particularly given evidence that banks are tightening lending conditions. Household income has been buoyed by government wage-replacement schemes, handout checks, and more generous unemployment benefits (Chart 9). But, when these run out, households will struggle if the programs are not topped up. Central banks are clearly willing to inject more liquidity if need be. But the US Congress is prevaricating on a second fiscal program, and the Merkel/Macron proposed EUR750 billion spending package in the EU is making little progress. It will probably take a wake-up call from a sinking stock market to push both to take action. Chart 8Companies Feeling The Pressure Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections Considerable damage has been done by the collapse in activity. We lowered our recommendation for global equities to neutral from overweight in May. We are still comfortable with that position. Given the high degree of uncertainty, this is not a market in which to take bold positioning in a portfolio. When you have a high conviction, position your portfolio accordingly; but when you are unsure, stay close to benchmark. With stocks up by 36% since their bottom on March 23rd, the market is pricing in a V-shaped recovery and not, in our view, sufficiently taking into account the potential downside risks. P/E ratios for global stocks are at very stretched levels (Chart 10). Chart 9Households Dependent On Handouts More Stimulus Forthcoming? Households Dependent On Handouts More Stimulus Forthcoming? Households Dependent On Handouts Chart 10Global Equities Are Expensive... Global Equities Are Expensive... Global Equities Are Expensive...   Nonetheless, we would not bet against equities. Simply, there is no alternative. Most government bond yields are close to their effective lower bound. Gold looks overbought (in the absence of a significant spike in inflation which, while possible, is unlikely for at least 12 months). No sensible investor in, say, Germany would want to hold 10-year government bonds yielding -50 basis points. Assuming 1.5% average annual inflation over the next decade, that guarantees an 18% real loss over 10 years. The only investors who hold such positions have them because their regulators force them to. Chart 11...But They Are Cheap Against Bonds ...But They Are Cheap Against Bonds ...But They Are Cheap Against Bonds The Sharpe ratio on 10-year US Treasurys, which currently yield 70 BPs, will be 0.16 (assuming volatility of 4.5%) over the next 10 years. A simple calculation of the likely Sharpe ratio for US equities (earnings yield of 4.5% and volatility of 16%) comes to 0.28. One would need to assume a disastrous outlook for the global economy to believe that stocks will underperform bonds in the long run. Though equities are expensive, bonds are even more so. The equity risk premium in most markets is close to a record high (Chart 11). With such mathematics, it is hard for a long-term oriented investor to be underweight equities. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com   What Our Clients Are Asking Chart 12Premature Opening Of The Economy Is Risky Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections COVID-19: How Risky Is Reopening? Countries around the world are rushing to reopen their economies, claiming victory over the pandemic. It is hard to be sure whether a second wave of COVID-19 will hit. What is certain, however, is that a premature relaxation of measures is as risky as a tardy initial response. That was the lesson from our Special Report analyzing the Spanish Flu of 1918. The risk is certainly still there: Herd immunity will require around 70% of the population to get sick, and a drug or vaccine will (even in an optimistic scenario) not be available until early next year. China and South Korea, for example, after reporting only a handful of daily new cases in early May, were forced to impose new restrictions over the past few weeks as COVID-19 cases spiked again (Chart 12, panel 1). We await to see if other European countries, such as Italy, Spain, and France will be forced to follow. Some argue that even if a second wave hits, policy makers – to avoid a further hit to economic output – will favor the “Swedish model”: Relying on people’s awareness to limit the spread of the virus, without imposing additional lockdowns and restrictions. This logic, however, is risky since Sweden suffered a much higher number of infections and deaths than its neighboring countries (panel 2). The US faces a similar fate. States such as Florida, Arizona, and Texas are recording a sharp rise in new infections as lockdowns are eased. In panel 3, we show the daily number of new infections during the stay-at-home orders (the solid lines) and after they were lifted (dashed lines). To an extent, increases in infections are a function of mass testing. However, what is obvious is that the percentage of positive cases per tests conducted has started trending upwards as lockdown measures were eased (panel 4). Our base case remains that new clusters of infections will emerge. Eager citizens and rushed policy decisions will fuel further contagion. If the Swedish model is implemented, lives lost are likely to be larger than during the first wave. Chart 13W Or U, Says The OECD Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections What Shape Will The Recovery Be: U, V, W, Or Swoosh? The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee has already declared that the US recession began in March. The economists’ consensus is that Q2 US GDP shrank by 35% QoQ annualized. But, after such a momentous collapse and with a moderate move back towards normalcy, it is almost mathematically certain that Q3 GDP will show positive quarter-on-quarter growth. So does this mean that the recession lasted only one quarter, i.e. a sharp V-shape? And does this matter for risk assets? The latest OECD Economic Outlook has sensible forecasts, using two “equally probable” scenarios: One in which a second wave of coronavirus infections hits before year-end, requiring new lockdowns, and one in which another major outbreak is avoided.2 The second-wave scenario would trigger a renewed decline in activity around the turn of 2020-21: a W-shape. The second scenario looks more like a U-shape or swoosh, with an initial rebound but then only a slow drawn-out recovery, with OECD GDP not returning to its Q4 2019 level before the end of 2021 (Chart 13). Chart 14Unemployment Will Take A Long Time To Come Down Unemployment Will Take A Long Time To Come Down Unemployment Will Take A Long Time To Come Down Why is it likely that, in even the absence of a renewed outbreak of the pandemic, recovery would be faltering? After an initial period in which many furloughed workers return to their jobs, and pent-up demand is fulfilled, the damage from the sudden stop to the global economy would kick in. Typically, unemployment rises rapidly in a recession, but recovers only over many years back to its previous low (Chart 14). This time, many firms, especially in hospitality and travel, will have gone bust. Capex plans are also likely to be delayed. Chart 15Sub-Potential Output Can Be Good For Risk Assets Sub-Potential Output Can Be Good For Risk Assets Sub-Potential Output Can Be Good For Risk Assets However, a slow recovery is not necessarily bad for risk assets. Periods when the economy is recovering but remains well below potential (such as 2009-2015) are typically non-inflationary, which allows central banks to continue accommodation (Chart 15). Is This Sharp Equity Rebound A Retail Investor Frenzy? The answer to this question is both Yes and No. From a macro fundamental perspective, the answer is No, because coordinated global reflationary policies and medical developments to fight the coronavirus have been the key drivers underpinning this equity rebound. “COVID-on” and “COVID-off” have been the main determinants for equity rotations. Chart 16Active Retail Participation Lately Retail Investors Have Driven Up Trading Volumes Active Retail Participation Lately Retail Investors Have Driven Up Trading Volumes Active Retail Participation Lately But at the individual stock level, the answer is Yes. Some of the unusual action in beaten-down stocks over the past few weeks may have its origin in an upsurge of active retail participation (Chart 16). Retail investors on their own are not large enough to influence the market direction. Many online brokerages do not charge any commission for trades, but make money by selling order flows to hedge funds. As such, the momentum set in motion by retail investors may have been amplified by fast-money pools of capital. Retail participation in some beaten-down stocks has also provided an opportunity for institutions to exit. BCA’s US Investment Strategy examined the change in institutional ownership of 12 stocks in three stressed groups between February 23 and June 14, as shown in Table 1. In the case of these stocks, retail investors have served as liquidity providers to institutional sellers seeking to exit their holdings. The redeployment of capital by institutions into large-cap and quality names may have pushed up the overall equity index level. Table 1Individuals Have Replaced Institutions Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Cash Injections Versus COVID Infections How Will Inflation Behave After COVID? Some clients have asked us about the behavior of inflation following the COVID epidemic. Over the very short term, inflation could have more downside. However, this trend is likely to reverse rapidly. Headline inflation is mainly driven by changes in the oil price and not by its level. Thus, even if oil prices were to stay at current low levels, the violent recovery of crude from its April lows could bring headline inflation near pre-COVID levels by the beginning of 2021 (Chart 17, top panel). This effect could become even larger if our Commodity strategist price target of 65$/barrel on average in 2021 comes to fruition. Chart 17Rising Oil Prices And Fiscal Stimulus Will Boost Inflation Rising Oil Prices And Fiscal Stimulus Will Boost Inflation Rising Oil Prices And Fiscal Stimulus Will Boost Inflation But will this change in inflation be transitory or will it prove to be sustainable? We believe it will be the latter. The COVID crisis may have dramatically accelerated the shift to the left in US fiscal policy. Specifically, programs such as universal basic income may now be within the Overton window3 of acceptable fiscal policy, thanks to the success of the CARES Act in propping up incomes amid Depression-like levels of unemployment (middle panel). Meanwhile there is evidence that this stimulus is helping demand to recover rapidly: Data on credit and debit card trends show that consumer spending in the US has staged a furious rally, particularly among low-income groups, where spending has almost completely recovered (bottom panel). With entire industries like travel, restaurants and lodging destroyed for the foreseeable future, the political will to unwind these programs completely is likely to be very low, given that most policymakers will be queasy about an economic relapse, even after the worst of the crisis has passed. Such aggressive fiscal stimulus, coupled with extremely easy monetary policy will likely keep inflation robust on a cyclical basis. Global Economy Overview: March-May 2020 will probably prove to be the worst period for the global economy since the 1930s, as a result of the sudden stop caused by the coronavirus pandemic and government-imposed restrictions on movement. As the world slowly emerges from the pandemic, data has started to improve. But there remain many risks, and global activity is unlikely to return to its end-2019 level for at least another two years. That means that further fiscal and monetary stimulus will be required. The speed of the recovery will be partly determined by how much more aggressively central banks can act, and by how much appetite there is among fiscal authorities to continue to bail out households and companies which have suffered a catastrophic loss of income. US: The economy has shown signs of a strong rebound from the coronavirus slump in March and April. Q2 GDP probably fell around 35% quarter-on-quarter annualized, but Q3 will almost certainly show positive growth. The Economic Surprise Index (Chart 18, panel 1) has bounced to a record high, after stronger-than expected May data, for example the 16% month-on-month growth in durable goods orders, and 18% in retail sales. But the next stage of the recovery will be harder: continuing unemployment claims in late June were still 19.5 million. Bankruptcies are rising, and banks are tightening lending conditions. One key will be whether Congress can pass a further fiscal program before the emergency spending runs out in July. Euro Area: Although pandemic lockdowns ended in Europe earlier than in the US, recovery has been somewhat slower. The euro zone PMI rebounded to close to 50 in June but, given that activity had collapsed in February-May, it is surprising (since the PMI measures month-on-month change) that it is not well above 50 (Chart 19, panel 1). Fiscal and monetary stimulus, while large, has not been as aggressive as in the US. The ECB remains circumscribed (as least psychologically) by the German constitutional court’s questioning the justification for previous QE. Germany and France have agreed a EUR750 billion additional package to help the periphery, but this has still to be finalized, due to the opposition of some smaller northern EU members. Chart 18Economic Data Has Started To Surprise To The Upside... Economic Data Has Started To Surprise To The Upside... Economic Data Has Started To Surprise To The Upside... Chart 19...But From Dramatically Low Levels ...But From Dramatically Low Levels ...But From Dramatically Low Levels   Japan: Although Japan escaped relatively easily from pandemic deaths and lockdowns, its economy remains notably weak. New machinery orders in April were still falling 18% YoY, and exports in May were down 28% YoY. The poor economic performance is due to its dependence on overseas demand, distrust in the government, the lingering effects of the ill-timed consumption tax rise last October, and limited room for manoeuvre by the Bank of Japan. The government has announced fiscal stimulus equal to a barely credible 40% of GDP, but much of this is double-counting, and less than half of the household and small-company income-replacement handouts announced in March have so far been paid out. Emerging Markets: India, Brazil, and other Latin American countries are now bearing the brunt of the coronavirus pandemic. Economies throughout Emerging Markets have weakened dramatically as a result. Two factors may come to their aid, though. China is again ramping up monetary stimulus, with a notable acceleration of credit growth over the past three months. Its economy has stabilized as a result, as PMIs show (panel 3). And the US dollar has begun to depreciate, which will take pressure off EM borrowers in foreign currencies, and boost commodities prices. The biggest risk is that many EM central banks have now resorted to printing money, which could result in currency weakness and inflation at a later stage. Interest Rates: Central banks in advanced economies have lowered policy rates to their effective lower bound. It is unlikely the Fed will cut into negative territory, having seen the nefarious effects of this on the banking systems in Japan and the euro zone, and particularly due to the large money-market fund industry in the US, which is unviable with negative rates. Reported inflation everywhere, both headline and core, has fallen sharply, but this is somewhat misleading since the price of items that households in lockdown have actually been buying has risen sharply. Markets have started to sniff out the possibility of inflation once the pandemic is over, and inflation expectations have begun to rise (panel 4). For now, deflation is likely to be the bigger worry and so we do not expect long-term rates to rise much this year. But a sharp pickup in inflation is a definite risk on the 18-24 month time horizon. Global Equities Chart 20Stretched Valuation Has Earnings Growth Bottomed? Has Earnings Growth Bottomed? Valuation Concern: Global equities staged an impressive rebound of 18% in Q2 after the violent selloff in Q1, thanks to the “whatever-it-takes” support from central banks, and massive fiscal stimulus packages around the globe. Within equities, our country allocation worked well, as the US outperformed both the euro Area and Japan. Our sector performance was mixed: The overweight in Info Tech and underweight in Utilities and Real Estate generated good profits, but the overweights in Industrials and Healthcare and the underweight in Materials suffered losses. As shown in Chart 20, even before the pandemic-induced profit contraction, forward earnings were already only flattish in 2019. The sharp selloff in Q1 brought the valuation multiple back down only to the same level as at the end of 2018. Currently, this valuation measure stands at the highest level since the Great Financial Crisis after a 37% increase in Q2 2020 alone. Such a rapid multiple expansion was one of the key reasons why we downgraded equities to Neutral in May at the asset-class level. Going forward, BCA’s house view is that easy monetary policies and stimulative fiscal policies globally will help to revive economic activity, and that a weakening US dollar will give an additional boost to the global economy, especially Emerging Markets. Consequently, we upgrade global Materials to neutral from underweight and put Emerging Market equities (currently neutral) on an upgrade watch (see next page). Warming To Reflation Plays Chart 21EM On Upgrade Watch EM On Upgrade Watch EM On Upgrade Watch Taking risk where risks will most likely be rewarded has been GAA’s philosophy in portfolio construction. As equity valuation reaches an extreme level, the natural thing to do is to rotate into less expensive areas within the equity portfolio. As shown in panel 2 of Chart 21, EM equities are trading at a 31% discount to DM equities based on forward P/E, which is 2 standard deviations below the average discount of past three years. Valuation is not a good timing tool in general, but when it reaches an extreme, it’s time to pay attention and check the fundamental and technical indicators. We are putting EM on upgrade watch (from our current neutral stance, and also closing the underweight in Materials given the close correlation of the two (Chart 21, panel 1). Three factors are on our radar screen: First, reflation efforts in China. The change in China’s total social financing as a % of GDP has been on the rise and BCA’s China Investment Strategy Team expects it to increase further. This bodes well for the momentum of the EM/DM performance, which is improving, albeit still in negative territory (panel 3). Second, a weakening USD is another key driver for EM/DM and the Materials sector relative performance as shown in panel 4. According to BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategy, the US dollar is likely to churn on recent weakness before a cyclical bear market fully unfolds.4 Last but not least, the recent surge in the number of the coronavirus infections in EM economies, especially Brazil and India, has increased the likelihood of a second wave of lockdowns. Government Bonds Chart 22Bottoming Bond Yields Bottoming Bond Yields Bottoming Bond Yields Maintain Neutral Duration. Global bond yields barely moved in Q2 as the global economy rebounded from the COVID-induced recession low (Chart 22, panel 1). The upside surprise in economic data releases implies that global bond yields will likely go up in the near term (panel 2). For the next 9-12 months, however, the upside in global bond yields might be limited given the increasing likelihood of a new set of COVID-19 lockdowns due to the recent surge in new infections globally, especially in the US, Brazil, and India. As such, a neutral duration stance is still appropriate (Chart 22). Chart 23Inflation Expectations On The Rise Inflation Expectations On The Rise Inflation Expectations On The Rise Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds. To fight off the risk of an extended recession, policymakers around the world are determined to continue to use aggressive monetary and fiscal stimulus to boost the global economy. The combined effect of extremely accommodative policy settings and the rebound in global commodity prices, especially oil prices, will push up inflation expectations (Chart 23). Higher inflation expectations will no doubt push up nominal bond yields somewhat, but according to BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS), positioning for wider inflation breakevens remains the “cleaner” way to profit for the initial impact of policy reflation.5 According to GFIS valuation models, inflation-linked bonds in Canada, Italy, Germany, Australia, France, and Japan should be favored over their respective nominal bonds. Corporate Bonds Chart 24Better Value In A-rated and Baa-rated Credit Better Value In A-rated and Baa-rated Credit Better Value In A-rated and Baa-rated Credit Investment-grade: Since we moved to overweight on investment-grade credit within the fixed-income category, it has produced 8.8% in excess returns over duration-matched government bonds. We remain overweight, given that the Federal Reserve has guaranteed to rollover debt for investment-grade issuers, essentially eliminating the left tail of returns. Moreover, the Fed has begun buying both ETFs and individual bond issues, in an effort to keep financial stress contained during the pandemic. However, there are some sectors within the investment-grade space that are more attractive than others. Specifically, our Global Fixed Income Strategy team has shown that A-rated and Baa-rated bonds are more attractive than higher-rated credits (Chart 24). Meanwhile, our fixed-income strategist are overweight Energy and Financials at the sector level.6 High-yield: High-yield bonds – where we have a neutral position - have delivered 11.5% of excess return since April. We are maintaining our neutral position. At current levels, spreads no longer offer enough value to justify an overweight position, specially if one considers that defaults in junk credits could be severe, since the Fed doesn’t offer the same level of support that it provides for investment-grade issuers. Within the high-yield space, we prefer Ba-rated credit. Fallen angels (i.e. bonds which fell to junk status) are particularly attractive given that most qualify for the Fed’s corporate buying program, since issuers which held at least a Baa3 rating as of March 22 are eligible for the Fed’s lending facilities.7  Commodities Chart 25Commodity Prices Will Rise As Growth Revives Commodity Prices Will Rise As Growth Revives Commodity Prices Will Rise As Growth Revives Energy (Overweight): A near-complete lack of storage led WTI prices to go into freefall and trade at -$40 in mid-April: The largest drawdown in oil prices over the past 30 years (Chart 25, panel 1). Since then, oil prices have picked up, reaching their pre-“sudden stop” levels, as the OPEC 2.0 coalition slashed production. Nevertheless, excess supply remains a key issue. Crude inventories have been on the rise as global crude demand weakens. Year-to-date inventories have increased by over 100 million barrels, and current inventories cover over 40 days of supply (panel 2). As long as the OPEC supply cuts hold and demand picks up over the coming quarters, the excess inventories are likely to be worked off. BCA’s oil strategists expect Brent crude to rise back above $60 by year-end. Industrial Metals (Neutral): Last quarter, we flagged that industrial metals face tailwinds as fiscal packages get rolled out globally – particularly in China where infrastructure spending is expected to increase by 10% in the latter half of the year. Major industrial metals have yet to recover to their pre-pandemic levels but, as lockdown measures are lifted and activity is restored, prices are likely to start to rise strongly (panel 3). Precious Metals (Neutral): The merits of holding gold were not obvious during the first phase of the equity sell-off in February and March. Gold prices tumbled as much as 13%, along with the decline in risk assets. Since the beginning of March, however, there have been as many positive return days as there has been negative (panel 4). However, given the uncertainty regarding a second wave of the pandemic, and the rise in geopolitical tensions between the US and China, as well as between India and China, we continue to recommend holding gold as a hedge against tail risks. Currencies Chart 26Momentum For The Dollar Has Turned Negative Momentum For The Dollar Has Turned Negative Momentum For The Dollar Has Turned Negative US Dollar: The DXY has depreciated by almost 3% since the beginning of April. Currently, there are multiple forces pushing the dollar lower: first, interest-rate differentials no longer favor the dollar Second, liquidity conditions have improved substantially thanks to the unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus, as well as coordinated swap lines between the Fed and other central banks to keep USD funding costs contained. Third, momentum in the DXY – one of the most reliable indicators for the dollar – has turned negative (Chart 26– top & middle panel). Taking all these factors into account, we are downgrading the USD from neutral to underweight. Euro: The euro should benefit in an environment where the dollar weakens, and global growth starts to rebound. Moreover, outperformance by cyclical sectors as well as concerns about over-valuation in US markets should bring portfolio flows to the Euro area. Therefore, we are upgrading the euro from neutral to overweight. Australian dollar: Last quarter we upgraded the Australian dollar to overweight due to its attractive valuations, as well as the effect of the monetary stimulus coming out of China. This proved to be the correct approach: AUD/USD has appreciated by a staggering 13% since our upgrade – the best performance of any G10 currency versus the dollar this quarter (bottom panel). Overall, while we believe that Chinese stimulus should continue to prop up the Aussie dollar, valuations are no longer attractive with AUD/USD hovering around PPP fair value. This means that the risk-reward profile of this currency no longer warrants an overweight position. Thus, we are downgrading the AUD to neutral. Alternatives Chart 27Opportunities Will Emerge In Private Equity Opportunities Will Emerge In Private Equity Opportunities Will Emerge In Private Equity Return Enhancers: Over the past year, we have flagged that hedge funds, particularly macro funds, will outperform other risk assets during recessions and periods of high market stress. This played out as we expected: macro hedge funds’ drawdown from January to March 2020 was a mere 1.4%, whereas other hedge funds’ drawdown ranged between 9% and 19% and global equities fell as much as 35% from their February 2020 peak. (Chart 27, panel 1). However, unlike other recessions, the unprecedented sum of stimulus should place a floor under global growth. Given the time it takes to move allocations in the illiquid space, investors should prepare for new opportunities within private equity as global growth bottoms in the latter half of this year. In an earlier Special Report, we stressed that funds raised in late-cycle bull markets tend to underperform given their high entry valuations. If previous recessions are to provide any guidance, funds raised during recession years had a higher median net IRR than those raised in the latter year of the preceding bull market (panel 2). Inflation Hedges: Over the past few quarters, we have been highlighting commodity futures as a better inflation hedge relative to other assets (e.g. real estate). Within the asset class, assuming a moderate rise in inflation over the next 12-18 months as we expect, energy-related commodities should fare best (panel 3). This corroborates with our overweight stance on oil over the next 12 months (see commodities section). Volatility Dampeners: We have been favoring farmland and timberland since Q1 2016. While both have an excel track record of reducing volatility, farmland’s inelastic demand during slowdowns will be more beneficial. Investors should therefore allocate more to farmland over timberland (panel 4). Risks To Our View The risks are skewed to the downside. After such a big economic shock, damage could appear in unexpected places. Banking systems in Europe, Japan, and the Emerging Markets (but probably not the US) remain fragile. Defaults are growing in sub-investment grade debt; mortgage-backed securities are experiencing rising delinquencies; student debt and auto loans are at risk. Emerging Market borrowers, with $4 trn of foreign-currency debt, are particularly vulnerable. The length and depth of recessions and bear markets are determined by how serious are the second-round effects of a cyclical slowdown. If the current recession really lasted only from March to July, and the bear market from February to March, this will be very unusual by historical standards (Chart 28). Chart 28Can The Recession And Bear Market Really Be All Over Already? Can It Really Be Over Already? Can It Really Be Over Already? Upside surprises are not impossible. A vaccine could be developed earlier than the mid-2021 that most specialists predict. But this is unlikely since the US Food and Drug Administration will not fast-track approval given the need for proper safety testing. If economies continue to improve and newsflow generally remains positive over the coming months, more conservative investors could be sucked into the rally. Evidence suggests that the rebound in stocks since March was propelled largely by hedge funds and individual day-traders. More conservative institutions and most retail investors remain pessimistic and have so far missed the run-up (Chart 29). One key, as so often, is the direction of US dollar. Further weakness in the currency would be a positive indicator for risk assets, particularly Emerging Market equities and commodities. In this Quarterly, we have moved to bearish from neutral on the dollar (see Currency section for details). Momentum has turned negative, and both valuation and relative interest rates suggest further downside. But it should be remembered that the dollar is a safe-haven, counter-cyclical currency (Chart 30). Any rebound in the currency would not only signal that markets are entering a risk-off period, but would cause problems for Emerging Market borrowers that need to service debt in an appreciating currency. Chart 29Many Investors Are Still Pessimistic Many Investors Are Still Pessimistic Many Investors Are Still Pessimistic Chart 30Dollar Direction Is Key Dollar Direction Is Key Dollar Direction Is Key     Footnotes 1  Please see BCA Webcast, "The Way Ahead For COVID-19: An Expert's Views," available at bcaresearch.com. 2  OECD Economic Outlook, June 2020, available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-outlook/volume-2020/issue-1_0d1d1e2e-en 3  The Overton window, named after Joseph P. Overton, is the range of policies politically acceptable to the mainstream population at a given time. It frames the range of policies that a politician can espouse without appearing extreme. 4  Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, “DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market?” dated June 5, 2020 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5  Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “How To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectations” dated June 23, 2020 available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy, "Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle," dated May 27, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 7  Fallen angels also outperform during economic recoveries. Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Even Fallen Angels Have A Place In Heaven," dated November 15, 2020, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com.   GAA Asset Allocation

Highlights Global Growth & Inflation: An increasing number of growth indicators worldwide are tracing out a “v”-shaped pattern from the COVID-19 recession. However, high unemployment and a lack of inflationary pressure will ensure that global monetary policies remain highly stimulative for some time. Duration:  Maintain a neutral duration stance in global fixed income portfolios, as the recent negative correlation between inflation expectations and real yields is likely to continue.  Stay overweight higher-yielding government bonds in the US, Canada and Italy versus core Europe and Japan.  Also, favor inflation-linked bonds over nominals - particularly in the US, Canada and euro area – as breakevens will continue drifting higher over the next 6-12 months. Corporate Credit: Maintain a neutral overall allocation to global spread product, focused on overweights in markets directly supported by central bank purchases (US investment grade corporates of maturities up to five years, US Ba-rated high-yield). Feature Today marks the midway point of what has already become one the most eventful years of our lifetimes. Investors have had to process multiple massive shocks: a global pandemic; a historically deep worldwide recession; and in the US, nationwide social unrest and a now politically vulnerable president.  Yet despite the severe economic shock and persistent uncertainties, financial market performance over the entire first six months of the year has not been terrible. The S&P 500 index is only down -5.5% year-to-date, while the NASDAQ index is up +10.5% over the same period. Meanwhile, the Barclays Global Aggregate benchmark fixed income index is up +3.9% so far in 2020 (in hedged US dollar terms).  In light of the magnitude of losses suffered by global equity and credit markets in February and March, those are impressive year-to-date returns. CHART OF THE WEEKA Tug Of War A Tug Of War A Tug Of War Falling government bond yields, driven lower by an aggressive easing of global monetary policies through rate cuts and quantitative easing (QE), have played a major role in driving the recovery in risk assets. With the number of global COVID-19 cases now accelerating rapidly once again, however, the odds are increasing that investors become more reluctant to drive equity and credit valuations even higher (Chart of the Week). At the halfway point of the calendar year, this is a good time to review our most trusted indicators, and current investment recommendations, for global government debt and corporate credit. Duration Allocation: A Non-Inflationary Growth Recovery – But With Higher Inflation Expectations Our current recommended overall global duration stance is NEUTRAL. Global growth has started to recover from the sharp COVID-19 recession.  Survey data like manufacturing and services purchasing managers indices (PMIs) have rapidly rebounded from the huge March/April drops, although most PMIs remain below the 50 level suggesting accelerating economic growth (Chart 2). While there is less timely “hard data” available due to reporting lags, there are signs of improvement in critical measures like US durable goods orders, which soared +15.8% in May after falling by similar amounts in both March and April.  Global realized inflation data remains very weak, however, with headline CPI flirting with deflation in most major develop economies.  Combined with still very high levels of unemployment, which will take years to return anywhere close to pre-COVID levels, the backdrop will keep central banks highly dovish for a long time. The US Federal Reserve has already signaled that the fed funds rate will remain near 0% until the end of 2022, while the Bank of Japan has said no rate hikes will happen before 2023 at the earliest. Our Global Duration Indicator, comprised of three elements - our global leading economic indicator and its diffusion index, along with the global ZEW measure of economic expectations - has already returned to pre-COVID levels (Chart 3).  This leading, directional indicator of bond yields suggests that the downward pressure on yields seen over the first half of 2020 is over.   Chart 2Growth, But Not Inflation, Is Recovering Growth, But Not Inflation, Is Recovering Growth, But Not Inflation, Is Recovering Chart 3Our Global Duration Indicator Says Bond Yields Will Bottom Out In H2/2020 Our Global Duration Indicator Says Bond Yields Will Bottom Out In H2/2020 Our Global Duration Indicator Says Bond Yields Will Bottom Out In H2/2020 However, it is far too soon to expect a big bond selloff, with nominal government bond yields now pulled in opposing directions by their real yield and inflation expectations components. As we discussed in last week’s report, our models for market-based inflation expectations indicate that breakevens derived from inflation-linked bonds are too low.1 Hyper-easy monetary policies from the Fed, ECB and other major central banks will help lift inflation expectations, especially with oil prices likely to continue rising over the next 12-18 months according to BCA’s commodity strategists.  Chart 4Higher Inflation Breakevens Should Eventually Help Steepen Yield Curves Higher Inflation Breakevens Should Eventually Help Steepen Yield Curves Higher Inflation Breakevens Should Eventually Help Steepen Yield Curves The rise in inflation breakevens already seen over the past three months in places like the US, Canada and Australia – combined with dovish forward guidance on future interest rates that has kept shorter-maturity bond yields anchored -  should have resulted in a bearish steepening of government bond yield curves.  Yet the differences between 10-year and 2-year yields across the major developed markets have gone sideways since the beginning of April, even as 10-year inflation breakevens have increased (Chart 4). This has also kept the overall level of nominal 10-year yields nearly unchanged over the same period; for example, the 10-year US Treasury yield is now at 0.64% compared to the 0.58% closing level seen back on April 1. An outcome of rising inflation expectations with stable nominal yields must mean that real bond yields have declined by nearly as much as breakeven inflation rates have increased.  That is exactly what has happened when looking at the actual real yield on 10-year inflation-linked bonds in the US, euro area, Canada, Japan, the UK and Australia. Using the US as an example, the 10-year inflation breakeven has increased +44bps since April 1, while the 10-year real yield has declined by -38bps. The decline in global real bond yields has coincided with the major central banks aggressively easing monetary policy, including large-scale purchases of government bonds.  This occurred even in countries that had not engaged in major QE programs before, like Australia and Canada. The sizes involved for the new QE purchases have been massive, given the significant increase in the size of central bank balance sheets in absolute terms and relative to GDP (Chart 5).  An outcome of rising inflation expectations with stable nominal yields must mean that real bond yields have declined by nearly as much as breakeven inflation rates have increased.   Chart 5Global QE Is Helping Drive Real Bond Yields Lower Global QE Is Helping Drive Real Bond Yields Lower Global QE Is Helping Drive Real Bond Yields Lower It is possible that the decline in real yields is due to other factors besides QE purchases, like markets pricing in structurally slower economic growth (and lower neutral interest rates) following the severe COVID-19 recession.  Or perhaps it is more fundamentally economic in nature, reflecting a surge in domestic savings at a time of falling investment spending.  The key takeaway for investors is that rising inflation expectations do not necessarily have to translate into higher nominal bond yields if the markets do not expect central banks to signal a need to tighten monetary policy in the near future, which would push real bond yields higher. For this reason, we continue to prefer structural allocations to inflation-linked bonds out of nominal government debt, rather than maintaining below-benchmark duration exposure in fixed income portfolios.  That is a position that benefits from both higher inflation breakevens and lower real yields, while still having the benefit of maintaining a neutral level of safe-haven duration exposure given the lingering uncertainties over the accelerating global spread of COVID-19. At the specific country level, we recommend overweighting inflation-linked bonds over nominals in the US, Italy and Canada where breakevens appear most cheap on our models. Bottom Line: Maintain a neutral duration stance in global fixed income portfolios, as the recent negative correlation between inflation expectations and real yields is likely to continue.  Stay overweight higher-yielding government bonds in the US, Canada and Italy versus core Europe and Japan.  Also, favor inflation-linked bonds over nominals - particularly in the US, Canada and euro area – as breakevens will continue drifting higher over the next 6-12 months. Corporate Credit Allocation: Keep Buying What The Central Banks Are Buying Our current recommended overall stance on global corporate credit is NEUTRAL. The same reflationary arguments underlying our recommended inflation-linked bond positions also help support our views on global corporate debt.  Aggressively easy monetary policies, combined with some recovery in global economic growth, will help minimize the risk premium on corporate debt.  Yield-starved investors will continue to have no choice but to look to corporate bond markets for income over the next 6-12 months. The same reflationary arguments under-lying our recommended inflation-linked bond positions also help support our views on global corporate debt.   The combined growth rate of the balance sheets for the major central banks (the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan and Bank of England) has been a reliable leading indicator of excess returns for global investment grade and high-yield debt since the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 6). With that combined balance sheet now expanding at a 34% year-over-year pace after the ramp up of global QE, this suggests continued support for global corporate outperformance versus government bonds over the next year. Corporate debt is also benefitting from direct central bank purchases by the Fed, ECB and Bank of England. Unsurprisingly, the 2020 peak in US investment grade and high-yield corporate spreads occurred on March 20, literally the last trading day before the Fed announced its corporate bond purchase programs (Chart 7).  Chart 6Global QE Will Continue To Support Risk Assets Global QE Will Continue To Support Risk Assets Global QE Will Continue To Support Risk Assets Chart 7The Fed Has Removed The 'Left Tail' Risk Of US Credit The Fed Has Removed The 'Left Tail' Risk Of US Credit The Fed Has Removed The 'Left Tail' Risk Of US Credit   The Fed’s announced plan for its corporate bond buying was to have it focused on shorter maturity (1-5 year) investment grade credit.  Later, the Fed allowed the programs to buy high-yield ETFs while also allowing “fallen angel” debt of investment grade credits downgrade to junk to be held within the programs.  Since that announcement in late March, risk premiums for US corporate debt across all credit tiers and maturities have narrowed.  However, the limits of that broad-based spread tightening may have now been reached, as some of the dislocations in US corporate bond markets created by the global market rout in February and early March have now been corrected.  Chart 8Relative US Corporate Spread Relationships Have Normalized Relative US Corporate Spread Relationships Have Normalized Relative US Corporate Spread Relationships Have Normalized For example, the spread on the Bloomberg Barclays 1-5 year US investment grade index – a proxy for the universe of bonds the Fed is buying – has moved from a level 25bps above that of the 5-10 year US investment grade index, seen before the Fed announced its purchase programs, to 53bps below the longer maturity index (Chart 8, top panel). This is a more normal “slope” for that spread maturity curve relationship, in line with levels seen over the past decade. This suggests that additional spread tightening in US investment grade corporates may be more widespread across all maturities, even with the Fed still focusing its own purchases on shorter-maturity bonds. A similar dynamic is evident in the US high-yield universe.  The spread between the riskier B-rated and Caa-rated credit tiers to Ba-rated names has narrowed since late March to the lower bound of a rising trend channel in place since mid-2018 (bottom panel).  The market appears to be pricing in a structurally rising risk premium between lower-rated junk and higher-rated US high-yield debt – likely a sign of a US credit cycle that was already maturing before COVID-19. The implication going forward is that additional outperformance of lower-rated US junk bonds will be difficult to achieve. The market appears to be pricing in a structurally rising risk premium between lower-rated junk and higher-rated US high-yield debt – likely a sign of a US credit cycle that was already maturing before COVID-19.  European corporate debt has also been witnessing similar trends to those seen in the US.  Euro area investment grade corporate spreads have tightened alongside US spreads since the March 20 peak, but that trend has now stabilized given the recent uptick in market volatility measures like the VIX and VStoxx index (Chart 9).  The spread tightening in euro area high yield has also stalled, with spreads seeing a slight uptick alongside the recent increase in market volatility (Chart 10). Chart 9Global IG Spread Tightening Has Stalled Global IG Spread Tightening Has Stalled Global IG Spread Tightening Has Stalled Chart 10Have Global HY Spreads Bottomed? Have Global HY Spreads Bottomed? Have Global HY Spreads Bottomed? Given the renewed uncertainty over the accelerating number of global COVID-19 cases, hitting large US population areas in the US southern states and across the emerging economies, it will be difficult for global market volatility and credit spreads to return to even the recent lows, much less the pre-COVID levels. Thus, we continue to recommend a “selective” approach to global corporate bond allocations, based on valuations, while maintaining a neutral exposure to credit versus government bonds. Our preferred method for evaluating the attractiveness of credit spreads is to look at 12-month breakeven spreads, or the amount of spread widening that would make corporate bond returns equal to duration-matched government debt over a one-year horizon.  We compare those breakeven spreads to their own history to determine if the current level of credit spreads offer value, while adjusting for the underlying spread volatility backdrop. In the US, the 12-month breakeven spread for investment grade corporates is now less attractive than was the case back in March, now sitting at the long-run median level (Chart 11, top panel). The 12-month breakeven for US high-yield is much more attractive, sitting near the highest readings dating back to the mid-1990s (bottom panel).  Of course, this approach only looks at spreads relative to their volatility and does not incorporate credit risk, which is an obvious risk after the recent collapse in US economic growth. In other words, high-yield needs to offer very high 12-month breakeven spreads to be attractive in the current environment. In the euro area, 12-month breakevens for high-yield are only at long-run median levels, while the breakevens for investment grade are a bit more attractive sitting at the 65th percentile of its own history (Chart 12). Chart 11US Corporate Breakeven Spreads: HY Looks Attractive, But Beware Defaults US Corporate Breakeven Spreads: HY Looks Attractive, But Beware Defaults US Corporate Breakeven Spreads: HY Looks Attractive, But Beware Defaults Chart 12European Corporate Breakeven Spreads: Now At Median Levels European Corporate Breakeven Spreads: Now At Median Levels European Corporate Breakeven Spreads: Now At Median Levels Importantly, 12-month breakeven spreads in both the US and euro area, for investment grade and high-yield, have not fallen into the lower quartile rankings, even after the sharp tightening of spreads since late March. This is a sign the current rally in global corporates has more room to run, strictly from a spread compression perspective.  For high-yield credit, however, the risk of default losses coming after a short, but intense, recession must be factored into any assessment of valuation. Chart 13Default-Adjusted HY Spreads In The US & Europe Are Unattractive Default-Adjusted HY Spreads In The US & Europe Are Unattractive Default-Adjusted HY Spreads In The US & Europe Are Unattractive Looking at default-adjusted spreads – spread in excess of realized and expected credit losses – shows that the current level of junk spreads on both sides of the Atlantic offers little-to-no compensation for credit losses (Chart 13).  Default-adjusted spreads are already well below long-run median levels, but if a typical 10-12% recessionary default rate is applied, expected credit losses over the next twelve months will exceed the current level of spreads, thus ensuring negative excess returns on allocations to junk bonds versus government bonds. Tying it all together, our valuation metrics for corporates suggest the following recommended allocations: Overweight US investment grade corporates, but focused on the 1-5 year maturity range that is supported by Fed purchases Overweight US Ba-rated high-yield (also eligible for Fed holdings), while underweighting lower-rated B- and Caa-rated junk Neutral allocation to euro area investment grade Underweight euro area high-yield across all credit tiers This allocation is in line with our current allocations within our model bond portfolio, which are on pages 13-14. Bottom Line: Maintain a neutral overall allocation to global spread product, focused on overweights in markets directly supported by central bank purchases (US investment grade corporates of maturities up to five years, US Ba-rated high-yield).   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “How To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectations”, dated June 23, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com Recommendations Contagion Vs. Reflation: The Battle Of 2020 Rages On Contagion Vs. Reflation: The Battle Of 2020 Rages On Contagion Vs. Reflation: The Battle Of 2020 Rages On Contagion Vs. Reflation: The Battle Of 2020 Rages On Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Dear client, We are sending you our Quarterly Strategy Outlook today, where we outline our thoughts on the macro landscape and the direction of financial markets for the rest of the year and beyond. Next week, please join me for a webcast on Thursday, July 9 at 10:00 AM EDT (3:00 PM BST, 4:00 PM CEST, 10:00 PM HKT) where I will discuss the outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Markets will trade nervously over the coming weeks in response to the second wave of the pandemic and the looming US fiscal cliff. Nevertheless, we would “buy the dip” if global equities were to fall 5%-to-10% from current levels. While the pace of reopening will slow, there is little appetite for the sort of extreme lockdown measures that were implemented in March. The US Congress will ultimately extend fiscal support for households and firms. Around the world, both fiscal and monetary policy will remain highly accommodative, which should provide a supportive backdrop for stocks. Many institutional investors missed the rebound in stocks and are eager to get back in. High levels of “cash on the sidelines” will further buttress equities. Remain overweight stocks versus bonds on a 12-month horizon. Favor cyclical sectors over defensives and non-US stocks over their US peers. The US dollar has entered a bear market. A weaker greenback will boost commodity prices and EM assets. Global bond yields will rise modestly over the next few years. However, they will remain extremely low by historic standards. Bond yields will only surge once inflation reaches uncomfortably high levels. At that point, the equity bull market will end. Fortunately, this is unlikely to happen for at least three years. I. Macro And Markets Financial markets’ response to the pandemic has followed three distinct phases: Phase One: Hope and Denial. While equities did buckle on the news that a previously unknown coronavirus had emerged in China, they quickly recovered in the hope that the epidemic would be contained. Equities remained resilient even as the virus resurfaced in South Korea and Iran, prompting us to pen a report in February entitled “Markets Too Complacent About The Coronavirus.”1 Phase Two: The Wile E. Coyote Moment.2 The second phase began with the outbreak in Italy. Scenes of overflowing emergency rooms prompted governments to order all non-essential workers to stay home. The resulting decline in commerce caused equities to plummet. Credit spreads widened, while funding markets began to seize up (Chart 1). Phase Three: Recovery. With memories of the 2008 global financial crisis still fresh in their minds, policymakers sprung into action. The combination of massive monetary and fiscal easing helped stabilize financial markets. Risk assets received a further boost as the number of new cases in Italy, Spain, New York City and other hotspots began to decline rapidly in April (Chart 2). The hope that lockdown measures would be relaxed continued to power stocks in May and early June. Chart 1Echos Of The Global Financial Crisis Prompted A Powerful Policy Response Echos Of The Global Financial Crisis Prompted A Powerful Policy Response Echos Of The Global Financial Crisis Prompted A Powerful Policy Response Chart 2Sharp Decline Of New COVID-19 Cases In April Allowed Equities To Recover Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Fast forward to the present and things do not seem as straightforward. Despite today’s rally, global equities are still down 4.7% from their June 8th high. The key immediate question for investors is whether the recent bout of volatility marks the end of Phase Three or just a temporary pause in a new cyclical bull market for stocks. On balance, we lean towards the latter scenario. As we discuss in greater detail below, while we do think that the next few months will be more treacherous for investors due to a resurgence in the number of Covid cases in some countries, as well as uncertainty over how the looming US fiscal cliff will be resolved, we expect global equities to be higher 12 months from now. Stocks And The Economy Pundits such as Paul Krugman often like to recite the mantra that “the stock market is not the economy.” While there is some truth to that, equities still tend to track the ups and downs of the business cycle. This can be observed simply by looking at the strong correlation between the US ISM manufacturing index and the S&P 500 (Chart 3).  Chart 3Strong Correlation Between Economic Growth And Stocks Strong Correlation Between Economic Growth And Stocks Strong Correlation Between Economic Growth And Stocks As happened in 2009 and during prior downturns, stocks bottomed this year at roughly the same time as leading economic indicators such as initial unemployment insurance claims peaked (Chart 4). Chart 4Equities Bottomed This Year At Around The Same Time As Leading Economic Indicators Peaked Equities Bottomed This Year At Around The Same Time As Leading Economic Indicators Peaked Equities Bottomed This Year At Around The Same Time As Leading Economic Indicators Peaked Will the economic data continue to improve, allowing equities to move higher? In the past, recoveries following exogenous shocks have tended to be more rapid than those following recessions that arose from endogenous problems. The pandemic would seem to qualify as an exogenous shock. Temporarily furloughed workers have accounted for the vast majority of the increase in US unemployment this year (Chart 5). As lockdown measures are relaxed, the hope is that most of these workers will return to their jobs. Chart 5Temporarily Laid Off Workers Account For The Vast Majority Of The Increase In US Unemployment This Year Temporarily Laid Off Workers Account For The Vast Majority Of The Increase In US Unemployment This Year Temporarily Laid Off Workers Account For The Vast Majority Of The Increase In US Unemployment This Year Bumps In The Road Nevertheless, the recovery will be a bumpy one. In the near term, the main barrier will be the virus itself. Globally, the number of new cases has been trending higher since early May. The number of deaths has also reaccelerated (Chart 6). In the US, the epicenter of the pandemic has shifted from the Northeastern tri-state corridor to the southern states. Florida, Texas, and Arizona have been particularly hard hit. Contrary to President Trump’s claims, more testing does not explain the rise in case counts. As Chart 7 shows, the fraction of tests coming back positive has actually been trending higher in all three states. Chart 6Globally, The Number Of New Cases Has Been Trending Higher Since Early May, While The Number Of Deaths Has Moved Off Its Recent Lows Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Chart 7Fraction Of Tests Coming Back Positive Has Been Moving Higher In Certain States Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave It did not have to be this way. The evidence suggests that the widespread use of masks could have kept the virus at bay while still allowing most economic activities to resume (Chart 8). Unfortunately, the question of whether to wear a mask, like almost everything else in the US, has become another front in the culture war. Chart 8Masks On! Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Mask wearing is much more common in China and the rest of east Asia, which is one key reason why the region has suffered far fewer casualties than elsewhere. Hence, a second wave is likely to be much more muted there. Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand should also remain largely unscathed going forward. Luckily, treatment options have improved over the past few months, as medical professionals have learned more about the virus. Hospitals have also built up capacity to deal with an influx of patients. Another less well recognized development is that protocols have been put in place to protect residents in long-term care facilities. In Canada, more than 80% of COVID deaths have occurred in nursing homes. All this suggests that while a second wave will weigh on global growth over the coming months, we are unlikely to see the sort of broad-based economic dislocations experienced in March. A Structural Break Even if a second wave does not turn out to be as disruptive as the first, it probably will be several years before spending in the sectors most affected by the virus returns to pre-pandemic levels. Indeed, there is a chance that some sectors may not ever fully recover. The technology to work from home was in place before the pandemic began. Many workers chose not to do so because they did not want to be the odd ones out. The pandemic may have nudged society to a new equilibrium where catching a red-eye flight to attend a business meeting becomes more the exception than the rule, while working from home is seen as perfectly acceptable (and safer) than going to the office. If that happens, there will be, among other things, less business travel going forward, as well as less demand for office space. Such a transformation could end up boosting productivity down the road by allowing companies to slash overhead costs and unnecessary expenses. However, it will impose considerable near-term dislocations, particularly for airlines, hotels, commercial real estate operators and developers, and associated lenders to these sectors. The Role Of Policy It would be unwise for policymakers to try to prevent the shift of capital and labor towards sectors of the economy where they can be more efficiently deployed. However, policy can and should smooth the transition. Chart 9Residential Construction Accounted For Less Than 20% Of The Job Losses During The Great Recession Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Most of the suffering during recessions comes in the form of collateral damage. For example, more than 80% of the jobs lost during the Great Recession were outside the residential real estate sector (Chart 9). One does not have to fill a half-empty swimming pool through the same pipe from which the water escaped. As long as there is enough demand throughout the economy, workers who lose their jobs will likely find new jobs in other sectors. This is where the role of monetary and fiscal policy takes center stage. Central banks moved quickly to ease monetary policy as soon as the pandemic began. Unfortunately, with rates already quite low in most countries, there was only so much that conventional monetary policy could achieve. The Federal Reserve, which had more scope to cut rates than most, brought the fed funds rate down 150 bps to a range of 0%-to-0.25%. As helpful as this action was, it fell well short of the more than five percentage points in easing that the Fed has delivered, on average, during past recessions (Chart 10). Chart 10Fed Easing Has Fallen Short This Time Around Fed Easing Has Fallen Short This Time Around Fed Easing Has Fallen Short This Time Around With conventional monetary policy constrained by the zero lower bound, central banks turned to unconventional tools, the most important of which were asset purchases, lending backstops, and forward guidance. These tools blurred the line between fiscal and monetary policy. To some extent, this was by design. By offering to buy government debt in unlimited quantities and at extremely low rates, central banks incentivized governments to run larger budget deficits. Even if one excludes loan guarantees, governments have eased fiscal policy by an extraordinary degree this year (Chart 11). The G7 as a whole has delivered 11.7% of GDP in fiscal stimulus, compared to 4% of GDP in 2008-10. In China, we expect the credit impulse to reach the highest level since the Global Financial Crisis, and the budget deficit to hit the highest level on record (Chart 12).  Chart 11Fiscal Stimulus Is Greater Today Than It Was During The Great Recession Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Chart 12China Has Opened The Spigots China Has Opened The Spigots China Has Opened The Spigots   Fiscal Austerity? Don’t Bet On It The recovery following the Great Recession was hampered by the decision of many governments, including the US, Germany, and Japan, to tighten fiscal policy prematurely, despite a lack of pressure from bond markets to do so. While a repeat of such an outcome cannot be excluded, we think it is quite unlikely. Politically, stimulus remains very popular (Table 1). Unlike during the housing bust, there has been little moral handwringing about bailing out households and firms that “don’t deserve it.” Thus, while the US faces a daunting fiscal cliff over the next two months – including 3% of GDP in expiring Paycheck Protection Program funding and over 1% of GDP in expanded unemployment benefits and direct payments to individuals – we expect Congress to ultimately take action to avert most of the cliff. Table 1There Is Much Public Support For Fiscal Stimulus Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave This will probably involve rolling over some existing programs and supplanting others with new measures such as increased aid to state and local governments. The same pattern is likely to be repeated globally. II. Long-Term Focus: Inflation And The Fiscal Hangover The combination of large budget deficits and falling output has caused the ratio of government debt-to-GDP to explode. The IMF now expects net government debt to reach 132% of GDP in advanced economies in 2021, up from an earlier estimate of 104% made last October (Chart 13). What will happen to all that debt? The answer partly hinges on what happens to the neutral rate of interest, or more precisely, the difference between the neutral rate and the trend growth rate of the economy. The neutral rate of interest is the interest rate that is consistent with full employment and stable inflation. When policy rates are above the neutral rate, unemployment will tend to rise, and vice versa. Most estimates of the neutral rate, such as those produced by the widely used Laubach-Williams model, suggest that it is currently quite low — certainly lower than the potential growth rate of most economies (Chart 14). Theoretically, when GDP growth exceeds the interest rate the government pays on its borrowings, the debt-to-GDP ratios will eventually converge to a stable level, even if the government keeps running a huge budget deficit.3 Chart 13Ratio Of Government Debt-To-GDP Is Exploding Higher On The Back Of Large Budget Deficits And Falling Output Government Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Ratio Of Government Debt-To-GDP Is Exploding Higher On The Back Of Large Budget Deficits And Falling Output Government Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Ratio Of Government Debt-To-GDP Is Exploding Higher On The Back Of Large Budget Deficits And Falling Output Chart 14The Neutral Rate Is Lower Than The Potential Growth Rate In Most Economies Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave   The catch is that this “stable” level of the debt-to-GDP ratio could turn out to be very high. This would leave the government extremely vulnerable to any future change in interest rates. Specifically, if at some point the neutral rate were to rise above the trend growth rate of the economy – and the central bank were to align policy rates with the new higher neutral rate – the government’s borrowing costs would soar. The government would then need to cut spending and/or increase in taxes to make room for additional interest payments.4  The Inflation Solution What if highly indebted governments refuse to tighten fiscal policy? At that point, they would either have to: 1) allow debt levels to spiral out of control; 2) default on the debt; or 3) lean on their central banks to keep rates low. The first two options are unlikely to be politically feasible, implying that the third one would be chosen. By definition, the third option would entail keeping policy rates below their neutral level, or in other words, keeping monetary policy more stimulative than is necessary to maintain full employment and stable inflation. Eventually, this would result in rising inflation. In theory, the increase in inflation can be temporary and limited. Rising consumer prices will lift nominal GDP, causing the ratio of debt-to-GDP to decline. Once the ratio shrinks by enough, central banks could raise interest rates to a suitably high level in order to bring inflation back down. Unfortunately, in practice, the whole process of driving inflation up in order to erode the real value of a government’s bond obligations could be quite destabilizing. This would be especially the case if, as is likely, a period of high inflation leads to a significant repricing of inflation expectations. Long-Term Inflation Risk Is Underpriced Chart 15Long-Term Inflation Expectations Remain Very Depressed Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Investors are not too worried that inflation will accelerate anytime soon. The CPI swap market expects inflation to remain subdued for decades to come (Chart 15). This could turn out to be an erroneous assumption. While central banks do not want inflation to get out of hand, they would be happy for it to increase from current levels. After all, they have been obsessing about the zero-lower bound constraint for the better part of two decades. If inflation is, say, 4% going into a downturn, central banks could cut nominal rates to zero, taking real rates to -4%. That would be quite stimulative. Such a deeply negative real rate would not be achievable if inflation were running at 1% going into a downturn.  As noted above, heavily indebted governments would also prefer higher inflation to higher interest rates. The former would erode the real value of debt, while the latter would require that tax dollars be diverted from social program to bondholders. The Neutral Rate May Rise The catch is that for inflation to rise, the neutral rate has to increase well above current policy rates. Will that happen? Our guess is that such an outcome is more likely than most investors believe. For one thing the neutral rate itself depends on the stance of fiscal policy. Looser fiscal policy will generate more demand in the economy. Since one can think of the neutral rate as the interest rate that equalizes aggregate demand with aggregate supply, this implies that larger budget deficits will increase the neutral rate. If, as seems likely, we are entering an era where political populism promotes big budget deficits, this makes it more likely that economies will, at some point, overheat. Savings Glut May Dissipate The structural forces that have depressed the neutral rate over the past few decades could also abate, and perhaps even reverse course. Take the example of demographics. Starting in the mid-1970s, the ratio of workers-to- consumers – the so-called “support ratio” – began to steadily increase as more women entered the labor force and the number of dependent children per household declined (Chart 16). An increase in the number of workers relative to consumers is equivalent to an increase in the amount of production relative to consumption. A rising support ratio is thus deflationary. More recently, however, the global support ratio has begun to decline as baby boomers leave the labor force in droves. Consumption actually increases in old age once health care spending is included in the tally (Chart 17). As populations continue to age, the global savings glut could dissipate, pushing up the neutral rate of interest in the process. Chart 16The Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Now Falling The Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Now Falling The Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Now Falling Chart 17As Populations Continue To Age, The Global Savings Glut Will Dissipate As Populations Continue To Age, The Global Savings Glut Will Dissipate As Populations Continue To Age, The Global Savings Glut Will Dissipate Meanwhile, globalization, a historically deflationary force, remains on the backfoot. The ratio of global trade-to-output has been flat for over a decade (Chart 18). Globalization took a beating from last year‘s trade war, and is taking another bruising from the pandemic, as more companies relocate production back home in order to gain greater control over their supply chains. It is possible that newfangled technologies will allow companies to cut costs, thereby helping them to bring down prices. But, so far, this remains more a hope than reality. As Chart 19 shows, productivity growth in the major economies remains abysmal. Weak supply growth would slow income gains, potentially leading to a depletion of excess savings. Chart 18The Ratio Of Global Trade-To-Output Has Failed To Rise For Over A Decade The Ratio Of Global Trade-To-Output Has Failed To Rise For Over A Decade The Ratio Of Global Trade-To-Output Has Failed To Rise For Over A Decade Chart 19Productivity Growth In The Major Economies Remains Abysmal Productivity Growth In The Major Economies Remains Abysmal Productivity Growth In The Major Economies Remains Abysmal   Social Unrest Continued social unrest could further disrupt the supply side of the economy. Violent crime has already spiked in a number of major US cities,5 just as it did five years ago in the aftermath of demonstrations in cities such as Baltimore and St. Louis (the US homicide rate rose 23% between 2014 and 2016, partly because police pulled out of many troubled neighbourhoods6). Markets generally ignored the social unrest back then, and they may do so again over the coming months. However, if recent developments herald the beginning of an extended crime wave, this could have momentous implications for asset markets. The number of people institutionalized in prisons and mental hospitals dropped dramatically during the 1960s. This corresponded with a sharp increase in the homicide rate (Chart 20). As violent crime soared, equity valuations dropped. Inflation also accelerated, hurting bondholders in the process (Chart 21). If a country cannot credibly commit to protecting its citizens, it is reasonable to wonder if it can credibly commit to maintaining price stability. Chart 20Dramatic Drop In Institutionalizations During The 1960s Corresponded With A Sharp Increase In The Homicide Rate Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Chart 21Rising Homicide Rates Coincided With A Drop In Equity Valuations And Higher Inflation In The 1970s Rising Homicide Rates Coincided With A Drop In Equity Valuations And Higher Inflation In The 1970s Rising Homicide Rates Coincided With A Drop In Equity Valuations And Higher Inflation In The 1970s As we discuss in greater detail below, the implication is that the long-term outlook for stocks and bonds is unlikely to be as rosy as the cyclical (3-to-12 month) outlook. III. Investment Implications For Now, Buy The Dip As anyone who has watched a horror movie knows, that scariest part of the film is the one before the monster is revealed. No matter how good the makeup or set design, our imaginations can always fathom something much more frightening than Hollywood can create. COVID-19 is a deadly disease, much deadlier than the common flu. But, at this point, it is a “known known.” The next few weeks will bring news reports of overflowing emergency rooms in some US states, delayed reopenings, and increased talk of renewed lockdowns. The knee-jerk reaction among investors will be to sell stocks. While that was the right trade in March, it may not be the right trade today, at least not for very long. Chart 22Betting Markets Now Expect Joe Biden To Become President Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave At this point, we know how the movie will end. As was the case during the first wave, the latest outbreak will be brought under control through a combination of increased voluntary social distancing and the cessation of activities that are known to significantly contribute to the spread of the disease (allowing bars and nightclubs to reopen was, as many predicted, a huge mistake). Likewise, while the next few weeks could see plenty of posturing among politicians in Washington, the end result will be a deal to avert most of the fiscal cliff. Investors who run for the hills now will end up making the same mistake as those who jettisoned stocks every time the debt-ceiling issue came to the fore in the past. Panicking about the outcome of November’s US presidential election would also be unwise. Yes, if Joe Biden wins and the Democrats take control of the Senate, then Trump’s corporate tax cuts would be in jeopardy. A full repeal would reduce S&P 500 EPS by about 12%. However, the betting markets are already expecting the Democrats to win the White House and Senate (Chart 22). Thus, some of this risk is presumably already priced in. Moreover, it is possible that the Democrats only partially reverse the corporate tax cuts, focusing more on closing some of the more egregious loopholes in the tax code. And even if corporate tax rates do rise, spending would likely rise even more, resulting in a net increase in fiscal stimulus. Lastly, a Biden presidency would result in less trade tension with China, which would be a welcome relief for equity investors. Are Stocks Already Pricing In A Benign Scenario? Chart 23Earnings Optimism Driven By Tech And Health Care Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Bottom-up estimates foresee S&P 500 earnings returning to 2019 levels next year. Does this mean that Wall Street analysts are banking on a V-shaped recovery? Not quite. Outside of the health care and technology sectors, EPS is still expected to be down 9% next year relative to 2019 (Chart 23). Globally, earnings estimates are still fairly downbeat. This suggests that analysts are expecting more of a U-shaped recovery. Of course, what matters to investors is not so much what analysts expect but what the market is pricing in. Given that the S&P 500 is down only 4% year-to-date, have investors gotten ahead of themselves? Again, it is not clear that they have. The value of the stock market does not simply depend on expected earnings growth. It also depends on the discount rate one uses to calculate the present value of future earnings. In a world of exceptionally low interest rates, the contribution from earnings far out into the future to this present value calculation is almost as important as the path of earnings over the next year or two. Provided that the pandemic does not permanently impair the supply-side of the economy, the impact on earnings should be transitory. In contrast, if long-term bond yields are any guide, the impact on the discount rate may be longer lasting. The 30-year US TIPS yield, a proxy for long-term real rate expectations, has fallen by 76 basis points since the start of the year, representing a significant decline in the risk-free component of the discount rate (Chart 24). If we put together analysts’ expectations of a temporary decline in earnings with the observed decline in real bond yields, what we get is an increase in the fair value of the S&P 500 of about 15% since the start of the year (Chart 25). Chart 24The 30-Year TIPS Yield Is Pointing To A Significant Decline In The Risk-Free Component Of The Discount Rate The 30-Year TIPS Yield Is Pointing To A Significant Decline In The Risk-Free Component Of The Discount Rate The 30-Year TIPS Yield Is Pointing To A Significant Decline In The Risk-Free Component Of The Discount Rate Admittedly, the notion that there could be a temporary decline in corporate earnings but a permanent decline in bond yields sounds contradictory. However, it need not be. Imagine a situation where the pandemic does permanently reduce private demand, but that this is fully counteracted by looser monetary policy and increased fiscal stimulus. The result would be the same level of GDP but a lower interest rate.7 As odd as it sounds, this suggests that the pandemic might have increased the fair value of the stock market. Chart 25The Present Value Of Earnings: A Scenario Analysis Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Lots Of Cash On The Sidelines Chart 26Lots Of Savings Slushing Around Lots Of Savings Slushing Around Lots Of Savings Slushing Around The combination of surging government transfers and subdued household spending has resulted in a jump in personal saving. Accumulated US personal savings totalled $1.25 trillion in the first five months of the year, up 123% from the same period last year. Much of that money has made its way into savings deposits and money market funds (Chart 26). As a share of stock market capitalization, US cash holdings currently stand at 51%, up nearly 12 percentage points from the start of the year. Looking at it differently, if the ratio of cash holdings-to-stock market capitalization were to return to January 1st levels, stocks would have to rise by about 30%. Retail Bros Versus The Suits Thanks to a steady flow of income from Uncle Sam, plenty of spare time, zero brokerage commissions, and a lack of opportunities for sports betting, the popularity of day trading has surged (Chart 27). It would be easy to dismiss the rise of the “retail bros” as another comical, and ultimately forgettable, chapter in financial history. That is what most have done. Not us. The late 1990s stock market bubble was as much a consequence of the boom in day trading as the cause of it. That boom lasted for more than four years, taking the S&P 500 to one record high after another. The current boom has lasted less than four months. It may have much further to run. Chart 27Day Trading Is Back In Style These Days Day Trading Is Back In Style These Days Day Trading Is Back In Style These Days Keep in mind that every time an institutional investor sells what they regard as overpriced shares to a retail trader, the institutional investor is left with excess cash that must be deployed elsewhere in the stock market. Buying begets buying. Then there are the hedge funds. Brokerages like Robinhood make much of their money by selling order flow data to hedge funds, who then trade on this information. This activity probably lifts prices by enhancing liquidity and reinforcing the price momentum generated by retail trades.  One would also be remiss not to point out that the mockery levelled at retail traders has an aura of hypocrisy to it. The average mutual fund underperforms its benchmark, even before fees are included. As we discussed before, this is not because active managers cannot outperform the market.8 It is because most don’t even bother to try. In contrast to retail traders, a large fraction of institutional investors did not participate in the stock market recovery that began in late March. According to the latest BoA Merrill Lynch Survey, fund managers were still more than one sigma underweight stocks and nearly one sigma overweight cash in June. Along the same vein, speculators increased short positions in S&P 500 futures contracts soon after stocks rallied, paring them back only recently (Chart 28). As of last week, bears exceeded bulls by 25 percentage points in the AAII survey (Chart 29). When positioning is underweight equities and sentiment is bearish, as it is today, stocks are more likely to go up than down.   Chart 28Speculators Still Net Short S&P 500 Futures Contracts Speculators Still Net Short S&P 500 Futures Contracts Speculators Still Net Short S&P 500 Futures Contracts Chart 29Many Investors Are Bearish On Stocks Many Investors Are Bearish On Stocks Many Investors Are Bearish On Stocks The bottom line is that stocks could fall another 5%-to-10% from current levels to about 2850 on the S&P 500 and 68 on the ACWI ETF but are unlikely to go much lower, as investors start to anticipate a peak in the number of new cases and a deal to maintain adequate levels of fiscal support. Start Of The Dollar Bear Market A weaker dollar should also help global equities (Chart 30). After peaking in March, the broad trade-weighted US dollar has fallen by 4.4%. Unlike last year, the dollar no longer benefits from higher US interest rates. Indeed, US real rates are below those of many partner countries due to the fact that US inflation expectations are generally higher than elsewhere (Chart 31). Chart 30A Weaker Dollar Should Also Help Global Equities A Weaker Dollar Should Also Help Global Equities A Weaker Dollar Should Also Help Global Equities Chart 31The Dollar Has Been Losing Interest Rate Support The Dollar Has Been Losing Interest Rate Support The Dollar Has Been Losing Interest Rate Support The dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it tends to move in the opposite direction of the global business cycle (Chart 32). If global growth recovers over the coming quarters, the dollar should weaken. The negative pressure on the dollar may be amplified by the fact that the second wave of the pandemic seems likely to affect the US more than most other large economies. Chart 32The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Commodities And Commodity Currencies To Benefit Once fears of a second wave abate, the combination of stronger global growth, infrastructure-intense Chinese stimulus, and a weaker dollar will also boost commodity prices (Chart 33). BCA’s commodity strategists remain particularly fond of oil. They expect demand to pick up gradually this year, with supply continuing to be curtailed by shut-ins among US producers and production discipline from OPEC and Russia. Their latest projections foresee WTI and Brent prices rising more than 50% above current market expectations in 2021 (Chart 34). Chart 33Commodity Prices Usually Rise When The Dollar Weakens Commodity Prices Usually Rise When The Dollar Weakens Commodity Prices Usually Rise When The Dollar Weakens Chart 34Oil Prices Are Expected To Recover Oil Prices Are Expected To Recover Oil Prices Are Expected To Recover Higher oil prices will be particularly beneficial to currencies such as the Norwegian krone, Canadian dollar, Mexican peso, Colombian peso, and Malaysian ringgit. A Weaker Dollar Will Support Non-US Stocks Stronger global growth, a weaker dollar, and higher commodity prices will disproportionately help the more cyclical sectors of the stock market (Chart 35). Since cyclical stocks tends to be overrepresented outside the US, non-US equities should outperform their US peers over the next 12 months. A weaker dollar will also reduce the local-currency value of dollar-denominated debt. This will be especially helpful for emerging markets. Despite the recent rally, the cyclically-adjusted PE ratio for EM stocks remains near historic lows (Chart 36). EM equities should fare well over the next 12 months. Chart 35Cyclical Sectors Should Outperform Defensives As Global Growth Recovers Cyclical Sectors Should Outperform Defensives As Global Growth Recovers Cyclical Sectors Should Outperform Defensives As Global Growth Recovers Cyclical Sectors Should Outperform Defensives As Global Growth Recovers Cyclical Sectors Should Outperform Defensives As Global Growth Recovers Chart 36EM Stocks Are Cheap Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Chart 37Non-US Stocks Look Cheaper Than Their US Peers In Both Absolute Terms And In Relation To Bond Yields Non-US Stocks Look Cheaper Than Their US Peers In Both Absolute Terms And In Relation To Bond Yields Non-US Stocks Look Cheaper Than Their US Peers In Both Absolute Terms And In Relation To Bond Yields Chart 38Expected Earnings Recovery: US Lags Slightly Behind Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave More broadly, non-US stocks look quite attractive in both absolute terms and in relation to bonds compared to their US peers (Chart 37). They are also unloved. In the BofA Merrill Lynch survey mentioned above, equity managers are heavily overweight the US, despite the fact that consensus earnings estimates point to a slightly faster recovery in EPS outside the United States (Chart 38). Thus, earnings trends, valuations, and sentiment all currently favor non-US stocks. Bond Yields To Stay Subdued… For Now It will probably take a couple of years for the unemployment rate in the G7 to fall to pre-pandemic levels. It will likely be another year or two before labor markets tighten to the point where inflation takes off. And, as discussed above, even if inflation does rise, central banks will be slow to raise rates both because they want higher inflation and because governments will pressure them to keep rates low in order to avoid having to redirect tax revenue from social programs to bondholders. All this suggests that short-term rates could remain depressed across much of the world until the middle of the decade. Chart 39Corporate Debt Metrics Among Publicly-Traded Issuers Are Worrisome Corporate Debt Metrics Among Publicly-Traded Issuers Are Worrisome Corporate Debt Metrics Among Publicly-Traded Issuers Are Worrisome Yield curves will steepen marginally over the next few years as global growth recovers and long-term bond yields rise in relation to short-term rates. In absolute terms, however, long-term yields will remain low. An initial bout of higher inflation will not be enough to lift long-term yields to a significant degree given the ability of central banks to cap yields via the threat of unlimited bond purchases – something that Japan and Australia are already doing. Yields will only rise substantially when central banks start feeling uneasy about accelerating inflation. As noted above, that point is probably still 3-to-5 years away. But, when it does come, it will be very painful for bondholders and equity holders alike. Not Much Scope For Further Spread Compression Spreads are unlikely to widen much in a low-rate, higher growth environment. Nevertheless, one should acknowledge that spreads are already low and corporate debt levels were quite elevated going into the recession, especially among companies with publicly-traded bonds (Chart 39). As such, while we generally favor a pro-risk stance over the next 12 months, we would recommend only benchmark exposure to high-yield credit. Within that category, we would favor consumer credit or corporate credit. We would especially shy away from credit linked to urban office and brick-and-mortar retail shopping, given the unfavorable structural shifts in those sectors.  Gold Is Still Worth Owning Chart 40Real Price Of Gold Is Elevated Relative To Its Long-Term History Real Price Of Gold Is Elevated Relative To Its Long-Term History Real Price Of Gold Is Elevated Relative To Its Long-Term History Lastly, a few words on gold. We upgraded our view on gold in late March. A weaker dollar will boost gold prices over the next 12 months, while higher inflation down the road makes gold an attractive hedge. Yes, the real price of gold is elevated relative to its long-term history (Chart 40). However, gold prices were distorted during most of the 20th century as one country after another abandoned the gold standard. The move to fiat money eliminated the need for central banks to hold large amounts of gold, which reduced underlying demand for the commodity. Had this move not happened, the real price of gold – just like the price of other real assets such as property and art – would have risen substantially. Thus, far from being above their long-term trend, gold prices could still be well below it. Our full suite of tactical, cyclical, and structural market views are depicted in the matrix below. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Markets Too Complacent About The Coronavirus,” dated February 21, 2020. 2  For those unfamiliar with Saturday morning cartoons, Wile E. Coyote is a devious and scheming Looney Tunes cartoon character usually depicted unsuccessfully attempting to catch his prey, the Road Runner. Wile E. Coyote is outwitted each time by the fast-running bird, but fails to learn his lesson and tries anew. One popular gag involves the coyote running off a cliff, stopping mid-air to look down, only to realize that there is no more road beneath him. 3 This is a tricky point to grasp, so it might be helpful to think through an example. Suppose that government debt is 100 and GDP is also 100. Let us assume that the interest rate is 1%, trend growth is 3%, and the government wishes to run a primary budget deficit of 5% of GDP (the primary deficit is the deficit excluding interest payments). It does not matter if the interest rate and growth are expressed in nominal terms or real terms, as long as we consistently use one or the other. Initially, the debt-to-GDP ratio is 100%. The following year, debt increases to 100+5+100*0.01=106, while GDP rises to 103. Hence, the debt-to-GDP ratio jumps to 106/103=102.9%. The debt-to-GDP ratio will keep rising until it reaches 250%. At that point, debt-to-GDP will stabilize. To see why, go back to the original example but now assume that debt is 250 while GDP is still 100. The following year, debt increases to 250+5+250*0.01=257.5, while GDP, as in the first example, rises to 103. 257.5 divided by 103 is exactly 250%. 4 The standard equation of debt sustainability, which we derived in Box 1 of the Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled “Is There Really Too Much Government Debt In The World?”, says that the ratio of government debt-to-GDP will be stable if the primary budget balance (expressed as a share of GDP), p, is equal to the debt-to-GDP ratio (D/Y) multiplied by the difference between the interest rate and the growth rate of the economy, that is, p=D/Y (r-g). When p>D/Y (r-g), debt-to-GDP will fall. When, p<D/Y (r-g), debt-to-GDP will rise. Note that the higher the debt-to-GDP ratio is at the outset, the more the primary budget surplus would need to increase in response to a rise in interest rates.  5 Please see Ashley Southall and Neil MacFarquhar, “Gun Violence Spikes in N.Y.C., Intensifying Debate Over Policing,” The Wall Street Journal, dated June 23, 2020; “Gun Violence Soars in Minneapolis,” WCCO/CBS Minnesota, dated June 22, 2020;  and Tommy Beer, “18 People Were Murdered In Chicago On May 31, Making It The City’s Single Deadliest Day In 60 Years,” Forbes, dated June 8, 2020. 6 Please see “Baltimore Residents Blame Record-High Murder Rate On Lower Police Presence,” npr.org, dated December 31, 2017. 7 For economics aficionados, one can model this as a permanent inward shift of the IS curve and permanent outward shift of the LM curve which leaves the level of GDP unchanged but results in lower equilibrium interest rate. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “Quant-Based Approaches To Stock Selection And Market Timing,” dated November 9, 2018. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Current MacroQuant Model Scores Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave Third Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: Navigating The Second Wave

Dear Client, There will be no US Equity Insights from July 1-3 inclusive, as the US Equity team will be on vacation for the week. Our regular publication schedule will resume on Monday July 13, 2020 with our Weekly Report. Happy Independence Day.  Kind Regards, Anastasios Highlights Portfolio Strategy Odds are high that stocks will move laterally in Q3, digesting the massive gains since the March 23 lows. Beyond that, on a cyclical 9-12 month time horizon we remain constructive on the return prospects of the broad market. On all three key profit fronts – price of credit, loan growth and credit quality – banks are starting to show signs of stress. Tack on the potential dividend cuts/suspensions and we were compelled to downgrade exposure to neutral. A dearth of M&A deals, a steep fall in margin debt and declining equity flows into mutual funds and exchange traded funds and potential dividend cuts/suspensions enticed us to trim exposure in the S&P investment banks & brokers index to neutral. Recent Changes Last Tuesday we downgraded the S&P banks and S&P investment banks & brokers indexes to neutral. These two moves also pushed the S&P financials sector weighting to neutral.1 Feature The SPX remains in churning mode, consolidating the massive gains since the March 23 lows. Easy fiscal and monetary policies are still the dominant macro themes underpinning markets, and thus any letdown in either loose policies poses a threat to the 1000 point three-month SPX run-up (bottom panel, Chart 1). Importantly, correlations have gone vertical of late with the CBOE’s implied correlation index – gauging the S&P 500 constituents’ pairwise correlations – surging to 70% (implied correlation index shown inverted, second panel, Chart 1). This is cause for concern as it has historically been a precursor to SPX pullbacks. Typically, stocks move in tandem, especially during risk off phases when everything becomes one big macro trade. Similarly, two Fridays ago we highlighted that the VIX and the S&P 500 were becoming positively correlated.2 The 20-day moving correlation between these two assets is shooting higher, approaching positive territory. Since late-2017 every time this correlation has hit the inflection point near the zero line, stocks has subsequently suffered a sizable setback (Chart 2). Chart 1Short-Term Downdraft Risks Are Rising Short-Term Downdraft Risks Are Rising Short-Term Downdraft Risks Are Rising Chart 2Watch SPX/VIX Correlation Watch SPX/VIX Correlation Watch SPX/VIX Correlation Tack on the public’s renewed interest in COVID-19 according to Google trends search results, and the odds are high that stocks will be range bound this summer (top panel, Chart 1). Beyond that, on a cyclical 9-12 month time horizon we remain constructive on the return prospects of the broad market. Turning over to profits on the eve of earnings season, our four-factor macro EPS growth model for the SPX has tentatively troughed at an extremely depressed level (Chart 3). Our SPX EPS estimate for next calendar year remains near $162/share which we consider trend EPS and was last hit both in 2018 and 2019.3 Chart 3Our EPS Growth Model Has Troughed Our EPS Growth Model Has Troughed Our EPS Growth Model Has Troughed Moreover, drilling beneath the surface, this week Table 1 updates the sector and subgroup EPS growth expectations. First we rank the GICS1 sectors and then within each sector we rank the subsectors, both times by absolute 12-month forward EPS growth using I/B/E/S/ data (see second columns, Table 1). The third columns in Table 1 show the sector growth rate relative to the SPX. Table 1Identifying S&P 500 Sector EPS Growth Leaders And Laggards Drilling Deeper Into Earnings Drilling Deeper Into Earnings The final columns highlight the trend in relative growth. In more detail, they compare the current relative growth rate to that of three months ago: a positive sign indicates an upgrade in analysts’ relative estimates and a negative sign a downgrade in analysts’ relative estimates. Tech, health care and communication services occupy the top ranks with positive EPS growth expectations, while financials, real estate and energy are forecast to contract in the coming 12 months and have fallen at the bottom of the table. Table 2Sector EPS And Market Cap Weights Drilling Deeper Into Earnings Drilling Deeper Into Earnings Given that the tech sector has the highest profit weight in the SPX roughly 23% projected for next year (Table 2) it has really helped the broad market’s profit growth recovery (Chart 4). As a reminder, we continue to employ a barbell portfolio approach and prefer defensive (software and services) to aggressive tech (hardware and equipment). On the flip side, financials have the third largest profit weight roughly 16% in the S&P 500, trailing tech and health care, and pose a big threat to overall SPX profits next year, especially if there are any hiccups with the reopening of the economy (Table 2). Worrisomely, investors are not voting with their feet and are doubting that financials profits will deliver as the market cap weight relative to the profit weight stands at negative 540bps.  Last Tuesday we downgraded the S&P financials sector to a benchmark allocation via trimming the S&P banks and S&P investment banks & brokers indexes to neutral and this week we delve into more details on these two early cyclical subgroups. Chart 4Earnings Finding Their Footing Earnings Finding Their Footing Earnings Finding Their Footing Downgrade Banks To Neutral… We were compelled to downgrade the S&P banks index to neutral last Tuesday in advance of the Fed’s stress test results. There are high odds that a number of banks will cut/suspend dividend payments in coming quarters in line with the Fed’s guidance in the latest round of stress test, especially if profits take a big hit as we expect. As a reminder, dividends are paid out below-the-line. Beyond the Fed’s stress tests and rising political risks,4 yellow flags are waving on all three key bank profit drivers, namely the price of credit, loan growth and credit quality. First, it is disconcerting that bank relative performance has really not taken the yield curve’s steepening cue and has negatively diverged as we showed last week.5 The year-to-date plummeting 10-year yield is weighing heavily on relative share prices (top panel, Chart 5). The transmission mechanism to bank profits of this lower price of credit is via the net interest margin (NIM) avenue (third panel, Chart 5). NIMs will remain under downward pressure as long at the 10-year Treasury yield stays suppressed owing to the Fed’s immense b/s expansion. The rising likelihood of yield curve control could keep interest rates on the long end of the curve depressed for a number of years similar to what happened between 1942 and 1951. Second, on the credit growth front news is equally worrisome. The widening in the junk spread signals loan growth blues in the quarters ahead (second panel, Chart 6). Despite the initial knee jerk reaction, primarily by corporations, of tapping existing C&I credit lines and causing a surge in bank credit growth, bankers are not willing to extend credit according to the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey (third panel, Chart 6). The same survey revealed that banks are reporting lower demand for credit across the board, warning that future loan growth will be anemic at best, especially given the collapse in our economic impulse indicator (bottom panel, Chart 6). Chart 5Bank Yellow Flags Waving Bank Yellow Flags Waving Bank Yellow Flags Waving Chart 6Loan Growth Will Suffer Loan Growth Will Suffer Loan Growth Will Suffer Finally, with regard to credit quality, delinquency and charge-off rates are all but certain to spike in the coming months. The third panel of Chart 7 highlights that historically all these credit quality gauges are lagging. However, the near vertical climb in the unemployment rate recently and persistently high continuing unemployment benefit claims near 20mn signal that non-performing loans (NPLs) are slated to soar in the back half of 2020 (bottom panel, Chart 7). True, the recent $2tn+ fiscal package is acting as a Band-Aid solution by putting money in unemployed consumers’ pockets, but when the money runs out on July 31, the going will get tough especially if Congress does not pass a new fiscal package. In addition, there are “extend and pretend” clauses in the existing relief package especially on the residential mortgage front that aim to help homeowners make ends meet. But, the longer workers stay out of the labor force the higher the chances that their skills atrophy making it difficult for them to return to work. As a result, foreclosure risk is on the rise. While residential real estate loans are no longer the largest category in bank loan books they still comprise a respectable 21% of total loans or $2.3tn, a souring housing market could spell trouble for banks (Chart 8). Chart 7Deteriorating Credit Quality Will Sink Profits Deteriorating Credit Quality Will Sink Profits Deteriorating Credit Quality Will Sink Profits Chart 8Housing Arrears Are A Risk Housing Arrears Are A Risk Housing Arrears Are A Risk Already, residential mortgage delinquencies are rising and in May surged to the highest level since November 2011 according to Bloomberg. 4.3mn residential real estate borrowers are in arrears (this delinquency count includes borrowers with forbearance agreements who missed payments) and “more than 8% of all US mortgages were past due or in foreclosure” according to Black Night Inc., a property information service. Tack on the shattering consumer confidence and the consumer loan category (credit card, auto and student debt) is also under risk of severe credit quality deterioration (fourth panel, Chart 7). The commercial real estate (CRE) side of loan books is also likely to bleed. Anecdotes where landlords are demanding past due rent payment from tenants are mushrooming, at a time when the same landlords refuse to service their loan obligations. According to TREPP, CMBS delinquencies are skyrocketing across different REIT lines of business. Importantly, CRE loans add up to $2.4tn on commercial bank balance sheets or roughly 22% of total loans. Encouragingly, in Q1 banks started to aggressively provision for steep credit losses with commercial bank loan loss reserves now climbing just shy of $180bn according to the latest FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile (second panel, Chart 7). This figure is almost twice as high as noncurrent loans and represents a healthy reserve coverage ratio. However, our fear is that if history at least rhymes NPLs will sling shot higher (bottom panel, Chart 7) rendering loan loss reserves insufficient. Putting this provisioning number in context, according to the Fed’s most adverse stress test scenarios banks’ losses could spring to $700bn: “In aggregate, loan losses for the 34 banks ranged from $560bn to $700bn”.6 As a result, banks will have to further provision for futures losses and thus take an additional hit to profitability. Our bank earnings growth model does an excellent job in capturing all these moving parts and warns of a contraction in profit in the back half of the year (bottom panel, Chart 9). Nevertheless, before getting too bearish on banks, there two key offsetting factors. Relative valuations are bombed out, signaling that most of the bad news is likely reflected in prices (bottom panel, Chart 5). Finally, technicals are also extremely oversold. The second panel of Chart 5 shows that relative momentum is as bad as it gets. Netting it all out, on all three key profit fronts – price of credit, loan growth and credit quality – banks are starting to show signs of stress and compel us to downgrade exposure to neutral. Chart 9Dividend Cuts Are Looming Dividend Cuts Are Looming Dividend Cuts Are Looming …And Move To The Sidelines On Investment Banks & Brokers The S&P investment banks & brokers (IBB) group has a similar investment profile to the S&P banks index. But, given its more cyclical nature it typically oscillates violently around banks’ relative performance. Thus last Tuesday, we were also compelled to move to the sidelines on this higher beta financials subgroup.7 The COVID-19 accelerated recession has not only mothballed potential M&A deals that were in the works, but also a number of previously announced deals have been canceled. In addition, the outlook for M&A is grim, at least until the dust really settles from the coronavirus pandemic (second panel, Chart 10), weighing heavily on the sector’s profit prospects. While “Robinhood” (retail investor) trading stories abound, margin debt remains moribund and continues to contract, despite the V-shaped recovery in all major US stock markets since the March 23 lows (third panel, Chart 10). This coincident indicator speaks volumes in the near term direction of the broad market and any sustained contraction in trading related debt uptake will likely dent IBB profitability. According to the American Association of Individual Investors bullish retail investors have been absent from this quarter’s massive stock market rally and equity mutual fund and exchange traded fund flows corroborate this message (fourth panel, Chart 10). With regard to cyclicality, IBB are extremely quick to prune labor in times of duress and aggressively add to headcount during expansions. Recent trimming of IBB input costs signal that this industry is retrenching as it is trying to adjust cost structures to lower revenue run rates (bottom panel, Chart 10). Chart 10Diminishing Activities Are Profit Sapping Diminishing Activities Are Profit Sapping Diminishing Activities Are Profit Sapping Related to the cyclical nature of the IBB industry, an accelerating stock-to-bond ratio has been synonymous with relative share outperformance and vice versa. In early June we turned cautious on the broad market’s near-term return prospects primarily on the back of rising (geo)political risks. The implication is that a lateral move in the broad market would push down the S/B ratio and weigh on relative share prices (Chart 11). However, there are some offsets that prevent us from turning outright bearish on this niche early-cyclical group. First relative valuations are extremely alluring. On a price-to-book basis IBB traded recently at 0.8x in absolute terms and at a steep 68% discount to the broad market (bottom panel, Chart 12). Chart 11Move To The Sidelines On This Highly Cyclical Industry Move To The Sidelines On This Highly Cyclical Industry Move To The Sidelines On This Highly Cyclical Industry Chart 12Some Positive Offsets Some Positive Offsets Some Positive Offsets Second, volatility has gone haywire since late-February and it remains elevated with a VIX reading still north of 30. This is a fertile environment for IBB trading desks and should translate into higher profits (second panel, Chart 12). Third, equity trading volumes have exploded. True, volumes spike on downdrafts, but they have remained at an historically high level recently underscoring that IBB trading desk should be minting money (third panel, Chart 12). Adding it all up, a dearth of M&A deals, a steep fall in margin debt and declining equity flows into mutual funds and exchange traded funds and potential dividend cuts/suspensions compelled us to trim exposure in the S&P investment banks & brokers index to neutral. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P banks index to neutral for a loss of 32.4% since inception. Trim the S&P investment banks & brokers index to neutral for a loss of 24% since inception. These moves also push the S&P financials sector to a benchmark allocation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in these indexes are: BLBG S5BANKX – JPM, BAC, C, WFC, USB, TFC, PNC, FRC, FITB, MTB, KEY, SIVB, RF, CFG, HBAN, ZION, CMA, PBCT, and BLBG S5INBK – GS, MS, SCHW, ETFC, RJF, respectively.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Insight Report, “Unresponsive” dated June 23, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Insight Report, “Tales Of The Tape” dated June 19, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Gauging Fair Value ” dated April 27, 2020, and BCA US Equity Strategy Special Report, “Debunking Earnings” dated May 19, 2020, both available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Insight Report, “Unresponsive” dated June 23, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5    Ibid. 6    https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200625c.htm 7    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Insight Report, “Unresponsive” dated June 23, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Drilling Deeper Into Earnings Drilling Deeper Into Earnings Size And Style Views June 3, 2019 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert)  January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth April 28, 2020  Stay neutral large over small caps  June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V).