Australia

Highlights Higher copper prices will follow in the wake of China's surge in steel demand, which lifted Shanghai steel futures to an all-time high just under 5,200 RMB/MT earlier this month, as building and infrastructure projects are completed this year (Chart of the Week). Copper will register physical deficits this year and next, which will pull inventories even lower and will push demand for copper scrap up in China and globally. High and rising copper prices could prompt government officials to release some of China's massive state holdings of copper – believed to total some 2mm MT – if the current round of market jawboning fails to restrain demand and price increases. Strong steel margins and another round of environmental restraints on mills are boosting demand for high-grade iron ore (65% Fe), which hit a record high of just under $223/MT earlier this week. Benchmark iron ore prices (62% Fe) traded at 10-year highs this week, just a touch below $190/MT. We are lifting our copper price forecast for December 2021 to $5.00/lb from $4.50/lb. In addition, we are getting long 2022 CME/COMEX copper vs short 2023 CME/COMEX copper at tonight's close, expecting steeper backwardation. Feature Government-mandated reductions of up to 30% in steel mill operations for the rest of the year in China's Tangshan steel hub to reduce pollution will tighten an already-tight market responding to a construction and infrastructure boom (Chart 2). This boom triggered a surge in steel prices, and, perforce, in iron ore prices (Chart 3). As it has in the past, this sets the stage for the next leg of copper's bull run. Chart of the WeekSurging Steel Presages Stronger Copper Prices In our modeling, we have found a strong relationship between steel prices, particularly for reinforcing bar (rebar), and copper prices, as can be seen in the Chart of the Week. Steel goes into building and infrastructure projects at the front end (in the concrete that is reinforced by steel and in rolled coil products), and then copper goes into the completed project (in the form of wires or pipes). Chart 2Copper Bull Market Will Continue In addition to the building and construction boom, continued gains in manufacturing will provide a tailwind for copper prices, which will be augmented by the global recovery in activity 2H21. Chart 4 shows the relationship between nominal GDP levels and copper prices. What's important here is economic growth in Asia (including China) and ex-Asia is, unsurprisingly, cointegrated with copper prices – i.e., economic growth and industrial commodities share a long-term equilibrium, which explains their co-movement. Chart 3Steel Boom Lifts Iron Ore Prices Media reports tend to focus on the effects of Chinese government spending as a share of GDP – e.g., total social financing relative to GDP – to the exclusion of the economic, particularly when trying to explain commodity price movements. To the extent the Chinese government is successful in further expanding the private sector – on the goods and services sides – organic economic growth will become even more important in explaining Chinese commodity demand. Chart 4Global Economic Grwoth Will Boost Copper Prices In our copper modeling, we find copper prices to be cointegrated with nominal Chinese GDP, EM Asian GDP and EM ex-Asian GDP, along with steel and iron ore prices, which, from a pure economics point of view, is what would be expected. On the other hand, there is no cointegration – i.e., no economic co-movement or a shared trend – between these industrial commodity prices and total social financing as a percent of nominal China GDP. These models allow us to avoid spurious relationships, which offer no help in explaining or forecasting these copper prices. Chart 5Iron Ore, Copper Demand Will Lift With The "Green Energy" Buildout Chart 6Renewables Dominate Incremental New Generation Longer term, as we have written in past research reports, the transition to a low-carbon energy mix favoring distributed renewable electricity generation, more resilient grids and electric vehicles (EVs) will be a major source of demand growth for bulks like iron ore and steel, and base metals, particularly copper (Chart 5).1 Already, renewable generation represents the highest-growth segment of incremental power generation being added to the global grid (Chart 6). Copper Supply Growth Requires Higher Prices Copper supply will have a difficult time accommodating demand in the short term (to end-2022) when, for the most part, the buildout in renewables and EVs will only be getting started. This means that over the medium (to end-2025) and the long terms (2050) significant new supply will have to be developed to meet demand. In the short term, the supply side of refined copper – particularly the semi-refined form of the metal smelters purify into a useable input for manufactured products (condensates) – is running extremely low, as can be seen in the longer-term collapse of Treatment Charges and Refining Charges (TC/RC) at Chinese smelters (Chart 7). At ~ $22/MT last week, these charges were the lowest since the benchmark TC/RC index tracking these charges in China was launched in 2013, according to reuters.com.2 Chart 7Copper TCRCs Fall As Supplies Fall, Pushing Prices Higher The copper supply story also can be seen in Chart 8, which converts annual supply and demand into balances, which will be mediated by the storage market. The International Copper Study Group (ICSG) estimates mine output again registered flat year-on-year growth last year, while refined copper supplies were up a scant 1.5% y/y. Chart 8Physical Deficits Will Draw Copper Stocks... Consumption was up 2.2%, according to the ICSG's estimates, which expects a physical deficit this year of 456k MT, after adjusting for Chinese bonded warehouse stocks. This will mark the fourth year in a row the copper market has been in a physical deficit, which, since 2017, has averaged 414k MT. The net result of this means inventories will once again be relied on to fill in supply gaps, and global stockpiles, which are down ~25% y/y, and will continue to fall (Chart 9). With mining capex weak and copper ore quality falling, higher prices will be required to incentivize significant new investment in production (Chart 10). However, the lead time on these projects is five years in the best of circumstances, which means miners have to get projects sanctioned with final investment decisions made in the near future (Chart 11). Chart 9...Which After Four Years Of Physical Deficits Are Low Chart 10Higher Copper Prices Required To Reverse Weak Capex, Falling Ore Quality Chart 11Falling Lead Times To Bring New Mines Online, But Time Is Short Investment Implications Our focus on copper is driven by the simple fact that it spans all renewable technologies and will be critical for EVs as well, particularly if there is widespread adoption of this technology (Chart 12). We continue to expect copper supply challenges across the short-, medium- and long-term investment horizons. To cover the short term, we recommended going long December 2021 copper on 10 September 2020, and this position is up 39.2%. To cover the longer term, we are long the S&P Global GSCI commodity index and the iShares GSCI Commodity Dynamic Roll Strategy ETF (COMT), recommended 7 December 2017 and 12 March 2021 , respectively, which are down 2.3% and 0.8%. Chart 12Widespread EV Uptake Will Create All New Copper Demand At tonight's close, we will cover the medium-term opportunity of the copper supply-demand story developed above by getting long the 2022 CME/COMEX copper futures strip and short 2023 CME/COMEX copper futures strip, given our expectation the continued tightening of the market will force inventories to draw, leading to a steeper backwardation in the copper forward curve. The principal risks to our short-, medium- and long-term positions above are a global failure to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, which, we believe is a short-term risk. Second among the risks to these positions is a large release of strategic copper concentrate reserves held by China's State Reserve Bureau (aka, the State Bureau of Minerial Reserves). In the case of the latter risk, the actual holdings of the Bureau are unknown, but are believed to be in the neighborhood of 2mm MT.3 Bottom Line: We remain bullish industrial commodities, particularly copper. Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Texas is expected to add 10 GW of utility-scale solar power by the end of 2022, according to the US EIA. Texas entered the solar market in a big way in 2020, installing 2.5 GW of capacity. The EIA expects The Great State to add ~ 5GW per year in the next two years, which would take total solar capacity to just under 15 GW. Roughly 30% of this new capacity is expected to be built in the Permian Basin, home to the most prolific oil field in the US. By comparison, the leading producer of solar power in the US, California, will add 3.2 GW of new solar capacity, according to the EIA (Chart 13). To end-2022, roughly one-third of total new solar generation in the will be added in Texas, which already is the leading wind-powered generator in the country. Wind availability is highest during the nighttime hours, while solar is most abundant during the mid-day period. Precious Metals: Bullish Palladium prices, trading ~ $2,876/oz on Wednesday, surpassed their previous record of $2,875.50/oz set in February 2020 and are closing in on $3,000/oz, as supply expectations continue to be lowered by Russian metals producer Nornickel, the largest palladium producer in the world (Chart 14). Earlier this week, the company updated earlier guidance and now expects mine output to be down as much as 20% this year in its copper, nickel and palladium operations, due to flooding in its mines. Palladium is used as a catalyst in gasoline-powered automobiles, sales of which are expected to rebound as the world emerges from COVID-19-induced demand destruction and a computer-chip shortage that has limited new automobile supply. In addition, production of platinum-group metals (PGMs) is being hampered by unreliable power supply in South Africa, which has forced the national utility suppling most of the state's power (> 90%) to revert to load-shedding schemes to conserve power. We remain long palladium, after recommending a long position in the metal 23 April 2020; the position is up 35.6%. Chart 13 Chart 14     Footnotes 1     Please see, e.g., Renewables, China's FYP Underpin Metals Demand, which we published 26 November 2020.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.   2     Please see RPT-COLUMN-Copper smelter terms at rock bottom as mine squeeze hits: Andy Home published by reuters.com 14 April 2021.  The report notes direct transactions between miners and smelters were reported as low as $10/MT, in a sign of just how tight the physical supply side of the copper market is at present. 3    Please see Column: Supercycle or China cycle? Funds wait for Dr Copper's call, published by reuters.com 20 April 2021.    Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights Q1/2021 Performance Breakdown: Our recommended model bond portfolio outperformed the custom benchmark index by +55bps during the first quarter of the year. Winners & Losers: The government bond side of the portfolio outperformed by +68bps, led overwhelmingly by our underweight to US Treasuries (+63bps). Spread product allocations underperformed by -11bps, primarily due to an overweight on UK corporates (-8bps). Portfolio Positioning For The Next Six Months: We are sticking with an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, given accelerating global growth momentum, expanding vaccinations and a highly stimulative fiscal/monetary policy mix. We are maintaining a moderate overweight to global spread product versus government debt, concentrated on an overweight to US high-yield given more stretched valuations in other credit sectors. On the margin, we are making the following changes to the portfolio allocations: downgrading both UK Gilts and UK investment grade corporates to neutral, while cutting the overall allocation to EM USD credit to neutral. Feature The first quarter of 2021 saw a sharp sell-off in global bond markets on the back of rising growth expectations, fueled by US fiscal stimulus and vaccine optimism. The US was near the front of the pack, with 10-year Treasuries having their biggest first quarter sell-off since 1994. Accommodative financial conditions, fueled by a highly stimulative mix of monetary and fiscal policies and improving sentiment, have lit a fire under a global economy set to reopen from pandemic lockdowns. Going forward, we expect US growth to continue leading the way, with implications for the dollar, commodity prices, and the expected path of policy rates. With that in mind, this week we are reviewing the performance of the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio during the first quarter of 2021. We also present our recommended positioning for the portfolio for the next six months (Table 1), as well as portfolio return expectations for our base case and alternative investment scenarios. Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning For The Next Six Months As a reminder to existing readers (and to new clients), the model portfolio is a part of our service that complements the usual macro analysis of global fixed income markets. The portfolio is how we communicate our opinion on the relative attractiveness between government bond and spread product sectors. We do this by applying actual percentage weightings to each of our recommendations within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. Q1/2021 Model Portfolio Performance Breakdown: Steering Clear Of Duration Chart 1Q1/2021 Performance: Bearish UST Bets Pay Off The total return for the GFIS model portfolio (hedged into US dollars) in the first quarter was -1.83%, dramatically outperforming the custom benchmark index by +55bps (Chart 1).1 This follows modest outperformance in 2020 which was driven largely by overweights on spread product initiated after the pandemic shock to markets. In terms of the specific breakdown between the government bond and spread product allocations in our model portfolio, the former generated +68bps of outperformance versus our custom benchmark index while the latter underperformed by -11bps. Our allocations to inflation-linked bonds in the US, Canada and Europe - which were a source of outperformance in 2020 - modestly underperformed this quarter (-2bps) as global real yields finally began to pick up. Our outperformance this quarter was driven overwhelmingly by our decision to go significantly underweight US Treasuries, and to position for a bearish steepening of the Treasury curve, ahead of last November’s US presidential election (Table 2). That resulted in the US Treasury allocation generating a massive +63bps of excess return in Q1/2022 as longer-term US yields surged higher. Table 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Overall Return Attribution The size of the US underweight was unusually large as we maintained only a neutral exposure to the other “high beta” markets that are typically positively correlated to US yield moves, Canada and Australia. Although the returns for those two government bond markets were very similar to that of US Treasuries in Q1, so the choice to stay neutral even with a bearish directional view on US yields did not impact the overall portfolio performance. Overweights to the more defensive “low beta” markets of Germany, France and Japan contributed a combined +4bps. We did see some losses on nominal government bonds in peripheral Europe (Italy: -0.6bps; Spain: -1.9bps), however, with the narrowing in spreads thrown off by a botched vaccine rollout. In spread product, underperformance came from overweights to UK investment grade corporates (-8bps), US CMBS (-4bps), and EM USD-denominated corporates (-2bps). This was despite the fact that spreads for UK corporates remained flat while US CMBS spreads actually narrowed. These losses were slightly offset by the overweight to lower-rated US high-yield (+3bps) and underweight to US agency MBS (+2bps). Our spread product losses, in total return terms, highlight the importance of considering duration risk when making a call on spread product, especially at a time when sovereign yields are rising and spreads offer little “cushion”. Duration also played a big part in nominal government bond outperformance, with a whopping +43bps of our total +55bps outperformance concentrated in just US Treasuries with a maturity greater than 10 years. In other words, overweighting overall global spread product and underweighting government bonds still generated major portfolio outperformance, even if there was a more mixed bag of returns within that credit overweight. The bar charts showing the total and relative returns for each individual government bond market and spread product sector are presented in Charts 2 & 3. Chart 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Government Bond Performance Attribution Chart 3GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2021 Spread Product Performance Attribution By Sector Biggest Outperformers: Underweight US Treasuries with a maturity greater than 10 years (+43bps), maturity between 7 and 10 years (+11bps), and with a maturity between 5 and 7 years (+7bps) Overweight US high-yield (+3bps) Underweight US agency MBS (+2bps) Overweight Italian inflation-indexed BTPs (+2bps) Biggest Underperformers: Overweight UK investment grade corporates (-8bps) Overweight US agency CMBS (-4bps) Overweight Spanish government bonds (-2bps) Chart 4 presents the ranked benchmark index returns of the individual countries and spread product sectors in the GFIS model bond portfolio for Q1/2021. Returns are hedged into US dollars (we do not take active currency risk in this portfolio) and adjusted to reflect duration differences between each country/sector and the overall custom benchmark index for the model portfolio. We have also color coded the bars in each chart to reflect our recommended investment stance for each market during Q1 (red for underweight, dark green for overweight, gray for neutral). Chart 4Ranking The Winners & Losers From The GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Universe In Q1/2021 Ideally, we would look to see more green bars on the left side of the chart where market returns are highest, and more red bars on the right side of the chart were returns are lowest. On that front, our portfolio allocations performed exceptionally well in Q1. In total return terms, the global bond market sell-off was a disaster for both government bonds and spread product. US high-yield, one of our longer-standing overweights, was the only sector to emerge unscathed, delivering a positive return of +42bps. Within our government bond allocation, the “defensive” markets—Japan (-44bps), Germany, (-261bps) and France (-371bps)—were nevertheless shaken by rising yields. On the other hand, we limited our downside by maintaining a neutral stance on the higher beta markets such as Canada (-406bps), New Zealand (-415bps), and the UK (-1389bps). Gilts sold off especially sharply as the UK outperformed global peers on COVID-19 vaccinations while inflation expectations continued to pick up. Our two underweights, US Treasuries (-426bps) and European high-yield (-426bps), were prescient. The latter market was one we chose to underweight given that spreads didn’t offer nearly enough compensation on a default-adjusted and breakeven basis. Bottom Line: Our model bond portfolio outperformed its benchmark index in the first quarter of the year by +55bps – a positive result driven by our underweight allocation to the US Treasury market and overall below-benchmark global duration stance. Future Drivers Of Portfolio Returns & Scenario Analysis Chart 5More Growth-Driven Upside For Global Yields Ahead Looking ahead, the performance of the model bond portfolio will continue to be driven predominantly by the future moves of global government bond yields, most notably US Treasuries. Our most favored leading indicators for global bond yields continue to signal more upside over at least the next six months (Chart 5). Our Global Duration Indicator, comprised of measures of future economic sentiment and momentum, remains at an elevated level. The ongoing climb in the global manufacturing PMI, which typically leads global real bond yields by around six months, suggests that the recent uptick in real yields can continue into the second half of 2021. We are still maintaining a bias towards bearish yield curve steepening across all the countries in the model bond portfolio. It is still far too soon to see bearish flattening of yield curves given the dovish bias of global central banks, many of which are actively targeting an overshoot of their own inflation targets. The US will be the first central bank to see any bearish flattening pressure, as the market more aggressively pulls forward the liftoff date of the next Fed tightening cycle in response to strong US growth, but that is an outcome we do not expect until well into the second half of 2021. With regards to country allocations within the government bond segment of the model bond portfolio, we continue to focus our maximum underweight on the US, while limiting exposure to the markets that are more sensitive to changes in US interest rates (Chart 6). Those “lower yield beta” markets (Germany, France and Japan) will continue to outperform the higher beta markets (Canada, Australia) over the latter half of 2021. We currently have Canada on “downgrade watch”, as economic momentum is accelerating and the housing bubble looks to be reflating, both of which will make the Bank of Canada turn more hawkish shortly after the Fed does. We are more comfortable keeping Australia at neutral, as Australian inflation is likely to remain too underwhelming for the Reserve Bank of Australia to turn less dovish and risk a surge in the Australian dollar. UK Gilts are a more difficult case, atypically acting like a lower beta market over the past few years. As we discussed in a Special Report published last month, we attribute the declining Gilt yield beta to the rolling shocks the UK has suffered over the past thirteen years – the 2008 global financial crisis, the 2012 euro area debt crisis, Brexit and, now, COVID-19 – that have hamstrung the Bank of England’s ability to try even modest interest rate hikes.2 With the impact of those shocks on UK growth now diminishing, we see the central bank under greater pressure to begin normalizing UK monetary policy over the couple of years. We downgraded our cyclical stance on UK Gilts and UK investment grade corporates to neutral from overweight in that Special Report and, this week, we are making the same reduction in UK weightings in our model bond portfolio (see the portfolio tables on pages 20-21). After that change, the overall duration of the model bond portfolio remains below that of the custom benchmark index, now by -0.75 years (Chart 7). Chart 6Low-Beta Markets Will Continue To Outperform USTs Chart 7Overall Portfolio Duration: Stay Below Benchmark We continue to see the dovish bias of global central bankers as being conducive to the outperformance of inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt (Chart 8). Yes, the “easy money” has been made betting on a recovery of inflation expectations from the bombed-out levels seen after the COVID-19 recession in 2020. However, within the major developed economies with inflation-linked bond markets, 10-year breakevens have already climbed beyond the pre-pandemic levels of early 2020 (Chart 9). The next targets are the previous cyclical highs seen in 2018 (and 2019 for the UK). Chart 8Dovish Central Banks Still Positive For Inflation-Linked Bonds Chart 9Inflation Breakevens Returning To Past Cyclical Peaks Chart 10Still A Supportive Backdrop For Global Corporates The 10-year US TIPS breakeven is already past that 2018 peak of 2.18%, and with the Fed showing no sign of concern about US growth and inflation accelerating, the 10-year US breakeven should end up moving into the high end of our expected 2.3-2.5% target range before the Fed begins to turn less dovish. Thus, we are maintaining a core allocation to linkers in the portfolio, focused on US TIPS and inflation-linked bonds in Italy, France and Canada. The same aggressive easing of global monetary policy that has been good for relative inflation-linked bond performance continues to benefit global corporate bonds. The annual rate of growth of the combined balance sheets of the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan and Bank of England remains an excellent leading indicator of the excess returns of both global investment grade and high-yield corporates over the past decade (Chart 10). With the combined balance sheet now expanding at a 55% pace, corporate bonds are still likely to continue to outperform government debt over the remainder of 2021. Much of that expected return outperformance of corporates will come via carry rather than spread compression, though. Our preferred measure of the attractiveness of credit spreads, the historical percentile ranking of 12-month breakeven spreads, shows that only US high-yield spreads are above the bottom quartile of their history among the credit sectors in our model portfolio (Chart 11). Given the absence of spread cushion in those other markets, we are maintaining an overweight stance on US high-yield in the model bond portfolio – especially versus euro area high-yield where we are underweight - while staying neutral investment grade credit in the US and Europe. Chart 11US High-Yield: The Last Bastion Of Attractive Spreads Within the euro area, we continue to prefer owning Italian government bonds over investment grade corporates, given the European Central Bank’s more explicit support for the former through quantitative easing (Chart 12). We expect Italian yields and spreads to converge down to Spanish levels, likely within the next 6-12 months, while there is limited downside for euro area investment grade spreads given tight valuations. Chart 12Favor Italian BTPs Over Euro Area IG We are not only looking at relative valuation considerations in developed market credit. Emerging market (EM) USD-denominated credit has benefited from a bullish combination of global policy stimulus, a weakening US dollar and rising commodity prices. We have positioned for that in our model portfolio through an overall overweight stance on EM USD credit, but one that favors investment grade corporates over sovereigns. Now, with the Chinese credit impulse likely to slow in the latter half of 2021 as Chinese policymakers look to rein in stimulus, a slower pace of Chinese economic growth represents a risk to EM credit (Chart 13). The same can be said for the US dollar, which is no longer depreciating with US bond yields rising and the markets questioning the Fed’s dovish forward guidance on future rate hikes (Chart 14). A strong US dollar would also be a risk to the commodity price rally that has supported EM financial assets. Chart 13Global Policy Mix Becoming Less Supportive For EM Chart 14A Stronger USD Is A Risk For EM Corporates Vs Sovereigns Chart 15A Moderate Overweight To Spread Product Vs Government Debt In response to these growing risks to the bullish EM backdrop, we are downgrading our overall EM USD credit exposure in the model bond portfolio to neutral from overweight. We are maintaining our relative preference for EM investment grade corporates over sovereigns, however, within that overall neutral allocation. Summing it all up, we are sticking with a moderately overweight stance on global spread product versus government debt in the model portfolio, equal to four percentage points (Chart 15). That overweight comes entirely from the US high-yield allocation. After the changes made to our UK and EM positions, the tracking error of the portfolio, or its expected volatility versus that of the benchmark index, is quite low at 41bps (Chart 16). This is an unsurprising outcome given that the current positioning is focused so heavily on the US (Treasury underweight, high-yield overweight), with much of the other positioning close to neutral. That will change as 2021 progresses but, for now, our highest conviction views are in US fixed income. One final point – the relatively concentrated positioning leaves the portfolio “flat carry”, with a yield roughly equal to that of the benchmark index (Chart 17). Chart 16Limited Use Of Portfolio 'Tracking Error' Chart 17Model Portfolio Yield Close To Benchmark Scenario Analysis & Return Forecasts After making the shifts to our model bond portfolio allocations in the UK and EM, we now turn to scenario analysis to determine the return expectations for the portfolio for the next six months. On the credit side of the portfolio, we use risk-factor-based regression models to forecast future yield changes for global spread product sectors as a function of four major factors - the VIX, oil prices, the US dollar and the fed funds rate (Table 2A). For the government bond side of the portfolio, we avoid using regression models and instead use a yield-beta driven framework, taking forecasts for changes in US Treasury yields and translating those in changes in non-US bond yields by applying a historical yield beta (Table 2B). For our scenario analysis over the next six months, we use a base case scenario plus two alternate “tail risk” scenarios, based on the following descriptions and inputs: Table 2AFactor Regressions Used To Estimate Spread Product Yield Changes Table 2BEstimated Government Bond Yield Betas To US Treasuries Base case: Ongoing global vaccinations lead to more of the global economy reopening over the summer, with excess savings built up during the pandemic – augmented by ongoing fiscal support – starting to be spent. US economic growth will be most robust out of the major economies, given the additional boost from fiscal stimulus, while China implements actions to slow credit growth and the euro area lags on vaccinations. The Fed stands its ground and maintains no rate hikes until at least 2023, and US TIPS breakevens climb to levels consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation mandate (2.3-2.5%). The US Treasury curve continues to bear-steepen, with the 10-year US yield rising to 2%. The VIX falls to 15, the US dollar is flat, the Brent oil price rises +5%, and the fed funds rate is unchanged at 0%. Optimistic case: A rapid pace of global vaccinations leads to booming growth led by the US but including a reopening euro area. Chinese policymakers tighten credit by less than expected. Markets begin to pull forward the timing and pace of future central bank interest rate hikes, most notably in the US but also in the other countries like Canada and the UK. Real bond yields continue to climb globally, but inflation breakevens stay elevated. The steepening trend of the US Treasury curve ends, and mild bear flattening begins with the 10-year reaching 2.2% and the 2-year yield climbing to 0.4%. The VIX stays unchanged at 18, the US dollar rises +5%, the Brent oil price climbs +2.5% and the fed funds rate stays unchanged. Pessimistic case: Setbacks on the pandemic, either from struggles with vaccine distribution or a surge in variant cases, lead to a slower pace of global growth momentum. Europe cannot reopen, China tightens credit policy faster than expected, and US households hold onto to excess savings amid lingering virus uncertainty. Diminished economic optimism leads to a pullback in global equity values and wider global credit spreads. The US Treasury curve bull flattens as longer-maturity yields fall in a risk-off move, with the 10-year yield moving back down to 1.5%. The VIX rises to 25, the US dollar falls -2.5% and the fed funds rate stays at 0%. The inputs into the scenario analysis are shown in Chart 18 (for the USD, VIX, oil and the fed funds rate), while the US Treasury yield scenarios are in Chart 19. The excess return scenarios for the model bond portfolio, using the above inputs in our simple quantitative return forecast framework, are shown in Table 3A (the scenarios for the changes in US Treasury yields are shown in Table 3B). Chart 18Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Chart 19US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Table 3AGFIS Model Bond Portfolio Scenario Analysis For The Next Six Months Table 3BUS Treasury Yield Assumptions For The 6-Month Forward Scenario Analysis The model bond portfolio is expected to deliver an excess return over the next six months of +46bps in the base case and +54bps in the optimistic scenario, but is only projected to underperform by -27bps in the pessimistic scenario. Bottom Line: We are sticking with an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, given accelerating global growth momentum, expanding vaccinations and a highly stimulative fiscal/monetary policy mix. We are maintaining a moderate overweight to global spread product versus government debt, concentrated on an overweight to US high-yield given more stretched valuations in other credit sectors. On the margin, we are making the following changes to the portfolio allocations: downgrading both UK Gilts and UK investment grade corporates to neutral, while cutting the overall allocation to EM USD credit to neutral.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The GFIS model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt replacing very high quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy/Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Why Are UK Interest Rates Still So Low?", dated March 10, 2021, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Central Bank Expectations: Market expectations of short-term interest rate moves over the next few years are inching higher. The potential for markets to offer a greater bond-bearish challenge to the current highly dovish forward guidance of the major central banks should not be dismissed given the growth-positive mix of expanding global vaccinations and US fiscal stimulus. Global Golden Rule: The gap between market expectations of global central bank policy rates and realized interest rate outcomes is a reliable predictor of government bond returns – a dynamic we have dubbed the “Global Golden Rule of Bond Investing”. Given our expectation that no major developed market central bank will hike rates within the next twelve months, the Global Golden Rule is calling for the recent government bond market laggards to outperform over the next year. Tapering & The Golden Rule: Government bonds in countries where central banks are most likely to begin tapering in 2022 well before considering rate hikes – most notably, the US and Canada – are likely to suffer returns worse than implied by the Global Golden Rule. It is too soon to raise allocations to those higher-beta bond markets. Feature As the first quarter of 2021 draws to a close, fixed income investors are licking their wounds from a rough start to the year. Government bonds across the developed world have absorbed heavy losses as yields have climbed higher, led by US Treasuries which are down -4.0% year-to-date in total return terms. Other markets have also been hit hard, like Canada (-3.9%), Australia (-3.5%) and the UK (-6.3%). The trend in rising yields has been concentrated at longer maturities, with shorter ends of yield curves seeing much smaller moves (Chart 1). Two-year government bond yields are still being pinned down by the dovish forward guidance of the major central banks. The Fed is signaling no rate hikes through at least the end of 2023, while other central banks are sending similar messages on the timing of any potential future rate moves. However, global growth expectations continue to gain upward momentum, fueled by the optimistic combination of expanding COVID-19 vaccinations and aggressive US fiscal stimulus. Real GDP growth is expected to soar to a mid-single digit pace in the US, UK, Canada and even the euro zone - moves heralded by the steady climb of the OECD leading economic indicators and composite purchasing manager indices (Chart 2). Chart 1Rising Yields Reflect Reflation Chart 2A Bond-Bearish Surge In Global Growth Markets will continue to pull forward the timing and pace of the next monetary tightening cycle if those faster above-trend growth forecasts are realized. This will represent a change of “leadership” in the global bond bear market from faster inflation breakevens to increased policy rate expectations helping drive real yields higher. That shift may already be underway according to the ZEW survey of global investor expectations which now shows that the net number of respondents expecting higher short-term interest rates in the US and UK has turned positive (Chart 3). Already, our Central Bank Monitors for the US, Canada and Australia (Chart 4) have climbed back to neutral levels suggesting that easier monetary policy is no longer required. Similar trends can be seen to a lesser extent in the UK, euro area and even Japan (Chart 5). These moves are already coinciding with increased cyclical upward pressure on global bond yields, even without any change in dovish central bank guidance alongside ongoing buying of government bonds via quantitative easing programs. Chart 3Shifting Expectations For Policy Rates? Chart 4Diminishing Need For Easy Monetary Policy Here   Chart 5Easy Policy Still Required Here How will a trend of rising short-term interest rate expectations translate into future expected returns on government bonds? For that, we revisit a framework temporarily set aside during the pandemic era of crisis monetary policies – the Global Golden Rule (GGR) of bond investing. An Update Of The Global Golden Rule, By Country In September 2018, we published a Special Report introducing a government bond return forecasting methodology called the “Global Golden Rule.” This was an extension of a framework introduced by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, that links US Treasury returns (versus cash) to changes in the fed funds rate that were not already discounted in the US Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve.1 The historical results convincingly showed that investors who "get the Fed right" by making correct bets on changes in the funds rate versus expectations were very likely to make the right call on the direction of Treasury yields. We discovered that relationship also held in other developed market countries. Thus, we now had a framework to help project expected bond returns simply based on a view for future central bank interest rate moves versus market expectations.2 Specific details on the calculation of the Global Golden Rule can be found in those original 2018 papers. In the following pages, we present the latest results of the Global Golden Rule for the US, Canada, Australia, the UK, the euro area and Japan. The set-up for the chart shown for each country is the same. We show the 12-month policy rate “surprise”, defined as the actual change in the central bank policy rate over the preceding 12-months versus the expected 12-month change in the policy rate from a year earlier extracted from OIS curves (aka our 12-month discounters). We then compare the 12-month policy rate surprise to the annual excess return over cash (treasury bills) of the Bloomberg Barclays government bond index for each country. We also show the 12-month policy rate surprise versus the 12-month change in the government bond index yield. The very strong historical correlation between those latter two series is the backbone of the Global Golden Rule framework. After that, we present tables showing expected yield changes and excess returns for various maturity points, as well as the overall government bond index, derived from the Global Golden Rule regressions. The expected change in yield is derived from regressions on the policy rate surprises, with different estimations done for each maturity point. In the tables, we show the results for different scenarios for changes in policy rates. For example, the row in the return tables called “1 rate hike” would show the expected yield changes and excess returns if the central bank for that particular country lifts the policy interest rate by +25bps over the next 12 months. This allows us to pick the scenario(s) that most closely correlate to our own expectation for central bank actions, translating that into government bond return expectations. Global Golden Rule: US Chart 6UST Selloff Akin To A Hawkish Surprise The Golden Rule would have underestimated the losses realized by US Treasuries over the past year (-4.5%), as negative excess returns over cash typically occur when the Fed is more hawkish than expectations – an outcome that did not occur (Chart 6). The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for the US is currently zero, as last year’s massively dovish rate cuts have rolled off. The US OIS curve now discounts only 5bps of interest rate increases over the next 12 months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the Fed’s guidance that no rate hikes will take place before the end of 2023. Our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 1 and Table 2, with the Fed keeping the funds rate unchanged near 0% for the next twelve months – a very modest “dovish” surprise. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of the overall US Treasury index yield falling -2bps that generates a total return of +1.1%. This is essentially a coupon-clipping return equivalent to the current index yield. Table 1US: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Table 2US: Expected Changes In Treasury Yields Over The Next 12 Months Global Golden Rule: Canada Chart 7Canadian Bond Selloff Worse Than Implied By Golden Rule Canadian government bonds have sold off smartly over the past 12 months, delivering an excess return over cash of -2.8%. That is a smaller loss, however, compared to other developed economy government bond markets. The Canadian OIS curve did not move as aggressively to price in rate cuts last year, so the rapid pace of Bank of Canada (BoC) easing that was actually delivered constituted a modest “dovish surprise” that helped mute Canadian bond losses to some degree (Chart 7). The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Canada is +37bps (a dovish surprise), but rate expectations are more aggressive on forward basis. The Canadian OIS curve now discounts +28bps of interest rate increases over the next 12-months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This stands out as the highest such figure among the countries discussed in this report. This is likely due to the relatively less dovish messaging from BoC officials who have hinted that QE could be tapered sooner than expected if the economy outperforms the BoC’s forecasts for 2021. Our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 3 and Table 4, with the BoC keeping the policy interest rate at 0.25% for the next twelve months. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of a decline in the overall Canadian government bond index yield of -12bps, delivering a projected total return of +1.69%. That return may turn out to be overly optimistic if the BoC does indeed begin tapering QE later this year. Table 3Canada: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Table 4Canada: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Global Golden Rule: Australia Chart 8Australian Bonds Acting Like The RBA Was Hawkish Australian government bonds have delivered a negative excess return over cash of -3.6% over the past year (Chart 8). This underperformed the projection from the Golden Rule, as the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) was not more hawkish than market expectations. The central bank actually delivered a dovish surprise in 2020, not only cutting policy rates dramatically but starting up a bond-buying QE program and instituting yield curve control to cap 3-year bond yields. The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Australia is zero, as last year’s massively dovish surprise rate cuts have rolled off. The Australia OIS curve now discounts only 7bps of interest rate increases over the next 12-months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the RBA’s highly dovish guidance suggesting that there will be no change to current policy settings until Australian wage growth picks up to the 3% level consistent with the RBA’s 2-3% CPI inflation target. The central bank does not expect that to occur before 2023. We agree with dovish guidance from the RBA, thus our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 5 and Table 6, with the RBA keeping the Cash Rate unchanged at 0.1% for the next twelve months. This generates a Golden Rule forecast of an -5bps decline in the overall Australian government bond index yield, producing a total return projection of +1.4%. Table 5Australia: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Table 6Australia: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Global Golden Rule: UK Chart 9A UK Gilt Selloff Without A Hawkish BoE UK Gilts underperformed the Golden Rule forecast over the past 12 months, delivering a negative excess return over cash of –5.1% even with the Bank of England (BoE) not delivering any hawkish surprise versus market expectations (Chart 9). The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for the UK is currently zero. The UK OIS curve now discounts only 5bps of interest rate increases over the next 12-months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the BoE’s guidance that no monetary tightening will take place until there is clear evidence that the excess capacity created by the pandemic shock is clearly being absorbed. Yet while the BoE has still left the door open to moving to a negative policy rate if needed, markets are not discounting any such move. Our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 7 and Table 8, with the BoE keeping the Bank Rate unchanged at 0.1% for the next twelve months. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of the overall UK Gilt index yield falling -2bps that generates a total return of +1.0%. This is a return only slightly above the current index yield. Table 7UK: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Table 8UK: Expected Changes In Gilt Yields Over The Next 12 Months Global Golden Rule: Germany Chart 10Even Bunds Acting Like ECB Is "Hawkish" German government bonds have produced an excess return over cash of -1.6% over the past year. There was no surprise from the European Central Bank (ECB) during that time relative to market expectations (Chart 10), so that negative return reflected the modest rise in German bond yields on the back of improving global growth. The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Germany (and the overall euro area) remains stuck near zero, as has been the case since the ECB cut its deposit rate below zero and instituted QE back in 2016. The euro area OIS curve now discounts only -4bps of interest rate cuts over the next 12 months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the ECB’s guidance that rates will be kept unchanged until at least 2023, as the central bank’s projections call for euro area inflation to not climb above 1.5% - below the ECB’s 2% target – through 2023. The OIS curve is discounting a small probability that the ECB could be forced to deliver a small rate cut given the degree of the euro area inflation undershoot. Our base case, however, is that the ECB will keep rates steady over the next 12 months (and likely for a few more years after that). Thus, the “Flat” scenarios shown in Table 9 and Table 10 are most relevant, with the German government bond index yield rising +2bps according to the Golden Rule. This produces a total return projection of -0.6%. Table 9Germany: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Table 10Germany: Expected Changes In Bund Yields Over The Next 12 Months Global Golden Rule: Japan Chart 11JGBs Bucking The Global "Hawkish" Selloff Japanese government bonds (JGBs) have delivered an excess return versus cash of -0.8% over the past twelve months (Chart 11). Although it may sound unusual for Japan, there was actually a tiny “hawkish” surprise as the Bank of Japan (BoJ) kept policy rates steady over the past year even as markets had priced in a possibility of a small rate cut in response to the COVID-19 growth shock. Admittedly, the Golden Rule framework is poorly suited to project Japanese bond returns. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) has been unable to lift policy rates for many years, while they have instituted yield curve control on 10-year JGBs since 2016, anchoring yields near zero. With no variability on policy rates or bond yields, a methodology that links bond returns to unexpected policy interest rate changes will have poor predictive power. The Japan OIS curve now discounts -5bps of interest rate cuts over the next 12 months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. The BoJ has not ruled out the possibility of a small rate cut sometime in the next few months, as Japanese inflation remains far below the 2% BoJ target. Our base case is the “Flat” scenarios shown in Table 11 and Table 12, with the BoJ keeping policy rates unchanged near 0% for the next twelve months. That generates a Golden Rule forecast of a +5bp increase in the Japanese government bond index yield, with a total return projection of -0.4%. This would be consistent with the BoJ producing a small hawkish “surprise” by not cutting rates deeper into negative territory. Table 11Japan: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Table 12Japan: Expected Changes In JGB Yields Over The Next 12 Months Investment Implications Of The Global Golden Rule Projections Among all the scenarios laid out above, our base case has been that no change in policy rates should be expected over the next 12 months in any of the countries. This fits with our view that central banks will be reluctant to consider any changes to the current dovish forward guidance on future rate hikes until there is clear evidence that the global economy has moved beyond the pandemic. That means taking some near-term inflation risks given the very robust pace of growth expected over the rest of 2021. In Table 13, we rank all the return projections generated by the Global Golden Rule for the “Flat” scenarios on policy rates over the next year. Returns are shown both in local currency terms and in USD-hedged terms. Table 13Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Assuming Policy Rates Remain Unchanged The return rankings are a mirror image of the performance seen year-to-date, with the “higher beta” bond markets (Canada, Australia and the US) outperforming the more defensive low-yielding markets (the UK, Germany and Japan). Returns are projected to be moderate, however, with Canada leading the way both unhedged (+1.69%) and currency hedged (+1.73%). The return rankings excluding the +10-year maturity buckets of the government bond indices are shown in Table 14. We present these to allow a more “apples to apples” comparison of the six regions shown, as the UK index has a huge weighting in the +10-year bucket while there is no +10-year benchmark for Australia. On this basis, Australia stands out as having the best Global Golden Rule generated return projections, both unhedged (+1.44%) and USD-hedged (+1.66%).3 Table 14 These return rankings run counter to our current recommended country allocation: underweight the US, overweight Germany and Japan and neutral the UK, Canada and Australia. We still believe there is more near-term upside for global bond yields, led by US Treasuries, thus it is too soon to begin to position for the results projected by the Global Golden Rule. There is one other factor that leads us to interpret the results cautiously – the likelihood that some central banks will begin tapering their bond purchases within the next 12 months. Our expectation is that the Fed will begin to signal a need to slow the pace of its QE bond buying in the fourth quarter of this year, with actual tapering beginning in Q1 of 2022. The BoC is likely to follow suit shortly thereafter. Thus, the Fed and BoC will begin tapering within the 12-month forecasting window of the Global Golden Rule. The RBA and BoE will debate a need to taper later in 2022 – beyond that 12-month window – while the ECB and BoJ will maintain their current pace of bond buying until at least the end of 2022. From the point of view of bond markets, tapering by the Fed and BoC will likely feel as if those central banks were actually delivering rate hikes. Bond yields will likely rise by more than projected by the Global Golden Rule in the “Flat” scenarios highlighted earlier. Quantitative models that attempt to translate QE into interest rate changes, so-called “shadow rates”, show that the Fed’s QE bond buying over the past year has been equivalent to nearly 250bp of additional Fed rate cuts after the funds rate was slashed to 0% (Chart 12). Thus, when the Fed begins to taper QE, it will conceptually be as if the Fed started a rate hike cycle with the starting point of a fed funds rate at minus -2.5%. When looking at the historical correlation of changes in the US shadow rate and US Treasury yields, the +40bps rise in the Treasury index yield over the past 12 months is equivalent to roughly a 100bp increase in the shadow fed funds rate (Chart 13, top panel). That would line up with a fairly aggressive pace of Fed tapering when looking at the correlation of changes in the shadow rate to changes in the size of the Fed balance sheet (middle panel). Chart 12"Shadow Policy Rates" Are Below 0% Chart 13UST Yields Discount A Lot Of Fed Tapering US Treasury yields have been rising for more fundamental reasons like improving growth expectations alongside rising inflation expectations. If the Fed is forced to signal a tapering of QE later this year because that robust growth outlook comes to fruition, it is a stretch to think that Treasury yields will not see additional upward pressure. Thus, we are sticking with our current country allocations, despite the message from our Global Golden Rule. US Treasury returns may look more like the “1 rate hike” or “2 rate hikes” scenarios shown in Table 1 when the Fed begins tapering early in 2022. The same goes for Canadian bond yields once the BoC moves to taper soon after the Fed, as we expect, which is why we are keeping Canada on “downgrade watch.” Bottom Line: The Global Golden Rule is calling for the recent government bond market laggards to outperform over the next year if central banks keep rates on hold. Government bonds in countries where central banks are most likely to begin tapering in 2022 well before considering rate hikes – most notably, the US and Canada – are likely to suffer returns worse than implied by the Global Golden Rule. It is too soon to raise allocations to those higher-beta bond markets.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcarearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated September 25, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Note that in Table 14, we rescale the other maturity buckets after removing the +10-year bucket. The index returns are presented as a market-capitalization weighted combination of the expected returns of the remaining maturity buckets. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Global Duration: Markets are correctly interpreting the $1.9 trillion US fiscal stimulus package as a factor justifying higher global growth expectations and bond yields. Maintain a below-benchmark stance on overall global duration. Yield Betas & Country Allocation: Within government bond portfolios, overweighting the “lower-beta” countries that have bond yields less sensitive to changes in US yields (Germany, France, Japan) versus the higher-beta markets (Canada, Australia, UK) remains the appropriate strategy during the current bond bear market. Underweights should remain concentrated in the US, though, as it is highly unlikely that any central bank will begin to tighten policy before the Fed. UK Follow-Up: The conclusions from our UK Special Report published last week do not change after adjusting for the difference in the inflation indices used to calculate UK inflation-linked bond yields compared to those of other countries. UK real interest rates are the lowest in the developed economies, while inflation breakevens are the highest. NOTE: There will be no Global Fixed Income Strategy report published next week. Instead, BCA Chief Global Fixed Income Strategist Rob Robis will do a webcast discussing his latest thoughts on global bond markets. Yields Rising Around The World Chart of the WeekPolicy Mix Is Bond-Bearish The path of least resistance for global bond yields remains biased upward. Optimism on future economic growth remains ebullient with consumer and business confidence indices surging in much of the developed world. The epicenter of the global bond bear market remains the US, where pandemic related economic restrictions are being unwound with 21.4% of the US population now having received at least one dose of a vaccine. Fiscal policy in the US is also supporting the positive vibes on future growth after the $1.9 trillion stimulus package was signed into law by President Biden last week. The 10-year US Treasury yield climbed back to the 2021 high of 1.63% on the back of that announcement. The US stimulus package changes the trajectory of the 2021 US fiscal impulse from a $0.8 trillion contraction to a $0.3 trillion expansion, according to estimates from the US Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (Chart of the Week). This, combined with ongoing quantitative easing from global central banks eager to keep bond yields as low as possible until inflation expectations sustainably return to policymaker targets, is providing a bond-bearish lift to both inflation expectations and real yields – most notably in the US. Central bankers can try to fight back against the speed of the increase in bond yields by maintaining their commitment to current policy settings, as the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Canada (BoC) did last week. The Fed, Bank of England (BoE) and Bank of Japan (BoJ) will all get the chance to do the same this at this week’s policy meetings. The likely message from all will be one of staying the course and not reflexively responding to higher bond yields, which have not triggered a broad-based selloff in global risk assets that would pre-emptively tighten financial conditions. The S&P 500 index hit an all-time high last week, while equity markets in Europe and Japan have returned to pre-pandemic levels (Chart 2). Global corporate credit spreads have remained calm, consistent with a positive growth backdrop that diminishes the potential for credit downgrades and defaults. The US dollar has gotten a lift from improving US growth expectations and relatively higher US Treasury yields, which has had some negative spillover effect into emerging market equities and currencies. The dollar rebound has been relatively modest to date, however, with the DXY index up only 3% from the early 2021 lows. A major reason why global equity and credit markets have absorbed higher bond yields so well is because the sheer scope of the new US fiscal stimulus will have a major impact on growth momentum both in the US and outside the US. This comes on top of the boost to optimism from the speed of the US and UK vaccine rollouts. In an update to its December 2020 economic outlook published last week, the OECD estimated that the $1.9 trillion US stimulus will boost US real GDP growth by 3.8 percentage points versus its original forecast over the next year (Chart 3). Other countries will also benefit from the implied surge in US demand spilling over from that stimulus package, with the OECD projecting a 1.1 percentage point increase to world real GDP growth. Chart 2Risk Assets Ignoring Rising Global Bond Yields Chart 3Big Growth Spillovers From US Fiscal Stimulus Countries that have the greater exposure to US demand, like Canada and Mexico, are expected to benefit a bit more than the rest of the world, but the expected boost to growth is consistent (around one half of a percentage point) from China to Europe to Japan to major emerging market countries like Brazil. That US-fueled pickup in global economic activity will help absorb some of the spare capacity that opened up during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Chart 4 and Chart 5, we show the estimates taken from the December 2020 OECD Economic Outlook for the output gaps in the US, euro area, UK, Japan, Canada and Australia for 2021 and 2022. We adjust those projections by the OECD’s estimate of the impact of the US fiscal stimulus in 2021, as well as by the additional upward revisions to the OECD growth projections in 2021 and 2022 that were published last week. Chart 4The $1.9 Trillion Stimulus Will Close The US Output Gap … Chart 5… And Help Narrow Output Gaps Elsewhere Chart 6Maintain Below-Benchmark Duration The conclusion is that the US output gap will be eliminated in 2022, while output gaps will still be negative, but diminished, in the other countries after factoring in the impact of the latest US fiscal package. This suggests that the maximum upward pressure on global bond yields should still be centered in the US, where inflation pressures will be more evident and the Fed will likely begin signaling a shift to a less dovish stance sooner than other central banks (although not likely until much later in 2021). Our Global Duration Indicator continues to flag pressure for higher bond yields ahead for the major developed economies (Chart 6). The improving growth momentum means that rising real yields should increasingly become the more important driver of higher nominal bond yields. Persistent central bank dovishness in the face of that growth surge, however, means that it is still too soon to position for narrowing global inflation expectations or any bearish flattening of government bond yield curves - even in the US. Bottom Line: Markets are correctly interpreting the $1.9 trillion US fiscal stimulus package as a factor justifying higher global growth expectations and bond yields. Maintain a below-benchmark stance on overall global duration. Using Yield Betas For Bond Country Allocation, One More Time Over the past two months, we have published Special Reports that delved into the outlook for bond yields and currencies in Australia, Canada and the UK. We selected those three countries as they represented the most likely downgrade candidates within our recommended government bond country allocation given their status as “higher beta” bond markets that are more correlated to US Treasury yields. We estimate US Treasury yield betas from a rolling regression (over a three-year window) of changes in 10-year non-US government bond yields to changes in 10-year US Treasury yields (Chart 7). This allows us to assess which markets are more or less sensitive to the ups and downs of US bond yields. We have used this framework to help guide our country allocation strategy during the pandemic and, for the most part, it has been successful. Chart 7Government Bond Yield Sensitivities To USTs Are Shifting Fast So far in 2021, the markets with higher US Treasury yield betas (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) have underperformed the lower beta markets (Germany, France and Japan). We show that in the top panel of Chart 8, which plots the yield betas at the start of the year versus the year-to-date relative return of each country’s government bond market to that of the overall Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index. The returns are adjusted to reflect any differences in the durations of each country versus that of the overall index, and are shown in USD-hedged terms to allow for a common currency comparison. The bottom panel of Chart 8 shows the same relationship for the all of 2020. This is a mirror image of what has occurred so far in 2021, with the countries with higher yield betas outperforming the lower beta markets. The obvious difference between the two years is the direction of Treasury yields, which fell in 2020 and have been rising this year. So far in 2020, the differences between the returns of the higher beta markets have been quite similar. New Zealand has had the biggest negative performance (-2.8% versus the global benchmark), but this has only been moderately worse than Australia (-2.6%) and Canada (-2.4%). These are all just slightly worse than the return of US Treasuries relative to the Global Treasury index (-2.3%). Our estimated yield betas have changed rapidly over the past few months. For example, the rolling three-year yield beta of Australia has shot up from 0.61 at the beginning of the year to 0.78, while Canada has seen a similar move (0.81 to 0.88). This reflects the rapid repricing of interest rate expectations in both countries as current growth momentum and growth expectations improve. While not a perfect relationship, yield betas do show some correlation to our Central Bank Monitors – designed to measure the pressure on central banks to tighten of ease monetary policy (Chart 9). The latest increases in the yield betas of Australia, New Zealand and Canada have occurred alongside a rising trend in our Central Bank Monitors for each nation. The implication is that the relative underperformance of government bonds in those countries is related to the cyclical pressure for the RBA, RBNZ and BoC to tighten monetary policy. Chart 8An Intuitive Link Between Yield Betas & Bond Market Performance Chart 9Cyclical Pressures & Yield Betas Are Linked At the same time, the yield betas of government bonds in Germany and the UK have remained low despite the cyclical upturn in our ECB and BoE Monitors. The lingering impact of COVID-19 lockdowns on economic growth and inflation in the euro area and UK is likely weighing on bond yields in both regions. This limits any challenge to the dovish forward guidance of the ECB and BoE, in contrast to the repricing of interest rate expectations seen in other countries. The market-implied path of policy interest rates extracted from OIS forward curves does show a much more aggressive expected path of policy rates in the higher beta markets versus the lower beta markets (Chart 10). Chart 10More Rate Hikes Expected In The Higher Yield Beta Countries​​​​​​​ The “liftoff” date for each central bank shown, representing when the first full interest rate hike is priced into the OIS forwards, is shown in Table 1. We rank the countries in the table by the amount of time until the discounted liftoff date, from shortest to longest. The first rate hike is expected in New Zealand in June 2022, with the BoC expected to lift rates in Canada two months later. The market is not pricing a full rate hike by the Fed until January 2023, while liftoff in the UK and Australia are expected during the summer of 2023. Table 1The "Pecking Order" Of Global Liftoff We treat the countries with perpetually low interest rates, the euro area and Japan, differently in Table 1, as both the ECB and BoJ would most likely move slowly if and when they ever decided to raise rates again. Thus, we define liftoff as only a 10bp increase in policy interest rates for those two regions, while for all the other central banks we assume the size of the first rate hike will be 25bps. On that reduced basis, the market is priced for “liftoff” by the ECB and BoJ in September 2023 and February 2025, respectively. In terms of that “order of liftoff” shown in Table 1, we generally agree with current market pricing except for New Zealand and Canada. We fully expect the Fed to be the first central bank to begin signaling the path towards monetary policy normalization, largely due to the impact of the fiscal stimulus, starting with a move to begin tapering the Fed’s asset purchases at the start of 2022. The Fed will also be the first to begin rate hikes after tapering. We do not anticipate the BoC or Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to make any hawkish moves (reduced asset purchases or rate hikes) before the Fed does the same, as this would put unwanted appreciation pressures on the New Zealand and Canadian dollars. We expect the BoC and RBNZ to move soon after the Fed begins to shift, followed by the BoE and RBA a bit later after that in line with the current liftoff ordering. The pace of rate hikes after liftoff also appears to be a bit too aggressively priced in the countries with higher yield betas. The cumulative amount of interest rate increases to the end of 2024 currently priced in OIS curves is larger in Canada (175bps) and Australia (156bps) than the US (139bps) and New Zealand (140bps). The relative differences are not huge, however, but we think the odds favor the Fed delivering the greater amount of rate hikes over the next three years. More generally, when looking at what is more important for each central bank in determining the timing of liftoff, we can boil it down to a couple of the most important measures for the higher beta countries (Chart 11): US: The Fed will continue to focus on both inflation expectations and broad measures of labor market utilization before signaling any policy shift. On that basis, there is still some way to go before TIPS breakevens return to the 2.3-2.5% level we believe to be consistent with the Fed sustainably hitting its 2% inflation goal on the PCE deflator. Also, there is still a lot of ground to cover before the US labor market fully returns to pre-pandemic health, as the employment/population ratio is four percentage points below the pre-COVID peak. New Zealand: The RBNZ is now under a lot more pressure to tighten policy after the New Zealand government changed the central bank’s remit to include stabilizing house prices, which have soured to unaffordable levels that have exacerbated income inequality. With house prices now rising at a 19% annual rate, the highest since 2004, the RBNZ will be under pressure to hike sooner, although any associated rise in the New Zealand dollar will likely be of equal concern. Canada: The BoC has been very candid that its current policy mix of aggressive asset purchases and 0% policy rates will be altered if the Canadian economy improves. We believe that the current trends of booming house price inflation, recovering business investment prospects and a rapidly recovering labor market will all make the BoC more willing to signal tighter monetary policy fairly soon after the Fed does the same. Australia: The RBA is likely to continue surprising bond markets with its dovishness in the face of a rapidly recovering economy, given underwhelming inflation. In a recent speech, RBA Governor Philip Lowe noted that Australian inflation will not return to the RBA’s 2-3% target band without wage growth rising from the current 1.4% pace up to 3%. The RBA does not expect the labor market to tighten enough to generate that kind of wage growth until at least 2024, suggesting no eagerness to begin normalizing monetary policy. Among the lower-beta markets, the most important things that will dictate future policy moves are the following (Chart 12): Chart 11What To Watch In The Higher Yield Beta Countries Chart 12What To Watch In The Lower Yield Beta Countries UK: The BoE’s current focus is on how fast the UK economy recovers from the pandemic shock, with inflation expectations remaining elevated (see the next section of this report). The degree of strength in business investment and consumer spending will thus dictate the timing of any BoE shift to a less accommodative policy stance. Euro Area: The latest set of ECB projections call for inflation to only reach 1.4% by 2023. As long as inflation (both realized and expected) stays well below the 2% ECB target, the central bank will focus more on supporting easy financial conditions (lower corporate bond yields, tighter Italy-Germany yield spreads and resisting euro currency strength). Japan: Inflation continues to underwhelm in Japan, and the BoJ is a long way from contemplating any tightening measures. Summing it all up, we still see value in using yield betas to dictate our recommended fixed income country allocations. Although these should be complemented with assessments of the relative likelihood of central banks moving before others to further refine country allocations. Bottom Line: Within government bond portfolios, overweighting the “lower-beta” countries that have bond yields less sensitive to changes in US yields (Germany, France, Japan) versus the higher-beta markets (Canada, Australia, UK) remains the appropriate strategy during the current bond bear market. Underweights should remain concentrated in the US, though, as it is highly unlikely that any central bank will begin to tighten policy before the Fed. A Brief Follow-Up To Our UK Special Report In our Special Report on the UK published last week, we noted that the UK had the lowest real bond yields and highest inflation expectations among the developed market countries with inflation-linked bonds.1 Some astute clients pointed out that we neglected to discuss how the UK inflation-linked bonds are priced off the UK Retail Price Index (RPI) which typically runs with a faster inflation rate than the UK Consumer Price Index (CPI). This creates a downward bias to UK real yields in comparison to other countries that use domestic CPI indices in inflation-linked bond pricing. We did not ignore the RPI-CPI differential in our report, we just did not think it to be relevant to the conclusions of our report. The UK still has the lowest real rates and highest inflation expectations even after adjusting both by the RPI-CPI gap (Chart 13). Furthermore, survey-based measures of UK inflation expectations are broadly in line with the RPI-based inflation breakevens, confirming the message from the RPI-based real yields and inflation expectations. Chart 13UK Real Yields Are Too Low, Using RPI Or CPI Looking ahead, the RPI-CPI gap is likely to stay in a much narrower range compared to its longer run history. Chart 14A Less Active BoE Has Narrowed The RPI-CPI Gap For example, between 2000 and 2007, the RPI-CPI gap averaged a full percentage point but with very large fluctuations (Chart 14). This is because mortgage interest costs are included in the RPI but are not part of the CPI. Thus, RPI inflation tends to be more volatile when the BoE is more active in adjusting interest rates. After the 2008 financial crisis, the BoE has kept policy rates at very low levels with very few changes. The RPI-CPI gap has narrowed as a result, averaging only one-half of a percentage point between 2009 to today. Thus, our conclusion on UK bond yields remains the same – Gilt yields are too low and are likely to rise further over the next 6-12 months.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy/Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Why Are UK Interest Rates Still So Low?",dated March 10, 2021, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com and fes.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index ​​​​​​​ Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights UK Interest Rates: A series of rolling shocks dating back to the 2008 financial crisis has prevented the Bank of England (BoE) from normalizing crisis-era levels of interest rates, even during years when inflation was overshooting the BoE 2% target. Brexit and COVID-19 were the last of those two shocks, but the growth- and inflation-dampening effects of both are fading fast. Implications for Gilts & GBP: The BoE’s dovish rhetoric, including hints that negative policy rates are still a viable option, looks increasingly inappropriate. The surge in real UK bond yields seen over the past month is just the beginning of a medium-term process of interest rate normalization. Maintain below-benchmark duration on Gilts, while downgrading UK allocations within dedicated global fixed income portfolios to neutral. The pound has upside in this environment, especially if depressed UK productivity starts to recover. Feature Chart 1UK Real Yields: Deeply Negative The UK has become one of the more peculiar corners of the global fixed income universe. The outright level of longer-term Gilt yields is in the middle of the pack among the major advanced economies. The story is much different, however, when breaking those nominal UK yields into the real and inflation expectations components. The deeply negative real yields on UK inflation-linked Gilts are the lowest among the majors, even in a world where sub-0% real yields are prevalent in most countries (Chart 1). The flipside of that deeply negative real yield is a high level of inflation expectations. The breakeven inflation rate derived from the difference between the nominal and real 10-year Gilt yields is 3.3%, the highest in the developed “linkers” universe. Inflation expectations in UK consumer surveys are at similar levels, well above the 2% inflation target of the Bank of England (BoE), suggesting little confidence in the central bank’s ability or willingness to hit its own inflation goals. In this Special Report, jointly published by BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy, we investigate why UK real interest rates have remained so persistently negative and assess the possibility of a shift in the low interest rate regime in a post-Brexit, post-pandemic UK – a move that could be quite bearish for UK fixed income markets and bullish for the British pound. Can The BoE Ignore Cyclical Upward Pressure On UK Bond Yields? The UK has suffered from a series of shocks, starting with the 2008 crisis, that have limited the ability of the BoE to attempt to tighten monetary policy. The 2011/12 European debt crisis hurt the UK’s most important trading partners, while the 2016 Brexit vote began a multi-year process of uncertainty over the future of those trading relationships. The COVID-19 pandemic is the latest shock, triggering a recession of historic proportions. The UK economy contracted by -10% in 2020, the largest decline since “The Great Frost” downturn of 1709. UK bond yields collapsed in response as the BoE cut rates to near-0% and reinforced that easy stance with aggressive quantitative easing and promises to keep rates unchanged over at the next few years. Today, UK financial markets are waking up to a world beyond the current COVID-19 lockdowns. The UK is running one of the world’s most successful vaccination rollouts, with 23 million jabs, or 35 per 100 people, already having been administered. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson recently unveiled a bold plan to fully reopen the UK economy from the current severe lockdowns by mid-year. The UK government’s latest budget called for additional spending measures over the next year, including maintaining the work furlough scheme that has supported household incomes during the pandemic. As a result, UK growth expectations have exploded higher. According to the Bloomberg consensus economics survey, UK nominal GDP growth is expected to surge to 8.4% over calendar year 2021, an annual pace not seen since 1990 (Chart 2). Nominal Gilt yields have begun to reprice higher to reflect those surging growth expectations, with the 5-year/5-year forward Gilt yield climbing 67bps so far in 2021. Real Gilt yields are also moving higher with the 10-year inflation-linked Gilt climbing 38bps year to date, providing additional interest rate support that has fueled a surge in the pound versus the dollar (bottom panel). Our own BoE Monitor - containing growth, inflation and financial variables that typically lead to pressure on the central bank to adjust monetary policy – is signaling a reduced need for additional policy easing (Chart 3). The momentum of changes in longer-maturity UK Gilts and the trade-weighted UK currency index are usually correlated to the ebbs and flows of the BoE Monitor. The latest surge higher in yields and the currency suggests that the markets are anticipating the type of recovery that will put pressure on the BoE to tighten. Chart 2A Growth-Driven Repricing Of Gilts & GBP Chart 3Gilts & GBP Sniffing Out A Less Dovish BoE? It may take a while to see the BoE turn more hawkish, however. The BoE has become one of least active central banks in the world over the past decade. After the BoE cut its official policy interest rate, the Bank Rate, by 500bps during the 2008 financial crisis and 2009 recession, rates were kept in a range between 0.25% and 0.75% for ten consecutive years. The BoE cut rates aggressively in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, lowering the Bank Rate in March 2020 from 0.75% to 0.1%, where it still stands. The BoE has used quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance to try and limit movements in bond yields whenever cyclical surges in inflation could have justified tighter monetary policy. That has led to an extended period of a negative BoE Bank Rate, something not seen since the inflationary 1970s (Chart 4). Back then, the BoE was lagging the surge in UK inflation, but still hiking nominal interest rates. Today, the central bank is keeping nominal rates near 0% with much lower levels of inflation. Chart 4Over A Decade Of Negative Real UK Interest Rates Short-term interest rate markets are still pricing in a very slow response from the BoE to the current growth optimism. Only 36bps of rate hikes over the next two years are discounted in the UK overnight index swap (OIS) curve. This go-slow response is in line with the BoE’s guidance on future rate hikes which, similar to the language used by other central banks like the Fed, calls for no pre-emptive rate hikes before inflation has sustainably returned to the BoE target. That combination would be consistent with current forward market pricing on both short-term interest rates and inflation. Chart 5BoE Keeping Real Rates Well Below R* In Chart 5, we show the real BoE Bank Rate, constructed by subtracting UK core CPI inflation from the Bank Rate. We also show a forward real rate calculated using the forward UK OIS and CPI swap curves. The market-implied path of the real Bank Rate shows very little change over the next decade, with the real Bank Rate expected to average around -2.5%. This is far below the estimates of a neutral UK real rate (or “r-star”) of just under 2%, as calculated by the New York Fed or recent academic studies. The neutral UK real rate has likely dipped because of the pandemic. The UK Office For Budget Responsibility (OBR) estimates that there has been a long-term “scarring” of the UK economy from COVID-19 through supply-side factors like weaker investment spending, lower productivity growth and diminished labor force participation – equal to three percentage points of the level of potential GDP.1 The BoE estimates a smaller “scarring” of 1.75 percentage points of potential output, but coming with a 6.5% reduction in the size of the UK capital stock. While these are significant reductions in the supply-side of the UK economy, they are not enough to account for the 4.5 percentage point difference between pre-pandemic estimates of the UK r-star and the market-implied path of the real BoE Bank Rate over the next decade. The implication is that the markets are not expecting the BoE to deviate from its strategy of doing very little with interest rates, even as growth recovers from the pandemic shock. That can be seen in the recent upturn in UK inflation expectations that is evident in both market-implied and survey-based measures. Chart 6UK Inflation Expectations Reflect BoE Policy, Not Actual Inflation The 5-year/5-year forward UK CPI swap rate now sits at 3.6%, not far off the 3.3% level of 5-10 year consumer inflation expectations from the latest YouGov/Citigroup survey (Chart 6). The fact that inflation expectations can remain so elevated at a time when headline CPI inflation is struggling to avoid deflation is striking. This indicates a belief that the BoE will do very little in the future to stop a booming UK economy that is expected to put sustained downward pressure on the UK unemployment rate over the next few years (bottom panel). This is from a relatively low starting point of the unemployment rate given the massive government support programs that have limited the amount of pandemic-related layoffs over the past year. The BoE should have reasons to be more concerned about a resurgence of UK inflation. In its latest Monetary Policy Report, the BoE published estimates showing that the entire collapse in UK inflation in 2020 was attributable to weaker demand for goods and services – especially the latter (Chart 7). This suggests that UK inflation could rebound by a similar amount as the UK economy reopens from pandemic lockdowns. According to the UK OBR, 21% of UK household spending is on items described as “social consumption”, like restaurants and hotels (Chart 8). This is a much larger proportion than seen in other major developed economies (excluding Spain) and explains why consumer spending plunged so much more dramatically in the UK during 2020 than in other countries. Chart 7Only A Temporary Drag On UK Inflation From COVID-19 Chart 8UK Households More Focused On “Social Consumption” If the UK pandemic-related restrictions are eased as planned over the next few months, the potential for a sharp snapback in UK consumer spending is significant. The BoE estimates that UK households now have £125bn of “excess” savings thanks to government income support and reduced spending on discretionary items like dining out and vacations. This is the fuel to support a rapid recovery in consumption over the next 6-12 months, especially as personal income growth will get a boost as furloughed workers begin returning to work (Chart 9). Chart 9UK Economy On The Mend Chart 10Big Boost To UK Growth From Housing & Government Spending A similar argument can be made for investment spending – the BoE estimates that UK businesses have amassed £100bn pounds of excess cash, and the latest reading on the BoE’s Agents' Survey of UK firms shows a slight increase after months of decline (bottom panel). With a Brexit deal with the EU finally reached at the start of 2021, UK businesses can also look to increase investment spending that had been delayed because of the years of Brexit uncertainty. The UK economy is already getting a boost from a recovery in the housing market fueled by low interest rates, high household savings and improving consumer confidence. Mortgage approvals have soared to the highest level since 2007, while house prices are now expanding at a 6.4% annual rate (Chart 10). Add it all up, and the economic momentum in the UK is positive and likely to accelerate further in the coming months as a greater share of the population becomes vaccinated. The BoE’s dovish policy stance is likely to appear increasingly inappropriate relative to accelerating UK growth and inflation trends over the next several months. Thus, on a cyclical basis, UK bond yields, both nominal and real, have more upside potential even after the recent increase. Bottom Line: A series of rolling shocks dating back to the 2008 financial crisis has prevented the Bank of England (BoE) from normalizing crisis-era levels of interest rates, even during years when inflation was overshooting the BoE 2% target. Brexit and COVID-19 were the last of those two shocks, but the growth- and inflation-dampening effects of both are fading fast. Structural Forces Keeping UK Interest Rates Low Are Fading Looking beyond the cyclical drivers, the structural factors that have held down UK interest rates in recent years are also starting to fade. The supply side of the UK economy has suffered because of Brexit uncertainty. The OECD’s estimate of potential UK GDP growth fell from 1.75% in 2015 to 1.0% in 2020 (Chart 11). This was mostly due to declining productivity growth – a consequence of years of very weak business investment. The 5-year annualized growth rate of real UK investment spending fell to -3% in 2020, a contraction only matched during the past 30 years after the 1992 ERM crisis and 2008 financial crisis. That plunge in investment coincided with almost no growth in UK labor productivity over that same 5-year window. Chart 11The Road To Faster Potential UK Growth Starts With Investment Slowing population growth also weighed on UK potential growth, slowing to the lowest level in 15 years in 2019 as immigration from EU countries to the UK fell sharply. COVID-19 also hurt immigration flows into the UK last year. The UK Office for National Statistics estimated that the non-UK born population in the UK fell by 2.7% between June 2019 and June 2020. Diminished potential GDP growth is a factor that would structurally reduce the equilibrium real UK interest rate. We are likely past the worst for that downward pressure on potential growth and real rates. Population growth should also stabilize as the UK borders open up again and pandemic travel restrictions are loosened. Measured productivity is already starting to see a cyclical recovery, while investment spending is likely to improve as cash-rich UK companies began to ramp up capital spending plans deferred by Brexit and COVID-19. While the process leading from faster investment spending into speedier productivity growth is typically slow, the key point is that the worst of downtrend is likely over. This is an important development that has implications for UK fixed income markets. When looking at an international comparison of real central bank policy rates within the developed economies, the UK has fallen into the grouping of countries with persistently negative policy rates, namely Japan, the euro area, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway (Chart 12). We have dubbed that group the “Secular Stagnation 5”, after the term made famous by former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers describing a state where the “natural” real rate of interest (r-star) that equates savings with investment is structurally negative. Chart 12Does The UK Belong In The 'Secular Stagnation 5'? Does the UK belong in the “Secular Stagnation 5”? As a way to assess this, we made some comparisons of selected UK data with the same data for those five countries. When looking at potential GDP growth and population growth, the UK sits right in the middle of the range of those growth rates for the five countries (Chart 13). UK productivity growth has underperformed the others recently but, prior to the 2016 Brexit shock, UK productivity was also in the middle of the Secular Stagnation 5 range. Chart 13Brexit Became A Major Hit To UK Potential Growth Chart 14UK Economy Less Focused On Investment & Exports On other measures, the UK is nothing like those other countries. The UK’s economy is far less geared towards exports and investment (Chart 14) and is more tilted towards consumer spending. That can be seen most clearly when looking at the data on savings/investment balances. The UK continuously runs a current account deficit, as opposed to the persistent surpluses seen in the Secular Stagnation 5 (Chart 15). Put another way, the UK is not a “surplus” country that saves more than it invests on a structural basis, a condition that typically depresses real interest rates. Chart 15The UK Is Not A Surplus Country Chart 16Gilts Will Not Become A Low-Beta Market Based on these cross-country comparisons, it is unusual for the UK to have such persistently low real interest rates. This has implications for UK bond yields. Over the past few years, Gilts have been transitioning from a status as a “high yield beta” market – whose yield movements are more correlated to swings in the overall level of global bond yields. The lower beta markets are in countries like Germany, France and Japan – all members of the Secular Stagnation club (Chart 16). The UK does not appear to warrant a permanent membership in that low-yielding group, based on structural factors. That is evident when looking at how Gilt yields are rising even with the BoE absorbing an increasing share of the stock of outstanding Gilts (bottom panel). We conclude that the transition of the UK to a low-beta market is related to the Brexit uncertainty post 2016 and the pandemic shock that has hit the consumer-focused UK economy exceptionally hard – both factors that are set to fade over the next year. Bottom Line: The BoE’s dovish rhetoric, including hints that negative policy rates are still a viable option, looks increasingly inappropriate. The surge in real UK bond yields seen over the past month is just the beginning of a medium-term process of interest rate normalization. Investment Conclusions Chart 17Downgrade Gilts To Underweight Our assessment of the cyclical and structural drivers of UK interest rates leads us to the following conclusions on UK fixed income and currency strategy: Duration: Maintain a below-benchmark exposure to UK interest rate movements. Gilt yields will rise by more than is discounted in the forwards over the next 6-12 months (Chart 17), coming more through rising real yields as the UK economy continues its post-Brexit, post-pandemic recovery. Country Allocation: Downgrade strategic allocations to UK Gilts to neutral from overweight in dedicated fixed income portfolios. Our long-standing view that Brexit uncertainty would lead to the outperformance of Gilts versus other developed bond markets is no longer valid. It is still too soon to move to a full underweight stance on Gilts – a better opportunity will develop by mid-year once it is more evident that the current success on UK vaccinations leads to a faster reopening of the UK economy. Yield Curve: Maintain positioning for a bearish steepening of the UK Gilt yield curve. While there is limited scope for more steepening through an even larger increase in inflation breakevens from current elevated levels, the long end of the Gilt curve can move higher by more than the front end as the market re-rates Gilts to a higher-beta status with a higher future trajectory for UK interest rates. Corporate Credit: Downgrade UK investment grade corporate bond exposure to neutral from overweight in dedicated fixed income portfolios. UK corporate spreads have returned to the 2017 lows and, while an improving growth dynamic is not overly bearish for credit, there is no longer a compelling valuation-based case for staying overweight UK investment grade corporates. This move brings our recommended UK allocation in line with our neutral stance on US and euro area investment grade corporates. Chart 18GBP/USD Appears Cheap On A PPP Basis Chart 19Low Productivity Is Weighing On The Pound Currency: A growth-driven path towards interest rate normalization should be positive for the British pound, which remains undervalued versus the US dollar on a purchasing power parity basis (Chart 18).2 A move to 1.45 on GBP/USD is possible within the next six months. A broader move towards pound strength will require an improvement in business investment, as the trade-weighted pound looks fairly valued on our productivity-based model (Chart 19). We do maintain our view that EUR/GBP can approach 0.80 by year-end based on a relatively stronger cyclical improvement in UK growth versus the euro area.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For further details on the OBR estimates of UK growth, inflation and fiscal policy, please see the March 2021 OBR Economic & Financial Outlook, which can be found here: https://obr.uk/ 2 Please see BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy Report, "Thoughts On The British Pound", dated December 18, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com.

Dear client, In addition to this week’s abbreviated report, we are also sending you a Special Report on currency hedging, authored by my colleague Xiaoli Tang. Xiaoli’s previous work mapped out a dynamic hedging strategy for developed market equity investors in various home currencies. In this report, she extends the work to emerging market exposure. I hope you will find the report insightful. Next week, in lieu of our weekly report on Friday, we will be sending you a joint Special Report on the UK on Tuesday, together with our Global Fixed Income colleagues. Kind regards, Chester Highlights The DXY index is up for the year, but further gains will be capped at 2-3% from current levels. Long yen positions are offside amid the dollar rally. This should wash out stale longs, and underpin the bull case. Lower the limit-sell on the gold/silver ratio to 68. We were stopped out of our short AUD/MXN position amidst a broad-based selloff in EM currencies. We are reinitiating the trade this week. Feature Chart I-1The Dollar Has Been Strong In 2021 The DXY index has once again kissed off the 90 level and is gaining momentum in March. Year-to-date, the DXY index is up 1.1%. This performance has been particularly pronounced against other safe haven currencies, such as the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen. GBP and AUD have fared rather well in this environment (Chart I-1). As the “anti-dollar,” the euro has also suffered.  Our technical indicators continue to warn that the dollar still has upside. Net speculative positions are at very depressed levels, consistent with many sentiment indicators that are bearish USD. However, this time around, any dollar rally could be capped at 2-3%, in sharp contrast to the bounce we witnessed in March 2020.  The Message From Dollar Technical Indicators Our dollar capitulation index has bounced from very oversold levels, and is now sitting above neutral territory (Chart I-2). The index comprises a standardized measure of sentiment, net speculative positioning and momentum. It is very rare that a drop in this index below the -1.5 level does not trigger a rebound in the dollar. This time around, the bounce has been rather muted. Chart I-2BCA Dollar Capitulation Index Suggests Some Upside Part of the reason has been concentration around dollar short positions. Investors throughout most of the pandemic executed their bearish dollar bets through the euro, yen and the Swiss franc (countries that already had negative interest rates). Positioning on risk on currencies such as the Australian dollar and the Mexican peso were neutral. This also explains the underperformance of the yen, as the dollar rises. From a sizing standpoint, ever since the dollar peaked in March 2020, counter-trend moves have been in the order of 2-3%. We expect this time to be no different. What To Do About The Yen The yen has been one of our core holdings on three fundamental pillars: it is cheap, it tends to rise during dollar bear markets and the economy in Japan is more hostage to deflation than the US. This bodes well for real rates in Japan, relative to the US. Over the last month, our long yen position has been put offside. First, demand for safe havens has ebbed as US interest rates have gapped higher (Chart I-3, panel 1). King dollar has once again become the safe haven of choice. As Chart I-1 illustrates, low beta currencies such as the Swiss franc and yen, that tend to do relatively well when the dollar is rallying, have underperformed.  Yield curve control (YCC) in Japan is also negative for the yen as interest rates rise (panel 2). Economic momentum in Japan is also rolling over (panel 3). Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s mulling to extend the state of emergency in the Tokyo region could further cripple any Japanese economic recovery. Chart I-3A Healthy Reset In The Yen Chart I-4USD/JPY Support Should Hold For short-term investors, USD/JPY is very overbought and is approaching strong resistance (Chart I-4). In our view, a washing out of stale shorts would provide a healthy reset for the bear market to resume. Meanwhile, USD/JPY and the DXY change correlations during risk-off periods, where the yen appreciates versus the dollar.  Therefore, a market reset is also positive for the yen.     Housekeeping Chart I-5Remain Short AUD/MXN We were stopped out of our short AUD/MXN trade last week for a loss of 6.1%. We are reinitiating the trade this week. The case for the trade, made a month ago, remains intact. A short-term recovery in the US economy, relative to the rest of the world, argues for an AUD/MXN short. In fact, a divergence has occurred between the BRL/MXN and the AUD/MXN exchange rate (Chart I-5). Domestic factors have certainly tempered the Brazilian real, but the underperformance of metal prices relative to oil in recent months is also a factor. We expect some convergence to occur, with MXN appreciating much faster than the AUD.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have stepped up: Personal income rose by 10% in January, while personal spending rose by 2.4% month-on-month. The ISM report was stellar. The manufacturing PMI improved from 58.7 to 60.8 in February. Prices paid rose to 86. Factory orders were slightly above expectations at 2.6% month-on-month in January.   The DXY index rose by 165 bps this week.  The narrative of a counter-trend reversal in the DXY index isn playing out. As the story unfolds, it will be important to establish targets. Our bias is that the DXY stalls before 93-94 is reached.  Report Links: Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Sizing A Potential Dollar Bounce - January 15, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area remain weak: Core CPI in the Eurozone came in at 1.1%, in line with expectations. The unemployment rate declined from 8.3% to 8.1% in January. January retail sales were weak at -6.4% year-on-year. The euro fell by 1.7%% against the US dollar this week. It will be almost impossible for the euro to rise in an environment where the dollar is in a broad-based decline. Given elevated sentiment on the euro, a healthy reset is necessary for the bull market to resume. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan has been marginally positive: The employment report was positive, with the unemployment rate dipping to 2.9% and an improvement in the jobs-to-applicants ratio in January. Consumer confidence in February is rebounding from very low levels. The Japanese yen fell by 1.5% against the US dollar this week. The recovery in the Japanese economy is fragile, and tentative signs of a renewed lockdown will knock down confidence. In this transition phase, yen long positions could be hostage to losses. Longer-term, the yen is cheap and will benefit from a broad-based dollar decline. Report Links: On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data out of the UK have been in line: Mortgage approvals rose 99K in January, in line with expectations. The construction PMI rose from 49.2 to 53.3 in February. Nationwide house prices are soaring, rising 6.9% in February on a year-on-year basis. The pound fell by 0.8% against the dollar this week. It is however the best performing currency this year. Our short EUR/GBP trade has benefited from faster vaccination in the UK (that could give way to a faster reopening of the economy) and a nice valuation starting point. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia was robust: Home lending remained in an uptrend. Owner-occupied loans increased by 11% in January, while investor loans increased by 9.4%. Terms of trade are soaring, rising 24% year-on-year in February. The current account surplus came in near a record A$14.5 billion in Q4. GDP grew by 3.1% QoQ in Q4. The Aussie fell by 1.8% his week. Terms of trade will continue being a tailwind for the AUD/USD. We also like the AUD/NZD cross, as a valuation and terms-of-trade bet. However, we expect that any positive surprises in the US will hurt AUD relative to the Americas. One way to play this is by shorting AUD/MXN. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 An Update On The Australian Dollar - September 18, 2020 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 There was scant data out of New Zealand this week: Terms of trade rose by 1.3% in Q4. CoreLogic home prices rose 14.5% in February. The New Zealand dollar fell by 2.4% against the US dollar this week. The kiwi ranks as the most unattractive currency in our FX framework. For one, it has catapulted itself to the most expensive currency in our PPP models. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada was positive: The Nanos confidence index rose from 58.2 to 59.4 in February. Annualized 4Q GDP came in at 9.6%, above expectations. Building permits rose 8.2% month-on-month in January. The Canadian dollar fell 0.4% against the US dollar this week. Oil prices remain very much in an uptrend, which is underpinning the loonie. Better US economic performance in the near term should also help the CAD. Report Links: Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data out of Switzerland have been improving: Swiss GDP rose by 0.3%  quarter-on-quarter in 4Q. The KOF leading indicator rose from 96.5 to 102.7 in February. The February manufacturing PMI rose from 59.4 to 61.3. Switzerland remains in deflation, with the core CPI that came in at -0.3% year-on-year in February. The Swiss franc fell by 2.6% against the US dollar this week. Safe -haven currencies continue to be laggards, as rates rise and gold falls to the wayside. This is bullish on  procyclical currencies, and negative the Swiss franc. We are long EUR/CHF on this basis, but short USD/JPY purely as portfolio insurance. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The data out of Norway has been robust: The unemployment rate fell from 4.4% to 4.3% The manufacturing PMI increased from 51.8 to 56.1 in February. The current account balance was robust in Q4. It should increase significantly in Q1 this year given the large trade balance in January. Being long the Norwegian krone is one of our high-conviction bets in the FX portfolio. The Norwegian krone fell by 1% against the US dollar this week, but outperformed the euro, amongst other currencies. The NOK ticks all the boxes of an attractive currency – cheap valuations, a liquidity discount, and primed to benefit from a global growth rebound. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Most Swedish data releases were in line with expectations: GDP came in at -0.2% quarter-on-quarter, below expectations. Retail sales rose 3.1% year-on-year, above expectations. The trade balance came in at a surplus of SEK 5.2 billion  in January. The manufacturing PMI remained elevated at 61.6 in February. The Swedish krona fell by 2.4% against the US dollar this week. Manufacturing data is improving in Sweden but the economy remains hostage to COVID-19, compared to Norway. That is weighing on the krona. That said, Sweden is a highly levered play on the global cycle. Therefore, once the pandemic is behind us, the SEK will outperform. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Rising Global Yields: The increased turbulence in global bond markets is part of the adjustment process to a more positive outlook for global economic growth. Rising real yields are now the main driver of nominal yield movements, with stable inflation expectations indicating that investors are not overly concerned about a sustained inflation overshoot. Duration: Central bankers will eventually be forced to shift to less dovish interest rate guidance to reflect the new reality of faster growth and increased inflation pressures, but this is likely to not occur until much later in 2021, starting with the Fed. Maintain a below-benchmark cyclical duration stance in global bond portfolios. UST Yields & Spreads: The selloff in US Treasuries has pushed US yields to levels that are starting to look a bit stretched relative to yields from other major developed economies like Germany and Japan. This is especially true on a volatility-adjusted basis. As a result, we are closing our tactical US-Germany spread widening trade in bond futures at a profit of 1.8%. Feature Chart of the WeekBond Yields Are Rising Because Of Growth The rapid surge in global bond yields seen so far in 2021 has led some commentators to declare that the dreaded “bond vigilantes” have returned to dole out punishment for overly stimulative fiscal and monetary policies (most notably in the US). The rapid pace of the bond selloff, with the 10-year US Treasury yield reaching 1.6% on an intraday basis last week, has raised fears that spiking yields could damage a fragile global economic recovery. This logic is backwards – it is surging growth expectations that are driving bond yields sustainably higher from deeply depressed levels. Global growth is projected to accelerate at a very rapid pace over the rest of this year and 2022. The combination of the Bloomberg consensus real GDP growth and inflation forecasts for the major developed economies suggest that nominal year-over-year GDP growth is expected to climb to 7.2% in the US, 8.4% in the UK and 6.4% in the euro area by year-end (Chart of the Week). Nominal growth in 2022 is expected to grow by another 5-7% across the same regions, suggesting a return to a slightly faster pace than prevailed during the pre-pandemic years of 2017-19 - even after a boom in 2021. Nominal longer-term global government bond yields, which had been priced for a pandemic-stricken economic backdrop, are now playing catch-up to the new reality of a post-pandemic, vaccinated world. Bond investors understand that the need for extreme monetary accommodation is ebbing, especially in the US where there will be an enormous fiscal impulse to growth in 2021 (and beyond). As a result, interest rate expectations are moving higher, fueling a repricing towards higher bond yields around the world. This process has more room to run. A Global Move Higher In Yields, For The Right Reasons Chart 2Reflationary Bear-Steepening Of Global Yield Curves The cyclical rise in developed market bond yields that began last summer was initially focused on longer-maturity yields boosted by rising inflation expectations (Chart 2). The very front-ends of bond yield curves – which are more sensitive to expectations of changes in central bank policy rates – have remained subdued. The upward pressure on global bond yields is starting to infect some shorter maturities, however. 5-year government bonds yields in the UK, Canada and Australia rose 44bps, 42bps and 35bps, respectively, during the month of February. The latter two represented a near doubling of the level of the 5-year yield. In the case of the UK, the surge in 5-year Gilt yields came from a starting point of negative yields at the end of January. Last week, the 5-year US Treasury yield jumped a massive 22bps on a single day due to a poorly received US Treasury auction. Year-to-date, longer-term global bond yields have been rising more through the real yield component than higher inflation expectations (Charts 3A & 3B). This is a change in the dynamics from the latter half of 2020 when inflation expectations were the dominant force pushing global yields higher. Chart 3AReal Yields Are Driving The Recent Bond Selloff … Chart 3B… Even In The Lower-Yielding Markets This shift in “leadership” of the global bond market selloff has been broad-based. 10-year real yields from inflation-linked bonds have surged higher in the US (+35bps year-to-date), UK (+40bps), Australia (+44bps) and Canada (+25bps). Real 10-year yields have even inched up in France (+9bps), despite euro area growth suffering because of COVID-19 lockdowns. This coordinated rise in real bond yields comes on the heels of a sharp improvement in overall global economic momentum and improving expectations for future growth. Manufacturing PMIs, a reliable leading indicator of real yields in the developed markets, began a cyclical improvement in the middle of last year and, right on cue, global bond yields bottomed out toward the end of 2020 (Chart 4). The link between that strong growth momentum and real bond yields comes from expected changes in central bank policies. Our Central Bank Monitors for the US, euro area, UK, Japan, Canada and Australia – designed to measure cyclical pressures on monetary policy - have all moved significantly higher since mid-2020 (Chart 5). This suggests a diminished need for additional monetary stimulus because of rebounding economic growth and intensifying inflation pressures. The Monitors have climbed to above pre-pandemic levels in the US and Australia. Chart 4Real Yields Starting To Catch Up To Solid Growth Chart 5Markets Starting To Discount Rate Hikes In 2023 Interest rate markets are responding to this cyclical pressure to tighten monetary policies by repricing the expected timing and pace of the next rate hiking cycle. Our 24-month discounters, which derive the amount of interest rate changes priced into overnight index swap (OIS) curves up to two years in the future, are now pricing in higher policy rates in the US (+40bps), the UK (+32bps), Australia (+36bps) and Canada (a whopping +82bps) by the first quarter of 2023. This repricing of interest rate expectations does conflict with current central bank forward guidance, to varying degrees. For example, the Fed continues to signal that there will not be any rate hikes until at least the end of 2023. Policymakers will not be overly concerned about higher government bond yields and shifting interest rate expectations, however, if there is limited spillover into broader financial market performance. In the US, the latest increase in real Treasury yields to date has had minimal impact on US equity market valuations or corporate bond yields (Chart 6A), suggesting no tightening of financial conditions that could impact future US economic growth. A similar situation is playing out in Europe, where higher longer-term real yields have had little impact on equity market valuations or the borrowing rates that the ECB is most concerned about, like Italian BTP yields (Chart 6B). Chart 6ANo Tightening Of Financial Conditions In The US... Chart 6B...Or Europe Currency valuations are a more important indicator of financial conditions for other central banks. For example, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has been explicit that its current policies – near-zero policy rates, yield curve control to anchor the level of 3-year bond yields and quantitative easing (QE) to moderate the level of longer-term yields – are intended to not only keep borrowing costs low but also dampen the value of the Australian dollar. At the moment, the US dollar is being pulled in different directions by the typical fundamental drivers. Real rate differentials between the US and other major developed economies remain unattractive for the greenback, even with the latest rise in US real yields (Chart 7). At the same time, growth differentials between the US and the other major economies are turning more USD-positive. For now, rate differentials are the more dominant factor for the US dollar and will remain so until the Fed begins to shift to a less dovish policy stance – an outcome that we do not expect until much later this year when the Fed will begin to prepare the market for a tapering of asset purchases in 2022. A sustainable bottoming of the US dollar, fueled by a shift to a less accommodative Fed, will also likely mark the end of the rising trend for global inflation expectations, given the links between the dollar, commodity prices and inflation breakevens (bottom panel). Central banks outside the US will continue to resist any unwelcome appreciation of their own currencies versus the US dollar. That means doing more QE when bond yields rise too quickly, as the RBA did this week and the ECB has threatened to do in recent comments from senior policymakers (Chart 8). Increasing the size of asset purchases is unlikely to sustainably drive non-US bond yields lower, however, in an environment of improving global growth that is causing investors to reassess the future path of interest rates. All more QE can hope to do at this point in the global business cycle is limit how fast bond yields can increase. Chart 7The USD Remains The Critical Reflationary Variable Chart 8More QE Is Less Effective At Capping Bond Yields   Chart 9Markets With A Lower Yield Beta To USTs Are Outperforming From an investment strategy perspective, the current growth-fueled move higher in global real bond yields does not change any of our suggested tilts. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark overall duration stance within global bond portfolios. Within our recommended country allocation among developed market government bonds, we continue to prefer a large underweight to US Treasuries and overweights to markets that are less susceptible to changes in US Treasury yields like Germany, France, Japan and the UK (Chart 9). We also continue to recommend only neutral allocations to Canadian and Australian government bonds (with below-benchmark duration exposure within those allocations), although we are on “downgrade alert” for both given their status as higher-beta bond markets with central banks more likely follow the Fed down a less dovish path later this year. Bottom Line: Rising real yields are now the main driver of nominal yield movements, with stable inflation expectations indicating that investors are not overly concerned about a sustained inflation overshoot. Central bankers will eventually be forced to shift to less dovish interest rate guidance to reflect the new reality of faster growth and increased inflation pressures, but this is likely to not occur until much later in 2021, starting with the Fed. Maintain a below-benchmark cyclical duration stance in global bond portfolios, with a large underweight allocation to US Treasuries. The UST-Bund Spread Widening Looks Stretched Chart 10Yield Chasing Has Been A Losing Strategy In 2021 Last August, we published a report discussing how “yield chasing” – a strategy of consistently favoring the highest yielding government bond markets – had become the default strategy for bond investors during the early months of the pandemic.1 We concluded that yield chasing would be a successful strategy for only as long as central banks stuck to their promises to maintain very loose monetary policy for the next few years. Investors would be forced to chase scarce yields in that environment, while worrying less about cyclical economic and inflation factors that could push up bond yields. Yield chasing has performed quite poorly so far in 2021. A basket of higher-yielding markets like the US, Canada and Australia has underperformed a basket of low-yielders like Germany, France and Japan by -1.4 percentage points (Chart 10). Obviously, such a carry-driven strategy would be expected to perform poorly during an environment of rising bond volatility as is currently the case. Markets that have been offering relatively enticing yields, like the US or Australia (Table 1), are actually generating the largest total return losses. Those higher-yielders have suffered more aggressive repricing of interest rate expectations, as discussed in the previous section of this report, leading to losses from duration that are dwarfing the higher yields. This is especially true in the US, where there remains the greater scope for an upward repricing of interest rate and inflation expectations. Table 1Government Bond Yields: Unhedged & Hedged Into USD This suggests that investors must be cautious on determining when to consider increasing exposure to higher yielders like the US, even after Treasury yields have increased substantially. One way to evaluate that is to look at the spreads between US Treasuries and low yielders like Germany and Japan, relative to US bond volatility. In Chart 11, we show the spread of 10-year US Treasuries to 10-year German Bunds. To facilitate a fair comparison between the two, we hedge the Treasury yield into euros while adjusting the spread for duration difference between the two bonds. The currency-hedged and duration-matched Treasury-Bund spread is shown in the middle panel of the chart. In the bottom panel, we adjust that spread for US interest rate volatility by dividing the spread by the level of the MOVE index of US Treasury option volatility. On an unadjusted basis, the 10-year yield gap now sits at 175bps, +70bps higher than the lows seen in August 2020. That spread is narrower on a currency hedged basis, with the 10-year US Treasury yield hedged into euros +73ps higher than the 10-year German bund yield. Two conclusions stand out from the chart: The currency-hedged and duration-matched spread is still well below the prior peaks dating back to 2000; The volatility-adjusted spread is already one standard deviation above the mean value since 2000. In other words, there is scope for US Treasuries yields to continue rising relative to German Bund yields based on levels reached in past cycles. Yet at the same time, the spread provides a reasonable level of compensation compared to the riskiness (volatility) of Treasuries, also based on past cycles. We show the same chart for the spread between 10-year US Treasuries and 10-year Japanese government bonds (JGBs) in Chart 12. In this case, there is also scope for additional spread widening although the volatility-adjusted spread is still not as attractive as at previous peaks since 2000. Chart 11UST-Bund Spread Looking Stretched Vs UST Vol Chart 12UST-JGB Spread Getting Stretched Vs UST Vol The message from the volatility-adjusted Treasury-Bund spread lines up with that of the momentum measures of the unadjusted spread. The latter is historically stretched relative to its 200-day moving average, while the change in the spread over the past six months has been as rapid as any of the moves seen since the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 13). Adding it all up, positioning for additional widening of the Treasury-Bund spread is a much poorer bet from a risk versus reward perspective than it was even a few months ago. On a fundamental medium-term basis, however, there is still room for the Treasury-Bund spread to widen further. Relative inflation and unemployment (spare capacity) trends both argue for relatively higher US bond yields (Chart 14). In addition, the Fed is almost certainly going to start tightening monetary policy well before the ECB, thus policy rate differentials will underpin a wider bond spread – although that is already largely discounted in the spread on a forward basis (top panel). Chart 13UST-Bund Spread Momentum Looks Stretched Chart 14Fundamentals Still Support A Wider UST-Bund Spread Chart 15Stay Underweight US Vs. Germany On A Strategic Basis Our fundamental fair value model of the 10-year Treasury-Bund spread shows that the spread is still cheap relative to fair value, which is rising (Chart 15). This suggests more medium-term upside in the spread, perhaps even by more than currently priced into the forwards over the next year. Based on this analysis, we see a case for maintaining a core strategic (6-12 month holding period) underweight position for the US versus Germany in our recommended country allocation within our model bond portfolio. At the same time, with the spread looking a bit stretched on some of the momentum and volatility-adjusted measures, we are taking profits on our tactical (0-6 month holding period) 10-year Treasury-Bund spread widening trade using bond futures, realizing a 1.8% return (see the Tactical Overlay table on page 18). Bottom Line: The selloff in US Treasuries has pushed US yields to levels that are starting to look a bit stretched relative to yields from other major developed economies like Germany and Japan. This is especially true on a volatility-adjusted basis. As a result, we are taking profits on our tactical US-Germany spread widening trade. However, we are maintaining our strategic overweight for Germany versus the US in our model bond portfolio, as fundamentals argue for a wider Treasury-Bund spread on a cyclical and strategic basis.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Report, "We’re All Yield Chasers Now", dated August 11, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights The pandemic is not yet over, but it appears that infections have peaked in the developed world and in most of the major developing economies. Economic growth will reaccelerate as social distancing abates and vaccination programs gather momentum. The current policy orthodoxy is night-and-day different from the orthodoxy that prevailed in the wake of the global financial crisis, as deficit shaming has given way to deficit positivity. Rapid expansion is more likely than a repeat of last decade’s tepid, plodding recovery and inflation will eventually supplant hysteresis as policymakers’ biggest worry. The impending passage of the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Act will vault the US ahead of its major economy counterparts in terms of pandemic spending. Washington’s massive fiscal commitment speeds up the timetable for closing the output gap in the US. Although inflation has become a hot topic among US investors, we do not see it materializing until next year at the earliest. Our base case has the Goldilocks backdrop of solid growth and ample monetary accommodation remaining in place for at least the rest of the year. Markets have fully discounted that scenario but investors should be aware that both downside and upside surprises are possible; bad virus news could drive a growth shortfall while households’ enormous excess savings could power a consumption breakout. The broad take-up of the Goldilocks scenario among equity investors will make it hard for stocks to dazzle in 2021. Nonetheless, we think conditions support mid-to-high single-digit returns, which will allow equities to outperform bonds. The combination of accelerating growth and quiescent central banks is catnip for equities but not so much for bonds, especially investment-grade sovereigns. Fixed-income investors should maintain below-benchmark duration as yield curves steepen. Steepening yield curves have given Financials a shot in the arm while weighing on the high-flying Tech sector. Reopening in the wake of COVID’s retreat should also redound to recent laggards’ benefit and we continue to expect value stocks will outperform their growth counterparts over the rest of the year. The US dollar will resume its downtrend as the virus is beaten back, albeit at a gentler pace than in 2020. Humanity Retakes The Lead Humankind cannot yet declare victory over COVID-19 but it does appear to have gained the upper hand as new case counts have plummeted from their January peak (Chart I-1). Restrictions helped turn the tide in Europe, albeit at the cost of cutting off oxygen to the economy (Chart I-2), but even in Sweden and the US, which eschewed EU-style restrictions, the virus has lost momentum. Increased vigilance apparently trumped fears that the coronavirus would flourish in the northern hemisphere winter. The potential for vaccine-resistant variants is a concern, but the pandemic news is clearly trending in the right direction. Chart I-1The Fever Has Broken Chart I-2Throwing The Merchants Out With The Bathwater As infections fall, so too does the strain on public health care systems. Plunging hospitalizations (Chart I-3) indicate that health care systems have recovered capacity. Hospitalizations are an important metric for tracking COVID’s impact on the economy because they lead restrictions on activity; when they are high and rising, officials are prone to limit person-to-person interaction, and when they are low and falling, officials roll back emergency limits. For services-heavy developed economies, easier restrictions are the key to a return to something more closely resembling normal activity until vaccinations confer herd immunity (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Restrictions Can Be Lifted As Health Care Systems Regain Capacity In the meantime, those who continue to be displaced by the pandemic and the distancing measures taken to combat it will fall back on fiscal support. Fourth-quarter deceleration in the United States highlighted the important role that fiscal transfers have played in keeping vulnerable households, businesses and communities afloat. The bulk of the transfers authorized under the CARES Act were distributed in two bursts. The first arrived in April and May via economic impact payments of $1,200 per adult and $500 per child that were paid in full to about two-thirds of American households1 (Chart I-5, top panel). Chart I-4Lockdowns Are A Drag Chart I-5Transfers Slowed To A Trickle In The Fall Chart I-6Fewer Transfers, Fewer Sales, ... The second burst came in the form of a weekly $600 federal unemployment insurance (UI) benefit supplement in April, May, June and July (Chart I-5, middle panel). Additional aid was provided by the pandemic unemployment assistance (PUA) program, which expanded UI benefits to independent contractors, self-employed individuals and other workers who would not otherwise qualify to receive them. The PUA program was the smallest of the three major transfer plans and the only one that ran until the end of the year, and as the arrival of the direct payment checks and final UI benefit supplements receded further into the past, the US economy began to show some signs of wear. Retail sales fell sequentially in all three months of the fourth quarter (Chart I-6) as total employment hit a wall (Chart I-7) and the economic surprise index swooned (Chart I-8).   Chart I-7... Fewer Jobs ... Chart I-8... And Fewer Positive Surprises Households’ ability to satisfy their obligations to creditors and landlords slipped as the year wore on as well. Fiscal transfers and forbearance programs have limited credit distress far more effectively than one would have expected when the COVID meteor hit the earth (Table I-1), but leading 30-day delinquency rates reveal a modest erosion since late summer (Chart I-9). The share of apartment renters paying at least some of their rent fell by more than one-and-a-half percentage points from year-ago levels in October, November, December and January, a first since the CARES Act transfers began to flow in time to help with the May rent (Chart I-10). It seems clear that lower-income households who relied most heavily on aid felt its absence as the year wore on. Table I-160- And 90-Day Consumer Delinquencies Are Down Year-Over-Year, ... Chart I-9... But Leading 30-Day Delinquencies Are On The Rise ... Chart I-10... And Apartment Rent Collections Have Been Slipping     We take the snapback in January retail sales as evidence that high marginal-propensity-to-consume households needed the second round of transfers provided for in December’s compromise spending bill. Both the economic impact payments ($600 per qualifying adult and $600 per child) and the supplemental UI benefits ($300 per week) were smaller, but the most vulnerable households put them to immediate use. We expect that February rent collections and consumer loan delinquencies will also show improvement, albeit not as dramatically as the retail sales series. With another, larger round of stimulus coming down the pike, it appears that the US economy will avoid a repeat of its fourth quarter fraying around the edges but slumps remain a possibility in economies that allow transfer schemes to lapse before COVID-19 can be tamed. And Now For Something Completely Different The global economy has confronted two significant crises in the space of a dozen years. The events that precipitated them could hardly have been more different: the global financial crisis (GFC) was an endogenous event with enough avarice, hubris, folly and villainy to support a cottage industry of books, movies and TV shows revisiting it, while the pandemic, for all of the official complacency and bumbling it laid bare, was simply an exogenous occurrence of great misfortune. The monetary policy response to both events has been substantially identical; the Fed swiftly took the fed funds rate back to zero, bought copious quantities of Treasury and agency securities, and launched a mix of old and new emergency measures. Other major central banks, which were largely unable to make any moves toward normalization between crises, simply maintained zero or negative interest rate policy and ramped up the pace and/or scope of their own asset purchase programs. The fiscal response has been dramatically different, however, in line with a 180-degree turn in budget orthodoxy. Chastened, perhaps, by Europe’s double-dip recession, or the protractedly tepid US expansion, economic mandarins have experienced a road-to-Damascus conversion. Whereas the OECD and the IMF began wagging their fingers at prodigal legislators while the global economy was still submerged under the GFC rubble, today they counsel that there is no rush to pull back on spending. As the OECD’s chief economist said in a January interview, “The first lesson [from the aftermath of the GFC] is to make sure governments are not tightening in the one to two years following the trough of GDP.2” The IMF has declared that “the near-term priority is to avoid premature withdrawal of fiscal support. Support should persist, at least into 2021, to sustain the recovery and to limit long-term scarring.3” Chart I-11What Goes Up Must ... Go Up Again The about-face in terms of fiscal deficits could have a profound effect on the character of the post-pandemic expansions. The plodding and protracted post-GFC recovery/expansion might be viewed as an object lesson in monetary policy’s limits. There is no gainsaying that central banks acted boldly to counter the GFC, cutting policy rates to zero and beyond, purchasing vast quantities of sovereign bonds, government agency securities and even debt and equity issued by private entities. The purchases caused central bank balance sheets to swell (Chart I-11), but the money creation impact was stunted by an offsetting wave of defaults and a general reluctance on the part of lenders and would-be borrowers to add to the stock of debt. Chart I-12GFC Stimulus Was Fleeting GFC fiscal spending was modest and largely limited to automatic stabilizers once emergency measures ran their course. Even the most celebrated efforts, like the United States’ 2009 Recovery Act, were intentionally modest in scope and limited in duration. Following the prevailing wisdom, national governments quickly moved to withdraw assistance and reduce their budget deficits once the worst of the crisis had passed (Chart I-12). Tepid investment, sluggish employment gains and fiscal drag all weighed on growth, defying the typical bigger-the-decline, bigger-the-bounce business cycle pattern. The picture is quite different today as central banks have gained a powerful and willing partner in their efforts to combat the damage wrought by a sudden shock. Pandemic fiscal stimulus initiatives have dwarfed GFC efforts across the major economies (Chart I-13). Once Congress passes the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Act, the US will have doubled down on its 2020 initiatives, committing to aid equivalent to an extraordinary 25% of its annual output. The ultimate effect on inflation, interest rates and exchange rates remains to be seen, but it is clear that the post-pandemic expansion will not unfold at the plodding pace of the post-GFC expansion. Chart I-13The COVID Fiscal Response Has Dwarfed The GFC's Goldilocks And The Two Tails Narrowing our focus to the US, which comprises nearly 60% of the market cap of the benchmark MSCI All-Country World Index, our base case is the Goldilocks scenario that markets appear to be discounting. That scenario would entail the just-right outcome of solid growth and continued monetary accommodation (Figure I-1). Since the Fed will only dial back accommodation if the economy appears to be at risk of overheating, it will take a growth disappointment, most likely from a negative virus surprise, for the US economy to tumble into the left-hand tail of the distribution. Figure I-1Goldilocks And The Two Tails Chart I-14Making Up For Lost Time We cannot rule out the possibility of virus-resistant mutations or new rounds of outbreaks from a weary populace that lets its guard down, but a failure to vaccinate at a pace consistent with achieving herd immunity by the end of September looks to be the most likely route to disappointment. To that end, we are monitoring vaccination progress against the pace required to get 50-80% of the population inoculated by the end of the third quarter (Chart I-14). The US got off to a slow start, but we are confident that it will catch up by early spring under an administration that has made crushing the virus its top priority and a Congress that is providing the resources to enable local health authorities to get the job done. The case for an upside near-term surprise stems from the notion that America’s solons have provided considerably more aid to households than was strictly necessary. As Chart I-7 showed, total employment fell by 25 million at the trough in April and close to 9 million fewer people are employed now than at the pre-pandemic peak. They can surely use a lifeline, along with the many Americans who are involuntarily working part time and those who are barely holding on even if they are fully employed. But they number far less than the 100 million households4 (two-thirds of all taxpayers) that received the full $1,800-per-adult economic impact payments ($1,200 last spring and $600 in January), and will be in line for another $1,400, as soon as March, under the terms of the new bill. Households who did not need the largesse have presumably saved the distributions, helping contribute to the $1.5 trillion of excess savings accumulated during the pandemic. Thanks to the transfers provided for by the CARES Act, our US Investment Strategy service estimates that aggregate household income from March through December was $450 billion greater than it would have been in the absence of COVID-19 (Table I-2). With the second round of direct payments amounting to about $150 billion and the third round likely to be more than double the second, household incomes will be boosted by another $500 billion and the excess savings horde will be on its way to $2 trillion and beyond. Even in a $21 trillion economy, that much dry powder has the potential to move the needle. Table I-2Households' Excess Pandemic Savings In the absence of even a somewhat related antecedent, no one can say for sure how much of the excess savings will be spent. Ricardian equivalence, which posits that households will be reluctant to spend fiscal windfalls if they anticipate that they will have to pay for them with higher future taxes, and Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis, which posits that consumption decisions are based on lifetime earnings, both suggest that the multiplier effect of the direct payments to households may not be all it's cracked up to be. Empirical evidence does not definitively support either model, but increased income has only accounted for a third of households’ mountain of savings in any event. The remaining two-thirds, amounting to over a trillion dollars, came from reduced consumption. Even if Ricardo’s and Friedman’s hypotheses are mostly on the mark, if much of the $1 trillion of 2020’s reduced consumption was merely deferred rather than destroyed (Box I-1), pent-up consumer demand could be significant. The range of potential outcomes is wide: on the one hand, money has tended to burn a hole in US households’ pockets; on the other, Ricardo and Friedman aren’t exactly Larry Kudlow or Peter Navarro. It is hard to assert with any conviction how much of the savings cache will be spent, or how quickly, but we highlight its presence to point out that near-term US growth could surprise to the upside. BOX I-1 Demand Deferral Or Demand Destruction? February’s Bank Credit Analyst presented a table with simple estimates of the US pandemic spending gap. It showed that spending on goods is tracking above the level that would have been expected if the pandemic had not occurred but that spending on services is down sharply, with an enormous gap in categories like food service, recreation and transportation. The fate of US households’ massive excess savings might come down to what happens to the forgone consumption. Consumption that is not deferred to some later period will simply disappear. Given that the consumption shortfall is entirely confined to services, the key question becomes: Is forgone services consumption more likely to turn into demand destroyed than forgone goods consumption? We suspect the answer is yes. Considering it from the perspective of the categories that suffered the biggest shortfalls, one cannot catch up by eating multiple restaurant dinners in a day, going back in time to attend last season’s sports and entertainment events, or taking more than one flight and staying in more than one hotel room. Services demand may also incorporate more of a discretionary component: one might want to go to a ballgame or a concert, or get out of town over a long weekend, but one eventually has to replace a sputtering car or refrigerator. Some forgone services demand likely turned into accelerated goods demand as white-collar workers redirected workday spending to building out office capabilities at home. Even more may have been diverted to home theater and exercise equipment, or to making one’s outdoor space into a more inviting place to while away the pandemic. The bottom line is that some goods demand appears to have been pulled forward by the pandemic while some services demand has likely been destroyed. There is surely pent-up consumer demand, and it will begin to be released once the pandemic has been subdued, but only some of the accumulated savings will be directed to satisfying it. Conclusions And Investment Recommendations For investors focused on the coming 6-12 months, the key takeaways from our analysis are as follows: Provided that official measures and personal vigilance continue to curtail COVID-19 until vaccinations can stifle it, the growth outlook should steadily improve. In the United States, where the federal government is determined to err on the side of providing too much fiscal support, growth could pick up a lot of steam. If enough pandemic-weary people fail to maintain their vigilance and observe social distancing measures, vaccine distribution efforts become snagged or vaccine-resistant strains emerge, growth could fall short of the consensus expectation embedded in financial market prices. Based on its plans to double down on its initial infusion of fiscal support, the US is the major economy most likely to exceed expectations, perhaps even to the point of overheating. After drilling into the increased income/foregone consumption components of the mountain of savings American households have amassed during the pandemic, however, we reiterate our conclusion that all of the savings will not be spent. The US economy will accelerate smartly this year but overheating is a low-probability event. Chart I-15The Coming Regional And Style Rotation Given these conclusions, we recommend the following investment stance over the next 6-12 months: Overweight equities, which will generate excess returns over sovereign bonds and cash in the absence of a negative COVID surprise, and underweight fixed income. Maintain below-benchmark duration in fixed income portfolios. Underweight US stocks and overweight global ex-US stocks, which will benefit from the reopening of the global economy, and value over growth stocks, which will benefit from reopening and a steeper yield curve. The former broke out in January and held their lead last month (Chart I-15, top panel) while value is testing resistance at its 200-day moving average (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Underweight the US dollar versus the euro in particular and other more cyclical currencies in general. We do not expect the greenback to fall as sharply as it did last year from May through December but we do expect it will resume declining over the rest of the year. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com February 25, 2021 Next Report: March 31, 2021 II. Requiem For Volcker And The Gipper For this month’s Special Report, we are sending you a collaboration between our US Investment Strategy and US Political Strategy teams. US Political Strategy is our newest strategy service and it extends the proprietary framework of our Geopolitical Strategy service to provide analysis of political developments that is relevant for US-focused investors. Please contact your relationship manager if you would like more information or to begin trialing the service. Ronald Reagan cast a long shadow over the elected officials who followed him … :The influence of the economic policies associated with Ronald Reagan held such persistent sway that even the Clinton and Obama administrations had to follow their broad outlines. … just as Paul Volcker did over central bankers at home and abroad … : The Volcker Fed’s uncompromising resistance to the 1970s’ runaway inflation established the Fed’s credibility and enshrined a new global central banking orthodoxy. … but it appears their enduring influence may have finally run its course … : The pandemic overrode everything else in real time, but investors may ultimately view 2020 as the year in which Democrats broke away from post-Reagan orthodoxy and the Fed decided Volcker’s vigilance was no longer relevant. … to investors’ potential chagrin: If inflation, big government and organized labor come back from the dead, globalization loses ground, regulation expands, anti-trust enforcement regains some bite and tax rates rise and become more progressive, then the four-decade investment golden age that Reagan and Volcker helped launch may be on its last legs. The pandemic dominated everything in real time in 2020, as investors scrambled to keep up with its disruptions and the countermeasures policymakers deployed to shelter the economy from them. With some distance, however, investors may come to view it as a year of two critical policy inflection points: the end of the Reagan fiscal era and the end of the Volcker monetary era. The shifts could mark a watershed because Reagan’s and Volcker’s enduring influence helped power an investment golden age that has lasted for nearly 40 years. What comes next may not be so supportive for financial markets. Political history often unfolds in cycles even if their starting and ending dates are never as clear cut in real life as they are in dissertations. Broadly, the FDR administration kicked off the New Deal era, a 48-year period of increased government involvement in daily life via the introduction and steady expansion of the social safety net, broadened regulatory powers and sweeping worker protections. It was followed by the 40-year Reagan era, with a continuous soundtrack of limited government rhetoric made manifest in policies that sought to curtail the spread of social welfare programs, deregulate commercial activity, devolve power to state and local government units and the private sector and push back against unions. The Obama and Trump administrations challenged different aspects of Reaganism, but the 2020 election cycle finally toppled it. Ordinarily, that might only matter to historians and political scientists, but the Reagan era coincided with a fantastic run in financial markets. So, too, did the inflation vigilance that lasted long after Paul Volcker’s 1979-1987 tenure at the helm of the Federal Reserve, which drove an extended period of disinflation, falling interest rates and rising central bank credibility. Our focus here is on fiscal policy, and we touch on monetary policy only to note that last summer’s revision of the Fed’s statement of long-run monetary policy goals shut the door on the Volcker era. The end of both eras could mark an inflection point in the trajectory of asset returns. The Happy Warrior The nine most terrifying words in the English language are, “I’m from the government, and I’m here to help.”5 Chart II-1After The Recession, Reagan Was A Hit Ronald Reagan held his conservative views with the zeal of the convert that he was.6 Those views were probably to the right of much of the electorate, but his personal appeal was strong enough to make them palatable to a sizable majority (Chart II-1). Substitute “left” for “right” and the sentiment just as easily sums up FDR’s ability to get the New Deal off the ground. Personal magnetism played a big role in each era’s rise, with both men radiating relatability and optimism that imbued their sagging fellow citizens with a sense of comfort and security that made them willing to try something very different. 1980 was hardly 1932 on the distress scale, but America was in a funk after the upheaval of the sixties, the humiliating end to Vietnam, Watergate, stagflation and a term and a half of uninspiring and ineffectual presidential leadership. Enter the Great Communicator, whose initial weekly radio address evoked the FDR of the Fireside Chats – jovial, resolute and confident, with palpable can-do energy – buffed to a shine by a professional actor and broadcaster whose vocal inflections hit every mark.7 The Gipper,8 with his avuncular bearing, physical robustness and ever-present twinkle in his eye, was just what the country needed to feel better about itself. Reaganomics 101 Government does not tax to get the money it needs; government always finds a need for the money it gets.9 President Reagan’s economic plan had three simple goals: cut taxes, tame government spending and reduce regulation. From the start of his entry into politics in the mid-sixties, Reagan cast himself as a defender of hard-working Americans’ right to keep more of the fruits of their labor from a grasping federal government seeking funding for wasteful, poorly designed programs. He harbored an intense animus for LBJ’s Great Society, which extended the reach of the federal government in ways that he characterized as a drag on initiative, accomplishment and freedom, no matter how well intentioned it may have been. That message hung a historic loss on Barry Goldwater in 1964 when inflation was somnolent but it proved to be far more persuasive after the runaway inflation of the seventies exposed the perils of excessive government (Chart II-2). Chart II-2Inflation Rises When The Labor Market Heats Up As the Reagan Foundation website describes the impact of his presidency’s economic policies, “Millions … were able to keep more of the money for which they worked so hard. Families could reliably plan a budget and pay their bills. The seemingly insatiable Federal government was on a much-needed diet. And businesses and individual entrepreneurs were no longer hassled by their government, or paralyzed by burdensome and unnecessary regulations every time they wanted to expand.” “In a phrase, the American dream had been restored.” The Enduring Reach Of Reaganomics I’m not in favor of abolishing the government. I just want to shrink it down to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub. – Grover Norquist Though President-Elect Clinton bridled at limited government’s inherent restrictions, bursting out during a transition briefing, “You mean to tell me that the success of the economic program and my re-election hinges on the Federal Reserve and a bunch of f***ing bond traders?” his administration largely observed them. This was especially true after the drubbing Democrats endured in the 1994 midterms, when the Republicans captured their first House majority in four decades behind the Contract with America, a skillfully packaged legislative agenda explicitly founded on Reagan principles. Humbled in the face of Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, and hemmed in by roving bands of bond vigilantes, Clinton was forced to tack to the center. James Carville, a leading architect of Clinton’s 1992 victory, captured the moment, saying, “I used to think that if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or … a .400 … hitter. But now I would like to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody.” Reagan’s legacy informed the Bush administration’s sweeping tax cuts (and its push to privatize social security), and forced the Obama administration to tread carefully with the stimulus package it devised to combat the Great Recession. Although the administration’s economic advisors considered the $787 billion (5%-of-peak-GDP) bill insufficient, political staffers carried the day and the price tag was kept below $800 billion to appease the three Republican senators whose votes were required to pass it. Even with the economy in its worst state since the Depression, the Obama administration had to acquiesce to Reaganite budget pieties if it wanted any stimulus bill at all. Its leash got shorter after it agreed with House Republicans to “sequester” excess spending under the Budget Control Act of 2011. On the Republican side of the aisle, Grover Norquist, who claims to have founded Americans for Tax Reform (ATR) at Reagan’s request, enforced legislative fealty to the no-new-tax mantra. ATR, which opposes all tax increases as a matter of principle, corrals legislators with the Taxpayer Protection Pledge, “commit[ting] them to oppose any effort to increase income taxes on individuals and businesses.” ATR’s influence has waned since its 2012 peak, when 95% of Republicans in Congress had signed the pledge, and Norquist no longer strikes fear in the hearts of Republicans inclined to waver on taxes. His declining influence is testament to Reaganism’s success on the one hand (the tax burden has already been reduced) and the fading appeal of its signature fiscal restraint on the other. Did Government Really Shrink? When the legend becomes fact, print the legend. – The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance For all of its denunciations of government spending, the Reagan administration ran up the largest expansionary budget deficits (as a share of GDP) of any postwar administration until the global financial crisis (Chart II-3). Although it aggressively slashed non-defense discretionary spending, it couldn’t cut enough to offset the Pentagon’s voracious appetite. The Reagan deficits were not all bad: increased defense spending hastened the end of the Cold War, so they were in a sense an investment that paid off in the form of the ‘90s peace dividend and the budget surpluses it engendered. Chart II-3Cutting The Federal Deficit Is Harder Than It Seems Nonetheless, the Reagan experience reveals the uncomfortable truth that there is little scope for any administration or Congressional session to cut federal spending. Mandatory entitlement spending on social security, Medicare and Medicaid constitutes the bulk of federal expenditures (Chart II-4) and they are very popular with the electorate, as the Trump campaign shrewdly recognized in the 2016 Republican primaries (Table II-1). Discretionary spending, especially ex-defense, is a drop in the bucket, thanks largely to a Reagan administration that already cut it to the bone (Chart II-5). Chart II-4The Relentless Rise In Mandatory Spending ... Chart II-5Overwhlems Any Plausible Discretionary Cuts   Table II-1How Trump Broke Republican Orthodoxy On Entitlement Spending The Reagan tax cuts therefore accomplished the easy part of the “starve the beast” strategy but his administration failed to make commensurate cuts in outlays (Chart II-6). If overall spending wasn’t cut amidst oppressive inflation, while the Great Communicator was in the Oval Office to make the case for it to a considerably more fiscally conservative electorate, there is no chance that it will be cut this decade. As our Geopolitical Strategy service has flagged for several years, the median US voter has moved to the left on economic policy. Reagan-era fiscal conservatism has gone the way of iconic eighties features like synthesizers, leg warmers and big hair, even if it had one last gasp in the form of the post-crisis “Tea Party” and Obama’s compromise on budget controls. Chart II-6Grover Norquist Is Going To Need A Bigger Bathtub Do Republicans Still Want The Reagan Mantle? Chart II-7“Limited Government” Falling Out Of Fashion Reaganism is dead, killed by a decided shift in broad American public opinion, and within the Republican and Democratic parties themselves. Americans are just as divided today as they were in Reagan’s era about the size of the government but the trend since the late 1990s is plainly in favor of bigger government (Chart II-7). Recent developments, including the 2020 election, reinforce our conviction that trend will not reverse any time soon. The Republicans are the natural heirs of Reagan’s legacy. Much of President Trump’s appeal to conservatives lay in his successful self-branding as the new Reagan. Though he lacked the Gipper’s charisma and affability, his unapologetic assertion of American exceptionalism rekindled some of the glow of Morning-in-America confidence. Following the outsider trail blazed by Reagan, he lambasted the Washington establishment and promised to slash bureaucracy, deregulate the economy and shake things up. Trump’s signature legislative accomplishment was the largest tax reform since Reagan’s in 1986. He oversaw defense spending increases to take on China, which he all but named the new “evil empire.”10 Like Reagan, he was willing to weather criticism for face-to-face meetings with rival nations’ dictators. Even his trade protectionism had more in common with the Reagan administration than is widely recognized.11 Chart II-8Reagan’s Amnesty On Immigration But major differences in the two presidents’ policy portfolios underline the erosion of the Reagan legacy’s hold. President Trump outflanked his Republican competitors for the 2016 nomination by running against cutting government spending – he was the only candidate who opposed entitlement reform. His signature proposal was to stem immigration by means of a Mexican border wall. While Reagan had sought to crack down on illegal immigration, he pursued a compromise approach and granted amnesty to 2.9 million illegal immigrants living in America to pass the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, sparing businesses from having to scramble to replace them (Chart II-8). While Reagan curtailed non-defense spending, Trump signed budget-busting bills with relish, even before the COVID pandemic necessitated emergency deficit spending. Trump tried to use the power of government to intervene in the economy and alienated the business community, which revered Reagan, with his scattershot trade war. Trump’s greater hawkishness on immigration and trade and his permissiveness on fiscal spending differentiated him from Reagan orthodoxy and signaled a more populist Republican Party. Chart II-9Trump Could Start Third Party, Give Democrats A Decade-Plus Ascendancy More fundamentally, Trump represents a new strain of Republican that is at odds with the party’s traditional support for big business and disdain for big government. If he leads that strain to take on the party establishment by challenging moderate Republicans in primary elections and insisting on running as the party’s next presidential candidate, the GOP will be swimming upstream in the 2022 and 2024 elections. It is too soon to make predictions about either of these elections other than to say that Trump is capable of splitting the party in a way not seen since Ross Perot in the 1990s or Theodore Roosevelt in the early 1900s (Chart II-9).12 If he does so, the Democrats will remain firmly in charge and lingering Reaganist policies will be actively dismantled. Even if the party manages to preserve its fragile Trumpist/traditionalist coalition, it is hard to imagine it will recover its appetite for shrinking entitlements, siding against labor or following a laissez-faire approach to corporate conduct and combinations. Republicans will pay lip service to fiscal restraint but Trump’s demonstration that austerity does not win votes will lead them to downplay spending cuts and entitlement reform as policy priorities – at least until inflation again becomes a popular grievance (Chart II-10). Republicans will also fail to gain traction with voters if they campaign merely on restoring the Trump tax cuts after Biden’s likely partial repeal of them. Support for the Tax Cut and Jobs Act hardly reached 40% for the general public and 30% for independents and it is well known that the tax reform did little to help Republicans in the 2018 midterm elections, when Democrats took the House (Chart II-11). Chart II-10Republicans Have Many Priorities Above Budget Deficits Chart II-11Trump Tax Cuts Were Never Very Popular On immigration the Republican Party will follow Trump and refuse amnesty. Immigration levels are elevated and Biden’s lax approach to the border, combined with a looming growth disparity with Latin America, will generate new waves of incomers and provoke a Republican backlash. On trade and foreign policy, Republicans will follow a synthesis of Reagan and Trump in pursuing a cold war with China. The Chinese economy is set to surpass the American economy by the year 2028 and is already bigger in purchasing power parity terms (Chart II-12). The Chinese administration is becoming more oppressive at home, more closed to liberal and western ideas, more focused on import substitution, and more technologically ambitious. The Chinese threat will escalate in the coming decade and the Republican Party will present itself as the anti-communist party by proposing a major military-industrial build-up. Yet it is far from assured that the Democrats will be soft on China, which is to say that they will not be able to cut defense spending substantially. Chart II-12China Is the New "Evil Empire" For GOP Will Biden Take Up The Cause? One might ask if the Biden administration might seek to adopt some elements of the Reagan program. President Biden is among the last of the pro-market Democrats who emerged in the wake of the Reagan revolution. Those “third-way” Democrats thrived in the 1990s by accommodating themselves to Reagan’s free-market message while maintaining there was a place for a larger federal role in certain aspects of the economy and society. The 2020 election demonstrated that the Democrats’ political base is larger than the Republicans’ and third-way policies could be a way to make further inroads with affluent suburbanites who helped deliver Georgia and Virginia. Alas, the answer appears to be no. The Democrats’ base increasingly abhors Reagan-era economic and social policies, and the country’s future demographic changes reinforce the party’s current, progressive trajectory. That means fiery younger Democrats don’t have to compromise their principles with third-way policies when they can just wait for Texas to turn blue. Chart II-13Democrats Look To New Deal, Eschew ‘Third Way’ Biden has only been in office for one month but a rule of thumb is that his party will pull him further to the left the longer Republicans remain divided and ineffective. His cabinet appointments have been center-left, not far-left, though his executive orders have catered to the far-left, particularly on immigration. In order to pass his two major legislative proposals through an evenly split Senate he must appeal to Democratic moderates, as every vote in the party will be needed to get the FY2021 and FY2022 budget reconciliation bills across the line, with Vice President Kamala Harris acting as the Senate tie breaker. Nevertheless his agenda still highlights that the twenty-first century Democrats are taking a page out of the FDR playbook and unabashedly promoting big government solutions (Chart II-13). Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan is not only directed at emergency pandemic relief but also aims to shore up state and local finances, education, subsidized housing, and child care. His health care proposals include a government-provided insurance option (originally struck from the Affordable Care Act to secure its passage in 2010) and a role for Medicare in negotiating drug prices. And his infrastructure plan is likely to provide cover for a more ambitious set of green energy projects that will initiate the Democratic Party’s next big policy pursuit after health care: environmentalism. The takeaway is not that Biden’s administration is necessarily radical – he eschews government-administered health care and is only proposing a partial reversal of Trump’s tax cuts – but rather that his party has taken a decisive turn away from the “third-way” pragmatism that defined his generation of Democrats in favor of a return to the “Old-Left” and pro-labor policies of the New Deal era (Chart II-14). The party has veered to the left in reaction to the Iraq War, the financial crisis, and Trumpism. Vice President Harris, Biden’s presumptive heir, had the second-most progressive voting record during her time in the Senate and would undoubtedly install a more progressive cabinet. Table II-2 shows her voting record alongside other senators who ran against Biden in the Democratic primary election. All of them except perhaps Senator Amy Klobuchar stood to his left on the policy spectrum. Chart II-14Democrats Eschew Budget Constraints Fundamentally the American electorate is becoming more open to a larger role for the government in the economy and society. While voters almost always prioritize the economy and jobs, policy preferences have changed. The morass of excessive inflation, deficits, taxation, regulation, strikes and business inefficiencies that gave rise to the Reagan movement is not remembered as ancient history – it is not even remembered. The problems of slow growth, inadequate health and education, racial injustice, creaky public services, and stagnant wages are by far the more prevalent concerns – and they require more, not less, spending and government involvement (Chart II-15). Insofar as voters worry about foreign threats they focus on the China challenge, where Biden will be forced to adopt some of Trump’s approach. Table II-2Harris Stood To The Left Of Democratic Senators Chart II-15Public Concern For Economy Means Greater Government Help When inflation picks up in the coming years, voters will not reflexively ask for government to be pared back so that the economy becomes more efficient, as they did once they had a taste of Reagan’s medicine in the early 1980s. Rather, they will ask the government to step in to provide higher wages, indexation schemes, price caps, and assistance for labor, as is increasingly the case. The ruling party will be offering these options and the opposition Republicans will render themselves obsolete if they focus single-mindedly on austerity measures. Americans will have to experience a recession caused by inflation – i.e. stagflation – before they call for anything resembling Reagan again. The Post-Reagan Market Landscape Many investors and conservative economists were shocked13 that the Bernanke Fed’s mix of zero interest rates and massive securities purchases did not foster runaway inflation and destroy the dollar. They failed to anticipate that widespread private-sector deleveraging would put a lid on money creation (and that other major central banks would follow in the Fed’s ZIRP and QE footsteps). But a longer view of four decades of disinflation suggests another conclusion: Taking away the monetary punch bowl when the labor party gets going and pursuing limited-government fiscal policy can keep inflation pressures from gaining traction. Globalization, technology-enabled elimination of many lower-skilled white-collar functions and the hollowing out of the organized labor movement all helped as well, though they helped foment a revolt among a meaningful segment of the Republican rank-and-file against Reagan-style policies. The Volcker Fed set the tone for pre-emptive monetary tightening and subsequent FOMCs have reliably intervened to cool off the economy when the labor market begins heating up. The Phillips Curve may be out of favor with investors, but wage inflation only gathers steam when the unemployment rate falls below its natural level (Chart II-16), and the Fed did not allow negative unemployment gaps to persist for very long in the Volcker era. Without wage inflation putting more money in the hands of a broad cross-section of households with a fairly high marginal propensity to consume, it’s hard to get inflation in consumer prices. Chart II-16Taking The Punch Bowl Away From The Union Hall The Fed took the cyclical wind from the labor market’s sails but the Reagan administration introduced a stiff secular headwind when it crushed PATCO, the air traffic controllers’ union, in 1981, marking an inflection point in the relationship between management and labor. That watershed event opened the door for employers to deploy much rougher tactics against unions than they had since before the New Deal.14 Reagan’s championing of free markets helped establish globalization as an economic policy that the third-way Clinton administration eagerly embraced with NAFTA and a campaign to admit China to the WTO. The latter coincided with a sharp decline in labor’s share of income (Chart II-17). Chart II-17Outsourcing Has Not Been Good For US Labor The core Reagan tenets – limited government, favoring management over labor, globalization, sleepy anti-trust enforcement, reduced regulation and less progressive tax systems with lower rates – are all at risk of Biden administration rollbacks. While the easy monetary/tight fiscal combination promoted a rise in asset prices rather than consumer prices ever since the end of the global financial crisis, today’s easy monetary/easy fiscal could promote consumer price inflation and asset price deflation. We do not think inflation will be an issue in 2021 but we expect it will in the later years of Biden’s term. Ultimately, we expect massive fiscal accommodation will stoke inflation pressures and those pressures, abetted by a Fed which has pledged not to pre-emptively remove accommodation when the labor market tightens, will eventually bring about the end of the bull market in risk assets and the expansion. Investment Implications Business revered the Reagan administration and investors rightfully associate it with the four-decade bull market that began early in its first term. Biden is no wild-eyed liberal, but rolling back core Reagan-era tenets has the potential to roll back juicy Reagan-era returns. Only equities have the lengthy data series to allow a full comparison of Reagan-era returns with postwar New Deal-era returns (Table II-3), but the path of Treasury bond yields in the three-decade bear market that preceded the current four-decade bull market suggests that bonds generated little, if any, real returns in the pre-Reagan postwar period (Chart II-18). Stagnant precious metal returns point to tame Reagan-era inflation and downward pressure on input costs. Table II-3Annualized Real Market Returns Before And After Reagan Chart II-18Bond Investors Loved Volcker And The Gipper Owning the market is not likely to be as rewarding going forward as it was in the Reagan era. Active management may again have its day in the sun as the end of the Reagan tailwinds open up disparities between sectors, sub-industries and individual companies. Even short-sellers may experience a renaissance. We recommend that multi-asset investors underweight bonds, especially Treasuries. We expect the clamor for bigger government will contribute to a secular bear market that could rival the one that persisted from the fifties to the eighties. Within Treasury portfolios, we would maintain below-benchmark duration and favor TIPS over nominal bonds at least until the Fed signals that its campaign to re-anchor inflation expectations higher has achieved its goal. Gold and/or other precious metals merit a place in portfolios as a hedge against rising inflation and other real assets, from land to buildings to other resources, are worthy of consideration as well. BCA has been cautioning of a downward inflection in long-run financial asset returns for a few years, based on demanding valuations and a steadily shrinking scope for ongoing declines in inflation and interest rates. Mean reversion has been part of the thesis as well; trees simply don’t grow to the sky. Now that the curtain has fallen on the Volcker and Reagan eras, the inevitable downward inflection has received a catalyst. We remain constructive on risk assets over the next twelve months, but we expect that intermediate- and long-term returns will fall well short of their post-1982 pace going forward. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators continue to demonstrate that US stocks are running hot. Our technical, valuation, and speculation indicators are very extended, and margin debt has soared since the S&P 500 bottomed last spring. With so little room for error, a near-term pullback in stock prices remains a significant risk. Our monetary indicator extended its downtrend, reflecting a diminished intensity of monetary support, but it remains above the boom/bust line. The upshot is that while the marginal stimulus provided by monetary policy is falling, the level of stimulus from easy monetary conditions remains significant. Forward equity earnings are pricing in a remarkably swift earnings recovery, but after a third consecutive quarter of double-digit earnings beats, the 2021 earnings outlook continues to gather momentum. Net revisions and positive earnings surprises remain near multi-decade highs. Among global equities, the US extended its modest underperformance after a decade of leading the pack. China continues to outperform, though at a slower rate since it became the first country to escape COVID-19’s grip, while emerging markets and Australia have also outperformed. Euro area stocks continue to lag, but we expect they will eventually take their place among the cyclical winners later this year. The US 10-Year Treasury yield surged in February, following through on January’s convincing break above its 200-day moving average. Our technical indicator shows that long-dated bonds are firmly in oversold territory, though they remain extremely expensive. Our valuation index points to higher yields over the cyclical investment horizon even if the rate of ascent eventually slows. The technical and valuation profile is similar for the US dollar. The greenback is technically oversold, even after its modest rally, but it remains expensive according to our models. If our base-case Goldilocks scenario unfolds globally this year, the counter-cyclical dollar should encounter a mild headwind. As with Treasuries, we expect valuation to trump technicals and see the USD continuing to trend lower over the full year. Commodity prices are surging across the board, ex-gold. Sentiment is bullish and speculative positioning in the CFTC’s 17-commodity aggregate grouping is at its post-GFC high, although it may have peaked for the time being. The move in commodities underscores the risk-on profile across financial markets and aligns with EM, Chinese and Australian equity outperformance. US and global LEIs remain in a solid uptrend. A peak in our global LEI (GLEI) diffusion index suggests that the pace of advance in the GLEI will moderate, but the diffusion index has not yet fallen to a level that would herald a meaningful decline in the LEI. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes   Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist   Footnotes 1 Every single adult taxpayer with adjusted gross income (AGI) of $75,000 or less (and every married filing jointly taxpayer with AGI of $150,000 or less) was eligible for the full payments, and taxpayers with AGIs below $99,000 and $198,000, respectively, were eligible for partial payments. 2 Giles, Chris. “OECD warns governments to rethink constraints on public spending,” Financial Times, January 4, 2021. OECD warns governments to rethink constraints on public spending | Financial Times (ft.com) Accessed February 20, 2021. 3 International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2020. Fiscal Monitor: Policies for the Recovery. Washington, October. p. ix. 4 An additional 20 million households have received partial payments. 5 August 12, 1986 Press Conference News Conference | The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation & Institute (reaganfoundation.org), accessed February 4, 2021. Reagan makes the quip in his prepared opening remarks. 6 Reagan was a Democrat until he entered politics in his fifties. He claimed to have voted for FDR four times. 7 April 3, 1982 Radio Address President Reagan's Radio Address to the Nation on the Program for Economic Recovery - 4/3/82 - YouTube, accessed February 4, 2021. 8 As an actor, Reagan was perhaps best known for his portrayal of Notre Dame football legend George Gipp, who is immortalized in popular culture as the subject of the “win one for the Gipper” halftime speech. 9 July 22, 1981 White House Remarks to Visiting Editors and Broadcasters reaganfoundation.org, accessed February 8, 2021. 10 Reagan famously urged his followers, in reference to the USSR, “I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire.” See his “Address to the National Association of Evangelicals,” March 8, 1983, voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu. 11 Robert Lighthizer, the Trump administration trade representative who directed its tariff battles, was a veteran of Reagan’s trade wars against Japan in the 1980s. 12 “Exclusive: The Trump Party? He still holds the loyalty of GOP voters,” USA Today, February 21, 2021, usatoday.com. 13 Open Letter to Ben Bernanke,” November 15, 2010. Open Letter to Ben Bernanke | Hoover Institution Accessed February 23, 2021. 14 Please see the following US Investment Strategy Special Reports, “Labor Strikes Back, Parts 1, 2 and 3,” dated January 13, January 20 and February 3, 2020, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.