BCA Indicators/Model

Highlights Senate Republicans would be suicidal not to agree to a fiscal relief bill before the election. Democrats are still offering a $2.2 trillion package. Grassroots Republican voters will forgive Republicans for blowing out the budget deficit but they will never forgive them for throwing away control of the White House and Senate. Nevertheless financial markets face more downside until a deal is reached. We are booking gains on several of our tactical risk-off trades but will hold our strategic risk-on trades, as we are still constructive over a 12-month period. Turkey is stepping back from its foreign adventurism in the face of constraints. Our GeoRisk Indicator for Turkey has rolled over. Feature Financial markets continue to sell off in the face of a range of risks, including new threats of COVID-19 restrictions in Europe, an increase in daily new cases of the disease in the United States (Chart 1), and the US Congress’s problems passing a new round of fiscal relief. Chart 1Increase In COVID-19 Cases Among Factors Weighing On Markets Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Chart 2Congress Will Pass Stimulus ~$2-$2.5 Trillion Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Since May, when the Democrats passed the $3.4 trillion HEROES Act, we have maintained that “stimulus hiccups” would roil the market. However, we also argued that Congress would eventually pass a new package – probably in the range of $2-$2.5 trillion (Chart 2).1 The latter part of this view remains to be seen and has come under pressure from investors who fear that Congress could fail to produce a bill entirely. We are sticking with our guns. GOP senators will recognize that they face sweeping election losses; House Democrats will not be able to reverse course and deprive households of badly needed assistance. However, stock investors might sell more between now and the final deal, which must be done by around October 9 so that lawmakers can go back to their home states to campaign for the November 3 election. Moreover the fiscal deal might not come in time to save the Republicans’ re-election bid in the White House and Senate, which raises further downside risk due to the Democratic agenda of re-regulation and tax hikes. And the election’s aftershocks could also be market-negative. For example, President Trump could also escalate the conflict with China, whether as the “comeback kid” or as a lame duck. Therefore this week we are booking some gains. We will not recommend a tactical risk-on position until our fiscal view is confirmed and we can reassess. US Fiscal Stimulus Is Coming Chart 3Republicans Highly Unlikely To Win House Of Representatives Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Why would Democrats agree to a stimulus bill given that it could help President Trump and the Republicans get re-elected? Democrats are afraid to deprive households of relief amid a crisis merely to spite the president and score election points. Around 28-43 of Democrats in the House of Representatives face re-election in districts that are competitive or could become competitive. Republicans need a net gain of 20 seats to retake the House (Chart 3). If Democrats offer to cooperate yet Republican senators balk, then the latter will take the blame for any failed deal and ensuing financial turmoil. The experience of other fiscal cliffs bears this out. The debt ceiling crises of 2011 and 2013 and the government shutdowns of 2013 and 2018-19 all suggest that net presidential and congressional approval ratings suffer when partisanship prevents compromise on major fiscal issues (Charts 4A and 4B). This is a risk for the ruling GOP. All Democrats have to do is remain open to compromise. Net presidential and congressional approval ratings suffer when partisanship prevents compromise on major fiscal issues – a risk for the ruling GOP. Chart 4AFiscal Failures Pose A Risk To Ruling GOP Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Chart 4BFiscal Failures Pose A Risk To Ruling GOP Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Confirming this reasoning, Democrats joined with Republicans this week to pass a continuing resolution to maintain government spending levels through December 11, thus avoiding a government shutdown. Clearly the two parties can still cooperate despite record levels of partisanship. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi ruled out using government shutdown as a weapon to hurt the Republicans, fearing it would backfire. And just last week vulnerable House members pressured Pelosi into stating that the House will remain in session in October until a fiscal relief bill is passed. Democrats remain committed to their current plan – solidifying their grip on the House and demonstrating that they can govern, and that government can do more for households, by passing bills. This is still the strategy even if the risk is that these bills give Trump a marginal benefit. The Democratic demand is for a very large fiscal package – House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is today offering $2.2 trillion, a compromise from the initial $3.4 trillion bill (Table 1). A smaller bill is harder to negotiate because it would cut the House Democrats’ spending priorities for their constituents, including around $1 trillion in state and local government aid, while still giving Trump a bounce in opinion polls for boosting pandemic relief. This is unacceptable – and this is how a policy mistake could happen. Table 1What A Fiscal Compromise Will Look Like Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Chart 5Senate Republicans Face A Hotly Contested Election Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Chart 6Republican Senators' Hung Up On Future Deficit Concerns Republican Senators' Hung Up On Future Deficit Concerns Republican Senators' Hung Up On Future Deficit Concerns Senate Republicans face a hotly contested election – with 23 of them up for re-election versus only 12 Democrats. However, 30 of them are not up for re-election this year (Chart 5). These senators fear the eventual return of deficit concerns among the Republican base so they are bargaining to limit emergency spending (Chart 6). Until they can be cajoled by their fellow senators and the White House, they pose a risk to the passage of new stimulus. But this risk is overrated. Ultimately Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and the Senate Republicans will capitulate. It is political suicide if they do not. The GOP will lose control of the Senate and the White House if premature fiscal tightening sparks a bloody September-October selloff just ahead of the election (Charts 7Aand 7B). Chart 7AStocks Sell, Bonds Rally … When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Stocks Sell, Bonds Rally... When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Stocks Sell, Bonds Rally... When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Chart 7BStocks Sell, Bonds Rally … When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Stocks Sell, Bonds Rally... When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Stocks Sell, Bonds Rally... When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Chart 8Trump Compares Poorly To Other Presidents Re-Elected Amid Recession Trump Compares Poorly To Other Presidents Re-Elected Amid Recession Trump Compares Poorly To Other Presidents Re-Elected Amid Recession Only three out of six presidents in modern times have been re-elected when a recession struck during the election year yet ended prior to the fall campaign. These were William McKinley in 1900, Teddy Roosevelt in 1904, and Calvin Coolidge in 1924.2 Trump faces the same scenario, but financial markets are signaling that Trump is not faring as well as these three predecessors (Chart 8). The Senate races are all on a knife’s edge (Chart 9). American politics are highly nationalized – partisan identification overrides regional concerns. President Trump has also personalized his political party, making the election a referendum on himself (Chart 10). These trends suggest the Senate will fall to the party that wins the White House. Chart 9The Senate Races Are All On A Knife’s Edge Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Consumer confidence is weak and bodes ill for the incumbent president and party (Chart 11). Chart 10Trump Has Personalized Partisan Politics Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Chart 11Consumer Confidence Bodes Ill For Trump And GOP Consumer Confidence Bodes Ill For Trump And GOP Consumer Confidence Bodes Ill For Trump And GOP A failure to provide stimulus will ensure that sentiment worsens for the rest of the campaign and overshadows some underlying material improvements that are the Republicans’ only saving grace. Wage growth is recovering in line with the V-shape recovery in blue and purple states, including purple states that voted for Trump (Chart 12). The manufacturing rebound – and a surge in loans – is creating the conditions for the “Blue Wall” of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin to re-elect President Trump (Chart 13). A fiscal failure will blot out this positive news. Chart 12Fiscal Failure Would Blot Out Economic Improvements Fiscal Failure Would Blot Out Economic Improvements Fiscal Failure Would Blot Out Economic Improvements Chart 13Blue Wall' Could Re-Elect Trump On Economic Improvement Blue Wall' Could Re-Elect Trump On Economic Improvement Blue Wall' Could Re-Elect Trump On Economic Improvement Republicans’ standing offer is for a $1.3 trillion bill. The bipartisan “Problem Solver’s Caucus” has separately proposed a $1.5 trillion package that could be converted. McConnell has shown he can muster his troops by producing 52 Republican votes on a skinny relief bill on September 10. The Senate will go on recess on Friday, October 9 and the House is committed to staying until a bill is done. Negotiations cannot drag on much longer than that, however, because lawmakers need to go back to their home states and districts to campaign for the election. The equity selloff suggests policymakers will need to respond sooner anyway. Is there a way for Trump to bypass Congress and provide stimulus unilaterally? Chart 14Gridlock In 2020-22 Is Possible Under Trump Or Biden Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Trump is only too happy to run against a “do-nothing Congress,” which is how Harry Truman pulled off his surprise victory in 1948. He could use executive orders to redirect federal funds that have already been appropriated. However, he has already provided stimulus by decree – delaying payroll tax collections and calling on states to provide unemployment insurance – and yet the market has sold off anyway. That is because these measures are half-baked – they lack the size and the force of an act of Congress. They require coordination with states and firms, which face uncertainty over the legality of the measures and have little incentive to make sacrifices for an administration that may not last more than a few months. In short, if Trump tries to stimulate by decree, it is an election gimmick that will not satisfy market participants who need to look beyond the next 39 days to the critical question of whether US fiscal authorities understand the needs of the economy and can coordinate effectively. Congressional failure will cast a pall over the outlook given that there is still a fair chance the election could produce gridlock for the 2020-22 period, under Trump or Biden (Chart 14). Bottom Line: Financial markets face more downside until Senate Republicans capitulate to Pelosi’s demand of a bill around $2-$2.5 trillion. We think they will, but that is not an argument for getting long now – Republicans could capitulate too late to save the market from a deeper selloff. Investors should book profits now and buy when the deal is clinched. What About The Supreme Court? The Supreme Court battle over the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg may increase the risk of miscalculation in the stimulus negotiations, but not by much. Subjectively we would upgrade that risk from 25% to 33%. Republicans will fill the vacant seat before the election. So far they have the votes – even if Senator Mitt Romney changes his mind, there is still a one-seat buffer. However, a win on the high court has a mixed impact on financial markets. It may increase the odds of a Democratic Party sweep, which is initially a net negative for equities. But House Democrats will become less inclined to compromise on the size of the fiscal bill that we expect. They will say “take it or leave it” on the $2.2 trillion offer. The lowest we can see Democrats passing is $1.9 trillion. If the GOP fails to budge, the equity selloff will be aggravated by the implication that Democrats will win a clean sweep and thus gain the power to raise corporate and capital gains taxes next year. We have put 55%-60% odds on a clean sweep, but the market stands at 49%, so there is room for the market to adjust (Chart 15). As for the Supreme Court itself, a Republican nomination is legitimate regardless of the election timing, though the decision to go forward this close to the election reveals extreme levels of polarization. The Republican pick could energize the Democrats in the election, as occurred with the nomination of Justice Brett Kavanaugh just ahead of the 2018 midterms. A Democratic overreaction could mobilize conservatives, but this will be moot if the stock market collapses. If the presidential election is contested or disputed, Trump’s court nominee pick could cast the decisive vote, although, once nominated, a justice may not rule in accordance with his or her nominator’s wishes. The Supreme Court battle raises the risk of stimulus miscalculation to 33%. In a period of “peak polarization,” one should expect the Supreme Court battle to escalate further from here (Chart 16). Democrats are likely to remove the filibuster if they win the Senate. This would theoretically enable them to create four new seats on the court, which they could then fill with liberal judges. Franklin Roosevelt attempted to pack the court in 1937 when it got in the way of the New Deal and his plan only narrowly failed due to the unexpected death of a key ally in the Senate. Chart 15A Democratic Sweep Would Aggravate The Equity Selloff A Democratic Sweep Would Aggravate The Equity Selloff A Democratic Sweep Would Aggravate The Equity Selloff Chart 16Supreme Court Battle Will Escalate Amid Extreme Polarization Supreme Court Battle Will Escalate Amid Extreme Polarization Supreme Court Battle Will Escalate Amid Extreme Polarization Not only might the court decide the election outcome, but future controversial legislation could live or die by the court’s vote, as occurred with Obamacare in 2012 (Chart 17). In the event that Democrats achieve a clean sweep, the conservative court will be their only obstacle and they will possess the means to remove it. Chart 17Supreme Court Battle Will Prove Market Relevant In Event Of Democratic Sweep Supreme Court Battle Will Prove Market Relevant In Event Of Democratic Sweep Supreme Court Battle Will Prove Market Relevant In Event Of Democratic Sweep Bottom Line: Earlier we saw a 25% chance that stimulus would fail – now we give it a 33% chance. However, the size of the stimulus is now even more likely to fall within the $2-$2.5 trillion range we have signaled in previous reports. The Supreme Court will become a major factor in domestic economic policy uncertainty if Democrats win a clean sweep of government. Turkey Hits Constraints In East Med – For Now … Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s foreign policy assertiveness has once again put Turkey in conflict with NATO allies. Tensions escalated last month after Greece signed a maritime boundary deal with Egypt that Athens said nullified last November’s Libya-Turkey agreement (Map 1). Map 1Turkey Testing Maritime Borders In the East Med Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) In response, Turkey issued a navigational warning (which was renewed thrice) and dispatched its seismic research vessel, the Oruc Reis, to explore for hydrocarbons in disputed areas of the Eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Cyprus. In shows of force, Turkey and Greece both deployed their navies to the area last month, raising the risk of an armed confrontation.3 The motivation for Erdogan’s hard power tactics is multi-pronged. Chart 18Erdogan’s Foreign Adventurism Reflects Domestic Weakness Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) On a domestic level, Erdogan’s East Med excursions are an attempt to rally domestic support, where he and his party have lost ground (Chart 18). Given that popular opinion in Turkey indicates that the majority see the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a “kin country” and that they do not expect Turkey to be accepted into the EU, Ankara’s East Med strategy is likely to find support. On an international level, Turkey is flexing its muscles against the West. Erdogan has inserted Turkish forces into conflicts in Syria and Libya, confronting NATO allies there, and authorized the provocative purchase of the Russian S400 missile defense system at the expense of membership in the US F-35 program. The East Med gambit is another challenge to the West by testing EU unity. Specifically Erdogan is demonstrating that Turkey is willing to use military force to reject any unilateral attempts by foreign powers to impose maritime borders on Turkey – for instance through the EU’s Seville map.4 By demonstrating maritime strength, Turkey hopes to twist the EU’s arm into agreeing to a more favorable maritime partition plan in the East Med. As such the conflict is part of Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” strategy to expand its sphere of influence and secure energy supplies.5 Turkey is extremely vulnerable as a geopolitical actor because it depends on imports for three-quarters of its energy needs.6 With energy accounting for 20% of its import bill, these imports are weighing on the current account balance (Chart 19). Turkey’s exclusion from regional gas agreements has thus been a blow to its self-sufficiency goals. Meanwhile Greece, Italy, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and Jordan have recently formalized their cooperation through the Cairo-based East Mediterranean Gas Organization. Turkish agitation in the East Mediterranean is an attempt to prevent others from exploiting gas resources there so long as its demands remain unmet. Erdogan’s retreat demonstrates Turkey’s constraints in its challenge to the EU. While the EU has yet to impose sanctions or penalties, Erdogan has now backtracked. Oruc Reis returned to Antalya on September 13, despite official statements that it would continue its mission. Turkish and Greek military officials have been meeting at NATO headquarters. And following talks with French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and EU President Charles Michel, Erdogan’s office announced on September 22 that Turkey and Greece were prepared to resume talks. The postponement of the European Council’s special meeting to discuss Turkish sanctions to October 1-2 plays to Turkey’s favor by giving more time for talks. Chart 19Turkey's Energy Dependence A Geopolitical Vulnerability Turkey's Energy Dependence A Geopolitical Vulnerability Turkey's Energy Dependence A Geopolitical Vulnerability Erdogan’s retreat demonstrates Turkey’s constraints in its challenge to the EU. The possibility of damaging sanctions was too much at a time of economic vulnerability. Given Turkey’s dependence on the EU for export earnings and FDI inflows, the impact of sanctions on Turkey’s economy cannot be overstated (Chart 20). Chart 20EU Sanctions Could Destroy Turkey's Economy EU Sanctions Could Destroy Turkey's Economy EU Sanctions Could Destroy Turkey's Economy Turkey is also facing constraints diplomatically as two of its regional rivals – the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel – have agreed to normalize relations and strengthen ties under the US-mediated Abraham Accords (Table 2). The UAE already dispatched F-16s to Crete to participate in joint training exercises in a show of support to Greece. Table 2The Abraham Accords Unify Turkey’s Regional Rivals Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Details about the potential sanctions have not been released. However, EU Minister of Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell has indicated that penalties could be levied not only on individuals, but also on assets, ships, and Turkish access to European ports and supplies. This could include banks financing energy exploration or even entire business sectors, such as the energy industry. Moreover, the EU could play other damaging cards such as halting EU accession talks, or limiting its customs union with Turkey, which Ankara hopes to modernize. Chart 21EU Needs Turkey’s Cooperation To Stem Flow Of Migrants Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) It is also in Europe’s interest to de-escalate the conflict. Sanctions on Turkey could accelerate Ankara’s re-orientation towards Russia and possibly China, expediting its transition to a hostile regional actor. In addition, Turkey has not shied away from using the 2016 migration deal, whereby Turkey has become the gatekeeper of Middle Eastern migrants fleeing to Europe, as a bargaining chip (Chart 21). Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu outright stated that Turkey will respond to EU sanctions by reneging on the deal, which could result in an influx of refugees into the EU and new challenges for Europe’s political establishment. Erdogan’s retreat is also likely a response to pressure from Washington. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lent some support to Greece and Cyprus during his September 12 visit to Cyprus. While the US has distanced itself from recent developments in the East Med, leaving German Chancellor Angela Merkel to play the role of mediator, a deterioration in Ankara’s relations with NATO allies could accelerate Turkey’s de-coupling from the West. Some within Washington are already calling for a relocation of the US strategic Incirlik air base to Greek islands. Erdogan’s retreat from a hawkish stance is in line with similar behavior elsewhere. For instance, despite having taken delivery of all parts and completed all necessary tests, Turkey has yet to activate its Russian S-400 missile defense system. It is wary of US sanctions. Similarly, Ankara has paused its Libyan offensive toward the eastern oil crescent in face of the risk of an outright military confrontation with Egypt. In each case, Erdogan appears to be at least temporarily recognizing the limits to his foreign adventurism. Nevertheless, the recent de-escalation does not mark the end of the conflict. Rather it demonstrates that both sides have hit constraints and are pausing for a breather. Chart 22Erdogan's Tactical Retreat Will Pull Down Turkish Risk Erdogan's Tactical Retreat Will Pull Down Turkish Risk Erdogan's Tactical Retreat Will Pull Down Turkish Risk The tactical retreat will provide some relief for the lira, which hit all-time lows against the dollar and euro, and thus pull down our Turkey GeoRisk indicator (Chart 22). But it does not guarantee that the Turkish risk premium will stay low. Talks between Greece and Turkey are unlikely to result in substantial breakthroughs. Instead the conflict will resurface – perhaps when Turkey is in a stronger economic position at home and the EU is distracted elsewhere, whether with internal political issues or conflicts with Russia, the UK, or any second-term Trump administration. Bottom Line: The recent de-escalation of East Med tensions does not mark the end of a bull market in Turkey-EU tensions. These tensions arise from geopolitical multipolarity – Turkey’s ability to act independently in foreign policy without facing an overwhelming, unified US-EU response. However, Turkey’s vulnerability to European economic sanctions shows that it faces real constraints. A major attempt to flout these constraints is a sell signal for the lira, as European sanctions could then become a reality. We remain negative on the lira, but will book gains on our short trade. Investment Takeaways We are booking gains on some of our tactical risk-off trades, given that we ultimately expect the US Congress to approve a new fiscal package. We are closing our long VIX December 2020 / short VIX January 2021 trade, which captured concerns about a contested election in the United States, for a gain of 4%. Volatility will still rise and a contested election is still possible, but the fiscal risk has gone up, COVID-19 cases have gone up, and Trump’s polling comeback has softened. The 4% gain does not include leverage or contract size. We were paid to put on the trade and now will be paid to exit it, so we are booking gains (Chart 23). Chart 23Book Gains On Bet On Near Term Volatility Book Gains On Bet On Near Term Volatility Book Gains On Bet On Near Term Volatility We are closing our short “EM Strongman Basket” of Turkish, Brazilian, and Philippine currencies for a gain of 4.5%. The trade has performed well but Turkey is not only recognizing its constraints abroad but also recognizing constraints at home by raising interest rates to defend the lira. In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro’s approval rating has surged and our GeoRisk indicator has topped out. The latest readings on our GeoRisk Indicators provide confirmation of our major themes, views, and trades. The charts of each country’s indicator can be found in the Appendix. Short China, Long China Plays: Geopolitical risk continues on the uptrend that began with Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and has not abated with the Phase One trade deal. Policymakers will remain entirely accommodative on fiscal and quasi-fiscal (credit) policy in the wake of this year’s recession. New financial regulations do not herald a return of the deleveraging campaign in any way comparable to 2017-18. The October Politburo meeting on the economy could conceivably sound a hawkish note, which could conveniently undermine sentiment ahead of the US election, but if this occurs then we would not expect follow-through. China plays and commodity plays should benefit, such as the Australian dollar, iron ore prices, and Brazilian and Swedish equities. Yet we remain short the renminbi, which has recently flagged after a fierce rally. Trump is negative for the RMB and Biden will ultimately be tough on China, contrary to the market consensus. Short Taiwan: US-China strategic relations have collapsed over the course of the year but financial markets have ignored it due to COVID-19 and stimulus. The only thing keeping US-China relations on an even keel is the Trump-Xi gentleman’s agreement, which expires on November 3 regardless of the election outcome. While outright military conflict over Taiwan cannot be ruled out, Beijing is much more likely to impose economic sanctions prior to any attempt to take the island by force. This has been our base case since 2016. Our GeoRisk indicator is just starting to price this risk so it remains highly underrated from the perspective of the Taiwanese dollar and equities. We are short and there is still time to put on shorts. Long South Korea: The rise in Korean geopolitical risk since the faltering of US-North Korean diplomacy in 2019 has peaked and fallen back, as expected. Pyongyang has not substantively tested President Trump during the election year and we still do not think he will – though a showdown would mark an October surprise that could boost Trump’s approval rating. South Korean political risk should continue falling and we are long Korean equities. Short Russia: Russian geopolitical risk has exploded upward, as we expected. We have been bearish on the Russian ruble and local currency bonds, though we should note that this differs from our Emerging Markets Strategy view based on macro fundamentals. Our reasoning predates the escalation of tensions with the EU over Belarus, but Belarus highlights the negative dynamic: Vladimir Putin in his fourth term is concerned about domestic social and political stability, and this concern is especially heightened after the global pandemic and recession. Therefore he has little ability to tolerate unrest in the former Soviet sphere. Moreover, he has a window of opportunity when the US administration is distracted, and not unfriendly, whereas that will change if the Democrats take over. If Democrats win, they will not try another diplomatic “reset” with Russia; they believe engagement has failed and want revenge for Putin’s undermining the Obama administration and 2016 election interference. The Nordstream 2 pipeline and Russian local currency bonds are at risk of new sanctions. The Democrats will also increase their efforts at cyber warfare and psychological warfare to counter Russia’s use of such measures. If Trump wins, the upside for Russia is limited as Trump’s personal preferences have repeatedly lost to the US political and military establishment when it comes to Russia. The US has remained vigilant against Russian threats and has increased support for countering Russia in eastern Europe and Ukraine. Chart 24Russia Is At Risk of US Sanctions Russia Is At Risk of US Sanctions Russia Is At Risk of US Sanctions In Belarus, President Lukashenko has been sworn in as president again, and he will not step down unless Russia and its allies orchestrate a replacement who is friendly toward Russian interests. Russia will not allow a pro-EU, pro-NATO government by any stretch of the imagination. The likeliest outcome is that Russia demonstrates its security and military superiority in a limited way, while the US and Europe respond with sanctions but not with military force. There is no appetite for the US or EU to engage in hot war with Russia over Belarus, which they have little hope of re-engineering in the Western image. We are short Russian currency and local bonds on the risk of sanctions stemming from either the US election cycle or the Belarus confrontation or both. We note that local currency bonds are not pricing in the risks that our geopolitical risk indicators are pricing (Chart 24). Long Europe: Our European geopolitical risk indicators show that the EU remains a haven of political stability in an unstable time. European integration is accelerating in the context of security threats from Russia, the potential for sustained economic conflict with the US (if Trump is re-elected), and economic competition with an increasingly authoritarian and mercantilist China. Europe’s latent strengths, when acting in unison, are brought out by the report on Turkey above. However, the 35% chance that the UK fails to reach a trade deal at the end of this year will still push our European risk indicators up in the near term.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com   We Read (And Liked) … Geopolitical Alpha: An Investment Framework For Predicting The Future What better way to revive the hallowed tradition of BCA Geopolitical Strategy book reviews than to give clients a sneak preview of our founder Marko Papic’s literary debut, Geopolitical Alpha: An Investment Framework for Predicting the Future?7 Long-time readers will know much of this book – it is the distillation of a decade of Marko’s work at BCA Research and, more recently, Clocktower Group. Here is the story of European integration – perhaps Marko’s greatest call, from back in 2011. Here is the story of multipolarity and investing. Here is the apex of globalization. Here is the decline of laissez-faire and the rise of dirigisme. Here is the end of Chimerica. Attendees of the BCA Research Academy will also recognize much in Marko’s formal exposition of his method. The categories of material constraints that bind policymakers. The practical application of the median voter theorem. The psychological lessons from Richards Heuer and Lee Ross. The occasional dash of game theory – and the workingman’s critique of it. The core teaching is the same: “Preferences are optional and subject to constraints, whereas constraints are neither optional nor subject to preferences.” There is also much that is new, notably Marko’s analysis of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is bound to generate controversy for classifying the whole episode as an example of mass hysteria comparable to the Salem witch trials, but which is as well-researched and well-argued as any section in the book. I was fortunate to learn the geopolitical method with Marko under the guidance of George Friedman, Peter Zeihan, Roger Baker, Fred Burton, Scott Stewart, and other colleagues at Stratfor (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.) in Austin, Texas from the era of the Iraq troop surge, the Russian invasion of Georgia, and the Lehman Brothers collapse. We both owe a lot to these teachers: the history of geopolitics, intelligence analysis, open source monitoring, net assessments, and, of course, forecasting. What Marko did was to take this armory of geopolitical analysis – which we both can testify is best taught in practice, not universities – and to put it to use in the financial context, where political analysis was long treated as optional and anecdotal despite the manifest and growing need for a rigorous framework. A hard-nosed analyst will never cease to be amazed by the gaps that emerge between the consensus view on Wall Street and a careful, disciplined net assessment of a nation or political movement. By the same token, the investor, trader, or economist will never cease to be amazed by the political analyst’s inability to grasp the concept of “already priced in” or “the second derivative.” What needed to be done was to master the art of macro investing and geopolitics. Marko took this upon himself. It was audacious and it provoked a lot of skepticism from the dismal scientists and the political scientists alike. But Geopolitical Alpha, the concept and the book, is the consequence – and we are now all the better for it. Marko is fundamentally a post-modern thinker. His methodological hero is Karl Marx for the development of materialist dialectic, the back-and-forth debate between economic forces that humans internalize in the form of competing ideologies. His foil is the humanist and republican, Niccolo Machiavelli – not for his amoral approach, but for prizing the virtue of the prince in the face of outrageous fortune. Human agency is Marko’s favorite punching bag – he excels at identifying the ways in which individuals will be frustrated despite their best efforts by the cold, insensitive walls of reality around them. If there is a critique of Marko’s book, then, it is that he gives short shrift to the classical liberal tradition – or as I like to think of it, the balance-of-power tradition. The idea that hegemony, or unipolarity, leads to a stable social and political environment conducive to peace and prosperity has a lot going for it. But it also partakes of an older tradition of thought that envisions a single, central political order as necessarily the most stable and predictable – a tradition that can be ascribed to Plato as well as Marx. You can see the positive implication for financial markets. But what if this tradition is only occasionally right – what if it too is subject to historical cycles? If that is the case, then the Beijing consensus is a mirage – and the US’s reversion to a blue-water strategy (not only under President Trump, but also under a future President Biden, according to his campaign agenda) does not necessarily herald the “end [of] American dominance on the world stage.” The classical tradition behind the Greco-Roman, British, and American constitutional systems, including their naval strategies, envisioned a multipolar order that was somewhat less stable but more durable, and this tradition has proven immensely beneficial for the creation of technology and wealth. Of course, Marko is very much alive to this tradition and, despite his critique of the ancients, shows himself to be highly sensitive to the interplay of virtue and fortune. Throughout the work, the analytical style can be characterized as restless energy in the service of cool, chess-playing logic. Marko is generous with his knowledge, merciless in drawing conclusions, and outrageously funny in delivery. He attacks the questions that matter most to investors and that experts too often leave shrouded in finely wrought uncertainty. He also shows himself to be a superb writer as well as strategist, interspersing his methodological training sessions with vivid anecdotes of a lifelong intellectual journey from a shattered Yugoslavia to the heights of finance. The bits of memoir are often the best, such as the intro to Chapter Six on geopolitics. To paraphrase a great author, Marko writes because he has a story to tell, not because he has to tell a story. The tale of the mysterious consulting firm Papic and Parsley will do a great public service by teaching readers precisely how skeptical of mainstream news journalism they should be. It isn’t enough to say that we read Geopolitical Alpha and liked it – the sole criterion for a review in this column. Rather, the book and its author are the reason this column exists. And Geopolitical Alpha is now the locus classicus of market-relevant geopolitical analysis.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We favored the upper side of the range, first $2.5 trillion, and subsequently something closer to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s demand of $2.2 trillion. We have speculated that Republicans may get her to settle at $1.9 trillion. 2 Two of these cases were unique in that a vice president took over from a president who died and then won re-election – unlike Trump’s scenario. 3 On August 12 a Greek Navy frigate collided with a Turkish vessel guiding the Oruc Reis. Athens called the incident an accident while Ankara referred to it as a provocation. 4 The so-called Seville Map was prepared at the request of the European Union by researchers at the University of Seville, attempts to clarify the exclusive economic zones of Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea. The US announced on September 21 that it does not consider the Seville map to have any legal significance. 5 The Blue Homeland or Mavi Vatan doctrine announced in 2006 intends to secure Turkish control of maritime areas surrounding its coast (Mediterranean Sea, Aegean Sea, and Black Sea) in order to secure energy supplies and support Turkey’s economic growth. 6 Erdogan’s claim that gas from the recently discovered Sakarya gas field would reach consumers by 2023 is likely overly optimistic and unrealistic. The drilling costs and commercial viability of the field are yet to be determined. Thus, the find does not impact dynamics in the East Med. 7 New Jersey: Wiley, 2021. 286 pages. Section II: GeoRisk Indicators China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Global GDP growth estimates from the OECD point to a stronger recovery in oil demand than markets are pricing in at present (Chart of the Week).  Our forecast for Brent remains at $46/bbl for 2H20 and $65/bbl on average for 2021. Global trade data – particularly EM import volumes, which are highly correlated with income (GDP) – remain supportive, as does monetary policy, particularly out of the US, EU and China.  Doubt surrounds the US Congress’s determination to extend the fiscal support that underpins many households’ and firms’ budgets, but we expect a deal. Aggregate demand uncertainty remains high.  COVID-19 infections are increasing globally.  However, death rates appear to be trending lower, which likely will keep lockdowns localized. On the supply side, the leaders of OPEC 2.0 – Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – continue to insist on full adherence to agreed production levels among member states.  This carries an implicit threat the leadership may be willing to flood the market with oil to remind the laggards of the consequences of cheating, which would hit non-Gulf OPEC members particularly hard. Longer term, sharp reductions in capex point to higher prices in the mid-2020s. Feature Stronger-than-expected growth estimates, most recently the OECD’s, suggest the decline in aggregate demand to the end of this year will not be as gruesome as earlier feared. Realized oil demand continues its V-shaped recovery, in line with rising GDP in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Stronger-than-expected growth estimates, most recently the OECD’s, suggest the decline in aggregate demand to the end of this year will not be as gruesome as earlier feared, and that growth could be stronger in 2021 than earlier anticipated, as seen in the Chart of the Week.1 The OECD is expecting global GDP growth to contract 4.5% this year vs. its June estimate of a 6% decline. The World Bank’s forecast of a 5.2% contraction in global GDP this year drives our oil-demand estimate, so the OECD’s estimate is more bullish for oil demand. Incoming data for EM import volumes suggest income is on track to recover by year-end or early 2021 in developing and emerging markets (Chart 2). EM import growth is driven by income growth; EM demand is the most important driver of global oil-demand growth. Chart of the WeekOECD Raises Global Growth Estimates Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery Chart 2EM Import Volumes Remain On Recovery Path EM Import Volumes Remain On Recovery Path EM Import Volumes Remain On Recovery Path Growth estimates continue to be overshadowed by fears of another round of widespread lockdowns arising from a second wave of COVID-19 infections and deaths. For next year, the OECD expects global growth to expand at a 5% rate vs. the World Bank’s 4.2% rate. We are awaiting the Bank’s updated income (GDP) estimates before revising our oil demand estimates. We already show EM oil demand, proxied by non-OECD consumption, recovering to pre-COVID-19 levels by the middle of next year, while DM demand flattens at a lower level (Chart 3). A confirmation of better-than-expected growth – particularly from EM economies – would move our expectation of a full recovery in EM oil-demand into 1H21 and could push DM demand up slightly. Chart 3EM Oil Demand Will Surpass Pre-COVID-19 Levels In Mid-2021 EM Oil Demand Will Surpass Pre-COVID-19 Levels In Mid-2021 EM Oil Demand Will Surpass Pre-COVID-19 Levels In Mid-2021 Chart 4COVID-19 Infections Rising, But Death Rates Are Falling Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery These growth estimates continue to be overshadowed by fears of another round of widespread lockdowns arising from a second wave of COVID-19 infections and deaths. This perforce makes any bullish demand recovery suspect. For the present, while COVID-19 infections are rising, death rates appear to be trending lower recently (Chart 4). If, as appears to be the case, a vaccine for the virus is approved later this year or in early 2021, markets likely would re-orient to discounting the time at which it is available globally to estimate a demand-recovery vector. Our estimate of the global oil-demand loss for this year is slightly larger than last month – -8.15mm b/s vs. -8.1mm b/d in August (Table 1). The US EIA and IEA also increased their estimates of 2020 global demand loss slightly this month as well, to -8.3mm b/d and -8.4mm b/d, respectively. OPEC once again is an outlier – albeit a very important source of information – in expecting a loss of -9.5mm b/d of demand this year. For 2021, we expect demand to grow 7.3mm b/d, vs. 6.5mm b/d from the EIA. OPEC expects oil-demand growth of 6.6mm b/d next year vs. last month’s forecast of 7mm b/d. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Holds Our expectation for OPEC 2.0 production is driven by our belief the group is targeting higher prices next year, and will adjust output to reach that goal. OPEC 2.0 continues to manage member-states’ output effectively. Compliance with the production cuts agreed by OPEC 2.0 remained strong in August – at 102%, based on OPEC’s calculations. The group’s production cut will be reduced to 5.8mm b/d starting in January 2021 from 7.7mm b/d currently (Chart 5). At its September 17 meeting, the coalition’s Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC) reiterated the importance of all countries complying with the agreed cuts, and recommended the so-called “compensation period” for underperforming countries failing to meet their production cuts be extended to the end of December 2020. This is meant to keep production below demand in 4Q20. For 2021, we continue to expect the group will accommodate higher demand growth by gradually increasing production beyond the currently planned January increase in quotas. This will limit the rise in prices, and will keep them below $70/bbl (Chart 6). Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Holds ... OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Holds ... OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Holds ... Chart 6... And Continues To Support Prices ... And Continues To Support Prices ... And Continues To Support Prices Our expectation for OPEC 2.0 production is driven by our belief the group is targeting higher prices next year, and will adjust output to reach that goal. KSA and Russia are making it abundantly clear in their public remarks they intend to keep the pressure up on the rest of OPEC 2.0 to move prices higher – their budgets have been hammered by the COVID-19 pandemic, after just starting to recover from the 2014-16 market-share war launched by OPEC when the pandemic hit earlier this year.2 Even in the current relatively low-price environment, KSA imposed a value-added tax (VAT) and is paring back social spending, while Russia is signaling it will increase in taxes on oil producers and metals companies and others to raise revenues.3 In the US, we believe most of the previously shut-in wells have been brought back on line. In our modeling, we marginally reduced OPEC 2.0’s production increase in this month’s forecast due to the slight downward revisions in demand. We now expect the group to increase its production to ~ 45mm b/d by December 2021, vs our previous expectation of ~ 46mm b/d. In our lower-demand scenario, which is driven by OPEC’s 2020 and 2021 demand estimates, we estimate prices would peak at ~ $50/bbl next year when keeping OPEC 2.0’s production unchanged vs. our base case. However, without the strong upward demand pressure, we believe OPEC 2.0 will keep its 5.8mm b/d production cuts in place for most of 2021 and that KSA, and to a lesser extent Russia, will push for strict production discipline at that level. This is sufficient to move prices close to $60/bbl on average in our lower-demand scenario in 2021 (Chart 7). Securing additional production cuts – to push average prices to $65/bbl as in our base case – from other OPEC 2.0 member states, including Russia, would be a difficult task. Chart 7Lower-Demand Price Scenarios Lower-Demand Price Scenarios Lower-Demand Price Scenarios Chart 8Falling US Rig Counts … Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery In the US, we believe most of the previously shut-in wells have been brought back on line. Going forward, legacy production declines rates will push onshore production down as new production from new completed wells remains below the level required to keep production flat (Chart 8). We expect production will bottom in June 2021 at ~ 8.1mm b/d before slowly moving up in 2H21 (Chart 9). The small uptick in production will come mainly from the completion of drilled-but-uncompleted (DUC) wells in the US shales, which expand and contract with the level of drilling activity, and function as a ready source of incremental lower-cost supply (Chart 10). DUCs will provide a cheap source of new production. We expect producers will begin developing this source of supply during the first half of next year, as the only expense left to bring oil to market from them are completion costs. Chart 9… And Falling US Production ... And Falling US Production ... And Falling US Production Chart 10Expect DUCs To Be Developed In 2021 Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery   Oil’s Capex Dilemma The IEA estimated oil and gas investment will fall by close to $244 billion y/y in 2020 which will reduce supply by ~ 2mm b/d by 2025. The combination of OPEC 2.0’s low-cost production and high spare capacity; parsimonious capital markets and the growing appeal of ESG-driven investment decisions; and concerns over peak oil demand will continue to limit funding to all but the most profitable producers, which will continue to limit E+P ex-OPEC 2.0.4 Consequently, new oil production in non-OPEC countries risks falling below the level needed to cover legacy wells’ decline rates, which we estimate at ~ 8% for non-OPEC ex-US shale production. This will be mostly apparent in The Other Guys – our moniker for all producers excluding Gulf OPEC, US shales, Canada, and Russia – which account for ~ 40% of global oil supply. In our view, the decline rates of The Other Guys currently are being overlooked, while the prospect of so-called “peak oil demand” is receiving a disproportionate amount of attention, and could be discouraging needed investment in new E+P. Keeping production flat in The Other Guys and US onshore production will require ~ 7mm b/d of new oil production between 2022 and 2025 (Chart 11). In the US, most of the added upstream capex will be dedicated to replacing legacy production declines. The IEA estimated oil and gas investment will fall by close to $244 billion y/y in 2020 which will reduce supply by ~ 2mm b/d by 2025. The sluggish rebound in capex could remove another 2-4mm b/d. According to IHS Markit, for supply to meet the expected demand over the next 5 years, close to $4.5 trillion in capex and opex is needed. The capital-constrained Other Guys’ supply growth, and a similar paucity of funding in the US and Canada will barely suffice to offset the decline rates in non-OPEC producing countries. This implies OPEC 2.0’s role will increase over the coming years as its spare capacity – which allows the group to move production to market more rapidly than shale producers – and ability to grow its productive capacity at low costs will disincentivize investments in major oil projects outside of these regions. Chart 11"The Other Guys" Production Remains In Decline Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery Investment Implications We expect the combination of OPEC 2.0 production discipline, parsimonious capital markets, and increasing decline rates will tighten the supply side of the market. In the near term, the recent upgrade in global GDP growth estimate from the OECD points to a stronger-than-expected recovery in oil demand, owing largely to massive fiscal and monetary support around the world. We expect the combination of OPEC 2.0 production discipline, parsimonious capital markets, and increasing decline rates will tighten the supply side of the market. As a result, we expect markets to continue to tighten (Chart 12), and for inventories to continue to draw this year and next (Chart 13). Chart 12Markets Will Continue To Tighten ... Markets Will Continue To Tighten ... Markets Will Continue To Tighten ... Chart 13... And Storage Will Continue To Draw ... And Storage Will Continue To Draw ... And Storage Will Continue To Draw We will continue to monitor growth estimates, but for the present, we are keeping our forecast for Brent at $46/bbl for 2H20 and $65/bbl on average for 2021. WTI will trade $2 - $4/bbl below Brent over this time. Longer term, producers outside the core OPEC 2.0 states are being starved for capital. The combination of continued production discipline and a paucity of capital available for producers outside this coalition are pointing toward a lower rate of supply growth going forward.    Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight  The recent announcement by Eastern Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar that the LNA would lift its blockade on oil output for a month does not meaningfully impact our previous Libyan oil production forecast. We continue to forecast a gradual recovery in the country’s production to 600k b/d and 900k b/d by December 2020 and 2021 (Chart 14). The news signals production could resume at a slightly higher pace than in our forecasts. However, we still believe risks to an export recovery are elevated, as the underlying conflicts in the country remain unresolved. Thus, we are keeping our projections largely unchanged (see Table 1). Base Metals: Neutral  World copper markets ended 1H20 with an apparent refined copper deficit of 278k MT, after adjustments for changes in Chinese bonded stocks. according to the International Copper Study Group. World ex-China refined copper usage declined ~ 9%, led by declines of 12% in Japan, 10% in the EU and ~ 8% in Asia (Ex-China). A 31% increase in net refined copper imports lifted Chinese apparent usage 9% offsetting, which offset declines in the rest of the world (Chart 15). China accounts for ~ 50% of refined copper consumption and ~ 40% of refined copper production. Precious Metals: Neutral  The sell-off in silver took prices below our trailing stop of $26/oz, leaving us with a gain of 40.5% since inception July 2, 2020. Our views for silver and gold remain positive, as the Fed continues to signal it will look through any pick-up in inflation, which we believe will keep real rates in the US low for the foreseeable future, and lead to a weaker USD. Ags/Softs:  Underweight  Soybean and corn futures paired back their gains, falling roughly 3.5% since last week. The USDA crop progress report for the week ending September 21, 2020, indicated that the deterioration in the condition of soybean and corn crops has stalled. The sharp rise in the US dollar Index has been another headwind. Given these factors and the precarious level of current prices, we recommend staying underweight agricultural products at this juncture.    Chart 14LIBYA CRUDE PRODUCTION SET TO REBOUND LIBYA CRUDE PRODUCTION SET TO REBOUND LIBYA CRUDE PRODUCTION SET TO REBOUND Chart 15Strong Chinese Copper Imports Strong Chinese Copper Imports Strong Chinese Copper Imports       Footnotes 1     Please see OECD Interim Economic Assessment, “Coronavirus: Living with uncertainty,” published September 16, 2020.   2     Following the JMMC meeting, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Al-Saud said OPEC 2.0 could hold an extraordinary meeting to address weaker demand, and warned traders against shorting the market.  Please see Saudi energy minister warns oil price gamblers ‘make my day’ published by aljazeera.com September 17, 2020. 3    Please see KSA VAT rate to increase to 15% from 1 July 2020 published by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited July 1, 2020.  See also Russian lawmakers give initial nod to hefty tax hike for mining, oil published by reuters.com September 22, 2020. 4    We opened our examination of the longer-term consequences of the contraction of supply growth last week in Oil's Next Bull Market, Courtesy Of COVID-19.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control

Highlights Bank credit 6-month impulses are plunging, and the pandemic is resurging. Maintain an overweight to growth defensives (technology and healthcare). In the short term, profits will be more resilient in a resurgent pandemic. In the long term, profits are well set to grow in an increasingly online, decentralised, remote-working, health-conscious world. The European stock market’s massive underweighting to growth defensives will weigh on its relative performance. Go underweight China economy plays. Fractal trade: Fractal analysis confirms that basic resources are vulnerable to a reversal. Within value cyclicals, tactically overweight financials versus basic resources. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Greatest Ever Monetary Stimulus Is Over... For Now The Greatest Ever Monetary Stimulus Is Over... For Now The Greatest Ever Monetary Stimulus Is Over... For Now Monetary stimulus, as measured by the increase in banks’ six-month credit flows, reached an all-time high during the summer months. But now, the greatest ever monetary stimulus is fading (Chart of the Week). In the US and China, the increase in banks’ six-month credit flows peaked at $700 billion and $800 billion respectively during May. In the euro area, the increase peaked at over $1 trillion during July. The combination constituted the greatest ever global monetary stimulus, trumping even the stimulus that followed the 2008 financial crisis (Charts I-2 - I-4). Chart I-2US Monetary Stimulus Is Fading US Monetary Stimulus Is Fading US Monetary Stimulus Is Fading Chart I-3China Monetary Stimulus Is Fading China Monetary Stimulus Is Fading China Monetary Stimulus Is Fading Chart I-4Euro Area Monetary Stimulus To Fade Euro Area Monetary Stimulus To Fade Euro Area Monetary Stimulus To Fade However, the increase in six-month credit flows has recently slumped to around $200 billion in both the US and China. The euro area has yet to update its data beyond July, but we expect it to fade too. The upshot is that the greatest ever monetary stimulus is over… for now. Bond Yields Are No Longer Stimulating Our preferred metric for assessing the transmission of monetary stimulus on an economy is the increase in the banks’ six-month credit flows. In turn, this depends on the six-month deceleration in the bond yield – meaning, the bond yield decline in the most recent six months must be greater than the decline in the previous six months. At first glance, this seems counterintuitive. Why focus on the bond yield’s deceleration rather than its plain vanilla decline? Box 1 explains how it follows from a fundamental accounting identity of GDP statistics.   Box 1 Why The Bond Yield’s Deceleration Matters GDP is a flow statistic. It measures the flow of goods and services produced in a period. Hence, the GDP flow receives a contribution from the bank credit flow in that period. In turn, the bank credit flow is established by the decline in the bond yield (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Decline In The Bond Yield Establishes The Bank Credit Flow The Decline In The Bond Yield Establishes The Bank Credit Flow The Decline In The Bond Yield Establishes The Bank Credit Flow It follows that GDP growth receives a contribution from bank credit flow growth. Which, in turn, receives a contribution from the bond yield deceleration. In other words, the bond yield decline in the most recent period must be greater than the decline in the previous period. Finally, our preferred period is six months because it empirically equals the time to fully spend a bank credit flow. A quarter is too short: a year is much too long.   Admittedly, during this year’s pandemic recession and rebound, the link between monetary stimulus and the real economy has weakened. Fiscal stimulus has played a more important role. Even when it comes to bank credit, much of the recent increase was not due to new loans. It was due to firms tapping pre-arranged credit lines, which they used to reinforce cash buffers, rather than to spend. Nevertheless, some impact of monetary stimulus will reach the real economy. This means that while this year’s earlier deceleration of bond yields was good news for the economy, the more recent acceleration of bond yields is bad news (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Recent Acceleration Of Bond Yields Is Bad News The Recent Acceleration Of Bond Yields Is Bad News The Recent Acceleration Of Bond Yields Is Bad News Tactically Underweight China Plays Through the summer months, 10-year bond yields flipped from sharp six-month decelerations to sharp accelerations. But the reversals were much more extreme in China and the US than in the euro area. Seen in this light, it is hardly surprising that the increase in six-month bank credit flows has already slumped in China and the US, and could soon turn negative. If so, they would be a contractionary force on the economy. One tactical investment conclusion is to underweight China economy plays. Specifically, with China’s bank credit six-month impulse in freefall, the 40 percent outperformance of basic resources versus financials is vulnerable to a sharp reversal (Chart I-7). This is also confirmed by fractal analysis (see later section). Chart I-7With China's Bank Credit 6-Month Impulse In Freefall, Basic Resources Are Vulnerable With China's Bank Credit 6-Month Impulse In Freefall, Basic Resources Are Vulnerable With China's Bank Credit 6-Month Impulse In Freefall, Basic Resources Are Vulnerable Stay underweight cyclicals. But within cyclicals, tactically overweight financials versus basic resources. A Resurgent Pandemic Will Force People Back Into Their Shells A resurgence of the pandemic will create a further headwind to the economy, irrespective of whether governments impose fresh lockdowns or not. This is because most of us have an instinct for self-preservation as well as protecting our loved ones. In response to a resurgent pandemic, we will go back into our shells. Shunning public transport, shopping, and other crowded places, some might even think twice about letting their children go to school. But if this cautious behaviour is voluntary, then why do governments need to impose lockdowns? The answer is that while the majority behaves responsibly, a minority behaves irresponsibly. In the pandemic, this is critical because less than 10 percent of infected people are responsible for creating 90 percent of all Covid-19 infections. If this tiny minority of so-called ‘super-spreaders’ is left unchecked, then the pandemic will let rip. At first glance, it appears that the lockdown is causing the recession. In fact, this is a classic confusion between correlation and causation. The true cause of the recession is the pandemic, which forces people into their shells. But to the extent that severity of the lockdown correlates with the severity of the pandemic, many people confuse the correlated lockdown with the underlying cause, the pandemic. The ultimate proof comes from Scandinavia. Sweden imposed no lockdown, while its neighbour Denmark imposed the most extreme lockdown in Europe. If it was the lockdown that caused the recession, then the economy of no-lockdown Sweden should have fared much better than that of lockdown Denmark. In fact, the two Scandinavian economies suffered identical 9 percent recessions (Chart I-8). Chart I-8No-Lockdown Sweden Suffered An Identical Recession To Lockdown-Denmark No-Lockdown Sweden Suffered An Identical Recession To Lockdown-Denmark No-Lockdown Sweden Suffered An Identical Recession To Lockdown-Denmark Focus On Sectors That Can Thrive In The New World Tactically we have recommended an underweight to stocks versus bonds since July 9, and this tactical position is broadly flat. Stick with it for now.1 A crucial question is: can bond yields go significantly lower? It is a crucial question because it was the collapse in bond yields earlier this year that saved the aggregate stock market. As long-duration bond yields plunged by 1 percent, the forward earnings yield of long-duration technology and healthcare stocks also plunged by 1 percent (Chart I-9). This surge in the valuation of the growth defensive sectors compensated for the collapsed profits of the value cyclical sectors – banks, basic resources, and oil and gas (Chart I-10). A resurgent pandemic combined with the end of the greatest ever monetary stimulus means that this playbook may get a rerun in the coming months. Chart I-9The Collapsed Bond Yield Explains The Collapsed Earnings Yield (Surging Valuation) Of Tech And Healthcare The Collapsed Bond Yield Explains The Collapsed Earnings Yield (Surging Valuation) Of Tech And Healthcare The Collapsed Bond Yield Explains The Collapsed Earnings Yield (Surging Valuation) Of Tech And Healthcare Chart I-10Tech And Healthcare Saved The Aggregate Stock Market Tech And Healthcare Saved The Aggregate Stock Market Tech And Healthcare Saved The Aggregate Stock Market The worry is that, from current levels, long-duration bond yields will struggle to plunge by another 1 percent and provide the same boost to valuations that they did in the first wave of the pandemic. In which case, the outlook for stocks and sectors will hinge more on their profits. On this basis, we still favour the growth defensives – which we define as technology and healthcare – both for the short term and the long term. In the short term, their profits will be more resilient in a resurgent pandemic. In the long term, their profits are well set to grow in an increasingly online, decentralised, remote-working, health-conscious world. One unfortunate consequence is that the European stock market’s massive underweighting to the growth defensives sectors will weigh on its relative performance, both in the short term and in the long term. Fractal Trading System* Supporting the fundamental analysis in the main body of this report, fractal analysis confirms that basic resources are vulnerable to a reversal versus financials. Hence, this week’s recommended trade is to go long financials versus basic resources. One way of implementing this is: long XLF, short XLB. Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 3.5 percent. In other trades, long ZAR/CLP reached the end of its holding period flat, and is now closed. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 58 percent. World: Basic Resources Vs. Financials World: Basic Resources Vs. Financials   When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Expressed as short DAX versus 10-year T-bond. Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields     Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations   Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations    

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of August 31, 2020.  The country allocation model still favors the US as its largest overweight. Despite Japan’s outstanding performance in August, the model still maintains its large underweight in Japanese equities, as shown in Table 1.  Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model slightly underperformed the MSCI World benchmark by 7 bps in August. The Level 1 model outperformed by 19 bps because of the overweight in the US, while the Level 2 model underperformed its benchmark by 104 bps partly because of its large underweight in Japan. August was a very strange month in the sense that only the US and Japan outperformed while the rest underperformed the MSCI World benchmark.  As such, except for the US and Japan bets, all other six underweight choices made positive contributions to the overall performance of the model, while all other four overweight bets made negative contributions. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its MSCI World benchmark by 404 bps, with 604 bps of outperformance from the Level 2 model, and 111 bps of outperformance from the Level 1 model. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %) GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1) GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1) GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1)   Chart 3GAA Non US Model (Level 2) GAA Non US Model (Level 2) GAA Non US Model (Level 2) For more on historical performance, please refer to our website https://www.bcaresearch.com/site/trades/allocation_performance/latest/G…. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, “Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model,” dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered as well when making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Model (Chart 4) is updated as of August 31, 2020. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance The model continues to maintain its pro-cyclical stance driven by an improvement in its global growth proxy, and remains exposed to cyclical sectors. Over the past month, the model outperformed its benchmark by 58 basis points. Year-to-date, the model has outperformed its benchmark by 212 basis points, and 227 basis points since going live. The model’s global growth proxy continues to signal a bullish stance – driven by its three components: Appreciating EM currencies, rising metal prices, and an improvement in broad business climate. The model therefore continues to remain positive on cyclical sectors. Global monetary easing for the coming years and low rates should keep the liquidity component favoring a mixed bag of cyclical and defensive sectors. The valuation component remains muted across all sectors except Energy. However, several sectors continue to be near the expensive and cheap zones – mainly Info Tech and Consumer Discretionary (expensive), and Real Estate and Consumer Staples (cheap). The model awaits confirming momentum signals to change recommendations for those sectors. The model upgraded Industrials this month based on an improvement in its momentum component. Table 3Overall Model Performance GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Table 4Current Model Allocations GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates     The model is now overweight five cyclical sectors in total. These are Information Technology, Consumer Discretionary, Communication Services, Materials, and Industrials. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report “Introducing the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model”, dated July 27, 2016, as well as the Sector Selection Model section in the Special Alert “GAA Quant Model Updates”, dated March 1, 2019 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com.   Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst amrh@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Scarce Yield: The correlation of relative global government bond returns and yield levels is becoming more positive. The trend should continue if central bankers across the developed world stick to their promises to maintain very loose monetary policy settings for at least the next two years, forcing investors to chase scarce yields while worrying less about cyclical economic and inflation factors. Country Allocations: Maintain overweights to higher-yielding government bonds (Italy, the US, Canada) versus low-yielders (Germany, France, Japan) within USD-hedged fixed income portfolios. Upgrade higher-yielders Spain and Australia to overweight, at the expense of the low-yielding UK and Germany. Feature “What is the investment rationale for buying developed market government bonds now?” We begin this week with a question posed by a BCA client in a recent meeting. It was a perfectly logical inquiry given the current microscopic level of yields on offer almost everywhere. Why bother buying a 10-year US Treasury barely yielding more than 0.5%, or a 10-year Italian BTP yielding less than 1%, with both offering little compensation for future inflation or fiscal risks? Chart of the WeekYield Chasing Is Now The Only Winning Strategy Yield Chasing Is Now The Only Winning Strategy Yield Chasing Is Now The Only Winning Strategy Our answer to the question – “because the Fed and ECB will do whatever is needed to prevent nominal bond yields from rising over the foreseeable future” – did little to influence the client’s view on the attractiveness of those yields (but did make her more comfortable about the equity and corporate credit exposures in her portfolio). In the current environment, where all countries are experiencing the ultimate exogenous negative growth shock – a deadly and highly contagious pandemic - the usual analysis of the cyclical economic and inflation dynamics of any single country now offers far less payoff to government bond investing. It is hard to find a country not suffering from weak growth, very low inflation, high unemployment (some of which is likely to be permanent) and ongoing uncertainty related to the spread of COVID-19. It is also hard to find a country where interest rates have not been cut to 0% (or even lower) and central banks have not ramped up bond buying activity. Increasingly, the relative performance of government bonds between countries reflects simple yield differentials, rather than differing monetary policy outlooks. Higher-yielding markets are outperforming the lower-yielding markets – a trend that has persisted throughout 2020 and is likely to intensify in the coming months (Chart of the Week). Growth? Inflation? Who Cares? Give Me Yield! Developed market government bond yields have been ignoring the usual message sent by cyclical economic indicators. The latest round of global manufacturing PMI data showed continued solid rebounds from the COVID-19 collapse in the US, UK, most of the euro area and other major regions. Nominal 10-year government bond yields in those countries typically track the path of the PMIs, but yields are now as much as 180bps (for US Treasuries) below the levels seen the last time PMIs were so elevated (Chart 2). There is an easy way to explain this discrepancy between bond yields and economic activity. In years past, markets would price in higher inflation expectations, and a greater probability of a future monetary tightening, when growth was improving. Today, policymakers worldwide are bending over backwards to let investors know that no interest rate increases should be expected for at least the next two years – even if growth is improving and inflation were to accelerate. This is having the effect of both lowering real bond yields and increasing inflation expectations, with central bankers also expressing a greater tolerance for future inflation that will limit “pre-emptive” rate increases. Our Central Bank Monitors continue to signal a need for easier monetary policies, even with the rebound in manufacturing data and economic optimism surveys witnessed in the US and UK lifting the Monitors there from the lows (Chart 3). Real bond yields are mirroring the trend in the Central Bank Monitors, indicating that some of the decline in real yields seen in the US, Europe, Canada and Australia is likely related to markets pricing in a lower-for-longer period of monetary policy rates, as we discussed in last week’s report.1 Chart 2Bond Yields Ignoring Improving PMIs Bond Yields Ignoring Improving PMIs Bond Yields Ignoring Improving PMIs Chart 3Plunging Real Yields Reflect Pressure On CBs To Stay Dovish Plunging Real Yields Reflect Pressure On CBs To Stay Dovish Plunging Real Yields Reflect Pressure On CBs To Stay Dovish Chart 4A Low-Volatility Backdrop Encourages Yield Chasing Behavior A Low-Volatility Backdrop Encourages Yield Chasing Behavior A Low-Volatility Backdrop Encourages Yield Chasing Behavior With bond markets having little reason to expect a shift to more bond-unfriendly monetary policies, it is no surprise that higher yielding government bond markets are outperforming low-yielders at an accelerating rate. When there is little to be gained or lost from the duration exposure of government bonds, then the expected returns on government bonds will more closely track yield levels. Fixed income investors seeking the highest returns will be forced to chase the bonds with the highest yields. The current calm volatility backdrop is also fostering an environment of yield-chasing, carry-driven strategies. Measures of yield volatility like the MOVE index of US Treasury option prices and swaption volatilities in Europe have calmed dramatically from the spike seen during February and March (Chart 4). Liquidity in government bond markets has also improved, with bid/ask spreads on 30-year US Treasuries and UK Gilts now back to normal tight levels.2 In a world of low bond volatility and yield chasing behavior, markets with the highest yields should end up outperforming lower yielding markets. Chart 5"High" Yielders Are The Winners In A Low-Yield Environment We’re All Yield Chasers Now We’re All Yield Chasers Now In Chart 5, we show the 2020 year-to-date government bond returns, for the 7-10 year maturity bucket, for the countries we include in our model bond portfolio (the US, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the UK, Japan, Canada and Australia). The returns are shown both currency unhedged (in USD terms) and hedged into US dollars, with the yield levels from the start of 2020 shown at the top of each bar. The ranking of the returns does generally follow the ranking of yields at the start of the year – the US, Canada, Australia and Italy outperforming low-yielding Germany, France and Japan. What is more interesting is how that correlation between yield levels and performance has evolved over the course of 2020, and even dating back to 2019. If a dynamic of strict yield chasing behavior was gaining steam, then the performance rankings of government bonds should increasingly reflect the rankings of available yields. One way to measure such a dynamic is with a statistic called a Spearman’s rank correlation. Simply put, the Spearman’s rank shows the correlation between the rankings of two sets of variables within each set, rather than the correlation of the variables themselves. If the correlation between the rankings is increasing, this suggests that the relationship between the two variables is becoming more dependent on the levels of the variables relative to each other. We present the Spearman’s rank correlation between yield levels and subsequent bond returns for the nine countries in our model bond portfolio universe in Chart 6. Weekly correlations are calculated using the ranking of the 10-year government bond yields from those nine countries and the rankings of the subsequent weekly total returns (currency unhedged) for those same markets. We present a rolling 52-week correlation coefficient in the chart, which shows a steadily rising trend over the past year of relative bond market performance becoming more dependent on relative initial yield levels. Chart 6High' Yielders Are The Winners In A Low-Yield Environment High' Yielders Are The Winners In A Low-Yield Environment High' Yielders Are The Winners In A Low-Yield Environment While the Spearman’s rank correlation is still relatively low, around 0.2 on the latest data point of the 52-week moving average, that does represent the highest level seen over the past two decades. On the margin, the more recent observations are showing an even higher level of correlation – a trend that should continue given the current easy global monetary policy settings described above that should continue to promote yield-chasing behavior. Another way to measure how much more yield driven government bond markets have become is to look at the relative performance of investment strategies that focus on allocations informed by yield levels. A simple such strategy is presented in Chart 7, using a rule of going long the highest yielding 10-year bond in our list of nine countries at the start of each week and holding only that bond for the subsequent week. We show the return of that simple strategy relative to the return Bloomberg Barclays 7-10 year Global Treasury index in the top panel of the chart, all measured in US dollars on an unhedged basis. The simple strategy of picking the highest yielding bond has been delivering solid outperformance versus the benchmark over the past 2-3 years, with year-over-year relative returns of between 5-10%. The strategy performed very well during the last period similar to today in the post-crisis years of 2012-16, when global policy rates were near 0% and central banks were aggressively expanding their balance sheets through quantitative easing. The year-over-year returns of this simple strategy were always positive during the period (shaded in the chart), which included some major moves in the US dollar that influenced unhedged bond returns. A simple strategy of selecting only the highest yielding government bond has also delivered solid returns of late when focused on other bond maturities besides the 10-year point (Chart 8). The information ratios of these strategies, shown in the chart as the relative year-over-year return of each strategy versus the benchmark compared to the volatility of that relative performance, are all at similar levels in the 0.27-0.94 range. Chart 7Chase The Highest Yields During Global QE & Extended ZIRP Chase The Highest Yields During Global QE & Extended ZIRP Chase The Highest Yields During Global QE & Extended ZIRP Chart 8Yield Chasing Strategies Outperforming Across All Maturities Yield Chasing Strategies Outperforming Across All Maturities Yield Chasing Strategies Outperforming Across All Maturities The efficiency of these strategies will likely not return to the levels seen during that 2012-16 period of extended easy global monetary policy, given the much lower yield levels seen across all bonds including outright negative yields in places like Germany and Japan. However, in a more general sense, selecting higher yielding bonds over lower yielding ones should continue to deliver stronger returns than passive low-yielding benchmarks for as long as policymakers continue to err on the side of reflation (0% rates, more quantitative easing, even yield curve control to limit yields from rising) when setting monetary policy. Selecting higher yielding bonds over lower yielding ones should continue to deliver stronger returns than passive low-yielding benchmarks for as long as policymakers continue to err on the side of reflation. Bottom Line: The correlation of relative global government bond returns and yield levels is becoming more positive. The trend should continue if policymakers stick to their promises to maintain very loose monetary policy settings for at least the next two years, forcing investors to chase scarce yields regardless of cyclical economic and inflation trends. Investment Implications & Alterations To Our Model Bond Portfolio Chart 9Higher-Yielding Government Bonds Will Continue To Shine Higher-Yielding Government Bonds Will Continue To Shine Higher-Yielding Government Bonds Will Continue To Shine The intensified yield chasing behavior has obvious implications for fixed income investors. Within dedicated global government bond portfolios, exposures should be concentrated in higher yielding markets at the expense of the low yielders. Already, the relative returns year-to-date (on a USD-hedged and duration-matched basis versus the Global Treasury index) reflect that conclusion, with the US (+692bps versus the index), Canada (+458bps) and Italy (+87bps) outperforming and Germany (-111bps), France (-77bps) and Japan (-472bps) lagging (Chart 9). Our current investment recommendations, both on a medium-term strategic basis and within our more flexible model bond portfolio, are generally in line with those rankings. Our recommendations already include overweights in the US, Canada, Italy and the UK; with underweights in Germany, France and Japan. We are currently neutral Spain and Australia. The view on Spain was a relative value consideration, as we preferred an overweight on Italy as our recommended exposure within the European peripherals. For Australia, we closed our long-standing overweight stance there back in May, primarily due to signs that the Australian economy was showing signs of recovery after what was a very modest initial wave of COVID-19 cases.3 Now, we see good reasons to upgrade Spain and Australia to overweight to gain even more exposure to high-yielding government bonds in a yield-scarce, yield-chasing world. Our recommendations already include overweights in the US, Canada, Italy and the UK; with underweights in Germany, France and Japan. In Chart 10, we present a scatter chart showing 10-year government bond yields, hedged into US dollars, plotted versus the latest trailing 1-year beta of yield changes to those of the 7-10 maturity bucket for the Global Treasury index. This is a simple way to present a reward versus risk relationship, using the yield beta as the measure of risk. The chart shows that Spain and Australia offer relatively attractive yields compared to other markets with similar yield betas. This offers a way to boost the expected yield from our recommended portfolio without raising the yield beta of the portfolio. Chart 10Upgrade Spain & Australia, Downgrade The UK In Global Bond Portfolios We’re All Yield Chasers Now We’re All Yield Chasers Now Specifically, we see two allocation changes that can be made to our model bond portfolio to reflect this view on relative yields: Upgrade Spain to overweight, while reducing the weight on UK Gilts to neutral Upgrade Australia to overweight, funded by reducing the German underweight allocation even further. We see good reasons to upgrade Spain and Australia to overweight to gain even more exposure to high-yielding government bonds in a yield-scarce, yield-chasing world. The USD-hedged yield pickup on both of those switches is substantial, as can be seen in Table 1 where we present unhedged and USD-hedged yields for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year government bonds across all developed markets. Switching from the UK to Spain generates a modest yield pick-up on an unhedged basis at the 10-year and 30-year maturity points. The pickup is far more attractive across all maturity points on a USD-hedged basis, ranging from +22bps for 2-year maturities to +101bps for 30-year bonds. Table 1Developed Market Bond Yields, Both Unhedged & Hedged Into USD We’re All Yield Chasers Now We’re All Yield Chasers Now In fact, UK Gilt yields across the entire maturity spectrum are now some of the lowest on offer within the developed market space, both on an unhedged and USD hedged basis. This alone is enough reason to downgrade Gilt exposure, especially with the Bank of England continuing to shoot down the notion of a move to negative UK policy rates that could also drive longer-dated Gilt yields into negative territory. As for Australia, the recent severe COVID-19 outbreak in Melbourne, the country’s second largest city, has raised fears that a new and more extended period of lockdowns may be necessary Down Under. This goes against our original thesis for downgrading Australian bond exposure a few months ago, thus a return to overweight as a yield pickup also makes sense on a fundamental basis – particularly with the RBA already using extreme measures like yield curve control to anchor the level of 3-year Australian bond yields from the short end of the curve. The yield pick-up from our recommended switch from Germany to Australia is significant from the 2-year to 30-year maturity points, ranging between 94bps to 182bps on an unhedged basis and 20bps to 109bps on a USD-hedged basis. The changes to our recommended country allocations in our model bond portfolio can be found on pages 12-13. Bottom Line: Maintain overweights to higher-yielding government bonds (Italy, the US, Canada) versus low-yielders (Germany, France, Japan) within USD-hedged fixed income portfolios. Upgrade higher-yielders Spain and Australia to overweight, at the expense of the low-yielding UK and Germany.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth?", dated August 4, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The bid-ask spreads shown are taken from the Bank of England’s latest Financial Stability Review, available here: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2020/august-2020.pdf 3 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End", dated May 13, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations We’re All Yield Chasers Now We’re All Yield Chasers Now Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of July 31, 2020.  The model has not made any meaningful adjustment to the top overweight countries with the top four remaining the US, Spain, Australia, and Sweden. Within the underweight countries, however, the UK has dropped out of the top four, replaced by Germany. Japan, France, and Switzerland remain in the top 4 underweight countries, as shown in Table 1.  Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model outperformed the MSCI World benchmark by 73 bps in July, with positive contributions from both the Level 1 and the Level 2 models. The Level 2 model outperformed its benchmark by 176 bps, thanks largely to the underweight in Japan and the UK, as well as the overweight in Sweden. The Level 1 model outperformed by 27 bps due to the large overweight in the US. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its MSCI World benchmark by 390 bps, with 714 bps of outperformance from the Level 2 model, and 74 bps of outperformance from the Level 1 model. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %) GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1) GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1) GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1)   Chart 3GAA Non US Model (Level 2) GAA Non US Model (Level 2) GAA Non US Model (Level 2) GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Model (Chart 4) is updated as of July 31, 2020. The model’s relative tilts between cyclicals and defensives did not change compared to last month. The model continues to maintain its cyclical stance driven by an improvement in its global growth proxy and remains exposed to cyclical sectors. Over the past month, the model outperformed its benchmark by 32 basis points. Year-to-date, the model has outperformed its benchmark by 144 basis points, and 149 basis points since inception. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance Table 3Overall Model Performance GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates The model’s global growth proxy improved – driven by appreciating EM currencies and rising metal prices, and therefore continues to remain positive on cyclical sectors. Global monetary easing and low rates should keep the liquidity component favoring a mixed bag of cyclical and defensive sectors. The valuation component remains muted across all sectors except Energy. However, multiple sectors continue to be near the expensive and cheap zones – mainly Info Tech and Consumer Discretionary (expensive), and Real Estate and Consumer Staples (cheap). The model awaits confirming momentum signals to change recommendations for those sectors. Table 4Current Model Allocations GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates The model is now overweight four cyclical sectors in total. These are Information Technology, Consumer Discretionary, Communication Services, and Materials. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report “Introducing the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model”, dated July 27, 2016, as well as the Sector Selection Model section in the Special Alert “GAA Quant Model Updates”, dated March 1, 2019 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com.   Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst amrh@bcaresearch.com    

Highlights The tech sector faces mounting domestic political and geopolitical risks. We fully expected stimulus hiccups but believe they will give way to large new fiscal support, given that COVID-19 is weighing on consumer confidence. Europe’s relative political stability is a good basis for the euro rally but any comeback in opinion polling by President Trump could give dollar bulls new life. DXY is approaching a critical threshold below which it would break down further. The US could take aggressive actions on Russia and Iran, but China and the Taiwan Strait remain the biggest geopolitical risk. Feature Near-term risks continue to mount against the equity rally, even as governments’ combined monetary and fiscal policies continue to support a cyclical economic rebound. Chart 1Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Testimony by the chief executives of Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Alphabet to the US House of Representatives highlighted the major political risks facing the market leaders. There are three reasons not to dismiss these risks despite the theatrical nature of the hearings. First, the tech companies’ concentration of wealth would be conspicuous during any economic bust, but this bust has left pandemic-stricken consumers more reliant on their services. Second, acrimony is bipartisan – conservatives are enraged by the tendency of the tech companies to side with the Democratic Party in policing the range of acceptable political discourse, and they increasingly agree with liberals that the companies have excessive corporate power warranting anti-trust probes. Executive action is the immediate risk, but in the coming one-to-two years congressional majorities will also be mustered to tighten regulation. Third, technology is the root of the great power struggle between the US and China – a struggle that will not go away if Biden wins the election. Indeed Biden was part of the administration that launched the US’s “Pivot to Asia” and will have better success in galvanizing US diplomatic allies behind western alternatives to Chinese state-backed and military-linked tech companies. US tech companies struggle to outperform Chinese tech companies except during episodes of US tariffs, given the latter firms’ state-backed turn toward innovation and privileged capture of the Chinese domestic market (Chart 1). The US government cannot afford to break up these companies without weighing the strategic consequences for America’s international competitiveness. The attempt to coordinate a western pressure campaign against Huawei and other leading Chinese firms will continue over the long run as they are accused of stealing technology, circumventing UN sanctions, violating human rights, and compromising the national security of the democracies. China, for its part, will be forced to take counter-measures. US tech companies will be caught in the middle. Like the threat of executive regulation in the domestic sphere, the threat of state action in the international sphere is difficult to time. It could happen immediately, especially given that the US is having some success in galvanizing an alliance even under President Trump (see the UK decision to bar Huawei) and that President Trump’s falling election prospects remove the chief constraint on tough action against China (the administration will likely revoke Huawei’s general license on August 13 or closer to the election). Massive domestic economic stimulus empowers the US to impose a technological cordon and China to retaliate. Combining this headline risk to the tech sector with other indications that the equity rally is extended – the surge in gold prices, the fall in the 30-year/5-year Treasury slope – tells us that investors should be cautious about deploying fresh capital in the near term. Republicans Will Capitulate To New Stimulus Just as President Trump has ignored bad news on the coronavirus, financial markets have ignored bad news on the economy. Dismal Q2 GDP releases were fully expected – Germany shrank by 10.1% while the US shrank by 9.5% on a quarterly basis, 32.9% annualized. But the resurgence of the virus is threatening new government restrictions on economic activity. US initial unemployment claims have edged up over the past three weeks. US consumer confidence regarding future expectations plummeted from 106.1 in June to 91.5 in July, according to the Conference Board’s index. Chart 2Global Instability Will Follow Recession A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Setbacks in combating the virus will hurt consumers even assuming that governments lack the political will to enforce new lockdowns. The share of countries in recession has surged to levels not seen in 60 years (Chart 2). Financial markets can look past recessions, but the pandemic-driven recession will result in negative surprises and second-order effects that are unforeseen. Yes, fresh fiscal stimulus is coming, but this is more positive for the cyclical outlook than the tactical outlook. Stimulus “hiccups” could precipitate a near-term pullback – such a pullback may be necessary to force politicians to resolve disputes over the size and composition of new stimulus. This risk is immediate in the United States, where House Democrats, Senate Republicans, and the White House have hit an all-too-predictable impasse over the fifth round of stimulus. The bill under negotiation is likely to be President Trump’s last chance to score a legislative victory before the election and the last significant legislative economic relief until early 2021. The Senate Republicans have proposed a $1.1 trillion HEALS Act in response to the House Democrats’ $3.4 trillion HEROES Act, passed in mid-May. As we go to press, the federal unemployment insurance top-up of $600 per week is expiring, with a potential cost of 3% of GDP in fiscal tightening, as well as the moratorium on home evictions. Congress will have to rush through a stop-gap measure to extend these benefits if it cannot resolve the debate on the larger stimulus package. If Democrats and Republicans split the difference then we will get $2.5 trillion in stimulus, likely by August 10. Compromise on the larger package is easy in principle, as Table 1 shows. If the two sides split the difference between their proposals in a commonsense way, as shown in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 1, then the result will be a $2.5 trillion stimulus. This estimate fits with what we have published in the past and likely meets market expectations for the time being. Table 1Outline Of Fifth US COVID Stimulus Package (Estimate) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Whether it is enough for the economy depends on how the virus develops and how governments respond once flu season picks up and combines with the coronavirus to pressure the health system this fall. A back-of-the-envelope estimate of the amount of spending necessary to keep the budget deficit from shrinking in the second half of the year comes much closer to the House Democrats’ $3.4 trillion bill (Table 2), which suggests that what appears to be a massive stimulus today could appear insufficient tomorrow. Nevertheless, $2.5 trillion is not exactly small. It would bring the US total to $5 trillion year-to-date, or 24% of GDP! Table 2Reducing The Budget Deficit On A Quarterly Basis Will Slow Economy A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) While a compromise bill should come quickly, the Republican Party is more divided over this round of stimulus than earlier this year. Chart 3US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 First, there is some complacency due to the fact that the economy is recovering, not collapsing as was the case back in March. Our US bond strategist, Ryan Swift, has shown that US personal income is much better off, thus far, than it was in the months following the 2008 financial crisis, even though the initial pre-transfer hit to incomes is larger (Chart 3). Second, the Republican Party is reacting to growing unease within its ranks over the yawning budget deficit, now the largest since World War II (Chart 4). Chart 4If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose Chart 5Consumer Confidence Sends Warning Signal To Republicans A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) If Republicans are guided by complacency and fiscal hawks, they will cook their own goose. A failure to provide government support will cause a financial market selloff, will hurt consumer confidence, and will put the final nail in the coffin of their own chance of re-election as well as President Trump’s. Consumer confidence tracks fairly well with presidential approval rating and election outcomes. A further dip could disqualify Trump, whereas a last-minute boost due to stimulus and an economic surge could line him up for a comeback in the last lap (Chart 5). These constraints are obvious so we maintain our high conviction call that a bill will be passed, likely by August 10. But at these levels on the equity market, we simply have no confidence in the market gyrations leading up to or following the passage of the bill. Our conviction level is on the cyclical, 12-month horizon, in which case we expect US and global stimulus to operate and equities to rise. Bottom Line: Political and economic constraints will force Republicans to join Democrats and pass a new stimulus bill of about $2.5 trillion by around August 10. This is cyclically positive, but hiccups in getting it passed, negative surprises, and other risks tied to US politics discourage us from taking an overtly bullish stance over the next three months. Yes, US-China Tensions Are Still Relevant Chart 6Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Financial markets have shrugged off US-China tensions this year for understandable reasons. The pandemic, recession, and stimulus have overweighed the ongoing US-China conflict. As we have argued, China is undertaking a sweeping fiscal and quasi-fiscal stimulus – despite lingering hawkish rhetoric – and the size is sufficient to assist in global economic recovery as well as domestic Chinese recovery. What the financial market overlooks is that China’s households and firms are still reluctant to spend (Chart 6). China’s Politburo's late July meetings on the economy are frequently important. Initial reports of this year’s meet-up reinforce the stimulus narrative. Hints of hawkishness here and there serve a political purpose in curbing market exuberance, both at home and in the US election context, but China will ultimately remain accommodative because it has already bumped up against its chief constraint of domestic stability. Note that this assessment also leaves space for market jitters in the near-term. The phase one trade deal remains intact as President Trump is counting on it to make the case for re-election while China is looking to avoid antagonizing a loose cannon president who still has a chance of re-election. As long as broad-based tariff rates do not rise, in keeping with Trump’s deal, financial markets can ignore the small fry. We maintain a 40% risk that Trump levels sweeping punitive measures; our base case is that he goes to the election arguing that he gets results through his deal-making while carrying a big stick. At the same time, our view that domestic stimulus removes the economic constraints on conflict, enabling the two countries to escalate tensions, has been vindicated in recent weeks. Chinese political risk continues on a general uptrend, based on market indicators. The market is also starting to price in the immense geopolitical risks embedded in Taiwan’s situation, which we have highlighted consistently since 2016. While North Korea remains on a diplomatic track, refraining from major military provocations, South Korean political risk is still elevated both for domestic and regional reasons (Chart 7). Chart 7China Political Risk Still Trending Upward China Political Risk Still Trending Upward China Political Risk Still Trending Upward The market is gradually pricing in a higher risk premium in the renminbi, Taiwanese dollar, and Korean won, and this pricing accords with our longstanding political assessment. The closure of the US and Chinese consulates in Houston and Chengdu is only the latest example of this escalating dynamic. While the US’s initial sanctions on China over Hong Kong were limited in economic impact, the longer term negative consequences continue to build. Hong Kong was the symbol of the Chinese Communist Party’s compatibility with western liberalism; the removal of Hong Kong’s autonomy strikes a permanent blow against this compatibility. China’s decision to go forward with the imposition of a national security law in Hong Kong – and now to bar pro-democratic candidates from the September 6 Legislative Council elections, which will probably be postponed anyway – has accelerated coalition-building among the western democracies. The UK is now clashing with China more openly, especially after blocking Huawei from its 5G system and welcoming Hong Kong political refugees. Australia and China have fought a miniature trade war of their own over China’s lack of transparency regarding COVID-19, and Canada is implicated in the Huawei affair. Even the EU has taken a more “realist” approach to China. Across the Taiwan Strait, political leaders are assisting fleeing Hong Kongers, crying out against Beijing’s expansion of control in its periphery, rallying support from informal allies in the US and West, and doubling down on their “Silicon Shield” (prowess in semiconductor production) as a source of protection. Intel Corporation’s decision to increase its dependency on TSMC for advanced microchips only heightens the centrality of this island and this company in the power struggle between the US and China. China cannot fulfill its global ambitions if the US succeeds in creating a technological cordon. Taiwan is the key to China’s breaking through that cordon. Therefore Taiwan is at heightened risk of economic or even military conflict. The base case is that Beijing will impose economic sanctions first, to undermine Taiwanese leadership. The uncertainty over the US’s willingness to defend Taiwan is still elevated, even if the US is gradually signaling a higher level of commitment. This uncertainty makes strategic miscalculations more likely than otherwise. But Taiwan’s extreme economic dependence on the mainland gives Beijing a lever to pursue its interests and at present that is the most important factor in keeping war risk contained. By the same token, Taiwanese economic and political diversification increases that risk. A “fourth Taiwan Strait crisis” that involves trade war and sanctions is our base case, but war cannot be ruled out, and any war would be a major war. Thus investors can safely ignore Tik-Tok, Hong Kong LegCo elections, and accusations of human rights violations in Xinjiang. But they cannot ignore concrete deterioration in the Taiwan Strait. Or, for that matter, the South and East China Seas, which are not about fishing and offshore drilling but about China’s strategic depth and positioning around Taiwan. Taiwan is at heightened risk of economic or military conflict. The latest developments have seen the CNY-USD exchange rate roll over after a period of appreciation associated with bilateral deal-keeping (Chart 8). Depreciation makes it more likely that President Trump will take punitive actions, but these will still be consistent with maintaining the phase one deal unless his re-election bid completely collapses, rendering him a lame duck and removing his constraints on more economically significant confrontation. We are perilously close to such an outcome, which is why Trump’s approval rating and head-to-head polling against Joe Biden must be monitored closely. If his budding rebound is dashed, then all bets are off with regard to China and Asian power politics. Chart 8A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation Bottom Line: China’s stimulus, like the US stimulus, is a reason for cyclical optimism regarding risk assets. The phase one trade deal with President Trump is less certain – there is a 40% chance it collapses as stimulus and/or Trump’s political woes remove constraints on conflict. Hong Kong is a red herring except with regard to coalition-building between the US and Europe; the Taiwan Strait is the real geopolitical risk. Maritime conflicts relate to Taiwan and are also market-relevant. Europe, Russia, And Oil Risks Europe has proved a geopolitical opportunity rather than a risk, as we have contended. The passage of joint debt issuance in keeping with the seven-year budget reinforces the point. The Dutch, facing an election early next year, held up the negotiations, but ultimately relented as expected. Emmanuel Macron, who convinced German Chancellor Angela Merkel to embrace this major compromise for European solidarity, is seeing his support bounce in opinion polls at home. He is being rewarded for taking a leadership position in favor of European integration as well as for overseeing a domestic economic rebound. His setback in local elections is overstated as a political risk given that the parties that benefited do not pose a risk to European integration, and will ally with him in 2022 against any populist or anti-establishment challenger. We still refrain from reinitiating our long EUR-USD trade, however, given the immediate risks from the US election cycle (Chart 9). We will reevaluate if Trump’s odds of victory fall further. A Biden victory is very favorable for the euro in our view. Chart 9EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity We are bullish on pound sterling because even a delay or otherwise sub-optimal outcome to trade talks is mostly priced in at current levels (Charts 10A and 10B). Prime Minister Boris Johnson has the raw ability to walk away without a deal, in the context of strong domestic stimulus, but the long-term economic consequences could condemn him to a single term in office. Compromise is better and in both parties’ interests. Chart 10APound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Chart 10BPound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Two other risks are worth a mention in this month’s GeoRisk Update: Chart 11Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: In recent reports we have maintained that Russian geopolitical risk is understated by markets. Domestic unrest is rising, the Trump administration could impose penalties over Nordstream 2 or other issues to head off criticism on the campaign trail, and a Biden administration would be outright confrontational toward Putin’s regime. Moscow may intervene in the US elections or conduct larger cyber attacks. US sanctions could ultimately target trading of local currency Russian government bonds, which so far have been spared (Chart 11). Iran: The jury is still out on whether the recent series of mysterious explosions affecting critical infrastructure in Iran are evidence of a clandestine campaign of sabotage (Table 3). The nature of the incidents leaves some room for accident and coincidence.1 But the inclusion of military and nuclear sites in the list leads us to believe that some degree of “wag the dog” is going on. The prime suspect would be Israel and/or the United States during the window of opportunity afforded by the Trump administration, which looks to be closing over the next six months. Trump likely has a high tolerance for conflict with Iran ahead of the election. Even though Americans are war-weary, they will rally to the president’s defense if Iran is seen as the instigator, as opinion polls showed they did in September 2019 and January of this year. Iran is avoiding goading Trump so far but if it suffers too great of damage from sabotage then it may be forced to react. The dynamic is unstable and hence an oil price spike cannot be ruled out. Table 3Wag The Dog Scenario Playing Out In Iran A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Chart 12Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil markets have the capacity and the large inventories necessary to absorb supply disruptions caused by a single Iranian incident (Chart 12). Only a chain reaction or major conflict would add to upward pressure. This would also require global demand to stay firm. The threat from COVID-19 suggests that volatility is the only thing one can count on in the near-term. Over the long run we remain bullish crude oil due to the unfettered commitment by world governments to reflation. Bottom Line: The euro rally is fundamentally supported but faces exogenous risks in the short run. We would steer clear of Russian currency and local currency bonds over the US election campaign and aftermath, particularly if Trump’s polling upturn becomes a dead cat bounce. Iran is a “gray swan” geopolitical risk, hiding in plain sight, but its impact on oil markets will be limited unless a major war occurs. Investment Implications The US dollar is at a critical juncture. Our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor argues that if the DXY index breaks beneath the 93-94 then the greenback has entered a structural bear market. The most recent close was 93.45 and it has hovered below 94 since Monday. Failure to pass US stimulus quickly could result in a dollar bounce along with other safe havens. Over the short run, investors should be prepared for this and other negative surprises relating to the US election and significant geopolitical risks, especially involving China, the tech war, and the Taiwan Strait. Over the long run, investors should position for more fiscal support to combine with ultra-easy monetary policy for as far as the eye can see. The Federal Reserve is not even “thinking about thinking about raising rates.” This combination ultimately entails rising commodity prices, a weakening dollar, and international equity outperformance relative to both US equities and government bonds.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Raz Zimmt, "When it comes to Iran, not everything that goes boom in the night is sabotage," Atlantic Council, July 30, 2020. Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar