Banks

Highlights Commercial rents have fallen in real terms, revealing that the commercial property price rally has been fueled exclusively by low rates. Limited upside for rents and an upward direction for future rates are two significant headwinds. However, commercial real estate is especially pro-cyclical and inflationary pressures need to work their way into the economy before the risk of a downturn becomes imminent. The good news is that the economy is less vulnerable to slipping commercial property prices. Large banks have shrunk their commercial property loan books and their composition has shifted towards safer categories of commercial loans. While the macroeconomic outlook remains somewhat neutral, CMBS’ risk/reward profile appears reasonably attractive relative to other US bond sectors. Feature Real estate was a bane for markets and the banking system in the last recession, and commercial properties have lately become an increasingly popular source of concern among investors. Average prices have grown by 90% over the past decade, rising well above their pre-Great Financial Crisis peaks. We have made the case that we are heading into the expansion’s last stretch. The study of economic cycles and our relentless quest to identify inflection points ahead of time become more timely as the bull market ages. To this end, current commercial property valuations deserve close scrutiny and we explore whether any underlying excesses could potentially disrupt financial stability or precipitate a recession in the US. We conclude that although commercial property prices have little hope of appreciating significantly from current levels, a reversal is not imminent until inflationary pressure forces rates higher. When prices eventually slip, the impact on the overall economy should be more attenuated than it was in the last recession, as the banking system has become less vulnerable to a downturn in commercial real estate. While the fundamental macro outlook remains neutral, suggesting no imminent pressure on spreads, US bond investors can find relative value in non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS (vs. corporate bonds rated A or higher) and in agency CMBS (vs. agency residential mortgaged-backed securities). A Rate-Driven Rally Chart 1Commercial Rents Have Decoupled From Property Prices Commercial Rents Have Decoupled From Property Prices Commercial Rents Have Decoupled From Property Prices Like all financial assets, commercial property prices are derived from discounting future cash flows to their present value. Since the crisis, a low rate environment, supported by a sluggish inflation backdrop and continuously accommodative monetary policy, has depressed the valuation equation’s denominator. Meanwhile, strong economic fundamentals and demographic trends - such as urbanization and the millennials’ tendency to marry and purchase a home at a later age - have helped boost the numerator for commercial and multi-family residential properties in the past decade. However, with the exception of multi-family residential real estate - for which price appreciation has also been the strongest - real rents have fallen (Chart 1), revealing that low rates have propelled commercial properties’ price appreciation over the past decade. The combination of falling real rents and surging property prices has depressed commercial real estate cap rates1 to cyclical low levels, raising the question of a potential unwind. Mathematically, an increase in cap rates could result, on the one hand, from rent growth outpacing inflation growth, translating into an increase in real rents on the numerator. Alternatively, cap rates could rise from falling property prices, reducing the denominator. On a cyclical horizon, the latter outcome seems more likely than the former. Little Upside Left For Rents First, the fact that rents in real terms have decreased in spite of sluggish inflation is a bad omen for the outlook for future real rents. We have made the case that there is more inflationary pressure than meets the eye beneath the surface of the US economy. The combination of an already very tight labor market and a pickup in manufacturing activity point towards further wage growth. Inflation is a lagging indicator that has more scope to rise than roll-over at this stage of the cycle. All else equal, upward inflationary pressure will depress real rents further. Second, nominal rents themselves are also facing significant headwinds. Office buildings’ and retail shopping centers’ vacancies have barely recovered from the hit they took in the last recession, while new inventory is struggling to get absorbed by new demand (Chart 2). A strong labor market generally supports the demand for office spaces but a tight labor market limits its future upside. The latter, though, increases potential wage gains and consumers’ purchasing power, whose fundamentals are already strong. We have shown that US consumers’ increased savings rates and lower debt levels put them in a good position to spend their incremental income. Chart 2Post-Crisis Office And Shopping Center Vacancies Remain Elevated... Post-Crisis Office And Shopping Center Vacancies Remain Elevated... Post-Crisis Office And Shopping Center Vacancies Remain Elevated... Chart 3...As These Sectors Face Structural Disruptions ...As These Sectors Face Structural Disruptions ...As These Sectors Face Structural Disruptions However, both sectors are facing structural disruptions. Co-working has introduced a new player in the office segment – a sub-lessor who signs long-term leases on space it rents out in short-term chunks. If a sizable sub-lessor like WeWork were forced to shrink its footprint, a lot of office supply would come back on to the market, while demand is shrinking as businesses attempt to reduce the area each employee occupies. Brick-and-mortar retailers continue to be buffeted as e-commerce captures an increasing share of consumer spending, keeping downward pressure on retail rents (Chart 3). The picture looks slightly brighter in the industrial properties space, where vacancies have recovered to healthier levels, though low vacancies have failed to lift rents as demand for properties is being met by new inventory (Chart 4). The revival in global manufacturing activity that we are expecting to occur this year should support industrial property rents in the near term, but the advanced age of the cycle limits future upside. Chart 4A Brighter Picture For Industrial And Apartment Buildings... A Brighter Picture For Industrial And Apartment Buildings... A Brighter Picture For Industrial And Apartment Buildings... Chart 5...Thanks To Rising Renters Income ...Thanks To Rising Renters Income ...Thanks To Rising Renters Income Chart 6Over-Construction Of High-Tier Properties Over-Construction Of High-Tier Properties Over-Construction Of High-Tier Properties Multi-family residential housing is the only sector that has experienced steady real rent growth, fueled by a combination of rising rentership rates and rising household income amongst renters (Chart 5). Homebuilders’ focus on building higher-end units has led to an oversupply of more expensive properties, and their prices have already started to contract on a year-on-year basis (Chart 6). Multi-family residential properties rents should lose momentum as the alternative cost of owning homes falls, especially as homebuilders attempt to right-size their mix of properties to offer more lower-end supply. Exhausted Demand A commercial real estate rally fueled by perpetually falling rates is unsustainable. Although the market sees the potential for an additional rate cut, we think the Fed is done cutting. Labor market strength and a revival in global manufacturing activity argue that no further accommodation or insurance rate cuts are necessary. From current levels, the path of least resistance for rates is upwards (Chart 7). Strong demand from institutional investors has also contributed to fueling prices. Pension funds and insurance companies’ holdings of mortgages and agency-backed securities have nearly doubled since 2010 (Chart 8, first panel) and their allocation as a percentage of total assets is nearing pre-recession highs (Chart 8, second panel). These levels allow them little flexibility to sustain their demand impulse, as there is only so much they can allocate to real estate and other alternative investments. Chart 7Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields Chart 8Saturated Demand From Institutional Investors... Saturated Demand From Institutional Investors... Saturated Demand From Institutional Investors... Demand from yield-hungry investors may also get exhausted if CMBS yields deflate to the point where they lose competitiveness relative to other income-producing investments. CMBS yields have broadly moved with other bond yields since the crisis, though US high-yield corporates have widened somewhat over the last few years, making them a slightly more appealing alternative to CMBS, all else equal (Chart 9). The steady downward pressure on multi-family cap rates since 2010 (Chart 10) reveals that the collateral underlying multi-family loans has become increasingly ambitiously priced, suggesting that losses given default on multi-family backed CMBS without agency backing may be rising, eroding prospective default-adjusted returns. Chart 9...And From Yield-Hungry Investors? ...And From Yield-Hungry Investors? ...And From Yield-Hungry Investors? Chart 10Cap Rates Have Reached Cyclical Lows Cap Rates Have Reached Cyclical Lows Cap Rates Have Reached Cyclical Lows New regulations also have the potential to retract a significant share of demand for commercial mortgages. The severe housing market deterioration during the Great Financial Crisis and the government intervention required to ensure Freddie Mac’s and Fannie Mae’s solvency led the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to place these two government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) under conservatorship in 2014 and to cap their holdings of multi-family mortgages to US$ 100 billion for each GSE. A commercial real estate rally fueled by perpetually falling rates is unsustainable. Current holdings of multi-family residential loans far exceed the stated limits (Table 1). GSEs hold nearly half of all multi-family residential loans outstanding. The post-crisis growth in GSE-guaranteed loans is largely attributable to the exclusion from the cap of certain categories of loans such as green energy loans (Chart 11). The FHFA eliminated these exemptions last year, making the US$ 200 billion cap more binding and applicable to all multi-family loans without exception.2 The impact on mortgage originators and investors is yet to be seen but it would naturally follow that demand for multi-family mortgages to bundle into CMBS would decline if the GSEs are forced to take a step back from the space. Table 1Commercial Real Estate Loans By Holder ($US Mn) Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability Chart 11Multi-Family Mortgage Debt Outstanding By Mortgage Holder Multi-Family Mortgage Debt Outstanding By Mortgage Holder Multi-Family Mortgage Debt Outstanding By Mortgage Holder Late-Cycle Dynamics Commercial mortgages are typically non-recourse (in case of default, the borrower can only recover the value of the collateralized property) making the loss given default a function of property prices. When times are good and property prices rise, borrowers can easily refinance their loans. The opposite holds in bad times. Therefore, commercial real estate prices are especially pro-cyclical. In spite of the headwinds outlined above, a commercial property downturn does not seem imminent. In spite of the headwinds outlined above, a commercial property downturn does not seem imminent. First, the US economy still has momentum, is supported by highly accommodative monetary policy and should get a boost from a global growth revival. Absent any major exogenous shock to the global economy, we expect that a recession is at least eighteen months away. For as long as the economy keeps expanding, commercial real estate prices can remain elevated. Second, sources of financing remain abundant as the emergence of alternative lenders (Chart 12) has offset the banks’ tighter lending standards for commercial properties (Chart 13). The proliferation of non-bank lenders is typically a late-cycle indicator. Chart 12The Proliferation Of Alternative Lenders… Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability However, when the economy starts contracting, a commercial real estate downturn could have an outsized impact on banks with significant exposure. In the late 1980s, the commercial property downturn induced a recession and the subprime mortgage bust gave rise to the Great Financial Crisis. Healthier Balance Sheets The good news for the economy today is that banks are less vulnerable to a downturn in commercial real estate than they were back then. The good news for the economy today is that banks are less vulnerable to a downturn in commercial real estate. Banks have decreased their overall exposure to commercial property loans to levels below their 2008 and 1989 peaks (Chart 14). It is worth noting, though, that smaller banks have taken an increasingly important role in the commercial property market as they now finance 65% of all commercial property loans. However, a stronger concentration in smaller banks represents a localized rather than systemic risk, as smaller banks tend to have a more concentrated geographic exposure. Conversely, large banks have significantly shrunk their commercial real estate loan books.3 Chart 14Large Banks Have Shrunk Their CRE Books... Large Banks Have Shrunk Their CRE Books... Large Banks Have Shrunk Their CRE Books... Chart 15...And Shifted Away From Speculative-Grade Loans ...And Shifted Away From Speculative-Grade Loans ...And Shifted Away From Speculative-Grade Loans Most importantly, the composition of the commercial property loan book has changed drastically since the Great Financial Crisis. Banks have significantly reduced their exposure to more speculative construction and development loans (Chart 15). Risk appetite typically increases in the latter stages of an expansion, yet construction loans remain at relatively depressed levels. The growth in commercial property loans since 2013 has entirely been explained by the rise in relatively less risky multi-family and non-residential non-farm loans. Investment Implications A commercial real estate downturn is probably not a 2020 event. Inflationary pressures need to make their presence felt across a wide swath of the economy before Fed hikes will give rates the scope to move sustainably higher. In the meantime, bond investors with a mandate to remain exposed to CMBS can reap the benefits of attractive risk/reward profiles relative to other segments of the US bond market. US Bond Strategy’s Excess Return Bond Map measures the number of standard deviations of spread widening a sector would need to experience, before losing 100 basis points relative to a duration-matched position in Treasuries4 (Chart 16). Sectors plotting near the top-right of the Map carry both high expected return and low risk. Sectors plotting near the bottom-left carry low expected return and high risk. Chart 16BCA US Bond Strategy’s Excess Return Bond Map Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability Chart 17Tighter Standards And Decelerating Prices Tighter Standards And Decelerating Prices Tighter Standards And Decelerating Prices This valuation framework currently suggests that CMBS look reasonably attractive. Non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS’ expected return is more promising than Aaa-and Aa-rated corporate bonds and somewhat similar to the expected return on an A-rated corporate bond. Meanwhile, CMBS exhibit a lower risk of losing 100 bps. Similarly, Agency CMBS offer greater expected return than Conventional 30-year Agency-backed residential MBS, along with a similar risk of losses. Although relative valuations appear attractive, the fundamental outlook remains neutral for CMBS spreads, for now. Periods of tightening commercial real estate lending standards and weakening commercial loan demand have historically coincided with decelerating commercial real estate prices and widening CMBS spreads. The Fed’s Q3 2019 Senior Loan Officer Survey revealed only a small net tightening of lending standards and unchanged demand (Chart 17). Overall, the lack of inflationary pressure suggests that neither a commercial real estate downturn nor a meaningful widening of CMBS spreads is an imminent threat.   Jennifer Lacombe Senior Analyst JenniferL@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 A capitalization rate is the ratio of net operating income (rent) to price and measures the expected rate of return on a real estate investment. As such, a property’s price can also be derived by dividing its rent by its cap rate. 2 More information about GSE’s conservatorship can be found on the FHFA’s website (https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae--Freddie-Conservatorships.aspx and https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/New-Multifamily-Caps-9132019.aspx). 3 An analysis of the largest banks’ earnings call we carried out last October also revealed that large banks were unanimously shrinking their commercial real estate books. For more details, please refer to US Investment Strategy Weekly Report from October 28, 2019, "What The Biggest Banks See", available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 For more details on the methodology behind our Excess Return Bond Map please see US Bond Strategy October 15, 2019 Weekly Report "A Perspective On Risk And Reward", available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights An analysis on India is available on page 12. There is extreme complacency in global financial markets. With currency markets’ implied volatility at a record low, we recommend going long EM currency volatility. The latter will rise in the next six month regardless the direction of global risk assets. For now, we remain long the EM MSCI equity index with a stop point at 1050. In India, nominal income growth has fallen below lending rates. The latter have not declined despite monetary easing. The authorities will force banks to reduce their lending rates, which will hurt bank stocks. Feature “…we have probably seen the end of the boom-bust cycle.” Bob Prince, Co-CIO of Bridgewater World Economic Forum, Davos January 22, 2020 Low Volatility = Complacency Chart I-1Go Long Currency Volatility Go Long Currency Volatility Go Long Currency Volatility The comment above by co-CIO of the largest hedge fund declaring the end of boom-bust cycle is consistent with lingering complacency in global financial markets. Any time an influential person made a similar declaration in the past, it marked a major turning point in financial markets. Remarkably, implied volatility for the US dollar has plummeted to a record low, as it has for EM currencies and a wide range of equity markets. Chart I-1 illustrates the implied volatility for EM currencies and the US dollar. Such low levels of implied currency market volatility historically preceded major moves in currency markets and often led to a material selloff in broad EM financial markets. It does not mean that the world economy will crash but financial markets volatility in general and currency market volatility in particular are bound to rise considerably in the months ahead. The risk-reward profile of going long EM currency or US dollar volatility appears very attractive. Today we recommend investors to go long EM currency volatility. The latter will rise regardless the direction of global risk assets. Concerning overall strategy, EM financial markets are entering a testing period. How broader EM risk assets and currencies perform in the coming weeks will signal how durable and long-lasting the current EM rally will be. Given global risk assets are overbought, a correction or consolidation phase is overdue. If EM equities, currencies and credit markets outperform, or at least do not underperform their DM peers in the course of this indigestion phase, it will beckon more upside for EM risk assets in 2020. If during budding market turbulence EM risk assets and currencies underperform their DM peers, it will signal their vulnerability in 2020.Implied volatility for the US dollar has plummeted to a record low, as it has for EM currencies. Implied volatility for the US dollar has plummeted to a record low, as it has for EM currencies. For now, we remain long the EM MSCI equity index with a stop point at 1050. We will upgrade our EM equity and credit market allocations versus DM if the EM universe generally exhibits relative resilience in the coming weeks, and more of our indicators confirm China’s growth recovery. Hints Of Recovery… December economic data out of China were strong, and it seems that the credit and fiscal stimulus are finally beginning to lift growth: Chinese imports and nominal industrial output – among the most reliable measures of the Chinese business cycle – posted very robust growth numbers in December (Chart I-2). DRAM and NAND semiconductor prices are climbing, and China’s container freight index is also in revival mode (Chart I-3). These high-frequency (daily and weekly) data confirm improving business activity in both the global semiconductor sector and in overall world trade. Chart I-2China's December Economic Data Were Strong China's December Economic Data Were Strong China's December Economic Data Were Strong Chart I-3Asia's Trade Is Recovering Asia's Trade Is Recovering Asia's Trade Is Recovering   There are tentative signs of amelioration in our proxies for marginal propensity to spend by households and enterprises in China (Chart I-4). A more decisive improvement in these indicators is needed to reinforce the positive outlook for China’s growth. …But Doubts Still Linger Despite the recent improvement in Chinese economic data and the rebound in China-related plays, there are a number of financial market indicators that are not yet confirming a sustainable business cycle recovery in China and global trade. In particular: First, apart from semiconductor stocks, global cyclical equity sectors and sub-sectors – industrials, materials, and freight and logistics – have begun, once again, underperforming defensive sectors (Chart I-5). Outperformance by these cyclical sectors against defensives is essential in confirming that global and Chinese capital spending – which were the primary sources of the most recent slowdown – are picking up again. Chart I-4China: Tentative Improvement In Household And Corporate Marginal Propensity To Spend China: Tentative Improvement In Household And Corporate Marginal Propensity To Spend China: Tentative Improvement In Household And Corporate Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart I-5Global Equities: Cyclicals Are Again Underperforming Defensives Global Equities: Cyclicals Are Again Underperforming Defensives Global Equities: Cyclicals Are Again Underperforming Defensives   Notably, the relative performance of EM share prices to the global equity benchmark historically tracks the relative performance of global materials versus the global overall stock index.1 However, the two have recently diverged (Chart I-6). In short, global materials are not corroborating sustainability in the recent EM outperformance. If EM equities, currencies and credit markets outperform, or at least do not underperform their DM peers in the course of this indigestion phase, it will beckon more upside for EM risk assets in 2020. Second, the rebound in Chinese and EM shares prices is not corroborated by Chinese onshore government bond yields, which are dipping to new cyclical lows (Chart I-7). In other words, interest rate expectations in China are falling – i.e., they are not confirming a robust recovery. Chart I-6Unsustainable Decoupling Unsustainable Decoupling Unsustainable Decoupling Chart I-7A Message From The Chinese Fixed-Income Market A Message From The Chinese Fixed-Income Market A Message From The Chinese Fixed-Income Market   Third, EM ex-China currencies have not yet broken out versus the US dollar (Chart I-8). Consistently, the broad trade-weighted US dollar has not yet broken down. Chart I-9 illustrates that the greenback’s advance-decline line has not yet fallen below its 200-day moving average, a condition that has historically been required to confirm the dollar’s cyclical bear market. Chart I-8EM Currencies: No Breakout Yet EM Currencies: No Breakout Yet EM Currencies: No Breakout Yet Chart I-9The US Dollar Is At A Critical Juncture The US Dollar Is At A Critical Juncture The US Dollar Is At A Critical Juncture   We view these exchange rate patterns as a litmus test to validate turning points in the global business cycle. Finally, the technical profiles of the KOSPI, EM small cap stocks and copper prices are inconclusive (Chart I-10). These markets have rebounded but seem to be confronting a critical technical test. If they decisively break above these technical levels, it will be a sign that the EM bull market will be lasting and durable. Otherwise, caution is still warranted. Bottom Line: There is a good amount of complacency among global investors at a time when there are several market signals that are still challenging the view of enduring revival in China/EM growth. Corporate Profits Will Be The Arbiter Ultimately, economic growth and corporate profits will determine the direction of not only share prices but also EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads as well as their currencies. So far, the EM equity rebound of the past 12 months has been solely due to multiples expansion amid a deepening EM profit recession: Earnings per share in US dollar terms has been contracting by 10% from a year ago, and the rate of change has so far not turned around (Chart I-11). Chart I-10The KOSPI And Copper Are Facing A Resilience Test The KOSPI And Copper Are Facing A Resilience Test The KOSPI And Copper Are Facing A Resilience Test Chart I-11EM Equities: A Profitless Rally? EM Equities: A Profitless Rally? EM Equities: A Profitless Rally?   Going forward, however, EM corporate profits growth is set to improve. Our indicator for semiconductor companies’ revenues is heralding a revival in semi sector profits (Chart I-12, top panel). The rate-of-change improvement in commodities prices is also foreshadowing potential amelioration in corporate earnings growth among energy producers and materials (Chart I-12, middle and bottom panels). Chart I-12EPS Growth In EM Technology, Energy And Materials EPS Growth In EM Technology, Energy And Materials EPS Growth In EM Technology, Energy And Materials We are negative on EM bank profits due to their need to recognize and provision for non-performing loans as well as the authorities’ mounting pressures on them to reduce lending rates. The latter will shrink banks’ elevated net interest rate margins. The profit profile of other EM equity sectors is illustrated in Chart I-13A and I-13B. Chart I-13AEM EPS Growth By Sectors EM EPS Growth By Sectors EM EPS Growth By Sectors Chart I-13BEM EPS Growth By Sectors EM EPS Growth By Sectors EM EPS Growth By Sectors   Provided technology, materials and energy stocks account for 33% of the MSCI EM aggregate equity index’s earnings (banks account for another 28% of total profits), it is safe to assume that the growth rate of EM EPS will move from -10% currently to zero or mildly positive territory by mid-2020. Nevertheless, beyond the next several months, our leading indicators on the EM profit outlook are not positive. China’s narrow money growth leads EM EPS by 12 months, and currently suggests the EPS recovery will be both muted and short-lived (Chart I-14). The technical profiles of the KOSPI, EM small cap stocks and copper prices are inconclusive. Further, China’s broad money impulse points to a peak in the credit impulse in the first half of the year (Chart I-15). Given that EM share prices bottomed a year ago, simultaneously with China’s credit impulse, odds are that EM equities could slump with a rollover in the latter. Chart I-14EM EPS: Marginal Improvement Ahead But No Robust Recovery EM EPS: Marginal Improvement Ahead But No Robust Recovery EM EPS: Marginal Improvement Ahead But No Robust Recovery Chart I-15China: A Signpost Of A Potential Top In The Credit Impulse China: A Signpost Of A Potential Top In The Credit Impulse China: A Signpost Of A Potential Top In The Credit Impulse   Chart I-16DM Central Banks' Assets And EM Stocks And Currencies: No Stable Correlation DM Central Banks' Assets And EM Stocks And Currencies: No Stable Correlation DM Central Banks' Assets And EM Stocks And Currencies: No Stable Correlation What if the current liquidity-driven rally continues? In our report last week titled A Primer On Liquidity, we elaborated at great length about the different liquidity measures and how they influence financial asset prices. Empirically, changes in DM central banks’ balance sheets have had no stable correlation with either EM share prices or EM local currency bonds, as demonstrated in Chart I-16. There have been periods over the past 10 years when EM risk assets and currencies have performed poorly, despite an accelerating pace of QE programs worldwide (Chart I-16). The true and critical driver for EM equity and currency performance has been EM’s own domestic fundamentals and China’s business cycle (please refer to Chart I-11 on page 7). To be sure, we are not suggesting that DM central bank policies have not affected global and EM financial markets at all. They have done so in spades. By purchasing and withdrawing about $9 trillion in high-quality securities from the marketplace, the monetary authorities have shrunk the stock of available financial assets. Consequently, even though QE programs have expanded broad money supply only modestly,2 the upshot has been that more money has been chasing fewer financial assets. Also, low interest rates reduce the opportunity cost of owning risk assets. These two phenomena have led investors to bid up prices of various securities, including EM ones. Nevertheless, despite the ongoing and indiscriminate global search for yield, EM share prices in US dollar terms and EM ex-China currencies (including carry, i.e. on a total-return basis) are still below their 2010 levels. Such poor performance of EM risk assets has been a corollary of just how bad EM fundamentals have been. Bottom Line: EM corporate profits will improve on a rate-of-change basis in the coming months. However, forward-looking indicators do not yet point to a robust recovery in EM corporate profits as occurred in 2017. Investment Conclusions We are maintaining our long EM equities position with a stop point at 1050 for the MSCI EM stock index (7% below the current level). If EM share prices, credit markets and currencies outperform their DM peers during a correction/consolidation phase, we will upgrade EM allocations to overweight in global equity and credit portfolios. At the moment, EM is confronting a resilience test. Within the EM equity universe, our overweights are Russia, Korea, Thailand, Mexico, UAE, Pakistan and central Europe. Our recommended equity underweights include Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong domestic stocks, South Africa, Turkey and Colombia. In sovereign credit and local bond markets, our overweights are Mexico, Russia, Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan and Ukraine. In turn, South Africa, Turkey, Philippines and Indonesia warrant an underweight stance. Today we are upgrading Indian bonds from neutral to overweight (see page 17).  In the currency space, we continue holding a short position versus the US dollar in the following basket of currencies: BRL, ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, PHP and KRW. As always, the full list of our positions is presented at the end of report (please refer to pages 18-19 and on our website).   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com India: Beware Of Private Banks And Consumer Perils Indian private banks and consumer staple stocks have been holding up the Indian equity market at a time when the rest of the bourse has been sluggish. Both sectors, however, are extremely expensive and thus tremendously sensitive to minor profit disappointments. Remarkably, private banks now trade at a price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio of 31 and price-to-book value (PBV) ratio of 4. Indian consumer staple stocks, on the other hand, trade at a P/E ratio of 41 (Chart II-1 and Chart II-2). Chart II-1Indian Private Bank Stocks Are Expensive Indian Private Bank Stocks Are Expensive Indian Private Bank Stocks Are Expensive Chart II-2Indian Consumer Staple Stocks Are Very Pricey Indian Consumer Staple Stocks Are Very Pricey Indian Consumer Staple Stocks Are Very Pricey   Chart II-3A Credit Boom Among Indian Private Banks A Credit Boom Among Indian Private Banks A Credit Boom Among Indian Private Banks Given that private banks have been specializing in both mortgages and non-mortgage consumer lending, the call on both private bank and consumer staple stocks is contingent on consumer financial health. The loan book of private banks has expanded tremendously: since 2010 it has grown at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 20% and 14% in nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) terms, respectively (Chart II-3).3 In turn, the share of household loans is reasonably large at around 52% of private banks total loan book.  Unfortunately, India’s consumer sector appears to be fragile at the moment. Employment and wage growth have downshifted – the Manpower employment index is at a 14-year low (Chart II-4). Consequently, household disposable income growth has decelerated to 9% in nominal terms (Chart II-5). Critically, households’ ability to service debt has deteriorated as nominal disposable household income growth has fallen slightly below borrowing costs, i.e., bank lending rates (Chart II-5). This development is precarious not only because it makes it more difficult for consumers to service their debt – causing NPLs to rise – but it also dampens consumer credit demand. Consequently, private banks’ considerable exposure to consumers could reverse the fortunes of the former as consumers face increasing difficulties servicing their debt. Moreover, with borrowing costs above nominal income growth, banks in India could face adverse selection problem. The latter is a phenomenon when loan demand primarily comes from riskier borrowers who are in desperate need for funding. In such a case, non-performing loans are bound to mushroom. Chart II-4India's Labor Market Is In Doldrums India's Labor Market Is In Doldrums India's Labor Market Is In Doldrums Chart II-5India: Household Nominal Income And Lending Rate India: Household Nominal Income And Lending Rate India: Household Nominal Income And Lending Rate Overall, household spending is in the doldrums. Two- and three-wheeler and passenger car unit sales have all been contracting. In the meantime, consumer demand for non-durable goods has also weakened, as reflected by stalling non-durable consumer goods production. Residential property demand has plummeted. According to the Reserve Bank of India’s December Financial Stability Report – quoting data from PropTiger DataLabs – housing sales units contracted by 20% in September from a year ago. In turn, growth in house prices has been anemic (Chart II-6). Prices are now growing below core inflation, i.e. property prices are deflating in real terms. Households’ ability to service debt has deteriorated as nominal disposable household income growth has fallen slightly below borrowing costs. Going forward, odds are that employment and wage growth will remain weak in India. The basis is the corporate sector is also struggling and still reluctant to invest and hire. Chart II-7 illustrates that the number of investment projects has collapsed, while capital goods production and capital goods imports are both shrinking (Chart II-7). Chart II-6India: Housing Market Is Feeble India: Housing Market Is Feeble India: Housing Market Is Feeble Chart II-7India: Companies Are Not Investing India: Companies Are Not Investing India: Companies Are Not Investing   Overall, the entire Indian economy is suffering from high borrowing costs in real (adjusted for inflation) terms (Chart II-8, top panel). Chart II-8Lending Rates Have Not Declined Despite Monetary Easing Lending Rates Have Not Declined Despite Monetary Easing Lending Rates Have Not Declined Despite Monetary Easing Importantly, the monetary policy transmission mechanism has not been working effectively in India. Even though the central bank has cut its policy rate by 135 basis points in 2019, prime borrowing did not budge (Chart II-8, middle panel). Consequently, loan growth has decelerated sharply (Chart II-8, bottom panel). On the whole, for the economy to recover, it requires considerably lower borrowing costs or a substantial fiscal boost. Indian central and state fiscal aggregate budget deficit is already wide at 6% of GDP. With public debt-to-GDP ratio at 68%, there is some but not enormous room for boosting government expenditures drastically. This makes reducing commercial bank lending rates the most feasible mechanism to jump-start the economy. Consequently, the authorities will become more aggressive in forcing commercial banks to cut their lending rates. This seems to be taking place as in September 2019 the RBI asked Indian commercial banks to link lending rates on certain types of loans more closely to the central bank’s policy rate to ensure more effective monetary policy transmission. Yet doing so will squeeze down commercial banks’ net interest rate margins – which have widened – and will hit banks’ profits. Alternatively, if lending rates do not fall, non-performing loans (NPLs) will increase because only risky borrowers will be willing to borrow while existing debtors will struggle to service their debt at current elevated interest rates. This will also depress bank profits. These two negative scenarios are probably reflected in low valuations of public bank share prices, but they are not yet priced in among private banks stocks. Given the latter’s exuberant valuations, only a small drop in net interest rate margins or a small rise in NPLs, will be enough to drag their share prices lower. Investment Conclusions Chart II-9India Vs. EM Relative Equity Performance Is Often About Oil India Vs. EM Relative Equity Performance Is Often About Oil India Vs. EM Relative Equity Performance Is Often About Oil Travails of the Indian economy will persist for now. Much more policy support is required to turn the business cycle around. EM equity investors should keep a neutral allocation to Indian stocks within an EM equity portfolio. Indian share prices often outperform their EM peers when oil prices drop and lag when crude prices rally (Chart II-9). Given our negative view on oil prices,4 we are reluctant to downgrade this bourse to underweight. Private banks are susceptible to a drawdown as either their net interest rate margins will drop or they will face rising non-performing loans. Consumer staples stocks are expensive and, hence, are vulnerable to marginal profit disappointments. We are upgrading our allocation to Indian domestic bonds from neutral to overweight within an EM local bond portfolio. Consistently, we are closing our yield curve steepening trade in India. This position has produced a 30 basis points gain since July 2016. Low inflation, weak real growth, a struggling credit system and ineffective transmission of monetary easing argue for even lower interest rates in India. The surge in food prices should be viewed as a relative price shock, not inflation. Higher food prices will curb the spending power of consumers and weaken their expenditures on non-food items. In addition, core inflation remains very low. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please click on the link to access EM: Perception versus Reality report. 2  Commercial banks’ reserves at central banks do not constitute and are not a part of narrow or broad money supply. 3  The calculation is based on the annual reports of four large Indian private banks: HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank, Kotak Mahindra Bank, and Axis Bank. 4   This is the Emerging Markets Strategy team’s view and it differs for BCA’s house view on oil. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

2020 High-Conviction Calls: S&P Banks 2020 High-Conviction Calls: S&P Banks Overweight The expected price of credit, still pristine credit quality, and a looming reacceleration in credit growth all argue for including the S&P banks index in our high-conviction overweight list. Banks stocks troughed in mid-August, sniffing out a sell-off in the bond market. As the bond sell-off gained steam, the bank outperformance phase also caught on fire. BCA’s view for next year calls for a 50-75bps selloff in the 10-year Treasury yield, further boosting the allure of bank equities. Beyond the rising price of credit, credit growth is another key industry profit driver. Importantly, the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey painted a bright picture on both the demand and supply of credit. In more detail, bankers reported that a rising number of credit categories reversed course and demand for loans slingshot higher. The upshot is that bank credit growth will likely reaccelerate in the first half of 2020. Finally, credit quality, the third key bank profit driver, is also emitting a positive signal. While a few loan categories have deteriorated recently in absolute terms, as percentage of loans outstanding, credit quality remains pristine. Despite all this enticing news, bank valuations remain anchored near rock bottom levels and a resurgent ROE is signaling that there is a long runway ahead for relative bank valuation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX – WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT, SIVB, FRC.  

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Interest rates are one of the most important macro drivers of overall equity returns via valuations. BCA’s view of a selloff in the bond market is a key factor underpinning most of our 2020 high-conviction calls. A 50bps to 75bps rise in the 10-year Treasury yield in 2020, as BCA predicts, will have significant knock on effects on sector selection. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 2020 Key Views: High-Conviction Calls 2020 Key Views: High-Conviction Calls Feature As 2019 draws to a close, this week we reveal our high-conviction calls for the coming year. But before proceeding, a brief market comment is in order. As 2019 draws to a close, this week we reveal our high-conviction calls for the coming year. But before proceeding, a brief market comment is in order. We remain perplexed by the market’s euphoric rise and near total neglect of weak profit growth fundamentals. This “hope rally”, as we have characterized it in the recent past, may have some more legs with the traditional Santa Rally around the corner, but the set up for stocks could not be more treacherous for 2020. Importantly, we deem the risk of not getting a Sino-American trade deal to be significantly greater than a relief rally in case of a successful deal. Most of the positive trade-related news is already reflected into equities. This complacent backdrop is reminiscent of the early 2018 SPX catapult to 2,870 as back then the fresh fiscal easing package was all priced into stocks in the first 20 trading days of that year. Chart 1 vividly depicts this euphoric melt-up in stocks with the longest dated VIX future trouncing the squashed front month VIX future. While this ratio is not at the stratospheric level hit in late-December 2017, it hit a wall recently forewarning that equities are skating on thin ice. Chart 1VOL... VOL... VOL... Similarly, speculators are net short vol, but a snap can occur at any time. This is eerily reminiscent of February 2018. Since 2017, this vol positioning measure has consistently troughed prior to the SPX peak on three occasions and a “four-peat” likely looms (vol net spec positions shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 2).   On the profit front, sector earnings breadth is sinking like a stone confirming the negatively anchored S&P 500 net EPS revisions ratio (Chart 3). We doubt that 10% EPS growth for calendar 2020 is even plausible, especially given the looming steep deceleration in equity retirement that we highlighted recently.1 Tack on the mighty US dollar, and profit headwinds abound. Chart 2...A Coiled Spring ...A Coiled Spring ...A Coiled Spring Chart 3No Earnings Pulse No Earnings Pulse No Earnings Pulse Market internals are also screaming that something is off in the equity markets. Small caps are trailing large caps, transports are at stall speed, weak balance sheet stocks are underperforming strong balance sheet stocks, the median stock as per the Value Line Geometric Index is far from all-time highs and high yield bonds (especially CCC rated) are also not confirming the SPX breakout (Chart 4). Importantly, the CBOE’s S&P 500 implied correlation index, which gauges “the expected average correlation of price returns of S&P 500 Index components, implied through SPX option prices and prices of single-stock options on the 50 largest components of the SPX”,2 is rising again over the 40% mark, underscoring that stocks are more and more beginning to move in tandem. Historically this has been a negative omen (implied correlation index shown inverted, top panel, Chart 5). Chart 4Watch Market Internals Watch Market Internals Watch Market Internals Chart 5Reflation No More? Reflation No More? Reflation No More? Downtrodden M&A activity is also firing a warning shot. A steep divergence of M&A deals from stock prices is atypical at this late stage of the business cycle (middle panel, Chart 5). In fact, out Reflation Gauge comprising the greenback, oil prices and the 10-year Treasury yield has taken a turn for the worse, signaling that economic surprises will likely suffer the same fate (bottom panel, Chart 5). All of this, warns that the risks of a significant pullback in the SPX are rising. What follows is four high-conviction overweight and four underweight calls. Similar to last year, we are using BCA’s view of a selloff in the bond market is a key factor underpinning most of our 2020 high-conviction calls.3 While last year this was offside, the collapse in the 10-year US Treasury yield from 3% last December to 1.75% currently offers a better backdrop for this view to pan out. A 50bps to 75bps rise in the 10-year Treasury yield in 2020, as our BCA house view predicts, will have significant knock on effects on sector selection.4 As a reminder, interest rates are one of the most important macro drivers of overall equity returns via valuations (10-year Treasury yield shown inverted, Chart 6). Moreover on a sector basis, the ebbs and flows of the risk free asset directly influence utilities, real estate, financials, consumer discretionary and tech growth stocks or more than half of the S&P 500’s market capitalization. Chart 6Priced To Perfection Priced To Perfection Priced To Perfection What follows is four high-conviction overweight and four underweight calls.     Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   S&P Managed Health Care (Overweight) We upgraded the S&P managed health care group to overweight in April shortly after Bernie Sanders re-introduced his revamped “Medicare For All” bill. Despite the recent explosive run up in relative share prices – partly owing to the drop in Elizabeth Warren’s odds of winning the Democratic candidacy and partly given her watering down of her “Medicare For All” take up plan – we are adding this health care sub-group to our high-conviction overweight call list. HMOs are finally raising prices at the steepest rate of the past fifteen years and while such breakneck pace is unsustainable, profit margins are set to expand smartly (Chart 7). The profit margin backdrop is enticing for health insurers for another reason: labor cost containment. CEOs have been extremely prudent refraining from adding to headcount. One final profit margin booster is the rising 10-year Treasury yield, as roughly 10% of the industry’s operating income is tied to “investment income”. In other words, as insurers receive the premia they typically invest it in Treasurys and that explains the high EPS and margin sensitivity on interest rate moves. Thus, if BCA’s bond view materializes, it will prove a tonic to both margins and profits. With regard to technicals, relative share prices are not as oversold as they were mid-year, but remain below the neutral zone still offering investors a compelling entry point to this position (bottom panel, Chart 7). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH – UNH, ANTM, HUM, CNC, WCG.  Chart 7S&P Managed Health Care S&P Managed Health Care S&P Managed Health Care S&P Machinery (Overweight) A tentative up-tick in EM data in general and China in particular along with improving operating metrics signal that the US/China trade war wounded machinery stocks deserve a high-conviction overweight status for 2020. In more detail, the budding recoveries in the EM and Chinese manufacturing PMIs herald a brighter outlook for relative share prices. China’s fiscal and credit impulse also signals that a bottom in relative share prices is likely already in place. If this leading indicator proves accurate in the coming months, then relative share prices can reclaim the early-2018 highs. On the operating front, the new orders-to-inventories momentum has traced a bottom. Assuming that the Chinese manufacturing PMI reading stays on an upward trajectory, machinery demand will make a durable comeback. None of these green shoots are reflected in sell-side analysts’ bombed out relative profit and sales growth expectations (bottom panel, Chart 8). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5MACH – CAT, DE, ITW, IR, CMI, PCAR, PH, SWK, FTV, DOV, XYL, IEX, WAB, SNA, PNR, FLS.  Chart 8S&P Machinery S&P Machinery S&P Machinery S&P Banks (Overweight) The expected price of credit, still pristine credit quality, and a looming reacceleration in credit growth all argue for including the S&P banks index in our high-conviction overweight list. Banks stocks troughed in mid-August, sniffing out a sell-off in the bond market. As the bond sell-off gained steam, the bank outperformance phase also caught on fire. BCA’s view for next year calls for a 50-75bps selloff in the 10-year Treasury yield, further boosting the allure of bank equities (top panel, Chart 9). Beyond the rising price of credit, credit growth is another key industry profit driver. Importantly, the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey painted a bright picture on both the demand and supply of credit. In more detail, bankers reported that a rising number of credit categories reversed course and demand for loans slingshot higher. The upshot is that bank credit growth will likely reaccelerate in the first half of 2020 (third panel, Chart 9). Finally, credit quality, the third key bank profit driver, is also emitting a positive signal. While a few loan categories have deteriorated recently in absolute terms, as percentage of loans outstanding, credit quality remains pristine. Despite all this enticing news, bank valuations remain anchored near rock bottom levels and a resurgent ROE is signaling that there is a long runway ahead for relative bank valuations (bottom panel, Chart 9). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX – WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT, SIVB, FRC.  Chart 9S&P Banks S&P Banks S&P Banks Long Large Caps/Short Small Caps (Overweight) The large cap size bias is our sole hold out from last year’s high-conviction list despite getting stopped out and booking a handsome 9% profit. Today we recommend reinstating a large cap size bias. This call actually represents a slight hedge on BCA’s overall higher interest rates view for next year. Financials comprise 13% of the SPX, but the weight jumps to 18% in small cap indexes. Thus, if the rising interest view is off the mark, the large cap bias will provide an offset. Relative forward profit growth favors mega caps and by a wide margin. One key factor underpinning this increasing profit gap is the massive profit margin divergence (Chart 10). Tack on the fact that index providers omit negative forward profits from their index EPS calculations and the narrative that small caps have cheapened versus large caps falls flat on an adjusted basis. Why? Because a large number of small caps have negative forward EPS. Moreover, we recently created a relative employment proxy that is firing on all cylinders. Not only is the small business labor market crumbling according to the latest NFIB survey, but hard data also suggest that nonfarm private small business payroll employment has ground to a halt. Finally, small caps are debt saddled compared with large caps and small cap b/s have actually been degrading of late (Chart 10). Chart 10Long Large Caps/Short Small Caps Long Large Caps/Short Small Caps Long Large Caps/Short Small Caps S&P Homebuilding (Underweight) We downgraded homebuilders to underweight in late-October, and today we are adding it to our high-conviction underweight call list. Most, if not all, positive profit drivers are already reflected in relative share prices. Specifically, the drubbing in interest rates has been more than accounted for by the year-to-date outperformance in homebuilders. Now that interest rates are moving in reverse, more pain lies ahead for the S&P homebuilding index (Chart 11). Worrisomely, consumers’ expectations to purchase a new home plunged anew last month according to The Conference Board’s survey, and that demand softness will weigh on housing starts and ultimately homebuilding revenues (Chart 11). Adding insult to injury, new house selling prices are losing ground to existing home prices, but such discounting is no longer boosting volumes as new home sales market share gains have stalled. Already, S&P homebuilding sales are contracting and the risk is that deflation gets entrenched in this construction industry (Chart 11). Simultaneously, lumber prices are gaining steam and coupled with contracting new home prices signal that homebuilding profits will suffer a setback. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5HOME – DHI, LEN, PHM, NVR.  Chart 11S&P Homebuilding S&P Homebuilding S&P Homebuilding S&P Semi Equipment (Underweight) While year-to-date chip equipment stocks are the best performing index in the SPX, we deem them a mania, and include them in our high-conviction underweight basket for 2020. The top panel of Chart 12 shows this irrational exuberance that has permeated the semi equipment universe is similar to the dotcom era excesses. Back in the late-1990s relative profit growth was sky high, but today it is flirting with the zero line, warning that gravity will pull these stocks back down to earth (second panel, Chart 12). The contracting ISM manufacturing survey signals that relative share price momentum running at a breakneck pace is unwarranted. The same holds true for relative forward profit and revenue growth expectations, especially given the ongoing contraction in global semi sales (middle panel, Chart 12). This deficient demand for semis and therefore semi equipment manufacturers is also apparent in deflating DRAM prices, our industry pricing power proxy. Historically, relative profit expectations and pricing power have moved in lockstep and the current message is to fade sell-side analysts’ buoyancy. Net earnings revisions have slingshot from extreme pessimism to extreme optimism during the past quarter and are vulnerable to disappointment (bottom panel, Chart 12). In sum, lack of profit growth, deficient industry demand, perky valuations and extremely overbought conditions all suggest that the mania in the S&P chip equipment index will likely turn into a panic next year. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5SEEQ – AMAT, LRCX, KLAC. Chart 12S&P Semi Equipment S&P Semi Equipment S&P Semi Equipment S&P Utilities (Underweight) Heavily indebted utilities are a high-conviction underweight call for next year. · Relative share prices and the 10-year Treasury yield are closely inversely correlated. Now that the risk free asset is having a more competitive yield, investors will likely start to abandon this niche defensive sector. The jury is still out on the final outcome of the Sino-American trade war. However, there has been a decisive change of heart in US exporters and the ISM manufacturing survey’s new export orders subcomponent reflects an, at the margin, improvement in the US/China trade relationship. This bodes ill for safe haven utilities stocks (Chart 13). Utilities command a 19.4 forward P/E multiple representing roughly a 10% premium to the broad market, but their forecast EPS growth rate at 5% trails the SPX by 400bps. Our composite relative Valuation Indicator has surged to one standard deviation above the historical mean, a level typically associated with recession (Chart 13). On the operating front, natural gas prices are contracting at the steepest pace of the past four years, and electricity capacity utilization is in a multi-decade downtrend, warning that the relative profitability will remain under pressure in 2020. The implication is that this crowded trade is at risk of deflating, especially if the breakout in bond yields gains steam as BCA expects. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5UTIL– PPL, PNW, ATO, PEG, FE, EIX, AEE, SO, SRE, AEP, XEL, DTE, EVRG, WEC, AES, CMS, LNT, ED, NRG, D, AWK, DUK, ETR, EXC, NEE, CNP, NI, ES.  Chart 13S&P Utilities S&P Utilities S&P Utilities S&P Real Estate (Underweight) We would refrain from chasing high yielding real estate stocks higher, and instead we are including them in our high-conviction underweight call list for 2020. The commercial real estate (CRE) sector is a bubble candidate that exemplifies this cycle’s excesses. CRE prices sit at roughly two standard deviations above both the historical time trend and the previous cycle’s peak (not shown). Worryingly, CRE demand is waning. Not only our proprietary real estate demand indicator has sunk recently, but also the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey revealed that demand for CRE loans remains feeble. Simultaneously, fewer bankers are willing to extend CRE credit according to the same quarterly Fed survey (Chart 14). Occupancy rates have crested and there are increasing anecdotes of credit quality deterioration. As a result, CRE rents are also failing to keep up with inflation which eats into relative cash flow growth prospects. The supply side build up tilts this delicate balance further into deficit. Non-residential construction shows no signs of abating, with multi-family housing starts still running at an historically high rate of roughly 400K/annum (Chart 14). Finally, interest rate related headwinds will also weigh on this high-yielding sector in coming quarters, especially if the selloff in the bond market gains steam as BCA expects. (Chart 14). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5RLST – AMT, PLD, CCI, SPG, EQIX, WELL, PSA, EQR, AVB, SBAC, O, DLR, WY, VTR, ESS, BXP, CBRE, ARE, PEAK, MAA, UDR, EXR, DRE, HST, REG, VNO, IRM, FRT, KIM, AIV, SLG, MAC. Chart 14S&P Real Estate S&P Real Estate S&P Real Estate Footnotes 1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Gasping For Air” dated November 18, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2    https://www.cboe.com/micro/impliedcorrelation/impliedcorrelationindicator.pdf 3    Please see BCA The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, “OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game” dated November 22, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4    Ibid. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%)

Highlights Building on a previous special report focused on the investable market, in this report we construct and present models designed to predict the odds of Chinese domestic equity sector outperformance. BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. Episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) than has been the case for the investable market, suggesting that periods of “abnormal” relative sector performance may occur more frequently than in the investable universe. Among the predictors included in our model, our Li Keqiang leading indicator (based on monetary conditions, money, and credit growth) has been the most important. Our base case view argues in favor of domestic cyclicals over defensives over the coming year, but recent sector performance suggests that domestic consumer discretionary and tech should be favored within a cyclical equity portfolio over energy, materials, and industrials barring a surge in oil prices or a capitulation by Chinese policymakers in favor of “flood irrigation-style” stimulus. Over the long-term, we argue that investors have a good reason to favor domestic defensives over cyclicals until the latter demonstrates meaningfully better earnings performance. Feature We examined China’s investable equity sector performance in detail in our October 30 Special Report,1 with a particular emphasis on understanding the specific macroeconomic or equity market factors that have historically predicted relative sector performance. In today’s report, we extend our approach to China’s A-share market. Our research focused on constructing and presenting models that quantify a checklist-based approach to determining the odds of equity sector performance. The aim is to use these models to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use them as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We find that episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) that has been the case for the investable market, suggesting that periods of “abnormal” relative sector performance may occur more frequently than in the investable universe. Among the macroeconomic and equity market factors that we found to be important predictors, our Li Keqiang leading indicator was the most significant. This confirms that China’s domestic market is more sensitive to monetary conditions, money, and credit growth than its investable peer. We also note the sharp difference in the relative performance of cyclicals versus defensives in the domestic market compared with the investable market, and what this means for investors over the coming 6-12 months. Finally, we argue that investors should maintain a structural bias towards defensive stocks in the domestic market until cyclicals demonstrate meaningfully better earnings performance, and point to an existing position in our trade book for investors interested in strategically allocating to the A-share market. Detailing Our Approach In our effort to better understand historical periods of domestic sector performance, we have chosen to model the probability of outperformance of each level 1 GICS sector (plus banks) based on a set of macro and equity market variables. Specifically, we use an analytical tool called a logistic regression, which forecasts the probability of a discrete event rather than forecasting the value of a dependent variable. We utilized this approach when building our earnings recession model for China (first presented in our January 16 Special Report).2 The “events” that we modeled are historical periods of individual Chinese investable sector outperformance from 2010 to 2018, relative to the MSCI China index (the “broad market”). We find that episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) than has been the case for the investable market. Chart I-1A and Chart I-1B illustrate these periods with shading in each panel. We then attempt to explain these episodes of outperformance with the following macro predictors: Chart I-1AThis Report Builds Models ##br##Aimed At... Chart 1A This Report Builds Models Aimed At… This Report Builds Models Aimed At… Chart I-1B...Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts Chart IB …Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts …Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts Periods of accelerating economic activity, represented by our BCA's China Activity Index Periods of rising leading indicators of economic activity, represented by our BCA Li Keqiang (LKI) Leading Indicator Episodes of tight monetary policy, defined as periods where China’s 3-month interbank repo rate is rising Periods of accelerating inflation, measured both by headline and core inflation We also include several equity market variables: uptrends in relative sector earnings, periods of rising broad market stock prices, uptrends in broad market earnings, and episodes of extreme technical conditions and relative over/undervaluation for the sector in question. In the case of energy stocks, we also include oil prices as a predictor. Chart I-2A and Chart I-2B illustrate these periods as well as the macro & market variables that we have included as predictors. Chart I-2AWe Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors... Chart 2A We Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors… We Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors… Chart I-2B...To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance Chart 2B …To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance …To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance Our approach also accounts for the existence of any leading or lagging relationships between the macro and market variables we have used as predictors and sector relative performance. In most cases the predictors lead relative sector performance, but in some cases it is the opposite. In the case of the latter, we have limited the lead of any variable in our models to three months in order to reduce the need to forecast. Finally, our approach also limits the extent to which we consider a leading relationship between our predictors and relative sector performance, in order to avoid picking up overlapping economic cycles. This issue, and the evidence supporting the existence of a 3½-year credit cycle in China, is detailed in Box I-1 of our October 30 Special Report (please see footnote 1). Key Drivers Of Sector Performance: Domestic Versus Investable Pages 11-22 present the results of each sector’s outperformance probability model, along with a list of factors that were found to be useful predictors and a summary of the results. The importance of the factors included in the models is shown in each of the tables at the top right of pages 11-22 by a score of 1-3 stars, (loosely representing key levels of statistical significance) as well as each factor’s optimal lead or lag. A minus sign shows that the predictor leads sector relative performance, whereas a plus sign shows that it lags. Following a review of our domestic equity sector outperformance models, differences in the results from those presented in our previous report can be organized into three distinct elements: 1) the breadth of macro & equity market factors in predicting sector performance, 2) the relative importance of our LKI leading indicator, and 3) the difference between domestic/investable cyclical versus defensive performance. The Breath Of Predictive Factors Chart I-3In The Domestic Market, The Breadth Of Predictive Factors Is Narrower Chart 3 In The Domestic Market, The Breadth Of Predictive Factors Is Narrower In The Domestic Market, The Breadth Of Predictive Factors Is Narrower Compared with the models for investible sector performance that we detailed in our previous report, our work modeling domestic equity sector performance highlights that the breadth of predictive factors is narrower, particularly among cyclical sectors (Chart I-3). Our model for domestic materials (shown on page 12) is one exception to this rule, but we found that our models for energy, industrial, and consumer discretionary relative performance were all focused on fewer predictors than is the case for the investable market. In addition, our domestic utilities model has considerably worse predictive power than our model for investable utilities. The case of industrials is particularly notable: our model for investable industrials highlighted the importance of tight monetary policy, rising core inflation, rising broad market stock prices & earnings, and overbought and oversold technical conditions in explaining past periods of industrial sector outperformance. By contrast, our domestic industrials model is quite simple: the sector has been more likely to outperform, with a lag, when our BCA China Activity Index and LKI leading indicator have been rising, and underperform following periods of extreme overvaluation. One of the core conclusions of our previous report was that investors should view the relative performance of investable industrials versus consumer staples as a reflationary barometer, given the strong sensitivity of both sectors to tight monetary policy. We explained this sensitivity by pointing to the substantial difference in corporate health between the two sectors: industrial firms are heavily debt-laden and thus experience deteriorating operating performance and an environment of rising interest rates. In comparison, food and beverage firms appear to have the strongest balance sheets among the sub-sectors that we have examined, suggesting that they would benefit less from easier monetary conditions than firms in other industries. Our leading indicator for Chinese economic activity has been considerably more important in predicting domestic equity sector outperformance than in the investable market. However, these dynamics appear to be completely absent in influencing performance in China’s domestic equity market. Not only has domestic industrial sector relative performance not been negatively linked to periods of tight monetary policy, but our model for consumer staples (shown on page 15) highlights that periods of staples performance have been driven by two simple factors: the relative trend in staples EPS  (positive sign), and the trend in broad market EPS (negative sign). The Relative Importance Of Monetary Conditions, Money, And Credit Growth Chart I-4 summarizes the significance of the factors in predicting sector performance in general, by summing up each predictor’s number of stars across all of the models. The chart shows that our LKI leading indicator is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis, followed by rising core inflation, rising broad market stock prices, rising economic activity, and oversold technical conditions. The ranking of results shown in Chart I-4 is fairly similar to those that we listed for the investable market, with two exceptions. First, for the domestic market, periods of tight monetary policy were considerably less important than in the investable market as an important predictor of relative sector performance. Instead, our LKI leading indicator was by far the most important predictor, which underscores a point that we have made in previous reports: domestic stocks appear to be much more sensitive to the trend in monetary conditions, money, and credit growth than for the investable market. This increased sensitivity has helped explain the difference in performance this year between the investable and domestic market, underscoring that the former has more catch-up potential than the latter in a trade truce scenario. Chart I-4Monetary Conditions, Money, & Credit Growth Drive A-Share Performance Chart 4 Monetary Conditions, Money, & Credit Growth Drive A-Share Performance Monetary Conditions, Money, & Credit Growth Drive A-Share Performance Second, in the investable market, episodes of significant overvaluation had essentially no power to predict future episodes of equity market underperformance. But this factor was an important or very important contributor to our domestic industrials, health care, and tech models. This finding is consistent with our May 23 Special Report, which noted that value stocks have outperformed in China’s domestic equity market over the past five years and underperformed in the investable market (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Value Has Been A More Successful ##br##Factor In The Domestic Market Chart 5 Value Has Been A More Successful Factor In The Domestic Market Value Has Been A More Successful Factor In The Domestic Market   Major Differences In The Performance Of Cyclicals Versus Defensives The results of our models for domestic equity sector performance did not change the cyclical & defensive labels that we applied in our previous report. The signs of the predictors shown in the tables on pages 11-22 clearly highlight that the domestic energy, materials, industrials consumer discretionary, and information technology sectors are cyclical sectors, and that consumer staples, health care, financials, telecom services, utilities, and real estate are defensive. What is striking, however, is that there is a major difference in the relative performance of equally-weighted domestic cyclicals versus defensives compared with what has occurred in the investable market over the past decade. Chart I-6A and Chart I-6B illustrate the different relative performance trends, along with their corresponding trends in relative P/E and relative EPS. Whereas the relative performance of investable cyclicals versus defensives has had somewhat of a stable mean over the past decade, domestic cyclicals have badly underperformed since early-2011. The charts also make it clear that this underperformance has been driven by a downtrend in relative EPS, not due to trend differences in relative valuation. Chart I-6ACyclicals/Defensives Somewhat Mean-Reverting In The Investable Market... Chart 6A Cyclicals/Defensives Somewhat Mean-Reverting In The Investable Market… Cyclicals/Defensives Somewhat Mean-Reverting In The Investable Market… Chart I-6B...But Not So In The Domestic##br## Market Chart 6B …But Not So In The Domestic Market …But Not So In The Domestic Market Digging further, it appears that this discrepancy can be largely explained by the significant difference in performance between investable and domestic tech over the past decade (Chart I-7). Whereas the former has outperformed the overall investable index by roughly 4-5 times since 2010, the relative performance of the latter has only very modestly risen. In effect, Charts I-6 and I-7 highlight that Chinese cyclical sectors have been structurally impaired over the past decade and have only been “saved” in the investable market by massive outsized outperformance of the tech sector. The fact that investable tech sector performance itself has been largely driven by 2 extremely successful firms underscores how narrowly based the investible cyclical versus defensives performance trend has been. Chart I-7A Huge Gap In Tech Explains Domestic Cyclical Underperformance Chart 7 A Huge Gap In Tech Explains Domestic Cyclical Underperformance A Huge Gap In Tech Explains Domestic Cyclical Underperformance Investment Conclusions There are three conclusions that investors can draw from our analysis. First, our research shows that episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) that has been the case for the investable market. This does not mean that domestic sector performance is not significantly impacted by macro and top down equity market factors, but it suggests that periods of “abnormal” relative sector performance may occur more frequently than in the investable universe. As such, investors should be prepared to include episode-specific investigation of abnormal performance as a regular part of their domestic equity sector allocation decisions. Investors should favor domestic cyclicals over the coming year, with exposure focused on consumer discretionary and tech. Second, the fact that our LKI leading indicator is in an uptrend suggests that investors should favor domestic cyclicals over defensives over the coming year, with a caveat. We have noted in several previous reports that our indicator is in a shallow uptrend, and the slower pace of money and credit growth than during previous economic upswings suggests that the bar may be higher for some cyclical sectors to outperform. We would advise investors to watch closely over the coming 3-6 months for signs of a technical breakout in all cyclical sectors. But sector performance in Q1 of this year, when the overall A-share market rose sharply versus global stocks, suggests that domestic consumer discretionary and tech should be favored within a cyclical equity portfolio over energy, materials, and industrials barring a surge in oil prices or a capitulation by Chinese policymakers in favor of “flood irrigation-style” stimulus (Chart I-8). Within resources, we prefer the investable energy sector to its domestic peer, due to a sizeable valuation advantage. Chart I-8Favor Select Domestic Cyclical Sectors Over The Coming Year Chart 8 Favor Select Domestic Cyclical Sectors Over The Coming Year Favor Select Domestic Cyclical Sectors Over The Coming Year As a third and final point, abstracting from our bullish outlook for select cyclical sectors over the coming year, Charts 6 and 7 clearly argue for investors to maintain a structural bias towards defensive stocks in the domestic market until cyclicals demonstrate meaningfully better earnings performance. In the May 23 Special Report that we referred to above, we noted that an A-share portfolio formed of industry groups with above-median return on equity and below-median ex-post beta has significantly outperformed over the past decade. Table I-1 presents the current industry group weights of this portfolio, and shows that overweight exposure is concentrated in the health care, consumer staples, and real estate sectors (all of which are defensive), and a heavy underweight towards industrials. Table I-1Current High ROE / Low Beta Factor Industry Group Portfolio Weights* Table 1 Current High ROE / Low Beta Factor Industry Group Portfolio Weights* Current High ROE / Low Beta Factor Industry Group Portfolio Weights* For clients who are interested in strategically allocating to the A-share market, we maintain a long position in this portfolio relative to the MSCI China A Onshore index in our trade book, and plan to continue to update the performance of the trade on a weekly basis. Energy Chart II-1 Chart II-1 Energy Energy Table II-1 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Similar to the investable energy sector, periods of domestic energy sector outperformance are strongly positively related to rising oil prices and rising headline inflation in China. We noted in our previous report that this is a behavioral relationship, rather than a fundamental one. Domestic energy stocks are negatively associated with rising broad market stock prices, unlike their investable peers. This largely reflects the fact that the relative performance of domestic energy stocks has been in a structural downtrend over the past decade. From 2010 to mid-2016, this decline was caused by a persistent underperformance in earnings. Since mid-2016, domestic energy sector EPS have been rising in relative terms, meaning that more recent underperformance has been due to multiple contractions. While not as relatively cheap as their investable peers, domestic energy stocks are heavily discounted versus the broad domestic market based on both the price/earnings ratio and the dividend yield. Consequently, it is possible that domestic energy stocks may at some point begin to outperform in a rising broad equity market environment. For now, our model argues for an underweight stance towards domestic energy due to the lack of a clear uptrend in oil prices. As a pure value play, investable energy stocks maintain a dividend yield of nearly 6.5%, and are thus more attractive than their domestic peers. Materials Chart II-2 Chart II-2 Materials Materials Table II-2 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our model for the domestic materials highlights that the sector’s performance has been related to strengthening economic activity and strongly related to a rising Li Keqiang leading indicator. Among the equity market variables that we tested, materials outperformance has been positively associated with rising relative EPS, rising broad market EPS, and prior oversold technical conditions. Similarly, the investable materials sector, these results show that domestic materials are a strong play on accelerating Chinese economic activity. The factors included in our domestic materials sector model are similar to those included in our investable material, except that relative material earnings have also been a significant predictor of sector relative performance. In addition, the macro & equity market predictors included in our domestic materials model have done a better job of leading material sector performance. The odds of domestic materials outperformance rose twice above the 50% mark this year according to our model, without any corresponding improvement in relative stock prices. The spikes in the model occurred largely because domestic materials became significantly oversold; technical conditions for the sector have only twice been weaker over the past decade. This underscores that investors should be watching domestic materials closely in Q1 of next year for signs of a relative rebound. Industrials Chart II-3 Chart II-3 Industrials Industrials Table II-3 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance The results of our model for domestic industrial sector outperformance are interesting, as they imply that the drivers of performance are different between the domestic and investable markets. In the investable index, we found that industrials were heavily sensitive to monetary policy, rising core inflation, relative sector earnings, and periods of rising broad market stock prices. Our domestic model is considerably simpler: industrials outperform, with a lag, when our activity index and Li Keqiang leading indicator are rising. Periods of strong overvaluation have also been significant in predicting future episodes of domestic industrial sector underperformance. It is not clear to us why the drivers of relative performance for domestic industrials have been different than in the investable equity index, But the good news is that the relative simplicity of the model makes the investment decision making process for domestic industrials considerably easier. Today, domestic industrials are significantly undervalued, and our Li Keqiang leading indicator is in a shallow uptrend. This suggests that domestic industrials are likely to begin outperforming at some point in early-2020 following a bottoming in Chinese economic activity, unless policymakers are quick to tighten once activity begins to improve (which would be contrary to our expectations). Consumer Discretionary Chart II-4 Chart II-4 Consumer Discretionary Consumer Discretionary Table II-4 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our domestic consumer discretionary model highlights that the sector’s relative performance is positively associated with a rising Li Keqiang leading indicator, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices. Similar to its investable peers, domestic consumer discretionary stocks are cyclical, and positive relationship with core inflation may reflect improved pricing power for the sector. Unlike investable consumer discretionary, the domestic consumer discretionary has not been meaningfully impacted by the December 2018 changes to the global industry classification standard. Hence, our model does not exclude the internet & direct marketing retail sector as we did in our previous report on investable sectors. For now, our model suggests that the domestic consumer discretionary sector is likely to continue to underperform, given decelerating core inflation and the lack of a clear uptrend in the broad domestic equity index. However, as a cyclical sector, we will be watching closely for an upside breakout in domestic consumer discretionary performance in the first quarter as a signal to increase exposure to the sector. Consumer Staples Chart II-5 Chart II-5 Consumer Staples Consumer Staples Table II-5 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our domestic consumer staples model is significantly different than that shown in our previous report for investable staples. This reflects sizeable differences in investable/domestic staples relative performance over the past decade, particularly from mid-2015 to late-2017 (where domestic staples outperformed significantly and investable staples languished). Of the two predictors found to be significant in explaining historical periods of domestic staples performance, a negative relationship with the trend in broad market EPS has been the most important. This underscores that staples are defensive sector. The trend in staples relative earnings has closely followed in importance, showing that the tremendous outperformance in domestic consumer staples over the past several years has, at least in part, been driven by fundamentals. Still, domestic consumer staples are currently priced at 34x earnings per share, compared with 15x for the overall domestic market. While our model currently argues for continued staples outperformance, the risk of a valuation mean reversion next year, against the backdrop of an improving economy, is above average. Over the coming 6-12 months, investors should be closely monitoring domestic staples for signs of waning earnings momentum and/or a major technical breakdown as potential signals to reduce domestic staples exposure. Health Care Chart II-6 Chart II-6 Health Care Health Care Table II-6 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Over the past decade, periods of domestic health care outperformance have been negatively associated with rising economic activity, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices. Oversold technical conditions and periods of overvaluation have also helped predict future episodes of health care relative performance. These factors clearly point to the defensive nature of domestic health care, similar to health care stocks in the investable index. However, one clear difference between investable and domestic health care is that the former appears to have leading properties and the latter does not. We noted in our previous report that periods of investable health care underperformance appeared to lead, on average, our BCA Activity Index, periods of rising core inflation, and uptrends in the broad investable index. By contrast, domestic health care lags the Activity Index and core inflation by just over a year, and also lags the trend in broad market EPS. Our model points to further health care outperformance, but we would expect domestic health care stocks to underperform at some point next year following an improvement in economic activity and a resumed uptrend in broad domestic EPS. Financials Chart II-7 Chart II-7 Financials Financials Table II-7 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our outperformance probability model for domestic financials highlights that the sector is countercyclical: periods of outperformance have been negatively related to our LKI leading indicator, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices. Similar to the case of the investable index and unlike the case globally, financials are clearly defensive. Investable financials have exhibited atypical performance this year according to the model presented in our previous report. By contrast, domestic financials have performed in line with what our model has suggested: our LKI leading indicator is in a shallow uptrend, and the relative performance of domestic financials has trended flat-to-down since late-2018. Barring a major shift by the PBoC towards a hawkish stance in the coming year (which we do not expect), our base case view for the Chinese economy implies that domestic financials are likely to continue to underperform. Banks Chart II-8 Chart II-8 Banks Banks Table II-8 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our model for domestic banks is similar to that of financials, with some important differences. In addition to being sensitive to our LKI leading indicator, domestic bank performance is negatively related to our Activity Index. Oversold technical conditions have also been quite important in predicting future episodes of domestic bank outperformance. The model is currently forecasting domestic bank underperformance, although it was late in predicting the selloff in bank stocks that began late last year. Similar to the case for domestic financials, our baseline view for the Chinese economy implies that domestic bank are likely to continue to underperform over the coming year. Information Technology Chart II-9 Information Technology Information Technology Table II-9 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our model for the domestic technology sector is different than that of investable tech, which reflects the vast difference in performance between the two sectors. While the relative performance of domestic tech has trended sideways over the past decade, investable tech stock prices have risen fourfold relative to the broad investable index. This difference is largely accounted for by the absence of the BAT stocks (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) from the domestic market. Similar to investable tech, domestic technology stocks are negatively related to tight monetary policy, and positively linked with a pro-cyclical economic variable (a rising LKI leading indicator). However, strangely, domestic tech has been strongly and negatively related to rising headline inflation, a finding with no clear fundamental basis. The model has been less successful in predicting domestic tech performance over the past year than in the past, which appears to be linked to the inclusion of headline inflation in the model. Rising headline inflation has been clearly associated with three major episodes of domestic tech underperformance since 2010, but over the past year domestic tech has outperformed as headline inflation accelerated. For now we would advise investors to focus on the other factors in the model: the lack of overvaluation, and our view that policy will remain easy on a measured basis, supports an overweight stance towards domestic tech over the coming year. Telecom Services Chart II-10 Telecom Services Telecom Services Table II-10 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our domestic telecom services relative performance model highlights that the sector is defensive like its investable peer, but the factors driving performance are somewhat different. The only similarity between the two models is that periods of outperformance are negatively related to rising broad market stocks prices for both investable and domestic telecom services, with domestic telecom stocks responding with a lag. Among the macro factors included in the model, periods of domestic telecom services outperformance are negatively and coincidently related to our LKI leading indicator, and positively related to tight monetary policy (with a slight lead). Oversold technical conditions have also proven to help predict future episodes of outperformance. The model failed to predict a brief period of outperformance in mid-2018, but has generally accurately predicted underperformance of domestic telecom stocks since early-2017. Barring a collapse in the US/China trade talks or considerably weaker near-term economic conditions than we expect, domestic telecom services will likely continue to underperform until the specter of tighter monetary policy emerges. This is unlikely to occur until the middle of 2020, at the earliest. Utilities Chart II-11 Utilities Utilities Table II-11 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Overall, our domestic utilities model has considerably worse predictive power than our model for investable utilities. The model shows that the performance of domestic utilities is negatively related to rising core inflation (with a lag) and rising broad market EPS, but these relationships are not particularly strong. We noted in our June 19 Special Report that domestic utilities ranked highly on the impact that relative EPS had on predicting relative stock prices , yet relative sector earnings did not register as a significant predictor in our model. This apparent discrepancy is resolved by differences in the time horizon between these two approaches. The analysis that we presented in our June 19 Special Report examined the relationship between earnings and stock prices over the entire sample period (2011-2018), meaning that it examined the predictive power of earnings over the long-term. The models built in this report have focused strongly on explaining periods of outperformance over a 6-12 month time horizon, there have been enough deviations in the trend between the relative performance of utilities and relative utilities earnings that the relationship between the two was not sufficiently strong to show up in the model. In other words, the long-term link between utilities relative earnings and stock prices is strong, but the short-term link is fairly weak. Real Estate Chart II-12 Real Estate Real Estate Table II-12 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Similar to investable real estate, our model shows that domestic real estate is a counter-cyclical sector in that it is negatively related to periods of rising economic activity, a rising LKI leading indicator, tight monetary policy, and rising core inflation. Overbought technical conditions have also aided in predicting future episodes of domestic real estate underperformance. Our model for domestic real estate stocks has performed quite well on average, but its predictive success since late-2017 has been mixed. This period of atypical underperformance has coincided with a considerably weaker rebound in residential floor space sold than has occurred in previous recoveries in the real estate market. This suggests that domestic real estate stocks are more susceptible to trends in housing sales than their investable peers (which appear to be mostly sensitive to rising house prices). We noted in our November 6 Weekly Report that floor space sold is picking up , but it still remains weak when compared with history. This, in combination with our view that the Chinese economy will improve over the coming year, suggests that investors should avoid domestic real estate exposure relative to the overall domestic equity market. Footnotes 1  Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance," dated October 30, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2  Please see China Investment Strategy "Six Questions About Chinese Stocks," dated January 16, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3  Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Chinese Equity Sector Earnings: Predictability, Cyclicality, And Relevance," dated June 19, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4  Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China Macro And Market Review," dated November 6, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Feature Chart I-1Lebanese Bond Yields Have Surged To Precarious Levels Lebanese Bond Yields Have Surged To Precarious Levels Lebanese Bond Yields Have Surged To Precarious Levels In a May 2018 Special Report, we warned that a devaluation and government default were only a matter of time in Lebanon. The country's sovereign US dollar bond yields have now reached a whopping 21% and local currency interest rates stand at 18% (Chart I-1). On the black market, the Lebanese pound is already trading 12% below its official rate. A public run on banks and bank deposit moratorium, as well as public debt default and a massive currency devaluation are now unavoidable. A Classic Case Of EM Bank Run And Currency Devaluation… The current state of Lebanon’s balance of  payments (BoP) is disastrous: The current account (CA) deficit has oscillated between 10% and 20% of GDP in the past 10 years (Chart I-2). This wide CA deficit has been funded by speculative portfolio flows into local currency government bonds, sovereign bonds and bank deposits. However, since the middle of 2018 these inflows have dried up. In turn, to defend the currency peg to the US dollar and avoid a currency depreciation in the face of the BoP deficit, the Central Bank of Lebanon (BDL) has been depleting its foreign exchange (fx) reserves, i.e., the central bank has been financing the BoP deficit (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Lebanon's Chronic Current Account Deficit Lebanon's Chronic Current Account Deficit Lebanon's Chronic Current Account Deficit   Chart I-3Lebanon: The BoP Has Been Deteriorating Substantially Lebanon: The BoP Has Been Deteriorating Substantially Lebanon: The BoP Has Been Deteriorating Substantially   BDL’s gross fx reserves – including gold – have dropped from $48 billion in 2018 to its current level of $43 billion. We estimate that BDL’s net foreign exchange reserves excluding commercial banks’ US dollar deposits at BDL are at just $26 billion. This amount is insufficient in light of the panic-induced outflows the country and the banking system are experiencing.1  As a result of the two-week long bank shutdown amid massive protests, confidence in the banking system is quickly collapsing and capital is leaving Lebanon. Chart I-4Depositors’ Are Heading For The Exit Depositors' Are Heading For The Exit Depositors' Are Heading For The Exit Worryingly, as a result of the two-week long bank shutdown amid massive protests, confidence in the banking system is quickly collapsing and capital is leaving Lebanon.2   Moreover, after opening their doors, Lebanese commercial banks are now imposing unofficial capital controls – they are paying US dollar deposits in local currency only and are no longer providing dollar-denominated credit lines to businesses and importers. This will only intensify the panic among depositors. Chart I-4 illustrates that local currency deposits have already been declining while US dollar deposits have been slowing, and will likely begin contracting soon. In short, capital outflows will intensify in the coming weeks as people and businesses quickly realize that banks cannot meet their demand for deposits. Critically, we suspect Lebanese commercial banks are short on US dollars to meet people’s demand for the hard currency. Commercial banks’ net foreign currency assets stand at negative $70 billion or 127% of GDP. They hold, roughly, somewhere around $20 billion worth of US dollars in the form of liquid and readily available deposits (in banks abroad and deposits in the central bank) versus $124 billion worth of dollar deposits. Over the years, Lebanese commercial banks have been an attractive place for investors and residents to park their US dollars given the high interest rate paid by the banks. In turn, Lebanese commercial banks have been converting these US dollar deposits into local currency in order to buy government bonds. With domestic bonds yielding well above the rates on US dollar deposits - and given the exchange rate peg to the dollar - commercial banks have been de facto playing the carry trade. In addition, commercial banks also lent some of these dollars directly to the private sector. With the economy collapsing and the widening dollar shortage, banks will not be able to either collect their dollar loans or purchase dollars in the market.   Without new dollar funding – which is very likely to persist – banks will fail to meet the demand for dollars. As a result, a bank run is imminent. At this point, the sole option is for the central bank to keep pushing local interest rates higher to discourage capital flight and a run on the banks. Yet, at 18% and surging, interest rates will suffocate the Lebanese economy and the property market. This will dampen sentiment further and cause a bank run. Bottom Line: A bank run is brewing and bank moratorium as well as currency devaluation are inevitable. …As Well As Public Debt Default Lebanese commercial banks are not only being squeezed by capital outflows and deposit withdrawals, they are also about to face a public debt default. Chart I-5Public Debt Dynamics Are Toxic Public Debt Dynamics Are Toxic Public Debt Dynamics Are Toxic Lebanese commercial banks are not only being squeezed by capital outflows and deposit withdrawals, they are also about to face a public debt default. Commercial banks own 37% of outstanding government debt. This will come on top of skyrocketing private-sector non-performing loans and will push banks into outright bankruptcy. Lebanon’s fiscal and public debt dynamics have reached untenable levels. The fiscal deficit stands at 10% of GDP and total public debt stands at 150% of GDP (Chart I-5). Surging government borrowing costs will push interest payments as a share of government aggregate expenditures to extremely high levels. These are unsustainable fiscal and debt arithmetics (Chart I-6). Meanwhile, government revenues will decline as growth falters (Chart I-6, bottom panel). The pillars of the Lebanese economy – private credit growth and construction activity – have been already collapsing (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Surging Interest Rates Will Make Public Debt Servicing Impossible Surging Interest Rates Will Make Public Debt Servicing Impossible Surging Interest Rates Will Make Public Debt Servicing Impossible Chart I-7Lebanon: Domestic Economy Has Been Collapsing Lebanon: Domestic Economy Has Been Collapsing Lebanon: Domestic Economy Has Been Collapsing Bottom Line: The Lebanese government will be forced to default on both local currency and dollar debt. This will be the final nail in the coffin of the Lebanese banking system.    Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    BDL does not publish its holding of net foreign exchange reserves. However, other estimates of BDL’s net fx reserves  are even lower. Please refer to the following paper: Financial Crisis In Lebanon, by Toufic Gaspard and the following article: Lebanon Warned on Default and Recession as Its Reserves Decline. 2   Banks shut down allegedly as a result of the ongoing civil disobedience that was sparked by the government’s reckless decision to tax WhatsApp's call service. The protests quickly escalated to a country-wide uprising, causing the government to resign on October 29.

Highlights In this report, we build and present models designed to predict the odds of Chinese investable equity sector outperformance, based on a set of macroeconomic and equity market factors. BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to help investors to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. Among the top six factors explaining historical periods of sector performance, three were macroeconomic in orientation, and two were directly related to the broad Chinese equity market. We see this as strongly supportive of the potential returns to be earned from active top-down sector rotation within China’s investable market. Cyclical stocks are very depressed relative to defensives, and we would favor them versus defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. Feature In our June 19 Special Report, we reviewed the predictability and cyclicality of equity sector earnings in China's investable & domestic markets, and examined the relevance of earnings in predicting relative sector performance over the past decade. We noted that a few sectors scored highly in terms of earnings predictability and the relevance of those earnings in predicting relative performance. But we also highlighted that most of China's equity sectors, in both the investable and domestic markets, either demonstrated earnings trends that were difficult to predict based on the trend in overall market earnings or exhibited relative performance that was difficult to explain based on the relative earnings profile. Our models are designed to predict equity sector relative performance using a series of macroeconomic and equity market factors. In short, our June report underscored that China’s equity sectors warranted a closer examination, with a particular emphasis on understanding the specific macroeconomic or equity market factors that have historically predicted relative sector performance. Today’s report examines this question in depth, focused on China’s investable equity market. We hope to extend our research to the A-share market in the near future. Our approach focuses on constructing and presenting models that quantify a checklist-based approach to determining the odds of equity sector performance. The aim is to use these models to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use them as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We conclude by highlighting the substantial underperformance of cyclical vs defensives sectors over the past two years, and argue that it is highly unlikely that cyclicals will underperform defensives over the coming 12 months if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the economy incrementally improves, as we expect. We also explain the importance of monitoring the relative performance of health care & utilities stocks over the coming few months, and present a unique sector-based barometer for gauging China’s reflationary stance. The latter two relative performance trends are likely to assist investors in positioning for the big call: the outperformance of Chinese investable stocks vs the global benchmark. Detailing Our Approach In our effort to better understand historical periods of sector outperformance, we have chosen to model the probability of outperformance of each level 1 GICS sector (plus banks) based on a set of macro and equity market variables. Specifically, we use an analytical tool called a logistic regression, which forecasts the probability of a discrete event rather than forecasting the value of a dependent variable. We utilized this approach when building our earnings recession model for China (first presented in our January 16 Special Report1), and investors will often see it (in its conceptually different but practically similar probit form) employed when analyzing the likelihood of an economic recession. The New York Fed’s US recession model is a notable example of the latter,2 which has received much attention by market participants over the past year following the inversion of the US yield curve. The “events” that we modeled are historical periods of individual Chinese investable sector outperformance from 2010 to 2018, relative to the MSCI China index (the “broad market”). Charts I-1A and I-1B illustrate these periods with shading in each panel. We then attempt to explain these episodes of outperformance with the following macro predictors: Chart I-1AThis Report Builds Models Aimed At... This Report Builds Models Aimed At... This Report Builds Models Aimed At... Chart I-1B...Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts ...Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts ...Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts Periods of accelerating economic activity, represented by our BCA's China Activity Index Periods of rising leading indicators of economic activity, represented by our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator Episodes of tight monetary policy, defined as periods where China’s 3-month interbank repo rate is rising Periods of accelerating inflation, measured both by headline and core inflation We also include several equity market variables: uptrends in relative sector earnings, periods of rising broad market stock prices, uptrends in broad market earnings, and episodes of extreme technical conditions and relative over/undervaluation for the sector in question. In the case of energy stocks, we also include oil prices as a predictor. Charts I-2A and I-2B illustrate these periods as well as the macro & market variables that we have included as predictors. Chart I-2AWe Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors... We Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors... We Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors... Chart I-2B...To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance ...To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance ...To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance Our approach also accounts for the existence of any leading or lagging relationships between the macro and market variables we have used as predictors and sector relative performance. In most cases the predictors lead relative sector performance, but in some cases it is the opposite. In the case of the latter, we have limited the lead of any variable in our models to 3 months in order to reduce the need to forecast. The link between tight monetary policy and industrial sector performance is one exception to this rule that we detail below. Finally, our approach also limits the extent to which we consider a leading relationship between our predictors and relative sector performance, in order to avoid picking up overlapping economic cycles. This issue, and the evidence supporting the existence of a 3½-year credit cycle in China, are detailed in Box 1. Box 1 Accounting For China’s 3½-Year Credit Cycle Over the course of the analysis detailed in this report, judgments concerning how much of a lead or lag to allow when accounting for any leading or lagging relationships between sector relative performance and either macroeconomic & stock market predictors were necessary. In cases where sector relative performance led any of our predictors, we capped the lead at 3-months to reduce the need to forecast the predictors when using the models. As explained below, the 8-month lead between industrial sector relative performance and tight monetary policy was the only exception to this rule. We also did not include any leading relationship between relative sector stock performance and the trend in relative sector EPS, and allowed at most a co-incident relationship. Limits were also required in the cases where our predictors led relative sector performance. While more lead time is usually better from the perspective of investment strategy, Chart I-B1 presents strong evidence of a 3½ -year credit cycle in China. Chart I-B2 illustrates the problem with including significant lags between predictors and relative sector performance when economic cycles are short. The chart shows the lead/lag correlation profile of the stylized cycle shown in Chart I-B1, and highlights that lags greater than 12-14 months risk picking up the impact of the previous economic cycle. Given this, we have limited the extent to which our predictors can lead relative sector performance in our models, and in practice lead times are generally less than one year. Chart I-B1Over The Past Decade, China Has Experienced A 3½-Year Credit Cycle A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Chart I-B2With Short Cycles, Excessive Lags Risk Picking Up The Previous Cycle With Short Cycles, Excessive Lags Risk Picking Up The Previous Cycle With Short Cycles, Excessive Lags Risk Picking Up The Previous Cycle The Key Drivers Of Chinese Investable Equity Sectors Pages 12-23 present the results of each sector’s outperformance probability model, along with a list of factors that were found to be useful predictors and a summary of the results. The importance of the factors included in the models is shown in each of the tables at the top right of pages 12-23 by a score of 1-3 stars, (loosely representing key levels of statistical significance) as well as each factor’s optimal lead or lag. A minus sign shows that the predictor leads sector relative performance, whereas a plus sign shows that it lags. Rising core inflation in China is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis. Chart I-3China’s Sectors Linked Strongly To Core Inflation, Monetary Policy, And Growth A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Chart I-3 summarizes the significance of the factors in predicting sector performance in general, by summing up each predictor’s number of stars across all of the models. The chart shows that rising core inflation in China is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis, followed by tight monetary policy, rising economic activity, rising broad market stock prices, oversold technical conditions, and rising broad market earnings. Chart I-3 highlights two important points: If regarded through the lens of causality alone, the strong relationship between rising core inflation and sector performance is somewhat surprising: normally, pricing power is subordinate to revenue/sales/demand as the primary factor driving fundamental performance. However, given that inflation is a lagging economic variable, we suspect that the significance of inflation in our models actually reflects the middle phase of the economic cycle in which sectors tend to best exhibit meaningful out/underperformance. It is also a stronger predictor of periods of tight monetary policy in China than headline inflation.3 This is an encouraging result for investors, as it suggests good odds that future episodes of meaningful sector outperformance can be identified given a particular macro view. Among the top six factors explaining historical periods of sector performance, three were macroeconomic in orientation, and two were directly related to the broad Chinese equity market. While Chinese equity sector performance can sometimes be idiosyncratic, we see this as strongly supportive of the idea that investors can earn positive excess returns by actively shifting between China’s equity sectors using a top-down approach. Turning to the specific results of our sector models, we present the following big-picture findings of our research: Defining China’s Cyclical & Defensive Sectors From a top-down perspective, the most important element of sector rotation typically involves shifting from defensive to cyclical stocks when economic activity is set to improve (and vice versa). In China, it is clear from the results of our models that the investable energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and information technology sectors are cyclical sectors. The relative performance of these sectors exhibits a positive relationship to pro-cyclical macro variables, or broad market trends. Following last year’s GICS changes, we also include the media & entertainment industry group (within the new communication services sector) in this list. Correspondingly, investable consumer staples, health care, financials, telecom services, utilities, and real estate are defensive sectors in China. Chart I-4Cyclical Stocks Are Bombed Out Versus Defensives Cyclical Stocks Are Bombed Out Versus Defensives Cyclical Stocks Are Bombed Out Versus Defensives Chart I-4 illustrates how these sectors have performed over the past decade by grouping them into equally-weighted cyclical and defensive stock price indexes, as well as the relative performance of cyclicals versus defensives. The chart makes it clear that cyclical stock performance is essentially as weak as it has ever been relative to defensives over the past decade, with the exception of a brief period in 2013. Panel 2 highlights that all of the underperformance of cyclicals over the past two years has been due to de-rating, rather than due to underperforming earnings. The Atypical Case Of Financials & Real Estate The fact that financial and real estate stocks are defensive in China is somewhat curious. In the case of financials, the abnormality is straightforward: most global equity portfolio managers would consider financials to be cyclical, and our work suggests that this is not true for the investable market. Our explanation for this apparent discrepancy is also straightforward: while small and medium banks in China have obviously grown in prominence over the past decade, large state-owned or state-affiliated commercial banks are still dominant in the provision of credit to China's old economy. In most cases China’s large banks lend to state-owned enterprises with implicit government guarantees, meaning that the earnings risk for Chinese banks has typically been lower than for the investable market in the aggregate. It remains to be seen whether this will remain true in a world where Chinese policymakers are keen to slow the pace at which China’s macro leverage ratio rises and to render the existing stock of debt more sustainable for the non-financial sector. Indeed, over a multi-year time horizon, the risk are not trivial that banks will be forced to recapitalize as a result of forced changes to loan terms (eg: significant increases in the amortization period of existing loans) or the recognition of sizeable loan losses, which would clearly increase the cyclicality of the Chinese investable financial sector. Chart I-5A Seeming Contradiction: Real Estate Is High-Beta, But Defensive A Seeming Contradiction: Real Estate Is High-Beta, But Defensive A Seeming Contradiction: Real Estate Is High-Beta, But Defensive On the real estate front, the anomaly is not that real estate stocks respond defensively to macroeconomic and stock market variables, it is that real estate stock prices are considerably more volatile than this defensive characterization would suggest. Globally (and especially in the US), real estate stocks are often viewed as bond proxies and thus are typically low-beta, but Chart I-5 shows that this is not the case in China. In our view, this issue is reconciled by the fact that Chinese investable real estate stocks are also highly positively linked to Chinese house price appreciation, with relative performance typically leading a pickup in house prices by up to 1 year. This strongly leading relationship has meant that real estate stocks have often outperformed the broad market as economic activity is slowing, in anticipation that policy easing will lead to an eventual recovery in house prices. Chart I-6Still Following The Defensive Playbook This Year Still Following The Defensive Playbook This Year Still Following The Defensive Playbook This Year In effect, investable real estate stocks are a high-beta sector that have acted counter-cyclically due to the historical interplay between economic activity, monetary policy, and the housing market. Real estate performance this year has not deviated from this playbook (Chart I-6), and so for now we are content to include real estate stocks in our defensive index. But similar to the case of financials, we can conceive of scenarios in which ongoing Chinese financial sector reform may change this relationship in the future. The Unique Monetary Policy Sensitivity Of Industrials And Consumer Staples Pages 14 and 16 highlight that industrials and consumer staples stocks have typically been sensitive to periods of tight monetary policy. In the case of industrials the relationship is negative, whereas consumer staples relative performance has been positively linked to these periods. In both cases, relative performance has led periods of tight monetary policy, significantly so in the case of industrials (by an average of 8 months). While the relative performance of banks, tech, and real estate stocks have also been linked to periods of tight monetary policy, industrials and consumer staples are the only sectors that have tended to lead these periods. Chart I-7Diverging Corporate Health Explains Industrials/Staples Monetary Policy Sensitivity Diverging Corporate Health Explains Industrials/Staples Monetary Policy Sensitivity Diverging Corporate Health Explains Industrials/Staples Monetary Policy Sensitivity This is a revelatory finding, and in our view it is explained by divergences in corporate health and leverage for the two sectors. We reviewed Chinese corporate health in our August 28 Special Report,4 and noted that the food & beverage sub-industry was a clear (positive) outlier based on our corporate health monitors. In particular, Chart I-7 highlights that food & beverage corporate health is markedly better than that for machinery companies or for industrial firms in general, supporting the notion that high (low) leverage is impacting the relative performance of industrials (consumer staples). The Leading Nature Of Health Care & Utilities Health care and utilities exhibit similar key drivers of relative performance: in both cases, periods of rising economic activity, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices are all negatively associated with performance. Health care and utilities relative performance also happens to lead all three of those predictors, by 1-3 months on average depending on the variable in question. Our modeling work highlights that these are the only sectors whose relative performance has led multiple factors, suggesting that health care & utilities stocks are particularly interesting market bellwethers to monitor. Core Inflation Matters More Than Headline, Except For Energy & Real Estate As highlighted in Chart I-3, rising core inflation has been a much more important signal about relative sector performance than headline inflation. Chart I-8In China, Food Prices (Not Energy) Account For Headline/Core Differences In China, Food Prices (Not Energy) Account For Headline/Core Differences In China, Food Prices (Not Energy) Account For Headline/Core Differences The two exceptions to this rule relate to the energy and real estate sectors, with the former positively linked to headline inflation and the latter negatively linked. In both cases, we suspect that the relationship is a behavioral rather than a fundamental one. For energy, while rising headline inflation in developed countries is usually associated with rising energy prices, this is not true in the case of China. Chart I-8 highlights that differences between headline and core inflation over the past decade have almost always been driven by rising food prices. This implies that some investors (incorrectly) view energy stocks as a hedge against increases in consumer prices, even if those increases are not driven by rising fuel costs. In the case of real estate, investor expectations of eroding real disposable income and its impact on the housing market are likely the best explanation for the negative link between real estate relative performance and rising headline inflation. Whereas rising core inflation likely reflects a durable improvement in economic momentum (and thus would be positively correlated with income growth), episodes of rising Chinese headline inflation often reflect supply shocks that investors may perceive to be detrimental to household spending power (and thus expected housing demand). Investment Conclusions Our work aimed at explaining historical periods of Chinese investable sector outperformance has three investment implications in the current environment. Cyclicals will probably outperform defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. First, within China’s investable market, Chart I-4 illustrated that cyclical stocks are very depressed relative to defensives. Given our view that Chinese investable stocks are likely to outperform their global peers over a 6-12 month time horizon, we would also favor cyclicals to defensives over that period. For investors who are not yet overweight cyclical stocks in China, we would advise waiting for concrete signs that growth has bottomed (which should emerge sometime in Q1) before putting on a long position as we remain tactically neutral towards Chinese versus global stocks. But the key point is that it is highly unlikely that cyclicals will underperform defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. Second, the fact that investable health care and utilities stocks have particularly leading properties suggests that they should be monitored closely over the coming few months. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of these sectors would be an important sign that market participants are anticipating a bottoming in China’s economy, which may give investors a green light to position for a bullish cyclical stance. For now, both of these sectors continue to outperform (Chart I-9), supporting our decision to remain tactically neutral towards Chinese stocks. Third, the heightened negative sensitivity of industrials and positive sensitivity of consumer staples to monetary policy suggests that the relative performance trend between the two sectors may serve as a reflationary barometer for China’s economy. Chart I-10 shows that industrials outperformed staples last year once the PBOC shifted into easing mode, and anticipated the recovery in the pace of credit growth. However, industrials soon began to underperform staples, which also seems to have anticipated the fact that the recovery in credit was set to be less powerful than what has occurred during previous cycles. The fact that the relative performance trend is off its recent low is notable, and may suggest that China’s existing reflationary stance will be sufficient to stabilize economic activity if a trade deal with the US is indeed finalized in the near future. Chart I-9Key Defensive Sectors Are Still Outperforming, Supporting Our Neutral Tactical Stance Key Defensive Sectors Are Still Outperforming, Supporting Our Neutral Tactical Stance Key Defensive Sectors Are Still Outperforming, Supporting Our Neutral Tactical Stance Chart I-10Industrials Vs. Staples Anticipated That Easing Would Only Be Measured Industrials Vs. Staples Anticipated That Easing Would Only Be Measured Industrials Vs. Staples Anticipated That Easing Would Only Be Measured As a final point, BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use the models as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We hope you will find these models to be a helpful quantification of the risk versus return prospects of allocating among China’s investable sectors. As always, we welcome any feedback that you may have about our approach.   Energy Chart II-1 Energy Energy Table II-1 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance   Unsurprisingly, our energy sector model highlights that periods of energy outperformance are strongly linked to periods of rising crude oil prices. However, what is surprising is that periods of accelerating headline inflation in China are even more closely linked to periods of energy sector outperformance than episodes of rising oil prices, and that these periods of accelerating inflation are not generally caused by rising energy prices. The lack of a clear economic rationale for this relationship implies that some investors (incorrectly) view energy stocks as a hedge against increases in consumer prices, even if those increases are largely driven by rising food prices. The model also highlights that periods of strong undervaluation have historically been significant in predicting future energy sector outperformance, with a lag of roughly 8 months. The probability of energy sector outperformance has fallen sharply according to our model, but for now we continue to recommend a long absolute energy sector position on a 6-12 month time horizon. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects oil prices to trade at $70/barrel on average next year,5 Chinese headline inflation continues to rise, and we noted in our October 2 Weekly Report that energy stocks are heavily discounted.6 Barring a durable decline in oil prices below $55/barrel, investors should continue to favor China’s energy sector. Materials Chart II-2 Materials Materials Table II-2 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Our model highlights that the materials sector is one of the clearest plays on accelerating industrial activity within the investable universe. Among the macro variables that we tested, periods of investable materials outperformance are strongly positively linked with periods when our BCA Activity Index and our leading indicator for the index have been rising. Periods of materials sector outperformance have also been positively correlated with prior periods of oversold technical conditions and rising broad market stock prices, underscoring that materials are a strongly pro-cyclical sector. We currently maintain no active relative sector trades, but our model suggests that investors should be underweight the investable materials sector relative to the broad investable index. Industrials Chart II-3 Industrials Industrials Table II-3 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Periods of industrial sector outperformance have historically been positively correlated with relative industrial sector earnings, broad market stock prices, and prior oversold technical conditions. They have been negatively correlated with periods of tight monetary policy, rising core inflation, and prior overbought technical conditions. Since 2010, periods of industrial sector performance have led periods of tight monetary policy by 8 months, the longest lead of relative equity performance to any macro variable that we tested in our model (and the longest lead that we allowed). Industrial sector performance has also been strongly negatively linked with periods of rising core inflation. These findings, and the fact that our Activity Index and its leading indicator have not been highly successful at predicting periods of industrial sector outperformance, strongly suggest that industrials, while pro-cyclical, are primarily driven by expectations of easy monetary policy. We noted in an August 2018 Special Report that state-owned enterprises have become substantially leveraged over the past decade,7 and in a more recent report we highlighted that industries such as machinery have experienced a significant deterioration in corporate health over the past decade.8 This helps explain why industrial sector performance is so negatively impacted by tight policy. Our model suggests that the best time to be overweight industrial stocks is the early phase of an economic rebound, when Chinese stock prices are rising but market participants are not yet expecting tighter policy. These conditions may present themselves sometime in Q1, but probably not over the coming 0-3 months. Consumer Discretionary Ex-Internet & Direct Marketing Retail Chart II-4 Consumer Discretionary Ex-Internet & Direct Marketing Retail Consumer Discretionary Ex-Internet & Direct Marketing Retail Table II-4 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Besides materials, China’s investable consumer discretionary sector has historically been the most positively associated with coincident and leading measures of industrial activity. Rising core inflation is also highly positively related to consumer discretionary outperformance, which may reflect improved pricing power for the sector. The strong link with industrial activity is in contrast to depictions of China’s consumer sector as being less correlated to money & credit trends than the overall economy, and is supportive of our view that industrial activity forms one of the three pillars of China’s business cycle.9 We ended the estimation period of our model as of December 2018, in order to avoid including the distortive effects of last year’s changes to the global industry classification standard (which resulted in Alibaba’s inclusion and overwhelming representation in the investable consumer discretionary sector). As such, the results of our model apply today to consumer discretionary stocks ex-internet & direct marketing retail. For now, the absence of an uptrend in our Activity Index and in core inflation is signaling underperformance of discretionary stocks outside of internet & direct marketing retail. Outperformance this year largely reflects a significant advance in consumer durable and apparel: by contrast, automobiles & components have underperformed the broad market by roughly 14% year-to-date. Consumer Staples Chart II-5 Consumer Staples Consumer Staples Table II-5 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Historically, periods of consumer staples outperformance have been predicted by a falling Activity Index, periods of tight monetary policy, and over/undervalued conditions. The impact of monetary policy is particularly heavy in the model, suggesting that consumer staples are somewhat the mirror image of industrials in terms of the impact of leverage on relative equity performance. This too is supported by our August 28 Special Report,10 which noted that corporate health for the food & beverage sector was the strongest among the sectors we examined. However, the model failed to capture what has been very significant staples outperformance this year, highlighting the occasional limits of a rule-of-thumb approach to sector allocation. Investable consumer staples are reliably low-beta compared with the broad market, and we are not surprised that investors have strongly favored the sector this year amid enormous economic and policy uncertainty. An eventual improvement in economic activity, coupled with fairly rich valuation, should work against consumer staples stocks sometime in the first quarter of 2020. Investors who are positioned in favor of China-related assets should also be watching closely for any signs of a technical breakdown in the relative performance trend of investable staples. Health Care Chart II-6 Health Care Health Care Table II-6 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Among the macro variables tested in our model, periods of health care outperformance are negatively related to coincident and leading measures of industrial activity and strongly negatively related to rising core inflation.  Health care outperformance is also strongly negatively related to periods of rising broad market stock prices, and positively related to prior oversold technical conditions. These results clearly signify that investable health care is a defensive sector, to be owned when the economy is slowing and when investable stocks in general are trending lower. Our model suggests that health care stocks are likely to continue to outperform, as they have been since the beginning of the year. A substantive US/China trade deal that meaningfully reduces economic uncertainty remains the key risk to health care outperformance over a 6- to 12-month time horizon. Financials Chart II-7 Financials Financials Table II-7 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Our model highlights that periods of financial sector outperformance over the past decade have been negatively associated with periods of rising core inflation (a strong relationship), and with periods of rising index earnings. Oversold technical conditions have also helped explain future episodes of financial sector outperformance. The link between core inflation and the outperformance of financials appears to represent a behavioral rather than a fundamental relationship. When modeling periods of rising financial sector relative earnings, the trend in broad market EPS is more predictive than that of core inflation, highlighting that the latter’s explanatory power is due to investor behavior. The results of our model, and the fact that core inflation leads Chinese index earnings, suggests that financials are fundamentally counter-cyclical and that investors see rising Chinese core inflation as confirmation that an economic expansion is underway (and that broad market earnings are likely to rise). Our model is currently predicting financial sector outperformance, but investable financials have modestly underperformed since the beginning of the year. This appears to have been caused by the underperformance of financial sector earnings this year as overall index earnings growth has decelerated, contrary to what history would suggest. We suspect that the ongoing shadow banking crackdown is related to financial sector earnings underperformance, and we would advise against an overweight stance towards investable financials until signs of improving relative earnings emerge. Banks Chart II-8 Banks Banks Table II-8 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Our model shows that periods of banking sector outperformance are more linked to macro variables than has been the case for the overall financial sector. Specifically, bank performance is negatively correlated with leading indicators of economic activity and rising core inflation, and especially negatively correlated with periods of tight monetary policy. Banks have also typically outperformed following periods of oversold technical conditions. Similar to financials, bank earnings are typically counter-cyclical, but relative bank earnings have not been good predictors of relative bank performance over the past decade. Still, the negative association of relative stock prices with leading economic indicators, rising core inflation and rising interest rates underscores that investors should normally be underweight banks if they expect overall Chinese stock prices to rise. Also similar to the overall financial sector, our model is currently predicting outperformance for bank stocks, but investable banks have underperformed year-to-date. The shadow banking crackdown is also likely impacting investable bank earnings, leading to a similar recommendation to avoid bank stocks until relative earnings look to be trending higher. “Tech+”   Chart II-9 Tech+' Tech+' Table II-9 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Our technology model has worked well at predicting periods of tech sector outperformance over the past several years, particularly from 2015 – 2017. The model suggests that, in addition to being negatively related to prior overbought conditions, periods of technology sector outperformance are associated with improving growth conditions, easy monetary policy, and rising prices. In other words, tech stocks are a growth & liquidity play. Owing to last year’s changes to the GICS, the results of our model apply today to Chinese investable internet & direct marketing retail, the media & entertainment industry group (within the new communication services sector), and the now considerably smaller information technology sector (the sum of which could be considered the “tech+” sector). The model has been predicting tech sector outperformance since May (in response to easier monetary policy), which has occurred for the official information technology sector. However, the BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) stocks are only up fractionally in relative terms from their late-May low. Our expectation that China’s economy is likely to bottom in Q1 means that we may recommend upgrading “tech+” stocks relative to the investable benchmark in the coming months. Telecom Services Chart II-10 Telecom Services Telecom Services Table II-10 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Our model for telecommunication services (now a level 2 industry group within the communication services sector) illustrates that telecom stocks have historically been counter-cyclical. Periods of telecom outperformance have been negatively associated with periods of rising core inflation, rising broad market stock prices, and rising broad market EPS. It is notable that telecom services stocks are driven more by cycles in overall stock prices than by cycles in economic activity. This suggests that investors tend to focus on the fact that telecom stocks are reliably low-beta compared with the overall investable market, causing out(under)performance of telecoms when the broad market is falling(rising). Similar to financials & banks, telecom stocks have not outperformed this year, in contrast to what our model would suggest. Earnings also appear to be the culprit, with the level of 12-month trailing earnings having fallen nearly 10% since the summer. China Mobile accounts for a sizeable portion of the telecom services index, and the company’s recent earnings weakness seems to be due to depreciation charges stemming from forced investment on 5G spending (mandated by the Chinese government). Our sense is that this will have only a temporary effect on telecom services EPS, meaning that investors should continue to expect the sector to behave in a counter-cyclical fashion over the coming year. Utilities Chart II-11 Utilities Utilities Table II-11 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance The early performance of our utilities model was mixed, as it generated several false sell signals during the 2011 – 2013 period despite recommending, on average, an overweight stance. However, over the past five years, the model has performed extremely well in terms of explaining periods of relative utilities performance. The model highlights that utilities are straightforwardly counter-cyclical. The relative performance of utilities stocks is positively related to its relative earnings trend, and negatively related to economic activity, rising core inflation, and broad market stock prices.  Consistent with a decline in the overall MSCI China index, the model has correctly predicted utilities outperformance this year. We expect utilities to underperform over a 6-12 month time horizon, but would advise against an aggressive underweight position until hard evidence of a bottom in Chinese economic activity emerges. Real Estate Chart II-12 Real Estate Real Estate Table II-12 A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance Our model for the relative performance of investable real estate has been among the most successful of those detailed in this report, which is somewhat surprising given the macro factors that the model shows drive real estate performance. While periods of relative real estate performance are modestly (negatively) associated with periods of tight monetary policy, rising headline inflation is the most important macro predictor of real estate underperformance. Among market factors driving performance, real estate stocks reliably underperform when broad market EPS are trending higher, and they historically outperform for a time after becoming relatively undervalued. Real estate relative performance is also strongly linked to periods of rising house prices, but the former tends to significantly lead the latter. Given that core inflation has better predicted episodes of tight monetary policy than headline inflation, investor expectations of eroding real disposable income is likely the best explanation for the negative link between real estate relative performance and rising headline inflation. Whereas rising core inflation likely reflects a durable improvement in economic momentum (and thus would be positively correlated with income growth), episodes of rising Chinese headline inflation often reflect supply shocks that investors may perceive to be detrimental to household spending power (and thus expected housing demand). Beyond the negative link between higher inflation and interest rates on investable real estate performance, the strong negative association with broad market earnings underscores that investors treat real estate as a defensive sector. We thus expect real estate stocks to continue to outperform in the near term, but underperform over a 6-12 month time horizon.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President jonathanl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Six Questions About Chinese Stocks," dated January 16, 2019. 2. Please see Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The Yield Curve as a Leading Indicator at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html 3. This is despite frequent concerns among investors that the PBOC is inclined to tighten in response to detrimental supply shocks. 4. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. 5. Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth," dated October 17, 2019. 6. Please see China Investment Strategy, "China Macro & Market Review," dated October 2, 2019. 7. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Chinese Policymakers: Facing A Trade-Off Between Growth And Leveraging," dated August 29, 2018. 8. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. 9. Please see China Investment Strategy, "The Three Pillars Of China’s Economy," dated May 16, 2018. 10. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The banks got the current earnings season off to a good start, … : Lending growth may be running in place, and net interest margins are under pressure, but positive operating leverage helped the banks beat expectations, and they are returning gobs of cash to their shareholders. … are quite constructive about the economy, … : The big banks’ CFOs and CEOs were uniformly bullish about the U.S. economy based on their perceptions of household and corporate health. … expect stellar credit performance to continue for the foreseeable future, … : Net charge-off and non-performing loan ratios are near all-time lows and the banks don’t see them rising any time soon. … and appear to be willing to extend loans in all categories except commercial real estate: Every bank sees unattractive competition in commercial real estate lending and plans to continue shrinking its CRE loan book. Nothing To See Here Two-fifths of the companies in the S&P 500 have now reported their quarterly earnings, and after this week the share will be two-thirds. At the aggregate level, it appears as if investors’ worst fears will not be realized, just as they weren’t in the first two quarters of the year. 2018’s greater than 20% year-on-year growth, powered by the sharp cut in the top corporate income tax rate, has rolled off, but earnings have yet to contract. They were projected to fall by a little over 3% at the beginning of this reporting season, but repeated practice has allowed corporate managements to hone their underpromise-and-overdeliver skills to a fine point, and we won’t be surprised if they avert an outright contraction. Chart 1Profit Margins Are Being Squeezed, ... Profit Margins Are Being Squeezed, ... Profit Margins Are Being Squeezed, ... Chart 2... But Neither Growing Compensation, ... ... But Neither Growing Compensation, ... ... But Neither Growing Compensation, ... Earnings growth has been stagnant this year (Chart 1, bottom panel), though revenues have grown a little faster than nominal GDP (Chart 1, top panel), with which they should converge over time. Profit margins have finally come under pressure, though it’s not exactly clear why. Employee compensation is businesses’ biggest expense by far, and while it has risen from its lows, its growth decelerated last quarter (Chart 2). Dollar strength is a headwind for U.S.-based multinationals, but the dollar only really moved last quarter, after ending the first half where it started the year (Chart 3). Dollar gains weigh on revenues just as surely as they do on profits, though we would not be at all surprised if the share of non-dollar expenses is a good bit smaller than the widely quoted 33-40% estimate of S&P 500 constituents’ foreign sales. Chart 3... Nor A Stronger Dollar Is A Clear-Cut Culprit ... Nor A Stronger Dollar Is A Clear-Cut Culprit ... Nor A Stronger Dollar Is A Clear-Cut Culprit Rate cuts have sparked a wave of mortgage refinancings, shifting wealth from mortgage investors to homeowners, who are more likely to spend it. Easier monetary conditions should help grease the skids for future earnings growth, both in the U.S. and abroad, and we expect the Fed will cut the fed funds rate by another 25 basis points when it meets this week. We have sympathy for the argument that since interest rates were not a meaningful constraint on growth, cutting them is not likely to provide much of a catalyst. Falling rates have provoked a wave of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4), however, so even if they don’t drive a big lending increase, they are already on their way to putting more money in the pockets of homeowners. Lower rates also reduce the risk of default by lowering debt-service costs for adjustable-rate borrowers, and by encouraging investors who need income to venture further out the risk curve, providing ample capital for borrowers seeking to extend their maturing obligations. Chart 4Putting More Money In Homeowners' Pockets Putting More Money In Homeowners' Pockets Putting More Money In Homeowners' Pockets Follow The Money Chart 5Bank Stocks Are Probing Resistance Bank Stocks Are Probing Resistance Bank Stocks Are Probing Resistance For two years, beginning in 2014, we reviewed the biggest banks’ earnings calls every quarter. The goal was to observe the give and take between bank management and sell-side analysts to gain some insight into the lending market and where it might be headed. We specifically sought information about banks’ willingness to lend, consumers’ and businesses’ appetite for credit, borrower performance, and the banks’ bottom-up perspective on the economy. We were also trying to glean insight into mortgage lending and what it might imply for residential investment. Studying the banks is a natural pursuit for a firm that was founded upon the insight that following money flows through the banking system would provide us with a window into the future direction of the economy and financial markets, and we return to it today. Our analysis is not meant to evaluate the banks’ own investment potential, though we note that they are testing resistance once again (Chart 5), and our Global Investment Strategy and U.S. Equity Strategy services both recommend overweighting them. This round of calls found bank management teams eager to ramp up their distributions to shareholders and optimistic about their ability to deploy technology to drive further efficiency gains. Big Banks Beige Book As a group, the banks were constructive on the economy. Despite widespread recession concerns, they do not see evidence of a looming slowdown from their interactions with consumers and businesses. Overall loan growth has remained around 5% over the last year and a half (Chart 6), while corporate and industrial (C&I) loan growth has ground to zero over the last thirteen weeks (Chart 7). The CEOs and CFOs do not see the C&I slump as the beginning of a worrisome trend, though, and global corporate bond issuance hit an all-time high in September, led by sizable issues from mega-cap U.S. companies. Businesses seeking credit are having no trouble getting it, though all the banks expressed an intention to continue cutting back their exposure to commercial real estate (CRE) loans. Chart 6Bank Lending Is Supporting Activity Without Risking Overheating Bank Lending Is Supporting Activity Without Risking Overheating Bank Lending Is Supporting Activity Without Risking Overheating Chart 7Lending Momentum Has Slowed, But It's Okay Lending Momentum Has Slowed, But It's Okay Lending Momentum Has Slowed, But It's Okay Another commercial real estate issue emerged across the calls: several of the biggest banks are consolidating their branch footprints. Prompted by questioning from one analyst, they touted branch closures as a way to enhance efficiency. We do not know if a reduction in bank demand for branch space would have an observable effect on demand for retail space across the country, but it certainly would in Manhattan. It seems possible that branch closures could pressure some retail lessors’ profitability, and thereby act as a drag on CRE whole-loan and CMBS performance at the margin. The Economy [C]onsumer spend and … confidence continue to be strong. I think business activity continues to be strong. I think it’s moderated somewhat because of … trade policy, but generally, I think the economy is solid. (Dolan, USB CFO) I think it’s fair to say that perhaps marginal investment is being impacted by trade fatigue in terms of the uncertainty, but … [there’s] still growth. … [T]he consumer is incredibly strong, … spending is strong, sentiment is strong, … credit is good. [I]t is true that [the recent ISM manufacturing and non-manufacturing surveys] were disappointing[,] so [there are] cautionary signs, but credit remains very good and there is still very healthy business activity. (Piepszak, JPM CFO) In general, our commercial customers continue to see moderate demand and no widespread issues related to trade uncertainty and interest rate changes. … [W]hile our customers are cautious, the most common concern they identify is their ability to hire enough qualified workers. (Shrewsberry, WFC CFO) Consumer payments up 6% year-to-date … [and 6% year-over-year 3Q growth in both our small business segment and total commercial loans] are tangible examples that the U.S. economy is still in solid shape, despite the worries and concerns about trade wars, capital investment slowdowns or other global macro conditions. (Moynihan, BAC CEO) Borrower Performance [W]e’ve had growth in the United States for the better part of 10 years [a]nd … credit is extraordinarily good. … [C]onsumer credit, commercial credit, wholesale is extraordinarily good, it can only get worse if you have a [turn in the] cycle. [Our guidance relates to expected performance across a full cycle.] We’re at the over-earning part of the cycle [beating the through-the-cycle expectation] in credit today, and [at] one point we’ll be at the under-earning part [pulling the full result down to our expectation]. (Dimon, JPM CEO) Our net charge-off rate remains near historic lows at 27 basis points (Chart 8). (Shrewsberry, WFC) Chart 8C&I Charge-Off Rates Are Near Their Historic Lows C&I Charge-Off Rates Are Near Their Historic Lows C&I Charge-Off Rates Are Near Their Historic Lows Credit quality remains stable, and we are not seeing any early indicators in our portfolio that cause us concern. (Cecere, USB CEO) Banks see no broad credit warning signs, but they're perfectly happy to let non-bank lenders take some commercial real estate share at this point of the cycle. We closely monitor our commercial portfolio for signs of weakness and credit quality indicators remain strong. (Shrewsberry, WFC) Lender Willingness [W]e are mindful that at some point, the industry will experience a credit downturn, and we remain disciplined in terms of origination quality and our long-term strategy of remaining within our defined credit box regardless of the competitive environment. (Cecere, USB) [Commercial] real estate banking [declined] as we remain selective, given where we are in the cycle. (Piepszak, JPM) [Commercial real estate lending] is one market where there’s late cycle behavior, there’s lots of non-bank competitors, … more than bank competitors. And so we really have to pick our spots in order to maintain our risk/reward, credit and pricing in loan terms quality. … I wouldn’t look for it to grow meaningfully until the cycle turns and our best customers have really interesting opportunities to put their own capital to work. (Shrewsberry, WFC) [Our declining commercial real estate lending is] really a function of [competition] that we’re not comfortable with. (Cecere, USB) Banks’ Real Estate Demand [C]ustomer behaviors are changing. The amount of transaction activity that’s happening in the branches is significantly less[.] In fact, … roughly 70, 80% of it goes through the digital channel today. So that gives us the opportunity to really reconfigure the branch network, both in terms of size and numbers[.] I think those trends are going to continue … , and … we may accelerate or increase some of [our right-sizing] activity[.] (Dolan, USB) Teller and ATM transactions declined 6% from a year ago, reflecting continued customer migration to digital channels. We’ve consolidated 130 branches in the first nine months of this year, including 52 branches in the third quarter. (Shrewsberry, WFC) [D]o we continue to work on real estate configurations that were down 50 million square feet from the start of 2010[?] [C]an we push [the occupancy rate] up, can we densify the space[?] (Moynihan, BAC) Investment Implications While rereading the April 2014 U.S. Investment Strategy that reviewed the big banks’ 1Q14 earnings calls, we were struck by how similar the picture is today. Back then, we described the central challenge for investors as choosing between mushy fundamentals and generous monetary policy that might be expected to inspire a valuation overshoot. As we do now, we anticipated that activity would soon pick up, providing markets with a fundamental boost, but we also had the sense that “policy settings are such that no much more than the status quo may be required to keep the party going.” We reiterated our equity overweight and our preference for spread product over Treasuries. Between inflection points, investing is an exercise in trend following, and there's no reason to believe that the monetary policy trend is about to change without clear advance notice. Although we are congenitally optimistic about our species and our country, we are not perma-bulls. We simply recognize that, between inflection points, investing is an exercise in trend following, no matter how uncomfortable it may make an investor to leave the portfolio dials alone for a while. As long as the monetary policy backdrop remains extremely accommodative across all of the major developed economies, and central banks are set to add even more accommodation before they start removing it, the bullish trend will remain in place. The prospective real returns of cash and highly-rated sovereign bonds are likely to remain negative for a while against that backdrop, encouraging investors to direct their marginal investment dollar to risk assets as long as a fundamental reversal is not imminent. We think a fundamental inflection is at least two years away, and therefore continue to believe that it is too early to de-risk investment portfolios. We reiterate our recommendation that investors remain at least equal weight equities in balanced portfolios, and at least equal weight spread product within their fixed-income allocations. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com