Banks

Highlights Macro outlook: Global growth will continue to decelerate into early next year on the back of brewing EM stresses and an underwhelming policy response from China. Equities: Stay neutral for now, while underweighting EM relative to DM stocks. Within DM, overweight the U.S. in dollar terms. Bonds: Global bond yields may dip in the near term, but the longer-term path is firmly higher. Currencies: The dollar is working off overbought conditions, but will rebound into year-end. EM currencies will suffer the most. Commodities: Favor oil over industrial metals. Precious metals will also remain under pressure until the dollar peaks next year, before beginning a major bull run as inflation accelerates. Feature I. Economic Outlook The Fed Can Hike A Lot More If 2017 was the year of a synchronized global growth recovery, 2018 is turning out to be a year where desynchronization is once again the name of the game. The U.S. economy continues to fire on all cylinders, while much of the rest of the world is struggling to stay afloat. The divergence in economic outcomes has been mirrored in central bank policy. The Fed is now hiking rates once per quarter whereas most other major central banks are still sitting on their hands. How high can U.S. rates go? The answer is a lot higher than investors anticipate. Market participants currently expect the Fed funds rate to rise to 2.37% by the end of this year and 2.84% by the end of 2019. No rate hikes are priced in for 2020 and beyond. The Fed dots are somewhat higher than market expectations (Chart I-1). The median dot rises to about 3.4% in 2020-21, but then falls back to 3% over the Fed's longer-run horizon. Both investors and the Fed have apparently bought into Larry Summers' secular stagnation thesis. They seem convinced that rates will not be able to rise above 3% without triggering a recession. While we have a lot of sympathy for Summers' thesis, it must be acknowledged that it is a theory about the long-term determinants of the neutral rate of interest. Over a shorter-term cyclical horizon, many factors can influence the neutral rate. Critically, most of these factors are pushing it higher: Fiscal policy is extremely stimulative. The IMF estimates that the U.S. cyclically-adjusted budget deficit will reach 6.8% of GDP in 2019. In contrast, the euro area is projected to run a deficit of only 0.8% of GDP (Chart I-2). The relatively more expansionary nature of U.S. fiscal policy is one key reason why the Fed can raise rates while the ECB cannot. Chart I-1Markets Expect No Fed Hikes Beyond Next Year October 2018 October 2018 Chart I-2Fiscal Policy Is More Expansionary In ##br##The U.S. Than In The Euro Area Fiscal Policy Is More Expansionary In The U.S. Than In The Euro Area Fiscal Policy Is More Expansionary In The U.S. Than In The Euro Area Credit growth has picked up. After a prolonged deleveraging cycle, private-sector nonfinancial debt is increasing faster than GDP (Chart I-3). The recent easing in The Conference Board's Leading Credit Index suggests that this trend will continue (Chart I-4). Chart I-3U.S. Private-Sector Nonfinancial Debt Is ##br##Rising At Close To Its Historic Trend U.S. Private-Sector Nonfinancial Debt Is Rising At Close To Its Historic Trend U.S. Private-Sector Nonfinancial Debt Is Rising At Close To Its Historic Trend Chart I-4U.S. Credit Growth Will Remain Strong U.S. Credit Growth Will Remain Strong U.S. Credit Growth Will Remain Strong Wage growth is accelerating. Average hourly earnings surprised on the upside in August, with the year-over-year change rising to a cycle high of 2.9%. This followed a stronger reading in the Employment Cost Index in the second quarter. A simple correlation with the quits rate suggests that there is plenty of upside for wage growth (Chart I-5). Faster wage growth will put more money into workers' pockets who will then spend it. The savings rate has scope to fall. The personal savings rate currently stands at 6.7%, more than two percentage points higher than what one would expect based on the current level of household net worth (Chart I-6). If the savings rate were to fall by two points over the next two years, it would add 1.5% of GDP to aggregate demand. Chart I-5The Quits Rate Is Signaling Upside For Wage Growth The Quits Rate Is Signaling Upside For Wage Growth The Quits Rate Is Signaling Upside For Wage Growth Chart I-6The Personal Savings Rate Has Room To Fall October 2018 October 2018 A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that these cyclical factors will permit the Fed to raise rates to 5% by 2020, almost double what the market is discounting.1 An Absence Of Major Financial Imbalances Will Allow The Fed To Keep Raising Rates The past three recessions were all caused by financial market overheating rather than economic overheating. The 1991 recession was mainly the consequence of the Savings and Loan crisis, compounded by the spike in oil prices leading up to the Gulf War. The 2001 recession stemmed from the dotcom bust. The Great Recession was triggered by the housing bust. Today, it is difficult to point to any clear imbalances in the economy. True, housing activity has been weak for much of the year. However, unlike in 2006, the home vacancy rate stands near record-low levels (Chart I-7). Tight supply will limit downside risks to both construction and home prices. On the demand side, low unemployment, high consumer confidence, and a rebound in the rate of new household formation should help the sector. Despite elevated home prices in some markets, the average monthly payment that homeowners must make to service their mortgage is quite low by historic standards (Chart I-8). The quality of mortgage lending has also been very high over the past decade, which reduces the risk of a sudden credit crunch (Chart I-9). Chart I-7Low Housing Inventories Will Support ##br##Home Prices And Construction Low Housing Inventories Will Support Home Prices And Construction Low Housing Inventories Will Support Home Prices And Construction Chart I-8Housing Affordabiity Is Not Yet Stretched Housing Affordabiity Is Not Yet Stretched Housing Affordabiity Is Not Yet Stretched Chart I-9Mortgage Lenders Are Being Prudent Mortgage Lenders Are Being Prudent Mortgage Lenders Are Being Prudent Unlike housing debt, there are more reasons to be concerned about corporate debt. The ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP has risen to record-high levels. So-called "covenant-lite" loans now make up the bulk of corporate leveraged loan issuance. While there is no doubt that the corporate debt market is the weakest link in the U.S. financial sector, some perspective is in order. U.S. corporate debt levels are quite low by global standards. Corporate debt in the euro area is more than 30 points higher as a percent of GDP than in the United States (Chart I-10). Moreover, the interest coverage ratio - EBIT divided by interest expense - for U.S. corporates is still above its historic average (Chart I-11). While this ratio will fall as interest rates rise, this will not happen very quickly. Most U.S. corporate debt is at fixed rates and average maturities have been rising. This reduces both rollover risk and the sensitivity of debt-servicing costs to higher short-term rates. Chart I-10U.S. Corporate Debt Not That High By Global Standards U.S. Corporate Debt Not That High By Global Standards U.S. Corporate Debt Not That High By Global Standards Chart I-11Interest Coverage Ratio Is Above Its Historic Average Interest Coverage Ratio Is Above Its Historic Average Interest Coverage Ratio Is Above Its Historic Average An increasing share of U.S. corporate debt is held by non-leveraged investors. Bank loans account for only 18% of nonfinancial corporate sector debt, down from 40% in 1980 (Chart I-12). This is important, because what makes a spike in corporate defaults so damaging is not the direct impact this has on the economy, but the second-round effects rising defaults have on financial sector stability. In any case, we already had a dress rehearsal for what a corporate debt scare might look like. Credit spreads spiked in 2015. Default rates rose, but the knock-on effects to the financial system were minimal. This suggests that corporate America could handle a fair bit of monetary tightening without buckling under the pressure. The Fed And The Dollar If the Fed is able to raise rates substantially more than the market is discounting while most central banks cannot, the short-term interest rate spread between the U.S. and its trading partners is likely to widen. History suggests that this will produce a stronger dollar (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Banks Have Been Reducing Their ##br##Exposure To The Corporate Sector Banks Have Been Reducing Their Exposure To The Corporate Sector Banks Have Been Reducing Their Exposure To The Corporate Sector Chart I-13Historically, The Dollar Has Moved ##br##In Line With Interest Rate Differentials Historically, The Dollar Has Moved In Line With Interest Rate Differentials Historically, The Dollar Has Moved In Line With Interest Rate Differentials Some have speculated that the Trump administration will intervene in the foreign-exchange market in order to drive down the value of the greenback. We doubt this will happen, but even if such interventions were to occur, they would not be successful. Presumably, currency interventions would take the form of purchases of foreign exchange, financed through the issuance of Treasurys. The purchase of foreign currency would release U.S. dollars into the financial system, but the sale of Treasury securities would suck those dollars back out of the system. The net result would be no change in the volume of U.S. dollars in circulation - what economists call a "sterilized" intervention. Both economic theory and years of history show that sterilized interventions do not have lasting effects on currency values. The Fed could, of course, provide funding for the Treasury's purchases of foreign exchange, leading to an increase in the monetary base. This would be tantamount to an unsterilized intervention. However, such a deliberate attempt to weaken the dollar by expanding the money supply would fly in the face of the Fed's efforts to cool growth by tightening financial conditions. We highly doubt the Fed's current leadership would go along with this. Emerging Markets In The Crosshairs The combination of rising U.S. rates and a stronger dollar is bad news for emerging markets. Eighty percent of EM foreign-currency debt is denominated in dollars. Outside of China, EM dollar debt is now back to late-1990s levels, both as a share of GDP and exports (Chart I-14). The wave of EM local-currency debt issued in recent years only complicates matters. If EM central banks raise rates to defend their currencies, this could imperil economic growth and make it difficult for local-currency borrowers to pay back their loans. Rather than hiking rates, some EM central banks may simply choose to inflate away debt. Consider the case of Brazil. The fiscal deficit stands at nearly 8% of GDP and government debt has soared from 60% of GDP in 2013 to 84% of GDP at present (Chart I-15). Ninety percent of Brazilian sovereign debt is denominated in reais. The Brazilian government won't default on its debt per se. However, if push comes to shove, Brazil's central bank can always step in to buy government bonds, effectively monetizing the fiscal deficit. This could cause the real to weaken much more than it already has. Chart I-14EM Dollar Debt Is High EM Dollar Debt Is High EM Dollar Debt Is High Chart I-15Brazil's Perilous Fiscal Position Brazil's Perilous Fiscal Position Brazil's Perilous Fiscal Position Chinese Stimulus To The Rescue? When emerging markets last succumbed to pressure in 2015, China saved the day by stepping in with massive stimulus. Fiscal spending and credit growth accelerated to over 15% year-over-year. The government's actions boosted demand for all sorts of industrial commodities. The stimulus measures in 2015 followed an even greater wave of stimulus in 2009. While these stimulus measures invigorated China's economy and helped put a floor under global growth, they came at a price: China's debt-to-GDP ratio has swollen from 140% in 2008 to over 250% at present, which has endangered financial stability (Chart I-16). Excess capacity has also increased. This can be seen in the dramatic rise in the capital-to-output ratio. It can also be seen in the fact that the rate of return on assets within the Chinese state-owned enterprise sector, which has been the main source of rising corporate leverage, has fallen below borrowing costs (Chart I-17). Chart I-16China: Debt And Capital ##br##Accumulation Went Hand In Hand China: Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand China: Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Chart I-17China: Rate Of Return On Assets ##br##Below Borrowing Costs For SOEs China: Rate Of Return On Assets Below Borrowing Costs For SOEs China: Rate Of Return On Assets Below Borrowing Costs For SOEs Chinese banks are being told that they must lend more money to support the economy, while ensuring that their loans do not turn sour. Unfortunately, that is becoming an impossible feat. Chart I-18China Saves A Lot China Saves A Lot China Saves A Lot The Chinese economy produces too much and spends too little. The result is excess savings, epitomized most clearly in a national savings rate of 46% (Chart I-18). As a matter of arithmetic, national savings must be transformed either into domestic investment or exported abroad via a current account surplus. Now that the former strategy has run into diminishing returns, the Chinese authorities will need to concentrate on the latter. This will require a larger current account surplus which, in turn, will necessitate a relatively cheap currency. Above-average productivity growth has pushed up the fair value of China's real exchange rate over time. However, the currency still looks expensive relative to its long-term trend line (Chart I-19). Pushing down the value of the yuan against the dollar will not be that difficult. Chart I-20 shows that USD/CNY has moved broadly in line with the one-year swap spread between the U.S. and China. The spread was about 3% earlier this year. Today, it stands at only 0.6%. As the Fed continues to raise rates, the spread will narrow further, taking the yuan down with it. Chart I-19The RMB Is Still Quite Strong The RMB Is Still Quite Strong The RMB Is Still Quite Strong Chart I-20USD/CNY Has Tracked China-U.S. Interest Rate Differentials USD/CNY Has Tracked China-U.S. Interest Rate Differentials USD/CNY Has Tracked China-U.S. Interest Rate Differentials Unlike standard Chinese fiscal/credit easing, a stimulus strategy focused on weakening the yuan would hurt other emerging markets by undermining their competitiveness in relation to China. A weaker yuan would also make it more expensive for Chinese companies to import natural resources, thus putting downward pressure on commodity prices. The Euro Area: Back In The Slow Lane After putting in a strong performance in 2017, the economy in the euro area has struggled to maintain momentum this year. Growth is still above trend, but the overall tone of the data has been lackluster at best, with the risks to growth increasingly tilted to the downside. Weaker growth in China and other emerging markets certainly has not helped. However, much of the problem lies closer to home. Bank credit remains the lifeblood of the euro area economy. The 12-month credit impulse - defined as the change in credit growth from one 12-month period to the next - tends to track GDP growth (Chart I-21).2 Euro area credit growth accelerated over the course of 2017, but has been broadly stable this year. As a result, the credit impulse has fallen, taking GDP growth down with it. It will be difficult for euro area GDP growth to increase unless credit growth starts rising again. So far, there is little sign that this is about to happen. According to the latest euro area bank lending survey, while banks continue to ease standards for business loans, they are doing so at a slower pace than in the past. A net 3% of banks eased lending standards in the second quarter, compared to 8% in the first quarter. Loan demand growth has been fairly stable. This suggests that loan growth will remain positive, but is unlikely to increase much from current levels. Worries about the health of European banks will further constrain credit growth. European banks in general, and Spanish banks in particular, have significant exposure to the most vulnerable emerging markets (Chart I-22). Chart I-21Euro Area Credit Growth Has Flatlined Euro Area Credit Growth Has Flatlined Euro Area Credit Growth Has Flatlined Chart I-22Spain Most Exposed To Vulnerable EMs October 2018 October 2018 Concerns about the ability of the Italian government to service its debt obligations will also restrain bank lending. Investors breathed a sigh of relief last month when the Italian government signaled a greater willingness to pare back next year's proposed budget deficit, in accordance with the dictates of the European Commission. Tensions remain, however, as evidenced by the fact that the ten-year spread between BTPs and German bunds is still 120 basis points higher than in April (Chart I-23). The European political establishment is terrified of the rise in populism across the region and would love nothing more than to see Italy's populist parties implode. This means that any help from the ECB and the European Commission will only arrive once a full-fledged crisis is underway. Anyway, it is far from clear that a smaller budget deficit would actually translate into a lower government debt-to-GDP ratio. Like China, Italy also has a private sector that saves too much and spends too little. A shrinking population has reduced the need for firms to invest in new capacity. The prior government's pension cuts have also incentivized people to save more for their retirement. The result is a private sector savings-investment surplus that stood at 5% of GDP in 2017 compared to close to breakeven a decade ago (Chart I-24). Chart I-23Italian/Bund Spreads Signal Lingering Fiscal Strain Italian/Bund Spreads Signal Lingering Fiscal Strain Italian/Bund Spreads Signal Lingering Fiscal Strain Chart I-24Italy: Private Sector Saves Too Much And Spends Too Little Italy: Private Sector Saves Too Much And Spends Too Little Italy: Private Sector Saves Too Much And Spends Too Little Unlike Germany, Italy cannot export its excess production because it does not have a hypercompetitive economy. Nor does it have the ability to devalue its currency to gain a quick competitiveness boost. This means that the Italian government has to absorb excess private-sector savings with its own dissavings - a fancy way of saying that it has to run a large budget deficit. This has effectively been Japan's strategy for over two decades. However, unlike Japan, Italy does not have a lender of last resort that can unconditionally buy government debt. This raises the risk that Italy's debt woes will resurface, either because the government abandons austerity measures, or because the lack of fiscal support causes nominal GDP to stagnate, making it all but impossible for the country to outgrow its debt burden. Receding Policy Puts The discussion above suggests that many of the "policy puts" that investors have relied on are in the process of having their strike price marked down to deeper out-of-the-money levels. Yes, the Fed will ease off on rate hikes if U.S. growth is at risk of stalling out completely. However, now that the labor market has reached full employment, the Fed will welcome modestly slower growth. Remember that there has never been a case in the post-war era where the three-month average of the unemployment rate has risen by more than a third of a percentage point without a recession taking place (Chart I-25). The further the unemployment rate falls below NAIRU, the more difficult it will be for the Fed to achieve the proverbial soft landing. Chart I-25Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Likewise, the "China stimulus put" - the presumption that most investors have that the Chinese authorities will launch a barrage of fiscal and credit easing at the first sign of slower growth - has become less reliable in light of the government's competing objectives namely reducing debt growth and excess capacity. The same goes for the "ECB put." Yes, the ECB will bail out Italy if the entire European project appears at risk. But spreads may need to blow out before the cavalry arrives. Meanwhile, just as the aforementioned policy puts are receding, new policy risks are rising to the fore, chief among them protectionism. We expect the trade war to heat up, with the Trump administration increasingly directing its ire at China. Trump's macroeconomic policies are completely at odds with his trade agenda. Fiscal stimulus will boost aggregate demand, which will suck in more imports. An overheated economy will prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would, leading to a stronger dollar. All this will result in a wider trade deficit. What will Trump tell voters two years from now when he is campaigning in Michigan and Ohio about why the trade deficit has widened rather than narrowed under his watch? Will he blame himself or Beijing? No trophy for getting that answer right. II. Financial Markets Global Equities The combination of slower global growth, rising economic vulnerabilities outside the U.S., and a more challenging policy environment caused us to downgrade our view on global equities from overweight to neutral in June,3 while reiterating our preference for developed market equities relative to EM stocks. For now, we are comfortable with our bearish view towards emerging market stocks. While EM equities have cheapened, they are not yet at washed out levels (Chart I-26). Bottom fishers still abound, as evidenced by the fact that the number of shares outstanding in the MSCI iShares Turkish ETF has almost tripled since early April (Chart I-27). Chart I-26EM Assets: Valuations Not Yet At Washed Out Levels EM Assets: Valuations Not Yet At Washed Out Levels EM Assets: Valuations Not Yet At Washed Out Levels Chart I-27EM Bottom Fishers Still Abound EM Bottom Fishers Still Abound EM Bottom Fishers Still Abound At some point - probably in the first half of next year - investors will liquidate their remaining bullish EM bets. At that point, EM stocks will rebound. European and Japanese equities should also start to outperform the U.S., given their more cyclical nature. As far as the absolute direction of the S&P 500 is concerned, the next few months could be challenging. U.S. stocks have been able to decouple from those in the rest of the world, but this state of affairs may not last. Recall that the S&P 500 fell by 22% peak-to-trough between July 20 and October 8, 1998, in what otherwise was a massive bull market. We do not know if there is another Long-Term Capital Management lurking around the corner, but if there is, a temporary selloff in U.S. stocks may be hard to avoid. Such a selloff would present a buying opportunity over a horizon of 12-to-18 months. If we are correct that cyclical forces have lifted the neutral rate of interest, it will take a while for monetary policy to reach restrictive territory. This means that both fiscal and monetary policy will stay accommodative at least for the next 18 months. As such, the S&P 500 may not peak until 2020. Appendix A - Chart I presents a stylized diagram of where we think global equities are going. It incapsulates three phases: 1) a challenging period over the next six months, driven by EM weakness; 2) a blow-off rally in equities starting in the middle of next year; 3) and finally, a recession-induced bear market beginning in late-2020. Appendix B also presents our valuation charts, which highlight that long-term return prospects are better outside the United States. Fixed Income After advocating for a long duration strategy for much of the post-crisis recovery, BCA declared "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market" on July 5, 2016, the very same day that the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield hit a record closing low of 1.37%. Cyclically and structurally, we continue to expect U.S. bond yields to rise more than the market is discounting. As noted above, the Fed is underestimating how high rates will need to go before they reach restrictive territory. This means that the Fed will end up behind the curve in normalizing monetary policy, causing the economy to overheat and inflation to rise above the Fed's comfort zone. Granted, the Fed is willing to tolerate a modest inflation overshoot. However, a core PCE reading above 2.3%, which is at the top end of the range of the Fed's own forecast, would prompt the Fed to expedite the pace of rate hikes. A bear flattening of the yield curve - a situation where long-term yields rise, but short-term rates go up even more - would be highly likely in that environment. Over a shorter-term horizon spanning the next six months, the outlook for yields is more benign. The combination of a stronger dollar, slower global growth, and flight-to-quality flows into the Treasury market from vulnerable emerging markets can cap yields. Add to this the fact that sentiment towards bonds is currently extremely bearish (Chart I-28), and a temporary countertrend decline in yields becomes quite probable. Chart I-28Bond Sentiment Is Extremely Bearish Bond Sentiment Is Extremely Bearish Bond Sentiment Is Extremely Bearish Developed market bond yields in general are likely to follow the direction of U.S. yields, both on the upside and the downside, but in a more muted manner. Outside the periphery, euro area yields have less scope to fall in the near term given that they are already so low. European yields also have less room to rise once global growth bottoms next year because the neutral rate of interest is much lower in the euro area than in the United States. Ironically, a more dovish ECB would help reduce Italian bond yields, as higher inflation is critical for increasing Italian nominal GDP. Since labor market slack is still elevated in Italy, continued monetary stimulus would also lift wages in core Europe more than in Italy, helping to boost Italy's competitiveness relative to the rest of the euro area. Japanese yields have plenty of scope to rise over the long haul. An aging population is pushing more people into retirement, which will cause the national savings rate to fall further. A decline in the savings pool will increase the neutral rate of interest in Japan. Instead of raising the policy rate, the Japanese authorities will let the economy overheat, generating inflation in the process. This will cause the yield curve to steepen, particularly at the very long end (e.g., beyond 10 years) which is the part of the yield curve that is the least susceptible to the BoJ's yield curve control regime. Appendix A - Chart II shows our expectations for the major government bond markets over the coming years. Turning to credit markets, high-yield credit typically underperforms in the latter innings of business-cycle expansions, a period when the Fed is raising rates. Thus, while we do not think that U.S. corporate debt levels will be a major source of systemic financial risk for the broader economy, this is hardly a reason to be overweight spread-product. A more cautious stance towards credit outside the U.S. is also warranted. Currencies And Commodities The dollar is working off overbought conditions, but will rebound into year-end, as EM tensions intensify and hopes of a massive credit/fiscal-fueled Chinese stimulus package fizzle. EM currencies will weaken the most against the dollar over the next three-to-six months, but the euro and, to a lesser extent, the yen, will also come under pressure. Granted, the dollar is no longer a cheap currency, but if long-term interest rate differentials stay anywhere close to current levels, the greenback will remain well supported. Consider the dollar's value against the euro. Thirty-year U.S. Treasurys currently yield 3.20% while 30-year German bunds yield 1.12%, a difference of 208 basis points. Even if one allows for the fact that investors expect euro area inflation to be lower than in the U.S. over the next 30 years, EUR/USD would need to trade at a measly 82 cents today in order to compensate German bund holders for the inferior yield they will receive.4 We do not expect EUR/USD to get down to that level, but a descent into the $1.10-to-$1.12 range over the next six months is probable. Sterling will remain hostage to Brexit negotiations. It is impossible to know how talks will evolve, but our bias is to take a somewhat pound-positive view. The main reason is that support for Brexit has faded (Chart I-29). Opinion polls suggest that if a referendum were held again, the "bremain" side would almost certainly prevail. Lacking public support for leaving the EU, it is unlikely that British negotiators could simply walk away from the table. This reduces the odds of a "hard Brexit" outcome. Indeed, a second referendum that leads to a "no-Brexit" verdict remains a distinct possibility. The combination of slower global growth and a resurgent dollar is likely to hurt commodity prices. Industrial metals are more vulnerable than oil. China consumes around half of all the copper, nickel, aluminum, zinc, and iron ore produced around the world (Chart I-30). In contrast, China represents less than 15% of global oil demand. Chart I-29When Bremorse Sets In When Bremorse Sets In When Bremorse Sets In Chart I-30China Is A More Dominant Consumer Of Metals Than Oil China Is A More Dominant Consumer Of Metals Than Oil China Is A More Dominant Consumer Of Metals Than Oil The supply backdrop for oil is also more favorable than for metals. Not only are Saudi Arabia and Russia maintaining production discipline, but U.S. sanctions against Iran threaten to weigh on global crude supply. Further reduction in Venezuela's oil output, as well as potential disruptions to Libyan or Iraqi exports, could also boost oil prices. The superior outlook for oil over metals means we prefer the Canadian dollar relative to the Aussie dollar. While AUD/CAD has weakened in recent months, the Aussie dollar is still somewhat expensive against the loonie based on our long-term valuation model (Chart I-31). We also see an increasing chance that Canada will negotiate a revamped trade deal with the U.S., as Trump focuses his attention more on China. Should this happen, it will remove the NAFTA break-up risk discount embedded in the Canadian dollar. Finally, a few words on precious metals. Precious metals typically struggle during periods when the dollar is appreciating (Chart I-32). Consequently, we would not be eager buyers of gold or other precious metals until the dollar peaks, most likely around the middle of next year. As inflation starts to accelerate in late-2019 and in 2020, gold will finally move decisively higher. Chart I-31Canadian Dollar Still Somewhat ##br##Cheap Versus The Aussie Dollar Canadian Dollar Still Somewhat Cheap Versus The Aussie Dollar Canadian Dollar Still Somewhat Cheap Versus The Aussie Dollar Chart I-32Gold Won't Shine Until The Dollar Peaks Gold Won't Shine Until The Dollar Peaks Gold Won't Shine Until The Dollar Peaks Appendix A - Chart III and Chart IV present an illustration of where the major currencies and commodities are heading. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy September 28, 2018 Next Report: October 25, 2018 1 Depending on which specification of the Taylor rule one uses, a one percent of GDP increase in aggregate demand will increase the neutral rate of interest by half a point (John Taylor's original specification) or by a full point (Janet Yellen's preferred specification). Fiscal policy is currently about 3% of GDP too stimulative compared to a baseline where government debt-to-GDP is stable over time. Assuming a fiscal multiplier of 0.5, fiscal policy is thus boosting aggregate demand by 1.5% of GDP. Nonfinancial private credit has increased by an average of 1.5 percentage points of GDP per year since 2016. Assuming that every additional one dollar of credit increases aggregate demand by 50 cents, the revival in credit growth is raising aggregate demand by 0.75% of GDP, compared to a baseline where credit-to-GDP is flat. The labor share of income has increased by 1.25% of GDP from its lows in 2015. Assuming that every one dollar shift in income from capital to labor boosts overall spending on net by 20 cents, this would have raised aggregate demand by 0.25% of GDP. Lastly, if the personal savings rate falls by two points over the next two years, this would raise aggregate demand by 1.5% of GDP. Taken together, these factors are boosting the neutral rate by anywhere from 2% (Taylor's specification) to 4% (Yellen's specification). This is obviously a lot, and easily overwhelms other factors such as a stronger dollar that may be weighing on the neutral rate. 2 Recall that GDP is a flow variable (how much production takes place every period), whereas credit is a stock variable (how much debt there is outstanding). By definition, a flow is a change in a stock. Thus, credit growth affects GDP and the change in credit growth affects GDP growth. Euro area private-sector credit growth accelerated from -2.6% in May 2014 to 3.1% in March 2017, but has been broadly flat ever since. Hence, the credit impulse has dropped. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Three Policy Puts Go Kaput: Downgrade Global Equities To Neutral," dated June 20, 2018. 4 For this calculation, we assume that the fair value for EUR/USD is 1.32, which is close to the IMF's Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimate. The annual inflation differential of 0.47% is based on 30-year CPI swaps. This implies that the fair value for EUR/USD will rise to 1.52 after 30 years. If one assumes that the euro reaches that level by then, the common currency would need to trade at 1.52/(1.0208)^30=0.82 today. APPENDIX A APPENDIX A CHART IMarket Outlook: Equities October 2018 October 2018 APPENDIX A CHART IIMarket Outlook: Bonds October 2018 October 2018 APPENDIX A CHART IIIMarket Outlook: Currencies October 2018 October 2018 APPENDIX A CHART IVMarket Outlook: Commodities October 2018 October 2018 APPENDIX B Long-Term Return Prospects Are Slightly Better Outside The U.S. October 2018 October 2018 Long-Term Return Prospects Are Slightly Better Outside The U.S. October 2018 October 2018 Long-Term Return Prospects Are Slightly Better Outside The U.S. October 2018 October 2018 Long-Term Return Prospects Are Slightly Better Outside The U.S. October 2018 October 2018 II. Is It Time To Buy Value Stocks? Per the most commonly referenced growth and value indexes, growth has been outperforming value for over 11 years, the longest stretch in the history of the series. Growth's extended winning streak has split investors into two camps: those who believe that value is finished because of overexposure and shortened investor timeframes, and those who are trying to identify the point at which reversion to the mean will ensue. In this Special Report, we argue that the traditional off-the-shelf indexes are poor proxies for true value. Their methodology strays quite far from the principles enumerated by Benjamin Graham, the father of value investing, and Fama and French, the researchers who demonstrated that lower-priced stocks have outperformed over time. The headline S&P 500 indexes currently differentiate between growth and value stocks using simplistic metrics that introduce considerable sector bias, reducing the difference between growth and value to a binary choice between Tech and Financials. Using tools developed by BCA's Equity Trading Strategy service, we create sector-neutral U.S. value and growth indexes that correct for the off-the-shelf indexes' flaws, and broaden the range of metrics Fama and French employed to make style distinctions. The ETS-derived indexes appear to better distinguish between value and growth stocks. The ETS value-versus-growth portfolio beat its Fama and French counterpart by four percentage points annually over its 22-year life. We join our custom value and growth indexes to Fama and French's to study the impact of macro variables on relative style performance over time for the purpose of gaining insight into the most opportune points to shift between styles. Relative style performance has not corresponded consistently or robustly enough with the business cycle, inflation, interest rates, or broad market direction to support reliable style-decision rules. We find that monetary policy settings, as defined by our stylized fed funds rate cycle, are a consistently reliable predictor of relative style performance. Per the fed funds rate cycle, tight policy is most conducive to value outperformance. From this perspective, value's decade-long slump is not a surprise, given that the ultra-accommodative tide has been lifting all boats. There is no rush to increase value exposure while policy remains easy, but investors should look to load up on value once policy becomes tight, using the metrics in our ETS model to identify true value stocks. We expect that the policy inflection will occur sometime in the second half of 2019, or the first half of 2020. Growth stocks have been on a tear for the longest stretch in the history of the series, based on the most commonly referenced growth and value indexes, even if their gains haven't yet matched the magnitude of the 1990s (Chart II-1). It is no surprise, then, that growth stocks are as expensive as they have ever been, outside of the tech-bubble era in the late 1990s. Many investors are thus wondering if the next "big trade" is to bet on an extended reversion to the mean during which value regains the ground it has given up. Chart II-1A Lost Decade For Value Stocks A Lost Decade For Value Stocks A Lost Decade For Value Stocks In this Special Report, we argue that the traditional off-the-shelf indexes are not very good at differentiating growth from value stocks. Trends in relative performance have much more to do with sector performance than intrinsic value, making the indexes a poor proxy for investors who are truly interested in selecting stocks based on their value and growth profiles. We create U.S. value and growth indexes that are unaffected by sector performance, using stock selection software provided by BCA's Equity Trading Strategy service. The results will surprise readers who are used to dealing with canned measures of value and growth. What Is Value Investing? Value investing principles have been around at least since the days when Benjamin Graham was a money manager himself. Style investing has been a part of the asset-management lexicon for four decades. Yet there is no universally agreed-upon definition of a value stock versus a growth stock. Based on our reading of Graham's Intelligent Investor, we submit that an essential element of value investing is the identification of stocks that are temporarily trading below their intrinsic value. The temporary drag may persist for a while - stock markets can remain oblivious to fundamentals for extended stretches - but it is ultimately expected to dissipate. Value investing is a play on negative overreaction or neglect, and dedicated value investors have to be contrarians, not to mention contrarians with strong stomachs. The temporary nature of undervaluation is a recurring theme in Graham's book. The stock market's ever-present proclivity toward overreaction ensures a steady supply of value opportunities: "The market is always making mountains out of molehills and exaggerating ordinary vicissitudes into major setbacks.1" "[W]hen an individual company ... begins to lose ground in the economy, Wall Street is quick to assume that its future is entirely hopeless and it should be avoided at any price.2" "[T]he outstanding characteristic of the stock market is its tendency to react excessively to favorable and unfavorable influences.3" Graham viewed security analysis as the comparison of an issue's market price to its intrinsic value. He advised buying stocks only when they trade at a discount to intrinsic value, offering an investor a "margin of safety" that should guard against significant declines. His favorite measure for assessing intrinsic value was a sober, objective estimate of average future earnings, grossed-up by an appropriate multiple. A low price-to-average-earnings ratio was the linchpin of his margin-of-safety mantra. Decades after Graham's heyday, University of Chicago professors Eugene Fama and Kenneth French bestowed the academy's seal of approval on value investing. Their landmark 1992 paper found that low price-to-book ("P/B") stocks consistently and convincingly outperformed high P/B stocks.4 Several "growth" and "value" indexes have been developed over the years, but they bear no more than a passing resemblance to Graham's, and Fama and French's, work. It is important to realize that the off-the-shelf indexes are far from an ideal proxy for the value factor that Fama & French tried to isolate. Traditional Growth And Value Indexes Are Wanting The off-the-shelf growth and value indexes shown in Chart II-1 all share similar cyclical profiles, with only small differences in long-term returns. Given the similarity of the indexes, we will focus on Standard & Poor's/Citigroup methodology for the purposes of this report.5 The headline S&P 500 indexes currently differentiate between growth and value stocks using the following metrics: 3-year growth rates in EPS, 3-year growth rates in sales-per-share, and 12-month price momentum; along with valuation yardsticks including price-to-book, price-to-earnings, and price-to-sales. Companies with higher growth rates in earnings and sales, and better price momentum, are classified as growth stocks, while those with lower valuation multiples are considered value stocks. Several stocks are cross-listed in both indexes, which is baffling and counterproductive for an investor seeking to implement a rigorous style tilt.6 Table II-1 contains a summary of the current sector breakdowns for the S&P 500 Growth and Value indexes. Table II-2 sheds light on each index's aggregate geographical and U.S. business cycle exposure, the former of which is based on our U.S. Equity Strategy service's judgment. Table II-1Current S&P 500 Style Index Exposures October 2018 October 2018 Table II-2The Value Index Has Less Global ##br##And Late Cyclical Exposure October 2018 October 2018 Growth is currently heavily weighted in Health Care, Technology and Consumer Discretionary sectors, while value has a high concentration of Financials, Energy and Consumer Staples (Table II-1). Table II-2 shows that the growth index has a clear current bias toward sectors with global economic exposure that typically outperform the broad equity market late in the business cycle. The value benchmark flips growth's global/domestic exposure, and has slightly more exposure to defensive sectors, while splitting its cyclical exposure evenly between early and late cyclicals. Sector Dominance Unfortunately, the reigning methodology creates a major problem - shifts in the relative performance of growth and value indexes are dominated by sector performance. Financials' higher debt loads, and banks' low-margin operations, depress their multiples relative to nonfinancial firms. Thus, Financials hold permanent residency in the off-the-shelf value indexes. Conversely, Tech stocks perennially account for an outsized proportion of most growth indexes' market cap. Value-versus-growth boils down to a binary choice between Financials and Tech.7 The growth/value price ratio has closely tracked the Technology/Financials price ratio since the late 1990s (Chart II-2, top panel). The correlation was much less evident before 1995, when Tech stocks accounted for a much smaller share of market capitalization. Chart II-3 demonstrates that the positive correlation between growth/value and Tech has steadily climbed over the decades to almost 1, while the correlation with Financials has become increasingly negative (currently at -0.75). Chart II-2The S&P 500 Style Indexes Merely Mimic Relative Sector Performance The S&P 500 Style Indexes Merely Mimic Relative Sector Performance The S&P 500 Style Indexes Merely Mimic Relative Sector Performance Chart II-3Style Capture Style Capture Style Capture In contrast, the Fama/French approach, which focuses exclusively on price-to-book while ensuring equal representation for large- and small-market-cap stocks, appears much less affected by sector skews; the growth/value index created from their data has not tracked the Tech/Financials ratio, even after 1995 (Chart II-2, second panel). Moreover, note that the extended downward trend in the Fama/French growth/value ratio is consistent with other academic research that shows that value stocks outperform growth over the long-term. The off-the-shelf indexes show the opposite, but that is because they are merely tracking the long-term outperformance of Tech relative to Financials. The bottom line is that the standard indexes incorporate flawed measures of growth and value that limit their usefulness for true style investing. Conventional Wisdom With respect to style investing and the economic cycle, the prevailing conventional wisdom holds that: Inflation - Growth stocks perform best during times of disinflation and persistently low inflation, whereas value stocks perform best during periods of accelerating inflation; Interest Rates - Periods of high and rising interest rates favor value stocks at the expense of growth; and Business Cycle - It is believed that growth stocks outperform value during recessions, because the latter tend to be more highly leveraged to the economic cycle than their growth counterparts. According to the conventional view, value stocks shine in the early and middle phases of a business cycle expansion. Growth stocks return to favor again in the late states of an expansion, when investors begin to worry about the pending end to the business cycle and are looking for reliable and consistent earnings growth. Do the traditional measures of growth and value corroborate this conventional wisdom? Chart II-4 shows that the S&P value/growth index and headline CPI inflation have both trended lower since the early 1980s, but there has been no tendency for value to outperform when inflation rises. Value has shown some tendency to outperform during rising-rate phases since the mid-1980s, but the relationship with the level of the fed funds rate is stronger than its direction, as we discuss below. The growth-over-value relationship with the business cycle is complicated by the tech bubble in the late 1990s, which heavily distorted relative sector performance. The Citigroup measure of growth began to outperform very late in the cycle and through the subsequent recession in some business cycles (1979-1981, 1989-1991, and 2007-2009; Chart II-5). The early and middle parts of the cycles, however, were a mixed bag. Chart II-4Spiting The Conventional Wisdom Spiting The Conventional Wisdom Spiting The Conventional Wisdom Chart II-5No Consistent Relationship With The Business Cycle No Consistent Relationship With The Business Cycle No Consistent Relationship With The Business Cycle The bottom line is that there appears to be some rough correspondence between the Citigroup index and the interest rate and growth cycles, but it is too variable to point to reliable rules for shifting between styles. Ultimately, determining the direction of the growth and value indexes is more about forecasting relative Tech and Financials performance than it is about identifying cheap stocks. A Better Value Approach We identify four broad shortcomings of off-the-shelf value indexes: They exclusively use trailing multiples, a rear-view mirror metric. They rely on simple price-to-book multiples, which flatter serial acquirers. They rely entirely on reported earnings, which are an imperfect proxy for cash flow. A share of stock ultimately represents a claim on its issuer's future cash flows. They make no attempt to place relative metrics into historical context. Without a mechanism to compare a particular segment's valuation relative to its history, structurally low-multiple stocks will be over-represented and structurally high-multiple stocks will be under-represented. BCA's Equity Trading Strategy (ETS) platform provides a way of differentiating value from growth stocks that avoids these problems. The web-based platform uses 24 quantitative factors to rank approximately 10,000 individual stocks in 23 countries. Users can rank and score individual equities to support a broad set of investment strategies and apply macro and sector views to single-name investments. The ETS approach has an impressive track record. Historically, the top decile of stocks ranked using the "BCA Score" methodology has outperformed stocks in the bottom decile by over 25% a year. The overall BCA Score includes all 24 factors when ranking stocks, but to develop our custom value index, we use only the five valuation measures in the ETS database: trailing P/E, forward P/E, price-to-tangible-book, price-to-sales and price-to-cash flow. Every quarter we rank the stocks within each of the 11 sectors based on an equally-weighted composite of the five valuation measures. Note that we are using the data to rank stocks only against other stocks in the same sector. We calculate the total return from owning the top 30% of stocks by value in each sector. We do the same with the bottom 30% and refer to this as our "growth" index.8 We then compute an equally-weighted average of the total returns for the growth indexes across the 11 sectors. We do the same for the value indexes. By comparing stock valuation only to other stocks in the same sector, this approach avoids the sector composition problem suffered by the off-the-shelf measures. Chart II-6 compares the ETS value/growth total return index to the Fama/French value/growth index. Data limitations preclude comparing the two measures before 1996, but the ETS index confirms the Fama/French result that value trumps growth over the long term. The ETS index follows a similar cyclical profile to the Fama/French index from 1997 to 2009, rising and falling in tandem. The two series subsequently diverge: per the criteria ETS uses to identify value and construct an index, lower-priced stocks have outperformed higher-priced ones for most of this expansion, while the Fama/French methodology suggests the reverse. Chart II-6The ETS Model Builds On Fama And French's Work The ETS Model Builds On Fama And French's Work The ETS Model Builds On Fama And French's Work By avoiding sector composition problems and using a wider variety of value measures, the ETS approach appears to be a superior measure of value. An investor that consistently over-weighted value stocks according to the ETS approach would have outperformed someone who did the same using the Fama methodology by an annual average of four percentage points from 1996 to 2018. The history of our ETS index only covers two recessions, limiting our ability to gauge its performance vis-Ã -vis a variety of macro factors, so we extend the ETS index back to 1926 using the Fama/French index. While joining two indexes with different methodologies is less than ideal, we feel the drawbacks are outweighed by the benefit of observing growth and value relative performance across more business cycles. The top panel of Chart II-7 shows U.S. real GDP growth, shaded for recessions. The bottom panel presents our extended ETS value/growth index, shaded for declines of more than 10%. The shaded periods overlap in many, but not all, cycles (indicated by circles in the chart). That is, growth stocks have tended to outperform during economic downturns, although this is not a hard-and-fast rule. Chart II-7No Hard-And-Fast Relationship With The Business Cycle... No Hard-And-Fast Relationship With The Business Cycle... No Hard-And-Fast Relationship With The Business Cycle... Value-over-growth relative returns exhibit some directionality with the overall equity market when looking at corrections (peak-to-trough declines of at least 10%, as shaded in the top panel of Chart II-8), though it should be noted that it is nearly impossible to flag a correction in advance. The relationship weakens when considering bear markets, i.e. peak-to-trough declines of at least 20%, which can be forecast with at least some reliability.9 The bottom panel is the same as in Chart II-7; the extended ETS index, shaded for periods of significant value stock underperformance. The correspondence between the shaded periods is hardly perfect, and there does not appear to be a practical style exposure message, even if an investor could call corrections in advance. Chart II-8...And Market Directionality Has Been An Imperfect Guide Over The Last 50 Years ...And Market Directionality Has Been An Imperfect Guide Over The Last 50 Years ...And Market Directionality Has Been An Imperfect Guide Over The Last 50 Years Valuation Relative valuation also provides some useful information on positioning, though it is not always timely. Chart II-9 presents an aggregate valuation measure for the stocks in our value index relative to that of the stocks in our growth index. Value stocks are expensive relative to growth when the valuation indicator is above +1 standard deviation, and value is cheap when the indicator is less than -1 standard deviation. Historically, investors would have profited if they had over-weighted value stocks when the valuation indicator reached the threshold of undervaluation, although subsequent outperformance was delayed by as much as a year in two episodes. In contrast, the valuation indicator is not useful as a 'sell' signal for value stocks because they can remain overvalued for long periods. Value was overvalued relative to growth for much of the time between 2009 and 2016. Value stocks have cheapened since then, although they have yet to reach the undervaluation threshold. The Fed Funds Rate Cycle While relative style performance may generally lean in one direction or another in conjunction with the business cycle, inflation, interest rates, or broad equity-market performance, there are no hard-and-fast rules. It is difficult to formulate any sort of rotation view between styles, and history does not inspire confidence that any such rule would generate material outperformance. The monetary policy backdrop offers a path forward. We have found the fed funds rate cycle offers a consistent guide to equity and bond returns in other contexts, and our Global ETF Strategy service has found a robust link between the policy cycle and equity factor performance.10 We segment the fed funds rate cycle into four phases, based on whether or not the Fed is hiking or cutting rates, and whether policy is accommodative or restrictive (Chart II-10). Our judgment of the state of policy is derived from comparing the fed funds rate to our estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, the policy rate that neither encourages nor discourages economic activity. Chart II-9Sizeable Undervaluation Flags Turning ##br##Points, But You May Have To Wait A While Sizeable Undervaluation Flags Turning Points, But You May Have To Wait A While Sizeable Undervaluation Flags Turning Points, But You May Have To Wait A While Chart II-10The Fed Funds Rate Cycle October 2018 October 2018 As defined by Fama and French, value stocks outperform growth stocks by a considerable margin when monetary policy is restrictive (Table II-3 and Chart II-11, top panel). Considering value and growth stocks separately, both perform extremely well when policy is easy (Chart II-11, second panel), but growth stocks barely advance when policy is tight, falling far behind their value counterparts. A strategy for generalist investors may be to seek out value exposure when policy is tight, while investing without regard to styles when it is easy. Table II-3The State Of Monetary Policy Is The ##br##Best Guide To Style Performance October 2018 October 2018 Chart II-11The State Of Monetary Policy Drives Style Performance The State Of Monetary Policy Drives Style Performance The State Of Monetary Policy Drives Style Performance Investment Conclusions: U.S. equity sectors that have traditionally been considered "growth" have outperformed value sectors for an extended period. The long slump has led some investors to argue that value investing is finished, killed by a combination of overexposure and short-term performance imperatives. Other investors see value's long drought as an anomaly, and are looking for the opportune time to bet on a reversal. We are in the latter camp. The difficulty lies in finding an indicator that reliably leads value stocks' outperformance. Most macro measures are unhelpful, though broad market direction offers some insight, as stocks with low price-to-book multiples have outperformed their high-priced peers by a wide margin during bear markets. Bear markets aren't the most useful timing guide, however, because one only knows in retrospect when they begin and end. The monetary policy backdrop holds the most promise as a practical guide. Although our determination of easy or tight policy turns on the modeled estimate of a concept and should not be looked to for absolute precision, it has provided a timely, reliable guide to value outperformance. We expect the relationship will persist because of the cushion provided by less demanding multiples. Earnings and multiples surge when policy is easy, lifting all boats. It is only when policy is tight, and the tide is going out, that the margin of safety offered by lower-priced stocks yields the greatest benefit. Per our estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, we are still firmly ensconced within Phase I of the policy rate cycle, and expect that we will remain there until sometime in the second half of 2019. We therefore expect that value, in Fama and French terms, will continue to underperform growth for another year. The clock is ticking for growth, though, as the expansion is in its latter stages and building inflation pressures will likely force the Fed to take a fairly hard line in this rate-hiking cycle. Once monetary policy turns restrictive, investors should hunt for value candidates using a range of valuation metrics, and combine them in a sector-neutral way, as we have via our Equity Trading Strategy service's model. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Doug Peta Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy 1 Graham, Benjamin, The Intelligent Investor, Harper Collins: New York, 2005, p. 97. 2 Ibid, p. 15. 3 Ibid, p. 189. 4 Fama, Eugene F. and French, Kenneth R., "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Market Returns," The Journal of Finance, Volume 47, Issue 2 (June 1992), pp. 427-465. 5 S&P currently brands its Growth and Value Indexes as S&P 500 Dow Jones Indexes, but Citigroup has the longest history of compiling S&P 500 Growth and Value Indexes, beginning in 1975, so we join the Citigroup S&P 500 style indexes to the Standard & Poor's series to obtain the maximum style-index history. We use the terms Citigroup and S&P interchangeably. 6 The Pure Value and Pure Growth indexes include only the top quartile of value and growth stocks, respectively, with no overlap between indexes, and are therefore better gauges of true style investing. 7 The Tech-versus-Financials cast of the indexes endures because all of the other sectors, ex-regulated Telecoms and Utilities, which account for too little market cap to make a difference, regularly move between the indexes as their fundamental fortunes, and investor appetites, wax and wane. The current Early Cyclical/Late Cyclical/Defensive profiles are not etched in stone and should be expected to shift, perhaps considerably, over time. 8 We created a second growth index by taking the top 30% of stocks ranked by earnings momentum. However, it made little difference to the results, so we will use the bottom 30% of stocks by value as our measure of "growth" for the purposes of this report, consistent with Fama/French methodology. 9 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst. September 2017, available on bca.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see the May 17, 2017 Global ETF Strategy Special Report, "Equity Factors And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle," available at getf.bcaresearch.com. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Our equity indicators continue to signal that caution is warranted, but U.S. profits remain potent enough to drown out scattered negative messages. Our Monetary Indicator remains at the low end of a multi-year range, suggesting that liquidity conditions have tightened. Our Composite Technical Indicator is in no-man's land, not far above the zero line that marks a sell signal, but coming close to issuing a buy signal by crossing above its 9-month moving average. Our Composite Sentiment Indicator is in a healthy position that suggests that the current level of investor optimism is sustainable. On the other hand, not one of our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) Indicators is moving in the right direction. The U.S. version is still weak and slowly getting weaker; the European one has flat-lined; and our Japanese WTP extended its decline, albeit from a high level. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) for stocks continues to issue a sell signal. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Momentum remains out of sync with valuation and policy, underlining the idea that caution is warranted. On balance, our indicators continue to suggest that the underlying supports of the U.S. equity bull market are eroding. Surging U.S. profits are papering over the cracks, and may still have some legs. Earnings surprises are at an all-time high, and the net revisions ratio remains elevated. The 10-year Treasury yield's march higher is due to run out of steam. Valuation (slightly cheap) and technicals (oversold by almost 2 standard deviations) imply that a countertrend pullback is not too far around the corner. Beyond a near-term correction, though, complacency about inflation and the Fed's ability to hike rates to at least the level of the FOMC voters' median projection points to looming capital losses. The dollar is quite expensive on a purchasing power parity basis, and its long-term outlook is not constructive, but policy and growth divergences with other major economies will likely keep the wind at its back in the near term. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Doug Peta Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy

Highlights Prediction 1: A major financial downturn will trigger the next major economic downturn, and not the other way round. Prediction 2: The straw that will break the back of a fragile financial system will be the global long bond yield rising by 60 bps within a short space of time. But for those who can fine tune, the global long bond yield must rise a further 30-50 bps before reaching the tipping point for the global risk-asset edifice. Take short-term profits in the overweight position in 30-year government bonds. Take short-term profits in the underweight position in basic materials. Take short-term profits in the underweight positions in Italy (MIB) and Spain (IBEX) and overweight position in Denmark (OMX). Feature The twenty-first century has witnessed three major downturns: the first started in 2000; the second started in 2007 culminating in the Lehman crisis a year later; and the third started in 2011 (Chart of the Week). Today, we are going to stick our necks out and make two predictions about the century's fourth major downturn. Chart of the WeekThree Episodes When Equities Underperformed Bonds By 20 Percent Or More Three Episodes When Equities Underperformed Bonds By 20 Percent Or More Three Episodes When Equities Underperformed Bonds By 20 Percent Or More A major financial downturn will trigger the fourth major economic downturn. The straw that will break the back of a fragile financial system will be the global long bond yield rising by 60 bps within a short space of time. Where The Consensus Is Very Wrong As investment strategists, our primary focus should be the financial markets rather than the economy. On this basis, we define a major downturn in terms of the markets: an episode in which equities underperform bonds by more than 20 percent over a period of more than six months.1 All the same, our market based definition of a major downturn perfectly captures the three occasions that the European economy went into recession or stagnation (Chart I-2). Does this mean that the economic downturns triggered the financial market downturns? No, quite the reverse. The onset of the three major financial downturns clearly preceded the onset of the three major economic downturns. Chart I-2Three Episodes When The Euro Area Economy ##br##Contracted Or Stagnated Three Episodes When The Euro Area Economy Contracted Or Stagnated Three Episodes When The Euro Area Economy Contracted Or Stagnated On reflection, this is hardly surprising. The twenty-first century's major economic downturns have all resulted from financial market distortions and fragilities: the bubble valuations of the technology, media and telecom sectors in 2000 (Chart I-3); the mispricing of U.S. mortgages and credit in 2007 (Chart I-4); and the mispricing of euro area sovereign credit risk in 2011 (Chart I-5). Therefore, it makes perfect sense that the downturns in financial markets should precede the downturns in the economy, even when both are measured in real time. Chart I-3The Major Downturns Stemmed From##br## Financial Market Distortions: The Dot Com ##br##Bubble In 1999/2000... The Major Downturns Stemmed From Financial Market Distortions: The Dot Com Bubble In 1999/2000... The Major Downturns Stemmed From Financial Market Distortions: The Dot Com Bubble In 1999/2000... Chart I-4...The Mispricing Of U.S. ##br##Mortgages And Credit##br## In 2007/2008... ...The Mispricing Of U.S. Mortgages And Credit In 2007/2008... ...The Mispricing Of U.S. Mortgages And Credit In 2007/2008... Chart I-5...And The Mispricing Of Euro Area ##br##Sovereign Credit Risk##br## In 2010/2011 ...And The Mispricing Of Euro Area Sovereign Credit Risk In 2010/2011 ...And The Mispricing Of Euro Area Sovereign Credit Risk In 2010/2011 Today, the consensus overwhelmingly believes that an economic downturn will cause the next major downturn in financial markets. But history has taught us time and time again that the causality is much more likely to run the other way. Why not learn the lesson? So here's our first prediction: a major financial downturn will trigger the fourth major economic downturn, and not the other way round. This prediction raises some obvious questions: what could be the major fragility in financial markets, and what could fracture it? A Sharp Rise In Bond Yields Triggered The Last Three Major Downturns Look carefully at the financial market downturns that started in 2000, 2007 and 2011, and you will see another striking similarity. In each episode, the global long bond yield rose by 60 bps or more in the months that preceded the onset of the financial market downturn: April 1999 through January 2000 (Chart I-6); March through July 2007 (Chart I-7); and October 2010 through April 2011 (Chart I-8). This strongly suggests that the spike in the bond yield was the trigger for the subsequent major downturn in financial markets. Chart I-6A Sharply Rising Bond Yield Triggered ##br##The Major Downturn Of 2000 A Sharply Rising Bond Yield Triggered The Major Downturn Of 2000 A Sharply Rising Bond Yield Triggered The Major Downturn Of 2000 Chart I-7A Sharply Rising Bond Yield Triggered##br## The Major Downturn Of 2007 And 2008 A Sharply Rising Bond Yield Triggered The Major Downturn Of 2007 And 2008 A Sharply Rising Bond Yield Triggered The Major Downturn Of 2007 And 2008 Chart I-8A Sharply Rising Bond Yield Triggered ##br##The Major Downturn Of 2011 A Sharply Rising Bond Yield Triggered The Major Downturn Of 2011 A Sharply Rising Bond Yield Triggered The Major Downturn Of 2011 A sharp rise in bond yields is usually the straw that breaks the back of financial market fragilities, in (at least) one of three ways: it flushes out those actors that are reliant on cheap liquidity; it pressures interest rate sensitive sectors in the economy; and it weighs on the valuations of other assets such as equities, especially if those valuations are already extremely elevated. Which segues us neatly to the current fragility in the global financial system. As we wrote last week, the post-2008 global experiment with quantitative easing, and zero and negative interest rate policy has boosted the valuations of all risk-assets across all geographies across all asset-classes. And the total value of those global risk-assets is $400 trillion, equal to about five times the size of the global economy.2 We have also consistently highlighted that not only do the rich valuations of $400 trillion of risk-assets depend (inversely) on bond yields, but that this relationship is an exponential function.3 So here's our second prediction: the straw that will break the back of a fragile financial system will be the global long bond yield rising by 60 bps within a short space of time - just as it did in 2000, 2007 and 2011. But Bond Yields Haven't Gone Up Far Enough... Yet Now comes some bullish news, at least for those who can play shorter-term moves in the market. The global long bond yield has been trapped within a tight channel and is only 20 bps up from its recent low in April (Chart I-9). Therefore, it has the scope to rise a further 30-50 bps before reaching the tipping point for the global risk-asset edifice and unleashing a 'risk-off' phase. Chart I-9In 2018, The Bond Yield Has Not Risen Sharply...Yet In 2018, The Bond Yield Has Not Risen Sharply...Yet In 2018, The Bond Yield Has Not Risen Sharply...Yet For those who want to fine tune their investment strategy, the journey up to that turning point would define a phase when many of this year's cyclical sector underperformances would end or even switch to a phase of modest outperformances. Bear in mind that the cyclical sector underperformances this year have been substantial: European banks have underperformed healthcare by 35 percent; global basic materials have underperformed the market by 10 percent; emerging market equities have underperformed developed market equities by 15 percent. So it is prudent to take some short-term profits, especially as these trends are likely to end, at least in the near term. Hence, three weeks ago we closed our underweight banks versus healthcare position, booking a tidy profit of 23 percent. Today, we are closing our underweight position in basic materials versus the market, booking a profit of 6 percent. In a similar vein, we are taking the modest profits in our overweight position in 30-year government bonds. Sector allocation has unavoidable implications for stock market allocation - because the mainstream stock market indexes all have dominant sector skews which determine their relative performances (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Italy Vs. Denmark = Banks Vs. Healthcare Italy Vs. Denmark = Banks Vs. Healthcare Italy Vs. Denmark = Banks Vs. Healthcare On this basis, closing our underweight banks versus healthcare removes the justification for being underweight bank-dominant Italy (MIB) and Spain (IBEX) and the justification for being overweight healthcare-dominant Denmark (OMX). These three positions now move to neutral. While we consider our next shift, our European stock market allocation is temporarily reduced to just five positions. Overweight: France, Ireland, Switzerland. Underweight: Sweden, Norway. Finally, just to say that there will be no report next week as I will be attending our annual Investment Conference which is in Toronto this year. I look forward to seeing some of you there. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Based on the relative performance of the MSCI All Country World Index versus the JP Morgan Global Government Bond Index, both in local currency terms. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'Trapped: Have Equities Trapped Bonds?' September 13 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'The Rule Of 4 For Equities And Bonds' August 2 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* This week, we note that the very strong recent outperformance of U.S. telecoms versus U.S. autos is technically extended, reaching a fractal dimension that has previously signalled the start of a countertrend move. Hence, the recommended trade is short U.S. telecoms, long U.S. autos. Set a profit target of 9% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 U.S. Telecom VS. Autos U.S. Telecom VS. Autos The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights The global 6-month credit impulse is likely to turn up in the fourth quarter. This warrants profit-taking in some pro-defensive equity sector, regional, and country allocation... ...for example, in the 35 percent outperformance of European healthcare versus banks in just seven months. But do not become aggressively pro-cyclical until the 10-year yield on the Italian BTP (now at 3.2) moves closer to 3... ...and the sum of the 10-year yields on the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB (now at 3.4) also moves closer to 3. Chart Of The WeekThe Cycle Is About To Turn The Cycle Is About To Turn The Cycle Is About To Turn Feature One of the most common questions we get is, when will the cycle turn? And our response is always, which cycle? The cycle that most people focus on is the so-called business cycle, which describes multi-year economic expansions punctuated by recessions. However, the business cycle - to the extent that it is a cycle - is very irregular. Its upswings and downswings vary greatly in length (Chart I-2). This irregularity is one reason why economists are useless at calling the turns. Nevertheless, investors still obsess with calling the business cycle because they think this is the only cycle that drives the financial markets. Chart I-2The Business Cycle Is Very Irregular The Business Cycle Is Very Irregular The Business Cycle Is Very Irregular We disagree. Nature bestows us with a multitude of cycles with different periodicities: the daily tides, the monthly phases of the moon, the annual seasons, and the multi-year climate cycles. So it would be unnatural, and somewhat arrogant, to assume the economy and financial markets possess only one cycle. In fact, just as in nature, the economy and financial markets experience a multitude of cycles with different periodicities. There Is Not One Cycle In The Economy, There Are Many If you plotted yearly changes in temperature, you would get a flat line and you would think there were no seasons! The point being that you cannot see a yearly cycle if you look at yearly changes. To see the cyclicality of the seasons, you must plot 6-month changes in temperature. Likewise, you cannot see the shorter-term cycles in the economy and financial markets using analysis, such as yearly changes, designed to see longer-term cycles. Once you grasp this basic maths, the mini-cycles in the economy and financial markets will stare you in the face (Chart I-3), and a whole new world of investment opportunities will open up. Chart I-3The Mini-Cycle Is Very Regular The Mini-Cycle Is Very Regular The Mini-Cycle Is Very Regular As we advised on January 4: "Global growth experiences remarkably consistent - and therefore predictable - 'mini-cycles', with half-cycle lengths averaging eight months. As the current mini-upswing started in May 2017 we can infer that it is likely to end at some point in early 2018. So one surprise could be that global growth will lose steam in the first half of 2018 rather than in the second half, contrary to what the consensus is expecting... Pare back exposure to cyclicals and redeploy to defensives" The advice proved to be very prescient. The global economy did enter a mini-downswing sourced in the emerging markets (Charts I-4 - I-6). Chart I-4The U.S. Mini-Downswing Was Muted... The U.S. Mini-Downswing Was Muted The U.S. Mini-Downswing Was Muted Chart I-5...The Euro Area Mini-Downswing Was Also Muted... ...The Euro Area Mini-Downswing Was Also Muted... ...The Euro Area Mini-Downswing Was Also Muted... Chart I-6...But The China Mini-Downswing Was Severe ...But The China Mini-Downswing Was Severe ...But The China Mini-Downswing Was Severe Nevertheless, the global nature of financial markets meant that the German 10-year bund yield declined by 40 bps, while European healthcare equities outperformed banks by a mouth-watering 35 percent, and materials by 15 percent (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Some of these performances are as large as can be gained in a full business cycle begging the question: Why obsess with the impossible-to-predict business cycle when there are equally rich pickings in the easier-to-predict mini-cycle? Chart I-7Banks Vs. Healthcare Tracks The Mini-Cycle Banks Vs. Healthcare Tracks The Mini-Cycle Banks Vs. Healthcare Tracks The Mini-Cycle Chart I-8Materials Vs. Healthcare Tracks The Mini-Cycle Materials Vs. Healthcare Tracks The Mini-Cycle Materials Vs. Healthcare Tracks The Mini-Cycle Furthermore, if you get the equity sector calls right, you will get the equity regional and country calls right too. As cyclicals have underperformed, the less cyclically-exposed S&P500 has been the star performer of the major regional indexes. And cyclical-heavy stock markets like Italy's MIB have strongly underperformed defensive-heavy stock markets like Denmark's OMX (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Italy Vs. Denmark = Banks Vs. Healthcare Italy Vs. Denmark = Banks Vs. Healthcare Italy Vs. Denmark = Banks Vs. Healthcare It follows that the evolution of the global economic mini-cycle is pivotal in every investment decision (Box 1). BOX 1 The Theory Of Economic And Market Mini-Cycles The academic foundation of the global economic mini-cycles is a model called the Cobweb Theorem.1 When bond yields rise, interest rate sensitive sectors in the economy feel a headwind, but with a lag. Similarly, when bond yields decline, interest rate sensitive sectors feel a tailwind, but again with a lag. The lag occurs because credit demand leads credit supply by several months. As credit demand leads credit supply, the turning point in the price of credit (the bond yield) always leads the quantity of credit supplied (the credit impulse). The result is a perpetual mini-cycle oscillation in both economic variables. And because the quantity of credit supplied is a marginal driver of economic activity, this also creates mini-cycles in economic activity. These mini-cycles are remarkably regular with half-cycle lengths averaging around eight months and the regularity creates predictability. Moreover, as most investors are unaware of this predictability, the next turning point is not discounted in financial market prices - providing a compelling investment opportunity for those who do recognise the existence and predictability of these cycles. The Mini-Cycle Will Soon Turn Up The global 6-month credit impulse entered its current mini-downswing in January. Given that mini-downswings tend to last around eight months, we should expect the global economy to exit its mini-downswing in September, the escape valve being the recent decline in bond yields (Chart Of The Week). The caveat is that bond yields were slow to react to the mini-downswing and the decline in 10-year yields, averaging around 40 bps from the peak, has been pretty shallow. It follows that the next mini-upswing could be delayed to October/November, and be somewhat muted. Nevertheless, the surprise could be that global growth will stabilise in the fourth quarter of 2018, contrary to what the consensus is expecting. And this would suggest taking some of the most mouth-watering profits in pro-defensive equity sector, regional, and country allocation - for example, in the 35 percent outperformance of European healthcare versus banks (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Banks Have Severely Underperformed Healthcare Banks Have Severely Underperformed Healthcare Banks Have Severely Underperformed Healthcare Would we go a step further and become pro-cyclical? Not yet. One reason is that there is a limit to how far bond yields can rise before destabilising the very rich valuations of all risk-assets. This is captured in our 'rule of 4' which says that when the sum of the 10-year yields on the U.S. T-bond, German bund, and Japanese government bond (JGB) exceeds 4 - which broadly equates to the global 10-year yield exceeding 2 percent - it is time to go underweight equities. With the sum now equal to 3.4, yields can rise by only 25-30 bps before hurting risk-assets. Another reason for circumspection is that the investment landscape is still scattered with a large number of landmines, one of which has its own rule of 4. The Other 'Rule Of 4': The Italian 10-Year Bond Yield When Italian bond prices decline, it erodes the value of Italian banks' €350 billion portfolio of BTPs and weakens the banks' balance sheets. Investors start to get nervous about a bank's solvency when equity capital no longer covers net non-performing loans (NPLs). On this basis, the largest Italian banks now have €160 billion of equity capital against €130 billion of net NPLs, implying excess capital of €30 billion (Chart I-11). It follows that the markets would start to worry about Italian banks' mark-to-market solvency if their bond valuations sustained a drop of around a tenth from the recent peak. We estimate this equates to the 10-year BTP yield breaching and remaining above 4 percent (Chart I-12).2 Chart I-11Italian Banks' Equity Capital Exceeds Net NPLs By 30 Bn Euro Italian Banks' Equity Capital Exceeds Net NPLs By €30 Bn Italian Banks' Equity Capital Exceeds Net NPLs By €30 Bn Chart I-12Italian Banks' Solvency Would Be In Question If The 10-Year Yield Breached 4% Italian Banks' Solvency Would Be In Question If The 10-Year Yield Breached 4% Italian Banks' Solvency Would Be In Question If The 10-Year Yield Breached 4% Today the 10-year BTP yield stands just shy of 3.2 percent, but it is about to enter a testing period. The Italian government must agree its 2019 budget by September and present a draft to the European Commission by mid-October. The budget must tread a fine line. Cutting the structural deficit to appease the Commission would diminish the credibility of the populist government. It would also be terrible economics, making it harder for Italy to escape its decade-long stagnation.3 On the other hand, locking horns with Brussels and aggressively increasing the structural deficit might panic the bond market. The optimal outcome would be to leave the structural deficit broadly where it is now. To sum up, the global 6-month credit impulse is likely to turn up in the fourth quarter, warranting some profit-taking in pro-defensive positions. But we do not advise aggressive pro-cyclical sector, regional, and country allocation until the 10-year yield on the Italian BTP (now at 3.2) - and the sum of the 10-year yields on the U.S. T-bond, German bund and JGB (now at 3.4) - both move closer to 3. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles' published on January 11 2018 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Assuming that the average maturity of Italian banks' BTPs is around 5 years. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'Monetarists Vs Keynesians: The 21st Century Battle' July 12 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal trading Model* In support of the preceding fundamental analysis, the outperformance of healthcare versus banks is technically extended. Its 130-day fractal dimension is at the lower bound which has reliably signalled previous trend exhaustions. On this basis we would position for a 10% reversal with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, long PLN/USD reached the end of its 65-day holding period comfortably in profit, and is now closed. This leaves six open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-13 Long Global Basic Resources, Short Global Chemicals Long Global Basic Resources, Short Global Chemicals * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights China's policy headwinds have begun to recede, but Beijing is not riding to the rescue for emerging markets; While monetary policy has eased substantively, credit growth will be hampered by the government's financial crackdown; Potential changes to China's Macro-Prudential Assessment framework could be significant, but the impact on credit growth is overestimated at present; The recognition of non-performing loans (NPLs) and cleansing of China's banking system is still in early innings and will weigh on banks' risk appetite; The anti-corruption campaign is another reason to be cautious on EM. Geopolitical Strategy recommends clients stay overweight China (ex-tech) relative to EM. Feature In the first part of this two-part Special Report, we concluded that policy headwinds to China's economic growth have begun to recede, but recent easing measures will likely disappoint the markets.1 Chart 1Money Growth Bottomed, Credit Still Weak Money Growth Bottomed, Credit Still Weak Money Growth Bottomed, Credit Still Weak In essence, China is girding for a trade war with the United States, which favors stimulus. But it is still attempting to reduce systemic financial risk. As a result, fiscal stimulus may surprise to the upside, but credit growth will be lackluster. The problem for investors - especially for emerging market (EM) assets and the commodity complex - is that Chinese fiscal stimulus typically operates with a six-to-ten month lag, as opposed to credit stimulus which only takes about three months to kick in.2 July statistics confirm our suspicion that credit stimulus will be hampered by the government's crackdown on shadow banking. Total credit growth remains weak, although broad money (M2) does appear to be bottoming (Chart 1). Thus far, BCA's China Investment Strategy has been correct in characterizing the latest developments as "taking the foot off the brake" rather than "pressing down on the accelerator."3 In this report we take a deeper dive into the policy factors that cause us to limit our "stimulus overshoot" scenario to a 10% subjective probability. The three chief reasons are: overstated easing of macro-prudential controls; the continuing process of cleansing the banking sector of non-performing loans; and the anti-corruption campaign in the financial sector. A Preemptive Dodd-Frank Since the Xi administration redoubled its efforts to tackle systemic financial risk last year, we have urged investors to be cautious about Chinese growth.4 The creation of new institutions and new regulatory requirements set in motion processes that would be hard to reverse quickly. While these institutions are now making several compromises for the sake of stability, their operations will continue to weigh on credit growth. In July 2017, China's government held the National Financial Work Conference to address the major issues facing the country's financial system. This conference takes place once every five years and has often occasioned significant shakeups in financial regulation. In 1997, it initiated a sweeping purge of the banking system, and in 2002, it saw the creation of three financial watchdogs that would become critical institutional players throughout the 2000s.5 Chart 2Crackdown On Informal Credit Continues Crackdown On Informal Credit Continues Crackdown On Informal Credit Continues One of the skeletons in the closet from 2002 was the debate over whether financial regulation should be heavily centralized or divided among different, specialized, state agencies. Former Premier Wen Jiabao won the argument with the creation of the three watchdogs covering banking, securities, and insurance. After a series of controversies and conflicts, the Xi administration decided that these agencies had failed in their primary purpose of curbing systemic risk and ordered a reorganization with greater centralization. At the 2017 financial conference, Xi announced the creation of the Financial Stability and Development Committee (FSDC) to act as a centralized watchdog over the entire financial system. The FSDC would coordinate with the central bank, oversee macro-prudential regulation, and prevent systemic risk. Liu He, Xi's right-hand man on the economy and a policymaker with a hawkish reputation, was soon promoted to the Politburo and given the top job at the FSDC.6 As a second step, the Xi administration announced that it would combine the banking and insurance regulators into a single entity - the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC). The CBIRC, to be headed by Xi ally, and notable hawk, Guo Shuqing, would continue and escalate the crackdown on shadow lending that Guo had begun at the helm of the bank watchdog in 2017 (Chart 2). The merging of the agencies would also close the regulatory gap that had seen the insurance regulator increase its dominion and rent-seeking by encouraging "excessive" financial innovation and risky pseudo-insurance products.7 The FSDC was expected, rightly, to bring a more hawkish tilt to Chinese macro-prudential regulation. In reference to the U.S.'s Financial Stability Oversight Council, we dubbed these moves a "Preemptive Dodd-Frank."8 We also argued, however, that the purpose was to bring unified command and control to financial regulation and that China would continue to prize stability above all. Therefore the degree of tightening or loosening should vary in accordance this goal.9 After a series of announcements in July and August, it is clear that China's government has shifted to a more accommodative posture (Chart 3). As usual, there are rumors of high-level political intrigue to go along with the policy shift: some argue that Premier Li Keqiang is making a comeback while Xi's golden boy, Liu He, has been sidelined due to his failure to forestall tariffs during his trade talks with Donald Trump this spring.10 Such rumors are valuable only in revealing the intensity of the policy debate in Beijing. Chart 3Monetary Policy Has Eased Substantively Monetary Policy Has Eased Substantively Monetary Policy Has Eased Substantively What is certain, however, is that the FSDC, with Liu He as chairman, only met for the first time as a fully assembled group in early July, just before the major easing measures were taken. This implies that any initial conclusions were pragmatic (i.e. not excessively hawkish). Moreover, Guo Shuqing is not only the CBIRC head but also the party secretary of the PBOC, meaning that central bank chief Yi Gang cannot have adopted easing measures without Guo's at least condoning it. Chinese policymakers see the recent easing measures as "fine-tuning" even as they continue the rollout of new regulatory institutions and systems. It is thus too soon to claim that Xi Jinping or any of these government bodies have thrown in the towel on their attempts to contain excessive leverage. Both the Politburo and the State Council - the highest party and state decision-makers - have made clear that they do not intend to endorse a massive stimulus on the magnitude of 2008-09 or 2015-16.11 They have also insisted that the "Tough Battle" against systemic financial risk, and the campaign to "deleverage" the corporate sector, will continue. What does this mean in practical terms? While new regulations will be compromised, they will also continue to be implemented. For example, authorities have watered down new regulations governing the $15 trillion asset management industry, yet the regulations are still expected to go into force by 2020. These rules will weigh on shadow banking activity (e.g. wealth management products) as banks prepare to meet the requirements.12 Two other examples are critical and will be discussed below: first, the potential easing of rules under the Macro Prudential Assessment (MPA) framework for stress-testing banks; second, this year's changes to rules governing non-performing loans (NPLs). In the former case, the degree of financial easing is potentially significant but at present overestimated by investors; in the latter case, the degree of tightening is already significant and widely underestimated. Bottom Line: New financial regulatory institutions will inherently suppress credit growth, especially by dragging on informal or non-bank credit growth. Macro-Prudential Assessments: Less Easing Than Meets The Eye A key factor in determining China's credit growth going forward will be banks' responses to any softening of the Macro Prudential Assessment (MPA) requirements. News reports have suggested that a relaxation of these rules may occur, but authorities have not finalized such a move. Furthermore, the impact on credit growth may be far less than the astronomical sums being floated around the investment community. The MPA framework began in 2016. It is an evaluative system of "stress-testing" China's banks each quarter. As such it is part of the upgrade of macro-prudential systems across the world in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, comparable to the American Financial Stability Oversight Committee or the European Systemic Risk Board.13 It is managed by the PBOC and the FSDC. The MPA divides banks into systemically important financial institutions and common institutions, and subdivides the former into those of national and regional importance. The evaluation method contains seven major criteria for assessing bank stability: Capital adequacy and leverage ratios; Bank assets and liabilities; Liquidity conditions; Pricing behavior for interest rates; Quality of assets; Cross-border financing; Execution of credit policy. The first and fourth of these criteria (capital adequacy and leverage ratios, and pricing behavior for interest rates) are in bold font because they result in a "veto" over the entire assessment: if a bank fails to maintain a sufficient capital buffer, or deviates too far from policy interest rates, it can fail the entire stress-test. Otherwise, failure of any two of the other five categories results in overall failure. A system of rewards and punishments awaits banks depending on how they perform (Diagram 1). Diagram 1China's Macro Prudential Assessment Framework Explained China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two On July 20, the PBOC published a document saying that "in order to better regulate assets of financial institutions, during Macro Prudential Assessment (MPA), relevant parameters can be reasonably adjusted." Subsequently Reuters reported that the PBOC would reduce the "structural parameter" and the "pro-cyclical contribution parameter" of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) requirements, thereby easing rules on one of the veto items. The structural parameter would fall from 1.0 to 0.5. Rumors suggest that the pro-cyclical parameter could fall from 0.4-0.8 to 0.3. No such changes have been finalized - only a few banks actually claim to have received notification of a change and there are regional differences. Clearly a general change of the rule would reduce regulatory constraints on bank credit. But how big would the impact be? Under the MPA, banks' CARs are not allowed to fall too far below the "neutral CAR," or C*, a variable that is calculated using the formula outlined in Diagram 2. Most of the variables in this formula will not change often: for instance, the minimum legal CAR will be slow to change, as will the capital reserve buffer and the bonus buffer for systemically important institutions. The one factor that can change frequently is the "discretionary counter-cyclical buffer," as it responds to the country's current place in the business cycle. Diagram 2China's Macro-Prudential Assessment Framework: Capital Adequacy Ratios China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two The key input to this factor is broad credit growth. Thus, if authorities should reduce the CAR's cyclical parameter from a simple average of 0.6 to 0.3, broad credit growth could go higher without creating an excessive increase in the pro-cyclical buffer. In other words, at present about 60% of bank credit expansion in excess of nominal GDP growth counts toward a counter-cyclical capital buffer, which is added to other capital buffers. A tweak to this parameter could decrease that proportion to 30%, meaning that bank lending could go twice as high with the same impact on the counter-cyclical buffer. More significantly, if authorities should reduce the CAR's structural parameter from 1.0 to 0.5, any increase in credit growth would have a less dramatic impact on C*. Hence banks would be able to lend more while still keeping their neutral CAR within the appropriate range relative to their actual CAR. Banks could theoretically lend twice as much with the same impact on the assessment.14 On paper these changes could result in unleashing as much as 41.4 trillion RMB in new lending in 2018, or 28 trillion (33% of GDP) on top of what could have been expected without any adjustment to the macro-prudential rules. This is because broad credit growth would theoretically be allowed to grow as fast as 30% instead of 17%.15 But in reality this growth rate is extremely unlikely. Why? Because it assumes that banks will grow their lending books as rapidly as they are allowed. In fact, banks are currently increasing broad credit at a rate of about 10%, which is considerably lower than either today's or tomorrow's permitted rate of growth under the MPA framework (Chart 4). If tweaks to the MPA increase this speed limit to 30%, it does not mean that banks will drive any faster than they are already driving. They are lending at the current pace for self-interested reasons (and there is fear of excessive debt, default, or insolvency due to the government's ongoing regulatory and anti-corruption crackdown).16 Chart 4Banks Are Not Lending To The Regulatory Maximum China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two Still, if the MPA rules are tweaked, then it will send a signal that macro-prudential scrutiny is abating and banks can lend more aggressively - this would have some positive effect on credit growth, at least for major banks that are secure in meeting their CARs. Moreover, there will be a practical consequence in that fewer banks will be punished for having insufficient CARs. At present, only rarely do banks fail the evaluations. But a strict CAR requirement during an economic downturn could change that. The proposed MPA adjustment would show that banks are graded on a sliding rule: the authorities would slide the grading scale downward to enable more banks to pass the test. This means fewer failures, which means fewer punitive measures that could upset liquidity or stability in the banking system. Ultimately, in order for the new system to have any credibility at all, punishment will have to be meted out to banks that fail the stress tests. A key punishment within the MPA system is exclusion from medium-term lending facility (MLF) loans from the PBOC. This is a regulatory action with teeth, as this is one of the PBOC's major means of injecting liquidity (Chart 5). A misbehaving bank could face short-term liquidity shortage or even insolvency. Therefore the authorities are opting to soften the rules so that the new regulatory system is preserved yet the harshest implications are avoided (for now). Chart 5Regulators Can Deprive Banks Of MLF Access Regulators Can Deprive Banks Of MLF Access Regulators Can Deprive Banks Of MLF Access This would be short-term gain for long-term pain, the opposite of what China needs from the standpoint of an investor looking for improvements to productivity and potential GDP growth. But it would not necessarily be a great boon for global risk assets in the near term. While it could help stabilize expectations for China's domestic growth, it is not clear that it would unleash a mass wave of new bank loans that would reaccelerate China's economy and put wings beneath EM assets and commodity prices. Bottom Line: Tweaking the MPA parameters is a clear example of policy easing. Yet the MPA system itself is a fairly rigorous means of stress-testing banks that is part of a much larger expansion of financial sector regulation. The results of the easier rules - if implemented - will not be as reflationary as might be expected from the headline 41 trillion RMB in new loans that could legally be created. Banks are already expanding loans more slowly than they are allowed to do, so increasing the speed limit will have little effect. The real purpose of the macro-prudential tweaks is to make it more difficult for banks to fail their stress tests in a downturn. As such, any tweaks would actually reveal that Chinese policymakers are expecting a more painful downturn, not that they are asking for a credit splurge. NPL Recognition Will Weigh On Credit Growth Another factor that we have highlighted that separates today's easing measures from outright stimulus: the growing recognition of non-performing loans (NPLs) in China's banks and the financial cleansing process. The government's reform push has already led to two trends that are relatively rare and notable in the Chinese context: rising corporate defaults (Chart 6) and rising bankruptcies (Chart 7). While the impact may be small relative to China's economic size, the direction of change is significant in a country that has been extremely averse to recognizing losses. Chart 6Defaults Are Rising China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two Chart 7Creative Destruction In China China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two These changes reflect the tightening of financial conditions and restructurings of various industries and as such are evidence of Xi's attempt to make progress on reforms while maintaining stability. They also reflect a general environment that is conducive to the realization of bad loans. Two recent policy decisions are affecting banks' accounting of bad loans. First, the CBIRC issued new guidance that eases NPL provision requirements for "responsible" banks (banks with good credit quality) while maintaining the existing requirements for "irresponsible" banks.17 Since the major state-controlled banks will largely meet the standards, they will be able to lend somewhat more (we estimate around 600 billion RMB or 0.7% of GDP). This would support the recent trend in which traditional bank lending rises as a share of total credit growth. Second, however, the CBIRC is requiring banks to reclassify all loans that are 90-or-more-days delinquent as NPLs, resulting in upward revisions of bank NPL ratios. This will send the official rate on an upward march toward 5%, from current extremely low 1.9% (Chart 8). It is the direction of change that matters, as NPL recognition can take on a life of its own. While many state banks may already have recognized the 90-day delinquent loans, many small and regional banks probably have not. Anecdotally, a number of small banks are reporting large NPL ratios as a result of the regulatory clampdown and definition change. Rural commercial banks, in particular, are in trouble with several showing NPLs in double digits (Chart 9). These small and regional banks will have until an unspecified date in 2019 to reclassify these loans and raise provisions against them. The result will hamper credit growth. Chart 8Bad Loan Ratios Set To Rise Bad Loan Ratios Set To Rise Bad Loan Ratios Set To Rise Chart 9City And Rural Commercial Banks Most At Risk Of Rising Bad Loans China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two To get a more detailed picture of the NPL recognition process, we have updated our survey of 16 commercial banks listed on the A-share market.18 This research reveals that banks have continued to increase the amount of bad loans they have written off. While the NPL ratio has remained roughly the same, cumulative loan-loss write-offs combined with NPLs have reached 7% of total loans and are still rising (Chart 10). This shows that a cleansing process is well underway. It is concerning that write-offs have reached nearly 50% of pre-tax profits. And even as losses mount, the proportion of each year's losses to the previous year's NPLs has fallen, implying that the previous year's NPLs had grown bigger (Chart 11). Chart 10The Bank Cleansing Process Continues China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two Chart 11Write-Offs Almost 50% Of Bank Profits Write-Offs Almost 50% Of Bank Profits Write-Offs Almost 50% Of Bank Profits Furthermore, while loan losses grow, the surveyed banks' profit growth has been reduced to virtually zero (Chart 12). Our updated "stress test" for Chinese banks, which is based on the same sample of 16 commercial banks, suggests that if total NPLs rise to a pessimistic, but still quite realistic, ratio of 13% (a weighted average of NPL ratio assumptions per sector, ranging from 10%-30%), then total losses could amount to 10.4 trillion RMB, or 12% of GDP (Table 1). Chart 12Write-Offs Weigh On##br## Bank Profit Growth China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two Table 1Pessimistic Scenario Analysis ##br##For Commercial Bank NPLs China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two In this scenario, banks' net equity would be impacted by 38% as this amount surpasses the buffer of net profits (1.75 trillion RMB) and NPL provisions (3 trillion). China's banks are well provisioned, but they would be less so after a hit of this nature. A similar stress-test by BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy found that equity impairment could range from 33%-49%, implying that Chinese banks were roughly 29% overvalued on a fair price-to-book-value basis.19 Looking at different economic sectors, it is apparent that domestic trade, manufacturing, and mining have seen the highest incidence of loans going sour (Table 2). In all three cases, it is reasonable to conjecture that the NPL ratio can continue to expand - and not only because of the definitional change. First, wholesale and retail (4.7%) consists largely of SMEs, and the government is publicly concerned about their ability to get credit. Second, manufacturing (3.9%) has been hit by changing trade patterns and rising labor costs and has not yet suffered the impact from recently imposed U.S. trade tariffs. Third, mining (3.6%) has felt the first wave of the impact from the government's cuts to overcapacity in recent years, but has seen very extensive restructuring and the fallout may continue. Table 2China: Troubled Sectors Can Produce More Bad Loans China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two More realistic NPL recognition is an important and positive development for China over the long run. Over the short run, banks' efforts to write-off NPL losses will weigh on their willingness to lend and could pose a risk to overall economic activity. Bottom Line: The government's reform and restructuring efforts are initiating a process of creative destruction in the Chinese economy. This is most notable in the government's willingness to recognize NPLs, which will continue to weigh on credit growth. The government is trying to control the pace and intensity of this process, but we expect credit stimulus to be disappointing relative to fiscal stimulus as long as the financial regulatory crackdown is at least half-heartedly implemented. Anti-Corruption Campaign Is Market-Negative Another reason to expect total credit growth to remain subdued comes from the anti-corruption campaign and its probes into local government finances and the financial sector. Chart 13Anti-Corruption Campaign Trudges Onward Anti-Corruption Campaign Trudges Onward Anti-Corruption Campaign Trudges Onward One of the new institutions created in China's 2017-18 leadership reshuffle was the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). This is a powerful new commission that is capable of overseeing the highest state authority (the National People's Congress). It is also ranked above the formal legal system, the Supreme Court and the public prosecutor's office. It is charged with formalizing the anti-corruption campaign and extending it from the Communist Party into the state bureaucracy, including state-owned enterprises.20 Having operated for less than a year, it is not possible to draw firm conclusions about the doings of the NSC, let alone any macro impact. Tentatively, the commission has focused on financial and economic crimes that have the potential to create a "chilling effect" among government officials and bank executives.21 Notably, the NSC has investigated Lai Xiaomin, former chief executive of Huarong, the largest of the big four Asset Management Corporations (AMCs), i.e. China's "bad banks." There is more than one reason for Huarong to attract the attention of investigators, but it is notable that it had extensive investments in areas outside its official duty of acquiring and disposing of NPLs. The implication could be that the government wants the AMCs to focus on their core competency: cleaning up the coming deluge of NPLs. The anti-corruption is also targeting local government officials for misappropriating state funds. These investigations involve punishment of provincial officials for false accounting as well as embezzlement and other crimes. We have noted before that the provinces that revised down their GDP growth targets most aggressively this year were also some of the hardest hit with anti-corruption probes into falsifying data and misallocating capital.22 On several occasions it has appeared as if the anti-corruption campaign was losing steam, but the broadest tally of cases under investigation suggest that it is still going strong despite hitting a peak at the beginning of the year (Chart 13). The campaign remains a potential source of disruption among the very officials whose risk appetite will determine whether central government policy easing actually results in additional bank lending and local government borrowing. Bottom Line: While difficult to quantify, the anti-corruption campaign will dampen animal spirits within local governments and the financial sector as long as the new NSC is seeking to establish itself and the Xi administration remains committed to prosecuting the campaign aggressively. Investment Conclusions We would be surprised if credit growth did not perk up at least somewhat as a result of the past month's easing measures. But as outlined above, these measures may disappoint the markets as a result of the ongoing financial regulatory drive, the baggage of NPL recognition, and any negative impact on risk appetite due to the anti-corruption campaign. And this is not even to mention the dampening effects of ongoing property sector and pollution curbs.23 In lieu of a credit surge, Beijing is likely to rely more on fiscal spending to stabilize growth. Fiscal spending also faces complications, of course. In recent years, China's local governments have built up a potentially massive pool of off-balance-sheet debt due to structural factors limiting local government revenue generation (Table 3). Beijing is now attempting to force this debt into the light. The local government debt maturity schedule suggests a persistent headwind in coming years as hidden debt is brought onto the balance sheet and governments scramble to meet payment deadlines (Chart 14). In addition, the local government debt swap program launched in 2014-15 will wrap up this month. Table 3Estimates Of Hidden Local Government Debt China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two Chart 14Local Governments Face Rising Debt Payments China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two Nevertheless Beijing has introduced a new class of "refinancing bonds" in 2018 to help stabilize the fiscal situation. These bonds are separate from brand new bonds that have the potential to increase significantly over the second half of this year. China's Finance Ministry has also reportedly asked local governments to issue 80 percent of net new special purpose bonds by the end of September. Since only about a quarter of the year's 1.35 trillion RMB quota was issued in H1, this order would mean that about half of the quota (675 billion RMB out of 1.35 trillion RMB) would be issued in August and September alone - implying a significant surge to Chinese demand, albeit with a lag of six months or so.24 The latest data releases from July suggest that Beijing is trying to do two things at once: ease liquidity conditions while cracking down on excess leverage. Until we see a spike in credit growth, we will continue to expect the policy turn to be only moderately reflationary, with the ability to offset existing headwinds but not spark a broad-based reacceleration of the economy. Going forward, data for the month of August will be very important to monitor, as many of the easing measures were not announced until late July. For all the reasons outlined in this two-part Special Report, we would view a sharp increase in total credit as a game-changer that would point toward a "stimulus overshoot" (Table 4). Such an overshoot is less likely if the government relies more heavily on fiscal spending this time around, which is what we expect. Table 4Will China Over-Stimulate This Time Around? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Part Two Meanwhile, turmoil in emerging markets - which we fully anticipated based on China's policy headwinds this year and our dollar bullish view - will only be exacerbated by China's unwillingness to stimulate massively.25 Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu, Senior Analyst qingyun@bcaresearch.com Yushu Ma, Contributing Editor yushum@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus?" dated August 8, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle," dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China Is Easing Up On The Brake, Not Pressing The Accelerator," dated July 26, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics - From Overstated To Understated Risks," dated November 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China," dated February 28, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see footnote 8 above. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Italy, Spain, Trade Wars... Oh My!" dated May 30, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see Part I of this series in footnote 1 above. 12 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Now What?" dated June 27, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Note that according to the new asset management rules, financial institutions will be required to have a risk reserve worth 10% of their fee income, or corresponding risk capital provisions. When the risk reserve balance reaches 1% of the product balance, no further risk provision will be required. We estimate that setting aside these funds will be a form of financial tightening worth about 1.2% of GDP. 13 Please see Liansheng Zheng, "The Macro Prudential Assessment Framework of China: Background, Evaluation and Current and Future Policy," Center for International Governance Innovation, CIGI Papers No. 164 (March 2018), available at www.cigionline.com. 14 Recall that the second category of the MPA consists of bank assets and liabilities. This category also has a rule for broad credit growth, which is that it should not exceed broad money (M2) plus 20%-25%. Therefore passing this part of the exam already requires banks to meet a 28%-33% speed limit on new credit. Assuming that that the pro-cyclical parameter of the CAR category remains at its current minimum of 0.4, then the structural parameter cannot be effectively pushed any lower than 0.6-0.8. The bottom line is that pushing the CAR structural parameter lower is not going to yield a significant increase in the allowable rate of credit growth. 15 To reach this estimate, we began with the fact that the outstanding level of broad credit growth was around 207 trillion RMB by the end of 2017 (that is, loans plus bonds plus equities plus wealth management products and other off-balance-sheet assets). The 2017 growth rate was about 10% and is assumed to be the same in 2018. Therefore broad credit should reach 227.7 trillion by the end of the year. Then, if we assume that all banks lend at the maximum weighted growth rate allowed by adjusting the structural parameter in the MPA CAR requirement (which is 30%), outstanding broad credit would reach 269.1 trillion by the end of the year. Hence an extra 41.4 trillion RMB in broad credit growth would be released. For comparison, please see CITIC Bond Investment, "Deep Analysis: Impact of Parameter Adjustments in the MPA Framework," July 30, 2018, available at www.sohu.com. 16 Based on actual CARs in 2017, the limit to broad credit growth was 17%-22% for large state-owned banks, 10%-20% for joint-equity banks, and 15%-20% for city or rural commercial banks. However, the actual broad credit growth for most banks was a lot lower than that. For example, for all five state-owned banks (nationally systemically important financial institutions), it was below 10%, well beneath the 17%-22% determined by their actual CARs and C*. 17 Under current regulations, the loan provision ratio is 2.5% while the NPL provision coverage ratio is 150%. The higher of the two is the regulatory standard for commercial banks. On February 28, 2018, the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued a notice declaring that the coverage requirement would change to a range of 120%-150%, while the loan provision requirement would change to a range of 1.5%-2.5%. Banks would qualify for the easier requirements according to how accurately they classified their loans, whether they disposed of their bad loans, and whether they maintained appropriate capital adequacy ratios. This could result in a release of about 800 billion RMB worth of provisions that can be kept as core tier-1 capital or support new lending. 18 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Stress-Testing Chinese Banks," dated July 27, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Mind The Breakdowns," dated July 5, 2018, and Special Report, "Long Indian / Short Chinese Banks," dated January 17, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 20 Please see Jamie P. Horsley, "What's So Controversial About China's New Anti-Corruption Body?" The Diplomat, May 30, 2018, available at thediplomat.com. 21 The NSC is operationally very close to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), which is the Communist Party corruption watchdog formerly headed by heavyweight Wang Qishan. It received only a 10% increase in manpower over the CDIC in order to expand its target range by 200% (covering all state agencies and state-linked organizations). It has allegedly meted out 240,000 punishments in the first half of 2018, up from 210,000 during the same period last year and 163,000 in H1 2016. About 28 of these cases were provincial-level cases or higher. The controversy over the "rights of the detained" has been highlighted by the beating of a local government official's limousine driver in one of the organization's first publicly reported actions. The NSC has also arrested local government officials tied to "corruption kingpin" Zhou Yongkang and known for misappropriating budgetary funds, and has secured the repatriation of fugitives who fled abroad and recovered the assets that they stole or embezzled. 22 The provinces include Tianjin, Chongqing, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, etc. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy "Trump, Year Two: Let The Trade War Begin," dated March 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. There is empirical evidence that anti-corruption probes are correlated with debt defaults. Please see Haoyu Gao, Hong Ru and Dragon Yongjun Tang, "Subnational Debt of China: The Politics-Finance Nexus," dated September 12, 2017, available at gcfp.mit.edu. 23 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble?" dated April 6, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com, and Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Blue Skies Drive China's Steel Policy," dated August 9, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 24 Please see "As economy cools, China sets deadline for local government special bond sales," Reuters, dated August 14, 2018, available at www.reuters.com. For more on local government bond issuance, see Part I of this series in footnote 1 above. Note also rumors in Chinese media suggesting that a new local government debt swap program could be launched with the responsibility of tackling off-balance-sheet debts that are guaranteed by local governments. The program has thus far only swapped debts that local governments were obligated to pay. It is not clear what would happen to a third class of local debt, that which is neither an obligation upon local governments nor guaranteed by them but that nevertheless is deemed to serve a public interest. 25 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The EM Bloodbath Has Nothing To Do With Trump," dated August 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Without a true banking union it is impossible to have a true monetary union. The result is a fragmented monetary policy. A fragmented monetary policy with an inflexibly rigid fiscal policy is a recipe for economic and political polarization. Until the banking union is complete, policymakers must permit a more fragmented fiscal policy as a crucial economic counterbalance. Expect a multi-year narrowing in core euro area long bond yield spreads versus their counterparts in the U.K. and U.S. Extremely loose monetary policy is inappropriate for Germany and France and ineffective for Italy. If Italy's banking system does recover to full functionality, the best long-term investment play will be Italy's real estate market. The equity play is Covivio. Feature The European Monetary Union is a contradiction because European monetary policy is not united; it is fragmented. Granted, the euro area has one policy interest rate, and one currency. But monetary policy works principally through accelerations and decelerations in the broad money supply, whose main component is bank credit. It follows that when the banking system is fragmented, a genuine monetary union is elusive. Italy Is 'Yin', The Rest Of Europe Is 'Yang' Economist Richard Koo distinguishes two distinct phases of an economy, a 'yin' phase and a 'yang' phase, with the key difference being the financial health of the private sector including the all-important banking system. In a yang economy, the private sector and the banks are solvent and functional. In such an economy, the smaller and less intrusive the government, the better. Fiscal policy is ineffective because it crowds out private investment. But monetary policy is highly effective because a forward-looking private sector generates a demand for bank credit which will accelerate or decelerate according to the policy interest rate. In a yin economy, the opposite is true. The private sector and/or the banks are insolvent and dysfunctional. In such an economy, monetary policy is ineffective. No amount of depressing interest rates, central bank liquidity injections, or bond buying is able to stimulate bank lending. This is because impaired balance sheets prevent the private sector from borrowing and/or the banks from lending. But in a yin economy, fiscal policy is highly effective. Because the private sector is single-mindedly paying down debt, the government can borrow and spend these private sector debt repayments and excess savings with no danger of crowding out. Indeed in a yin economy, if the government consistently applies an appropriately sized fiscal stimulus, the economy can continue to grow at a healthy pace. Chart I-1-Chart I-6 should make it crystal clear that while Germany and France have a yang economy, Italy has a yin economy. Chart I-1Italy Has A 'Yin' Economy: ##br##Monetary Policy Is Not Effective... Italy Has A Yin Economy: Monetary Policy Is Not Effective... Italy Has A Yin Economy: Monetary Policy Is Not Effective... Chart I-2...But Fiscal Policy##br## Is Effective ...But Fiscal Policy Is Effective ...But Fiscal Policy Is Effective Chart I-3France Has A 'Yang' Economy: ##br##Monetary Policy Is Effective... France Has A Yang Economy: Monetary Policy Is Effective... France Has A Yang Economy: Monetary Policy Is Effective... Chart I-4...But Fiscal Policy##br## Is Not Effective ...But Fiscal Policy Is Not Effective ...But Fiscal Policy Is Not Effective Chart I-5Germany Has A 'Yang' Economy:##br## Monetary Policy Is Effective... Germany Has A Yang Economy: Monetary Policy Is Effective... Germany Has A Yang Economy: Monetary Policy Is Effective... Chart I-6...But Fiscal Policy ##br##Is Not Effective ...But Fiscal Policy Is Not Effective ...But Fiscal Policy Is Not Effective A Monetary Union Needs A Banking Union In Germany and France, bank credit has surged in response to the ECB's ultra-accommodative monetary policy. But in Italy, bank credit growth is almost non-existent. Through the past ten years, no amount of depressing interest rates, central bank liquidity injections, or bond buying has been able to stimulate Italy's money supply (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7Italian Banks Are ##br##Not Lending... Italian Banks Are Not Lending... Italian Banks Are Not Lending... Chart I-8...Because The Italian Banking System Has##br## Been Left Undercapitalised For A Decade ...Because The Italian Banking System Has Been Left Undercapitalised For A Decade ...Because The Italian Banking System Has Been Left Undercapitalised For A Decade Furthermore, when the ECB bought Italian government bonds from investors, where did Italian investors deposit the hundreds of billions of euros they received? Not in the local Italian banks, but in German banks, which they deemed to be much safer. Italian banks are not lending, and their depositors are still very wary, because the Italian banking system has been left undercapitalized for a decade. The irony is that the ECB's bond-buying was supposed to help Italy the most, but has probably helped it the least (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The ECB's Bond-Buying Has Exacerbated##br## The Target2 Imbalances The ECB's Bond-Buying Has Exacerbated The Target2 Imbalances The ECB's Bond-Buying Has Exacerbated The Target2 Imbalances Europe's full-fledged banking union is still years away. Europe has established a single supervisor for its 130 largest banks. It has also set up a single resolution fund (SRF) to wind down failing banks in an orderly fashion. Unfortunately, the SRF's coffers will not be full for another six years.1 Until then, the SRF will not be credible to the financial markets without a backstop. A candidate to provide such a backstop would be the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), but this is work in progress. Europe also lacks a common deposit insurance scheme. Knowing that the buck stops with the national government makes depositors wary, as has been the case recently in Italy. The large international banks are keen to implement a pan-European deposit insurance scheme. But this requires a clean-up of bank balance sheets in certain countries, notably Italy. Otherwise, the prudent banks will balk at the prospect of paying for the past mistakes of their less prudent competitors. Again, this is work in progress which may take several years to complete. A Fragmented Monetary Policy Requires A Fragmented Fiscal Policy If the entire euro area economy enters a yin phase, the constituent governments are allowed to use fiscal policy to support growth. For example, when the whole euro area went into a yin phase during the debt crisis, the European Commission relaxed the normal 3% cap on government deficits, and this fiscal stimulus helped the most troubled countries to weather the storm. But what if one country enters a yin phase, while the others are still in a yang phase? For example, a 'no-deal' Brexit would hit Ireland much harder than other euro area economies. The EU budget can help to an extent but, at just 1% of Europe's GDP compared to almost 20% in the U.S., the budget is small. This might still be sufficient to help Ireland, but it is insufficient for a large economy like Italy. The ESM can also help, but the assistance arrives too late - when the troubled country has already lost market access, and thereby is in, or close to, a recession. The unfortunate truth is that without a true banking union it is impossible to have a true monetary union. The result is a fragmented monetary policy, as is the case right now. A fragmented monetary policy with an inflexibly rigid fiscal policy is a recipe for economic polarization and thereby, political polarization. Therefore, until the banking union is complete, policymakers must permit a more fragmented fiscal policy as a crucial economic counterbalance. Because ultimately, a less economically polarized euro area will be a more successful and united euro area. An important test to this thesis has now arrived, as the new government in Italy prepares next year's budget. The government must agree its fiscal plan by September and present a draft to the European Commission by mid-October. Italy was projected to reduce its structural deficit by about 0.8 percent. But given that Italy will have one of the world's lowest structural deficits in the coming years, this reduction seems unnecessarily drastic (Table I-1). Because an increase in the deficit might unnerve the markets, the optimal outcome would be to leave the structural deficit close to its current level. Table 1Italy Will Have One Of The World's Lowest Structural Deficits Why Europe Must Fragment To Unite Why Europe Must Fragment To Unite We end with two brief thoughts for investors. The evidence clearly shows that the ECB's extremely loose monetary policy is wholly inappropriate for the euro area's mostly yang economy and largely ineffective for Italy's yin economy. On this premise, expect a multi-year narrowing in core euro area long bond yield spreads versus their counterparts in the U.K. and U.S. Finally, if Italy's banking system does gradually recover to full health and functionality, the best long-term investment play will be Italy's real estate market, in which prices have been bid down to depressed levels due to a lack of a lack of bank financing. On this premise, the long-term equity play is Covivio. Please note that I am taking a brief summer break, so the next weekly report will come out on August 23. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 The SRF will be gradually built up during 2016-2023 and shall reach the target level of at least 1% of the amount of covered deposits of all credit institutions within the Banking Union by December 31 2023. Fractal Trading Model* We have seven open positions, so we are not adding any new trades this week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 Long EM / short DM Long EM / short DM The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Overweight - Downgrade Alert We put the S&P banks index on downgrade alert in mid-May and removed it from the high-conviction overweight list for a relative gain of 6%, on the back of budding evidence that the bank/yield curve correlation was getting re-established as the one with the 10-year Treasury yield was getting shattered. We also warned that were banks not to participate in the next bond market selloff we would pull the trigger and downgrade to neutral. On the eve of Q2 earnings season there is hope for a reversal of fortunes in this key financials sub-index. The U.S. economy is overheating and pricing pressures are making their way through to the CPI. This should be fertile ground for bank equities as they represent the nervous system of the economy by providing much needed credit. Indeed, commercial & industrial (C&I) loans - the largest credit segment in bank balance sheets - have soared; not only are they making new all-time highs in level terms, but momentum is gaining steam (middle panel). This is not only centered on C&I loans, but other categories are also expanding nicely, especially residential mortgage loans. Loan origination is synonymous with profit growth at a time when the regulatory noose is getting relaxed and banks anew passed the Fed's strict stress tests. Tack on shareholder friendly activities and there is much to like about banks this earnings season. Bottom Line: Stay overweight banks, but stay tuned. Banks On Banks Banks On Banks

Dear Client, Geopolitical analysis is a fundamental part of the investment process. My colleague, and BCA's Chief Geopolitical Strategist, Marko Papic will introduce a one-day specialized course - Geopolitics & Investing - to our current BCA Academy offerings. This special inaugural session will take place on September 26 in Toronto and is available, complimentary, only to those who sign up to BCA's 2018 Investment Conference. The course is aimed at investors and asset managers and will emphasize the key principles of our geopolitical methodology. Marko launched BCA's Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) in 2012. It is the financial industry's only dedicated geopolitical research product and focuses on the geopolitical and macroeconomic realities which constrain policymakers' options. The Geopolitics & Investing course will introduce: The constraints-based methodology that underpins BCA's Geopolitical Strategy; Best-practices for reading the news and avoiding media biases; Game theory and its application to markets; Generating "geopolitical alpha;" Manipulating data in the context of political analysis. The course will conclude with two topical and market-relevant "war games," which will tie together the methods and best-practices introduced in the course. We hope to see you there. Click here to join us! Space is limited. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Chief Emerging Markets Strategist Highlights The authorities in China have begun easing liquidity conditions but that is not sufficient to turn positive on mainland growth. For the next six months at least, the mainland's growth conditions will continue deteriorating and that warrants a negative stance on China-related risk assets, including commodities and EM. The path of least resistance for the dollar is up. This will continue to weigh on EM risk assets. A narrowing interest rate differential between China and the U.S. will continue exerting downward pressure on the RMB's value versus the dollar. Our credit stress test on Turkish banks suggests their stocks are not yet cheap assuming the non-performing loan ratio rises to 15%. Stay short banks and the lira. Feature China's economic slowdown, ongoing trade wars and accumulating U.S. inflation pressures will continue propping up the U.S. dollar, thereby sustaining a perfect storm for EM financial markets. This is taking place amid the poor structural fundamentals in the developing economies and the existing overhang of investor positions in EM. Altogether this argues for more downside in EM financial markets. A strong dollar is also a bad omen for developed markets' stock indexes. The reason being that the dollar is a countercyclical variable, and the greenback's rallies usually coincide with global trade downturns that are bearish for global cyclical equity sectors (Chart I-1). Needless to say, tariffs on imports are ultimately negative for global trade, and will exacerbate the global growth slowdown that has been occurring since early this year. In fact, there is anecdotal evidence that global trade has so far temporarily benefited from mounting expectations of tariffs.1 Companies have ordered more inputs and shipped more goods in advance of higher tariffs coming into effect. This is why global shipments and manufacturing production have so far held up reasonably well, while business expectations have plummeted (Chart I-2). Consequently, global trade and manufacturing production will likely record considerable weakness later this year. Since markets are typically forward looking, asset prices will adjust beforehand. Chart I-1Global Industrial Stocks And U.S. Dollar Global Industrial Stocks And U.S. Dollar Global Industrial Stocks And U.S. Dollar Chart I-2Global Trade Is Heading South Global Trade Is Heading South Global Trade Is Heading South We are maintaining our negative stance on EM stocks, currencies, credit markets and high-yielding local bonds. China Is Easing Liquidity, But Don't Hold Your Breath Chart I-3Chinese Interest Rates And EM Stocks: ##br##Positively Correlated Chinese Interest Rates And EM Stocks: Positively Correlated Chinese Interest Rates And EM Stocks: Positively Correlated China's softening industrial data, growing anecdotal evidence of a worsening credit crunch in the economy, U.S. tariffs, and plunging domestic share prices have been sufficient for the authorities to ease liquidity conditions in the Chinese banking system. Not surprisingly, many investors are wondering whether the worst is over for Chinese stocks and China-related financial markets worldwide, including those in EM. At the current juncture, liquidity easing by the PBOC is a necessary but not sufficient condition to turn positive on this nation's industrial cycle as well as EM risk assets. We have the following considerations on this topic: First, China's risk-free interest rates - government bond yields - led the selloff in both EM and Chinese stocks (Chart 3). These bond yields have plunged since November, foreshadowing the slowdown in China's growth and the carnage in EM/Chinese financial markets. By and large, there has been a positive correlation between EM share prices and China's local bond yields and interbank rates as illustrated on Chart I-3. For example, EM stocks, currencies and credit markets rallied substantially in 2017 in the face of rising interest rates in China. Likewise, they dropped in the second half of 2015 as bond yields and money market rates in China plunged. The rationale behind the positive correlation between EM risk assets and Chinese interest rates is that the latter rise and EM risk assets rally when the mainland economy is improving. The opposite is also true. At the moment, Chinese risk-free bond yields will likely continue to drop as additional slowdown in growth is in the cards. This heralds a further drop in EM financial markets. Second, any major stimulus will constitute a retraction of the Chinese government's policy of deleveraging and containing financial risks. The latter is the code phrase Chinese authorities use to stop fueling bubbles and speculative excesses. Hence, any policy stimulus will for now be measured and insufficient to boost growth this year. China is saddled with massive debt and money overhangs and a bubbly property market. Ongoing enormous expansion in money supply (i.e., RMB deposits)2 (Chart I-4) and a narrowing interest rate differential over the U.S. will continue exerting downward pressure on the RMB's value (Chart I-5). Chart I-4'Helicopter Money' In China Helicopter Money' In China Helicopter Money' In China Chart I-5The RMB Will Depreciate Further The RMB Will Depreciate Further The RMB Will Depreciate Further Even though capital controls have tightened since 2015, the capital account is not perfectly closed. As such, shrinking interest rate deferential versus the U.S. warrants further yuan depreciation. In short, the authorities cannot reduce interest rates further and expand money/credit growth at a double-digit rate without tolerating sizable currency deprecation. If the Chinese authorities opt for a large fiscal and credit stimulus again, the nation's structural imbalances will grow further. In this scenario, the Middle Kingdom's secular growth outlook will deteriorate, and policymakers' manoeuvring room to stimulate in the future will narrow. Chart I-6China: The Industrial Cycle Is Slumping China: The Industrial Cycle Is Slumping China: The Industrial Cycle Is Slumping Crucially, China's enormous money and credit creation are entirely unrelated to its high savings rate. Money and credit in China have been driven by speculative behavior of Chinese banks and borrowers not households' high savings rate. We have discussed these issues in detail in our past special reports3 and will not expand on them here. Third, there has been money/credit tightening on three fronts in China - liquidity, regulatory and anti-corruption. Even though liquidity conditions in the banking system are now ameliorating, as evidenced by the plunge in interbank rates, the regulatory clampdown on the shadow banking system as well as the anti-corruption campaign targeting the financial industry are still underway. The latter policy initiatives will continue to curb credit creation by suppressing banks' and shadow banking institutions' ability and willingness to finance the real economy. In fact, it is not inconceivable that the regulatory clampdown and anti-corruption campaign will have a larger impact on credit supply than the decline in borrowing costs. Finally, policy easing and tightening works with a time lag. China's business cycles and related financial markets do not always respond swiftly to changes in policy stance. Specifically, monetary and fiscal policies were easing substantially from the middle of 2015, yet EM/China-related risk assets continued to plummet for six months until February 2016. Conversely, policy was tightening in China throughout 2017, yet EM/China-related asset markets did well in 2017. In brief, there could be a long lag between a change in policy stance and a reversal in financial markets. For now, we reckon that the cumulative effect of policy tightening of the past 18 months will continue to seep through the Chinese economy till the end of this year. Chart I-6 demonstrates that various industrial cycle indicators continue to deteriorate. Bottom Line: The authorities in China have begun easing liquidity conditions but that is not sufficient to turn positive on Chinese growth and China-related risk assets, including commodities and EM. For the next six months at least, the mainland's growth conditions will continue deteriorating and that warrants a negative stance on China-related risk assets. More Downside The indicators that have been useful in foretelling the turmoil in EM financial markets this year are signaling that a negative stance is still warranted: One indicator that gave an early warning signal for the current EM selloff was EM sovereign and corporate bond yields. At the moment, the average of EM dollar-denominated corporate and sovereign bond yields continues to presage lower EM stock prices, as demonstrated in Chart I-7 - bond yields are shown inverted in this chart. Chart I-7Rising EM Borrowing Costs Are Bearish For Their Stocks Rising EM Borrowing Costs Are Bearish For Their Stocks Rising EM Borrowing Costs Are Bearish For Their Stocks Notably, EM share prices display lower correlation with U.S. bond yields and U.S. TIPS yields than with EM corporate and sovereign bond yields (Chart I-8). Why are EM share prices exhibiting a stronger correlation with EM bond yields rather than with U.S. Treasury yields? The basis is that EM equities are sensitive to EM - not U.S. - borrowing costs. So long as the rise in U.S. bond yields is offset by compressing EM credit spreads, EM corporate and sovereign U.S. dollar bond yields - i.e. EM borrowing costs in dollars - will decline, and EM share prices will rally (Chart I-7). But when EM corporate (or sovereign) yields rise - irrespective of whether because of rising U.S. Treasury yields or widening EM credit spreads - EM borrowing costs in dollars rise, and consequently equity prices come under considerable selling pressure. In other words, a drop in U.S. bond yields on its own is not enough for EM share prices to advance, and conversely, a rise in U.S. bond yields is not sufficient for EM stocks to drop. It is movements in EM U.S. dollar bond yields, which are comprised of U.S. Treasury yields and EM credit spreads, that matter for the direction of EM equity prices. Regarding local bond yields, EM share prices typically exhibit a strong negative correlation with EM domestic government bonds yields - the latter are shown inverted on this chart (Chart I-9). Since we expect EM currencies to depreciate further and, given the negative correlation between EM currency values and their local bond yields, the latter will continue rising. Chart I-8EM Stocks And U.S. Rates: ##br##Mixed Relationship EM Stocks And U.S. Rates: Mixed Relationship EM Stocks And U.S. Rates: Mixed Relationship Chart I-9EM Equities And Local Bond Yields: ##br##Strong Correlation EM Equities and Local Bond Yields: Strong Correlation EM Equities and Local Bond Yields: Strong Correlation The risky-to-safe-haven currency ratio4 continues to fall after experiencing a major breakdown early this year (Chart I-10, top panel). Historically, this ratio has been correlated with EM share prices and currently heralds further downside (Chart I-10, bottom panel). This ratio also is agnostic to the dollar's direction - it swings between risk-on versus risk-off regimes in financial markets, regardless of the general trend in the greenback. Hence, this indicator answers the question of the direction of EM share prices, regardless of the dollar's trend. Finally, key to EM performance has been corporate profits. Presently, the outlook for EM corporate profits is still negative, as suggested by the negative readings on China's money and credit (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Are Risk Assets In A Bear Market? bca.ems_wr_2018_07_12_s1_c10 bca.ems_wr_2018_07_12_s1_c10 Chart I-11EM Corporate Profits Will Likely Shrink EM Corporate Profits Will Likely Shrink EM Corporate Profits Will Likely Shrink Bottom Line: EM risk asset will continue selling off and underperforming their DM counterparts. Stay short/underweight EM risk assets. The Dollar's Trend Is Still Up The U.S. dollar is instrumental to EM financial market trends. We expect the dollar rally to persist for now - at least through the end of this year. The underlying inflation gauge measure calculated by New York Fed points to further acceleration in U.S. consumer price inflation (Chart I-12). Furthermore, America's job market is continuing to tighten. In brief, U.S. domestic demand will stay robust even as global trade slumps. These will limit the Federal Reserve's ability to back off from tightening, even if EM financial markets continue to sell off. Chart I-12U.S. Inflation Risks Are To The Upside U.S. Inflation Risks Are To The Upside U.S. Inflation Risks Are To The Upside Remarkably, a strong U.S. exchange rate is needed to cap America's growth and inflation and to boost growth in the rest of the world, especially in Asia. Given the widening growth momentum between the U.S. and Asia, the dollar will likely need to rally significantly to reverse the growth differential currently moving in favor of America. This will be especially true if more trade tariffs are imposed. Odds are that the RMB will depreciate further given the backdrop of lower interest rates in China - discussed above. That will cause a downturn in emerging Asian currencies. A strong dollar, a slowdown in Chinese/EM demand for commodities and large net long positions by investors in oil and copper all argue for a considerable drop in commodities prices in the months ahead. This is bearish for Latin American and many other EM exchange rates. Bottom Line: The path of least resistance for the dollar is up. This will continue to weigh on EM risk assets. With respect to currency positions, we recommend investors to continue to short a basket of EM currencies such as BRL, ZAR, TRY, MYR and IDR versus the dollar. CLP and KRW are also among our shorts given our bearish outlook for copper prices, global trade and Asian currencies. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Turkish Banks: A Bargain Or Value Trap? 12 July 2018 Turkish bank stocks have now fallen by 40% in local currency terms and by 55% in U.S. dollar terms since their peak early this year (Chart II-1), prompting the question whether they have become a bargain or are still a value trap. Banks represent 30% of the Turkey MSCI index and are integral to the performance of this bourse. Although Turkish banks appear to be cheap with their price-to-trailing earnings ratio at 4.5 and their price-to-book value ratio at 0.62, they are still vulnerable to a substantial rise in non-performing loans (NPL) and ensuing provisioning, write-off and equity dilution. Turkey has been experiencing an enormous credit binge for years and its interest rates have risen by 600 basis points since the start of the year. Yet, current NPLs and provisions stand at a mere 3% and 2.3% of total outstanding loan, respectively (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Turkish Stocks: A Long-Term Perspective Turkish Stocks: A Long-Term Perspective Turkish Stocks: A Long-Term Perspective Chart II-2Turkish Banks Are Underprovisioned Turkish Banks Are Underprovisioned Turkish Banks Are Underprovisioned The creditworthiness of debtors is worse when one takes into account that Turkish companies have large foreign currency debt and a record amount of foreign debt obligations due in 2018 (Chart II-3). In our credit stress test, we assume that in the baseline scenario the non-performing credit assets (NPCA) ratio will rise to 15% (Table II-1). Taking into account that the NPL-to-total loan ratio reached 18% in 2002 after the 2001 currency crisis, we believe 15% is a reasonable estimate. Chart II-3Turkey: Record High Foreign Debt Obligations Turkey: Record High Foreign Debt Obligations Turkey: Record High Foreign Debt Obligations Table II-1Credit Stress Test For Turkish Banks EM: A Perfect Storm EM: A Perfect Storm To put this number further into perspective, India - one of the very few countries within the EM universe to have somewhat fully recognized its NPLs - currently has an NPL ratio of 15% on its public banks. Chart II-4Turkish Equities: ##br##A Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio Turkish Equities: A Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio Turkish Equities: A Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio If we assume that Turkish bank stocks at the end of this cycle will trade at a price-to-book ratio of 1 after adjusting for all credit losses, then banks' stock prices are currently about 17% overvalued in the baseline scenario of 15% NPCA (Table II-1, the middle row). In all three scenarios, we assume a recovery rate of 40%. With regards to the overall equity market, Chart II-4 demonstrates that the cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio for Turkish stocks is currently around 5, compared to the historical average of 8. For the bourse's CAPE ratio to drop to two standard deviations below its mean, share prices have to fall by another 20-25%. This is plausible given the outlook for more populist economic policies following the recent elections. Besides, corporate profits will contract considerably because of the monetary tightening that has occurred since early this year. The exchange rate is critical for Turkish financial markets. As such, revisiting currency valuation is also important. Our favorite measure of currency valuation is the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs. This takes into account both wages and productivity. Hence, it gauges competitiveness much better than the measures of real effective exchange rate based on consumer and producer prices. Using this measure, as of July 11 the lira was slightly more than one standard deviation below its historical mean (Chart II-5). For it to reach two standard deviations below its mean, it would roughly take another 15-17% depreciation, versus an equal-weighted basket of the dollar and euro. Given the current macroeconomic backdrop and the outlook for more unorthodox policies, including possible capital controls following President Erdogan's appointment of his son-in law as the key economic policymaker, the lira will likely undershoot. Meantime, foreign holdings of Turkish local bonds and stocks were not yet depressed as of June 29 (Chart II-6). Chart II-5Turkish Lira: An Undershoot Is Likely Turkish Lira: An Undershoot Is Likely Turkish Lira: An Undershoot Is Likely Chart II-6Foreign Ownership Is Still High Foreign Ownership Is Still High Foreign Ownership Is Still High Bottom Line: Provided Turkey's political outlook has deteriorated further after the recent elections, we assess that only after a 15% depreciation in the lira versus an equal-weighted basket of the dollar and euro, in combination with a 15-20% drop in stocks in local currency terms, will Turkish equities be a true bargain and warrant a positive stance. For now, dedicated EM equity and fixed income portfolios (both credit and local currency bonds) should continue to underweight Turkey. Our open directional trades at the moment remain: Short Turkish bank stocks Short TRY / long USD. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the following article Global automakers hail more ships as trade battles heat up. 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "Follow The Money, Not The Crowd," dated July 26, 2017, available on ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "The True Meaning Of China's Great 'Savings' Wall," dated December 20, 2017, available on ems.bcaresearch.com; and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "Is Investment Constrained By Savings? Tales Of China And Brazil," dated March 22, 2018, link is available on page 17. 4 Average of cad, aud, nzd, brl, clp & zar total return indices relative to average of jpy & chf total returns (including carry); rebased to 100 at January 2000. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Dear Client, Geopolitical analysis is a fundamental part of the investment process. My colleague, and BCA's Chief Geopolitical Strategist, Marko Papic will introduce a one-day specialized course - Geopolitics & Investing - to our current BCA Academy offerings. This special inaugural session will take place on September 26 in Toronto and is available, complimentary, only to those who sign up to BCA's 2018 Investment Conference. The course is aimed at investors and asset managers and will emphasize the key principles of our geopolitical methodology. Marko launched BCA's Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) in 2012. It is the financial industry's only dedicated geopolitical research product and focuses on the geopolitical and macroeconomic realities which constrain policymakers' options. The Geopolitics & Investing course will introduce: The constraints-based methodology that underpins BCA's Geopolitical Strategy; Best-practices for reading the news and avoiding media biases; Game theory and its application to markets; Generating "geopolitical alpha;" Manipulating data in the context of political analysis. The course will conclude with two topical and market-relevant "war games," which will tie together the methods and best-practices introduced in the course. We hope to see you there. Click here to join us! Space is limited. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist Feature We live in strange economic times. Financial markets applauded President Trump's Keynesian stimulus package, even though it will lift the U.S. structural deficit to a crisis-era level approaching 7% of GDP. Yet markets seem uncomfortable about the merest hint of fiscal stimulus in Italy, where the government finances are close to a structural balance! (Table I-1) Table I-1Italy's Structural Deficit Has Almost Disappeared Monetarists Vs Keynesians: The 21st Century Battle Monetarists Vs Keynesians: The 21st Century Battle Meanwhile the ECB must supposedly maintain negative interest rates to support a fragile Italy; and the Fed must supposedly hike rates many more times to prevent the U.S. overheating. In this Special Report, we ask: might the policy prescription of tight fiscal/loose monetary for Italy and loose fiscal/tight monetary for the U.S. be completely back to front? For Italy, Mainstream Economists Are Prescribing Wrong Remedies For many years, mainstream economists prescribed remedies for sluggish growth in southern Europe on the basis of three articles of blind faith. First, that the ailment in Italy (and previously in Spain and Portugal) arose from structural impediments to growth; second, that in response to an ailing economy, ultra-loose monetary policy is always and everywhere effective; and third, that government borrowing is at best a necessary evil and at worst a recipe for disaster; As a result, European policymakers have expended much time and energy attempting structural reforms, experimenting with ultra-loose monetary policy, and aggressively shrinking government deficits. Of course, carefully chosen structural reforms are no bad thing for an economy. But can you name an economy in the world that would not benefit from carefully chosen structural reforms? The misguided obsession with structural reforms has caused mainstream economists to miss the real cause of Italy's ailment - its crippled banking system (Feature Chart). Feature ChartItaly's Problem In One Picture: A Crippled Banking System Italy's Problem In One Picture: A Crippled Banking System Italy's Problem In One Picture: A Crippled Banking System In a normal world, the task of ensuring that private sector savings are borrowed and spent falls on the banks, which take in the savings and debt repayments and lend them out to others in the private sector who can make the best use of the funds. But if a dysfunctional banking system fails this task, the savings generated by the private sector will find no borrowers. The unrecycled funds become a leakage to the national income stream generating a deflationary headwind for the economy. This headwind will persist until the banks are repaired to fulfil their intermediation task of recycling savings and debt repayments. Since 2008, the stock of loans to Italian households and firms has been stagnant while in real terms it has fallen (Chart I-2). The upshot is that the real money supply has shrunk despite low private sector indebtedness (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4), record low interest rates and massive injections of liquidity into the banking system. Why? Chart I-2Italian Bank Lending Has Fallen In Real Terms Italian Bank Lending Has Fallen In Real Terms Italian Bank Lending Has Fallen In Real Terms Chart I-3Italy Is Less Indebted... Italy Is Less Indebted... Italy Is Less Indebted... Chart I-4...Than France ...Than France ...Than France The simple reason is that after the 2008 global financial crisis Italian banks' balance sheets were left unrepaired and undercapitalized (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). For an individual bank whose solvency is impaired, the right thing to do is shrink its loan book relative to its equity capital. But when the entire banking system is doing this simultaneously, the economy falls into a massive fallacy of composition: what is right for an individual bank becomes very deflationary when all banks are doing it together. Under these circumstances, an agent outside the fallacy of composition - namely, the government - must counter this deflationary headwind by borrowing and spending the un-recycled private sector savings. Chart I-5After The 2008 Crisis Italian Banks ##br##Were Left Unrepaired... After The 2008 Crisis Italian Banks Were Left Unrepaired... After The 2008 Crisis Italian Banks Were Left Unrepaired... Chart I-6...And ##br##Undercapitalized ...And Undercapitalized ...And Undercapitalized When To Use Fiscal Stimulus, And When Not To Deficit spending is often associated with crowding out and misallocation of resources. But when the banking system is not recycling savings and debt repayments within the private sector, the opposite is true. Government borrowing and spending causes no crowding out because the government is simply utilising the un-recycled private sector savings and debt repayments. And importantly, this deficit spending prevents a deflationary shrinkage of the broad money supply. Unfortunately, this concept has met with great resistance. Most people are aware of the size of government debt and deficits, but few people are aware of the leakage to the national income stream that occurs when a dysfunctional banking system is unable to recycle savings and debt repayments within the private sector. By not making this crucial connection, people believe that government spending would be profligate. They do not realise that if the private sector as a whole is saving money, the public sector must borrow and spend the money to keep the economy afloat. This leads to important lessons on when Keynesian stimulus is highly effective and when it is ineffective. When the solvency of the private sector - including, crucially, the banking system - is healthy, bank lending responds well to changes in interest rates (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Hence, in such a world, monetary policy should be the main tool for regulating economic activity. This describes the recent situation in most developed economies, including the U.S. Fiscal stimulus is largely ineffective because it leads to crowding out, and a sub-optimal allocation of resources. Chart I-7Lower Interest Rates Have Stimulated ##br##Bank Lending In Germany... Lower Interest Rates Have Stimulated Bank Lending In Germany... Lower Interest Rates Have Stimulated Bank Lending In Germany... Chart I-8...And ##br##France... ...And France... ...And France... However, when the private sector and/or the banking system is insolvent and dysfunctional, it is monetary stimulus that becomes ineffective. No extent of depressing interest rates and/or central bank liquidity injections will stimulate bank lending (Chart I-9). This describes the recent situation in Italy. The broad money supply becomes very dependent on government spending, making fiscal stimulus highly effective. Chart I-9...But Not In Italy ...But Not In Italy ...But Not In Italy But can monetary stimulus still help via the exchange rate channel? A weaker euro boosts the competitiveness of firms selling euro priced products in international markets. Therefore, firms exporting discretionary goods and services which are price elastic could benefit. Against this, the weaker euro makes everyone in the euro area poorer in terms of the goods and services they can buy from outside the euro area. This is particularly significant for non-discretionary items - food and energy - of which Europe is a large importer. Given that the volumes of these purchases tend to be inelastic, their price increase in euro terms can weigh down the real spending power of euro area consumers. The upshot is that a weaker exchange rate's aggregate impact on an economy depends on how the winners and losers net out. Italy might become more competitive vis-à-vis its non-euro trading partners, but Italian consumers may suffer a loss of real spending power - which would partly or wholly cancel out the benefit to the exporters. What Is The Prescription Right Now? In summary, neither the monetarists nor the Keynesians are all-powerful. In a world where the private sector is dysfunctional, the effectiveness of both monetary and fiscal policies are opposite to those in a world in which the private sector is functional. Therefore, it is crucial to recognise which of these two phases the economy is in, and then implement the economic policies, monetary or fiscal, most effective in that phase. What are the key messages right now? In Italy, the banking system is still healing and not fully functional. This suggests that for Italy, the ECB's ultra-loose monetary policy is largely ineffective whereas fiscal stimulus - even modest - would be highly effective (Chart I-10). But in the other major economies, including the U.S., the private sector is fully functional. This means that monetary policy is effective, whereas fiscal stimulus will be largely ineffective (Chart I-11). Interestingly, in a just-released paper 'Fiscal Policy in Good Times and Bad' the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco reaches exactly the same conclusion, pointing out that:1 Chart I-10A Strong Recent Connection Between ##br##Fiscal Thrust And GDP Growth In Italy A Strong Recent Connection Between Fiscal Thrust And GDP Growth In Italy A Strong Recent Connection Between Fiscal Thrust And GDP Growth In Italy Chart I-11A Weak Connection Between Fiscal##br## Thrust And GDP Growth In The U.S. A Weak Connection Between Fiscal Thrust And GDP Growth In The U.S. A Weak Connection Between Fiscal Thrust And GDP Growth In The U.S. "A number of macroeconomic forecasters expect the Tax Cuts And Jobs Act to boost 2018 GDP growth by around a percentage point... (but) the true boost is more likely to be well below that, as small as zero..." Pulling all of this together, we end with two takeaways for investors: don't bet on the ultra-loose monetary policy in the euro area continuing indefinitely; and as the San Francisco Fed advises, don't bet on President Trump's Keynesian stimulus being a game changer for U.S. growth. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the FRBSF Economic Letter 'Fiscal Policy in Good Times and Bad', Tim Mahedy and Daniel J. Wilson, July 9, 2018 available at https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2018-18.pdf

Dear Client, Geopolitical analysis is a fundamental part of the investment process. My colleague, and BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, Marko Papic will introduce a one-day specialized course - Geopolitics & Investing - to our current BCA Academy offerings. This special inaugural session will take place on September 26 in Toronto and is available, complimentary, only to those who sign up to BCA’s 2018 Investment Conference. The course is aimed at investors and asset managers and will emphasize the key principles of our geopolitical methodology. Marko launched BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) in 2012. It is the financial industry’s only dedicated geopolitical research product and focuses on the geopolitical and macroeconomic realities which constrain policymakers’ options. The Geopolitics & Investing course will introduce: The constraints-based methodology that underpins BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy; Best-practices for reading the news and avoiding media biases; Game theory and its application to markets; Generating “geopolitical alpha;” Manipulating data in the context of political analysis. The course will conclude with two topical and market-relevant “war games,” which will tie together the methods and best-practices introduced in the course. We hope to see you there. Click here to join us! Space is limited. Mathieu Savary, Foreign Exchange Strategist Highlights On a short-term basis, the dollar is massively overextended and is likely to experience a correction over the coming weeks. EM assets and currencies are the anti-dollar, and will benefit from these dynamics. As a result, oversold commodity currencies like the AUD, CAD, and NZD should be the main beneficiaries of a dollar correction within the G-10 FX space. However, this bout of dollar weakness is unlikely to mark the end of the greenback's 2018 rally. Global liquidity conditions remain very dollar bullish as the U.S. economy is absorbing liquidity from the rest of the world. This creates a scarcity of greenbacks in international markets. It is also dollar bullish because it weighs on the outlook for global growth, flattering the countercyclical nature of the USD. Gold should be the key gauge to judge whether these dynamics will be playing out as we foresee. Feature The last quarter was dominated by the dollar's strength and weakness in EM bonds; weakness that has now spread to EM equities. After such violent moves, it is now time to reflect and to try to understand what the second half of the year may have in store for the dollar. In our view, the dollar move has become overextended. As a result, we anticipate the dollar to experience a correction over the course of the coming months - a move that should benefit risk assets, and EM plays in particular. However, while this correction is likely to be playable for tactical traders, this does not spell the end of the dollar rally and EM selloff. The global liquidity backdrop supports a continuation of the trends seen over the past few months. Short-Term Momentum Extremes The vigor of the dollar rally this year along with the violence of EM bond, currency and equity selling has been eye-catching. However, we are seeing many signs that these moves may have become overdone on a short-term basis. Let's begin with EM assets. EM assets are very important due to their high sensitivity to global liquidity, global growth and the dollar. The market breadth of EM stocks is near its most oversold levels since the financial crisis. This suggests that commodity currencies are likely to experience a relief rally in the coming weeks (Chart I-1). In fact, both the MACD and 14-day RSI oscillators of EM stocks are corroborating this message, having hit some of their lowest levels since 2016 (Chart I-2). Such a rebound could be especially beneficial for the AUD, NZD, and CAD, as speculators have accumulated large short positions in these currencies (Chart I-3). Chart I-1EM Are ##br##Oversold EM Are Oversold EM Are Oversold Chart I-2EM Oscillators Point##br## To A Rebound EM Oscillators Point To A Rebound EM Oscillators Point To A Rebound Chart I-3More Reasons For The AUD ##br##And His Friends To Rebound More Reasons For The AUD And His Friends To Rebound More Reasons For The AUD And His Friends To Rebound The key for this rally to unfold will be U.S. dollar weakness - a correction that we feel is likely to materialize. From a technical perspective, our dollar capitulation index is currently flagging massively overbought conditions, a picture that our intermediate-term indicator also highlights (Chart I-4). Looking at the euro - the largest constituent of the DXY dollar index - provides a mirror image. The EUR/USD's intermediate-term momentum measure is flagging deeply oversold levels, and the paucity of up days in this pair over the recent month is also congruent with a temporary bottom (Chart I-5). In fact, shorter-term indicators like the MACD and 14-day RSI oscillators have not only reached deeply oversold readings, but have also recently begun to form positive divergences with the price of EUR/USD itself (Chart I-6). Chart I-4The Dollar Should Correct The Dollar Should Correct The Dollar Should Correct Chart I-5Euro Is The Anti-Dollar Euro Is The Anti-Dollar Euro Is The Anti-Dollar Chart I-6Positive Divergences In The Euro Positive Divergences In The Euro Positive Divergences In The Euro What could be a catalyst for a dollar correction that would also help EM assets and thus provide a welcome boost to the euro, and even more so commodity currencies? China obviously plays a key role. One of the crucial ingredients behind the recent generalized USD strength and selloff in EM-related plays has been the rapid fall in the yuan against the dollar. As we argued last week, this remains a key risk for the remainder of the year. However, we also prophesized that Beijing is concerned by the speed of the recent decline, and could try to manage the pace of CNY's fall for now.1 Early this week, the People's Bank of China began "open-mouth" operations in an effort to support the RMB, which seems to be putting a temporary floor under the renminbi. As long as the dam resists, the DXY's rally will pause. Additionally, the speed of the divergence between U.S. growth and the rest of the world has probably reached a short-term peak that will temporarily get reversed. As Chart I-7 illustrates, European, Japanese and Australian economic surprises are attempting to form a bottom, while U.S. ones have just moved below the zero line. Finally, the dollar is likely to lose one of its key supports from last quarter: the U.S. Treasury. As Chart I-8 illustrates, when the Treasury rebuilds its cash balances, the dollar does well. Essentially, through 2017, the Treasury was draining its cash balance ahead of the debt-ceiling standoff. By spending its stash of cash, the U.S. federal government was injecting reserves - in effect liquidity - into the banking system. After the debt-ceiling extension last September, the Treasury proceeded to rebuild its pile of funds, draining reserves and liquidity out of the banking system. This process is now over, and therefore this support for the dollar will continue to fade. Chart I-7Economic Surprises And The Dollar: ##br##From Friends To Foes Economic Surprises And The Dollar: From Friends To Foes Economic Surprises And The Dollar: From Friends To Foes Chart I-8The U.S. Treasury Is Done Rebalancing##br## Its Cash Balance The U.S. Treasury Is Done Rebalancing Its Cash Balance The U.S. Treasury Is Done Rebalancing Its Cash Balance Altogether, these dynamics are likely to cause the dollar to soften in the near term, especially since, as Dhaval Joshi highlighted in BCA's European Investment Strategy, currency market players are displaying a high degree of groupthink - as measured by the trade-weighted dollar's fractal dimension - and could easily be panicked by a defusing of the growth divergence theme (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Group Think In The Dollar = Hightended Risk Of Countertrend Group Think In The Dollar = Hightended Risk Of Countertrend Group Think In The Dollar = Hightended Risk Of Countertrend Bottom Line: The dominant trends of the second quarter - a strong dollar, weak commodity currencies and EM plays - are now crowded trades. With the Chinese monetary authorities trying to limit the speed of the CNY's decline, with economic surprises outside the U.S. finding a floor, and with the U.S. Treasury backing away from reducing liquidity in the banking system, a countertrend move across the dollar, EM assets, and commodity currencies is a growing possibility. Why A Countertrend Move And Not A New Trend? Our view remains that global growth has further room to decelerate, that investors have fully anticipated an increase in global inflation, and that the renminbi has greater downside. All these support our expectation that if a period of weakness in the dollar were to materialize this summer, it would be temporary.2 However, another factor plays a big role: The evolution of liquidity flows in the global economy. Essentially, at the core of this argument lies the fact that we worry that the continued growth outperformance of the U.S. along with the revival of animal spirits in this enormous economy will suck in dollar liquidity from the rest of the world. Not only will this create a scarcity of dollars, thus bidding up the price of the greenback in the process, but it will also hurt highly indebted EM economies - nations that have high dollar debts and thus need dollar liquidity to stay afloat (Chart I-10). To begin with, U.S. banks have been slowly increasing their lending to the U.S. private sector. The upsurge in business confidence, with the NFIB small business survey and the Duke CFO survey near record highs, along with the increase in U.S. capex, confirms the durability of this rebound. Additionally, U.S. households also have the wherewithal to increase their borrowings. Not only is household debt as a percentage of disposable income near a 15-year low but, most importantly, debt servicing costs as a percentage of disposable income remain at levels last seen in the early 1980s (Chart I-11). Moreover, banks are still easing their lending standards on mortgages - which represent nearly 70% of household credit - and mortgage quality as measured by FICO scores are still well above levels that prevailed prior to the financial crisis. Chart I-10EM Dollar Debt Is High EM##br## Have A Lot Of Dollar Debt EM Dollar Debt Is High EM Have A Lot Of Dollar Debt EM Dollar Debt Is High EM Have A Lot Of Dollar Debt Chart I-11U.S. Households Have The ##br##Wherewithal To Take On Debt U.S. Households Have The Wherewithal To Take On Debt U.S. Households Have The Wherewithal To Take On Debt This is important, because when banks increase their loan books, they run down their liquidity (Chart I-12). To be more specific, rising loan issuance results in banks selling securities on their balance sheets and running down their cash balances. As Chart I-13 illustrates, when the cash and security inventories of U.S. commercial banks decrease, the U.S. dollar rallies. This relationship was very strong from 1980 to 2008 but loosened for two years during the financial crisis. Since 2010, it has re-established itself. The probability is therefore high that it will remain in place, and be a dollar-bullish factor over the medium term. Chart I-12Rapid Loan Growth Means Less Liquid Rapid Loan Growth Means Less Liquid Rapid Loan Growth Means Less Liquid Chart I-13The Dollar Abhors Liquid Bank Balance Sheets The Dollar Abhors Liquid Bank Balance Sheets The Dollar Abhors Liquid Bank Balance Sheets Moreover, by looking at the holdings of securities on banks' balance sheets, we can see that since 2012, they have even provided a leading signal on the dollar. This relationship currently points toward additional dollar strength (Chart I-14). The tighter relationship between securities holdings and the dollar than between total liquidity on banks' balance sheets and the dollar is due to the fact that securities can be re-hypothecated, and therefore can create a much greater supply of dollars in offshore markets than cash alone. The dollar-bullish liquidity backdrop is not limited to banks' balance sheets alone. Long-term portfolio flows into the U.S. have increased substantially in recent months, but still remain well below previous peaks (Chart I-15, top panel). Moreover, as the U.S.'s growing energy independence has prevented the trade deficit from expanding, the American basic balance of payments is now back in positive territory (Chart I-15, bottom panel). This too suggests that the U.S. is absorbing more dollars than it is supplying to the global economy. Chart I-14Declining Security Holdings Of Banks##br## Point To A Surge In The Dollar Declining Security Holdings Of Banks Point To A Surge In The Dollar Declining Security Holdings Of Banks Point To A Surge In The Dollar Chart I-15Money Is Flowing##br## Out Of The U.S. Money Is Flowing Out Of The U.S. Money Is Flowing Out Of The U.S. This reality is mirrored by the link between the bond issuance of U.S. firms and the dollar. When U.S. businesses increase their issuance of bonds, this tends to result in a strong dollar and weak majors (Chart I-16). The vigor of the U.S. economy and the deregulatory tendencies of the Trump administration suggest that U.S. companies could continue to issue more bonds, which will drag more liquidity out of the rest of the world and support the dollar in the process. The profit repatriation initiated by President Trump's tax reform is also supportive of the dollar. As Chart I-17 illustrates, when U.S. entities repatriate funds from abroad, the dollar tends to strengthen. Today, they are doing so with more gusto than ever. It is important to remember that this is not a reflection of American firms necessarily buying dollars directly. After all, a lot of their foreign earnings are already held in USD. Instead, it reflects the fact that when U.S. firms bring back their dollars into the U.S., the supply of high-quality collateral available in offshore markets declines, which means that acquiring dollars becomes more expensive.3 Chart I-16Rising Bond Issuance Helps The Dollar Rising Bond Issuance Helps The Dollar Rising Bond Issuance Helps The Dollar Chart I-17Trump's Tax Repatriation Is Dollar Bullish Trump's Tax Repatriation Is Dollar Bullish Trump's Tax Repatriation Is Dollar Bullish Finally, this decline in dollar liquidity is starting to be felt abroad, a phenomenon magnified by the slowdown in global trade. Global reserves are not increasing as fast as they were in 2017. As a result, a key component of global dollar-based liquidity, the Federal Reserve's accumulation of custodial holdings of securities, is also declining fast - a decrease exacerbated by the fact that the Fed is curtailing the size of its own balance sheet (Chart I-18). Historically, a decline in dollar-based liquidity is not only associated with lower global growth and a stronger greenback, but also with falling EM asset prices, EM currencies, and commodity currencies. Gold prices will provide insight on whether global liquidity remains favorable to the dollar and negative for EM assets. As Chart I-19 illustrates, gold has already broken down an intermediate upward sloping trend line, but is rebounding against the primary trend in place since the early days of 2016. If this rebound peters off and gold breaks below this primary trend line, it will be a clear indication that the decline in liquidity outside the U.S. is having a nefarious impact on global growth. This headwind to global economic activity will support additional dollar strength and asset price weakness. Chart I-18Declinning Dollar Bond Liquidity Declinning Dollar Bond Liquidity Declinning Dollar Bond Liquidity Chart I-19Litmus Test For Liquidity Litmus Test For Liquidity Litmus Test For Liquidity Bottom Line: The dollar faces near-term downside risk, but this move is likely to prove to be countertrend in nature as the global liquidity backdrop remains dollar bullish. The U.S. economy is currently sucking in global liquidity from the rest of the world, which is creating a scarcity of dollars in offshore markets. Not only is this scarcity inherently dollar bullish, but it also weighs on global growth, further flattering the dollar - a currency that performs well when global growth softens. As a result, while short-term investors should hedge some of their long-dollar exposure over the coming weeks, longer-term investors should use this correction to accumulate more dollars in order to benefit from another leg of the dollar's rally this fall. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World", dated June 29, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Reports, titled "What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World", dated June 19, 2018, "Inflation Is In The Price", dated June 15, 2018, and "This Time Is NOT Different", dated May 25, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "It's Not My Cross To Bear", dated October 27, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was mixed: ISM manufacturing increased to 60.2 from 58.7; ISM prices paid declined to 76.8 from 79.5; Continuing and initial jobless claims both increased, disappointing expectations; Factory orders grew by 0.4% in monthly terms. After hitting deeply overbought levels, the dollar is losing momentum and risks correcting as economic surprises in the U.S. continue to decline while global ones are finding a floor, for now. Even if the dollar were to correct, budding inflationary pressures and higher growth in the U.S. are likely to prompt the Fed to hike at a faster rate than the rest of the developed world, providing the greenback with substantial upside. Report Links: What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 This Time Is NOT Different - May 25, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 European data was mixed: Manufacturing PMI improved for Italy, declined for France and remained unchanged for Germany, while decreasing for the euro area as a whole; Euro area retail sales increased by 1.4%, less than the expected 1.5%; Speculations about the ECB's actions are causing substantial movements in markets. The French 5/30 yield curve flattened by about 30 bps at rumors of an "Operation Twist" by the ECB, following the end of the APP in December. However, the euro has remained stable for around a month now, suggesting that markets have already discounted a substantially easier monetary policy. Despite this, the current slowdown in global growth is likely to have a further detrimental effect on the euro. Report Links: What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Housing starts yearly growth surprised to the upside, coming in at 1.3%. However, the Markit Services PMI came in at 51.4, underperforming expectations. Moreover, consumer confidence surprised to the downside, coming in at 43.7. USD/JPY has rallied by roughly 0.5% this past week. Overall we continue to be positive on the yen tactically, given that trade tensions as well as tightening in China should continue to create a risk-off environment where the yen thrives. However, on a longer term basis we maintain our bearish stance, as the BoJ will keep its ultra-dovish monetary policy in order to kick start Japan's moribund inflation. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been positive: Mortgage approvals outperformed expectations, coming in at 64.526 thousand. Moreover, Construction PMI surprised to the upside, coming in at 53.1. Finally, Markit Services PMI also outperformed expectations, coming in at 55.1. GBP/USD has risen by roughly 1% since last week. Overall, we expect that cable will continue to depreciate, as any pullback in the dollar will likely be temporary. Nevertheless, the pound should outperform the euro, given that Europe will likely suffer more from emerging market weakness than the U.K. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Australian data was disappointing: The AiG Performance of Manufacturing Index declined slightly from 57.5 to 57.4; RBA Commodity Index in SDR terms grew by 6.6% only, less than the expected 7.5%; Building permits contracted by 3.2% on a monthly basis; The trade balance came out less than expected at AUD 827 million. In its latest monetary policy statement, the RBA highlighted that Australian monetary conditions have tightened, noting lower housing credit growth and tighter lending standards. As 85% of home loans are variable-rate mortgages, the highly indebted Australian households are extremely susceptible to a direct tightening in interest rates. Furthermore, wage growth at 2.1% and inflation at 1.9% implies a paltry 0.2% real wage growth, adding additional risk to household financial conditions. Alongside a clouded global growth outlook, the RBA is therefore unlikely to hike in this environment anytime soon. Report Links: What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 The kiwi has been relatively flat this week. Overall, even if a short-term bounce is likely over the coming weeks, we continue to be bearish on this cross, as commodity currencies like the NZD or the AUD should suffer in the current risk-off environment where liquidity is scarce. However, the New Zealand dollar will probably outperform the Australian dollar. After all, Australia is more exposed to the Chinese Industrial Cycle than New Zealand, being a large base metals exporter. Meanwhile, we remain bearish on the NZD on a longer term basis, as the new government will restrict immigration and implement a dual mandate for the RBNZ, both measures which will lower the neutral rate in New Zealand. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Despite the rapid increase in oil prices, the Canadian dollar has not been able to keep up. NAFTA tensions are placing downward pressure on the loonie, despite the Canadian economy's rosy conditions. The most recent Business Outlook Survey by the BoC shows increasing economic activity with a robust sales outlook. In addition, capacity utilization is becoming ever tighter, with the amount of firms finding it difficult to meet unexpected demand at the highest level since the history of the data. Furthermore, the labor market continues to tighten, as hiring plans continue to trend upward. This is likely to keep the BoC somewhat hawkish, despite trade worries. The strength of the Canadian economy is therefore likely to lift the CAD above other G10 currencies this year, except against the greenback. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: The KOF leading indicator outperformed expectations, coming in at 101.7. Moreover, the SVME PMI index also surprised to the upside, coming in at 61.6. However, retail sales yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at -0.1%. Finally, headline inflation came in line with expectations, coming in at 1.1%. EUR/CHF has risen by roughly 0.5% this week. Overall, we continue to be bullish on a tactical basis on the franc, given that trade tensions and the policy tightening in China should ultimately keep the current risk-off in place. That being said we are cyclically bearish on the CHF, as the SNB will continue to maintain an extraordinarily easy monetary policy stance in order to prevent an appreciating franc to prevent the Swiss central bank from reaching its inflation target. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been positive: Retail sales growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.8%. Moreover, registered unemployment continued to be very low at 2.2%, in line with expectations. USD/NOK has fallen by nearly 1% since last week, partly due to the rise in oil price, caused by a large draw in inventories. Overall we continue to be bullish on this cross, given that we maintain that the U.S. dollar will continue rising. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 A shift in stance at the Riksbank has been the major force behind the SEK's appreciation of around 2% against both USD and EUR in the past couple of days. The upward revision of CPIF inflation from 1.9% to 2.1% in both 2018 and 2019, and the downward revision of the unemployment rate were particularly important. In addition, three policymakers expressed hawkish views: Deputy Governors Flodén and Skingsley suggested a hike in October or December, while Ohlsson advocated for a higher repo rate of 25 bps now in response to stronger economic growth in both Sweden and abroad. Consistently, these members expressed similar opinions on the termination of foreign exchange interventions, as inflation is near its target. However, the underlying dovish intonations of Stegan Ingves still lurk within the Riksbank, presenting possible downside risk in the short-term. Nevertheless, these views support our longer-term bullish view of the SEK vis-à-vis the euro, based on diverging rate differentials. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights Domino dynamics continue escalating within the EM universe confirming that a major bear market is underway. Several global cyclical market segments have recently experienced technical breakdowns. This confirms that global growth is slowing. It is not too late to short/sell EM risk assets. We reiterate the long Indian / short Chinese banks equity trade. Feature The selloff in global risk assets continues to exhibit a pattern of falling dominos. It began with the breakdown in the weakest spots of the EM world, Turkey and Argentina, and then spread to Brazil and Indonesia. Only weeks later it hit other vulnerable EM markets such as South Africa. During this period, north Asian stocks and currencies - Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese - displayed resilience. It was tempting to argue that the EM selloff was being driven by idiosyncratic risks and was limited to current account deficit countries vulnerable to U.S. Federal Reserve tightening. However, in recent weeks these north Asian markets have plunged - making the EM selloff largely broad-based and pervasive. In our June 14 report,1 we argued that major and drawn-out financial market downturns usually occur in phases and often resemble a domino effect. Since then, the domino effect has escalated confirming our bias that EMs are in a major bear market. Several important markets and cyclical market segments have recently broken down, and investors should heed messages from them: Copper prices fell below their 200-day moving average; they have also broken down the trading range that had persisted since last September (Chart I-1, top panel). The precious metals price index seems to be sliding through the floor of its trading range of the past 18 months (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Global cyclical equity sectors and sub-sectors such as mining, steel, chemicals and industrials have also broken their 200-day moving averages in absolute term (Chart I-2). They have also been underperforming the global equity index, which is consistent with the global trade slowdown that is beginning to escalate. Chart I-1Breakdown in Metals Prices Breakdown in Metals Prices Breakdown in Metals Prices Chart I-2Global Equities: Cyclicals Have Broken Down Global Equities: Cyclicals Have Broken Down Global Equities: Cyclicals Have Broken Down Although Chinese PMI data have not been particularly weak, anecdotal evidence from the ground suggests that the credit tightening of the past 18 months is taking its toll on China's financial system and economy. There are numerous reports about bankruptcies of Peer-to-peer lending platforms and struggles in other parts of the shadow banking system. The selloff in Chinese onshore A shares confirms this. Presently, this market has become less driven by retail investors as it was back in 2015. Hence, one can argue that portfolio managers on the mainland are selling their stocks because they believe economic conditions are worsening. Meanwhile, international investors have so far been more sanguine. Importantly, EM corporate and sovereign U.S. dollar bond yields are rising, heralding lower share prices (Chart I-3). Bond yields are shown inverted on this chart. The top panel is for EM overall and the bottom panel is for Asia only. Chart I-3EM Credit Markets Entail More Downside In EM Share Prices EM Credit Markets Entail More Downside In EM Share Prices EM Credit Markets Entail More Downside In EM Share Prices Chart I-4EM Versus U.S.: New Lows Lie Ahead EM Versus U.S.: New Lows Lie Ahead EM Versus U.S.: New Lows Lie Ahead Finally, the resilience of the U.S. equity index and corporate spreads has been due to robust domestic demand - the slowdown in global trade has not affected the U.S. However, odds are that the current global selloff continues to develop in a typical domino fashion. If so, the U.S. markets - equities and credit - will be the last dominos to fall but they will outperform their global peers. It is very unlikely that American stocks and credit markets will be able to sail through this EM storm unscathed. Notably, the resilience of the S&P 500 can be attributed to 10 large-cap stocks that are extremely overbought and likely expensive. This gives us more confidence to argue that this EM riot will meaningfully affect U.S. equity and credit markets. The link will be the U.S. dollar. The greenback will continue its unrelenting rally, which will trim U.S. multinationals' profits and weigh on the S&P 500. Bottom Line: EM risk assets are in a major bear market, and there is still a lot of downside. It is not too late to sell or underweight EM. This is despite EM's relative performance versus the S&P 500 is back to its early 2016 lows, as is the JP Morgan EM currency index (Chart I-4). News lows lie ahead. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "EM: Sustained Decoupling, Or Domino Effect?" dated June 14, 2018 available on page 17. Chart II-1More Upside In Long Indian/Short ##br##Chinese Bank Stocks More Upside In Long Indian/Short Chinese Bank Stocks More Upside In Long Indian/Short Chinese Bank Stocks Reiterating Long Indian / Short Chinese Banks Trade This week we revisit our long Indian / short Chinese banks trade that we initiated on January 17.1 The trade is up only 5.7% since inception (Chart II-1), and with more monetary policy easing occurring in China and the recent sharp rise in non-performing loans (NPL) in India, it is appropriate to reassess this recommendation. Having updated the stress tests on the largest public banks in both countries and performed a new stress test on five Indian private banks, we are reiterating our strategy of being long Indian / short Chinese banks. A Perspective On Credit Cycles In India And China Both India and China have gone through major credit binges over the past 10-15 years, albeit over different time periods (Chart II-2A and Chart II-2B). Chart II-2ACredit Boom Was Smaller In India...Than In China Credit Boom Was Smaller In India...Than In China Credit Boom Was Smaller In India...Than In China Chart II-2BCredit Boom Was Smaller In India...Than In China Credit Boom Was Smaller In India...Than In China Credit Boom Was Smaller In India...Than In China India's public banks have, in recent years, recognized bad loans and provisioned meaningfully for them. Non-performing loans (NPLs) for Indian public banks now stand at a whopping 15% of total outstanding loans, while provisioning levels have spiked to 7% of total loans (Chart II-3). Chart II-3NPLs And Their Provisions: India And China NPLs And Their Provisions: India And China NPLs And Their Provisions: India And China By comparison, Chinese public banks - the largest five banks, excluding policy banks, where the central government owns 70-80% of equity - are at the early stages of dealing with their troubled assets. Their NPLs and provisions stand at mere 1.8% and 3.3% of total outstanding loans, respectively (Chart II-3). Does such a wide disparity in NPL ratios between Chinese and Indian banks make sense? We do not think so. It is unlikely that Indian public banks are more poorly managed vis-a-vis Chinese public banks. All are run by government-appointed officials and are equally prone to politically driven and inefficient lending. Further, the magnitude of the Chinese credit boom since 2009 was considerably greater than India's during the 2003-2012 period. It is therefore highly unlikely that the resulting NPLs are substantially smaller in China than in India. In fact, several cases of Chinese banks hiding bad assets have recently been publicized.2 We strongly believe this phenomenon is widespread on the mainland, and that NPLs among Chinese public banks are being grossly underreported. It's All About Regulation The true vindication for this disparity lies in the drastically different stances that financial regulators in both countries have adopted to deal with the non-performing and stressed assets that their banks sit on. The Chinese authorities have been exhibiting greater forbearance with their commercial banks. For instance, in March, they lowered the provision coverage ratio for commercial banks. This is ameliorating Chinese commercial banks' short-term profitability and capitalization ratios. In brief, Chinese regulators have been very accommodative by allowing commercial banks to pursue "window dressing" of their financial statements and ratios. Indian regulators, by contrast, have been exerting relentless pressure on their banks to swiftly deal with their stressed assets at the cost of short-term profitability. For instance, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) recently introduced an extremely stringent framework for the recognition and resolution of NPLs. Indian commercial banks now have to immediately recognize stressed assets and find a resolution within 180 days. Failure to resolve a stressed account forces banks to take the defaulter to court in order to initiate bankruptcy procedures. Bottom Line: India has taken painful measures to push its banks to clean up their balance sheets. By comparison, China has so far been kicking the can down the road with respect to its banking system. As a result, the banks' balance sheet cleansing cycle is much more advanced in India than in China. Public Banks Stress Tests Below we present our updated stress tests which we performed on India's top seven public banks and China's top five public commercial banks (excluding policy banks). We used the following assumptions in our analysis (Tables II-1 and II-2): Table II-1Stress Test Of Top 7 Indian Public Banks Mind The Breakdowns Mind The Breakdowns Table II-2Stress Test Of Top 5 Chinese Public Banks Mind The Breakdowns Mind The Breakdowns Indian non-performing risk-weighted assets (NPA) to rise to 16% (optimistic), 18% (baseline), and 19% (pessimistic), up from 15% currently. For China, we assume NPAs to rise to 10% (optimistic), 12% (baseline), and 13% (pessimistic), up from 1.6% currently. Provided the magnitude and duration of China's credit boom has considerably surpassed that of India, the assumption of this stress test that NPAs will rise to 12% in China but 18% in India implies that Chinese public banks allocated credit much better than their Indian peers. Hence, this exercise in no way favored Indian banks over Chinese ones. We used risk-weighted assets to calculate losses. Risk-weighting adjusts bank assets for their riskiness which in turn makes comparisons between the two banking systems more sensible. Finally, we assumed a 30% recovery ratio (RR) for both countries. The RR on Chinese banks' NPLs from 2001 to 2005 was 20%. This occurred amid much stronger nominal and real growth. Thus, a 30% RR rate today is not low. The outcome of the tests are as follows: Under the baseline scenario of 18% NPA in India and 12% NPA in China, losses post recovery and provisions amount to 1.8 trillion rupees in the former (1.3% of GDP) and RMB 3.3 trillion in the latter (3.9% of GDP) (Tables II-1 and II-2, column 6). These losses would impair 41% of equity capital in India and 44% in China (Tables II-1 and II-2, column 7). Adjusting the current price-to-book value (PBV) ratios for public banks in both countries to the equity impairment under the baseline scenario lifts their PBV ratios to 1.5 in India and 1.7 in China (Tables II-1 and II-2, column 8). Assuming a 1.3 fair PBV ratio3 for banks in both countries, Indian banks appear overvalued by 15% and Chinese banks by 29% (Tables II-1 and II-2, last column). In other words, after the recognition and provisioning of reasonable levels of NPA, Indian public banks appear less overvalued than their Chinese counterparts. These results make sense to us; Indian public banks have been provisioning aggressively for their troubled assets, and bad news is somewhat discounted in their share prices. Chart II-4Loan Write-Offs Have Been Much ##br##Greater In India Than In China Mind The Breakdowns Mind The Breakdowns Remarkably, Indian public banks have also been writing off more bad loans than their Chinese counterparts. Chart II-4 shows cumulated write-offs of these public banks in India and China since 2010. Bad asset write-offs have so far amounted to RMB 1.2 trillion in China and 3 trillion rupees in India. This is equivalent to 2% and 8% as a share of current risk-weighted assets, respectively. Another way to compare and analyze NPA cycles between two countries is to assess the progress that each country has made toward resolving the full amount of outstanding bad assets - i.e. a full NPA cycle. We define a full NPA cycle in the following way: Total NPA losses under our baseline scenario, plus cumulated past write-offs. In order to measure progress toward resolving the full NPA cycle, we take the ratio of the stock of provisions plus cumulated write-offs and divide that by the full NPA cycle losses (i.e. [provisions + write-offs] / full NPA cycle losses). In India, assuming that NPAs on its largest public banks reach 18% of risk weighted assets - then the full NPA cycle for India would amount to 9.4 trillion rupees, or 26% of current risk-weighted assets (i.e. 6.4 trillion rupees in NPA remaining plus 3 trillion in write-offs made). Meanwhile, India's public banks' progress amounts to 5.6 trillion rupees. This is equal to 60% of India's full NPA cycle. By contrast, Chinese public banks' full NPA cycle would amount to RMB 8 trillion (or 14% of risk-weighted assets) under our baseline scenario. Further, China's banks progress amounts to RMB 2.6 trillion. This is equivalent to only 33% of the full NPA cycle in China. Hence, Indian public banks are closer to their peak NPA cycle versus their Chinese counterparts. Note that this particular analysis assumes no recovery in bad loans in either country. Further, the above analysis does not attune for the fact that Chinese banks have more risky off-balance sheet assets than their Indian peers. Incorporating off-balance sheet assets and liabilities would make the stress tests much more favorable for Indian public banks relative to China. Stress Test For India's Private Banks Private banks are a part of our long Indian / short Chinese banks trade. Indian private banks are also not insulated from regulatory clean-up efforts. In recent years, these lenders significantly boosted their credit to the consumer and service sectors. Higher than normal defaults have not yet transpired but this is a scenario that cannot be ruled out given the frantic pace of lending (Chart II-5). We performed a stress test on five4 large Indian private banks as well (Table II-3): Chart II-5India: Consumer And Service ##br##Credit Is Booming India: Consumer And Service Credit Is Booming India: Consumer And Service Credit Is Booming Table II-3Stress Test Of 5 Large Indian Private Banks Mind The Breakdowns Mind The Breakdowns We assumed the following NPA scenarios: 6% (optimistic), 8% (baseline), and 9% (pessimistic), up from 5% currently. Similar to the above analysis, we used risk-weighted assets to calculate asset losses, though we used a recovery ratio of 50% for private banks instead of 30% for public banks. The basis is that private banks' lending has been concentrated on consumer loans and mortgages and the recovery ratio on these loans will likely be higher - especially taking into consideration the quality of collateral. Our results are as follows: Under the baseline scenario of an 8% NPA ratio, 7% of these private banks' equity would be impaired (Table II-3, column 7). The adjusted PBV would move to 3.9. This compares to a fair value of 3.3 for Indian private banks (Table II-3, column 8), which is the historical PBV mean of private banks in India. In other words, Indian private banks are overvalued by 18% - slightly more than their public peers (Table II-3, column 9). Bottom Line: Indian private banks are overvalued too but less so than Chinese public banks. Investment Conclusions We reiterate our long Indian / short Chinese banks equity trade, initiated on January 17. We track the performance of this recommendation using the BSE's Bankex index for India and the MSCI Investable bank index for China in common currency terms - currency unhedged. In addition, among Chinese-listed banks, we maintain our short small / long large banks (Chart II-6). Smaller banks are more leveraged as well as exposed to non-standard assets and regulatory tightening than large public banks. Finally, the Indian bourse's relative performance against the EM equity benchmark negatively correlates with oil prices - the oil price is shown inverted on this chart (Chart II-7). Chart II-6Stay Short Chinese Small / Long Large Banks Stay Short Chinese Small/Long Large Banks Stay Short Chinese Small/Long Large Banks Chart II-7India's Relative Equity Performance To EM And Oil Prices India's Relative Equity Performance To EM And Oil Prices India's Relative Equity Performance To EM And Oil Prices Given BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service expects oil prices to drop meaningfully in the second half of this year,5 this should help Indian equities outperform their EM peers. Besides, Indian banks are more advanced than many of their EM peers in terms of bad assets recognition and provisioning and that should also help the Indian bourse outperform the EM overall equity index in common currency terms. We reiterate our overweight stance on Indian equities within a fully invested EM equity portfolio. In contrast, we are neutral on China's investable stock index's relative performance versus the EM stock index. The main reason why we have not underweighted the Chinese bourse - despite our negative view on China - is the exchange rate; the potential downside in the value of the RMB versus the U.S. dollar in the next six months is less than potential downside in many other EM exchange rates. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "Long Indian / Short Chinese Banks" dated January 17, 2018 available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the following article: http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2139904/pressure-chinas-banks-report-bad-debt-good-news-foreign 3 It is the average PBV ratio for EM banks since 2011. 4 HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank, Axis Bank, Yes Bank, and IDFC Bank. 5 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "China's Crude Oil Inventories: A Slippery Slope" dated June 21, 2018 available on page 17. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations