Base Metals & Iron Ore

Highlights The slowdown in global industrial activity appears to have bottomed. This, along with an apparent shared desire for a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war, points toward a measured recovery in manufacturing and global trade, which will contribute to higher iron-ore and steel demand beginning in 1H20. A trade-war ceasefire, should it endure, will reduce global economic uncertainty. Along with continued monetary accommodation from systematically important central banks, reduced economic uncertainty will boost global growth and industrial-commodity demand generally by allowing the USD to weaken. We expect Beijing policymakers to remain focused on keeping GDP growth above 6.0% p.a. To that end, we believe a boost in infrastructure spending next year is likely, which also will be bullish for steel demand. Given China’s growing share of global steel production, we expect price differentials for high-grade iron ore – most of which comes from Brazil – to widen as steel demand increases next year. Given this view, we are initiating a strategic iron-ore spread trade at tonight’s close: Getting long December 2020 high-grade (65% Fe) futures traded on the Singapore Exchange vs. short the benchmark-grade (62% Fe) December 2020 futures traded on the CME. We recommend a 20% stop-loss on this recommendation. Feature Iron ore and steel demand will get a lift from the rebound our proprietary Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index has been forecasting for the past few months (Chart of the Week). The GIA index is designed to pick up changes in Chinese industrial activity, given its outsized influence on world industrial output, and also makes use of trade data, FX rates, and global manufacturing data. The rebound we are expecting will get a fillip from an apparent shared desire for a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war, which, based on media reports, is close to being agreed. Should this ceasefire prove to be durable, it would contribute to a lowering of global economic policy uncertainty (GEPU), which, as we have shown recently, has kept the USD well bid to the detriment of industrial-commodity demand.1 Chart of the WeekBCA GIA Index Pick-Up Points To Higher Global Steel Demand BCA GIA Index Pick-Up Points To Higher Global Steel Demand BCA GIA Index Pick-Up Points To Higher Global Steel Demand While we do expect economic uncertainty to decline next year, it will remain elevated due to continued Sino-US trade tensions – even if a “phase-one” deal is agreed – ongoing hostilities in the Persian Gulf, and popular discontent with the political status quo globally. As global economic uncertainty fades, the USD broad trade-weighted index for goods (TWIBG) will fall, which will bolster EM GDP growth, and a recovery in global trade next year (Chart 2). If, as media reports suggest, this so-called “phase-one” agreement includes a relaxation – or complete removal – of tariffs by the US on Chinese imports, we would expect manufacturing activity to pick up as Chinese manufacturers spin-up capacity to meet demand. A reduction in tariffs also will lessen the deadweight loss they imposed on US households, which will support higher consumption.2 Chart 2Reduced Global Economic Uncertainty Bolsters Global Trade Volumes, EM GDP Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift That said, economic uncertainty still remains high. This uncertainty is destructive of demand and will remain a key risk factor in 2020. While we do expect economic uncertainty to decline next year, it will remain elevated due to continued Sino-US trade tensions – even if a “phase-one” deal is agreed – ongoing hostilities in the Persian Gulf, and popular discontent with the political status quo globally. China’s Steel Demand Holds Up In Trade War China accounts for more than half of global steel production and consumption, and the lion’s share of seaborne iron-ore consumption (Chart 3). This makes its steel industry critically important to the global economy, and a key barometer of industrial activity worldwide. With global industrial activity bottoming and moving higher, and the USD expected to weaken, we expect iron ore demand and steel production in China to move higher next year as domestic and global demand for steel rises. China’s apparent steel demand held up fairly well during the slowdown observed in manufacturing and in commodity demand growth globally, averaging 8% y/y growth ytd (Chart of the Week, bottom panel). It now appears to be stalling in the wake of the global manufacturing slowdown. In addition, Chinese credit stimulus remains weak, contrary to expectations. However, with global industrial activity bottoming and moving higher, and the USD expected to weaken, we expect iron ore demand and steel production in China to move higher next year as domestic and global demand for steel rises.3 Chart 3China Dominates Global Steel Production and Consumption China Dominates Global Steel Production and Consumption China Dominates Global Steel Production and Consumption Chart 4Construction, Real Estate Strength Offset Lower Chinese Auto Production Construction, Real Estate Strength Offset Lower Chinese Auto Production Construction, Real Estate Strength Offset Lower Chinese Auto Production Greater demand for steel by the construction and real estate sectors offset lower consumption by the automobile industry in China this year, as manufacturing and trade slowed globally (Chart 4). Overall, apparent demand is still growing (Chart 5), which will continue to support iron ore imports, even though domestic production of low-grade ore picked up as steelmakers’ margins tightened earlier in the year (Chart 6). Chart 5China"s Apparent Steel Demand Growth Holds Up During Industrial Slowdown China"s Apparent Steel Demand Growth Holds Up During Industrial Slowdown China"s Apparent Steel Demand Growth Holds Up During Industrial Slowdown Chart 6China Iron Ore Imports Remain Stout China Iron Ore Imports Remain Stout China Iron Ore Imports Remain Stout Chinese imports from Brazil have rebounded following the Brumadinho tailings dam collapse in January at Vale’s Córrego do Feijão iron ore mine, which killed close to 300 people. The collapse in margins from steel mills combined with outages to Brazil and Australia high-grade ore exports led to a rise in imports and domestic production of low-grade iron ore. High-Grade Iron Ore Favored; Policy Uncertainty Persists Our overall view for industrial commodities – iron ore, steel, base metals and crude oil – is constructive but not wildly bullish going into next year. Our oil view, for example, calls for a rally in the average price of crude oil next year of ~ 10% from current levels for Brent crude oil, the world benchmark. While we expect global monetary stimulus to offset much of the tightening of financial conditions brought on by the Fed’s rate hikes last year, and China’s de-leveraging campaign of 2017-18, elevated economic uncertainty will keep the USD better bid that it otherwise would be absent the Sino-US trade war and global economic policy uncertainty. This translates into weaker commodity demand, generally, as a strong USD raises local-currency costs for consumers and lowers local-currency production costs for producers. At the margin, both push commodity prices lower. On a relative basis, we expect the more efficient, less-polluting technology likely will be called on to meet higher steel demand – in China and globally – next year, which means higher-grade iron ore will be favored by Chinese steel mills as profitability improves. For iron ore and steel in particular, environmental considerations also are important, given the Chinese government's “Blue Skies Policy” aimed at reducing the country’s high levels of air pollution.4 This policy has led to the forced retirement of older, highly polluting steelmaking capacity, which has been replaced with newer, less-polluting technology that favors high-grade iron ore. However, the application of regulations designed to reduce pollution has been uneven, and still relies on local compliance, which has been spotty. We expect demand for high-grade ore will increase as global manufacturing and trade also recovers. On a relative basis, we expect the more efficient, less-polluting technology likely will be called on to meet higher steel demand – in China and globally – next year, which means higher-grade iron ore will be favored by Chinese steel mills as profitability improves. The restoration of high-grade exports from Brazil means this ore will be available. It is worthwhile noting that these steelmakers account for an increasing share of global capacity. For this reason, we expect demand for high-grade ore will increase as global manufacturing and trade also recovers (Chart 7). Given our view, at tonight’s close we will get long December 2020 high-grade iron-ore futures (65% Fe) traded on the Singapore Exchange vs. short benchmark-grade iron-ore futures (62% Fe) traded on the CME. Both are quoted in USD/MT and settle basis Chinese port-delivery (CFR) indexes in cash. Given the uncertain nature of the durability and depth of the ceasefire currently being negotiated by the US and China, we will keep a stop-loss on this position of 20%. Bottom Line: China’s steel demand has held up relatively well despite the global slowdown in manufacturing and trade. Given our expectation for a pick-up in global growth – in response to global monetary and fiscal stimulus and lower economic uncertainty in the wake of a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war – we expect Chinese steel demand to resume growing. This will support iron ore prices, particularly for high-grade ores. On the back of this expectation, we are recommending an iron-ore spread trade, going long high-grade futures vs. short benchmark-grade iron ore futures. Chart 7High-Grade Iron Ore Should Outperform Strategically High-Grade Iron Ore Should Outperform Strategically High-Grade Iron Ore Should Outperform Strategically   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight. Bloomberg reported China is looking to invest between $5-$10 billion in the Saudi Aramco IPO through various vehicles. Such an investment would give China a deeper stake in the Kingdom’s oil industry, and a hedge to price shocks. In addition, it could open the way for deeper investment in the Saudi oil and petchems industries. For KSA, as we have argued in the past, a deepening of China’s investment and involvement in the Kingdom’s economy would diversify the states that have a vested interest in ensuring its safety.5 We will be updating our analysis of China’s pivot to the Middle East, and KSA’s pivot to Asia next week. Separately, we the last of our Brent backwardation trades – i.e., long December 2019 Brent vs. short December 2020 Brent – was closed last week with a gain of 110.8%. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper prices are up 6% vs. last month, supported by supply-side worries in Chile and, more recently, easing trade tensions. Cyclically, we believe copper prices are turning up – spurred by easy monetary conditions and fiscal stimulus directed at infrastructure and construction spending. Most of our key commodity-demand indicators have bottomed and are suggesting EM demand growth will move up. This supports a year-end base metal rally. Precious Metals: Neutral. A risk-on sentiment fueled by expectation the U.S. and China will sign a trade deal weighs on gold’s safe-haven demand. Prices fell 2% since last week. Additionally, U.S. 10-year bond yields shot higher – pushing gold prices lower – on Tuesday following a stronger-than-expect ISM services PMI data release. Gold-backed ETF holdings reached a new record in September at 2,855 MT (up 377 MT ytd), surpassing the December 2012 peak. A reversal in investors’ sentiment towards gold could send prices down. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA reported that 52% of the U.S. corn has been harvested, a 13 percentage point increase relative to last week, yet the figure came shy of analysts’ expectation and far below the 2014-2018 average of 75%. On a weekly basis, corn prices are still down 2% due to drier weather forecast. Soybean harvest did better reaching 75%, and meeting expectations. Soybean price is almost unchanged on a weekly basis, despite having edged higher earlier in the week on the back of rising expectations the US and China will agree on a ceasefire in the ongoing trade war.   Footnotes 1     We measure this uncertainty using the Baker-Bloom-Davis Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) index. This is a GDP-weighted index of newspaper headlines containing a list of words related economic uncertainty. Newspapers from 20 countries representing almost 80% of global GDP are scoured for reports reflecting economic uncertainty. Please see our October 17 and October 31, 2019, reports Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth and Global Financial Conditions Support Higher Commodity Demand for the original research on this topic. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2    We discuss deadweight losses to US households arising from the tariffs in Waiting To Get Long Copper, In China’s Steel Slipstream, published August 29, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3    BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy expects China’s business cycle likely will bottom in 1Q20 of next year, rather than in 4Q19. This aligns with our expectation. Please see China Macro And Market Review, published November 6, 2019. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4    We examined the implications of China’s “Blue Skies” policy in China's Anti-Pollution Resolve Critical To Iron Ore Markets, published April 4, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5    We discuss these issues in our Special Report entitled ضد الواسطة published November 16, 2018. The Arabic title of the report translates as "Against Wasta." Wasta means reciprocity in formal and informal dealings. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift

Highlights The global manufacturing cycle is likely to bottom soon, and consumption and services remain robust. The risk of recession over the next 12 months is low. This suggests that equities will continue to outperform bonds. But the risks to this optimistic scenario are rising. A denting of consumer confidence and worsening of geopolitical tensions could hurt risk assets. We hedge this by overweighting cash. China remains reluctant for now to use aggressive monetary easing. Until it does, the less cyclical U.S. equity market should outperform. We may shift into EM and European equities when China ramps up stimulus and the manufacturing cycle clearly bottoms. To hedge against this upside risk, we go tactically overweight Financials, and reiterate our overweight on Industrials and neutral on Australia. Bond yields should continue their rebound. We recommend an underweight on duration and favor TIPS. Credit should outperform on the cyclical horizon, but high corporate debt is a risk – we recommend a neutral position. Recommendations Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Hedges All Around Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Hedges All Around   Feature Overview Hedges All Around This is a particularly uncertain time for the global economy – and so a tricky one for asset allocators. Will manufacturing activity bottom soon, or will it drag down the services sector and consumption with it? Will bond yields continue their strong rebound? Is the Fed done cutting rates? Will China now ramp up monetary stimulus? Will Iran escalate a confrontation with Saudi Arabia? What will President Trump tweet about next? This is the sort of environment in which portfolio construction comes into its own. We have our view on all these questions, but our level of conviction is somewhat lower than usual. The way for investors to react is to plan asset allocation in such a way that a portfolio is robust in all the most probable scenarios. We expect the global manufacturing cycle to bottom soon. The Global Leading Economic Indicator is already picking up, and the Global PMI shows some signs of bottoming (Chart 1). The shortest-term lead indicator, the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index, has recently jumped in every region except Europe (Chart 2). (See also What Our Clients Are Asking on page 7 for some more esoteric indicators of cycle bottoms.) The bottoming-out is due to easier financial conditions over the past nine months, a stabilization in Chinese growth, and simply time – the down-leg in manufacturing cycles typically last 18 months, and this one peaked in H1 2018. Chart 1First Signs Of Bottoming First Signs Of Bottoming First Signs Of Bottoming Chart 2Surprisingly Strong Surprises Surprisingly Strong Surprises Surprisingly Strong Surprises     At the same time, government bond yields should have further to rise. The Fed may cut rates once more but, given the resilient U.S. economy, no more than that. This is less than the 59 basis points of cuts over the next 12 months priced in by the Fed Fund futures. The recent pick-up in economic surprises suggests that the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield should return at least to where it was six months ago, 2.3-2.4% (Chart 3). This might be delayed, however, if there is an increase in political tensions, for example a break-up of the U.S./China trade talks (Chart 4). Chart 3Long-Term Rates To Rebound Further... Long-Term Rates To Rebound Further... Long-Term Rates To Rebound Further... Chart 4...But Geopolitical Tensions Remain A Risk ...But Geopolitical Tensions Remain A Risk ...But Geopolitical Tensions Remain A Risk This implies that equities are likely to continue to outperform bonds over the next few quarters, and so we remain overweight global equities and underweight global bonds on the 12-month investment horizon. However, the risks to this rosy scenario are rising. We remain concerned about the inverted yield curve, which has accurately forecast every recession since World War II, usually about 18 months in advance (Chart 5). The 3-month/10-year curve inverted in the middle of this year. We also worry that the weakness in the manufacturing sector may dent consumer confidence. There are some signs of this in Europe and Japan – but none significant yet in the U.S. (Chart 6). Accordingly last month, as a hedge against an economic downturn, we went overweight cash, which we see as a more attractive hedge, from a risk/reward point-of-view, than bonds. Chart 5Can We Ignore The Message From The Yield Curve? Can We Ignore The Message From The Yield Curve? Can We Ignore The Message From The Yield Curve? Chart 6Some Signs Of Weaker Consumer Confidence Some Signs Of Weaker Consumer Confidence Some Signs Of Weaker Consumer Confidence     We also remain overweight U.S. equities, which are lower-beta and have fewer structural headwinds than equities in other regions. However, we continue to look for an entry point into the more cyclical equity markets which would also be beneficiaries of bolder China stimulus. China’s monetary easing remains more tepid than in previous stimulus episodes. It has probably been enough to stabilize domestic activity (Chart 7) but not to trigger a rally in industrial commodity prices, EM assets, and euro area equities, as it did in 2016. A pick-up in global PMIs and signs of stronger Chinese credit growth would clearly help EM and Europe (Chart 8) but we need higher conviction that these things are indeed happening before making that move. In the meantime, we are hedging the upside risk by raising the global Financials sector tactically to overweight, since it would likely do well if euro area stocks started to outperform. Earlier this year, we raised the Industrials sector to overweight and Australian equities to neutral, also to hedge against the upside risk from more aggressive Chinese stimulus. Chart 7Chinese Stimulus Has Merely Stabilized Growth Chinese Stimulus Has Merelyy Stabilized Growth Chinese Stimulus Has Merelyy Stabilized Growth Chart 8Europe And EM Are The Most Cyclical Markets Europe And EM Are The Most Cyclical Markets Europe And EM Are The Most Cyclical Markets     Chart 9Oil Price Spikes Often Precede Recessions Oil Price Spikes Often Precede Recessions Oil Price Spikes Often Precede Recessions The biggest geopolitical risk to our sanguine scenario is the situation in the Middle East, after the attacks on Saudi oil refineries. Every recession in the past 50 years has been preceded by a 100% year-on-year spike in the crude oil price (though note that Brent would need to rise to over $100 a barrel by year-end, from $61 today, for that to eventuate (Chart 9)). A short-term oil shortage is not the problem since strategic reserves are ample. But the attack demonstrates the vulnerability of the Saudi installations. And a reprisal attack on Iran could lead it to block the Strait of Hormuz, through which more than 20% of global oil passes. We have an overweight on the Energy sector, partly as a hedge against these risks. BCA’s oil strategists expected Brent crude to rise to $70 this year, and average $74 in 2020, even before the recent attack. They argue that the risk premium in the oil price (the residual in Chart 10) is too low, given not only tensions with Iran, but also other potential supply disruptions in Iraq, Libya, Venezuela and elsewhere.   Chart 10Is The Oil Risk Premium Too Low? Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Hedges All Around Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Hedges All Around   Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com     What Our Clients Are Asking Which Leading Indicators Should Investors Watch To Time The Rebound In Global Growth? Chart 11Positive Signals For Global Growth Is Eurozone Manufacturing Close To A Bottom? Positive Signals For Global Growth Is Eurozone Manufacturing Close To A Bottom? Positive Signals For Global Growth During 2019, the global growth decline was a key driver of the bond rally and the outperformance of defensive assets. Thus, timing when this decline will reverse will be crucial, since it would also result in a change of leadership from defensive to cyclical assets. But how can this be done? Below we list three of our favorite indicators that have provided reliable leading signals on the global economy in the past: Carry-trade performance: The performance of EM currencies with very high carry versus the yen tends to be a leading indicator for global growth (Chart 11, panel 1). In general, carry trades distribute liquidity from countries where funds are plentiful but rates of return are low (like Japan), to places with savings shortfalls and high risk, but where prospective returns are high. Positive performance of these currencies tends to signal a positive shift in global liquidity, which usually fuels global growth. Swedish inventory cycle: The Swedish new-orders-to-inventories ratio is a leading indicator of the global manufacturing cycle (panel 2). Why? Sweden is a small open economy that is very sensitive to global growth dynamics. Moreover, Swedish exports are weighted towards intermediate goods, which sit early in the global supply chain. This makes the Swedish inventory cycle a good early barometer of the health of the global manufacturing cycle. G3 monetary trends: G3 excess money supply – measured as the difference between money supply growth and loan growth – is a leading indicator of global industrial production (panel 3). As base money and deposits become more plentiful in the banking system relative to the pool of existing loans, the liquidity position of commercial banks improves. This provides banks with the necessary fuel to generate more loan growth, a development which eventually provides a boon to economic activity. Importantly, all these leading indicators are sending a positive signal on the global economy. This confirms our view that rates should go up as global growth strengthens. Therefore, investors should remain overweight equities and underweight bonds in their portfolios.   Is It Time To Buy Euro Area Banks? In a Special Report on euro area banks in December 2018, we noted that “Historically, when the relative P/B discount hits the lower band and the relative dividend yield hits the upper band, a rebound in relative return performance could be expected”.1 Our recommendation back then was that “long-term investors should avoid banks in the region, but investors with a more tactical mandate and much nimbler style could use the valuation indicators to ‘time’ their entry into and exit out of banks as a short-term trade.” Since then, banks have continued to underperform the overall market by over 10%, further pushing down relative valuation metrics. Currently, both relative P/B and relative dividend yield are at extreme levels that have historically heralded at least a short-term bounce. The euro area PMI is still below 50, but there are signs that the euro area economy could rebound later this year, which should be positive for banks’ relative earnings. Already, forward EPS growth has been stabilizing relative to the broad market (Chart 12, panel 4). In addition, two of the key concerns back in December 2018 were Italian government debt and the unwinding of QE. Now Italian debt is no longer in crisis and the ECB has relaunched QE. As such, investors with a tactical mandate and a nimble style should buy (overweight) banks in the euro area. Long-term investors should still avoid such a short-term trade because structural issues remain. Chart 12Tactically Upgrade Euro Area Banks Tactically Upgrade Euro Area Banks Tactically Upgrade Euro Area Banks   Is The Gold Rally Over? Spot gold prices have increased 17% year-to-date, on the back of global growth weakness, dovish central banks, and rising political tensions. Should investors now pare back their gold exposure? Common sense would suggest they should. However, these are not ordinary times. In the short term, gold prices might suffer from some profit-taking due to overbought technicals and excessively positive sentiment (Chart 13, panel 1). Moreover, gold prices have moved this year due to increased market expectations of central bank easing (panel 2). We expect that markets will be disappointed going forward by only limited rate cuts, which could put downward pressure on gold. On the other hand, with approximately 27%, or $14.9 trillion, of global debt with negative yields at the moment, investors will continue to shift to the next best asset – zero-yielding gold (panel 3). This is clear from the rise in holdings of gold over the past few years by both central banks and investors (panels 4 & 5). We expect this trend to persist as investors continue their search to avoid negative yields and focus on capital preservation. Geopolitical tensions have intensified since the beginning of the year: ongoing yet inconclusive trade negotiations between the U.S. and China, implementation of further tariffs, Brexit uncertainty, and the recent military attacks in the Middle East (panel 6). This environment should also continue to push gold prices higher. We continue to recommend gold as a hedge against inflation – which we see picking up over the next 12 months – as well as against any further deterioration in global growth and the geopolitical situation. Chart 13Gold: Sell Or Hold? Gold: Sell Or Hold? Gold: Sell Or Hold? Risks to the rosy scenario are rising. We remain concerned about the inverted yield curve, which has accurately forecast every recession since World War II. How Low Can Rates Go? The zero lower bound is a thing of the past. Last month, Denmark’s central bank cut rates to -0.75%, and 10-year government bonds in Switzerland hit a historic low for any major country, -1.12%. In the next recession, how much further could interest rates theoretically fall? For individuals, cash rates might be limited by the cost of storing paper currency, which has a zero yield (unless governments find a way to ban cash or charge an annual fee on it). A bank safety deposit box costs about $300 a year, and a professional-quality safe big enough to store $1 million (which would be a pile of $100 bills 31 x 55 cms, weighing 10 kg) costs $2,000 with installation costs. Amortize the latter over 10 years, and the cost of storing $1 million is about 0.2%-0.3% a year. Swiss franc bills – maximum denomination CHF1,000 – would cost less to store. But storage costs for physical gold are around 2% a year. Since rates have fallen below this, there must be other constraints. Individuals would find storing money in cash possibly dangerous and certainly very inconvenient (imagine having to transport the cash to a bank to pay a tax bill). And the cost for a rich individual or company of storing, say, $1 billion (weighing 10 tonnes) would be much higher. Given the history in even low-rate countries (Chart 14, panel 1), we suspect around -1% is the level at which cashholders would seek alternatives to bank deposits of government bills. Chart 14How Low Can They Go? How Low Can They Go? How Low Can They Go? Chart 15Yield Curves When Rates Are At Zero Or Below Yield Curves When Rates Are At Zero Or Below Yield Curves When Rates Are At Zero Or Below   At the long end, the yield curve does not typically invert much when short-term rates are zero or negative (Chart 15). The biggest 3-month/10-year inversion was in Switzerland earlier this year, -0.05%. This points then to the absolute lowest level for 10-year bonds anywhere, even in the middle of a nasty recession, at around -1.1%. That is a worry for asset allocators. It means that the maximum mathematical upside for Swiss government bonds from their current level (-0.8%) is 3% while it is 5% for German bonds (currently -0.5%). This is not much of a hedge. Only the U.S. looks better: if the 10-year Treasury yield falls to 0%, the total return is 18%.   Global Economy Chart 16U.S. Growth Remains Solid U.S. Growth Remains Solid U.S. Growth Remains Solid Overview: Industrial-sector growth globally has been weak, with the manufacturing PMI in most countries falling below 50. But consumption and services almost everywhere have remained resilient, even in the manufacturing-heavy euro area. And there are tentative signs of a bottoming-out in manufacturing. However, a full-scale rebound will depend on further monetary stimulus in China, where the authorities still seem cautious about rolling out easing on the scale of what was done in 2016. U.S.: U.S. manufacturing has now followed the rest of the world into contraction, with the ISM manufacturing index slipping below 50 in August (Chart 16, panel 2). However, consumption and services are holding up well. Employment continues to expand (albeit at a slightly slower pace than last year, perhaps because of a lack of jobseekers), there is no sign of a rise in layoffs, and consumer confidence remains close to a historical high (though it slipped slightly in September). Housing has recovered after last year’s slowdown, and the recent congressional budgetary agreement means fiscal policy will be mildly expansionary over the coming 12 months. Only capex (panel 5) has slowed, as companies postpone investment decisions due to uncertainty surrounding the trade war. The consensus expects U.S. real GDP growth of 2.2% this year, above most estimates of trend growth. Euro Area: Given its higher concentration in manufacturing, European growth is weaker than in the U.S. The manufacturing PMI has been below 50 since February, and fell further to 45.6 in August. Industrial production is shrinking by 2% year-on-year. Italy has experienced two negative quarters of growth, and Germany may also enter a technical recession in Q3 (GDP shrank by 0.1% in Q2). However, there are some tentative signs that manufacturing is bottoming: the ZEW survey in September, for example, surprised on the upside. And, like the U.S., consumption remains strong. Even in manufacturing-heavy Germany, employment continues to grow, and retail sales in July were up 4.4% year-on-year. In the U.K., however, uncertainty surrounding Brexit has damaged business investment, though employment has been strong.2 Chart 17First Signs Of A Rebound In The Rest Of The World? First Signs Of A Rebound In The Rest Of The World? First Signs Of A Rebound In The Rest Of The World? Japan: Consumption has already slipped, even before the consumption tax hike scheduled in October. Retail sales in July fell 2% year-on-year, due to negative wage growth and consumer sentiment falling to a five-year low. Manufacturing continues to suffer from China’s slowdown and the strong yen (up 6% over the past 12 months), with exports falling 6% and industrial production down 2% year-on-year over the past three months. The effect of the consumption tax hike may be cushioned by government measures (lowering taxes on autos and making high-school education free, for example). And a pickup in Chinese growth would boost exports. But there are scant signs yet of a bottoming in activity. Emerging Markets: China’s growth appears to have stabilized, with both manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs above 50 (Chart 17, panel 3). But confidence remains fragile, with retail sales growth slowing to a 20-year low and car sales down 7% in August, despite the introduction of cars compliant with new emissions standards. The authorities have responded with further easing measures (including a further cut in the reserve requirement in September) but seem reluctant to launch a full-scale monetary stimulus, similar to what they did in 2016. Elsewhere in EM, growth has slowed in countries with structural issues (latest year-on-year real GDP growth in Argentina is -5.7%, in Turkey -1.5% and in Mexico -0.8%) but remains fairly resilient elsewhere (India 5%, Indonesia 5%, Poland 4.2%, Colombia 3.4%). Interest Rates: Central banks almost everywhere have turned dovish, with the Fed cutting rates for a second time, the ECB restarting asset purchases, and the Bank of Japan signaling it will ease in October. But further monetary accommodation will probably be less than the market expects. The Fed signaled that its cuts were just a mid-cycle correction and that further easing is unlikely. And the ECB and BoJ have little ammunition left. With signs of growth bottoming, and the market understanding that central banks’ dovish turn is reaching its end, long-term rates, which have already risen in the U.S. from 1.45% to 1.72% in September, are likely to move higher. Investors should also carefully watch U.S. inflation, which is showing signs of underlying strength, with core CPI inflation rising 2.4% year-on-year in August (and as much as 3.4% annualized over the past three months).   Global Equities Chart 18Has Earnings Growth Bottomed? Has Earnings Growth Bottomed? Has Earnings Growth Bottomed? Still Cautious, But Adding An Upside Hedge: Global equities registered a small loss of 8 basis points in Q3 (Chart 18) despite all the headline risks from geopolitics and weakening economic data. Overall, our defensive country allocation worked well in Q3, since DM equities outperformed EM by 4.5%, and the U.S. outperformed the euro area by 2.8%. Our sector positioning did not do as well since underweights in Utilities and Consumer Staples and overweights in Industrials, Energy and Health Care all went in the wrong direction, even though the underweight in Materials did help to offset the loss. During the quarter, however, both sector and country rotations were evident within the global equity universe, in line with the wild swings in bond yields. September saw some reversals in DM/EM, U.S./euro area and cyclical/defensives. Going forward, BCA’s House View remains that global economic growth will begin to recover over the coming months, albeit a little later than we previously expected. As such, our defensive country allocation remains appropriate. We did put euro area and EM equities on upgrade watch in April,3 but the delay in the global recovery also implies that it is still not the time to trigger this call. With our view that bond yields have hit bottom,4 we are making one adjustment in our global sector allocation by upgrading Financials to overweight from neutral. We are financing this by cutting in half the double overweight in Health Care to overweight (see next page for more details). This adjustment also acts as a hedge against two possible outcomes: 1) that the euro area outperforms the U.S., and 2) that Elizabeth Warren wins in the upcoming U.S. presidential election.5   Upgrade Global Financials To Overweight From Neutral Chart 19Upgrade Global Financials Upgrade Global Financials Upgrade Global Financials The relative performance of global Financials to the overall equity market has been hugely affected by the movements in global bond yields (Chart 19, panel 1). As bond yields made a sharp reversal in September, so did the relative performance of Financials, even though it is barely evident on the chart given how much Financials have underperformed the broad market over recent years. It’s not clear how sustainable the sharp reversal in bond yields will be, but BCA’s House View is that bond yields will move higher over the next 9-12 months. As such, we are upgrading Financials to overweight from neutral, for the following additional reasons: Valuations are extremely attractive as shown in panel 2. More importantly, the relative valuation is now at an extreme level that historically heralded a bounce in Financials’ relative performance. Loan quality has improved. The U.S. non-performing loan (NPL) ratio is nearing the lows reached before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Even in Spain and Italy, NPL ratios have fallen significantly, though they remain higher than they were prior to the GFC (panel 3). U.S. consumption has been strong, housing has rebounded, and demand for loans is getting stronger (panel 4), in line with data such as the Citi Economic Surprise Index, suggesting that economic data may have hit bottom. To finance this upgrade, we cut the double overweight of Health Care to overweight, as a hedge against Elizabeth Warren winning next year’s U.S. presidential election and tightening rules on drug pricing. Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight On Duration. Our below-benchmark duration call was severely challenged by the global bond markets in the first two months of the third quarter. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield hit 1.43% on September 3 in response to the weaker-than-expected ISM manufacturing index in the U.S., 57 bps lower than the level at the end of previous quarter, and just a touch higher than the historical low of 1.32% reached on July 6, 2016. The rebound in bond yields since September 5, however, was driven not only by the ebb and flow in the U.S./China trade policy dynamics, but also by the positive surprises in economic data releases, as shown in Chart 20. BCA’s Global Duration Indicator, constructed by our Global Fixed Income Strategy team using various leading economic indicators, is also pointing to higher yields globally going forward. Investors should maintain a slight underweight on duration over the next 9-12 months. Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds. Global inflation expectations have also rebounded after continuing their downtrend in the first two months of the quarter. This largely reflects the acceleration in August in realized inflation measures such as core CPI, core PCE, and average hourly earnings. In addition, historically, the change in the crude oil price tends to have a good correlation with inflation expectations. The oil price jumped initially by 20% following the attack on the Saudi Arabian oil production facilities. While it’s not clear how the geopolitical tensions will evolve in the Middle East, a conservative assumption of a flat oil price until the end of the year still points to much higher inflation expectations, supporting our preference for inflation-linked bonds over nominal bonds. We also favor linkers in Japan and Australia over their respective nominal bonds (Chart 21). Chart 20Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom Chart 21Favor Inflation Linkers Favor Linkers Favor Linkers We continue to look for an entry point into more cyclical markets which would benefit from a bolder Chinese stimulus. Corporate Bonds Since we turned cyclically overweight on credit within a fixed-income portfolio, investment-grade bonds and high-yield bonds have produced 220 and 73 basis points, respectively, of excess return over duration-matched government bonds. We remain bullish on the outlook for credit over the next 12 months, as we expect global growth to accelerate before the end of the year. Historically, improving global growth has resulted in sustained outperformance of credit over government bonds. Moreover, default rates should remain subdued over the next year given that lending standards continue to ease (Chart 22, panel 1). How long will we remain overweight credit? High levels of leverage, declining interest coverage ratios, and the high share of Baa-rated debt in the U.S. corporate debt market continue to make credit a risky proposition on a structural basis. However, with inflation expectations still very low, the Fed has a strong incentive to keep monetary policy easy. This dovish monetary policy should keep interest costs at bay, helping credit outperform over the next year. That said, we believe that there are some credit categories that are more attractive than others. Specifically, we recommend investors favor Baa-rated and high yield securities, given that there is still room for further credit compression in these credit buckets (panel 2 and panel 3). On the other hand, investors should stay away from the highest credit categories, as they no longer offer value (panel 4). Chart 22Baa-rated And High-Yield Credit Offer The Most Value Baa-rated And High-Yield Credit Offer The Most Value Baa-rated And High-Yield Credit Offer The Most Value   Commodities Chart 23No Supply Shock In The Oil Market Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Hedges All Around Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Hedges All Around Energy (Overweight): September’s drone attack on Saudi crude facilities sent oil prices soaring as much as 20% in the days following, before falling back to pre-attack levels. Initial estimates estimated the supply disruption at 5.7 million barrels a day – approximately 5.5% of global supply – making it the largest crude supply outage in history. However, assuming the Saudis can return 70% of the lost output back online as they claim, OPEC’s spare capacity, approximately 1.8 million barrels a day, should be able to balance the market and cover the remaining lost production.6,7 In the longer-term, a pick-up in global oil demand, as economic growth rebounds, plus supply tightness should keep oil price elevated, with Brent reaching $70 this year and averaging $74 in 2020 (Chart 23, panels 1 & 2). Industrial Metals (Neutral): A combination of half-hearted year-to-date stimulus by Chinese authorities and a stronger USD in the second and third quarters of 2019 have driven industrial metals spot prices lower. However, the Chinese government announced additional stimulus in September, with further bond issuance to finance infrastructure projects and an easing of monetary policy (panel 3). This should give some upside for industrial metal prices over the coming six-to-12 months. Precious Metals (Neutral): We remain positive on gold, despite its strong performance year-to-date, since we see it as a good hedge against recession, inflation, and geopolitical risks. We discuss gold in detail in the What Our Clients Are Asking section on page 9. Silver also looks attractive in the short term. The nature of the use of silver has changed over the past two decades, from being mostly a base metal for industrial fabrication to becoming more of a precious metal viewed as a safe haven. The correlation between gold and silver prices has increased since the Global Financial Crisis from an average of 0.5 pre-crisis to 0.8 post-crisis (panels 4 & 5). Global growth and political uncertainty should support silver prices in the coming months. Currencies U.S. Dollar: The trade-weighted dollar has appreciated by 2.5% since we turned neutral in April. We expect that the steep drop in yields will continue to ease financial conditions and help global growth in the last quarter of the year. Given that the dollar is a counter-cyclical currency, an environment where global growth rallies have historically been negative for the greenback. Euro: Since we turned bullish in April, EUR/USD has depreciated by 2.7%. Overall, we continue to be positive on EUR/USD on a cyclical timeframe. After the ECB cut rates by 10 basis points and announced further rounds of quantitative easing, there is not much room left for the euro area to keep easing relative to the U.S. (Chart 24, panel 1). Moreover, improving expectations of profit growth in the euro area vis-à-vis the U.S. will drive money flows towards Europe, pushing EUR/USD up in the process (panel 2). Emerging Market Currencies: We remain bearish on emerging market currencies for the time being. That being said, they remain on upgrade watch for the end of the year. There are multiple signs that global growth is turning up, a consequence of the easy financial conditions caused by some of the lowest bond yields on record. Moreover, the marginal propensity to spend (proxied by M1 growth relative to M2 growth) in China, the main engine of EM growth, continues to point to further appreciation in emerging market currencies (panel 3). Chart 24Interest Rate And Profit Expectation Differentials Favor The Euro The Euro Might Soon Pop Interest Rate And Profit Expectations Differentials Favor The Euro The Euro Might Soon Pop Interest Rate And Profit Expectations Differentials Favor The Euro     Alternatives Chart 25Favor Hedge Funds Untill Global Growth Bottoms Favor Hedge Funds Untill Global Growth Bottoms Favor Hedge Funds Untill Global Growth Bottoms Return Enhancers: Over the past 12 months, we have recommended investors pare back on private equity and increase allocations to hedge funds – macro hedge funds in particular. This was due to our judgement that we are late in the economic cycle. While we expect growth to pick up over the coming months, this is not yet clear in the data (Chart 25, panel 1). This uncertain macro outlook will prove tough for private equity funds, especially given an environment of rising multiples and increasing competition for deals. We continue to see global macro hedge funds as the best hedge ahead of the next recession and would advise investors to allocate funds now, given the time it takes to move allocations in the illiquid space. Inflation Hedges: In the current environment, TIPS are likely a better inflation hedge than illiquid alternative assets. Our May 2019 Special Report 8 showed that TIPS produce a particularly attractive risk-adjusted return during times when inflation is rising, but still fairly low (below 2.3%). TIPS should do well, therefore, in the environment we expect over the next few months, where the Fed remains dovish, cutting rates perhaps once more, while condoning a moderate acceleration of inflation (panel 2). Volatility Dampeners: Structured products – mostly Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) – have had an excellent record of reducing portfolio volatility (panel 3). Despite that, we do not recommend more than a neutral allocation to MBS currently due to a less-than-attractive valuation picture. Despite Treasury yields falling by more than 100 basis points this year and refinancing activity picking up, nominal MBS spreads remained near their all-time lows. However, as Treasury yields bottom, we expect refinancing to slow, putting downward pressure on spreads. Risks To Our View The most likely upside risk comes from the Fed being too dovish and falling behind the curve. Underlying inflation pressures in the U.S. remain strong (with core CPI up 3.4% annualized over the past three months). After two rate cuts, the Fed Funds rate is now comfortably below the neutral rate: 0.1% in real terms compared to a Laubach-Williams r* of 0.8% (Chart 26). Tightness in the money markets have pushed the Fed to start expanding its balance sheet again. If manufacturing growth accelerates next year, and wages and profits begin to rise, a stock market melt-up, similar to that in 1999, would be possible. Eventually, though, the Fed would need to raise rates (perhaps sharply) to kill inflation, which could usher in the next recession. There are a broader range of possible downside risks. As argued throughout this Quarterly, there are various possible triggers of recession: failure of China to stimulate, and a loss of confidence by consumers, in particular. Some models of recession put the risk over the next 12 months as high as 30% (Chart 27). Structurally, the biggest risk is probably the high level of corporate debt in the U.S. (Chart 28). A breakdown in the junk bond market, as seen briefly last December, could lead to companies failing to refinance the large amount of debt maturing over the next 18 months. Geopolitical risks also remain elevated and are, by nature, hard to forecast. The outcome of Brexit remains highly uncertain – though we see low risk of a no-deal exit. We expect trade talks between the U.S. and China to drag on, without a comprehensive deal, while a clear breakdown would be negative. Impeachment of President Trump is probably not a significant market event, but might hurt market sentiment briefly (particularly if it makes the election of Elizabeth Warren more likely). The Iran/Saudi conflict could escalate. Risk premiums may need to rise to take into account these threats. Chart 26Is The Fed Turning Too Dovish? Is The Fed Turning Too Dovish? Is The Fed Turning Too Dovish? Chart 27What Risk Of Recession? What Risk Of Recession? What Risk Of Recession? Chart 28Is Corporate Debt The Biggest Risk? Is Corporate Debt The Biggest Risk? Is Corporate Debt The Biggest Risk?   Footnotes 1Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, titled "Euro Area Banks: Value Play Or Value Trap?" dated December 14, 2018, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, “United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise?”, dated 20 September 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3Please see Global Asset Allocation Quarterly, titled "Quarterly - April 2019" dated April 1, 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 4Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom," dated September 6, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Elizabeth Warren And The Markets," dated September 13, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6Dmitry Zhdannikov and Alex Lawler “Exclusive: Saudi oil output to return faster than first thought - sources,” Reuters, dated Sepetmber 17, 2019. 7Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Alert titled, “Attacks On Critical Infrastructure In KSA Raises Questions About U.S. Response,” dated September 16, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, titled “Investors’ Guide To Inflation Hedging: How To Invest When Inflation Rises,” dated May 22, 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation

Commodity demand appears to be turning up, based on our assessment of global industrial activity. As demand picks up, we expect industrial commodity prices will move higher (Chart of the Week, top panel). For all practical purposes, central banks and numerous governments have moved into recession-fighting mode, following the contraction in manufacturing activity brought on by the U.S. Fed’s rates-normalization policy last year, and China’s deleveraging campaign in 2017-18. Together, these policies severely retarded credit and liquidity available to markets, and drove the USD higher, to the detriment of commodity demand (Chart of the Week, middle panel). Current policy responses will support a revival of manufacturing, and with it, global trade (Chart of the Week, bottom panel). While we continue to expect a weaker USD on the back of additional Fed easing this year and recovery of ex-U.S. economic growth in line with our House view, we remain wary uncoordinated global monetary accommodation by a large number of central banks could leave the dollar well bid. This could stifle the commodity-demand revival by keeping local-currency commodity costs high (Chart 2). This would be especially bearish for base metals prices.1 Chart of the WeekGlobal Industrial Activity Moving Higher Global Industrial Activity Moving Higher Global Industrial Activity Moving Higher Chart 2USD Strength Will Pose Risk To Industrial Commodity Demand USD Strength Will Pose Risk To Industrial Commodity Demand USD Strength Will Pose Risk To Industrial Commodity Demand Highlights Energy: Overweight. The appointment of Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s (KSA) new Energy Minister signals the royal family will push harder to manage production and reduce global oil inventories ahead of the IPO of Saudi Aramco. The prince brings more than 30 years of experience to the role, making him something of an outlier among KSA’s ministers – technocrats typically have occupied the position, and he is the first royal to serve as Energy Minister. We believe the prince’s immediate goal is to get Brent into the mid- to high-$70/bbl ahead of the IPO later this year or early next year. The first leg of the IPO reportedly will be done locally in the Kingdom, with Saudi investors taking ~ 1% of the Saudi Aramco float. Base Metals: Neutral. China imported 1.82mm MT of copper concentrates in August, a 9.3% increase y/y, as smelters continue to buy partly processed ores to feed expanding capacity. Concentrate imports in July were a record 2.07mm MT. Precious Metals: Neutral. The World Platinum Investment Council (WPIC) forecasts a 9% increase in platinum demand this year, driven primarily by ETF investors. This “more than offsets expected demand decreases in the automotive and jewellery segments of 4% and 5% respectively.” WPIC reduced its expected physical surplus this year to 345k ounces, from its earlier expectation of 375k ounces. Our tactical long platinum position recommended August 29, 2019 is up 1.9%. Separately, we are taking profits on our Long 10-year TIPS position at tonight’s close. It was up 9.3% on September 10, 2019. The position was recommended July, 27, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. A wet start to the planting season points to lower corn and bean yields this year vs. 2018. AccuWeather expects 2019 corn yields will fall 7.35% y/y to 13.36 billion bushels, and soybean yields will be down 19.5% y/y to 3.658 billion bushels. Besides stressing crops at the beginning of the season, weather-related delays also increase the risk some of this year’s crop will be exposed to frost at the end of the season before it is harvested. Weather effects continue to be apparent in the USDA’s crop conditions report, particularly for corn, where the USDA now rates 55% of the U.S. crop good or excellent, vs. 68% a year earlier. Last week, the USDA rated 58% of the corn crop good or excellent. Feature Leading indicators are signaling the slowdown in global growth – i.e., aggregate-demand growth – likely bottomed ex-Europe (Chart 3). The chart shows easing global financial conditions, along with fiscal stimulus, most likely have arrested the slowdown in industrial commodity demand (Chart 4). Chart 3Manufacturing Downturn Likely Arrested Following Broad Monetary Stimulus Manufacturing Downturn Likely Arrested Following Broad Monetary Stimulus Manufacturing Downturn Likely Arrested Following Broad Monetary Stimulus Chart 4Global Financial Conditions Are Supportive Easier Financial Conditions Will Benefit Global Growth Global Financial Conditions Are Supportive Easier Financial Conditions Will Benefit Global Growth Global Financial Conditions Are Supportive Easier Financial Conditions Will Benefit Global Growth We expect the recovery in demand will be most visible in the LMEX base metals index and in oil markets. Base metals demand is highly concentrated in China – accounting for ~ 50% of global demand – and EM Asia.  Our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast continues to signal oil demand also will revive in 2H19 as GDP growth picks up (Chart 5). Markets still could wobble, which is why the evolution of EM import volumes remains important, given their high correlation with GDP levels. A number of gauges we follow closely – particularly those associated with the movement of good on the sea (Chart 6) and in the air (Chart 7) – have turned up in 3Q19. We expect this to continue into 4Q19 and next year. Chart 5Monetary, Fiscal Stimulus Will Lift Oil Demand Monetary, Fiscal Stimulus Will Lift Oil Demand Monetary, Fiscal Stimulus Will Lift Oil Demand   Chart 6Shipping Gauges Signal Uptick in Movement of Goods Shipping Gauges Signal Uptick in Movement of Goods Shipping Gauges Signal Uptick in Movement of Goods Chart 7Air Freight Gauges Signal Uptick in Movement of Goods Air Freight Gauges Signal Uptick in Movement of Goods Air Freight Gauges Signal Uptick in Movement of Goods USD Strength Keeps Us Wary The contraction in manufacturing and EM trade volumes is largely the result of the Fed’s rates-normalization policy last year, and China’s deleveraging campaign in 2017-18, in our view. These policies raised the value of the USD, which raised local-currency costs of dollar-denominated commodities, and all other goods and services invoiced and funded with dollars (Chart 8). Indeed, as Chart 2 shows, oil prices and base metals prices in local-currency terms ex-U.S. are closer to their earlier highs when Brent was trading above $100/bbl. This redounded to the detriment of commodity demand.2 The Sino-U.S. trade war certainly does not help commodity demand. For the most part, however, we believe this affects demand expectations – i.e., capex- and investment-driven demand. We believe firms and households will reduce outlays and increase precautionary savings, as a buffer against an expansion of the trade war into a larger global conflict, which likely would impair global supply chains and growth prospects. Chart 8Strong USD Keeps Us Wary Strong USD Keeps Us Wary Strong USD Keeps Us Wary While we expect the USD to weaken as the Fed cuts its policy rate, in line with our House view, we reiterate the non-trivial risk that global monetary accommodation still could leave the dollar well bid.3 Rising negative yielding debts globally makes U.S. yields relatively attractive despite the ongoing easing, supporting capital inflows in U.S. fixed income markets. Investment Implications The coincidence of fiscal and monetary policy easing is showing up in our gauges of global economic activity and in our leading indicators. We remain long oil exposure and precious metals – gold on a strategic basis, silver and platinum on a tactical basis. As we see industrial commodity demand picking up, we will look to go long copper. Bottom Line: Our gauges of economic activity continue to point to a bottoming of the global ex-U.S. slowdown in industrial activity, particularly in manufacturing, which has been hard-hit by a downturn in auto output. We expect USD weakness to become a tailwind for industrial commodities; however, we are wary continued strength in the dollar – it is above its 1Q02 peak – could crimp industrial metals, and maybe even oil, prices (Chart 9). Chart 9USD TWIB Strength Hampers Industrial Commodity Demand USD TWIB Strength Hampers Industrial Commodity Demand USD TWIB Strength Hampers Industrial Commodity Demand   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      We use base metals demand, particularly for copper, as an indicator of EM industrial activity in our modeling. These markets are somewhat removed from the idiosyncratic forces driving oil supply-demand dynamics, particularly on the supply side, where OPEC 2.0 continues to maintain its policy of production discipline to reduce global inventory levels. OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition lead by KSA and Russia, which was formed in 2016 with the explicit mission of reducing the global oil-inventory overhang resulting from the 2014-15 market share war launched by the original OPEC states in 2H14. 2      Last week we discussed USD strength vis-à-vis oil demand. Please see Central Bank Easing Key To Oil Prices. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3      A non-trivial risk is bounded at the lower end by Russian-roulette odds – i.e., 1:6 – in our usage of the phrase. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q2 Industrial Commodity Demand Recovery Will Boost Metals, Oil Industrial Commodity Demand Recovery Will Boost Metals, Oil Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Industrial Commodity Demand Recovery Will Boost Metals, Oil Industrial Commodity Demand Recovery Will Boost Metals, Oil

Away from the Sino-U.S. trade-war headlines – and the remarkable commodity price volatility they produce – apparent steel consumption in China is up 9.5% y/y in the first seven months of this year. This is being spurred by fiscal stimulus directed at infrastructure and construction spending, which remains strong relative to year-ago levels (Chart of the Week).1 Demand for copper normally drafts in the wake of China’s steel demand, and picks up when steel-intensive capital projects are being wired for use. In less uncertain times, getting long copper would make sense.2 Chart of the WeekFiscal Stimulus Boosts China Steel Consumption Fiscal Stimulus Boosts China Steel Consumption Fiscal Stimulus Boosts China Steel Consumption We are holding off getting long for now, given the policy uncertainty – particularly in re trade policy – that dominates commodity markets, none moreso than steel and base metals. While the odds of a resolution to the trade war might be edging up from our 40% expectation, moving them closer to those of a coin toss does not justify taking the risk.3 Highlights Energy: Overweight. Retaliatory tariffs on $75 billion of U.S. imports, including crude oil, into China, provoked an additional 5% duty by President Trump on ~ $550 billion of goods shipped to the U.S. by China. This will lift the total tariff on $250 billion of U.S. imports from China to 30%, and on another $300 billion to 15%, starting Oct. 1 and Sept. 1. Following the imposition of Chinese tariffs, China Petroleum & Chemical Corp, or Sinopec, petitioned Beijing for waivers on U.S. crude imports. Base Metals: Neutral. Included in the latest Chinese tit-for-tat tariff retaliations is a 5% tariff increase on copper scrap imports from the U.S., which takes the duty to 30%; the re-imposition of 25% tariffs on U.S. auto imports, and a 5% tariff on auto parts. The latter tariffs go into effect December 15, according to Fastmarkets MB. Precious Metals: Neutral. We are getting long platinum at tonight’s close, but with a tight stop of -10%, given highly volatile – and uncertain – trading markets. In addition to following the wake of safe-haven demand for gold, a physical deficit for platinum is possible.4 Markets have been well supported technically – bouncing off long-term support of ~ $785/oz dating to the depths of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 – 09. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA reported 57% of the U.S. corn crop is in good or excellent condition this week, vs. 68% a year ago. The Department also reported 55% of the soybean crop was in good or excellent shape vs. 66% last year at this time. Feature Iron ore price surged more than 38.1% y/y, while steel prices rallied in 1Q19 off their year-end 2018 lows, helped by the Central Committee fiscal stimulus directed at infrastructure and construction, which hit the market after the collapse of Vale’s Brumadinho dam in January (Chart 2). The combination of the fatal dam disaster and fiscal stimulus in China lifted prices for iron ore and steel sharply.5 Chart 2Iron Ore and Steel Rally Leaves Copper Behind Iron Ore and Steel Rally Leaves Copper Behind Iron Ore and Steel Rally Leaves Copper Behind Chart 3China's Construction, Real Estate Investment Spur Higher Steel Demand China's Construction, Real Estate Investment Spur Higher Steel Demand China's Construction, Real Estate Investment Spur Higher Steel Demand While policymakers guide domestic markets to expect reduced stimulus for the real-estate sector, we continue to expect copper demand to pick up in the short term. Our modeling indicates strong steel consumption presages higher copper consumption, especially when construction’s contribution is high (Chart 3). This is because the projects accounting for that consumption typically are fitted out with electrical wiring six months or so after the structures built with all that steel are made ready for residential or commercial use (Chart 4).6 This should support copper prices as we go through 2H19, although a slowdown in steel’s apparent consumption in 1Q19 followed by a rebound in April could make for a bumpy ride. CPC Central Committee guidance is stressing the need to get stimulus to the “real economy, such as privately-owned manufacturers and high-tech firms, which are the engines of long-term growth.”7 Still, while policymakers guide domestic markets to expect reduced stimulus for the real-estate sector, we continue to expect copper demand to pick up in the short term, as completed construction and infrastructure and projects in the pipeline from past stimulus are made ready for use.8 Chart 4Higher Steel Demand Normally Presages Higher Copper Demand Higher Steel Demand Normally Presages Higher Copper Demand Higher Steel Demand Normally Presages Higher Copper Demand   Copper Puzzle: Why Was It Left Behind? Part of the explanation for copper’s lackluster relative performance likely is USD-related: A strong dollar will reduce demand. Prices for iron ore and steel have come back to earth, following their impressive rallies this year. However, as Chart 2 illustrates, copper prices languished, and retreated to $2.50/lb on the COMEX. This, despite a contraction of physical copper concentrates supply, which kept copper treatment and refining charges (TC/RC) close to record lows, and inventories tight globally (Chart 5).9 Part of the explanation for copper’s lackluster relative performance likely is USD-related: A strong dollar will reduce demand (Chart 6).10 Our House view continues to expect the U.S. Fed to deliver a 25bp rate cut at its mid-September meeting. This could be followed by additional easing if Sino-U.S. trade tensions persist or get worse. Our House view expects Fed easing and a recovery in EM GDP growth will weaken the USD later this year. As iron ore shipments pick up from Brazil and Australia, we would expect pressure on those prices as the additional supply arrives at Chinese docks, and residential construction wanes (Chart 7). This should, in relative terms, mean copper outperforms iron ore, all else equal, since copper supplies and inventories are contracting. And, as construction spending moderates and winter restrictions on steel mills go into effect, we would expect copper to outperform steel. Chart 5Global Copper Inventories Remain Tight Global Copper Inventories Remain Tight Global Copper Inventories Remain Tight   Chart 6Strong USD Restrains Base Metal Demand Strong USD Restrains Base Metal Demand Strong USD Restrains Base Metal Demand Chart 7China's Iron Ore Imports Remain Strong China's Iron Ore Imports Remain Strong China's Iron Ore Imports Remain Strong Lastly, we would note from a technical perspective that copper has been – and remains – oversold (Chart 8). This could reflect the fact that, among base metals, it has the deepest liquidity, so that when hedgers or speculators are looking for a way to hedge trade-war risk vis-à-vis China – or to simply take a view on EM GDP prospects – copper is the preferred vehicle. It still is too early to wade into buying based on technicals, and, historically, copper has dipped further into oversold territory than where it now sits. But continued excursions into oversold territory will get our attention, and incline us to revisit our bullish bias. Chart 8Technically, Copper's Oversold Technically, Copper's Oversold Technically, Copper's Oversold   Trade War Deadweight The foregoing analysis suggests copper is due to rally. That is our expectation, at any rate. But uncertainty re the Sino-U.S. trade war and other exogenous policy issues – chiefly increasing recession risks arising from higher tariffs on Chinese imports to the U.S., a possible oil-price spike driven by military action in the Persian Gulf, and a disorderly Brexit – forces us to stand aside. Back in May, the N.Y. Fed conducted an analysis of U.S. President Donald Trump’s increase in tariff rates on $200 billion of Chinese imports from 10% to 25%.11 The N.Y. Fed estimated this increase in the tariff rates on that $200 billion would cost the average American household $831/yr, owing to a sharp increase in the deadweight loss arising from the increase. The deadweight loss estimated by the bank arising from tariff increase on the $200 billion of goods subject to the duty went from $132/household/year to $620/household/year. This means the total cost of the tariffs on the $200 billion of goods went from $414/household/year to $831/household/year. The N.Y. Fed notes: Economic theory tells us that deadweight losses tend to rise more than proportionally as tariffs rise because importers are induced to shift to ever more expensive sources of supply as the tariffs rise. Very high tariff rates can thereby cause tariff revenue to fall as buyers of imports stop purchasing imports from a targeted country and seek out imports from (less efficient) producers in other countries. The deadweight loss that comes from importers being forced to buy tariffed goods from higher-cost suppliers is, in other words, highly non-linear. This latest round of tariff increases is being levied on $550 billion of imports come September 1 and October 1. According to the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, a Washington-based research joint-venture between the Urban Institute and the Brookings Institute, U.S. middle-class households earning $50k to $85k, received an average income tax cut of about $800 last year following passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), which was signed in to law by President Trump December 22, 2017.12 Further increasing tariffs, as proposed, means the after-tax income of average U.S. households will contract, as the total cost of tariffs overwhelms the value of TCJA tax cuts for middle-income households, if they are imposed as scheduled. China's economy is struggling under the strain of the trade war, as it overlaps with President Xi’s reform and deleveraging campaign of 2017-18.  While these campaigns have been postponed, the lingering effects are weighing on growth.  In addition, banks and corporations appear to be backing away from taking on new risks. The state’s reflationary measures, including a big boost to local government spending, have so far been merely sufficient for domestic stability.12 Bottom Line: Fundamentals and technicals align to support copper prices. However, given the uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the Sino-U.S. trade war we are staying on the sidelines, and avoiding putting on a long position at present. Rising tariffs by the U.S. and China increases the risk of recession in both countries.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      In Copper Will Benefit Most From Chinese Stimulus, published April 25, 2019, we noted China would deploy $300 billion (~ 2 trillion RMB) to support policymakers’ GDP growth targets this year. See also the June 2019 issue of Resources and Energy Quarterly, published by the Australian Government’s Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, particularly Section 3 beginning on p. 22. 2      We are referring to Knightian uncertainty here, a distinction developed by economist Frank Knight in his 1921 book "Risk, Uncertainty and Profit". Uncertainty in Knight’s sense refers to a risk that is “not susceptible to measurement,” per the MIT.edu reference above. This differs from the “risk” we routinely consider in this publication, which can be measured via implied volatilities in options markets. A pdf of the book can be downloaded at the St. Louis Fed’s FRASER website. 3      These odds were calculated by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy group. For a discussion, please see our article entitled Expanded Sino – U.S. Trade War Could Be Bullish For Base Metals, published May 9, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4      This is not a certainty. In its PGM Market Report for May 2019, Johnson Matthey, the platinum-group metals refiner, forecast a slight physical platinum deficit this year of ~ 4MT, while Metals Focus expects a 20MT surplus. 5      The Australian Government DIIS report footnoted above (fn 1) states, “Production growth in China was driven by stimulatory government spending, which focused on higher infrastructure investment and boosting construction activity.” This is consistent with our framework for analyzing Chinese bulks (iron ore and steel) and base metals markets: Steel production and consumption are directed by the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, which motivates us to treat China’s steel market as a unified vertically integrated industry. Chinese steel production, accounts for ~ 50% of the global total. Its strong showing this year pushed world steel production up ~ 5% y/y in the first five months of this year, according to the DIIS. 6      In our modeling of copper prices, we lag steel apparent consumption by six months. 7      Please see Property sector cooling to help real economy funding, published by China Daily on August 1, 2019. 8      BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy noted, “The July Politburo statement signaled a greater willingness to stimulate the economy; as a result, we are penciling in a slightly more optimistic scenario on forthcoming credit growth through the remainder of the year, by adding 300 billion yuan of debt-to-bond swaps and 800 billion yuan of extra infrastructure spending to our baseline estimate for the rest of 2019. However, this would only add a credit impulse equivalent of 1 percentage point of nominal GDP and would only marginally reduce the probability of an earnings recession to 40%.” Please see Don’t Bottom-Fish Chinese Assets (Yet), published August 14, 2019. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 9      The International Copper Study Group reported world mine production fell ~ 1% in the January – May 2019 period to ~ 8.3mm MT. Global refined copper production also was down ~ 1% to 9.8mm MT, while refined copper usage was down less than 1% over the same period. China’s refined usage – ~ 50% of world demand – was up 3.5%. 10   Our modeling indicates a 1% y/y increase in the broad trade-weighted USD translates into a 0.7% y/y decrease in the price of copper. Iron ore also is affected by USD levels, but price formation in this market is dominated by the overwhelming influence of Chinese demand on the seaborne iron-ore market, which accounts for close to 70% of global demand. For steel, China accounts for slightly more than half of global supply and demand, which somewhat insulates it from USD effects. 11   Please see New China Tariffs Increase Costs to U.S. Households, published by the N.Y. Fed May 23, 2019. 12   Please see Big Trouble In Greater China, a Special Report published by BCA Research's Geopolitical and China Investment strategies August 23, 2019.  It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q2 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Image

Chart II-1Is Deflation In Steel And Coal Back? Is Deflation In Steel And Coal Back? Is Deflation In Steel And Coal Back? Unlike 2015 when steel, iron ore and coal prices collapsed, in the current downturn they have so far held up reasonably well. They have begun falling only recently (Chart II-1). Even though we do not anticipate a 2015-type Armageddon in steel, iron ore and coal prices, they will deflate further due to supply outpacing demand in China. For both steel and coal, the pace of “de-capacity” reforms in China has diminished considerably, with declining shutdowns of inefficient capacity and rising advanced capacity, as we argued in a couple of reports last year.  This has led to a faster growth in supply, while demand has been dwindling with weak economic growth. Lower steel, iron ore and coal prices will harm Chinese and global producers along with their respective countries.1 Steel And Iron Ore First, both crude steel and steel products output will likely grow at a pace of 5-7% (Chart II-2). As the 2016-2020 steel de-capacity target (150 million tons capacity reduction) was already achieved by the end of 2018, the scale of further shutdowns will be limited. In addition, collapsing graphite electrode prices reflect an increased supply of this material. This along with more availability of scrap steel will facilitate the continuing expansion of cleaner technology (electric furnace (EF)) steel capacity and their output in China. The newly added EF steel capacity is planned at about 21 million tons in 2019 (representing 1.8% of official aggregate steel production capacity), slightly lower than the 25 million tons in 2018. Second, we expect steel products demand to grow at 3-5%, slightly weaker than output. Construction accounts for about 55% of Chinese final steel demand, with about 35% stemming from the property market and 20% from infrastructure. The automotive sector contributes about 10% of final Chinese steel demand. All of these end markets are weak and do not yet show signs of revival (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Steel Production In China Steel Production In China Steel Production In China Chart II-3No Recovery In Chinese Demand No Recovery In Chinese Demand No Recovery In Chinese Demand   Concerning iron ore price, we expect more downside than in steel. Supply disruptions among Brazilian and Australian producers were the main cause for the significant rally in iron ore prices this year. Evidence is that these producers have already resumed their output recovery. Current iron ore prices are still well above marginal production costs of major global iron ore producers. Besides, ongoing large currency depreciation in commodity producing countries will push down their marginal production costs in U.S. dollars terms. This will encourage further supply.  As China has increased its use of scrap steel in its crude steel production, the country’s iron ore demand has not grown much. In fact, imports of this raw material have contracted (Chart II-4) As scrap steel prices are currently very low relative to the price of imported iron ore (Chart II-5), steel producers in China will continue to use scrap steel instead of iron ore. Chart II-4China's Imports Of Iron Ore Have Been Shrinking China's Imports Of Iron Ore Have Been Shrinking China's Imports Of Iron Ore Have Been Shrinking Chart II-5Scrap Steel Is A Cheap Substitute For Iron Ore Scrap Steel Is A Cheap Substitute For Iron Ore Scrap Steel Is A Cheap Substitute For Iron Ore   Coal Chart II-6Coal Output Is Rising, But Beijing's Goal To Reduce Its Usage Coal Output Is Rising, But Beijing's Goal To Reduce Its Usage Coal Output Is Rising, But Beijing's Goal To Reduce Its Usage Chinese coal prices will also be under downward pressure. First, coal output growth will likely slow but will still stand at 2-4% down from a current 6% level (Chart II-6, top panel). The government has set a production goal of 3900 million tons for 2020. Given last year’s output of 3680 million tons, this implies only a 2.9% annual growth rate this year and the next. Second, the demand for both thermal coal and coking coal will likely weaken. They account for 80% and 20% of total coal demand, respectively. About 60% of Chinese coal is used to generate thermal power. As the country continues to promote the use of clean energy, thermal power output growth will likely slow further. Increasing the nation’s reliance on clean energy is an imperative strategic objective for Beijing. Given that thermal coal still accounts for a whopping 70% of electricity production, China will maintain its effort on reducing coal in its energy mix (Chart II-6, bottom panel). In the same vein, the government will continue to replace coal with natural gas in home heating. Finally, Chinese coal import volumes are likely to decline as the nation is increasingly relying on its domestic sources. In particular, the strategic Menghua railway construction will be completed in October. It will be used to transport the commodity from large producers in the north to the coal-deficit provinces in the south. This will reduce the nation’s coal imports, as the transportation cost of shipping domestic coal to the southern power plants will become more competitive than imported coal. Macro And Investment Implications First, companies and economies producing these commodities will face deflationary pressures. These include - but are not limited to - Indonesia, Australia, Brazil and South Africa, as well as steel producers around the world. Second, the RMB depreciation will allow China to gain further market share in the global steel market. In fact, China’s share of global steel output has been rising (Chart II-7, top panel). The bottom panel of Chart II-7 shows that steel production in the world excluding China have actually come to a grinding halt at a time when mainland producers have enjoyed high output growth. Global steel stocks have broken down and global mining equities are heading into a breakdown (Chart II-8). Chart II-7China Has Been Gaining A Share In Global Steel Market China Has Been Gaining A Share In Global Steel Market China Has Been Gaining A Share In Global Steel Market Chart II-8Breakdown In Steel And Mining Stocks Breakdown In Steel And Mining Stocks Breakdown In Steel And Mining Stocks   Finally, we remain bearish on commodities and other global growth sensitive currencies. In particular, we continue shorting the following basket of EM currencies against the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR and KRW. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      This is BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy view and is different from BCA’s house view.

Highlights The current global trade downtrend has primarily been due to a contraction in Chinese imports. The latter reflects weakness in China's domestic demand in general and capital spending in particular. The current global manufacturing and trade downturns will prove to be drawn out. Several important markets have already experienced technical breakdowns, and a few others are at risk of doing so. EM domestic bonds and EM credit markets could be the last shoe to drop in this EM selloff. Steel, iron ore and coal prices, will all deflate further due to supply outpacing demand in China. Feature In our report last week, we argued that the odds of a liquidation phase in EM are growing. This week’s report continues exploring this theme, offering additional rationale and evidence of a pending breakdown in EM. Trade Tariffs: The Wrong Focus? The media and many investors seem to be solely focused on the impact of U.S. tariffs against imports from China. Yet these tariffs have not been the primary cause of the ongoing global manufacturing and trade recessions. It appears that the headlines and many investors are looking at individual trees and ignoring the forest. Chart I-1Chinese Imports Are Worse Than Exports Chinese Imports Are Worse Than Exports Chinese Imports Are Worse Than Exports Global trade contraction and China’s growth slump are not solely due to the trade tariffs imposed by the U.S. but rather stem from weakening domestic demand in China. Chart I-1 illustrates that Chinese aggregate exports are faring much better than imports. If the imposed tariffs were the main culprit behind both weakness in Chinese growth and global trade, mainland exports would have registered a far-greater hit by now than imports. However, they have not yet done so. This entails that U.S. tariffs have so far not had a substantial impact on Chinese and global manufacturing. The key point we would like to emphasize is that the current global trade downtrend has primarily been due to a contraction in Chinese imports. In turn, the accelerating decline in mainland imports is a reflection of relapsing domestic demand in China. The latter has been instigated by lethargic money/credit impulses owing to the government’s 2017-2018 deleveraging campaign and its reluctance to undertake an economy-wide irrigation type stimulus. What’s more, the recent RMB depreciation will likely intensify the Chinese import contraction already underway, as the same amount of yuan will buy less goods priced in U.S. dollars than before (Chart I-2). Given the majority of goods and commodities procured by mainland companies are priced in dollars, suppliers will receive fewer dollars, and their revenue derived from sales to and in China will continue to shrink (Chart I-3). Chart I-2RMB Depreciation Will Depress China's Purchases From Rest Of The World RMB Depreciation Will Depress China's Purchases From Rest Of The World RMB Depreciation Will Depress China's Purchases From Rest Of The World Chart I-3China Is In A Recession From Perspective Of Its Suppliers China Is In A Recession From Perspective Of Its Suppliers China Is In A Recession From Perspective Of Its Suppliers   We do not deny that the trade war has prompted a deterioration in sentiment among Chinese businesses and consumers as well as multinational companies, which in turn has dented both their spending and global trade. We do not see these issues reversing anytime soon. If the imposed tariffs were the main culprit behind both weakness in Chinese growth and global trade, mainland exports would have registered a far-greater hit by now than imports. Chart I-4EM EPS Are Contracting EM EPS Are Contracting EM EPS Are Contracting Even though U.S. President Donald Trump is flip-flopping on tariffs and their implementation, barring a major deal between the U.S. and China, business sentiment worldwide will not improve on a dime. In brief, delaying some import tariffs from September to December is unlikely to promote an imminent global trade recovery. The confrontation between the U.S. and China is profoundly not about trade: it is a geopolitical confrontation for global hegemony that will last years if not decades. Businesses in China and CEOs of multinational companies realize this, and they will not change their investment plans on Trump’s latest tweet delaying some tariffs. For now, we do not detect signs of an impending growth turnaround in China’s domestic demand and global trade. Therefore, China-related risk assets, commodities and global cyclicals are at risk of breaking down. Economic Rationale The global trade and manufacturing recession will linger for a while longer, and a recovery is not in the offing: The business cycle in EM/China continues to downshift. Consistently, corporate earnings are already or soon will be contracting in EM, China and the rest of emerging Asia (Chart I-4). EM corporate EPS contraction is broad-based (Chart I-5A and I-5B). The recent declines in oil and base metals prices entail earnings shrinkage for energy and materials companies (Chart I-5B, bottom two panels). Chart I-5AEM EPS Contraction Is Broad Based EM EPS Contraction Is Broad Based EM EPS Contraction Is Broad Based Chart I-5BEM EPS Contraction Is Broad Based EM EPS Contraction Is Broad Based EM EPS Contraction Is Broad Based   China’s monetary and fiscal stimulus has not yet been sufficient to revive capital spending in general and construction activity in particular (Chart I-6). Chinese household spending is also exhibiting little signs of recovery (Chart I-7). Chart I-6China: Building Construction Is Dwindling China: Building Construction Is Dwindling China: Building Construction Is Dwindling Chart I-7China: Consumer Spending Has Not Yet Recovered China: Consumer Spending Has Not Yet Recovered China: Consumer Spending Has Not Yet Recovered   Domestic demand continues to deteriorate, not only in China but also in other emerging economies, as we documented in our July 25 report. In EM ex-China, imports of capital goods and auto sales are contracting (Chart I-8). High-frequency freight data point to ongoing weakness in shipments in both the U.S. and China (Chart I-9). Chart I-8EM Ex-China: Domestic Demand Is Depressed EM Ex-China: Domestic Demand Is Depressed EM Ex-China: Domestic Demand Is Depressed Bottom Line: The current global manufacturing and trade downturns will prove to be drawn out, and investors should be wary of betting on an impending recovery. This is BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy view and is different from BCA’s house view which is anticipating an imminent global business cycle recovery. Chart I-9Global Freight Does Not Signal Recovery Global Freight Does Not Signal Recovery Global Freight Does Not Signal Recovery   Breakdown Watch Financial market segments sensitive to the global business cycle have been splintering at the edges. These cracks appear to be proliferating to the center and will render considerable damage to aggregate equity indexes. EM corporate EPS contraction is broad-based. We explained our rationale behind using long-term moving averages to identify significant breakouts and breakdowns in last week’s report. We also highlighted the numerous breakdowns that have already transpired. Today, we supplement the list: EM equity relative performance versus DM has fallen below its previous lows (Chart I-10, top panel). Crucially, emerging Asian stocks’ relative performance versus DM has clearly breached its 2015-2016 lows (Chart I-10, bottom panel). The KOSPI and Chinese H-share indexes have broken below their three-year moving averages (Chart I-11, top two panels). Chart I-10EM Equities Relative Performance Has Broken Down EM Equities Relative Performance Has Broken Down EM Equities Relative Performance Has Broken Down Chinese bank stocks in particular have been responsible for dragging China’s H-share index lower (Chart I-11, bottom panel). In addition, Chinese small-cap stocks dropped below their December low, as have copper prices and our Risk-On versus Safe-Haven currency ratio1 (Chart I-12). Finally, German chemical and industrial share prices such as BASF, Siemens and ThyssenKrupp have decisively broken down (Chart I-13). Chart I-11Breakdowns In Korea And China... Breakdowns In Korea And China... Breakdowns In Korea And China...   Chart I-12...In Commodities Space As Well bca.ems_wr_2019_08_15_s1_c12 bca.ems_wr_2019_08_15_s1_c12 Chart I-13German Manufacturing Stocks Are In Free Fall German Manufacturing Stocks Are In Free Fall German Manufacturing Stocks Are In Free Fall   This implies that Germany’s manufacturing slowdown is not limited to the auto sector but rather is pervasive. Besides, these companies are greatly exposed to China/EM demand, and their share prices simply reflect the ongoing slump in China/EM capital spending. There are several other market signals that are at a critical technical juncture, and their move lower will confirm our downbeat view on global growth and cyclical markets. In particular: The global stocks-to-U.S. Treasurys ratio has dropped to a critical technical line (Chart I-14, top panel). Failure to hold this defense line would signal considerable downside in global cyclical assets. Similarly, the Chinese stock-to-bond ratio – calculated using total returns of both the MSCI China All-Share index and domestic government bonds – has plunged. The path of least resistance for this ratio might be to the downside (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Given China is the epicenter of the global slowdown, this ratio is of vital importance. The lack of recovery in this ratio signifies lingering downside growth risks. Finally, global cyclical sectors’ relative performance versus defensive ones is sitting on its three-year moving average (Chart I-15). A move lower will qualify as a major breakdown and confirm the absence of a global manufacturing and trade recovery. Chart I-14Global Stocks-To-Bonds Ratio: Sitting On Edge Global Stocks-To-Bonds Ratio: Sitting On Edge Global Stocks-To-Bonds Ratio: Sitting On Edge Chart I-15Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives: At A Critical Juncture Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives: At A Critical Juncture Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives: At A Critical Juncture   Bottom Line: Several important markets have already experienced technical breakdowns, and a few others are at risk of doing so. All in all, these provide us with confidence in maintaining our downbeat stance on EM risk assets and currencies. EM Bonds: The Last Shoe To Drop? Although EM share prices are back to their December lows, EM local currency and U.S. dollar bonds have done well this year, benefiting from the indiscriminate global bond market rally. However, there are limits to how far and for how long the performance of EM domestic and U.S. dollar bonds can diverge from EM stocks, currencies and commodities prices (Chart I-16). EM domestic bond yields have plunged close to the 2013 lows they touched prior to the Federal Reserve’s ‘Taper Tantrum’ selloff (Chart I-17, top panel). That said, on a total return basis in common currency terms, the GBI EM domestic bond index has not outperformed U.S. Treasurys, as shown in the bottom panel of Chart I-17. Chart I-16Which Way These Gaps Will Close? Which Way These Gaps Will Close? Which Way These Gaps Will Close? Chart I-17EM Domestic Bonds: Poor Risk-Reward Profile EM Domestic Bonds: Poor Risk-Reward Profile EM Domestic Bonds: Poor Risk-Reward Profile   Looking forward, EM exchange rates remain critical to the returns of this asset class. With the GBI EM local currency bond index’s yield spread over five-year U.S. Treasurys at about 400 basis points, EM currencies have very little room to depreciate before foreign investors begin experiencing losses. We believe that further RMB depreciation, commodities prices deflation and EM exports contraction all bode ill for EM exchange rates. Consequently, we expect EM local bonds to underperform U.S. Treasurys of similar duration over the next several months. German chemical and industrial share prices such as BASF, Siemens and ThyssenKrupp have decisively broken down. Finally, the euro has begun rapid appreciation versus EM currencies. This will erode EM local bonds’ returns to European investors and trigger a period of outflows. Within this asset class, our overweights are Mexico, Russia, Central Europe, Chile, Korea and Thailand, while we continue to recommend underweight positions in the Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Peru within an EM local currency bond portfolio. As to EM credit space (hard currency bonds), these markets are overbought, and investors positioning is heavy. EM currency depreciation and lower commodities prices typically herald widening spreads. Argentina has a large weight in the EM credit indexes, and the crash in Argentine markets could be a trigger for outflows from this asset class. Technically speaking, there are already several negative signposts. The excess returns on EM sovereign and corporate bonds seem to have rolled over, having failed to surpass their early 2018 highs (Chart I-18). Besides, EM sovereign CDS spreads are breaking out (Chart I-19, top panel). Chart I-18EM Credit Markets Is Toppy EM Credit Markets Is Toppy EM Credit Markets Is Toppy Chart I-19EM Credit Space Is Entering Selloff EM Credit Space Is Entering Selloff EM Credit Space Is Entering Selloff   Finally, there are noticeable cracks in the emerging Asian corporate credit market. The price index of China’s high-yield property bonds – that account for a very large portion not only of the Chinese but also the emerging Asian corporate bond universes – has petered out at an important technical resistance level (Chart I-19, bottom panel). Further, the relative total return of emerging Asia’s investment-grade corporate bonds against their high-yield peers is correlated with Asia corporate spreads, and presently points to wider spreads (Chart I-20). The rationale is that periods when safer parts of the credit universe outperform the riskier ones are usually associated with widening credit spreads. China’s property market remains vulnerable as the central authorities in Beijing have not provided much housing-related stimulus in the current downtrend. Furthermore, companies in this space are overleveraged, generate poor cash flow and have limited access to credit. The euro has begun rapid appreciation versus EM currencies. This will erode EM local bonds’ returns to European investors and trigger a period of outflows. Overall, Chinese property developers will affect the EM credit space in two ways. First, their credit spreads will likely continue to shoot up, generating investor anxiety and outflows from this asset class. Second, reduced investment by debt-laden and cash-strapped property developers will inflict pain on industrial and materials companies in Asia and beyond. We discuss the outlook for steel, iron ore and coal, which are very exposed to Chinese construction, in the section below. Bottom Line: For asset allocators, we recommend underweighting EM sovereign and corporate credit versus U.S. investment grade, a strategy we have been advocating since August 16, 2017 (Chart I-21). For dedicated portfolios, the list of our overweights and underweights, as always, is presented at the end of the report (page 21). Chart I-20Emerging Asian Corporate Spreads Will Widen Emerging Asian Corporate Spreads Will Widen Emerging Asian Corporate Spreads Will Widen Chart I-21Favor U.S. Investment Grade Versus EM Overall Credit Favor U.S. Investment Grade Versus EM Overall Credit Favor U.S. Investment Grade Versus EM Overall Credit   As for EM domestic bonds, we continue to recommend betting on yield declines in select countries without taking on currency risk. These include Korea, Chile, Mexico and Russia. We will warm up to this asset class in general when we alter our negative EM currency view. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Chinese Steel, Iron Ore And Coal Markets: Renewed Deflation Chart II-1Is Deflation In Steel And Coal Back? Is Deflation In Steel And Coal Back? Is Deflation In Steel And Coal Back? Unlike 2015 when steel, iron ore and coal prices collapsed, in the current downturn they have so far held up reasonably well. They have begun falling only recently (Chart II-1). Even though we do not anticipate a 2015-type Armageddon in steel, iron ore and coal prices, they will deflate further due to supply outpacing demand in China. For both steel and coal, the pace of “de-capacity” reforms in China has diminished considerably, with declining shutdowns of inefficient capacity and rising advanced capacity, as we argued in a couple of reports last year.  This has led to a faster growth in supply, while demand has been dwindling with weak economic growth. Lower steel, iron ore and coal prices will harm Chinese and global producers along with their respective countries.2 Steel And Iron Ore First, both crude steel and steel products output will likely grow at a pace of 5-7% (Chart II-2). As the 2016-2020 steel de-capacity target (150 million tons capacity reduction) was already achieved by the end of 2018, the scale of further shutdowns will be limited. In addition, collapsing graphite electrode prices reflect an increased supply of this material. This along with more availability of scrap steel will facilitate the continuing expansion of cleaner technology (electric furnace (EF)) steel capacity and their output in China. The newly added EF steel capacity is planned at about 21 million tons in 2019 (representing 1.8% of official aggregate steel production capacity), slightly lower than the 25 million tons in 2018. Second, we expect steel products demand to grow at 3-5%, slightly weaker than output. Construction accounts for about 55% of Chinese final steel demand, with about 35% stemming from the property market and 20% from infrastructure. The automotive sector contributes about 10% of final Chinese steel demand. All of these end markets are weak and do not yet show signs of revival (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Steel Production In China Steel Production In China Steel Production In China Chart II-3No Recovery In Chinese Demand No Recovery In Chinese Demand No Recovery In Chinese Demand   Concerning iron ore price, we expect more downside than in steel. Supply disruptions among Brazilian and Australian producers were the main cause for the significant rally in iron ore prices this year. Evidence is that these producers have already resumed their output recovery. Current iron ore prices are still well above marginal production costs of major global iron ore producers. Besides, ongoing large currency depreciation in commodity producing countries will push down their marginal production costs in U.S. dollars terms. This will encourage further supply.  As China has increased its use of scrap steel in its crude steel production, the country’s iron ore demand has not grown much. In fact, imports of this raw material have contracted (Chart II-4) As scrap steel prices are currently very low relative to the price of imported iron ore (Chart II-5), steel producers in China will continue to use scrap steel instead of iron ore. Chart II-4China's Imports Of Iron Ore Have Been Shrinking China's Imports Of Iron Ore Have Been Shrinking China's Imports Of Iron Ore Have Been Shrinking Chart II-5Scrap Steel Is A Cheap Substitute For Iron Ore Scrap Steel Is A Cheap Substitute For Iron Ore Scrap Steel Is A Cheap Substitute For Iron Ore   Coal Chart II-6Coal Output Is Rising, But Beijing's Goal To Reduce Its Usage Coal Output Is Rising, But Beijing's Goal To Reduce Its Usage Coal Output Is Rising, But Beijing's Goal To Reduce Its Usage Chinese coal prices will also be under downward pressure. First, coal output growth will likely slow but will still stand at 2-4% down from a current 6% level (Chart II-6, top panel). The government has set a production goal of 3900 million tons for 2020. Given last year’s output of 3680 million tons, this implies only a 2.9% annual growth rate this year and the next. Second, the demand for both thermal coal and coking coal will likely weaken. They account for 80% and 20% of total coal demand, respectively. About 60% of Chinese coal is used to generate thermal power. As the country continues to promote the use of clean energy, thermal power output growth will likely slow further. Increasing the nation’s reliance on clean energy is an imperative strategic objective for Beijing. Given that thermal coal still accounts for a whopping 70% of electricity production, China will maintain its effort on reducing coal in its energy mix (Chart II-6, bottom panel). In the same vein, the government will continue to replace coal with natural gas in home heating. Finally, Chinese coal import volumes are likely to decline as the nation is increasingly relying on its domestic sources. In particular, the strategic Menghua railway construction will be completed in October. It will be used to transport the commodity from large producers in the north to the coal-deficit provinces in the south. This will reduce the nation’s coal imports, as the transportation cost of shipping domestic coal to the southern power plants will become more competitive than imported coal. Macro And Investment Implications First, companies and economies producing these commodities will face deflationary pressures. These include - but are not limited to - Indonesia, Australia, Brazil and South Africa, as well as steel producers around the world. Second, the RMB depreciation will allow China to gain further market share in the global steel market. In fact, China’s share of global steel output has been rising (Chart II-7, top panel). The bottom panel of Chart II-7 shows that steel production in the world excluding China have actually come to a grinding halt at a time when mainland producers have enjoyed high output growth. Global steel stocks have broken down and global mining equities are heading into a breakdown (Chart II-8). Chart II-7China Has Been Gaining A Share In Global Steel Market China Has Been Gaining A Share In Global Steel Market China Has Been Gaining A Share In Global Steel Market Chart II-8Breakdown In Steel And Mining Stocks Breakdown In Steel And Mining Stocks Breakdown In Steel And Mining Stocks   Finally, we remain bearish on commodities and other global growth sensitive currencies. In particular, we continue shorting the following basket of EM currencies against the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR and KRW. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1          Average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP & ZAR total return (including carry) indices relative to average of JPY & CHF total returns. 2      This is BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy view and is different from BCA’s house view. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Fixed-Income And Credit Recommendations

Highlights Central banks globally have turned dovish, with the Fed virtually promising to cut rates in July. But this will be an “insurance” cut, like 1995 and 1998, not the beginning of a pre-recessionary easing cycle. The global expansion remains intact, with the fundamental drivers of U.S. consumption robust and China likely to ramp up its credit stimulus over the coming months. The Fed will cut once or twice, but not four times over the next 10 months as the futures markets imply. Underlying U.S. inflation – properly measured – is trending higher to above 2%. U.S. GDP growth this year will be around 2.5%. Inflation expectations will move higher as the crude oil price rises. Unemployment is at a 50-year low and the U.S. stock market at an historical peak. These factors suggest bond yields are more likely to rise than fall from current levels. The upside for U.S. equities is limited, but earnings growth should be better than the 3% the bottom-up consensus expects. The key for allocation will be when to shift in the second half into higher-beta China-related plays, such as Europe and Emerging Markets. For now, we remain overweight the lower-beta U.S. equity market, neutral on credit, and underweight government bonds. To hedge against the positive impact of China stimulus, we raise Australia to neutral, and re-emphasize our overweights on the Industrials and Energy sectors. Feature Overview Precautionary Dovishness – Or Looming Recession?   Recommendations Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Precautionary Dovishness – Or Looming Recession? Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Precautionary Dovishness – Or Looming Recession? Central banks everywhere have taken a decidedly dovish turn in recent weeks. June’s FOMC statement confirmed that “uncertainties about the outlook have increased….[We] will act as appropriate to sustain the expansion,” hinting broadly at a rate cut in July. The Bank of Japan’s Kuroda said he would “take additional easing action without hesitation,” and hinted at a Modern Monetary Theory-style combination of fiscal and monetary policy. European Central Bank President Draghi mentioned the possibility of restarting asset purchases. There are two possible explanations. Either the global economy is heading into recession, and central banks are preparing for a full-blown easing cycle. Or these are “insurance” cuts aimed at prolonging the expansion, as happened in 1995 and 1998, or similar to when the Fed went on hold for 12 months in 2016 (Chart 1). Our view is that it is most likely the latter. The reason for this is that the main drivers of the global economy, U.S. consumption ($14 trillion) and the Chinese economy ($13 trillion) are likely to be strong over the next 12 months. U.S. wage growth continues to accelerate, consumer sentiment is close to a 50-year high, and the savings rate is elevated (Chart 2); as a result core U.S. retail sales have begun to pick up momentum in recent months (Chart 3). Unless something exogenous severely damages consumer optimism, it is hard to see how the U.S. can go into recession in the near future, considering that consumption is 70% of GDP. Moreover, despite weaknesses in the manufacturing sector – infected by the China-led slowdown in the rest of the world – U.S. service sector growth and the labor market remain solid. This resembles 1998 and 2016, but is different from the pre-recessionary environments of 2000 and 2007 (Chart 4). There is also no sign on the horizon of the two factors that have historically triggered recessions: a sharp rise in private-sector debt, or accelerating inflation (Chart 5). Chart 1Insurance Cuts, Or Full Easing Cycle? Insurance Cuts, Or Full Easing Cycle? Insurance Cuts, Or Full Easing Cycle? Chart 2Consumption Fundamentals Are Strong... Consumption Fundamentals Are Strong... Consumption Fundamentals Are Strong... Chart 3...Leading To Rebound In Retail Sales ...Leading To Rebound In Retail Sales ...Leading To Rebound In Retail Sales Chart 4Manufacturing Weak, But Services Holding Up Manufacturing Weak, But Services Holding Up Manufacturing Weak, But Services Holding Up   Chart 5No Signs Of Usual Recession Triggers No Signs Of Usual Recession Triggers No Signs Of Usual Recession Triggers China’s efforts to reflate via credit creation have been somewhat half-hearted since the start of the year. Investment by state-owned companies has picked up, but the private sector has been spooked by the risk of a trade war and has slowed capex (Chart 6). China may have hesitated from full-blown stimulus because the authorities in April were confident of a successful outcome to trade talks with the U.S., and a bit concerned that the liquidity was going into speculation rather than the real economy. But we see little reason why they will not open the taps fully if growth remains sluggish and trade tensions heighten.1 Chinese credit creation clearly has a major impact on many components of global growth – in particular European exports, Emerging Markets earnings, and commodity prices – but the impact often takes 6-12 months to come through (Chart 7). A key question is when investors should position for this to happen. We think this decision is a little premature now, but will be a key call for the second half of the year. Chart 6China's Half-Hearted Reflation China's Half-Hearted Reflation China's Half-Hearted Reflation Chart 7China Credit Growth Affects The World China Credit Growth Affects The World China Credit Growth Affects The World Chart 8Fed Won't Cut As Much As Market Wants... Fed Won't Cut As Much As Market Wants... Fed Won't Cut As Much As Market Wants... The Fed has so clearly signaled rate cuts that we see it cutting by perhaps 50 basis points over the next few months (maybe all in one go in July if it wants to “shock and awe” the market). But the futures market is pricing in four 25 bps cuts by April next year. With GDP growth likely to be around 2.5% this year, unemployment at a 50-year low, trend inflation above 2%,2 and the stock market at an historical high, we find this improbable. Two cuts would be similar to what happened in 1995, 1998 and (to a degree) 2016 (Chart 8). In this environment, we think it likely that equities will outperform bonds over the next 12 months. When the Fed cuts by less than the market is expecting, long-term rates tend to rise (Chart 9). BCA’s U.S. bond strategists have shown that after mid-cycle rate cuts, yields typically rise: by 59 bps in 1995-6, 58 bps in 1998, and 19 bps in 2002.3 A combination of rising inflation, stronger growth ex-U.S., a less dovish Fed that the market expects, and a rising oil price (which will push up inflation expectations) makes it unlikely – absent an outright recession – that global risk-free yields will fall much below current levels. Moreover, June’s BOA Merrill Lynch survey cited long government bonds as the most crowded trade at the moment, and surveys of investor positioning suggest duration among active investors is as long as at any time since the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 10). Chart 9...So Bond Yields Are Likely To Rise ...So Bond Yields Are Likely To Rise ...So Bond Yields Are Likely To Rise Chart 10Investors Betting On Further Rate Decline Investors Betting On Further Rate Decline Investors Betting On Further Rate Decline The outlook for U.S. equities is not that exciting. Valuations are not cheap (with forward PE of 16.5x), but earnings should be revised up from the currently very cautious level: the bottom-up consensus forecasts S&P 500 EPS growth at only 3% in 2019 (and -3% YoY in Q2). We have sympathy for the view that there are three put options that will prop up stock prices in the event of external shocks: the Fed put, the Xi put, and the Trump put. Relating to the last of these, it is notable that President Trump tends to turn more aggressive in trade talks with China whenever the U.S. stock market is strong, but more conciliatory when it falls (Chart 11). For now, therefore, we remain overweight U.S. equities, as a lower beta way to play an environment that continues to be positive – but uncertain – for stocks. But we continue to watch for the timing to move into higher-beta China-related markets as the effects of China’s stimulus start to come through. Chart 11Trump Turns Softer When Market Falls Trump Turns Softer When Market Falls Trump Turns Softer When Market Falls   Garry Evans Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com   What Our Clients Are Asking Chart 12Temporary Forces Drove Inflation Downturn Temporary Forces Drove Inflation Downturn Temporary Forces Drove Inflation Downturn Why Is Inflation So Low? After reaching 2% in July 2018, U.S. core PCE currently stands at 1.6%, close to 18 month lows. This plunge in inflation, along with increased worries about the trade war and continued economic weakness, has led the market to believe that the Fed Funds Rate is currently above the neutral rate, and that several rate cuts are warranted in order to move policy away from restrictive territory. We believe that the recent bout of low inflation is temporary. The main contributor to the fall in core PCE has been financial services prices, which shaved off up to 40 basis points from core PCE (Chart 12, panel 1). However, assets under management are a big determinant of financial services prices, making this measure very sensitive to the stock market (panel 2). Therefore, we expect this component of core PCE to stabilize as equity prices continue to rise. The effect of higher equity prices, and the stabilization of other goods that were affected by the slowdown of global growth in late 2018 and early 2019, may already have started to push inflation higher. Month-on-month core PCE grew at an annualized rate of 3% in April, the highest pace since the end of 2017. Meanwhile, trimmed mean PCE, a measure that has historically been a more stable and reliable gauge of inflationary pressures, is at a near seven-year high (panel 3). The above implies that the market might be overestimating how much the Fed is going to ease. We believe that the Fed will likely cut once this year to soothe the pain caused by the trade war on financial markets. However, with unemployment at 50-year lows, and inflation set to rise again, the Fed is unlikely to deliver the 92 basis points of cuts currently priced by the OIS curve for the next 12 months. This implies that investors should continue to underweight bonds. Chart 13Turning On The Taps Turning On The Taps Turning On The Taps Will China Really Ramp Up Its Stimulus? The direction of markets over the next 12 months (a bottoming of euro area and Emerging Markets growth, commodity prices, the direction of the USD) are highly dependent on whether China further increases monetary stimulus in the event of a breakdown in trade negotiations with the U.S. But we hear much skepticism from clients: aren’t the Chinese authorities, rather, focused on reducing debt and clamping down on shadow banking? Aren’t they worried that liquidity will simply flow into speculation and have little impact on the real economy? Now the government has someone to blame for a slowdown (President Trump), won’t they use that as an excuse – and, to that end, are preparing the population for a period of pain by quoting as analogies the Long March in the 1930s and the Korea War (when China ground down U.S. willingness to prolong the conflict)? We think it unlikely that the Chinese government would be prepared to allow growth to slump. Every time in the past 10 years that growth has slowed (with, for example, the manufacturing PMI falling significantly below 50) they have always accelerated credit growth – on the basis of the worst-case scenario (Chart 13, panel 1). Why would they react differently this time, particularly since 2019 is a politically sensitive year, with the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic in October and several other important anniversaries? Moreover, the government is slipping behind in its target to double per capita income in the 10 years to end-2020 (panel 2). GDP growth needs to be 6.5-7% over the next 18 months to achieve the target. The government’s biggest worry is employment, where prospects are slipping rapidly (panel 3). This also makes it difficult for the authorities to retaliate against U.S. companies that have large operations, such as Apple or General Motors, since such measures would hurt their Chinese employees. Besides a significant revaluation of the RMB (which we think likely), China has few cards to play in the event of a full-blown trade war other than fully turning on the liquidity tap again. Chart 14 Aren’t There Signs Of Bubbliness In Equity Markets? Clients have asked whether the current market environment has been showing any classic signs of euphoria. These usually appear with lots of initial public offerings (IPO), irrational M&A activity, and excess investor optimism. The IPO market has some similarities to the years leading up to the dot-com bubble, but it is important to look below the surface. The percentage of IPOs with negative earnings in 2018 was similar to the previous peak in 1999. However, the average first-day return of IPOs in 2019, while still above the historical average, has been much lower than that during the dot-com bubble period (Chart 14, panel 1). There is also a difference in the composition of firms going public. There are now many IPOs for biotech firms that have heavily invested in R&D, and so have relatively low sales currently but await a breakthrough in their products; by their nature, these are loss-making (panel 2). Cross-sector, unrelated M&A activity has also often been a sign of bubble peaks. It is a consequence of firms stretching to find inorganic growth late in the cycle. Such deals are characterized by high deal premiums, and are usually conducted through stock purchases rather than in cash. The current average deal premium is below its historical average (panel 3). Additionally, 2018 and 2019-to-date M&A deals conducted using cash represented 60% and 90% of the total respectively, compared to only 17% between 1996 and 2000. Investor sentiment is also moderately pessimistic despite the rally in the S&P 500 since the beginning of the year (panel 4). This caution suggests that investors are fearful of the risk of recession rather than overly positive about market prospects, despite the U.S. market being at an historical high. Given the above, we do not see any signals of the sort of euphoria and bubbliness that typically accompanies stock market tops. Will Japan Benefit From Chinese Reflation? Japan has been one of the worst-performing developed equity markets since March 2009, when global equities hit their post-crisis bottom in both USD (Chart 15) and local currency terms. Now with increasing market confidence in China’s reflationary policies, clients are asking if Japan is a good China play given its close ties with the Chinese economy. Our answer is No. Chart 15 Chart 16Downgrade Japan To Underweight Downgrade Japan To Underweight Downgrade Japan To Underweight   It’s true that Japanese equities did respond to past Chinese reflationary efforts, but the outperformances were muted and short-lived (Chart 16, panel 1). Even though Japanese exports to China will benefit from Chinese reflationary policy (panel 5), MSCI Japan index earnings growth does not have strong correlation with Japanese exports to China, as shown in panel 4. This is not surprising given that exports to China account for only about 3% of nominal GDP in Japan (compared to almost 6% for Australia, for example). The MSCI Japan index is dominated by Industrials (21%) and Consumer Discretionary (18%). Financials, Info Tech, Communication Services and Healthcare each accounts for about 8-10%. Other than the Communication Services sector, all other major sectors in Japan have underperformed their global peers since the Global Financial Crisis (panels 2 and 3). The key culprit for such poor performance is Japan’s structural deflationary environment. Wage growth has been poor despite a tight labor market. This October’s consumption tax increase will put further downward pressure on domestic consumers. There is no sign of the two factors that have historically triggered recessions: a sharp rise in private-sector debt, or accelerating inflation. As such, we are downgrading Japan to a slight underweight in order to close our underweight in Australia (see page 16). This also aligns our recommendation with the output from our DM Country Allocation Quant Model, which has structurally underweighted Japan since its inception in January 2016. Global Economy Chart 17Is Consumption Enough To Prop Up U.S. Growth? Is Consumption Enough To Prop Up U.S. Growth? Is Consumption Enough To Prop Up U.S. Growth? Overview: The tight monetary policy of last year (with the Fed raising rates and China slowing credit growth) has caused a slowdown in the global manufacturing sector, which is now threatening to damage worldwide consumption and the relatively closed U.S. economy too. The key to a rebound will be whether China ramps up the monetary stimulus it began in January but which has so far been rather half-hearted. Meanwhile, central banks everywhere are moving to cut rates as an “insurance” against further slowdown. U.S.: Growth data has been mixed in recent months. The manufacturing sector has been affected by the slowdown in EM and Europe, with the manufacturing ISM falling to 52.1 in May and threatening to dip below 50 (Chart 17, panel 2). However, consumption remains resilient, with no signs of stress in the labor market, average hourly earnings growing at 3.1% year-on-year, and consumer confidence at a high level. As a result, retail sales surprised to the upside in May, growing 3.2% YoY. The trade war may be having some negative impact on business sentiment, however, with capex intentions and durable goods orders weakening in recent months. Euro Area: Current conditions in manufacturing continue to look dire. The manufacturing PMI is below 50 and continues to decline (Chart 18, panel 1). In export-focused markets like Germany, the situation looks even worse: Germany’s manufacturing PMI is at 45.4, and expectations as measured by the ZEW survey have deteriorated again recently. Solid wage growth and some positive fiscal thrust (in Italy, France, and even Germany) have kept consumption stable, but the recent tick-up in German unemployment raises the question of how sustainable this is. Recovery will be dependent on Chinese stimulus triggering a rebound in global trade. Chart 18Few Signs Of Recovery In Global Ex-U.S. Growth Few Signs Of Recovery In Global Ex-U.S. Growth Few Signs Of Recovery In Global Ex-U.S. Growth Japan: The slowdown in China continues to depress industrial production and leading indicators (panel 2). But maybe the first “green shoots” are appearing thanks to China’s stimulus: in April, manufacturing orders rose by 16.3% month-on-month, compared to -11.4% in March. Nonetheless, consumption looks vulnerable, with wage growth negative YoY each month so far this year, and the consumption tax rise in October likely to hit consumption further. The Bank of Japan’s six-year campaign of maximum monetary easing is having little effect, with core core inflation stuck at 0.5% YoY, despite a small pickup in recent months – no doubt because the easy monetary policy has been offset by a steady tightening of fiscal policy. Emerging Markets: China’s growth has slipped since the pickup in February and March caused by a sharp increase in credit creation. Seemingly, the authorities became more confident about a trade agreement with the U.S., and worried about how much of the extra credit was going into speculation, rather than the real economy. The manufacturing PMI, having jumped to almost 51 in March, has slipped back to 50.2. A breakdown of trade talks would undoubtedly force the government to inject more liquidity. Elsewhere in EM, growth has generally been weak, because of the softness in Chinese demand. In Q1, GDP growth was -3.2% QoQ annualized in South Africa, -1.7% in Korea, and -0.8% in both Brazil and Mexico. Only less China-sensitive markets such as Russia (3.3%) and India (6.5%) held up. Interest rates: U.S. inflation has softened on the surface, with the core PCE measure slipping to 1.6% in April. However, some of the softness was driven by transitory factors, notably the decline in financial advisor fees (which tend to move in line with the stock market) which deducted 0.5 points from core PCE inflation. A less volatile measure, the trimmed mean PCE deflator, however, continues to trend up and is above the Fed’s 2% target. Partly because of the weaker historical inflation data, inflation expectations have also fallen (panel 4). As a result, central banks everywhere have become more dovish, with the Australian and New Zealand reserve banks cutting rates and the Fed and ECB raising the possibility they may ease too. The consequence has been a big fall in 10-year government bonds yields: in the U.S. to only 2% from 3.1% as recently as last September. Global Equities Chart 19Worrisome Earnings Prospects Worrisome Earnings Prospects Worrisome Earnings Prospects Remain Cautiously Optimistic, Adding Another China Hedge: Global equities managed to eke out a small gain of 3.3% in Q2 despite a sharp loss of 5.9% in May. Within equities, our defensive country allocation worked well as DM equities outperformed EM by 2.9% in Q2. Our cyclical tilt in global sector positioning, however, did not pan out, largely due to the 2% underperformance in global Energy as the oil price dropped by 2% in Q2. Going forward, BCA’s House View remains that global economic growth will pick up sometime in the second half thanks to accommodative monetary policies globally and the increasing likelihood of a large stimulus from China to counter the negative effect from trade tensions. This implies that equities are likely to rally again after a period of congestion within a trading range, supporting a cautiously optimistic portfolio allocation for the next 9-12 months. The “optimistic” side of our allocation is reflected in two aspects: 1) overweight equities vs. bonds at the asset class level; and 2) overweight cyclicals vs. defensives at the global sector level. However, corporate profit margins are rolling over and earnings growth revisions have been negative (Chart 19). Therefore, the “cautious” side of our allocation remains a defensive country allocation, reflected by overweighting DM vs. EM. Our macro view hinges largely on what happens to China. There is an increasing likelihood that China may be on a reflationary path to stimulate economic growth. We upgraded global Industrials in March to hedge against China’s re-acceleration. Now we upgrade Australia to neutral from a long-term underweight, by downgrading Japan to a slight underweight from neutral, because Australia will benefit more from China’s reflationary policies (see next page). Chart 20Australian Equities: Close The Underweight Australian Equities: Close The Underweight Australian Equities: Close The Underweight Upgrade Australian Equities To Neutral The relative performance of MSCI Australian equities to global equities has been closely correlated with the CRB metal price most of the time. Since the end of 2015, however, the CRB metals index has increased by more than 40%, yet Australian equities did not outperform (Chart 20, panel 1). Why? The MSCI Australian index is concentrated in Financials (mostly banks) and Materials (mostly mining), as shown in panel 2. Aussie Materials have outperformed their global peers, but the banks have not (panel 3). The banks are a major source of financing for the mining companies (hence the positive correlation with metal prices). They are also the source of financing for the Aussie housing markets, which have weighed down on the banks’ performance over the past few years due to concerns about stretched valuations. We have been structurally underweight Australian equities because of our unfavorable view on industrial commodities, and also our concerns on the Australian housing market and the problems of the banks. This has served us well, as Australian equities have done poorly relative to the global aggregate since late 2012. Now interest rates in Australia have come down significantly. Lower mortgage rates should help stabilize house prices, which suffered in Q1 their worst year-on-year decline, 7.7%, in over three decades. Australian equity earnings growth is still slowing relative to the global earnings, but the speed of slowing down has decreased significantly. With 6% of GDP coming from exports to China, Aussie profit growth should benefit from reflationary policies from China (panel 4). Relative valuation, however, is not cheap (panel 5). All considered, we are closing our underweight in Australian equities as another hedge against a Chinese-led re-acceleration in economic growth. This is financed by downgrading Japan to a slight underweight (for more on Japan, see What Our Clients Are Asking, on page 11). Government Bonds Chart 21Limited Downside In Yields Limited Downside In Yields Limited Downside In Yields Maintain Slight Underweight On Duration: After the Fed signaled at its June meeting that rates cuts were likely on the way, the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield dropped to 1.97% overnight on June 20, the lowest since November 2016. Overall, the 10-year yield dropped by 40 bps in Q2 to end the quarter at 2%. BCA’s Fed Monitor is now indicating that easier monetary policy is required. But that is already more than discounted in the 92 bps of rate cuts over the next 12 months priced in at the front end of the yield curve, and by the current low level of Treasury yields. (Chart 21). We see the likelihood of one or two “insurance” cuts by the Fed, but the current environment (with a record-high stock market, tight corporate spreads, 50-year low unemployment rate, and 2019 GDP on track to reach 2.5%) is not compatible with a full-out cutting campaign. In addition, the latest Merrill Lynch survey indicated that long duration is the most crowded global trade. Given BCA’s House View that the U.S. economy is not heading into a recession but rather experiencing a manufacturing slowdown mainly due to external shocks, the path of least resistance for Treasury yields is higher rather than lower. Investors should maintain a slight underweight on duration over the next 9-12 months. Chart 22Favor Linkers Over Nominal Bonds Favor Linkers Over Nominal Bonds Favor Linkers Over Nominal Bonds Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds: Global inflation expectations have dropped anew in the second quarter, with the 10-year CPI swap rate now sitting at 1.55%, 41 bps lower than its 2018 high of 1.96%. However, historically, the change in the crude oil price tends to have a good correlation with inflation expectations. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service revised down its 2019 Brent crude forecast to an average of US$73 per barrel from US$75, but this implies an average of US$79 in H2. (Chart 22). This would cause a significant rise in inflation expectations in the second half, supporting our preference for inflation-linked over nominal bonds. We also favor linkers in Japan and Australia over their respective nominal bonds. Corporate Bonds Chart 23Profit Growth Should Still Outpace Debt Growth Profit Growth Should Still Outpace Debt Growth Profit Growth Should Still Outpace Debt Growth We turned cyclically overweight on credit within a fixed-income portfolio in February. Since then, corporate bonds have produced 120 basis points of excess return over duration-matched Treasuries. We believe this bullish stance on credit will continue to pay dividends. The global leading economic indicators have started to stabilize while multiple credit impulses have started to perk up all over the world. Historically, improving global growth has been positive for corporate bonds (Chart 23, panel 1). A valid concern is the deceleration in profit growth in the U.S., as the yearly growth of pre-tax profits has fallen from 15% in 2018 Q4 to 7% in the first quarter of this year. In general, corporate bonds suffer when profit growth lags debt growth, as defaults tends to rise in this environment. Is this scenario likely over the coming year? We do not believe so. While weak global growth at the end of 2018 and beginning of 2019 is likely to weigh on revenues, the current contraction in unit labor costs should bolster profit margins and keep profit growth robust (panel 2). Additionally, the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey shows that C&I loan demand has decreased significantly this year, suggesting that the pace of U.S. corporate debt growth is set to slow (panel 3). How long will we remain overweight? We expect that the Federal Reserve will do little to no tightening over the next 12 months. This will open a window for credit to outperform Treasuries in a fixed-income portfolio. We have also reduced our double underweight in EM debt, since an acceleration of Chinese monetary stimulus would be positive for this asset class. Commodities Chart 24Watch Oil And Be Wary Of Gold Watch Oil And Be Wary Of Gold Watch Oil And Be Wary Of Gold Energy (Overweight): Supply/demand fundamentals continue to be the main driver of crude oil prices. However, it seems as though the market is discounting something else. President Trump’s tweets, OPEC+ coalition statements, and concerns about future demand growth are contributing to price swings (Chart 24, panel 1). According to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, weak demand has reduced oil prices by $2/barrel this year. That should be offset, however, by a much larger contribution from supply cuts, speculative demand, and a deteriorating geopolitical environment. We see crude prices tilted to the upside, as OPEC’s ability to offset any supply disruptions (besides Iran and Venezuela) is limited (panel 2). We expect Brent to average $73 in 2019 and $75 in 2020. Industrial Metals (Neutral): A stronger USD accompanied by weakening global growth since 2018 has put downward pressure on industrial metal prices, which are down about 20% since January 2018. However, we now have renewed belief that the Chinese authorities will counter with a reflationary response though credit and fiscal stimulus. That should push industrial metal prices higher over the coming 12 months (panel 3). Precious Metals (Neutral): Allocators to gold are benefiting from the current environment of rising geopolitical risk, dovish central banks, a weaker USD, and the market’s flight to safety. Escalated trade tensions, falling global yields, and lower growth prospects are some of the factors that have supported the bullion’s 18% return since its September 2018 low. Until evidence of a bottom in global growth emerges, we expect the copper-to-gold ratio – another barometer for global growth – to continue falling (panel 4). The months ahead could see a correction, as investors take profits with gold in overbought territory. Nevertheless, we continue to recommend gold as both an inflation hedge as well as against any uncertain escalated political tensions. Currencies Chart 25Stronger Global Growth Will Weigh On The Dollar Stronger Global Growth Will Weigh On The Dollar Stronger Global Growth Will Weigh On The Dollar U.S. dollar: The trade-weighted dollar has been flat since we lowered our recommendation from positive to neutral in April. We expect that the Fed will cut rates at least once this year, easing financial conditions, and boosting economic activity. This will eventually prove negative for the dollar. However as long as the global economy is weak the greenback should hold up. Stay neutral for now. Euro: Since we turned bullish on the euro in April, EUR/USD has appreciated by 1.5%. Overall, we continue to be bullish on EUR/USD on a cyclical timeframe. Forward rate expectations continue to be near 2014 lows, suggesting that there is little room for U.S. monetary policy to tighten further vis-à-vis euro area monetary policy, creating a floor under the euro (Chart 25, panel 1). EM Currencies: We continue to be negative on emerging market currencies. However, some indicators suggest that Chinese weakness, the main engine behind the EM currency bear market might be reaching its end. Chinese marginal propensity to spend (proxied by M1 growth relative to M2 growth), has bottomed and seems to have stabilized (panel 2). The bond market has taken note of this development, as Chinese yields are now rising relative to U.S. ones (panel 3). Historically, both of these developments have resulted in a rally for emerging market currencies. Thus, while we expect the bear market to continue for the time being, the pace of decline is likely to ease, making EM currencies an attractive buy by the end of the year. Accordingly, we are reducing our underweight in EM currencies from double underweight to a smaller underweight position. Alternatives Chart 26 Return Enhancers: Hedge funds historically display a negative correlation with global growth momentum. Despite growth slowing over the past year, hedge funds underperformed the overall GAA Alternatives Index as well as private equity. Hedge funds usually outperform other risky alternatives during recessions or periods of high credit market stress. Credit spreads have been slow to rise in response to the slowing economy and worsening political environment. A pickup in spreads should support hedge fund outperformance (Chart 26, panel 2). Inflation Hedges: As we approach the end of the cycle, we continue to recommend investors reduce their real estate exposure and increase allocations towards commodity futures. Our May 2019 Special Report4 analyzed how different asset classes perform in periods of rising inflation. Our expectation is that inflation will pick up by the end of the year. An allocation to commodity futures, particularly energy, historically achieved excess returns of nearly 40% during periods of mild inflation (panel 3). Volatility Dampeners: Realized volatility in the catastrophe bond market is generally low. In fact, absent any catastrophe losses, catastrophe bonds provide stable returns, with volatility that is comparable to global bonds (panel 4). In a December 2017 Special Report,5 we tested for how the inclusion of catastrophe bonds in a traditional 60/40 equity-bond portfolio would have impacted portfolio risk-return characteristics. Replacing global equities with catastrophe bonds reduced annualized volatility by more than 1.5%. Risks To Our View Chart 27What Risk Of Recession? What Risk Of Recession? What Risk Of Recession? Our main scenario is sanguine on global growth, which means we argue that bond yields will not fall much below current levels. The risks to this view are mostly to the downside. There could be a full-blown recession. Most likely this would be caused either by China failing to do stimulus, or by U.S. rates being more restrictive than the Fed believes. Both of these explanations seem implausible. As we argue elsewhere, we think it unlikely that China would simply allow growth to slow without reacting with monetary and fiscal stimulus. If current Fed policy is too tight for the economy to withstand, it would imply that the neutral rate of interest is zero or below, something that seems improbable given how strong U.S. growth has been despite rising rates. Formal models of recession do not indicate an elevated risk currently (Chart 27). We continue to watch for the timing to move into higher-beta China-related markets as the effects of China’s stimulus start to come through. Even if growth is as strong as we forecast, is there a possibility that bond yields fall further. This could come about – for a while, at least – if the Fed is aggressively dovish, oil prices fall (perhaps because of a positive supply shock), inflation softens further, and global growth remains sluggish. Absent a recession, we find those outcomes unlikely. The copper-to-gold ratio has been a good indicator of U.S. bond yields (Chart 28). It suggests that, at 2%, the 10-year Treasury yield has slightly overshot. In fact, in June copper prices started to rebound, as the market began to price in growing Chinese demand. Chart 28Can Bond Yields Fall Any Further? Can Bond Yields Fall Any Further? Can Bond Yields Fall Any Further? Chart 29Are Analysts Right To Be So Gloomy? Are Analysts Right To Be So Gloomy? Are Analysts Right To Be So Gloomy?   For U.S. equities to rise much further, multiple expansion will not be enough; the earnings outlook needs to improve. Analysts are still cautious with their bottom-up forecasts, expecting only 3% EPS growth for the S&P500 this year (Chart 29). This seems easy to beat. But a combination of further dollar strength, worsening trade war, further slowdown in Europe and Emerging Markets, and higher U.S. wages would put it at risk. Footnotes 1 Please see What Our Clients Are Asking on page 9 of this Quarterly for further discussion on why we are confident China will ramp up stimulus if necessary. 2 Trimmed Mean PCE inflation, a better indicator of underlying inflation than the Core PCE deflator, is above 2%. Please see What Our Clients Are Asking on page 8 of this Quarterly for details. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Track Records,” dated June 18, available at usb.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report “Investors’ Guide To Inflation Hedging: How To Invest When Inflation Rises,” dated May 22, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report “A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds,” dated December 12, 2017 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com   GAA Asset Allocation

Highlights Coming up on the deadline for President Trump’s China – U.S. tariff ultimatum, tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese imports could go to 25% from 10% on Friday – the outlook for base metals remains complicated, particularly for aluminum and copper.1 Of course, the U.S. and China could have a meeting of the minds and agree to resolve the outstanding issues in the trade negotiations. This would be supportive of continued global supply-chain expansion, EM income growth and base metals prices generally. On the downside, an escalation of the Sino – U.S. trade war could retard investment in global supply chains, as firms hunker down for an extended and contentious contraction in global trade.2 This would be bearish for EM income growth, which would translate directly into lower base metals demand and, all else equal, depress prices. Still, a breakdown in trade talks could be bullish for base metals, as China likely would increase its fiscal, monetary and credit stimulus, in an attempt to offset the income-suppressing effects of reduced global trade and investment. As we said, it’s complicated. Two of the three outcomes above are supportive of base metals prices – i.e., a deal is agreed, and increased Chinese stimulus in the event of a breakdown in negotiations. Against this backdrop, we are closing our long tactical trading recommendations in copper and aluminum at tonight’s close, and replacing them with a call spread on July CME COMEX copper, in which we will get long $3.00/lb calls vs. short $3.30/lb calls. The call spreads are a low-risk way of positioning in a volatile market for a likely price-supportive outcome in these talks – the max loss on this position is the net premium paid to get long the spread. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Supply-side fundamentals continue to dominate oil price formation. An unplanned outage in Russia that took ~ 1mm b/d of oil off the market this week, following the contamination of exports with organic chloride left in shipments via Transneft’s European pipeline system. Russia’s Energy Ministry is guiding markets to expect the contamination will be cleared up toward the end of this month.3 Base Metals: Neutral. We are closing our tactical aluminum and copper trade recommendations at tonight’s close. We do see the potential for higher base metals prices – particularly copper – if China expands fiscal and monetary stimulus in the wake of a breakdown in trade talks with the U.S., or both sides can resolve their differences. We expect copper will benefit most from such outcomes. However, we believe a call spread – long July $3.00/lb CME COMEX calls vs. short $3.30/lb calls expiring in July – is a lower-risk way of expressing this view. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold could rally in the wake of an expanded trade war, if the Fed and the PBOC – along with other systemically important central banks – adopt more accommodative monetary policies in anticipation of a widening trade conflict. Greater fiscal, credit and monetary stimulus by China in response to a breakdown in trade talks also could boost safe-haven demand for gold. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The risk of a wider Sino – U.S. trade war – particularly the likely retaliation by China if U.S. tariffs are raised to 25% on already-targeted exports of $200 billion – would be especially bearish for soybeans and grain exports from the U.S. We remain underweight. Feature In the wake of President Donald Trump’s ultimatum to China to resolve trade talks by tomorrow, BCA Research’s geopolitical strategists give 50% odds to a successful trade deal being concluded by end-June. The odds of an extension of trade talks are 10%; and the odds of no deal on trade, 40% (Table 1). Table 1Updated Trade War Probabilities (May 2019) Expanded Sino – U.S. Trade War Could Be Bullish For Base Metals Expanded Sino – U.S. Trade War Could Be Bullish For Base Metals Of these possible outcomes, the no-deal scenario – i.e., an escalation in the trade war including raising tariffs on imports from China to 25% on the $200 billion of goods now carrying a 10% duty – would be the most volatile, and likely would push base metals’ prices lower in the short-term. A trade deal would set markets to estimating the extent of supply-chain investment and trade-flow revival, as the drawn-out uncertainty around the outcome of the Sino – U.S. trade war fades. Given the slim wedge our geopolitical strategists see between the deal and no-deal outcomes to these trade talks, we believe the implications of the latter need to be sorted. An agreement to extend trade talks likely would be welcomed with the same aplomb shown by markets prior to this current level of high drama. In this scenario, markets likely would price in an economically rational outcome to the U.S. – China trade negotiations, which resolves the uncertainty around tariffs and other investment-retarding policies. Given the slim wedge our geopolitical strategists see between the deal and no-deal outcomes to these trade talks, we believe the implications of the latter need to be sorted. In the short term – i.e., following a breakdown in the talks – market sentiment likely would become more negative, as traders priced in the implications for reduced global supply-chain investment and trade flows, particularly re China and EM exporters. In addition, base metals markets would discount the income hit to EM these effects would feed into, raising the likelihood commodity demand growth would slow. News flow would then dictate price action for the metals over the short term. As markets discount these expectations, we believe Chinese policymakers would act to increase the levels of fiscal, credit and monetary stimulus domestically, to counter the hit to domestic income. The lagged effects of this stimulus will have a strong influence on base metals’ price formation, and, depending on the level of stimulus, could be bullish for metals prices. China’s Influence on Base Metals Higher Post-GFC In previous research, we found copper, and to lesser extent aluminum and the LMEX index, which is heavily weighted to both, benefit most from monetary, credit and fiscal stimulus in China.4 Other metals also experience a lift when the level of these Chinese policy variables rises; however, their relationship with EM and China’s industrial production cycle is weaker and time varying (Chart of the Week). Chart 1 In Table 2, we show how different policy and macro factors affect various base metal prices and the LMEX; these models generate the output for the curves in the Chart of the Week. The table show the coefficients of determination for single-variable regressions for each metal on the EM- or China-focused factor shown in the columns for the period 2000 to now, and 2010 to now. Within the base metals complex, copper, the LMEX index and aluminum exhibit the strongest and most reliable relationships with the explanatory variables shown at the top of each column. Table 2Coefficients Of Determination: Base Metals Prices (yoy) Vs. Key Factors Expanded Sino – U.S. Trade War Could Be Bullish For Base Metals Expanded Sino – U.S. Trade War Could Be Bullish For Base Metals The biggest takeaway from this analysis is that, for each individual metal, Chinese economic activity in particular, and EM income dynamics generally dominate price determination. The importance of these factors increased considerably post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC). As was the case with our correlation analysis, this is best captured by our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index (Chart 2, panel 1). This is clearly seen in the co-movement of our GIA index and copper prices (Chart 2, panel 2), and EM GDP.5 Chart 3 shows the GIA index disaggregated in its four main components. Chart 2BCA's GIA Index Vs. EM GDP, Copper Prices BCA's GIA Index Vs. EM GDP, Copper Prices BCA's GIA Index Vs. EM GDP, Copper Prices Chart 3BCA GIA Index Components' Performance BCA GIA Index Components' Performance BCA GIA Index Components' Performance Our analytical framework for base metals in China holds the nonferrous “pillar industries” behave as vertically integrated conglomerates. The influence of China’s economy on base metals prices is not unexpected: As China’s relative share of base metals supply and demand versus the rest of the world has grown, the marginal impact of its fiscal, credit, monetary and trade policies increased (Chart 4). The principal effect would be visible in China’s demand-side effects, to which the supply side would respond. That is to say, China’s monetary, credit and fiscal policies post-GFC lifted domestic incomes, which lifted demand domestically. In addition, aggressive export-oriented trade policy contributed to income growth, as well. This prompted increased base metals and bulk (e.g., steel) output on the supply side. Chart 4 A large part of this dynamic likely is explained by the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the base-metals markets in China. It is important to note these SOEs are strategic government holdings, responding to and directing government policy, as was recently noted in a University of Alberta study on SOEs:      … the government maintains control over a number of economically significant industries, such as the automobile, equipment manufacturing, information technology, construction, iron and steel, and nonferrous metals sectors, which are all considered to be ‘pillar industries’ of the Chinese economy. The government, as a matter of official policy, intends to maintain sole ownership or apply absolute control over only what it considers to be strategic industries, but also maintains relatively strong control over the pillar industries.6 Our analytical framework for base metals in China holds the nonferrous “pillar industries” behave as vertically integrated conglomerates – ranging from firms refining of raw ore to those producing finished products used in infrastructure, construction, etc. In this framework, nonferrous metals in China are not commodity markets per se, but vertically integrated policy-driven industries responding to directives from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Politburo through to the State Council and the various ministries directing production and consumption.7 At the heart of this is the CCP’s efforts to direct economic growth. Investment Implications The implication of our policy-focused research is investors should focus on metals for which a large share of the variance in y/y prices can be explained by movements in Chinese economic activity. The no-deal outcome could be positive for base metals prices. To get a handle on this, we looked at the variance decomposition of each metal’s price in response to exogenous shocks originating from (1) Chinese economic activity, (2) EM (ex-China) and Complex Economies industrial activity, (3) U.S. industrial activity, and (4) the U.S. trade weighted dollar (Table 3).8 Using this approach, we found that: Copper, aluminum and the LMEX’s variances are mostly explained by China’s economic activity (~ 25%); specifically, shocks to the state’s industrial activity and credit cycle. This corroborates our earlier research, in which we focused on correlations between base metals and these factors. Idiosyncratic factors seem to account for a large part of nickel, lead and zinc’s price formation. This is seen by the large proportion of their variances that is unexplained by our selected explanatory variables. Given the opacity of fundamental data in these markets, we tend to avoid positioning in them. On average, EM ex-China and U.S. industrial activity account for a similar proportion of the variance in metal’s prices (~ 8%). While the U.S. dollar appears to be the second most important variable (~ 14%). Table 3China’s Economic Activity Drives Metals’ Return Variability Expanded Sino – U.S. Trade War Could Be Bullish For Base Metals Expanded Sino – U.S. Trade War Could Be Bullish For Base Metals Our analysis indicates that, as a group, base metals will be supported by the ongoing credit stimulus in China. Each metal is positively correlated with China’s credit cycle and industrial activity. Nonetheless, from our correlation, regression and variance-decomposition analysis, we believe copper and aluminum provide a better and more reliable exposure, as does exposure to the LMEX index, because of its high aluminum and copper weightings. Bottom Line: Approaching the ultimatum set by U.S. President Trump for a resolution to the Sino – U.S. trade war, markets are understandably taut. The odds of a deal vs. no-deal outcome by end-June are close, while the odds trade talks are extended account for the difference. In our estimation, the no-deal outcome could be positive for base metals prices, given our expectation Chinese policymakers will lift the amount of stimulus to the domestic economy to offset the negative effects of an expanded trade war. A deal would remove a lot of the uncertainty currently holding back global supply-chain capex and trade flows, which also would be bullish for base metals.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      For further discussion, please see “U.S. And China Get Cold Feet,” a Special Alert published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy May 6, 2019. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Our geopolitical strategists give the odds of a successful trade deal being concluded by end-June 50%; that trade talks continue, 10%; and the odds of no deal on trade, 40%. 2      Please see “Global market structures and the high price of protectionism,” delivered at the Jackson Hole central bank conference August 25, 2018, by Agustín Carstens, General Manager, Bank for International Settlements. 3      Please see “Russia sees oil quality normalizing in late May after contamination, output drops,” published May 7, 2019, by reuters.com. 4      Please see our Weekly Report of April 25, 2019, entitled “Copper Will Benefit Most From Chinese Stimulus.” It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5      BCA’s GIA index is heavily weighted toward EM industrial-commodity demand. Please see “Oil, Copper Demand Worries Are Overdone,” where we introduce and discuss the GIA index, published February 14, 2019, in BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6      Please see “State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy Today: Role, Reform, and Evolution,” China Institute, University of Alberta, May 2018. 7      Something approximating a pure commodity market is crude oil – the supply and demand curves of many globally distributed sellers and buyers meet and clear the market. As such, a reasonable explanatory model for the evolution of prices can be generated using fundamental inputs (i.e., supply, demand and inventories). Fitting such models to base metals has proved difficult. We have better success explaining base metals prices using macro economic policy variables we believe are important to CCP policymakers – trade, credit, domestic GDP, etc. This is a new avenue of research, which we hope to use to hone in on a good explanatory model to account for ~ 50% of global base metal demand, and, in some instances (e.g., copper and steel, respectively) close to 40% - 50% of supply, as seen in Chart 4. Our current base metals research is focused on trying to disprove the hypothesis these are policy-directed markets within China. This aligns with Karl Popper’s falsifiability condition, which states a theory must be subject to independent, disinterested testing capable of refuting it, to be considered scientific. Please see “Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery,” (reprinted 2008), Routledge Classics, particularly Chapter 4. 8      Complex economies are countries ranking at the top of MIT’s Economic Complexity Index (ECI), and which export industrial goods to EM and China. The EM (ex-China) and Complex Economies variable is the first principal component extracted from a group of ~60 series related to industrial production in these countries. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q1 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Image