Bear/Bull Market

Highlights Looking into 2018, the major risk factors driving gold - inflation and inflation expectations; fiscal and monetary policy; and geopolitics - will, on balance, continue to favor gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. We expect gold will provide a good hedge against rising inflation. However, this will be partially mitigated by Fed rate hikes next year. On the back of tighter U.S. monetary policy, our macroeconomists expect a recession by 2H19, possibly earlier in 2019, which likely would be sniffed out by equity markets as early as 2H18. Our analysis indicates gold will provide a good hedge against this expected recession and the associated equity bear market.1 Lastly, geopolitical risks from (1) U.S.-North Korea tensions, (2) trade protectionism of the Trump administration and (3) ongoing conflicts in the Middle East will support gold prices next year, given the metal's safe-haven properties. Energy: Overweight. At the end of 3Q17, our open energy recommendations were up 45%, led by our long Dec/17 WTI $50/bbl vs. $55/bbl Call spread. We closed out our long Brent recommendations in 3Q17 for an average gain of 116%. (Please see p. 13 for a summary of trades closed in 3Q17). Base Metals: Neutral. Our tactical short Dec/17 copper position ended 3Q17 up 6%. We are placing a trailing stop at $3.10/lb. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our long gold portfolio hedge ended 3Q17 up 4.3%. The balance of risks continues to favor this as a strategic position, which we discuss below. Ags/Softs: Neutral. We lifted our weighting on ags - particularly grains - to neutral last week. Our long corn/short wheat position is up 1.2%. Feature Chart of the WeekInflation And U.S. Financial Variables##BR##Explain Gold Prices Inflation And U.S. Financial Variables Explain Gold Prices Inflation And U.S. Financial Variables Explain Gold Prices Inflation and U.S. financial variables - particularly the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB), and real rates - are the main factors explaining the evolution of gold prices (Chart of the Week).2 Subdued inflation and low unemployment - a decoupling of the so-called Phillips Curve relationship that drives central-bank models of the macroeconomy - have dominated the macro landscape this year (Chart 2). We expect that current low inflation, positive growth, and low interest rates will remain in place for the next 12 months (Chart 3). Although economies such as the U.S. are growing above trend, inflation has remained weak due to a redistribution of demand through imports from countries with spare capacity, according to BCA's Global Investment Strategy.3 This is expected to continue in the near term to end-2018. However, we expect the USD to gradually strengthen, as the Fed cautiously normalizes policy rates, while other systemically important central banks remain accommodative relative to the U.S. central bank (Chart 4). Further falls in the unemployment rate will push the U.S. economy into the steep end of the Phillips Curve. Weak capex in the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) era means demand for labor will increase as low unemployment - and associated higher wages - encourage higher consumer spending. This will cause inflation to lift next year or early 2019. Chart 2A Decoupling Of The Phillips Curve Relationship? Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold In such an environment, any U.S. tax cuts - which we still expect by the end of 1Q18 - will simply add fuel to the inflationary fire, and lift inflation expectations for next year and beyond. As BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team puts it, the tax cuts are a "form of modest stimulus ... (which), this far into the economic cycle, could have a significant effect."4 With unemployment at or below levels consistent with full employment in the U.S. and little slack of any sort, it would not take much in the way of fiscal stimulus to further pressure inflation. Chart 3No Pressure From Inflation Or U.S. Financial##BR##Variables...For Now No Pressure From Inflation Or U.S. Financial Variables...For Now No Pressure From Inflation Or U.S. Financial Variables...For Now Chart 4A Strengthening U.S. Dollar Will##BR##Keep The Pressure Off Gold A Strengthening U.S. Dollar Will Keep The Pressure Off Gold A Strengthening U.S. Dollar Will Keep The Pressure Off Gold Inflation vs. Fed Hikes In the face of the rising inflation we expect next year, gold's appeal will increase. As our previous research reveals, gold's correlation with inflation is strengthened during periods of low real rates, i.e., the difference between nominal rates and inflation. This is a perfect context for gold. However, gold's ability to hedge inflation risks to portfolios will be partially hampered by a more-hawkish Fed. As inflation finally takes off, the Fed will feel confident to hike rates more aggressively. More than anything, this will put a bid under the USD, as U.S. interest-rate differentials vs. other currencies rise in favor of the dollar. In addition, real rates will rise as the Fed gains confidence it can lift policy rates without doing serious harm to the U.S. economy, and follows thru with its normalization. Thus, the gold market will be facing two opposing forces: On the one hand, gold will be an attractive inflation hedge as inflationary pressures build up. On the other, as the Fed begins to tighten to respond to those inflationary pressures, gold will lose its appeal in the face of rising real rates and a strong dollar. Chart 5Fed Will Ease Pressure Off Gold##BR##If It Gets Ahead Of Inflation Fed Will Ease Pressure Off Gold If It Gets Ahead Of Inflation Fed Will Ease Pressure Off Gold If It Gets Ahead Of Inflation The timing of the Fed's rate hikes will be critical to the evolution of gold prices next year and beyond. We previously assumed that rate hikes will remain behind wage growth, which would be supportive of gold prices as inflation picks up. However, if the Fed begins hiking ahead of any realized uptick in inflation, this would create a stronger-than-expected headwind for gold (Chart 5). While we expect inflation to take off in 2H18, our House view calls for 2 to 3 hikes by then. This is a risk to our gold view. Longer term, Fed rate hikes could trigger a feedback loop that will make it difficult for the U.S. central bank policy to support low unemployment rates. As real rates rise, increased unemployment will lead households to spend less. Lower demand will force firms to reduce hiring. The accompanying slowing of U.S. growth will disseminate to the rest of the world, pushing the global economy into a shallow recession as early as 2H19. In all likelihood, this higher-inflation/higher-policy-rate period will be sniffed out by equity markets before the economy actually enters a recession, leading to a bear market. Somewhat counterintuitively, this will favor gold as a portfolio hedge, as we discuss below. Bottom Line: As U.S. unemployment continues falling, inflation will re-emerge, as predicted by the Philips Curve trade-off so important to central-bank policy. Gold then will face two opposing forces. Its inflation hedging properties will be partially hamstrung by rising real U.S. rates and a strengthening USD. Nevertheless, we will turn bullish gold towards the end of next year as signs of an equity bear market emerge. Gold Will Outperform In An Equity Bear Market Our modelling indicates gold is an exceptional safe-haven during downturns in equity markets.5 It is especially attractive in equity bear markets because its returns during such episodes are negatively correlated with the U.S. stock market. This relationship with equities does not hold in bull markets -- gold prices typically rise during such periods, but at a slower rate than equities (Table 1). Table 1Gold's Ability To Hedge U.S. Equities Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold In a Special Report titled "Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time?" BCA's Global Asset Allocation Strategy team looked at the performance of nine safe-haven assets and found, on average, they are negatively correlated with equities in every bear market since 1972.6 Although the current equity bull market still has room to run, recessions and bear markets tend to coincide (Chart 6). If the economy goes into recession in 2H19, equities could peak as early as the end of next year.7 Chart 6Bear Markets Usually Precede Recessions Bear Markets Usually Precede Recessions Bear Markets Usually Precede Recessions Gold's role as a global portfolio hedge during bear markets would thus support the hypothesis that the metal could enter a bull market as soon as end-2018 when equity markets start pricing in a recession (Chart 7). Things could get interesting at this point, since a clear indication the economy is entering into a recession likely will cause "traumatized" central bankers to turn overly dovish. This would add support to the gold market longer term.8 Chart 7Gold Outperforms During Recessions##BR##And Geopolitical Crises Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold Correlations between safe havens decline during bear markets, as our GAA strategists found when they compared correlations by dividing the assets into three "buckets": currencies, inflation hedges, and fixed-income instruments. In this analysis, our GAA team found that gold outperformed TIPS and Farmland in the inflation-hedge bucket.9 Bottom Line: Gold is an exceptional hedge against downturns in equity markets. The bear market preceding the late-2019 recession we expect will put a bid under gold. The eventual turn to the dovish side by central bankers will further support the metal. Gold Will Hedge Geopolitical Risks A confluence of elevated geopolitical risks next year will drive part of gold's performance. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) group has highlighted the following three themes investors need to track going into next year: U.S.-China Tensions: Our geopolitical strategists believe that the Korean conflict is a derivative of a more important secular trend of U.S.-China tensions. They estimate the risk of total war on the Korean peninsula at less than 3% and believe that the market impact of North Korea's provocations has peaked in the late summer. Nevertheless, they warn against complacency, as the underlying tensions over Pyongyang's nuclear program remain unresolved and North Korea could break with its past patterns.10 If the North stages attacks against U.S. or Japanese assets, or international shipping or aircraft, for instance, it could cause a larger safe-haven rally than what we witnessed earlier this year. At the very least, geopolitically induced volatility may return as U.S. President Trump tries to convince the world that war is a real option - a critical condition for establishing a "credible threat" of war with which to influence North Korean behavior - and as the U.S. and China spar over other issues. Trump's protectionism: Trump's campaign promised significant trade-protectionism. While he has not yet acted on those promises, the risk is that he returns to them next year.11 These policies could impact the gold market by: a. Feeding fears that the United States is abandoning the global liberal order; b. Intensifying U.S. trade tensions and strategic distrust with China; c. Pressuring U.S. domestic inflation via higher import prices. This risk will become even more elevated if the Trump administration and Congress fail to pass any tax legislation this year. Our geopolitical strategists believe that such a failure, while not their baseline scenario, would drive Trump to focus on his foreign policy and trade agenda more intently, especially ahead of the midterm elections in November next year, which would increase safe-haven flows. 3. Mideast Troubles: While we are not alarmist about the Middle East, the risk of market-relevant conflicts will be higher over the coming 12 months than over the previous year, following the fall of ISIS. The latter gave reason for various regional powers to cooperate, while its absence will revive their grievances with each other. Kurdish assertiveness is a key consequence, highlighted by last month's Kurdish independence referendum.12 Iraqi forces have pushed ISIS out of major Iraqi cities and the slowdown in the fight against ISIS could push Iraqi forces to focus on regaining the province of Kirkuk. Kirkuk, which is home to major oil fields and reserves, has been under Kurdish control since 2014 when the Peshmerga forces there captured it from ISIS. As ISIS ceases to be a threat, Baghdad will try to regain control of these precious oil fields. The Kurdish conflict, as well as Trump's pressure tactics against Iran, will increase geopolitical risks in oil-producing (hence market-relevant) areas. Chart 82017 Risks Were Overstated 2017 Risks Were Overstated 2017 Risks Were Overstated In a recent study investigating how different "safe-havens" assets react to political and financial events, our GPS colleagues found that gold provides the best average returns following a major geopolitical event (Chart 7).13 Our House geopolitical view has maintained that political risks in 2017 were overstated. This was particularly the case in Europe, where much of the risk was exaggerated and merely the product of linear extrapolation from the outcomes of the U.K. referendum on EU membership and the U.S. presidential election. As such, we do not expect any European break-up risk to support gold prices next year. Although elevated Italian Euroscepticism is one lingering European risk that could impact gold markets, we see this as a long-term risk rather than a market catalyst arising from the Italian general election in May next year. Reflecting our view, the policy uncertainty index has fallen drastically in the last two months (Chart 8). Bottom Line: Elevated political risks in 2018 will further support the gold market. Most notable on our geopolitical strategists' minds are continued U.S.-China tensions (most notably over Korea), Trump's protectionist policies, and potential conflicts in the Middle East. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Go Long Gold As A Strategic Portfolio Hedge," dated May 4, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Our results show 1% increase in U.S. YoY CPI, 5 year real rates, and USD TWI are associated with a 4% increase, 0.18% decline and a 0.21% decline in gold prices, respectively. The adjusted R2 is 0.88. 3 Please see the Global Investment Strategy Outlook "Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," dated October 4, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Is King Dollar Back," dated October 4, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 We use the S&P 500 Total Return (TR) index as a proxy for U.S. equities. 6 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report "Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time?," dated April 21, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see Global Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook, dated October 2, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see the Global Investment Strategy Outlook "Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," dated October 4, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report "Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time?," dated April 21, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Armed conflict in the Middle East usually lead to a sharp rally in gold prices. Please see Table 1 from Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?," dated August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics And Safe Havens," dated November 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights Financial markets have slipped into a 'risk off' phase. The upbeat second quarter earnings season in the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone was overwhelmed by a number of negative events. Equity bear markets are usually associated with recessions. On that score, we do not see any warning signs of an economic downturn. However, geopolitical risks are rising at a time when valuation measures suggest that risk assets are vulnerable. We do not see the debt ceiling or the failure of movement on U.S. tax reform as posing large risks for financial markets. However, trade protectionism and, especially, North Korea are major wildcards. We don't believe the tensions in the Korean peninsula will end the cyclical bull market in global equities. Nonetheless, investors should expect to be tested numerous times over the next year to 18 months. BCA Strategists debated trimming equity exposure to neutral. However, the majority felt that, while there will be near-term volatility, the main equity indexes are likely to be higher on a 6-12 month horizon. Riding out the volatility is a better approach than trying to time the short-term ups and downs. That said, it appears prudent to be well shy of max overweight positions and to hold some safe haven assets within diversified portfolios. On a positive note, we have upgraded our EPS growth forecasts, except in the Eurozone where currency strength will be a significant drag in the near term. The Fed faced a similar low inflation/tight labor market environment in 1999. Policymakers acted pre-emptively and began to tighten before inflation turned up. This time, the FOMC will want to see at least a small increase in inflation just to be sure. Wages may be a lagging indicator for inflation in this cycle. Watch a handful of other indicators we identify that led inflection points in inflation in previous long economic expansions. This year's euro strength is unlikely to delay the next installment of ECB tapering, which we expect in early in 2018. Investors seem to be taking an "I'll believe it when I see it" attitude toward the U.S. inflation outlook, which has led to very lopsided rate expectations. Keep duration short. Feature Chart I-1Trump Popularity Headwind For Tax Reform September 2017 September 2017 A 'risk off' flavor swept over financial markets in August. The upbeat second quarter earnings season in the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone was overwhelmed by a number of negative events, from President Trump's Charlottesville controversy to the never-ending staff changes in the White House to North Korean tensions to the Texas flood and the terror attack in Spain. Trump's popularity rating is steadily declining, even now among Republican voters (Chart I-1). This has raised concerns that none of his business-friendly policies, tax cuts or initiatives to boost growth will be successfully enacted. It is even possible that the debt ceiling will be used as a bargaining chip among the various Republican factions. The political risks are multiplying at a time when the equity and corporate bond markets are pricey. Valuation measures do not help with timing, but they do inform on the potential downside risk if things head south. At the moment, we do not see any single risk as justifying a full retreat into safe havens and a cut in risk asset allocation to neutral or below. Nonetheless, there is certainly a case to be cautious and hold some traditional safe haven assets. Timing The Next Equity Bear Market It is rare to have an equity bear market without a recession in the U.S. There have been plenty of market setbacks that did not quite meet the 20% bear-market threshold, but were nonetheless painful even in the absence of recession (Black Monday, LTCM crisis, U.S. debt ceiling showdown and euro crises). Unfortunately, these corrections are very difficult to predict. At least with recessions, investors have a fighting chance in timing the exit from risk exposure. The slope of the yield curve and the Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) are classic recession indicators, and for good reason (Chart I-2). Over the past 50 years they have both successfully called all seven recessions with just one false positive. We can eliminate the false positive signals by combining the two indicators and follow a rule that both must be in the red to herald a recession.1 Chart I-2The Traditional Recession Indicators Have Worked Well The Traditional Recession Indicators Have Worked Well The Traditional Recession Indicators Have Worked Well It will be almost impossible for the yield curve to invert until the fed funds rate is significantly higher than it is today. Thus, it may be the case that a negative reading on the LEI, together with a flattening (but not yet inverted) yield curve, will be a powerful signal that a recession is on the way. Neither of these two indicators are warning of a recession. Global PMIs are hovering at a level that is consistent with robust growth. The erosion in the Global ZEW and the drop in the diffusion index of the Global LEI are worrying signs, but at the moment are consistent with a growth slowdown at worst (Chart I-3). Financial conditions remain growth-friendly and subdued inflation is allowing central banks to proceed cautiously when tightening (in the case of the Fed and Bank of Canada) or tapering (ECB). As highlighted in last month's Overview, the global economy has entered a synchronized upturn that should persist for the next year. The U.S. will be the first major economy to enter the next recession, but that should not occur until 2019 or 2020, barring any shocks in the near term. That said, risk asset prices have been bid up sharply and are therefore vulnerable to a correction. Below, we discuss five key risks to the equity bull market. (1) Is All Lost For U.S. Tax Cuts? Our recent client meetings highlight that investors are skeptical that any fiscal stimulus or tax cuts will see the light of day in the U.S. Tax cuts and infrastructure spending appear to have been priced out of the equity market, according to the index ratios shown in Chart I-4. We still expect a modest package to eventually be passed, although time is running out for this year. Tax reform is a major component of Trump's and congressional Republicans' agenda. If it fails, Republicans will have to go to their home districts empty-handed to campaign for the November 2018 midterm elections. Chart I-3Some Worrying Signs On Growth Some Worrying Signs On Growth Some Worrying Signs On Growth Chart I-4Fiscal Stimulus Largely Priced Out Fiscal Stimulus Largely Priced Out Fiscal Stimulus Largely Priced Out One implication of Tropical Storm Harvey is that it might force Democrats and Republicans to cooperate on an infrastructure bill for rebuilding. Even a modest spending boost or tax reduction would be equity-market positive given that so little is currently discounted. The dollar should also receive a lift, especially given that the Fed might respond to any fiscally-driven growth impulse with higher interest rates. (2) Who Will Lead The Fed? There is a significant chance that either Yellen will refuse to stay on when her term expires next February or that Trump will appoint someone else anyway. In this case, we would expect the President to do everything he can to ensure that the Fed retains its dovish bias. This means that he is likely to favor a non-economist and a loyal adviser, like Gary Cohn, over any of the more traditional, and hawkish, Republican candidates. Cohn could not arrive at the Fed and change the course of monetary policy on day one. The FOMC votes on rate changes, but in reality decisions are formed by consensus (with one or two dissents). The only way Cohn could implement an abrupt change in policy is if the Administration stacks the Fed Governors with appointees that are prepared to "toe the line" (the Administration does not appoint Regional Fed Presidents). Stacking the Governorships would take time. Nonetheless, it is not clear why President Trump would take a heavy hand in monetary policy when the current FOMC has been very cautious in tightening policy. The bottom line is that we would not see Cohn's appointment to the Fed Chair as signaling a major shift in monetary policy one way or the other. (3) The Debt Ceiling A more immediate threat is the debt ceiling. Recent fights over Obamacare and tax reform have pit fiscally conservative Republicans against the moderates, and it is possible that the debt ceiling is used as a bargaining chip in this battle. While government shutdowns have occurred in the past, the debt ceiling has never been breached. At the end of the day, the debt ceiling will always be raised because no government could stand the popular pressure that would result from social security checks not being mailed out to seniors or a halt to other entitlement programs. Even the Freedom Caucus, the most fiscally conservative grouping in the House, is considerably divided on the issue. This augurs well for a clean bill to raise the debt ceiling as the Republican majority in the House is 22 and the Freedom Caucus has 31 members. Democrats will not stand in the way of passage in the Senate. The worst-case scenario for the market would be a two-week shutdown in the first half of October, just before the debt ceiling is hit. We would not expect a shutdown to have any lasting impact on the economy, although it could provide an excuse for the equity market to correct. That said, the risk of even a shutdown has been diminished by events in Houston. It would be very difficult and damaging politically to shut down the government during a humanitarian emergency. (4) Trade And Protectionism The removal of White House Chief Strategist Stephen Bannon signals a shift in power toward the Goldman clique within the Trump Administration. National Economic Council President Gary Cohn, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross are now firmly in charge of economic policy. The mainstream media has interpreted this shift within the Administration as reducing the risk of trade friction. We do not see it that way. President Trump still sounds hawkish on trade, particularly with respect to China. Our geopolitical experts point out that there are few constraints on the President to imposing trade sanctions on China or other countries. He could use such action to boost his popularity among his base heading into next year's midterm elections. On NAFTA, the Administration took a hard line as negotiations kicked off in August. This could be no more than a negotiating tactic. Our base case is that it will be some time before investors find out if negotiations are going off the rails. That said, the situation is volatile for both NAFTA and China, and we can't rule out a trade-related risk-off phase in financial markets over the next year. (5) North Korea North Korea's missile launch over Japan highlights that the tense situation is a long way from a resolution. The U.S. is unlikely to use military force to resolve the standoff. There are long-standing constraints to war, including the likelihood of a high death toll in Seoul. Moreover, China is unlikely to remain neutral in any conflict. However, the U.S. will attempt to establish a credible threat in order to contain Kim Jong-un. From an investor's perspective, it will be difficult to gauge whether the brinkmanship and military displays are simply posturing or evidence of real preparations for war.2 We don't believe the tensions in the Korean peninsula will end the cyclical bull market in global equities. Nonetheless, investors should expect to be tested numerous times over the next year to 18 months. Adding it all up, there is no shortage of things to keep investors awake at night. We would be de-risking our recommended portfolio were it not for the favorable earnings backdrop in the major advanced economies. Profit Outlook Update Chart I-5EPS Growth Outlook EPS Growth Outlook EPS Growth Outlook Second quarter earnings season came in even stronger than our upbeat models suggested in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. This led to upward revisions to our EPS growth forecast, except in the Eurozone where currency strength will be a significant drag in the near term. The U.S. equity market enjoyed another quarter of margin expansion in Q2 2017 and the good news was broadly based. Earnings per share were higher versus Q2 2016 in all 11 sectors. Results were particularly strong in energy, technology and financials. Looking ahead, an update of our top-down model suggests the EPS growth will peak just under 20% late this year on a 4-quarter moving average basis, before falling to mid-single digits by the end of 2018 (Chart I-5). The peak is predicted to be a little higher than we previously forecast largely due to the feed-through of this year's pullback in the dollar. In Japan, a solid 70% of reporting firms beat estimates. Chart I-6 shows that Japan led all other major stock markets in positive earnings surprises in the second quarter. Manufacturing sectors, such as iron & steel, chemicals and machinery & electronics, were particularly impressive in the quarter, reflecting yen weakness and robust overseas demand. Japanese earnings are highly geared to the rebound in global industrial production. Moreover, Japan's nominal GDP growth accelerated in the second quarter and the latest PPI report suggested that corporate pricing power has improved. Twelve-month forward EPS estimates have risen to fresh all times highs, and have outperformed the U.S. in local currencies so far this year. Corporate governance reform - a key element of Abenomics - can take some credit for the good news on earnings. The share of companies with at least two independent directors rose from 18% in 2013 to 78% in 2016. The number of companies with performance-linked pay increased from 640 to 941, while the number that publish disclosure policies jumped from 679 to 1055. Analysts have been slow to factor in these positive developments. We expect trailing EPS growth to peak at about 25% in the first half of 2018 on a 4-quarter moving total basis, before edging lower by the end of the year. This is one reason why we like the Japanese market over the U.S. in local currency terms. Second quarter results in the Eurozone were solid, although not as impressive as in the U.S. and Japan. The 6% rise in the trade-weighted euro this year has resulted in a drop in the earnings revisions ratio into negative territory. Our previous forecast pointed to a continued rise in the 4-quarter moving average growth rate into the first half of 2018. However, we now expect the growth rate to dip by year end, before picking up somewhat next year. If the euro is flat from today's level, our model suggests that the drag on EPS growth will hover at 3-4 percentage points through the first half of next year as the negative impact feeds through (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Chart I-6Japan Led In Q2 Earning Surprises September 2017 September 2017 Chart I-7Currency Effects On Eurozone EPS Currency Effects On Eurozone EPS Currency Effects On Eurozone EPS Our top-down EPS model highlights that Eurozone earnings are quite sensitive to swings in the currency. In Chart I-7, we present alternative scenarios based on the euro weakening to EUR/USD 1.10 and strengthening to EUR/USD 1.30. For demonstration purposes we make the extreme assumption that the trade-weighted value of the euro rises and falls by the same amount in percentage terms. Profit growth decelerates by the end of 2017 in all three scenarios because of the lagged effect of currency swings. The projections begin to diverge only in 2018. EPS growth surges to around 20% by the end of next year in the euro-bear case, as the tailwind from the weakening currency combines with continuing robust economic growth. Conversely, trailing earnings growth hovers in the 5-8% range in the euro bull scenario, which is substantially less than we expect in the U.S. and Japan over the next year. EPS growth remains in positive territory because the assumed strength in European and global growth dominates the drag from the euro. The strong euro scenario would be negative for Eurozone equity relative performance versus global stocks in local currencies, although Europe might outperform on a common currency basis. The bottom line is that 12-month forward earnings estimates should remain in an uptrend in the three major economies. This means that, absent a negative political shock, the equity bull phase should resume in the coming months. Monetary policy is unlikely to spoil the party for risk assets, although the bond market is a source of risk because investors seem unprepared for even a modest rise in inflation. FOMC Has Seen This Before The Minutes from the July FOMC meeting highlighted that the key debate still centers on the relationship between labor market tightness and inflation, the timing of the next Fed rate hike and how policy should adjust to changing financial conditions. Chart I-8The FOMC Has Been Here Before The FOMC Has Been Here Before The FOMC Has Been Here Before The majority of policymakers are willing for now to believe that this year's soft inflation readings are driven largely by temporary 'one-off' factors. The hawks worry that a further undershoot of unemployment below estimates of full employment could suddenly generate a surge of inflation. They also point to the risk that low bond yields are promoting excess risk taking in financial markets. Moreover, the recent easing in financial conditions is stimulative and should be counterbalanced by additional Fed tightening. The hawks are thus anxious to resume tightening, despite current inflation readings. Others are worried that inflation softness could reflect structural factors, such as restraints on pricing power from global developments and from innovations to business models spurred by advances in technology. In this month's Special Report beginning on page 18, we have a close look at the impact of "Amazonification" in holding down overall inflation. We do not find the evidence regarding e-commerce compelling, but the jury is still out on the impact of other technologies. If robots and new business strategies are indeed weighing on inflation, it would mean that the Phillips curve is very flat or that the full employment level of unemployment is lower than the Fed estimates (or both). Either way, the doves would like to see the whites-of-the-eyes of inflation before resuming rate hikes. The last time the Fed was perplexed by a low level of inflation despite a tight labor market was in the late 1990s (Chart I-8). The FOMC cut rates following the LTCM financial crisis in late 1998, and then held the fed funds rate unchanged at 4¾% until June 1999. Core inflation was roughly flat during the on-hold period at 1% to 1½%, even as the unemployment rate steadily declined and various measures pointed to growing labor shortages. The FOMC 's internal debate in the first half of 1999 sounded very familiar. The minutes from meetings at that time noted that some policymakers pointed to the widespread inability of firms to raise prices because of strong competitive pressures in domestic and global markets. Some argued that significant cost saving efforts and new technologies also contributed to the low inflation environment for both consumer prices and wages. One difference from today is that productivity growth was solid at that time. The FOMC decided to hike rates in June 1999 by a quarter point, despite the absence of any clear indication that inflation had turned up. Policymakers described the tightening as "a small preemptive move... (that) would provide a degree of insurance against worsening inflation later". The Fed went on to lift the fed funds rate to 6½% by May 2000. Interestingly, the unemployment rate in June 1999 was 4.3%, exactly the same as the current rate. There are undoubtedly important differences in today's macro backdrop. The Fed is also more fearful of making a policy mistake in the aftermath of the Great Recession and financial crisis. Nonetheless, the point is that the Fed has faced a similar low inflation/tight labor market environment before, but in the end patience ran out and policymakers acted pre-emptively. Inflation Warning Signs During Long-Expansions We have noted in previous research that inflation pressures are slower to emerge in 'slow burn' recoveries, such as the 1980s and 1990s. In Chart I-9, we compare the core PCE inflation rate in the current cycle with the average of the previous two long expansion episodes (the inflection point for inflation in the previous cycles are aligned with June 2017 for comparison purposes). The other panels in the chart highlight that, in the 1980s and 1990s, wage growth was a lagging indicator. Economic commentators often assume that inflation is driven exclusively by "cost push" effects, such that the direction of causation runs from wage pressure to price pressure. However, causation runs in the other direction as well. Households see rising prices and then demand better wages to compensate for the added cost of living. This is not to say that we should totally disregard wage information. But it does mean that we must keep an eye on a wider set of data. Indicators that provided some leading information in the previous two long cycles are shown in Chart I-10. To this list we would also add the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressure index, which is not shown in Chart I-10 because it does not have enough history. At the moment, the headline PPI, ISM Prices Paid and BCA's pipeline inflation pressure index are all warning that inflation pressures are gradually building. However, this message is not confirmed by the St. Louis Fed's index and corporate selling prices. We are also watching the velocity of money, which has been a reasonably good leading indicator for U.S. inflation since 2000 (Chart I-11). Chart I-9In The 80s & 90s Wage Growth ##br##Gave No Early Warning On Inflation In The 80s & 90s Wage Growth Gave No Early Warning On Inflation In The 80s & 90s Wage Growth Gave No Early Warning On Inflation Chart I-10Leading Indicators Of Inflation ##br##In "Slow Burn" Recoveries Leading Indicators Of Inflation In "Slow Burn" Recoveries Leading Indicators Of Inflation In "Slow Burn" Recoveries Chart I-11Money Velocity And Inflation Money Velocity And Inflation Money Velocity And Inflation Our Fed view remains unchanged from last month; the FOMC will announce its balance sheet diet plan in September and the next rate hike will take place in December. Nonetheless, this forecast hangs on the assumption that core inflation edges higher in the coming months. Some indicators are pointing in that direction and recent dollar weakness will help. Wake Me When Inflation Picks Up Investors seem to be taking an "I'll believe it when I see it" attitude toward the U.S. inflation outlook. They also believe that persistent economic headwinds mean that monetary policy will need to stay highly accommodative for a very long time. Only one Fed rate hike is discounted between now and the end of 2018, and implied forward real short-term rates are negative until 2022. While we do not foresee surging inflation, the risks for market expectations appear quite lopsided. We expect one rate hike by year end, followed by at least another 50 basis points of tightening in 2018. The U.S. 10-year yield is also about almost 50 basis points below our short-term fair value estimate (Chart I-12). Moreover, over the medium- and long-term, reduced central bank bond purchases will impart gentle upward pressure on equilibrium bond yields. Twenty-eighteen will be the first time in four years in which the net supply of government bonds available to private investors will rise, taking the U.S., U.K., Eurozone and Japanese markets as a group. This year's euro strength is unlikely to delay the next installment of ECB tapering, which we expect in early in 2018. The currency appreciation will keep a lid on inflation in the near term. However, we see the euro's ascent as reflective of the booming economy, rather than a major headwind that will derail the growth story. Overall financial conditions have tightened this year, but only back to levels that persisted through 2016 (Chart I-13). Chart I-12U.S. 10-year Yield Is Below Fair Value U.S. 10-year Yield Is Below Fair Value U.S. 10-year Yield Is Below Fair Value Chart I-13Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Financial Conditions It will take clear signs that the economy is being negatively affected by currency strength for the ECB to back away from tapering. Indeed, the central bank has little choice because the bond buying program is approaching important technical limits. European corporate and peripheral bond spreads are likely to widen versus bunds as a result. The implication is that global yields have significant upside potential relative to forward rates, especially in the U.S. market. Duration should be kept short. JGBs are the only safe place to hide if global yields shift up because the Bank of Japan is a long way from abandoning its 10-year yield peg. Treasury yields should lead the way higher, which will finally place a bottom under the beleaguered dollar. Nonetheless, we are tactically at neutral on the greenback. Conclusions Chart I-14Gold Loves Geopolitical Crises September 2017 September 2017 In light of rising geopolitical risk, the BCA Strategists recently debated trimming equity exposure to neutral. Some argued that the risk/reward balance has deteriorated; the upside is limited by poor valuation, while there is significant downside potential if the North Korean situation deteriorates alarmingly. However, the majority felt that, while there will be near-term volatility, the main equity indexes are likely to be higher on a 6-12 month horizon. Riding out the volatility is a better approach than trying to time the short-term ups and downs. That said, it appears prudent to be well shy of max overweight positions and to hold some safe haven assets within diversified portfolios. BCA research has demonstrated that U.S. Treasurys, Swiss bonds and JGBs have been the best performers in times of crisis (Chart I-14).3 The same is true for the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, such that the currency exposure should not be hedged in these cases. The dollar is more nuanced. It tends to perform well during financial crises, but not in geopolitical crises or recessions. Gold has tended to perform well in geopolitical events and recessions, although not in financial crises. We continue to prefer Japanese to U.S. stocks in local currency terms, given that EPS growth will likely peak in the U.S. first. Japanese stocks are also better valued. Europe is a tough call because this year's currency strength will weigh on earnings in the next quarter or two. However, the negative impact on earnings will reverse if the euro retraces as we expect. EM stocks have seen the strongest positive earnings revisions this year. We continue to worry about some of the structural headwinds facing emerging markets (high debt levels, poor governance, etc.). However, the cyclical picture remains more upbeat. Chinese H-shares remain our favorite EM market, trading at just 7.5 times 2017 earnings estimates. Our dollar and duration positions have been disappointing so far this year. Much hinges on U.S. inflation. Investors appear to have adopted the idea that structural headwinds to inflation will forever dominate the cyclical pressures. This means that the bond market is totally unprepared for any upside surprises on the inflation landscape. Admittedly, a rise in bond yields may not be imminent, but the risks appear to us to be predominantly to the upside. Lastly, crude oil inventories are shrinking as our commodity strategists predicted. They remain bullish, with a price target of USD60/bbl. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst August 31, 2017 Next Report: September 28, 2017 1 Please see BCA Global ETF Strategy, "A Guide To Spotting And Weathering Bear Markets," dated August 16, 2017, available at etf.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?" dated August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com II. Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve? A "culture of profound cost reduction" has gripped the business sector since the GFC according to one school of thought, permanently changing the relationship between labor market slack and wages or inflation. If true, it could mean that central banks are almost powerless to reach their inflation targets. Amazon, Airbnb, Uber, robotics, contract workers, artificial intelligence, horizontal drilling and driverless cars are just a few examples of companies and technologies that are cutting costs and depressing prices and wages. In the first of our series on inflation, we will focus on the rise of e-commerce and the related "Amazonification" of the economy. In theory, positive supply shocks should not have more than a temporary impact on inflation if the price level is indeed a monetary phenomenon in the long term. But a series of positive supply shocks could make it appear for quite a while that low inflation is structural in nature. We are keeping an open mind and reserving judgement on the disinflationary impact of robotics, artificial intelligence and the gig economy until we do more research. But in terms of the impact of e-commerce, it is difficult to find supportive evidence at the macro level. The admittedly inadequate measures of online prices available today do not suggest that e-commerce sales are depressing the overall inflation rate by more than 0.1 or 0.2 percentage points. Moreover, it does not appear that the disinflationary impact of competition in the retail sector has intensified over the years. Today's creative destruction in retail may be no more deflationary than the shift to 'big box' stores in the 1990s. Perhaps lower online prices are forcing traditional retailers to match the e-commerce vendors, allowing for a larger disinflationary effect than we estimate. However, the fact that retail margins are near secular highs outside of department stores argues against this thesis. The sectors potentially affected by e-commerce make up a small part of the CPI index. The deceleration of inflation since the GFC has been in areas unaffected by online sales. High profit margins for the overall corporate sector and depressed productivity growth also argue against the idea that e-commerce represents a large positive macro supply shock. Perhaps the main way that e-commerce is affecting the macro economy and financial markets is not through inflation, but via the reduction in the economy's capital spending requirement. This would reduce the equilibrium level of interest rates, since the Fed has to stimulate other parts of the economy to offset the loss of demand in capital spending in the retail sector. Anecdotal evidence is all around us. The global economy is evolving and it seems that all of the major changes are deflationary. Amazon, Airbnb, Uber, robotics, contract workers, artificial intelligence, horizontal drilling and driverless cars are just a few examples of companies and technologies that are cutting costs and depressing prices and wages. Central banks in the major advanced economies are having difficulty meeting their inflation targets, even in the U.S. where the labor market is tight by historical standards. Based on the depressed level of bond yields, it appears that the majority of investors believe that inflation headwinds will remain formidable for a long time. One school of thought is that low inflation reflects a lack of demand growth in the post-Great Financial Crisis (GFC) period. Another school points to the supply side of the economy. A recent report by Prudential Financial highlights "...obvious examples of ... new business models and new organizational structures, whereby higher-cost traditional methods of production, transportation, and distribution are displaced by more nontraditional cost-effective ways of conducting business."1 A "culture of profound cost reduction" has gripped the business sector since the GFC according to this school, permanently changing the relationship between labor market slack and wages or inflation (i.e., the Phillips Curve). Employees are less aggressive in their wage demands in a world where robots are threatening humans in a broadening array of industrial categories. Many feel lucky just to have a job. In a highly sensationalized article called "How The Internet Economy Killed Inflation," Forbes argued that "the internet has reduced many of the traditional barriers to entry that protect companies from competition and created a race to the bottom for prices in a number of categories." Forbes believes that new technologies are placing downward pressure on inflation by depressing wages, increasing productivity and encouraging competition. There are many factors that have the potential to weigh on prices, but analysts are mainly focusing on e-commerce, robotics, artificial intelligence, and the gig economy. In the first of our series on inflation, we will focus on the rise of e-commerce and the related "Amazonification" of the economy. The latter refers to the advent of new business models that cut out layers of middlemen between producers and consumers. Amazonification E-commerce has grown at a compound annual rate of more than 9% over the past 15 years, and now accounts for about 8½% of total U.S. retail sales (Chart II-1). Amazon has been leading the charge, accounting for 43% of all online sales in 2016 (Chart II-2). Amazon's business model not only cuts costs by eliminating middlemen and (until recently) avoiding expensive showrooms, but it also provides a platform for improved price discovery on an extremely broad array of goods. In 2013, Amazon carried 230 million items for sale in the United States, nearly 30 times the number sold by Walmart, one of the largest retailers in the world. Chart II-1E-Commerce: Steady Increase In Market Share E-Commerce: Steady Increase In Market Share E-Commerce: Steady Increase In Market Share Chart II-2Amazon Dominates September 2017 September 2017 With the use of a smartphone, consumers can check the price of an item on Amazon while shopping in a physical store. Studies show that it does not require a large price gap for shoppers to buy online rather than in-store. Amazon appears to be impacting other retailers' ability to pass though cost increases, leading to a rash of retail outlet closings. Sears alone announced the closure of 300 retail outlets this year. The devastation that Amazon inflicted on the book industry is well known. It is no wonder then, that Amazon's purchase of Whole Foods Market, a grocery chain, sent shivers down the spines of CEOs not only in the food industry, but in the broader retail industry as well. What would prevent Amazon from applying its model to furniture and appliances, electronics or drugstores? It seems that no retail space is safe. A Little Theory Before we turn to the evidence, let's review the macro theory related to positive supply shocks. The internet could be lowering prices by moving product markets toward the "perfect competition" model. The internet trims search costs, improves price transparency and reduces barriers to entry. The internet also allows for shorter supply chains, as layers of wholesalers and other intermediaries are removed and e-commerce companies allow more direct contact between consumers and producers. Fewer inventories and a smaller "brick and mortar" infrastructure take additional costs out of the system. Economic theory suggests that the result of this positive supply shock will be greater product market competition, increased productivity and reduced profitability. In the long run, workers should benefit from the productivity boost via real wage gains (even if nominal wage growth is lackluster). Workers may lower their reservation wage if they feel that increased competitive pressures or technology threaten their jobs. The internet is also likely to improve job matching between the unemployed and available vacancies, which should lead to a fall in the full-employment level of unemployment (NAIRU). Nonetheless, the internet should not have a permanent impact on inflation. The lower level of NAIRU and the direct effects of the internet on consumer prices discussed above allow inflation to fall below the central bank's target. The bank responds by lowering interest rates, stimulating demand and thereby driving unemployment down to the new lower level of NAIRU. Over time, inflation will drift back up toward target. In other words, a greater degree of the competition should boost the supply side of the economy and lower NAIRU, but it should not result in a permanently lower rate of inflation if inflation is indeed a monetary phenomenon and central banks strive to meet their targets. Still, one could imagine a series of supply shocks that are spread out over time, with each having a temporary negative impact on prices such that it appears for a while that inflation has been permanently depressed. This could be an accurate description of the current situation in the U.S. and some of the other major countries. We have sympathy for the view that the internet and new business models are increasing competition, cutting costs and thereby limiting price increases in some areas. But is there any hard evidence? Is the competitive effect that large, and is it any more intense than in the past? There are a number of reasons to be skeptical because most of the evidence does not support Forbes' claim that the internet has killed inflation. (1) E-commerce affects only a small part of the Consumer Price Index As mentioned above, online shopping for goods represents 8.5% of total retail sales in the U.S. E-commerce is concentrated in four kinds of businesses (Table II-1): Furniture & Home Furnishings (7% of total retail sales), Electronics & Appliances (20%), Health & Personal Care (15%), and Clothing (10%). Since goods make up 40% of the CPI, then 3.2% (8% times 40%) is a ballpark estimate for the size of goods e-commerce in the CPI. Table II-1E-Commerce Market Share Of Goods Sector (2015) September 2017 September 2017 Table II-2 shows the relative size of e-commerce in the service sector. The analysis is complicated by the fact that the data on services includes B-to-B sales in addition to B-to-C.2 However, e-commerce represents almost 4% of total sales for the service categories tracked by the BLS. Services make up 60% of the CPI, but the size drops to 26% if we exclude shelter (which is probably not affected by online shopping). Thus, e-commerce in the service sector likely affects 1% (3.9% times 26%) of the CPI. Table II-2E-Commerce Market Share Of Service Sector (2015) September 2017 September 2017 Adding goods and services, online shopping affects about 4.2% of the CPI index at most. The bottom line is that the relatively small size of e-commerce at the consumer level limits any estimate of the impact of online sales on the broad inflation rate. (2) Most of the deceleration in inflation since 2007 has been in areas unaffected by e-commerce Table II-3 compares the average contribution to annual average CPI inflation during 2000-2007 with that of 2007-2016. Average annual inflation fell from 2.9% in the seven years before the Great Recession to 1.8% after, for a total decline of just over 1 percentage point. The deceleration is almost fully explained by Energy, Food and Owners' Equivalent Rent. The bottom part of Table II-3 highlights that the sectors with the greatest exposure to e-commerce had a negligible impact on the inflation slowdown. Table II-3Comparison Of Pre- and Post-Lehman Inflation Rates September 2017 September 2017 (3) The cost advantages for online sellers are overstated Bain & Company, a U.S. consultancy, argues that e-commerce will not grow in importance indefinitely and come to dominate consumer spending.3 E-commerce sales are already slowing. Market share is following a classic S-shaped curve that, Bain estimates, will top out at under 30% by 2030. First, not everyone wants to buy everything online. Products that are well known to consumers and purchased on a regular basis are well suited to online shopping. But for many other products, consumers need to see and feel the product in person before making a purchase. Second, the cost savings of online selling versus traditional brick and mortar stores is not as great as many believe. Bain claims that many e-commerce businesses struggle to make a profit. The information technology, distribution centers, shipping, and returns processing required by e-commerce companies can cost as much as running physical stores in some cases. E-tailers often cannot ship directly from manufacturers to consumers; they need large and expensive fulfillment centers and a very generous returns policy. Moreover, online and offline sales models are becoming blurred. Retailers with physical stores are growing their e-commerce operations, while previously pure e-commerce plays are adding stores or negotiating space in other retailers' stores. Even Amazon now has storefronts. The shift toward an "multichannel" selling model underscores that there are benefits to traditional brick-and-mortar stores that will ensure that they will not completely disappear. (4) E-commerce is not the first revolution in the retail sector The retail sector has changed significantly over the decades and it is not clear that the disinflationary effect of the latest revolution, e-commerce, is any more intense than in the past. Economists at Goldman Sachs point out that the growth of Amazon's market share in recent years still lags that of Walmart and other "big box" stores in the 1990s (Chart II-3).4 This fact suggests that "Amazonification" may not be as disinflationary as the previous big-box revolution. (5) Weak productivity growth and high profit margins are inconsistent with a large supply-side benefit from e-commerce As discussed above, economic theory suggests that a positive supply shock that cuts costs and boosts competition should trim profit margins and lift productivity. The problem is that the margins and productivity have moved in the opposite direction that economic theory would suggest (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Amazon Vs. Walmart: ##br##Who's More Deflationary? September 2017 September 2017 Chart II-4Incompatible With A Supply Shock Incompatible With A Supply Shock Incompatible With A Supply Shock By definition, productivity rises when firms can produce the same output with fewer or cheaper inputs. However, it is well documented that productivity growth has been in a downtrend since the 1990s, and has been dismally low since the Great Recession. A Special Report from BCA's Global Investment Strategy5 service makes a convincing case that mismeasurement is not behind the low productivity figures. In fact, in many industries it appears that productivity is over-estimated. If e-commerce is big enough to "move the dial" on overall inflation, it should be big enough to see in the aggregate productivity figures. Chart II-5Retail Margin Squeeze ##br##Only In Department Stores Retail Margin Squeeze Only In Department Stores Retail Margin Squeeze Only In Department Stores One would also expect to see a margin squeeze across industries if e-commerce is indeed generating a lot of deflationary competitive pressure. Despite dismally depressed productivity, however, corporate profit margins are at the high end of the historical range across most of the sectors of the S&P 500. This is the case even in the retailing sector outside of department stores (Chart II-5). These facts argue against the idea that the internet has moved the economy further toward a disinflationary "perfect competition" model. (6) Online price setting is characterized by frictions comparable to traditional retail We would expect to observe a low price dispersion across online vendors since the internet has apparently lowered the cost of monitoring competitors' prices and the cost of searching for the lowest price. We would also expect to see fairly synchronized price adjustments; if one vendor adjusts its price due to changing market conditions, then the rest should quickly follow to avoid suffering a massive loss of market share. However, a recent study of price-setting practices in the U.S. and U.K. found that this is not the case.6 The dataset covered a broad spectrum of consumer goods and sellers over a two-year period, comparing online with offline prices. The researchers found that market pricing "frictions" are surprisingly elevated in the online world. Price dispersion is high in absolute terms and on par with offline pricing. Academics for years have puzzled over high price rigidities and dispersion in retail stores in the context of an apparently stiff competitive environment, and it appears that online pricing is not much better. The study did not cover a long enough period to see if frictions were even worse in the past. Nonetheless, the evidence available suggests that the lower cost of monitoring prices afforded by the internet has not led to significant price convergence across sellers online or offline. Another study compared online and offline prices for multichannel retailers, using the massive database provided by the Billion Prices Project at MIT.7 The database covers prices across 10 countries. The study found that retailers charged the same price online as in-store in 72% of cases. The average discount was 4% for those cases in which there was a markdown online. If the observations with identical prices are included, the average online/offline price difference was just 1%. (7) Some measures of online prices have grown at about the same pace as the CPI index The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics does include online sales when constructing the Consumer Price Index. It even includes peer-to-peer sales by companies such as Airbnb and Uber. However, the BLS admits that its sample lags the popularity of such services by a few years. Moreover, while the BLS is trying to capture the rising proportion of sales done via e-commerce, "outlet bias" means that the CPI does not capture the price effect in cases where consumers are finding cheaper prices online. This is because the BLS weights the growth rate of online and offline prices, not the price levels. While there may be level differences, there is no reason to believe that the inflation rates for similar goods sold online and offline differ significantly. If the inflation rates are close, then the growing share of online sales will not affect overall inflation based on the BLS methodology. The BLS argues that any bias in the CPI due to outlet bias is mitigated to the extent that physical stores offer a higher level of service. Thus, price differences may not be that great after quality-adjustment. All this suggests that the actual consumer price inflation rate could be somewhat lower than the official rate. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily mean that inflation, properly measured, is being depressed by e-commerce to a meaningful extent. Indeed, Chart II-6 highlights that the U.S. component of the Billion Prices Index rose at a faster pace than the overall CPI between 2009 and 2014. The Online Price Index fell in absolute and relative terms from 2014 to mid-2016, but rose sharply toward the end of 2016. Applying our guesstimate of the weight of e-commerce in the CPI (3.2% for goods), online price inflation added to overall annual CPI inflation by about 0.3 percentage points in 2016 (bottom panel of Chart II-6). There is more deflation evident in the BLS' index of prices for Electronic Shopping and Mail Order Houses (Chart II-7). Online prices fell relative to the overall CPI for most of the time since the early 1990s, with the relative price decline accelerating since the GFC. However, our estimate of the contribution to overall annual CPI inflation is only about -0.15 percentage points in June 2017, and has never been more than -0.3 percentage points. This could be an underestimate because it does not include the impact of services, although the service e-commerce share of the CPI is very small. Chart II-6Online Price Index Online Price Index Online Price Index Chart II-7Electronic Shopping Price Index Electronic Shopping Price Index Electronic Shopping Price Index Another way to approach this question is to focus on the parts of the CPI that are most exposed to e-commerce. It is impossible to separate the effect of e-commerce on inflation from other drivers of productivity. Nonetheless, if online shopping is having a significant deflationary impact on overall inflation, we should see large and persistent negative contributions from these parts of the CPI. We combined the components of the CPI that most closely matched the sectors that have high e-commerce exposure according to the BLS' annual Retail Survey (Chart II-8). The sectors in our aggregate e-commerce price proxy include hotels/motels, taxicabs, books & magazines, clothing, computer hardware, drugs, health & beauty aids, electronics & appliances, alcoholic beverages, furniture & home furnishings, sporting goods, air transportation, travel arrangement and reservation services, educational services and other merchandise. The sectors are weighted based on their respective weights in the CPI. Our e-commerce price proxy has generally fallen relative to the overall CPI index since 2000. However, while the average contribution of these sectors to the overall annual CPI inflation rate has fallen in the post GFC period relative to the 2000-2007 period, the average difference is only 0.2 percentage points. The contribution has hovered around the zero mark for the past 2½ years. Surprisingly, price indexes have increased by more than the overall CPI since 2000 in some sectors where one would have expected to see significant relative price deflation, such as taxis, hotels, travel arrangement and even books. One could argue that significant measurement error must be a factor. How could the price of books have gone up faster than the CPI? Sectors displaying the most relative price declines are clothing, computers, electronics, furniture, sporting goods, air travel and other goods. We recalculated our e-commerce proxy using only these deflating sectors, but we boosted their weights such that the overall weight of the proxy in the CPI is kept the same as our full e-commerce proxy discussed above. In other words, this approach implicitly assumes that the excluded sectors (taxis, books, hotels and travel arrangement) actually deflated at the average pace of the sectors that remain in the index. Our adjusted e-commerce proxy suggests that online pricing reduced overall CPI inflation by about 0.1-to-0.2 percentage points in recent years (Chart II-9). This contribution is below the long-term average of the series, but the drag was even greater several times in the past. Chart II-8BCA E-Commerce Proxy Price Index BCA E-Commerce Proxy Price Index BCA E-Commerce Proxy Price Index Chart II-9BCA E-Commerce Adjusted Proxy Price Index BCA E-Commerce Adjusted Proxy Price Index BCA E-Commerce Adjusted Proxy Price Index Admittedly, data limitations mean that all of the above estimates of the impact of e-commerce are ballpark figures. Conclusions We are keeping an open mind and reserving judgement on the disinflationary impact of robotics, artificial intelligence and the gig economy until we do more research. But in terms of the impact of e-commerce, it is difficult to find supportive evidence. The available data are admittedly far from ideal for confirming or disproving the "Amazonification" thesis. Perhaps better measures of e-commerce pricing will emerge in the future. Nonetheless, the measures available today do not suggest that online sales are depressing the overall inflation rate by more than 0.1 or 0.2 percentage points, and it does not appear that the disinflationary impact has intensified by much. One could argue that lower online prices are forcing traditional retailers to match the e-commerce vendors, allowing for a larger disinflationary effect than we estimate. Nonetheless, if this were the case, then we would expect to see significant margin compression in the retail sector. The sectors potentially affected by e-commerce make up a small part of the CPI index. The deceleration of inflation since the GFC has been in areas unaffected by online sales. High corporate profit margins and depressed productivity growth also argue against the idea that e-commerce represents a large positive macro supply shock. Finally, today's creative destruction in retail may be no more deflationary than the shift to 'big box' stores in the 1990s. Perhaps the main way that e-commerce is affecting the macro economy and financial markets is not through inflation, but via the reduction in the economy's capital spending requirement. Rising online activity means that we need fewer shopping malls and big box outlets to support a given level of consumer spending. This would reduce the equilibrium level of interest rates, since the Fed has to stimulate other parts of the economy to offset the loss of demand in capital spending in the retail sector. To the extent that central banks were slow to recognize that equilibrium rates had fallen to extremely low levels, then policy was behind the curve and this might have contributed to the current low inflation environment. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 Robert F. DeLucia, "Economic Perspective: A Nontraditional Analysis Of Inflation," Prudential Capital Group (August 21, 2017). 2 Business to business, and business to consumer. 3 Aaron Cheris, Darrell Rigby and Suzanne Tager, "The Power Of Omnichannel Stores," Bain & Company Insights: Retail Holiday Newsletter 2016-2017 (December 19, 2016). 4 "US Daily: The Internet And Inflation: How Big Is The Amazon Effect?" Goldman Sachs Economic Research (August 2, 2017). 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 6 Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Viacheslav Sheremirov, and Oleksandr Talavera, "Price Setting In Online Markets: Does IT Click?" Journal of the European Economic Association (July 2016). 7 Alberto Cavallo, "Are Online And Offline Prices Similar? Evidence From Large Multi-Channel Retailers," NBER Working Paper No. 22142 (March 2016). III. Indicators And Reference Charts Stocks struggled in August on the back of intensifying geopolitical risks, such that equity returns slipped versus bonds in the month. The earnings backdrop remains constructive for global stocks. In the U.S., 12-month forward EPS estimates continue to climb, in line with upbeat net revisions and earnings surprises. Nonetheless, the risk/reward balance has deteriorated due to escalating risks inside and outside of the U.S. Allocation to risk assets should still exceed benchmark, but should be shy of maximum settings. It is prudent to hold some of the traditional safe haven assets, including gold. Our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) remained at 100% in August, sending a bullish message for equities. We introduced the RPI in the July report. Quite simply, it combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators are also bullish on stocks for the U.S., Europe and Japan. These indicators track flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The U.S. WTP topped out in June and the same occurred in August for the Japan and the Eurozone indexes. While the indicators are still bullish, they highlight that flows into the equity markets in the major countries are beginning to moderate. These indicators would have to clearly turn lower to provide a bearish signal for stocks. The VIX increased last month, but remains depressed by historical standards. This implies that the equity market is vulnerable to bad news. However, investor sentiment is close to neutral and our speculation index has pulled back from previously elevated levels. These suggest that investors are not overly long at the moment. Our monetary indicator is only slightly negative, but the equity technical indicator is close to breaking below the 9-month moving average (a negative technical sign). Bond valuation continues to hover near fair value, according to our long-standing model that is based on a simple regression of the nominal 10-year yield on short-term real interest rates and a moving average of inflation. Another model, presented in the Overview section, estimates fair value based on dollar sentiment, a measure of policy uncertainty and the global PMI. This model suggests that the 10-year yield is almost 50 basis points on the expensive side. We think that Fed rate expectations are far too benign, suggesting that bond yields will rise. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China

This week we are sending you two Special Reports (both included in this document) that were previously published in the May and June editions of The Bank Credit Analyst. Both reports discuss the long-term outlook for global bond yields. The first report emphasizes the importance of demographics and the second focuses on the outlook for productivity growth. We are also sending a Weekly Report published jointly by our Global Fixed Income Strategy and U.S. Bond Strategy services. Highlights The fundamental drivers of the low rate world are considered by many to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields quite depressed by historical standards for years to come. However, some of the factors behind ultra-low interest rates have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. The age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. Global investment needs will wane along with population aging, but the majority of the effect on equilibrium interest rates is in the past. In contrast, the demographic effects that will depress desired savings are still to come. The net impact will be bond-bearish. Moreover, the massive positive labor supply shock, following the integration of China and Eastern Europe into the world's effective labor force, is over. Indeed, this shock is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power, sparking a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby placing upward pressure on global real bond yields. It is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. This could be inflationary if it disrupts global supply chains. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. As for China, the fundamental drivers of its savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Technological advance will remain a headwind for real wage gains, but at least the transition to a world that is less labor-abundant will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We are not making the case that real global bond yields are going to quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations for bond yields are too low. Investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Feature In the September 2016 The Bank Credit Analyst, we summarized the key drivers behind the major global macroeconomic disequilibria that have resulted in deflationary pressure, policy extremism, dismal productivity, and the lowest bond yields in recorded history (Chart I-1). The disequilibria include income inequality, the depressed wage share of GDP, lackluster capital spending, and excessive savings. Chart I-1Global Disequilibria Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds The fundamental drivers of the low bond yield world are now well documented and understood by investors. These drivers generally are considered to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields and interest rates at historically low levels for years to come according to the consensus. Based on discussions with BCA clients, it appears that many have either "bought into" the secular stagnation thesis or, at a minimum, have adopted the view that growth headwinds preclude any meaningful rise in bond yields. However, bond investors might have been lulled into a false sense of security. Yields will not return to pre-Lehman norms anytime soon, but some of the factors behind the low-yield world have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. Most importantly, the age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. We have reached the tipping point. Equilibrium real bond yields will gradually move higher as a result. But before we discuss what is changing, it is important to review the drivers of today's macro disequilibria. Several of them predate the Great Financial Crisis, including demographic trends, technological advances, and the integration of China's massive workforce and excess savings into the global economy. Ultra-Low Rates: How Did We Get Here? (A) Demographics And Global Savings The so-called Global Savings Glut has been a bullish structural force for bonds for the past couple of decades. We won't go through all of the forces behind the glut, but a key factor is population aging in the advanced economies. Ex-ante desired savings rose as baby boomers entered their high-income years. The Great Financial Crisis only served to reinforce the desire to save, given the setback in the value of boomers' retirement nest eggs.1 The corporate sector also began to save more following the crisis. Chart I-2Global Shifts In The Saving ##br##And Investment Curves Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Even more importantly, the surge in China's trade surplus since the 1990s had to be recycled into the global pool of savings. While China's rate of investment was very high, its propensity to save increased even faster, resulting in a swollen external surplus and a massive net outflow of capital. Other emerging economies also made the adjustment from net importers of capital to net exporters following the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. By leaning into currency appreciation, these countries built up huge foreign exchange reserves that had to be recycled abroad. In theory, savings must equal investment at the global level and real interest rates shift to ensure this equilibrium (Chart I-2). China's excess savings, together with a greater desire to save in the developed countries, represented a shift in the saving schedule to the right. The result was downward pressure on global interest rates. (B) Demographics And Global Capital Spending Demographics and China's integration also affected the investment side of the equation. A slower pace of labor force growth in the developed countries resulted in a permanently lower level of capital spending relative to GDP. Slower consumer spending growth, as a result of a more moderate expansion in the working-age population, meant a reduced appetite for new factories, malls, and apartment buildings. Chart I-3 shows that the growth rate of global capital spending that is required to maintain a given capital-to-output ratio has dropped substantially, due to the dramatic slowdown in the growth of the world's working-age population.2 Keep in mind that this estimate refers only to the demographic component of investment spending. Actual capital expenditure growth will not be as weak as Chart I-3 suggests because firms will want to adopt new technologies for competitive or environmental reasons. Nonetheless, the point is that the structural tailwind for global capex from the post-war baby boom has disappeared. Chart I-3Demographics Are A Structural Headwind For Global Capex Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds (C) Labor Supply Shock And Global Capital Spending While the working-age population ratio peaked in the developed countries years ago, it is a different story at the global level (Chart I-4). The integration of the Chinese and Eastern European workforces into the global labor pool during the 1990s and 2000s resulted in an effective doubling of global labor supply in a short period of time. Relative prices must adjust in the face of such a large boost in the supply of labor relative to capital. The sudden abundance of cheap labor depressed real wages from what they otherwise would have been, thus incentivizing firms to use more labor and less capital at the margin. The combination of slower working-age population growth in the advanced economies and a surge in the global labor force resulted in a decline in desired global capital spending. In terms of Chart I-2, the leftward shift of the investment schedule reinforced the impact of the savings impulse in placing downward pressure on global interest rates. (D) Labor Supply Shock And Income Inequality The wave of cheap labor also aggravated the trend toward greater inequality in the advanced economies and the downward trend in labor's share of the income pie (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Chart I-5Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped In theory, a surge in the supply of labor is a positive "supply shock" that benefits both developed and developing countries. However, a recent report by David Autor and Gordon Hanson3 highlighted that trade agreements in the past were incremental and largely involved countries with similar income levels. The sudden entry of China to the global trade arena, involving a massive addition to the effective global stock of labor, was altogether different. The report does not argue that trade has become a "bad" thing. Rather, it points out that the adjustment costs imposed on the advanced economies were huge and long-lasting, as Chinese firms destroyed entire industries in developed countries. Chart I-6Hollowing Out Hollowing Out Hollowing Out The lingering adjustment phase contributed to greater inequality in the major countries. Management was able to use the threat of outsourcing to gain the upper hand in wage negotiations. The result has been a rise in the share of income going to high-income earners in the Advanced Economies, at the expense of low- and middle-income earners (Chart I-6). The same is true, although to a lesser extent, in the emerging world. Greater inequality, in turn, has weighed on aggregate demand and equilibrium interest rates because a larger share of total income flowed to the "rich" who tend to save more than the low- and middle-income classes. (E) The Dark Side Of Technology Advances in technology also contributed to rising inequality. In theory, new technologies hurt some workers in the short term, but benefit most workers in the long run because they raise national income. However, there is evidence that past major technological shocks were associated with a "hollowing out" or U-shaped pattern of employment. Low- and high-skilled employment increased, but the proportion of mid-skilled workers tended to shrink. Wages for both low- and mid-skilled labor did not keep up with those that were highly-skilled, leading to wider income disparity. Today, technology appears to be resulting in faster, wider and deeper degrees of hollowing-out than in previous periods of massive technological change. This may be because machines are not just replacing manual human tasks, but cognitive ones too. A recent IMF report made the case that technology and global integration played a dominant role in labor's declining fortunes. Technology alone explains about half of the drop in the labor share of income in the developed countries since 1980.4 Falling prices for capital goods, information and communications technology in particular, have facilitated the expansion of global value chains as firms unbundled production into many tasks that were distributed around the world in a way that minimized production costs. Chart I-7 highlights that the falling price of capital goods in the advanced economies went hand-in-hand with rising participation in global supply chains since 1990. Falling capital goods prices also accelerated the automation of routine tasks, contributing especially to job destruction in the developed (high-wage) economies. In other words, firms in the developed world either replaced workers with machinery in areas where technology permitted, or outsourced jobs to lower-wage countries in areas that remained labor-intensive. Both trends undermined labor's bargaining power, depressed labor's share of income, and contributed to inequality. The effects of technology, global integration, population aging and China's economic integration are demonstrated in Chart I-8. The world working-age-to-total population ratio rose sharply beginning in the late 1990s. This resulted in an upward trend in China's investment/GDP ratio, and a downward trend in the G7. The upward trend in the G7 capital stock-per-capita ratio began to slow as a result, before experiencing an unprecedented contraction after the Great Recession and Financial Crisis. Chart I-7Economic Integration And ##br##Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Chart I-8Macro Impact Of ##br##Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock The result has been a deflationary global backdrop characterized by demand deficiency and poor potential real GDP growth, both of which have depressed equilibrium global interest rates over the past 20 to 25 years. Transition Phase It would appear easy to conclude that these trends will be with us for another few decades because the demographic trends will not change anytime soon. Nonetheless, on closer inspection the global economy is transitioning from a period when cyclical economic pressures and all of the structural trends were pushing equilibrium interest rates in the same direction, to a period in which the economic cycle is becoming less bond-friendly and some of the secular drivers of low interest rates are gradually changing direction. First, the massive labor supply shock of the past few decades is over. The world working-age population ratio has peaked according to United Nations estimates. This ratio is already declining in the major advanced economies and is in the process of topping out in China. The absolute number of working-age people will shrink in China and the G7 countries over the next five years, although it will continue to grow at a low rate for the world as a whole (Chart I-9). Unions are unlikely to make a major comeback, but a backdrop that is less labor-abundant should gradually restore some worker bargaining power, especially as economies regain full employment. The resulting upward pressure on real wages will support capital spending as firms substitute toward capital and away from (increasingly expensive) labor. Consumer demand will also receive a boost if inequality moderates and the labor share of income begins to rise. Globalization On The Back Foot Second, it is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. Global exports appear to have peaked relative to GDP and average tariffs have ticked higher (Chart I-10). The World Trade Organization has announced that the number of new trade restrictions or impediments outweighed the number of trade liberalizing initiatives in 2016. The U.K. appears willing to sacrifice trade for limits to the free movement of people. The new U.S. Administration has ditched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is threatening to impose punitive tariffs on some trading partners. Chart I-9Working-Age Population To Shrink In G7 And China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China Chart I-10Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. If the U.S. were to impose high tariffs on China, for example, it would make a part of the Chinese capital stock redundant overnight. In order for the global economy to produce the same amount of goods and services as before, the U.S. and other countries would need to invest more. Any unwinding of globalization would also be inflationary as it would disrupt international supply chains. Demographics And Saving: From Tailwind To Headwind... Chart I-11Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Third, the impact of savings in the major advanced economies and China on global interest rates will change direction as well. In the developed world, aggregate household savings will come under downward pressure as boomers increasingly shift into retirement. Economists are fond of employing the so-called life-cycle theory of consumer spending. According to this theory, consumers tend to smooth out lifetime spending by accumulating assets during the working years in order to maintain a certain living standard after retirement. The U.N. National Transfer Accounts Project has gathered data on spending and labor income by age cohort at a point in time. Chart I-11 presents the data for China and three of the major advanced economies. The data for the advanced economies suggest that spending tends to rise sharply from a low level between birth and about 15 years of age. It continues to rise, albeit at a more modest pace, through the working years. Other studies have found that consumer spending falls during retirement. Nonetheless, these studies generally include only private spending and therefore do not include health care that is provided by the government. The data presented in Chart I-11 show that, if government-provided health care is included, personal spending rises sharply toward the end of life. The profile is somewhat different in China. Spending rises quickly from birth to about 20 years of age, and is roughly flat thereafter. Indeed, consumption edges lower after 75-80 years of age. These data allow us to project the impact of changing demographics on the average household saving rate in the coming years, assuming that the income and spending profiles shown in Chart I-11 are unchanged. We start by calculating the average saving rate across age cohorts given today's age structure. We then recalculate the average saving rate each year moving forward in time. The resulting saving rate changes along with the age structure of the population. The results are shown in Chart I-12. The saving rates for all four economies have been indexed at zero in 2016 for comparison purposes. The aggregate saving rate declines in all cases, falling between 4 and 8 percentage points between 2016 and 2030. Germany sees the largest drop of the four countries. Chart I-12Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving The simulations are meant to be suggestive, rather than a precise forecast, because the savings profile across age cohorts will adjust over time. Moreover, governments will no doubt raise taxes to cover the rising cost of health care, providing a partial offset in terms of the national saving rate.5 Nonetheless, the simulations highlight that the major economies are past the point where the baby boom generation is adding to the global savings pool at a faster pace than retirees are drawing from it. The age structure in the major advanced economies is far enough advanced that the rapid increase in the retirement rate will place substantial downward pressure on aggregate household savings in the coming years. It is well known that population aging will also undermine government budgets. Rising health care costs are already captured in our household saving rate projection because the data for household spending includes health care even if it is provided by the public sector. However, public pension schemes will also be a problem. To the extent that politicians are slow to trim pension benefits and/or raise taxes, public pension plans will be a growing drain on national savings. Could younger, less developed economies offset some of the demographic trends in China and the Advanced Economies? Numerically speaking, a more effective use of underutilized populations in Africa and India could go a long way. Nevertheless, deep-seated structural problems would have to be addressed and, even then, it is difficult to see either of these regions turning into the next "China story" given the current backlash against globalization and immigration. ...And The Capex Story Is Largely Behind Us Demographic trends also imply less capital spending relative to GDP, as discussed above. In terms of the impact on global equilibrium interest rates, it then becomes a race between falling saving and investment rates. Some analysts point to the Japanese experience because it is the leading edge in terms of global aging. Bond yields have been extremely low for many years even as the household saving rate collapsed, suggesting that ex-ante investment spending shifted by more than ex-ante savings. Nonetheless, Japan may not be a good example because the deterioration in the country's demographics coincided with burst bubbles in both real estate and stocks that hamstrung Japanese banks for decades. A series of policy mistakes made things worse. Economic theory is not clear on the net effect of demographics on savings and investment. The academic empirical evidence is inconclusive as well. However, a detailed IMF study of 30 OECD countries analyzed the demographic impact on a number of macroeconomic variables, including savings and investment.6 They estimated separate demographic effects for the old-age dependency ratio and the working-age population ratio. Applying the IMF's estimated model coefficients to projected changes in both of these ratios over the next decade suggests that the decline in ex-ante savings will exceed the ex-ante drop in capex requirements by about 1 percentage point of GDP. This is a non-trivial shift. Moreover, our simulations highlight that timing is important. The outlook for the household saving rate depends on the changing age structure of the population and the distribution of saving rates across age cohorts. Thus, the average saving rate will trend down as populations continue to age over the coming decades. In contrast, the impact of demographics on capital spending requirements is related to the change in the growth rate of the working-age population. Chart I-13 once again presents our estimates for the demographic component of capital spending. The top panel presents the world capex/GDP ratio that is necessary to maintain a constant capital/output ratio, and the bottom panel shows the change in that ratio. The important point is that the downward adjustment in world capex/GDP related to aging is now largely behind us because most of the deceleration in the growth rate of the working-age population is done. This is in contrast to the household saving rate adjustment where all of the adjustment is still to come. China Is Transitioning Too China must be treated separately from the developed countries because of its unique structural issues. As discussed above, household savings increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s (Chart I-14). This trend reflected a number of factors, including: Chart I-13Demographics And Capex Requirements Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart I-14China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... the rising share of the working-age population; a drop in the fertility rate, following the introduction of the one-child policy in the late 1970s that allowed households to spend less on raising children and save more for retirement; health care reform in the early 1990s required households to bear a larger share of health care spending; and job security was also undermined by reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the late 1990s, leading to increased precautionary savings to cover possible bouts of unemployment. These savings tailwinds have turned around in recent years and the household saving rate appears to have peaked. China's contribution to the global pool of savings has already moderated significantly, as measured by the current account surplus. The surplus has withered from about 9% in 2008 to 2½% in 2016. A recent IMF study makes the case that China's national saving rate will continue to decline. The IMF estimates that for every one percentage-point rise in the old-age dependency ratio, the aggregate household saving rate will fall by 0.4-1 percentage points. In addition, the need for precautionary savings is expected to ease along with improvements in the social safety net, achieved through higher government spending on health care. The household saving rate will fall by three percentage points by 2021 according to the IMF (Chart I-15). Competitive pressure and an aging population will also reduce the saving rates of the corporate and government sectors. Chart I-15...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink Of course, investment as a share of GDP is projected to moderate too, reflecting a rebalancing of the economy away from exports and capital spending toward household consumption. The IMF expects that savings will moderate slightly faster than investment, leading to a narrowing in the current account surplus to almost zero by 2021. A lot of assumptions go into this type of forecast such that we must take it with a large grain of salt. Nonetheless, the fundamental drivers of China's savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Moreover, a return to large current account surpluses would likely require significant currency depreciation, which is a political non-starter given U.S. angst over trade. The risk is that China's excess savings will be less, not more, in five year's time. Tech Is A Wildcard It is extremely difficult to forecast the impact of technological advancement on the global economy. We cannot say with any conviction that the tech-related effects of "hollowing out", "winner-take-all" and the "skills premium" will moderate in the coming years. Nonetheless, these effects have occurred alongside a surge in the world's labor force and rapid globalization of supply chains, both of which reinforced the erosion of employee bargaining power. Looking ahead, technology will still be a headwind for some employees, but at least the transition from a world of excess labor to one that is more labor-scarce will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We will explore the impact of technology on productivity, inflation, growth, and bond yields in a companion report to be published in the next issue. Conclusion: The main points we made in this report are summarized in Table I-1. All of the structural factors driving real bond yields were working in the same (bullish) direction over the past 30-40 years. Looking ahead, it is uncertain how technological improvement will affect bond prices, but we expect that the others will shift (or have already shifted) to either neutral or outright bond-bearish. Table I-1Key Secular Drivers Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds No doubt, our views that globalization and inequality have peaked, and that the labor share of income has bottomed, are speculative. These factors may not place much upward pressure on equilibrium yields. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the demographic effect that has depressed capital spending demand is well advanced. We see it shifting from a positive factor for bond prices to a neutral factor in the coming years. It is also clear that the massive positive labor supply shock is over, and is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power and the resulting boost consumer spending will be negative for bonds. This may also spark a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby place additional upward pressure on global real bond yields. Admittedly, however, this last point requires more research because theory and empirical evidence on it are not clear. Perhaps most importantly, the aging of the population in the advanced economies has reached a tipping point; retirees will drain more from the pool of savings than the working-age population will add to it in the coming years. We have concentrated on real equilibrium bond yields in this report because it is the part of nominal yields that is the most depressed relative to historical norms. The inflation component is only a little below a level that is consistent with central banks meeting their 2% inflation targets in the medium term. There is a risk that inflation will overshoot these targets, leading to a possible surge in long-term inflation expectations that turbocharges the bond bear market. This is certainly possible, as highlighted by a recent Global Investment Strategy Quarterly Strategy Outlook.7 Pain in bond markets would be magnified in this case, especially if central banks are forced to aggressively defend their targets. Please note that we are not making the case that real global bond yields will quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. It will take time for the bond-bullish structural factors to unwind. It will also take time for inflation to gain any momentum, even in the United States. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations suggest that investors have adopted an overly benign view on the outlook for yields. For example, implied real short-term rates remain negative until 2021 in the U.S. and 2026 in the Eurozone, while they stay negative out to 2030 in the U.K. (Chart I-16). We doubt that short-term rates will be negative for that long, given the structural factors discussed above. Another way of looking at this is presented in Chart I-17. The market expects the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years to be only slightly above today's spot yield, which itself is not far above the lowest levels ever recorded. Market expectations are equally depressed for the 5-year forward rate for the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart I-16Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Chart I-17Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History The implication is that investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst MarkM@bcaresearch.com 1 It is true that observed household savings rates fell in some of the advanced economies, such as the United States, at a time when aging should have boosted savings from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. This argues against a strong demographic effect on savings. However, keep in mind that we are discussing desired (or ex-ante) savings. Ex-post, savings can go in the opposite direction because of other influencing factors. As discussed below, global savings must equal investment, which means that shifts in desired capital spending demand matter for the ex-post level of savings. 2 Arithmetically, if world trend GDP growth slows by one percentage point, then investment spending would need to drop by about 3½ percentage points of GDP to keep the capital/output ratio stable. 3 David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 205-240 (October 2016). 4 Please see "Understanding The Downward Trend In Labor Income Shares," Chapter 3 in the IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2017). 5 In other words, while the household savings rate, as defined here to include health care spending by governments on behalf of households, will decline, any associated tax increases will blunt the impact on national savings (i.e. savings across the household, government and business sectors). 6 Jong-Won Yoon, Jinill Kim, and Jungjin Lee, "Impact Of Demographic Changes On Inflation And The Macroeconomy," IMF Working Paper no. 14/210 (November 2014). 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook: Second Quarter 2017: A Three Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds? Productivity growth has declined in most countries. This appears to be a structural problem that will remain with us for years to come. In theory, slower productivity growth should reduce the neutral rate of interest, benefiting bonds in the process. In reality, countries with chronically low productivity growth typically have higher interest rates than faster growing economies. The passage of time helps account for this seeming paradox: Slower productivity growth tends to depress interest rates at the outset, but leads to higher rates later on. The U.S. has reached an inflection point where weak productivity growth is starting to push up both the neutral real rate and inflation. Other countries will follow. The implication for investors is that government bond yields have begun a long-term secular uptrend. The market is not at all prepared for this. Slow Productivity Growth: A Structural Problem Productivity growth has fallen sharply in most developed and emerging economies (Chart II-1). As we argued in "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," there is little compelling evidence that measurement error explains the productivity slowdown.1 Yes, the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, indoor plumbing, and air conditioning. No one has offered a convincing explanation for why the well-known problems with productivity calculations suddenly worsened about 12 years ago. Chart II-1Productivity Growth Has Slowed In Most Major Economies Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds If mismeasurement is not responsible for the productivity slowdown, what is? Cyclical factors have undoubtedly played a role. In particular, lackluster investment spending has curtailed the growth in the capital stock (Chart II-2). This means that today's workers have not benefited from the improvement in the quality and quantity of capital to the same extent as previous generations. However, the timing of the productivity slowdown - it began in 2004-05 in most countries, well before the financial crisis struck - suggests that structural factors have been key. These include: Waning gains from the IT revolution. Recent innovations have focused more on consumers than businesses. As nice as Facebook and Instagram are, they do little to boost business productivity - in fact, they probably detract from it, given how much time people waste on social media these days. The rising share of value added coming from software relative to hardware has also contributed to the decline in productivity growth. Chart II-3 shows that productivity gains in the latter category have been much smaller than in the former. Chart II-2The Great Recession Hit ##br##Capital Stock Accumulation The Great Recession Hit Capital Stock Accumulation The Great Recession Hit Capital Stock Accumulation Chart II-3The Shift Towards Software Has ##br##Dampened IT Productivity Gains The Shift Towards Software Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains The Shift Towards Software Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains Slower human capital accumulation. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the pace it did in the 1990s (Chart II-4). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores in mathematics and science, is edging lower in the OECD, and is showing very limited gains in most emerging markets (Chart II-5). Test scores tend to be much lower in countries with rapidly growing populations (Chart II-6). Consequently, the average level of global mathematical proficiency is now declining for the first time in modern history. Chart II-4The Contribution To Growth ##br##From Rising Human Capital Is Falling Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart II-5Math Skills Around The World Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Decreased creative destruction. The birth rate of new firms in the U.S. has fallen by half since the late 1970s and is now barely above the death rate (Chart II-7). In addition, many firms in advanced economies are failing to replicate the best practices of industry leaders. The OECD reckons that this has been a key reason for the productivity slowdown.2 Chart II-6The Best Educated EMs Have The Worst Demographic Outlooks Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart II-7Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Productivity Growth And Interest Rates Investors typically assume that long-term interest rates will converge to nominal GDP growth. All things equal, this implies that faster productivity growth should lead to higher interest rates. Most economic models share this assumption - they predict that an acceleration in productivity growth will raise the rate of return on capital and incentivize households to save less in anticipation of faster income gains.3 Both factors should cause interest rates to rise. The problem is that these theories do not accord with the data. Chart II-8 shows that interest rates are far higher in regions such as Africa and Latin America, which have historically suffered from chronically weak productivity growth. In contrast, rates are lower in regions such as East Asia, which have experienced rapid productivity growth. One sees the same negative correlation between interest rates and productivity growth over time in developed economies. In the U.S., for example, interest rates rose rapidly during the 1970s, a decade when productivity growth fell sharply (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Emerging Markets: Interest Rates Tend To ##br##Be Higher Where Productivity Growth Is Weak Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart II-9U.S. Interest Rates Soared In ##br##The 1970s While Productivity Swooned U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The 1970s While Productivity Swooned U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The 1970s While Productivity Swooned Two Reasons Why Slower Productivity Growth May Lead To Higher Interest Rates There are two main reasons why slower productivity growth may lead to higher nominal interest rates over time: Slower productivity growth may eventually lead to higher inflation; Slower productivity growth may deplete national savings, thereby raising the neutral real rate of interest. We discuss each reason in turn. Reason #1: Slower Productivity Growth May Fuel Inflation Most economists agree that chronically weak productivity growth tends to be associated with higher inflation. Even Janet Yellen acknowledged as much, noting in a 2005 speech that "the evidence suggests that the predominant medium-term effect of a slowdown in trend productivity growth would likely be higher inflation."4 In theory, the causation between productivity and inflation can run in either direction: Weak productivity gains can fuel inflation while high inflation can, in turn, undermine growth. With respect to the latter, economists have focused on three channels: First, higher inflation may make it difficult for firms to distinguish between relative and absolute price shocks, leading to suboptimal resource allocation. Second, higher inflation may stymie capital accumulation because investors typically pay capital gains taxes even when the increase in asset values is entirely due to inflation. Third, high inflation may cause households and firms to waste time and effort on economizing their cash holdings. There are also several ways in which slower productivity growth can lead to higher inflation. For example, sluggish productivity growth may increase the likelihood that a country will be forced to inflate its way out of any debt problems. In addition, central banks may fail to recognize structural declines in productivity growth in real time, leading them to keep interest rates too low in the errant belief that weak GDP growth is due to inadequate demand when, in fact, it is due to insufficient supply. There is strong evidence that this happened in the U.S. in the 1970s. Chart II-10 shows that the Fed consistently overestimated the size of the output gap during that period. Chart II-10The Fed Continuously Overstated ##br##The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s Reason #2: Slower Productivity Growth May Deplete National Savings, Leading To A Higher Neutral Real Rate Imagine that you have a career where your real income is projected to grow by 2% per year, but then something auspicious happens that leads you to revise your expected annual income growth to 20%. How do you react? If you are like most people, your initial inclination might be to celebrate by purchasing a new car or treating yourself to a lavish vacation. As such, your saving rate is likely to fall at the outset. However, as the income gains pile up, you might find yourself running out of stuff to buy, resulting in a higher saving rate. This is particularly likely to be true if you grew up poor and have not yet acquired a taste for conspicuous consumption. Now consider the opposite case: One where you realize that your income will slowly contract over time as your skills become increasingly obsolete. The logic above suggests that your immediate reaction will be to hunker down and spend less - in other words, your saving rate will rise. However, as time goes by and the roof needs to be changed and the kids sent off to college, you may find it hard to pay the bills - your saving rate will then fall. The same reasoning applies to economy-wide productivity growth. When productivity growth increases, household savings are likely to decline as consumers spend more in anticipation of higher incomes. Meanwhile, investment is likely to rise as firms move swiftly to expand capacity to meet rising demand for their products. The combination of falling savings and rising investment will cause real rates to increase. As time goes by, however, it may become increasingly difficult for the economy to generate enough incremental demand to keep up with rising productive capacity. At that point, real rates will begin falling. The historic evidence is consistent with the notion that higher productivity growth causes savings to fall at the outset, but rise later on. Chart II-11 shows that East Asian economies all had rapid growth rates before they had high saving rates. China is a particularly telling example. Chinese productivity growth took off in the early 1990s. Inflation accelerated over the subsequent years, while the country flirted with current account deficits - both telltale signs of excess demand. It was not until a decade later that the saving rate took off, pushing the current account into a large surplus, even though investment was also rising at the time (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, ##br##Followed By Higher Savings Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, Followed By Higher Savings Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, Followed By Higher Savings Chart II-12China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, ##br##Then Savings Rate Took Off China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, Then Savings Rate Took Off China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, Then Savings Rate Took Off Today, Chinese deposit rates are near rock-bottom levels, and yet the household sector continues to save like crazy. This will change over time. The working-age population has peaked (Chart II-13). As millions of Chinese workers retire and begin to dissave, aggregate household savings will fall. Meanwhile, Chinese youth today have no direct memory of the hardships that their parents endured. As happened in Korea and Japan, the flowering of a consumer culture will help bring down the saving rate. Meanwhile, sluggish income growth in the developed world will make it difficult for households to save much. Population aging will only exacerbate this effect. As my colleague Mark McClellan pointed out in last month's edition of The Bank Credit Analyst, elderly people in advanced economies consume more than any other age cohort once government spending for medical care on their behalf is taken into account (Chart II-14).5 Our estimates suggest that population aging will reduce the household saving rate by five percentage points in the U.S. over the next 15 years (Chart II-15). The saving rate could fall as much as ten points in Germany, leading to the evaporation of the country's mighty current account surplus. As saving rates around the world begin to fall, real interest rates will rise. Chart II-13China's Very High Rate Of National Savings ##br##Will Face Pressure From Demographics China's Very High Rate Of National Savings Will Face Pressure From Demographics China's Very High Rate Of National Savings Will Face Pressure From Demographics Chart II-14Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Chart II-15Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings The Two Reasons Reinforce Each Other The discussion above has focused on two reasons why chronically low productivity growth could lead to higher interest rates: 1) weak productivity growth could fuel inflation; and 2) weak productivity growth could deplete national savings, leading to higher real rates. There is an important synergy between these two reasons. Suppose, for example, that weak productivity growth does eventually raise the neutral real rate. Since central banks cannot measure the neutral rate directly and monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, it is possible that actual rates will end up below the neutral rate. This would cause the economy to overheat, resulting in higher inflation. Thus, if the first reason proves to be true, it is more likely that the second reason will prove to be true as well. The Technological Wildcard So far, we have discussed productivity growth in very generic terms - as basically anything that raises output-per-hour. In reality, the source of productivity gains can have a strong bearing on interest rates. Economists describe innovations that raise the demand for labor relative to capital goods as being "capital saving." Paul David and Gavin Wright have argued that the widespread adoption of electrically-powered processes in the early 20th century serves as "a textbook illustration of capital-saving technological growth."6 They note that "Electrification saved fixed capital by eliminating heavy shafts and belting, a change that also allowed factory buildings themselves to be more lightly constructed." In contrast, recent technological innovations have tended to be more of the "labor saving" than "capital saving" variety. Robotics and AI come to mind, but so do more mundane advances such as containerization. Marc Levinson has contended that the widespread adoption of "The Box" in the 1970s completely revolutionized international trade. Nowadays, huge cranes move containers off ships and place them onto waiting trucks or trains. Thus, the days when thousands of longshoremen toiled in the great ports of Baltimore and Long Beach are gone.7 If technological progress is driven by labor-saving innovations, real wages will tend to grow more slowly than overall productivity (Chart II-16). In fact, if technological change is sufficiently biased in favour of capital (i.e., if it is extremely "labor saving"), real wages may actually decline in absolute terms (Chart II-17). Owners of capital tend to be wealthier than workers. Since richer people save more of their income than poorer people, the shift in income towards the former will depress aggregate demand (Chart II-18). This will result in a lower neutral rate. Chart II-16U.S.: Real Wages Have Been ##br##Lagging Productivity Gains U.S.: Real Wages Have Been Lagging Productivity Gains U.S.: Real Wages Have Been Lagging Productivity Gains Chart II-17Examples Of Capital-Biased ##br##Technological Change Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds It is difficult to know if the forces described above will dissipate over time. Productivity growth is largely a function of technological change. We like to think that we are living in an era of unprecedented technological upheavals, but if productivity growth has slowed, it is likely that the pace of technological innovation has also diminished. If so, the impact that technological change is having on such things as the distribution of income and global savings - and by extension on interest rates - could become more muted. To use an analogy, the music might remain the same, but the volume from the speakers could still drop. Capital In A Knowledge-Based Economy Labor-saving technological change has not been the only force pushing down interest rates. Modern economies are transitioning away from producing goods towards producing knowledge. Companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon have thrived without having to undertake massive amounts of capital spending. This has left them with billions of dollars in cash on their balance sheets. The price of capital goods has also tumbled over the past three decades, allowing companies to cut their capex budgets (Chart II-19). Chart II-18Savings Heavily Skewed ##br##Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Chart II-19Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed ##br##Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed Companies To Slash Capex Budgets In addition, technological advances have facilitated the emergence of "winner-take-all" industries where scale and network effects allow just a few companies to rule the roost (Chart II-20). Such market structures exacerbate inequality by shifting income into the hands of a few successful entrepreneurs and business executives. As noted above, this leads to higher aggregate savings. Market structures of this sort could also lead to less aggregate investment because low profitability tends to constrain capital spending by second- or third-tier firms, while the worry that expanding capacity will erode profit margins tends to constrain spending by winning companies. The combination of higher savings and decreased investment results in a lower neutral rate. As with labor-saving technological change, it is difficult to know how these forces will evolve over time. The growth of winner-take-all industries has benefited greatly from globalization. Globalization, however, may be running out of steam. Tariffs are already extremely low in most countries, while the gains from further breaking down the global supply chain are reaching diminishing returns (Chart II-21). Perhaps more importantly, political pressures for greater income distribution, trade protectionism, and stronger anti-trust measures are likely to intensify. If that happens, it may be enough to reverse some of the downward pressure on the neutral rate. Chart II-20A Winner-Take-All Economy A Winner-Take-All Economy A Winner-Take-All Economy Chart II-21The Low-Hanging Fruits Of ##br##Globalization Have Been Picked The Low-Hanging Fruits Of Globalization Have Been Picked The Low-Hanging Fruits Of Globalization Have Been Picked Investment Conclusions Is slow productivity growth good or bad for bonds? The answer is both: Slow productivity growth is likely to depress interest rates at the outset, but is liable to lead to higher rates later on. The U.S. has likely reached the inflection point where slow productivity is going from being a boon to a bane for bonds. Chart II-22 shows that the U.S. output gap would be over 8% of GDP had potential GDP grown at the pace the IMF projected back in 2008. Instead, it is close to zero and will likely turn negative if growth remains over 2% over the next few quarters. Other countries are likely to follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Chart II-22Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks ##br##To Lower Potential Growth Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks To Lower Potential Growth Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks To Lower Potential Growth To be clear, productivity is just one of several factors affecting interest rates - demographics, globalization, and political decisions being others. However, as we argued in our latest Strategy Outlook, these forces are also shifting in a more inflationary direction.8 As such, fixed-income investors with long-term horizons should pare back duration risk and increase allocations to inflation-linked securities. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal,"The Best versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence across Firms and the Role of Public Policy," OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 5 (November 2016). 3 Consider the widely-used Solow growth model. The model says that the neutral real rate, r, is equal to (a/s) (n + g + d), where a is the capital share of income, s is the saving rate, n is labor force growth, g is total factor productivity growth, and d is the depreciation rate of capital. All things equal, an increase in g will result in a higher equilibrium real interest rate. The same is true in the Ramsey model, which goes a step further and endogenizes the saving rate within a fully specified utility-maximization framework. In this model, consumption growth is pinned down by the so-called Euler equation. Assuming that utility can be described by a constant relative risk aversion utility function, the Euler equation states that consumption will grow at (r-d)/h where d is the rate at which households discount future consumption and h is a measure of the degree to which households want to smooth consumption over time. In a steady state, consumption increases at the same rate as GDP, n+g. Rearranging the terms yields: r=(n+g)h+d. Notice that both models provide a mechanism by which a higher g can decrease r. In the Solow model, this comes from thinking about the saving rate not as an exogenous variable, but as something that can be influenced by the growth rate of the economy. In particular, if s rises in response to a higher g, r could fall. Likewise, in the Ramsey model, a higher g could make households more willing to forgo consumption today in return for higher consumption tomorrow (equivalent to a decrease in the rate of time preference, d). This, too, would translate into a lower neutral rate. 4 Janet L. Yellen, "The U.S. Economic Outlook," Presentation to the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, February 11, 2005. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds," April 28, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Paul A. David, and Gavin Wright,"General Purpose Technologies And Surges In Productivity: Historical Reflections On the Future Of The ICT Revolution," January 2012. 7 Marc Levinson, "The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger," Princeton University Press, 2006. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Near record high levels for stocks are not an impediment to gains in the stock-to-bond ratio in the next 12 months. Minutes from June's FOMC meeting confirmed that policymakers agree that monetary policy should continue to normalize in the coming quarters. None of the main indicators that have provided some leading information in the past are warning of an equity bear market. Solid ISM and industrial production readings herald bullish profit growth in the second half the year. Treasury yields are headed higher in 2017, supporting our stocks over bond view. Within the U.S. bond market, we prefer short over long duration and investment-grade and high-yield bonds over high-quality debt; MBS will be hurt more than Treasuries as the Fed pares its balance sheet. Feature U.S. stocks will continue to reach all-time highs if inflation remains low, the economic backdrop fosters EPS growth and the Fed only gradually raises rates. We expect these conditions to stay in place in the second half of 2017 and into 2018, allowing stocks to outrun bonds. We note below that neither valuations nor technicals are flashing a red warning sign. Chart 1 shows that most of the time, even when equities are at record highs, valuations are above average (but not extreme) and the Fed is slowly removing accommodation, stocks can still rise. Moreover, none of the indicators that provided leading information in the past now warn of an equity bear market. Chart 1Macro Conditions Favorable For More Gains In Equities Macro Conditions Favorable For More Gains In Equities Macro Conditions Favorable For More Gains In Equities Chart 2Labor Market Strong But Wages Still Stagnant Labor Market Strong But Wages Still Stagnant Labor Market Strong But Wages Still Stagnant The June jobs report suggests that the environment of solid economic growth and still muted wage pressures remains in place, a positive backdrop for equity markets. The report showed that the economy added 222,000 jobs in June, well above the consensus forecast of 178,000. Prior months were also revised higher by 47,000 pushing the 3-month moving average up to 180,000 jobs per month. This is right in line with the 187,000 jobs per month averaged in 2016. Despite robust payroll gains, the unemployment rate actually ticked higher in June, from 4.3% to 4.4%, as previously sidelined workers were drawn back into the labor force. Meanwhile, wage growth continues to underwhelm, rising only 0.2% in June with the year-over-year growth rate holding steady at 2.5%. The deceleration in the 3 month change in average hourly earnings from 2.7% in December 2016 to 1.9% in June challenges the Fed's view on inflation (Chart 2). The recent moderation in wage growth is not yet severe enough to prevent the Fed from delivering one more rate hike before year-end. However, if the labor force participation rate continues to increase, and especially if this increase occurs alongside a rising unemployment rate, then the Fed's forecast of gradually accelerating wages will come into question. Fed Minutes: No Change To Our Base Case Minutes from June's FOMC meeting show that the debate among policymakers over monetary policy centers on the timing and pace of normalization in the coming quarters. The minutes did not provide any new insight about the Fed's plans to shrink its balance sheet. This will be done using caps on the monthly amount of principal repayments from the Fed's security holdings that will not be rolled over. These caps will rise over time on a pre-set path. The FOMC is still debating the timing of the start of this process. The FOMC was reasonably pleased with the tone of recent economic data, which support the view that GDP has bounced back from a soft patch in the first quarter. The June manufacturing and services ISM surveys, released since the FOMC meeting, undoubtedly reinforced policymakers' confidence in the underlying growth trajectory (see below for more details). The FOMC participants discussed at length the recent pullback in core measures of consumer price inflation. Most policymakers are willing for the time being to believe that inflation is driven primarily by temporary one-off factors. Others are worried that it will be more enduring. The moderation in three-month rates of change of prices this year was widespread across sectors of the CPI (i.e. it is not merely the result of one-offs). Inflation according to the Fed's favored measure, the core PCE price index, has also moderated this year although the disinflation has not been as broadly based as in the CPI (Chart 3). Much of the FOMC's debate focused on the relationship between labor market tightness and inflation. The doves want to see inflation rise closer to the 2% target before tightening even more. The hawks worry that the relationship could be non-linear, which means that a further undershoot of unemployment below estimates of full employment could suddenly generate a surge in inflation. At a minimum, an undershoot could boost risks to financial stability by promoting excess risk-taking in the financial markets. The minutes reveal that the worries about the impact of easing financial conditions on financial stability have intensified since the start of the year. Inflation forecasting has been particularly tricky since the Great Recession for both the Fed and other economic prognosticators. Admittedly, it is difficult to explain the sudden and broadly-based inflation deceleration, even in sectors that have nothing to do with oil prices, shifts in the currency or wage growth. That said, the model shown in the top panel of Chart 4 suggests that core CPI inflation will edge higher in the coming months. This reflects the acceleration in ECI wage growth (feeding into higher core services inflation) and in core goods inflation (reflecting rising import prices), which more than offset the slight moderation in our projection for shelter inflation. Chart 3Inflation Readings Must##BR##Improve In Next Few Months Inflation Readings Must Improve In Next Few Months Inflation Readings Must Improve In Next Few Months Chart 4Core CPI Should Edge Higher##BR##In Coming Months Core CPI Should Edge Higher In Coming Months Core CPI Should Edge Higher In Coming Months Bottom Line: The minutes did not change our base case outlook; the FOMC will announce in September that it will begin to shrink the Fed's balance sheet shortly thereafter. The next rate hike will occur in December. Nonetheless, this forecast hangs importantly on the assumption that core inflation edges higher in the coming months. We think it will, but uncertainty is high. Monitoring The Bear Market Barometer The FOMC's seeming determination to stick with the current tightening timetable raises question marks over the equity market, especially given elevated valuations. Chart 5Equity Bear Market Indicators Equity Bear Market Indicators Equity Bear Market Indicators BCA's Chief Economist, Martin Barnes, highlighted the best "equity bear market" indicators to watch in a 2014 Special Report1. He noted that no two bear markets are the same and that there are no indicators that have reliably heralded bear phases. Nonetheless, there are some common elements. The safest time to invest in the market is when monetary conditions are favorable, there are no signs of a looming economic downturn, extreme overvaluation is not present and technical indicators are not flashing red. Some indicators related to each of these fundamental factors are shown in Chart 5: Monetary Conditions: The yield curve is flat by historical standards, but it is far from inverted. Moreover, real short-term interest rates are usually substantially higher than today, and above 2%, when bear markets commence. Excess liquidity, which we define as M2 growth less nominal GDP growth, is also well above the zero line, a threshold that in the past has warned of a downturn in stock prices. Valuation: Our composite valuation indicator is still shy of the +1 standard deviation level that defines over-valued. However, this is due to the components that compare equity prices to bond yields. The other three components of the equity indicator, which are unrelated to bond yields, suggest that stock valuation is stretched. Economic Outlook: Economic data, such as the leading economic indicator and ISM, have been unreliable bear market signals. We do not see anything that indicates that a recession is on the horizon. U.S. growth will remain above-trend in the second half of the year based on its relationship with financial conditions. Technical Conditions: Sentiment is elevated, which is bearish from a contrary perspective. However, breadth, the deviation from the 40- week moving average and our composite technical indicator, all are not flashing red. Earnings: Trends in earnings and margins did not provide any additional reliable signals for timing equity market downturns in the past. Still, it is a bad sign when EPS growth tops out. This is often preceded by a peak in industrial production growth. We expect EPS growth to continue to accelerate for at least a few more months, but we are closely watching industrial production. Bottom Line: The equity market is vulnerable to unforeseen shocks given stretched valuation. Nonetheless, none of the indicators that have provided leading information in the past warn of an equity bear market. ISM Above 50 Supports 2H Profit Outlook The elevated level of ISM sets the stage for EPS growth to gather speed in the second half of 2017. Industrial production is a good proxy for sales of S&P 500 companies (Chart 6). A rollover in the 12-month change in IP would challenge our view. However, strong readings on the ISM, which tracks IP, suggest that IP should accelerate in the next six months (Chart 6, panel 1). Chart 6Solid Backdrop For Earnings And Sales Solid Backdrop For Earnings And Sales Solid Backdrop For Earnings And Sales At 57.8 in June, the ISM has rebounded from the recent low of 47.9 in 2015. Investors wonder if it will roll over again or simply fluctuate at a high level. The leading components of ISM, including the new orders index and the new orders-to-inventory ratio, indicate that the ISM will remain above 50 in the months ahead (Chart 7). Moreover, the new export orders component of the ISM has also surged. The implication is that foreign demand (rather than domestic consumer or business spending) is leading the U.S. manufacturing sector. In fact, the 3- and 12-month change in the industrial production indices in advanced economies outside the U.S. have outpaced domestic growth (Chart 8). Chart 7IP Poised To Accelerate IP Poised To Accelerate IP Poised To Accelerate Chart 8U.S. IP Lagging Other Developed Markets U.S. IP Lagging Other Developed Markets U.S. IP Lagging Other Developed Markets Bottom Line: Firm readings on ISM are an indication that our bullish profit story for 2017 remains intact. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds. Inflection Point The increase in Treasury yields since late June indicates that growth expectations had become overly pessimistic. Our assessment is that U.S. growth will remain above trend for the rest of 2017. The implication for investors is that Treasury bond yields will move higher, the yield curve will bear-steepen, and that credit will outperform Treasuries in the second half of 2017. Moreover, we expect MBSs to underperform. According to our U.S. Bond Strategy service2, Treasury yields are poised to follow the economic surprise index higher in the coming months. Extreme net long positioning in the futures market supports the view. The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.52%. Our 3-factor version of the model, which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.45% (Chart 9). Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Small positive excess returns, consistent with carry, remain the most likely scenario for investment- grade credit, where we recommend an overweight. We do not see the potential for much spread tightening from current levels. However, a large spread widening would be equally unlikely given the favorable backdrop of steady growth and muted inflation. We recommend an overweight in the high-yield market. We expect the decline in the 12-month trailing speculative default rate to continue for the rest of the year, aided by a moderation in energy sector defaults (Chart 10, bottom panel). This means that the current compensation offered by junk spreads in excess of expected default losses stands at 221 bps, in line with its historical average (Chart 10, panel 3). In last week's Weekly Report3 our U.S. Bond Strategy team showed that a default-adjusted spread of 221 bps is consistent with excess returns close to 150 bps during the next 12 months. Chart 9Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Chart 10High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview Our Energy Sector Strategy team stated in a Weekly Report4 last week that our base case of $50-$60/bbl WTI crude oil prices by the end of 2017 should keep high-yield energy spreads contained. We remain underweight MBSs. Nominal MBS spreads are already very tight compared with previous levels, and they appear even tighter relative to trends in net issuance. While refinancing activity will remain depressed, we see potential for option-adjusted spreads to follow net issuance higher, even as the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) remains low. The Fed's exit from the MBS market, which could occur as early as September, represents an additional upside risk for spreads. Bottom Line: Rates have bounced up after undershooting between March and the end of June. Loftier inflation readings are needed to sustain the bounce. Higher rates in the rest of 2017 support our stocks-over-bond stance. Within the U.S. bond market, we favor short duration over long, and credit over high-quality. MBSs will be hurt more than Treasurys as the Fed begins to shrink its balance sheet. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Special Report "Timing The Next Equity Bear Market, " dated January 24, 2014, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Inflection Point", dated July 5, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "HY Debt Update: Offshore Drilling & Transportation Getting Left Behind", dated July 5, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Economic Outlook: Global growth will remain strong over the next 12 months, but will start to slow in the second half of 2018, potentially setting the stage for a recession in 2019. Overall Strategy: Investors should overweight equities and spread product for now. However, be prepared to pare back exposure next summer. Fixed Income: Maintain below benchmark duration exposure over the next 12 months. Underweight U.S. Treasurys, stay neutral Europe, and overweight Japan. Equities: Remain overweight developed market equities relative to their EM peers. Within the DM sphere, favor the euro area and Japan over the U.S. in local-currency terms. In the EM universe, Chinese H-shares have significant upside. Currencies: The selloff in the dollar is overdone. The broad trade-weighted dollar will appreciate by 10% before peaking in mid-2018. The yen still has considerable downside against the dollar, as does the euro. Commodities: Oil will rally over the coming months as global inventories decline. Gold will continue to struggle, before exploding higher towards the end of this decade. Feature I. Global Macro Outlook End Of The Global Manufacturing Recession Global growth estimates have been trending higher over the past 12 months, having bottomed last summer. Ironically, the collapse in oil prices in late 2014 was both the main reason for the deterioration in global growth as well as its subsequent rebound. Plunging oil prices led to a massive decline in capital spending in the energy sector and associated industries. In the U.S., energy capex dropped by 70% between Q2 of 2014 and Q3 of 2016. The economic fallout was even more severe in many other economies, especially emerging markets such as Russia and Brazil. The result was a global manufacturing recession and a pronounced slump in international trade (Chart 1). When thinking about oil and the economy, the distinction between levels and rates of change is important: While rapidly falling oil prices tend to be bad for global growth, lower oil prices are good for it. By the middle of 2016, the damage from the oil crash had largely run its course. What was left was a massive windfall for households, especially poorer ones who spend a disproportionate share of their paychecks at the pump. Industries that use oil as an input also benefited. Simply put, the oil crash went from being a bane to a boon for the global economy. A Solid 12-Month Outlook We expect global growth to remain firm over the next 12 months. Financial conditions in most countries have eased substantially since the start of the year thanks to rising equity prices, lower bond yields, and narrower credit spreads (Chart 2). Our empirical analysis suggests that easier financial conditions tend to lift growth with a lag of 6-to-9 months (Chart 3). This bodes well for activity in the remainder of this year. Chart 1The Manufacturing Recession Has Ended The Manufacturing Recession Has Ended The Manufacturing Recession Has Ended Chart 2Financial Conditions Have Eased Globally Financial Conditions Have Eased Globally Financial Conditions Have Eased Globally A number of "virtuous cycles" should amplify the effects of easier financial conditions. In the U.S., a tight labor market will lead to faster wage growth, helping to spur consumption. Rising household spending, in turn, will lead to lower unemployment and even faster wage growth. Strong consumption growth will also motivate firms to expand capacity, translating into more investment spending. Chart 4 shows that the share of U.S. firms planning to increase capital expenditures has risen to a post-recession high. Chart 3Easier Financial Conditions Will Support Growth Easier Financial Conditions Will Support Growth Easier Financial Conditions Will Support Growth Chart 4U.S. Firms Plan To Boost Capex U.S. Firms Plan To Boost Capex U.S. Firms Plan To Boost Capex The euro area economy continues to chug along. The purchasing manager indices (PMIs) dipped a bit in June, but remain at levels consistent with above-trend growth. The German Ifo business confidence index hit a record high this week. Corporate balance sheets in the euro area are improving and credit growth is accelerating. This is helping to fuel a rebound in business investment (Chart 5). The fact that the ECB has no intention of raising rates anytime soon will only help matters. As inflation expectations begin to recover, short-term real rates will fall. This will lead to a virtuous circle of stronger growth, and even higher inflation expectations. The Japanese economy managed to grow by an annualized 1% in the first quarter. This marked the fifth consecutive quarter of positive sequential growth, the longest streak in 11 years. Exports are recovering and both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs stand near record-high levels (Chart 6). Chart 5Euro Area Data Remain Upbeat Euro Area Data Remain Upbeat Euro Area Data Remain Upbeat Chart 6Japanese Economy Is Rebounding Japanese Economy Is Rebounding Japanese Economy Is Rebounding Chart 7China: Slight Slowdown, But No Need To Worry China: Slight Slowdown, But No Need To Worry China: Slight Slowdown, But No Need To Worry The Chinese economy has slowed a notch since the start of the year, but remains robust (Chart 7). Real-time measures of industrial activity such as railway freight traffic, excavator sales, and electricity production are rising at a healthy clip. Exports are accelerating thanks to a weaker currency and stronger global growth. Retail sales continue to expand, while the percentage of households that intend to buy a new home has surged to record-high levels. The rebound in Chinese exports and industrial output is helping to lift producer prices. Higher selling prices, in turn, are fueling a rebound in industrial company profits (Chart 8). A better profit picture should support business capital spending in the coming months. Meanwhile, the Chinese government's "regulatory windstorm" - as the local press has called it - has largely bypassed the real economy. In fact, medium and long-term lending to nonfinancial corporations, a key driver of private-sector capital spending and physical commodity demand, has actually accelerated over the past eight months (Chart 9). Chart 8China: Higher Selling Prices Fueling A Rebound In Profits China: Higher Selling Prices Fueling A Rebound In Profits China: Higher Selling Prices Fueling A Rebound In Profits Chart 9China: Credit To The Real Economy Is Accelerating China: Credit To The Real Economy Is Accelerating China: Credit To The Real Economy Is Accelerating All Good Things Must Come To An End We remain optimistic about global growth over the next 12 months. Unfortunately, things are likely to sour in the second half of 2018, possibly setting the stage for a recession in the U.S. and several other countries in 2019. The odds of a recession rise when economies approach full employment (Chart 10). The U.S. unemployment rate now stands at 4.3% and is on track to break below its 2000 low of 3.8% next summer. A cursory look at the data suggests that the unemployment rate is usually either rising or falling (Chart 11). And once it starts rising, it keeps rising. In fact, there has never been a case in the postwar era where the three-month average of the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession ensuing. Chart 10Recessions Become More Likely When The Labor Market Begins To Overheat Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull Chart 11Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Modern economies contain numerous feedback loops. When unemployment starts increasing, this fuels a vicious cycle where rising joblessness saps confidence and incomes, leading to less spending and even higher unemployment. History suggests that it is almost impossible to break this cycle once it starts. The Fed is well aware of the risks of letting the unemployment rate fall to a level where it has nowhere to go but up. Unfortunately, calibrating monetary policy in a way that achieves a soft landing is easier said than done. Changes in monetary conditions affect the economy with a lag of about 12-to-18 months. Once it has become obvious that a central bank has either loosened or tightened monetary policy too much, it is often too late to right the ship. The risks of a policy error are particularly high in today's environment where there is significant uncertainty about the level of the long-term neutral rate. Question marks about the future stance of fiscal policy will also complicate the Fed's job. We expect the Trump administration to succeed in passing legislation that cuts both personal and corporate income taxes later this year or in early 2018. The bill will be "fully funded" in the sense that there will be offsetting spending cuts, but these will be back-loaded toward the end of the 10-year budget window, whereas the tax cuts will be front-loaded. This will generate a modest amount of fiscal stimulus over the next few years. That being said, the proposed changes to health care legislation could more than neutralize the effects of lower tax rates. The Senate bill, as currently worded, would lead to substantial cuts to Medicaid relative to existing law, as well as deep cuts to insurance subsidies for many poor and middle-class families. Our base case is that Republicans in Congress fail to pass a new health care bill, thus leaving the Affordable Care Act largely unscathed. However, if they succeed, the overall stance of federal fiscal policy would likely shift from being somewhat accommodative, on net, to somewhat restrictive. This would expedite the timing of the recession. How Deep A Recession? If the U.S. does succumb to a recession in 2019, how bad will it be? Here, there is both good news and bad news. The good news is that financial and economic imbalances are not as severe today as those that existed in the lead-up to the past few recessions. The Great Recession was preceded by a massive housing bubble, associated with overbuilding and a sharp deterioration in mortgage lending standards (Chart 12). Today, residential investment stands at 3.9% of GDP, compared to a peak of 6.6% of GDP Q1 of 2006. Lending standards, at least judging by FICO scores, have remained fairly high over the course of the recovery. In relation to income and rents, home prices are also much lower today than they were a decade ago. Likewise, the massive capex overhang that preceded the 2001 recession is largely absent at present. Chart 12No New Bubble In The U.S. Housing Sector No New Bubble In The U.S. Housing Sector No New Bubble In The U.S. Housing Sector Chart 13Consumer Credit: Making A Comeback... Consumer Credit: Making A Comeback... Consumer Credit: Making A Comeback... The bad news is that cracks in the economy are starting to form. In contrast to mortgage debt, student debt has gone through the roof and auto loans are nearly back to pre-recession levels as a share of disposable income (Chart 13). Not surprisingly, this is starting to translate into higher default rates (Chart 14). The fact that this is happening when the unemployment rate is at the lowest level in 16 years is a cause for concern. Meanwhile, the ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP has risen above 2000 levels and is closing in on its 2007 peak (Chart 15). Chart 14...With Defaults Starting To Rise In Some Categories ...With Defaults Starting To Rise In Some Categories ...With Defaults Starting To Rise In Some Categories Chart 15U.S. Corporate Sector Has Been Feasting On Credit U.S. Corporate Sector Has Been Feasting On Credit U.S. Corporate Sector Has Been Feasting On Credit We are particularly worried about the health of the commercial real estate (CRE) market. CRE prices currently stand 7% above pre-recession levels in real terms, having risen by a staggering 82% since the start of 2010 (Chart 16). U.S. financial institutions hold $3.8 trillion in CRE loans, $2 trillion of which are held by banks. As a share of GDP, the outstanding stock of CRE bank loans in most categories is near pre-recession levels (Chart 17). Chart 16Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Chart 17CRE Debt Is Rising CRE Debt Is Rising CRE Debt Is Rising The retail sector is already under intense pressure due to the shift in buying habits towards E-commerce. Vacancy rates in the apartment sector have started to tick higher and rent growth has slowed (Chart 18 and Chart 19). The number of apartment units under construction stands at a four-decade high, despite a structurally subdued pace of household formation (Chart 20). Most of these units are likely to hit the market in 2018, which will result in a further increase in vacancy rates. Vacancies in the office sector are also likely to rise, given the recent increase in the number of new projects in the pipeline. On the flipside, demand growth for new office space is set to weaken, as a tighter labor market leads to slower payroll gains. Chart 18Vacancy Rates Are Bottoming Outside The Industrial Sector... Vacancy Rates Are Bottoming Outside The Industrial Sector... Vacancy Rates Are Bottoming Outside The Industrial Sector... Chart 19...While Rent Growth Is Losing Steam ...While Rent Growth Is Losing Steam ...While Rent Growth Is Losing Steam If vacancy rates across the CRE sector start rising in earnest, real estate prices will fall, leading to a decline in the value of the collateral backing CRE loans. This could prompt lenders to pull back credit, causing prices to fall further. Seasoned real estate investors are no strangers to such vicious cycles, and if the next one begins late next year when growth is slowing because the economy is running out of spare capacity and financial conditions are tightening, it would further add to the risks of a recession. Chart 20Apartment Supply Is Surging, But Will There Be Enough Demand? Apartment Supply Is Surging, But Will There Be Enough Demand? Apartment Supply Is Surging, But Will There Be Enough Demand? Gauging The Global Spillover Effects What repercussions would a U.S. recession have for the rest of the world? Simply based on trade flows, the answer is "not much." U.S. imports account for less than 5% of global ex-U.S. GDP. Thus, even a significant decline in U.S. spending abroad would not make much of a dent in overseas growth. More worrisome are potential financial spillovers. As the IMF has documented, these have been the dominant drivers of the global business cycle in the modern era.1 Chart 21Global Debt Levels Are Still High Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull Correlations across global markets tend to increase when risk sentiment deteriorates. Thus, if U.S. stocks buckle in the face of rising recessionary risks, risk assets in other economies are sure to suffer. The fact that valuations are stretched across so many markets only makes the problem worse. A flight towards safety could trigger a pronounced decline in global equity prices, wider credit spreads, and lower property prices. This, in turn, could lead to a sharp decline in household and corporate net worth, resulting in tighter financial conditions and more stringent lending standards. Elevated debt levels represent another major source of vulnerability. Total debt as a share of GDP is greater now than it was before the Great Recession in both advanced and emerging markets (Chart 21). High debt burdens will prevent governments from loosening fiscal policy in countries that are unable to issue their own currencies. The monetary transmission mechanism also tends to be less effective in the presence of high debt. This is especially the case in today's environment where the zero lower-bound on nominal interest rates remains a formidable challenge. The presence of these fiscal and monetary constraints implies that the severity of the next recession could be somewhat greater than one might expect based solely on the underlying causes of the downturn. II. Financial Markets Overall Strategy The discussion above implies that the investment outlook over the next few years is likely to be of the "one step forward, two steps back" variety. The global economy is entering a blow-off stage where growth will get better before it gets worse. We are bullish on global equities and spread product over the next 12 months, but expect to turn bearish on risk assets next summer. Until then, investors should position for a stronger dollar and higher bond yields. We recommend a slight overweight allocation to developed market equities over their EM peers. Within the DM sphere, we favor the euro area and Japan over the U.S. in local-currency terms. In the EM universe, Chinese H-shares stand out as offering an attractive risk-reward profile. Comparing government bonds, we are underweight U.S. Treasurys, neutral on European bonds, and overweight Japan. These recommendations are broadly in line with the output of our in-house quantitative models (Table 1 and Chart 22). Table 1BCA's Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations* Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull Chart 22Message From Our U.S. Stock Market ##br##Timing Model Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull Equities Earnings Are Key Earnings have been the main driver of the global equity bull market. In fact, the global forward P/E ratio has actually declined slightly since February, despite a 3.9% gain in equity prices (Chart 23). Strong global growth should continue to boost corporate earnings over the next 12 months. Consensus bottom-up estimates call for global EPS to expand by 14% in 2017 and a further 11% in 2018. The global earnings revision ratio moved into positive territory earlier this year for the first time in six years (Chart 24). Chart 23Earnings Have Been The Main Driver ##br##Of The Global Equity Bull Market Earnings Have Been The Main Driver OfThe Global Equity Bull Market Earnings Have Been The Main Driver OfThe Global Equity Bull Market Chart 24Global Earnings Picture ##br##Looks Solid Global Earnings Picture Looks Solid Global Earnings Picture Looks Solid Global monetary conditions generally remain favorable. Our U.S. Financial Conditions Index has loosened significantly. Historically, this has been a bullish signal for stocks.2 Excess liquidity, which we define as M2 growth less nominal GDP growth, is also still well above the zero line, a threshold that has warned of a downturn in stock prices in the past. Chart 25Individual Investors Are Not Overly Bullish On U.S. Equities But... Individual Investors Are Not Overly Bullish On U.S. Equities But... Individual Investors Are Not Overly Bullish On U.S. Equities But... Sentiment is stretched, but not excessively so. The share of bullish respondents in the AAII's weekly poll of individual investors stood at 29.7% this week (Chart 25). This marked the 18th consecutive week that optimism has been below its long-term average. Market Vane's survey of traders and Yale's Investor Confidence index paint a more complacent picture, as do other measures such as the VIX and margin debt (Chart 26). Nevertheless, as long as earnings continue to grow and monetary policy remains in expansionary territory, sentiment can remain elevated without being a significant threat to stocks. Overweight The Euro Area And Japan Over The U.S. Regionally, earnings revisions have been more positive in Europe and Japan than in the U.S. so far this year. Net profit margins are also lower in Europe and Japan, which gives these two regions more room for catch-up. Moreover, unlike the Fed, neither the ECB nor the BoJ are likely to raise rates anytime soon. As we discuss in greater detail in the currency section of this report, this should lead to a weaker euro and yen, giving European and Japanese exporters a further leg up in competitiveness. Lastly, valuations are more favorable in the euro area and Japan than in the U.S., even if one adjusts for differing sector weights across the three regions (Chart 27). Chart 26...There Are Signs Of Complacency ...There Are Signs Of Complacency ...There Are Signs Of Complacency Chart 27U.S. Valuations Seem Stretched Relative ##br##To Other Bourses Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull Mixed Outlook For EM Earnings growth in emerging markets has accelerated sharply. Bottom-up estimates imply EPS growth of 20% in 2017 and 11% in 2018 for the EM MSCI index. Our EM strategists believe this is too optimistic, given the prospect of a stronger dollar, high debt levels across the EM space, poor corporate governance, and the lack of productivity-enhancing structural reforms. These problems warrant a slight underweight to emerging markets in global equity portfolios. Nevertheless, considering the solid backdrop for global growth, EM stocks should still be able to deliver positive real total returns over the next 12 months. Within the EM space, we favor Russia, central Europe, Korea, Taiwan, India, Thailand, and China. Chinese H-shares, in particular, remain quite attractive, trading at only 7.1-times forward earnings and 1.0-times book value. Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives ... For Now Looking at global equity sectors, upward revisions have been largest for industrials, materials, financials, and real estate. Revisions for energy, health care, and telecom have been negative. We expect cyclical stocks to outperform defensives over the next 12 months. Energy stocks will move from being laggards to leaders, as oil prices rebound. Financials should also do well, as steeper yield curves, increased M&A activity, and falling nonperforming loans bolster profits. Equity Bear Market Will Begin Late Next Year As growth begins to falter in the second half of 2018, stocks will swoon. U.S. equities are likely to fall 20% to 30% peak to trough, marking the first sustained bear market since 2008. Other stock markets will experience similar declines. Global equities will eventually recoup most of their losses at the start of the 2020s, but the recovery will be a lackluster one. As we have argued extensively in the past, global productivity growth is likely to remain weak.3 Population aging will deplete savings, leading to higher real interest rates. The next recession could also propel more populist leaders into power. None of these things would be good for stocks. Against today's backdrop of lofty valuations, global stocks will deliver a total real return in the low single-digit range over the next decade. Fixed Income Bonds Have Overreacted To The Inflation Dip We turned structurally bearish on government bonds on July 5th, 2016. As fate would have it, this was the very same day that the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield dropped to a record closing low of 1.37%. The dramatic bond selloff that followed was too much, too fast. We warned at the start of this year that bond yields were likely to climb down from their highs. At this point, however, the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of lower yields. Chart 28 shows that almost all of the decline in bond yields has been due to falling inflation expectations. Real yields have remained resilient, suggesting that investors' views of global growth have not changed much. This helps explain why stocks have been able to rally to new highs. The fall in inflation expectations has been largely driven by the decline in commodity prices. Short-term swings in oil prices should not affect long-term inflation expectations, but in practice they do (Chart 29). If oil prices recover in the second half of this year, as we expect, inflation expectations should shift higher as well. This will translate into higher bond yields. Chart 28Inflation Expectations Declined This Year, ##br##But Real Yields Remained Resilient Inflation Expectations Declined This Year, But Real Yields Remained Resilient Inflation Expectations Declined This Year, But Real Yields Remained Resilient Chart 29Low Oil Prices Drag Down##br## Inflation Expectations Low Oil Prices Drag Down Inflation Expectations Low Oil Prices Drag Down Inflation Expectations U.S. Treasurys Are Most Vulnerable Tightening labor markets should also boost inflation expectations. This is particularly the case in the U.S., where the economy is quickly running out of surplus labor. Some commentators have argued that the headline unemployment rate understates the true amount of economic slack. We are skeptical that this is the case. Table 2 compares a wide variety of measures of labor market slack with where they stood at the height of the business cycle in 2000 and 2007. The main message from the table is that the unemployment rate today is broadly where one would expect it to be based on these collaborating indicators. Table 2Comparing Current Labor Market Slack With Past Cycles 12-MONTH Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull If the U.S. has reached full employment, does the absence of wage pressures signal that the Phillips curve is dead? We don't think so. For one thing, wage growth is not that weak. Our wage growth tracker has risen from a low of 1.2% in 2010 to 2.4% at present (Chart 30). In fact, real wages have been rising more quickly than productivity for the past three years (Chart 31). Unit labor cost growth is now just shy of where it was at the peaks of the last two business cycles (Chart 32). Chart 30Stronger Labor Market ##br##Is Leading To Faster Wage Growth Stronger Labor Market Is Leading To Faster Wage Growth Stronger Labor Market Is Leading To Faster Wage Growth Chart 31Real Wages Now Increasing Faster##br## Than Productivity Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Chart 32Unit Labor Cost Growth Close ##br##To Previous Two Peaks Unit Labor Cost Growth Close To Previous Two Peaks Unit Labor Cost Growth Close To Previous Two Peaks The evidence generally suggests that the Phillips curve becomes "kinked" when the unemployment rate falls towards 4%. In plain English, this means that a drop in the unemployment rate from 10% to 8% tends to have little effect on inflation, while a drop from 4.5% to 3.5% does. The experience of the 1960s is illustrative in that regard. Chart 33 shows that much like today, inflation in the first half of that decade was well anchored at just below 2%. However, once the unemployment rate fell below 4%, inflation took off. Core inflation rose from 1.5% in early 1966 to nearly 4% in early 1967, ultimately making its way to 6% by 1970. The Fed is keen to avoid a repeat of that episode. In a recent speech, New York Fed President and FOMC vice chairman Bill Dudley warned that "If we were not to withdraw accommodation, the risk would be that the economy would crash to a very, very low unemployment rate, and generate inflation ... Then the risk would be that we would have to slam on the brakes and the next stop would be a recession." If U.S. growth remains firm and inflation rebounds in the second half of this year, as we expect, the Fed will get the green light to keep raising rates in line with the "dots." The market is not prepared for that, as evidenced by the fact that it is pricing in only 27 basis points in rate hikes over the next 12 months. We are positioned for higher rate expectations by being short the January 2018 fed funds contract. The ECB And The BoJ Will Not Follow The Fed's Lead Could better growth prospects cause the ECB and the BoJ to follow in the Fed's footsteps and take away the punch bowl? We doubt it. Investors are reading too much into Mario Draghi's allegedly more "hawkish" tone. There is a huge difference between removing emergency measures and beginning a full-fledged tightening cycle. Labor market slack is still considerably higher in the euro area than was the case in 2008. Outside of Germany, the level of unemployment and underemployment in the euro area is about seven points higher than it was before the Great Recession (Chart 34). Chart 33Inflation In The 1960s Took Off ##br##Once The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% Inflation In The 1960s Took Off Once The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% Inflation In The 1960s Took Off Once The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% Chart 34Euro Area: Labor Market Slack##br## Is Still High Outside Of Germany Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Is Still High Outside Of Germany Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Is Still High Outside Of Germany At this point, the market is pricing in too much tightening from the ECB. Our months-to-hike measure has plummeted from a high of 65 months in July 2016 to 25 months at present (Chart 35). Investors now expect real yields in the U.S. to be only 16 basis points higher than in the euro area in five years' time.4 This is below the 76 basis-point gap in the equilibrium rate between the two regions that Holston, Laubach, and Williams estimate (Chart 36). Chart 35ECB: Markets Are Pricing In Too Much Tighteninh ECB: Markets Are Pricing In Too Much Tighteninh ECB: Markets Are Pricing In Too Much Tighteninh Chart 36The Neutral Rate Is Lowest In The Euro Area The Neutral Rate Is Lowest In The Euro Area The Neutral Rate Is Lowest In The Euro Area As for Japan, while the unemployment rate has fallen to a 22-year low of 2.8%, this understates the true amount of slack in the economy. Output-per-hour in Japan remains 35% below U.S. levels. A key reason for this is that many Japanese companies continue to pad their payrolls with excess labor. This is particularly true in the service sector, which remains largely insulated from foreign competition. In any case, with both actual inflation and inflation expectations in Japan nowhere close to the BoJ's target, this is hardly the time to be worried about an overheated economy. And even if the Japanese authorities were inclined to slow growth, it would be fiscal policy rather than monetary policy that they would tighten first. After all, they have been keen to raise the sales tax for several years now. The Bank Of England's Dilemma Gilts are a tougher call. The equilibrium rate is higher in the U.K. than in most other developed economies. Inflation has risen, although that has largely been a function of a weaker currency. Fiscal policy is turning more accommodative, which, all things equal, would warrant a more bearish view on gilts. The big wildcard is Brexit. Chart 37 shows that the U.K. is the only major country where growth has faltered this year. Worries over Britain's future relationship with the EU have likely contributed to the slowdown. Ongoing Brexit angst will keep the Bank of England on hold, justifying a neutral weighting on gilts. Stay Short Duration ... For Now In summary, investors should keep global duration risk below benchmark levels over the next 12 months. Regionally, we recommend underweighting U.S. Treasurys, overweighting Japan, and maintaining a neutral position towards euro area and U.K. government bonds. Reflecting these recommendations, we are closing our short Japanese, German and Swiss 10-year bond trade for a gain of 5.3% and replacing it with a short 30-year U.S. Treasury bond position. As global growth begins to slow in the second half of next year, global bonds will rally. However, as we discussed at length in our Q2 Strategy Outlook, the rally will simply represent a countertrend move in what will turn out to be a structural bear market.5 The 2020s, in short, could end up looking a lot like the 1970s. Spread Product: Still A Bit Of Juice Left While we prefer equities to high-yield credit on a risk-adjusted basis over the coming months, we would still overweight spread product within a global asset allocation framework. The option-adjusted spread of the U.S. high-yield index offers 200 basis points above the Treasury curve after adjusting for expected defaults, roughly in line with the mid-point of the historical data (Chart 38). Corporate defaults are likely to trend lower over the next 12 months, spurred by stronger growth and a rebound in oil prices. Chart 37U.K. Is Lagging Its Peers U.K. Is Lagging Its Peers U.K. Is Lagging Its Peers Chart 38Default-Adjusted Junk Spreads Are At Historical Average Default-Adjusted Junk Spreads Are At Historical Average Default-Adjusted Junk Spreads Are At Historical Average As with all our other views, the picture is likely to change sharply in the second half of next year. At that point, corporate spreads will widen, warranting a much more defensive stance. Currencies And Commodities The Dollar Bull: Down But Not Out Our long-standing dollar bullish view has come under fire over the past few months. The Fed's broad trade-weighted dollar index has fallen 4.6% since December. Momentum in currency markets can be a powerful force, and so we would not be surprised if the dollar remains under pressure over the coming weeks. However, over a 12-month horizon, the greenback will strengthen, as the Fed raises rates more quickly than expected while most other central banks stand pat. When all is said and done, the broad-trade weighted dollar is likely to peak next summer at a level roughly 10% higher than where it is today. That would still leave it substantially below prior peaks in 1985 and 2000 (Chart 39). The U.S. trade deficit has fallen from a peak of nearly 6% of GDP in 2005 to 3% of GDP at present (Chart 40). Rising shale production has reduced the demand for oil imports. A smaller trade deficit diminishes the need to attract foreign capital with a cheaper currency. Chart 39The Dollar Is Below Past Peaks The Dollar Is Below Past Peaks The Dollar Is Below Past Peaks Chart 40The U.S. Trade Deficit Has Halved Since 2005 The U.S. Trade Deficit Has Halved Since 2005 The U.S. Trade Deficit Has Halved Since 2005 Sentiment and speculative positioning towards the dollar have swung from extremely bullish at the start of the year to being more neutral today (Chart 41). In contrast, long euro speculative positions and bullish sentiment have reached the highest levels in three years. Our tactical short euro/long dollar trade was stopped out this week for a loss of 1.6%. However, we continue to expect EUR/USD to fall back towards parity by the end of the year. We also expect the pound to weaken against the dollar, but appreciate slightly against the euro. Now that the Bank of Japan is keeping the 10-year JGB yield pinned to zero, the outlook for the yen will be largely determined by what happens to yields abroad. If we are correct that Treasury yields - and to a lesser extent yields in Europe - rise, the yen will suffer. Commodity Currencies Should Fare Well Higher commodity prices should benefit currencies such as the Canadian and Aussie dollars and the Norwegian krone. Our energy strategists remain convinced that crude prices are heading higher. They expect global production to increase by only 0.7 MMB/d in 2017, compared to 1.5 MMB/d growth in consumption. While shale output continues to rise, this is largely being offset by falling production from conventional oil fields. Consequently, oil inventories should fall in the remainder of this year. If history is any guide, this will lead to a rebound in oil prices (Chart 42). Chart 41USD: Sentiment And Positioning ##br##Are Not Lopsided Anymore USD: Sentiment And Positioning Are Not Lopsided Anymore USD: Sentiment And Positioning Are Not Lopsided Anymore Chart 42Falling Oil Inventories Should Lead ##br##To Higher Crude Prices Falling Oil Inventories Should Lead To Higher Crude Prices Falling Oil Inventories Should Lead To Higher Crude Prices The outlook for industrial metals is not as upbeat as for oil, but metal prices should nevertheless rebound over the coming months. We suspect that much of the recent weakness in metal prices can be attributed to the regulatory crackdown on shadow banking activity in China. Many Chinese traders had used commodities as collateral for loans. As their loans were called in, they had no choice but to liquidate their positions. Today, speculative positioning in the commodity pits has returned to more normal levels (Chart 43). This reduces the risk of a further downdraft in commodity prices. BCA's China strategists expect the Chinese authorities to relax some of their tightening measures. This is already being seen in a decline in interbank lending rates and corporate bond yields (Chart 44). Chart 43Commodities: Long Speculative Positions Returning ##br##To More Normal Levels Commodities: Long Speculative Positions Returning To More Normal Levels Commodities: Long Speculative Positions Returning To More Normal Levels Chart 44China: Some Relief##br## After Recent Tightening Action? China: Some Relief After Recent Tightening Action? China: Some Relief After Recent Tightening Action? One key reason why the authorities have been able to let interest rates come down is because capital outflows have abated. Compared to late 2015, economic growth is stronger and deflationary pressures have receded. The trade-weighted RMB has also fallen by 7.5% since then, giving the economy a competitive boost. As such, the seeming can't-lose bet on further yuan weakness has disappeared. We still expect the RMB to depreciate against the dollar over the next 12 months, but to strengthen against most other currencies, including the euro and the yen. If the yuan remains resilient, this will limit the downside risk for other EM currencies. Nevertheless, at this point, much of the good news benefiting EM currencies has been priced in. Across the EM universe, in addition to the Chinese yuan, we like the Mexican peso, Taiwan dollar, Indian rupee, Russian ruble, Polish zloty, and Czech koruna. Lastly, a few words on the most timeless of all currencies: gold. We expect bullion to struggle over the next 12 months on the back of a stronger dollar and rising bond yields. However, once the Fed starts cutting rates in 2019 and stagflationary forces begin to gather steam in the early 2020s, gold will finally have its day in the sun. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 For example, please see Box 4.1: Financial Linkages and Spillovers in "Spillovers and Cycles in the Global Economy," IMF World Economic Outlook, (April 2007). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model," dated May 5, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds?" dated May 31, 2017; Global Investment Strategy - Strategy Outlook, "First Quarter 2017 From Reflation To Stagflation, (Section: Supply Matters), First Quarter 2017 From Reflation To Stagflation, (Section: Supply Matters)," dated January 6, 2017; and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 U.S. minus euro area 5-year/5-year forward real bond yields. Real bonds yields are calculated as a difference between nominal yields and the CPI swap rate. Euro area yields refer to a GDP-weighted average of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Italy, and Spain. 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook: Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights A whiff of global deflation shook-up financial markets in June, driven by melting oil prices and a startling May U.S. CPI report. Nonetheless, we have not changed our recommended asset allocation. Bond markets have over-discounted the impact of the commodity price weakness, especially with regard to Fed policy and long-term inflation expectations in the major countries. We do not see the selling pressure in the commodity pits as a harbinger of slower global growth. Above-trend growth in the U.S. is likely in the second half of the year, along with continuing robust activity at the global level. Oil prices should rebound, based on our view that consumption will outstrip production in the second half of the year; the surprise will be how strong oil prices are in the coming months. The FOMC appears more determined than in the past to stick with the current policy normalization timetable. Unemployment will edge further below the full-employment level if the FOMC does not slow the pace of job creation. We believe that the labor market is tight enough to gradually push up inflation. Together with a rebound in the commodity pits, this means that the recent bond rally will reverse. Soft U.S. CPI readings are a challenge to our view. The Fed will delay the next rate hike into next year if core inflation does not move up in the next few months. The equity market is vulnerable to unforeseen shocks given stretched valuation. Nonetheless, none of the main indicators that have provided leading information in the past are warning of an equity bear market. The profit backdrop remains constructive. Our base case is that stocks beat bonds and cash for the remainder of 2017. We expect to trim exposure to equities next year, but the evolution of a number of indicators will influence the timing. The same is true for corporate bonds. The dollar's bull phase has one more upleg left. Japanese, European and U.K. equities will outperform the U.S. in local currency terms. Feature A whiff of global deflation shook-up financial markets in June, driven by melting oil prices and a startling May U.S. CPI report. Investors quickly concluded that the Fed will have to proceed even more slowly in terms of its policy normalization plan which, in turn, sent the dollar and global bond yields sharply lower. Equity indexes held up because of the dollar and bond yield "relief valves". Stocks are also benefiting from the continuing rebound in corporate earnings growth in the major economies. Nonetheless, the commodity pullback and soft U.S. inflation data are a challenge to our reflation theme, which includes a final upleg in the U.S. dollar and a negative view on bond prices. We believe that markets have over-discounted the impact of the commodity price weakness, especially with regard to Fed policy and long-term inflation expectations in the major countries. Above-trend growth in the U.S. is likely in the second half of the year, along with continuing robust activity at the global level. We also think that the FOMC is more determined than in the past to stick with the current policy normalization timetable. The bottom line is that we are not changing our recommended asset allocation based on June's market action. We remain overweight stocks and corporate bonds relative to government bonds and cash. We are also short duration and long the dollar. A key risk to our asset allocation relates to our contrarily bullish view on oil prices. Oil Drove The Bond Rally... The decline in long-term bond yields since March reflected in large part a drop in inflation expectations (Chart I-1). BCA's fixed-income strategists point out that the slump in long-term inflation expectations has been widespread across the major countries, irrespective of whether actual inflation is trending up or down.1 Core inflation has moved lower in the U.S., Japan, Canada and (slightly) in the Eurozone, but has increased in Australia and the U.K. In terms of diffusion indexes, which often lead core inflation, they are falling in the U.S., Japan and Canada, but are rising in the U.K., the Eurozone and Australia (Chart I-2). Chart I-1 Inflation Expectations Drive Bond Rally Inflation Expectations Drive Bond Rally Inflation Expectations Drive Bond Rally Chart I-2Diverging Inflation Trends Diverging Inflation Trends Diverging Inflation Trends Given all these diverging signals within the national inflation data, it is odd that there has been such a uniform decline in inflation expectations across the major bond markets. That leads us to look to the commodity price decline as the main driver of the downshift in expectations. Short-term moves in oil prices should not affect long-term inflation expectations, but in practice the correlation has been strong since the plunge in oil prices beginning in 2014. Weaker oil and other commodity prices have also fed investor concerns that global growth is waning. We see little evidence of any slowdown in global growth, although some leading indicators have softened. Key monthly data such as industrial production, retail sales and capital goods orders reveal an acceleration in growth for the advanced economies as a group (Chart I-3). There has also been a general upgrading of the consensus growth forecast for the major countries and for the world in both 2017 and 2018 (Chart I-4). This is unlike previous years, when growth forecasts started the year high, only to be slashed as the year progressed. Chart I-3No Slowdown In Advanced Economies No Slowdown In Advanced Economies No Slowdown In Advanced Economies Chart I-4Growth Expectations Revised Up Growth Expectations Revised Up Growth Expectations Revised Up ...But Watch Out For A Reversal The implication is that we do not see the selling pressure in the commodity pits as a harbinger of slower global growth. Nonetheless, the mini oil meltdown in June went against our medium-term bullish view. In a recent report,2 our Energy Sector Strategy team noted that investors are confused about conflicting supply signals in oil markets. Traders do not yet see the physical shortage that the IEA/EIA/OPEC and BCA's top-down supply & demand analyses argue will prevail in the coming months. Chart I-5Falling Inventories To Drive Oil Rebound Falling Inventories To Drive Oil Rebound Falling Inventories To Drive Oil Rebound The investment community is being overly pessimistic in our view. The coalition led by the Saudi Arabia and Russia will have removed 1.4 MMB/d of production on average from the market between January 2017 and end-March 2018, versus peak production in November of last year. This will be diluted somewhat by the Libyan and U.S. production gains, but the increased production will not be sufficient to counter the OPEC/Russia cuts entirely. We expect global production to increase by only 0.7 MMB/d in 2017, an estimate that includes rapid increases in U.S. shale output. Meanwhile, we expect consumption to grow by 1.5 MMB/d, implying that oil inventories will fall over the remainder of this year. If history is any guide, this will lead to a rebound in oil prices (Chart I-5). It will be quite a shock to markets if crude reaches $60/bbl by December as we expect. As for base metals, it appears that the correction is largely related to reduced speculative demand rather than weak global and/or Chinese demand. It is true that the Chinese economy has slipped a notch according to some measures, such as housing starts and M2 growth. Nonetheless, the government remains cognizant of the risks of tightening policy too aggressively, especially with the National Party Congress slated for this autumn. The PBoC injected 250 billion yuan into the financial system in June and fiscal policy has been eased. Real-time measures of industrial activity such as railway freight traffic, excavator sales, and electricity production remain upbeat. Retail sales continue to expand at a healthy clip. Export growth is accelerating thanks to a weaker currency and stronger global activity. Given that many investors remain concerned about a hard landing in China, the bar for positive surprises is comfortably low. If China can clear this bar, as we expect it will, it will be good news for the commodity currencies and other commodity plays. A rebound in base metal and, especially, oil prices would boost global inflation expectations and bond yields, especially since inflation expectations have fallen too far relative to underlying non-energy inflation pressures. This forecast also applies to the U.S. bond market, although there was more to the soft May CPI report than oil prices. Is The Fed's Inflation Target Credible? Investors are questioning whether the Fed has the ability to reach its inflation goals. Is it possible that the U.S. is following Japan's roadmap where even an over-heated labor market is insufficient to generate any meaningful inflation? We argued above that the moderation in inflation expectations in the major markets was mostly related to the decline in commodity prices. However, in the U.S., it also reflected a fairly widespread pullback in CPI inflation this year. This is contrary to Fed Chair Yellen's assertion that most of it reflects special factors such as wireless telecommunications prices. The deceleration in inflation began around the start of the year. The three-month rate of change of the headline index fell by more than five percentage points between January and May, of which energy accounts for 3.3 percentage points. The deceleration in the core rate was a less severe, but still substantial at 2.8 percentage points. Table I-1 presents the components of the CPI that made the largest contribution to the deceleration in core inflation. Motor vehicles, owners' equivalent rent, apparel, recreation, wireless telecom and medical care services accounted for 1.2 percentage points as a group. However, many other sectors contributed in a small way to the overall deceleration of core inflation in the first five months of the year. Table I-1Key Drivers Of U.S. Core Inflation Deceleration In 2017 July 2017 July 2017 Some special factors were at play. The moderation in rent inflation likely reflects the bottoming of the vacancy rate. Discounting in the auto sector is not a surprise given weak sales. Wireless prices can be viewed as a special case as well. Nonetheless, the breadth and suddenness of the deceleration in core inflation across such diverse sectors, some unrelated to labor markets, commodity prices, the dollar or on-line shopping, is worrying. The disinflation this year in the Fed's preferred measure, the PCE price index, is not as extended but the data are published almost a month behind the CPI data. A diffusion index made up of the components of the PCE index is still in positive territory, unlike the CPI's diffusion index (Chart I-6). Nonetheless, the CPI data suggest that core PCE inflation will edge lower when the May data are released at the end of June. There has also been a moderation in some of the wage inflation data, such as average hourly earnings (Chart I-7). The slowdown has been fairly widespread across manufacturing and services. However, the soft patch already appears to be over; 3-month rates of change have firmed almost across the board (retail is a major exception). There is no slowdown evident at all in the better-constructed Employment Cost Index (ECI) as of the first quarter (Chart I-8). The ECI is adjusted to avoid compositional effects that can distort the aggregate index. The related diffusion indexes also remain constructive. Chart I-6PCE Inflation Rate To Follow CPI Lower PCE Inflation Rate To Follow CPI Lower PCE Inflation Rate To Follow CPI Lower Chart I-7AHE SoftPatch Appears Over... AHE SoftPatch Appears Over... AHE SoftPatch Appears Over... Chart I-8...And The ECI Marches Higher ...And The ECI Marches Higher ...And The ECI Marches Higher We conclude from these and other wage measures that the Phillips curve is still operating in the U.S. Admittedly, the curve appears to be quite flat, which means it is difficult to generate inflation even with a tight labor market. Nonetheless, the relationship between the ECI and various measures of labor market tightness shown in Chart I-8 does not appear to have broken down. The percentage of U.S. states with unemployment below the Fed's estimate of full employment jumped to 70% in May. Anything over 60% in the past has been associated with wage pressure (Chart I-9). The bottom line is that, while we are concerned about the breadth of the soft patch in the consumer price data, we are in agreement with the Fed hawks that the labor market is tight enough to gradually push up inflation. We are willing at this point to chalk up the recent drop in core inflation partly to randomness in the data, and partly to lagged effects of the slowdown in real GDP growth in the first half of 2016 (Chart I-10). Admittedly, however, the U.S. inflation reports in the coming months are a key risk to our reflation-related asset allocation. Chart I-9More Than 70% Of U.S. States Have Excess Labor Demand More Than 70% Of U.S. States Have Excess Labor Demand More Than 70% Of U.S. States Have Excess Labor Demand Chart I-10Financial Conditions Point To Faster Growth And Inflation Financial Conditions Point To Faster Growth And Inflation Financial Conditions Point To Faster Growth And Inflation What Will The Fed Do? The CPI data have certainly rattled some members of the FOMC. Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Kaplan and Kashkari, for example, believe that the Fed needs to be patient to ensure that the inflation pullback is temporary. However, the June FOMC Statement and Yellen's press conference suggested that the consensus is determined to stick with the current tightening timetable in terms of rate hikes and balance sheet adjustment. She stressed that the FOMC makes policy for the "medium term," and should not over-react to short-term wiggles in the data. Vice President Dudley echoed this view in recent comments he made to the press. The Fed has been quick to back away from planned rate hikes at the first hint of trouble in recent years. However, it appears that the reaction function has changed, now that the labor market is at full employment. This is especially the case because financial conditions have eased further, despite the June rate hike. Unemployment will edge further below the full-employment level if the FOMC does not slow the pace of job creation. Policymakers know that the Fed has had little success in the past when it tried to nudge unemployment higher in order to relieve budding inflation pressure; these attempts almost always ended in recession. Dudley added that "...pausing policy now could raise the risk of inflation surging and hurting the economy." Other FOMC members are worried that financial stability risk will build if the low-rate environment extends much further. The bottom line is that we expect the Fed to stick with the game-plan for now. The FOMC will begin shrinking the balance sheet in September, but will wait until December for the next rate hike. That said, a stubbornly low inflation rate in the coming months would likely see the FOMC postpone the next rate increase into next year. Where Next For Bonds? We see three possible scenarios for the bond market: Reflation Returns: Weak recent inflation readings are nothing more than a lagged response to last year's deceleration in economic growth. U.S. growth accelerates in the second half, unemployment falls further and both wage growth and inflation pick up. Oil inventories begin to contract and prices head higher. The FOMC is vindicated in its inflation view and proceeds with the current rate hike and balance sheet adjustment agenda. Investors receive a "wake up call" from the Fed, bond prices get hit and recent curve-flattening trend reverses. Fed Capitulates: The U.S. labor market continues to tighten, but core PCE inflation is still close to 1½% by the September FOMC meeting. We would expect the Fed to lower its forecasted rate hike path, signaling that no further rate hikes are likely in 2017. Long-maturity real yields would fall in this scenario, although long-term inflation expectations could rise to the extent that the Fed's more dovish tilt will weaken the dollar and generate more inflation in the medium term. Nominal yields may not end up moving much in this scenario. A Policy Mistake: If core inflation remains low between now and the September FOMC meeting and the Fed continues to write-off low inflation as transitory, signaling its intention to stick to its current projected rate hike path, then the market would begin to discount a "policy mistake" scenario. The yield curve would flatten and long-maturity nominal yields would fall, led by tighter TIPS breakevens. In terms of probabilities, we would characterize Scenario 1 as our base case, Scenario 2 as unlikely and Scenario 3 as a tail risk. We remain short-duration in anticipation of a rebound in long-term inflation expectations and higher yields. A bond selloff, however, should not present a major headwind for stocks as long as the earnings backdrop remains constructive. Will The Real Profit Margin Please Stand Up For some time we have been highlighting the importance of the mini-cycle in U.S. earnings growth; the corporate sector is in a catch-up phase following last year's profit recession, a trend that extends beyond the energy patch. EPS growth has surged this year on the back of somewhat stronger sales and rising S&P 500 margins. The National Accounts (NIPA) data, however, paint a different picture. Earnings growth for the entire corporate sector fell sharply in the first quarter and margins continued to slide. If the NIPA data are telling the true story, then the equity market is in big trouble because it suggests that the earnings outlook is much weaker than what is discounted in stock prices. There are many definitional differences that make it difficult to reconcile the NIPA and S&P data.3 Nonetheless, we can make some general observations. Chart I-11 presents the 4-quarter growth rate of NIPA profits4 and a proxy for aggregate S&P earnings. For the latter, we multiplied earnings-per-share by the divisor to obtain an estimate of the level of aggregate earnings in dollar terms (i.e. not on a per-share basis). The bottom panel of Chart I-11 compares the level of profits, each indexed to be 100 in 2011 Q1. The charts highlight that, while there have been marked differences in annual growth rates between the two measures in some years, the levels ended up being close to the same point in the first quarter of 2017. The dip in NIPA profit growth in the first quarter was not reflected in the S&P measure. It appears that this is partly due to different profiles for profit growth in the energy and financials sectors. That said, broadly speaking, it does not appear that the difference in margins is due to a significant divergence in aggregate profits. It turns out that most of the margin divergence is related to the denominator of the calculation (Chart I-12). The NIPA denominator is corporate sector Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is a value-added concept that is quite different from sales. It is not clear why, but GDP has grown much faster than sales since the end of 2014. It appears to us that the S&P data are telling the correct story at the moment. After all, sales are straight forward to measure, while value added is complicated to construct. The fact that sales are growing slowly is not a bullish point for stocks. Nonetheless, it does not appear that financial engineering has distorted bottom-up company data to such an extent that the S&P data are signaling strong profit growth when the reality is the opposite. We expect the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning early in 2018. Nonetheless, the profit backdrop remains positive for stocks for now. The same is true in the Eurozone and Japan, where margins are also rising. It is worrying that a large part of this year's U.S. equity market advance has been concentrated in a small number of stocks, but that belies the breadth of the profit recovery (Chart I-13). The proportion of S&P industry groups with rising earnings estimates is above 75%. Such widespread participation is consistent with ongoing upward revisions to 12-month forward earnings estimates. Chart I-11S&P And NIPA Profit Comparison S&P And NIPA Profit Comparison S&P And NIPA Profit Comparison Chart I-12Denominator Explains S&P/NIPA Margin Divergence Denominator Explains S&P/NIPA Margin Divergence Denominator Explains S&P/NIPA Margin Divergence Chart I-13Positive Earnings Revisions Are Broadly Based Positive Earnings Revisions Are Broadly Based Positive Earnings Revisions Are Broadly Based The solid earnings backdrop is the main reason we remain overweight stocks versus bonds and cash. Of course, given poor valuation, we must be extra vigilant in watching for warning signs of a bear market. Valuation has never been good leading indicator for bear markets, but it does provide information on the risks. Monitoring The Bear Market Barometer BCA's Chief Economist, Martin Barnes, highlighted the best "equity bear market" indicators to watch in a 2014 Special Report.5 He noted that no two bear markets are the same, and that there are no indicators that have reliably heralded bear phases. Nonetheless, there are some common elements. The safest time to invest in the market is when monetary conditions are favorable, there are no signs of a looming economic downturn, there is not extreme overvaluation, and technical indicators are not flashing red. Some indicators related to each of these fundamental factors are shown in Chart I-14: Chart I-14Equity Bear Market Indicators Equity Bear Market Indicators Equity Bear Market Indicators Monetary Conditions: The yield curve is quite flat by historical standards, but it is far from inverting. Moreover, real short-term interest rates are normally substantially higher than today, and above 2%, when bear markets commence. Excess liquidity, which we define as M2 growth less nominal GDP growth, is also still well above the zero line, a threshold that has warned of a downturn in stock prices in the past. Valuation: Our composite valuation indicator is still shy of the +1 standard deviation level that defines over-valued. However, this is because of the components that compare equity prices to bond yields. The other three components of the equity indicator, which are unrelated to bond yields, suggest that stock valuation is quite stretched. Economic Outlook: Economic data such as the leading economic indicator and ISM have been unreliable bear market signals. That said, we do not see anything that suggests that a recession is on the horizon. Indeed, U.S. growth is likely to remain above-trend in the second half of the year based on its relationship with financial conditions. Technical conditions: Sentiment is elevated, which is bearish from a contrary perspective. However, breadth, the deviation from the 40-week moving average, and our composite technical indicator are not flashing red. Earnings: Trends in earnings and margins did not provide any additional reliable signals for timing equity market downturns in the past. Still, it has been a bad sign when EPS growth topped out. And this has often been preceded by a peak in industrial production growth. We expect U.S. EPS growth to continue to accelerate for at least a few more months, but are watching industrial production closely. EPS growth in Japan and the Eurozone will likely peak after the U.S., since these markets are not as advanced in the profit rebound. The bottom line is that the equity market is vulnerable to unforeseen shocks given stretched valuation. Nonetheless, none of the main indicators that have provided some leading information in the past are warning of an equity bear market. Investment Conclusions The major world bourses remain in a sweet spot because of the mini cyclical rebound in profits. One can imagine many scenarios in which equities suffer a major correction or bear phase. However, stocks would likely perform well under the two most likely scenarios for the remainder of the year. If U.S. and global growth disappoint, the combination of low bond yields and still-robust earnings growth will continue to support prices. Conversely, if world growth remains solid and the U.S. picks up, as we expect, then bond yields will rise but investors will pencil-in an even stronger profit advance over the next year. Of course, this win-win situation for stocks will not last forever. Perhaps paradoxically, the economic cycle could be shortened if the U.S. Congress gets around to passing a bill that imparts fiscal stimulus in 2018. The Fed would have to respond with a more aggressive tightening timetable, setting the stage for the next recession. In contrast, the economic cycle would be further stretched out in the absence of fiscal stimulus, keeping alive for a while longer the lackluster growth/low inflation/low bond yield backdrop that has been favorable for the equity market. We are watching the indicators discussed above to time the exit from our pro-risk asset allocation that favors stocks and corporate bonds to government bonds and cash. As for the duration call, the whiff of deflation that has depressed bond yields over the past month is overdone. Investors have also become too complacent on the Fed. We expect that the recent drop in commodity prices, especially oil, will reverse. If this view is correct, it means that the cyclical bull phase in the dollar is not over because market expectations for the pace of Fed rate hikes will rise relative to expectations in the other major economies (with the exception of Canada). We are still looking for a 10% dollar appreciation. It also means that Treasurys will underperform JGBs and Bunds within currency-hedged fixed-income portfolios. We expect the Eurostoxx 600 and the Nikkei indexes to outperform the S&P 500 this year in local currencies, despite our constructive view on U.S. growth. Stocks are cheaper in the former two markets. Moreover, both Japan and the Eurozone are earlier in the profit mini-cycle, which means that there is room for catch-up versus the U.S. over the next 6-12 months when growth in the latter tops-out. The prospect of structural reform in France is also constructive for European stocks, following the election of a reformist legislature in June. However, the upcoming Italian election warrants close scrutiny. The key risk to this base case is our view that oil prices will rebound. This is clearly a non-consensus call. If OPEC production cuts are unable to overwhelm the rise in U.S. shale output, then inventories will remain elevated and oil prices could move even lower in the near term. Our bullish equity view would be fine in this case, but the bond bear market and dollar appreciation we expect would at least be delayed. Finally, a few words on the U.K. Our geopolitical experts highlight two key points related to June's election outcome: fiscal austerity is dead and the U.K. will pursue a "softer" variety of Brexit. This combination should provide a relatively benign backdrop for U.K. stocks and the economy over the next year. Nonetheless, the cloud of uncertainty hanging over the U.K. is large enough to keep the Bank of England (BoE) on hold. Some BoE hawks are agitating for tighter policy due to the worsening inflation overshoot, but it will probably be some time before the consensus on the Monetary Policy Committee shifts in favor of rate hikes. This means that it is too early to position for gilt underperformance within fixed-income portfolios. Sterling weakness looks overdone, although we do not see much upside either. As long as Brexit talks do not become acrimonious (which is our view), the U.K. stock market should be one of the outperformers in local currency terms among the major developed markets. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst June 29, 2017 Next Report: July 27, 2017 1 For more discussion, see Alternative Facts in the Bond Market at BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, dated June 13, 2017 available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Views from the Road," dated June 21, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com 3 The first problem is that the S&P data are expressed on a per-share basis. Moreover, the NIPA data adjusts for inventory and depreciation allowance. S&P margins are calculated using sales in the denominator, while we generally use GDP as the denominator for calculating NIPA profits. 4 The NIPA data shown include financials and profits earned overseas, as is the case for the S&P. 5 Please see BCA Special Report "Timing The Next Equity Bear Market," dated January 24, 2014, available at bcaresearch.com II. Preferences As Trading Constraints: A New Asset Allocation Indicator Our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) is the latest installment in our ongoing research into trading rules that can augment our top-down macro approach to asset allocation. The RPI borrows from Paul Samuelson's "revealed preference" theory of consumer behavior to market behavior. It combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and the monetary policy backdrop. A trading rule for the stock/bond allocation based on the RPI outperforms traditional technical, monetary, and valuation indicators. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive equity market momentum lines up with positive signals from policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. This model adds value on its own, but we feel that it is best used in conjunction with other indicators designed to improve performance around major market turning points. Future research will experiment with combining the RPI with other indicators to further enhance performance. In the meantime, we will present the RPI's signals each month in Section III of the monthly publication. As with all indicators and models, however, the RPI is only one input to our decision process. We base our asset allocation decision on a combination of indicators, macro themes, detailed data analysis and judgment. In 1938, economist Paul Samuelson published a paper entitled, "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior," in which he outlined an alternative to the well-known economic principle, utility theory. He dubbed his work "revealed preference theory."1 His goal was to redefine utility - a measure of consumer satisfaction with a good or service - by observing behavior. He posited that when consumers reveal their preferences by buying one item rather than another, they reveal the way in which they maximize happiness or satisfaction. For instance, one can measure preferences via experiments in which a subject is given $200 and the choice between two brands of shoes at different prices. Repeating the exercise at different levels of income and relative prices generates "preference axioms." Samuelson's theory has many more layers of complexity, but this Special Report focuses on modelling investors' preferences through observed behavior. Borrowing from Samuelson's reasoning, we developed a methodology to identify investors' axioms of preference for equities and bonds at different levels of incomes and prices. Then we compared investors' real actions with those anticipated by our methodology. This allowed us to generalize our findings and analyze the effects on a portfolio of equities and bonds. The main finding of our statistical exercise is that asset allocators can profit from understanding how short-term moves are linked to the market's revealed preferences at different times during the economic cycle. We then use the results to construct an indicator and a trading rule that not only outperforms a buy-and-hold strategy by a wide margin, it outperforms other traditional trading rules as well. Building A Revealed Preference Model Our primary objective in constructing a revealed preference indicator (RPI) is to understand: (1) how market preferences shape the behavior of investors; and (2) how they ultimately affect future returns. To do so, we broke down our analysis into three key areas: Part I identifies market preferences for different levels of income and price in the economy. Part II defines a general investment strategy that utilizes historic preferences and short-term market movements as a market timing tool. Part III optimizes the RPI and compares its historical track record with a buy-and-hold asset allocation and trading rules based on other indicators. Part I - Developing The Framework The first step in building the RPI is to establish the proper control variables. We limited our basket of investable "goods" to U.S. equities and 10-year Treasurys. We also need a variable that is analogous to the income measure that Samuelson used in his study. For the choice facing investors who are deciding between buying two financial assets, we believe that a measure of market "liquidity" is more appropriate than income. By this we do not mean the ease by which financial assets can be bought and sold. Rather, it is "funding liquidity", or how easily it is to borrow to invest. BCA often uses the four phases of the Fed cycle, as interest rates fluctuate around the equilibrium level, as a measure of funding liquidity (Chart II-1):2 Chart II-1Fed Funds Rate As A Proxy For Income Fed Funds Rate As A Proxy For Income Fed Funds Rate As A Proxy For Income Phase I = Policy is accommodative but the fed funds rate is rising. Phase II = Policy is tight and the Fed is still tightening. Phase III = Policy is tight but the Fed is cutting rates. Phase IV = Policy is easy and the Fed is cutting rates. The rationale for using the fed funds-rate cycle as a proxy for income is that, when interest rates are below equilibrium, monetary conditions are accommodative. Leverage is easy to obtain because there is plenty of liquidity (income) to fund investments. When conditions are tight, funding liquidity is relatively scarce. To measure relative prices, we first divided the S&P 500 price index by its 12-month moving average and second, we took the inverse of the 10-year Treasury yield divided by 12-month moving average.3 We then used the ratio of these two deviations-from-trend to construct a relative price measure (Chart II-2). This ratio provides a single measure of how expensive stocks and bonds are, not only to each other, but to their own history as well. We then grouped the relative price data into four sets of percentiles, or buckets, shown in Table II-1. Stocks are expensive and bonds cheap at the top of the table, while the reverse is true at the bottom. Chart II-2Constructing A Single Price Measure For Equities And Bonds Constructing A Single Price Measure For Equities And Bonds Constructing A Single Price Measure For Equities And Bonds Table II-1Distribution Of Relative Price July 2017 July 2017 Table II-2A presents the average historical monthly percent change in stock prices for each combination of the four relative price and liquidity buckets over the entire dataset. In the fourth phase of the Fed cycle (when monetary conditions are easy and the Fed is still cutting interest rates), and when relative prices are in the first bucket (i.e. stocks are expensive), the average stock price increase during the month was slightly above 1% percent. Table II-2B provides the same breakdown for the average change in bond yields (shown in basis points, not returns). Tables II-2A and II-2B are recalculated at each point in time - meaning that we used an expanding sample to calculate the price buckets, and updated the results for the ensuing price or yield movements as new data are added. That way, we completely avoid the advantage of hindsight. To simplify our methodology, we coded the results to end up with the stock and bond returns for the 16 different combinations of Fed and relative price buckets. Table II-3 uses the results from Tables II-2A and II-2B in the last period of history as an example. The "Liquidity" and "Price" columns indicate the bucket (e.g. price in bucket 1 and liquidity in bucket 1). The "Stocks" and "Bonds" columns are coded as "1" if the asset appreciated during the month given the indicated liquidity/price bucket, and a "0" if it depreciated that month. Table II-2AEquity Market Reactions At Given Levels Of Price And Liquidity July 2017 July 2017 Table II-2BTreasury Market Reactions At Given Levels Of Price And Liquidity July 2017 July 2017 Chart II-3Revealing What Investors Prefer July 2017 July 2017 Part II - Habits Create Expectations It is important to keep in mind that the objective of our revealed preference model is not to use the revealed market preferences as forecasts but rather to examine what happens when investors decide to follow or ignore them. Our hypothesis in building this model is that, when investors go against their historical preferences, the result should be interpreted as short-term noise. It is only when preferences and (subsequent) short-term market moves are aligned that we should heed the signal and invest accordingly. Table II-3 can be thought of as the market's revealed preference. Again, keep in mind that we allowed revealed preferences to change over time by recalculating it under our stretching-sample approach. The following steps detail how we used investor preferences to create a trading rule that verifies our hypothesis empirically: Step 1 - Expected vs. Actual: The first step is to examine how actual equity prices and bond yields behaved relative to their expected trajectory. We created two variables - one for equities and one for bonds. If revealed preference last month (t-1) suggested that the asset's return should be positive in the subsequent month (t), and it indeed turned out to be positive in period t, then we coded month t as "1." If both the revealed preference and the actual outcome were negative, we coded it as "-1." If they did not match, the code is "0" (in other words, the market did not follow the typical historical revealed preference). Thus we have two time series, one for bonds and one for stocks, which are made up of 1s, -1s and zeros. Step 2 - Bullish, Bearish, and Neutral: We combined the coded series for stocks and bonds to encompass the nine possible outcomes in our model (i.e. both bonds and stocks can have a value in any month of 1, 0 or -1, providing 9 different combinations). Table II-4 presents the nine outcomes along with the asset allocation that would have maximized investor returns based on our historical analysis. For example, investors were paid to be overweight equities when equities and bonds have a code of "1" and "-1," respectively (top row in Table II-4). In other words, stocks tended to outperform bonds when revealed preferences from the month before predicted rising stock prices and rising bond yields, and these predictions were confirmed. Table II-4Understanding The Signals From Preferences July 2017 July 2017 If revealed preference is not confirmed for both bonds and stocks, then it is best for investors to stand aside with a benchmark allocation. Step 3 - "If It Don't Make Dollars, It Don't Make Sense": To test whether our theory would add strategic value, we computed a trading rule to see how well it performed against a benchmark portfolio of 50% equities and 50% Treasurys. The trading rule was computed as follows: when the revealed preference for equities is positive (at time t-1) and this signal is confirmed in t, then in t+1 we allocate 100% to the S&P 500 and 0% to Treasurys. When the revealed equity preference signal is correctly bearish, we removed all exposure to equities and allocated 100% to Treasurys. When the signal was neutral, we kept a benchmark allocation of 50% equities and 50% Treasurys. Chart II-3 shows that this trading rule outperforms the benchmark, confirming our initial hypothesis - one should fade the short-term movements when investors go against their preferences, and only follow the signals when those movements align with historical preferences. History shows that investors tend to underperform in terms of the stock/bond allocation when they deviate from their revealed preference. Chart II-3Correctly Gauging How Investors Behave Pays Off Correctly Gauging How Investors Behave Pays Off Correctly Gauging How Investors Behave Pays Off Part III - Validating The Results One drawback is that this trading rule would require frequent portfolio allocation changes every month, as shown in Chart II-4. As such, we constructed a smoothed version by imposing the rule that asset allocation is unchanged unless the model provides a new signal for two months in a row (Chart II-5).4 These restrictions not only dramatically reduced the frequency of the asset allocation adjustments, but it also augmented historical cumulative excess returns (Chart II-6). Chart II-4Revealed Preference Indicator Is Inherently Volatile Revealed Preference Indicator Is Inherently Volatile Revealed Preference Indicator Is Inherently Volatile Chart II-5Removing Some Of The Noise Removing Some Of The Noise Removing Some Of The Noise Any new indicator of course must be able to outperform a buy-and-hold strategy to be useful but it is also interesting to see how its performance ranks compared to a set of random portfolios. This way, we can identify if the indicator truly provides additional information. Random portfolios are generated using a monthly allocations of 100% or 0% to equities, with the remainder in Treasurys. Chart II-7 shows the performance of the smoothed indicator versus a set of 1,000 randomly generated portfolios. Chart II-6Once Smoothed, The RPI Truly Shines Once Smoothed, The RPI Truly Shines Once Smoothed, The RPI Truly Shines Chart II-7The RPI Adds A Significant Amount Of Information The RPI Adds A Significant Amount Of Information The RPI Adds A Significant Amount Of Information We compared the indicator's trading rule to simple moving averages or BCA's other indicators. We also wanted to ensure that the RPI adds value beyond investing based strictly on the four phases of the liquidity cycle or based on relative value alone. We therefore compared the track record of the RPI trading rule to rules that are based on: (1) the deviation of the S&P 500 from its 12-month moving trend; (2) BCA's monetary conditions indicator; (3) BCA's valuation indicator; (4) BCA's technical indicator; (5) the four phases of the Fed cycle; and (6) the relative price index. Charts II-8A and II-8B highlights that RPI indeed impressively dominates the other trading rules. The one exception is that, during the Great Recession, the model's performance fell to roughly match the performance of a S&P 500 technical trading rule. Chart II-8AThe RPI Outperforms The Sum Of Its Parts... July 2017 July 2017 Chart II-8B...As Well As Other Indicators July 2017 July 2017 Part IV - Conclusions The RPI is the latest installment in our ongoing research into trading rules that can augment our top-down macro approach to asset allocation. Quite simply, it combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. This model adds value on its own, but we feel that it will best be used in conjunction with other indicators designed to improve performance around major market turning points. Future research will experiment with combining the RPI with other indicators to further enhance performance. In the meantime, we will present the RPI's signals each month in Section III of the monthly publication. As with all indicators and models, however, the RPI is only one input to our decision process. We base our asset allocation decision on a combination of indicators, macro themes, detailed data analysis and judgment. The indicator's current reading for stocks versus bonds, at benchmark, is more conservative than our official recommendation. The benchmark reading reflects the fact that equities are overvalued and that investors have deviated from their preferences in their past two quarters. David Boucher Associate Vice President Quantitative Strategist 1 For more information, please see P. A. Samuelson, "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior," Economica 5:17 (1938), pp. 61-71. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "Stocks And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle," dated December 23, 2013, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 We tested a few other measures, most notably the stock-to-bond total return ratio (measured by comparing each asset's total returns), but the chosen measures provided the best and most robust results. 4 We conducted a statistical exercise to validate and optimize the allocations in Table 4 to provide a smoother performance. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Thanks to the recent dollar and bond yield “relief valves”, the S&P 500 is stubbornly holding above the 2,400 level. The breakout above this level further stretched valuation metrics. Measures such as the Shiller P/E and price/book are at post tech-bubble highs. Stocks remain expensive based on our composite Valuation Index, although it is still shy of the +1 standard deviation level that demarcates over-valuation. This is because our composite indicator includes valuation measures that take into account the low level of interest rates. Of course, once interest rate normalization is well underway, these indicator will not look as favorable. It is good news for the equity market that our Monetary Indicator did not move further into negative territory over the past month. Indeed, the indicator has hooked up slightly and is sitting close to a neutral level. Our equity Technical Indicator remains constructive. Other measures, such as our Speculation Index, composite sentiment and the VIX suggest that equity investors are overly bullish from a contrary perspective. On the other hand, the U.S. earnings surprises diffusion index highlights that upside earnings surprises are broadly based. Our elevated U.S. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator ticked down from a high level this month, suggesting that ‘dry powder’ available to buy this market is depleted. This indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. In contrast to the U.S., the WTP indicators for both the Eurozone and Japan are rising from a low level. This suggests that a rotation into these equity markets is underway and has some ways to go. We remain overweight both the Eurozone and Japanese markets relative to the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. The pull back in long-term bond yields since March was enough to “move the dial” in terms of the bond valuation or technical indicators. U.S. bond valuation has inched lower to fair value. However, we believe that fair value itself is moving higher as some of the economic headwinds fade. We also think that the FOMC is determined to stick with the current tightening timetable in terms of rate hikes and balance sheet adjustment, which support our negative view on bond prices. Now that oversold technical conditions have been unwound, it suggests that the consolidation phase for bond yields is largely complete. The trade-weighted dollar remains quite overvalued on a PPP basis, although less so by other measures. Technically, it is a bearish sign that the dollar moved lower and crossed its 200-day moving average. However, our Composite Technical Indicator highlights that overbought conditions have been worked off. We still believe the U.S. dollar’s bull phase has one more upleg left. Technical conditions are also benign in the commodity complex. Most commodities have shifted down over the last month to meet support at their 200-day moving averages. Base metals are due for a bounce, but we are most bullish on oil. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China

Highlights The risk asset friendly outcomes in the French and South Korean elections are the latest examples of fading geopolitical risk, and we expect that to continue over the remainder of 2017. Although it has been well over a year since the last 10% pullback, the U.S. equity market is not "due" for a correction. For many investors, the drop in commodity prices has replaced geopolitics as the most likely cause of the next equity market correction. What is Dr. Copper's diagnosis? We re-examine our Yield and Protector portfolios to find out which assets will hold up best if there is a correction. Many investors cite the monthly report on average hourly earnings as evidence that the Fed has it wrong on the economy and the labor market. We disagree. Feature U.S. stock prices remain within striking distance of their all-time highs and many investors continue to worry about the next correction. The risk asset friendly outcomes in the French and South Korean elections are the latest examples of fading geopolitical risk, and we expect that to continue over the remainder of 2017. The market has all but ignored the recent political turmoil in Washington. For many investors, the drop in commodity prices has replaced geopolitics as the most likely cause of the next equity market correction, while others note that it's been more than 15 months since the last 10%+ correction and that we are "due" for one. But is Dr. Copper still a reliable indicator of equity market tops? And if a correction is at hand, which assets would hold up best on the way down? We also review yet another disconnect between the Fed and the market: average hourly earnings. Geopolitical Risk Continues To Fade As A Market Concern Emmanuel Macron's victory was a resounding one as French voters rejected Le Pen's anti-Europe message in last week's election. Removing the possibility of a French President that is dedicated to exiting the eurozone is obviously positive for European stocks and investor risk appetite the world over. Next up are the two rounds of legislative elections in June. Polls are sparse, but they support the view that Macron's En Marche and the center-right Les Republicains will capture the vast majority of seats in the legislature. A Macron presidency supported by Les Republicains in the National Assembly would be a bullish outcome for investors, according to our geopolitical strategists. On the international stage - where the president has few constraints - France will be led by a committed Europhile willing to push Germany towards a more proactive policy. On the domestic stage - where the National Assembly dominates - Macron's cautiously pro-growth agenda will be pushed further to the right by Les Republicains. Such an election outcome would make possible the passage of genuine structural reforms that would suppress wage growth and make French exports more competitive. The presidential election result in South Korea last week was exactly what the market expected, and should help to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. For now, the situation in Washington around President Trump's firing of FBI Director Comey has not had a major impact on markets. If the Democrats win the House of Representatives in 2018, our geopolitical team believes that impeachment proceedings will begin against Trump. On one hand, this means that polarization in the U.S. is about to reach record-high levels. On the other, it should motivate the GOP to get tax reform done before it is too late. Bottom Line: Investors may be shocked into pricing greater odds of Euro Area dissolution when Italy comes back into focus, but that is a risk for 2018. We expect market-friendly policies emerging from Washington this year, although the Comey affair highlights that the road will be anything but smooth. Corrections And Pullbacks In Context Geopolitical risk appear to have faded for now, but with U.S. equities at or close to all-time highs, talk of a correction is hard to avoid. We continue to favor stocks over bonds this year and suggest that any sell-off in equities will be bought not sold. A hard landing in China, major disappointment on the Trump legislative agenda, a prolonged spell of weakness in the U.S. economic data1, and an overly aggressive Fed in 2017 may all serve as catalysts for a pullback. Above average PE ratios and measures of market volatility that are at cycle lows have only added to the chorus of those saying we are "due" for a correction. History suggests otherwise. From the end of WWII through 2009, the S&P 500 has experienced, on average, two 10% corrections and 10 corrections of 5% of more during equity bull markets. Since the start of the current bull market in March 2009 we've had 22 pullbacks of 5% or more and six corrections of more than 10% (using market closing prices) Table 1. This suggests that the market has seen its fair share of pullbacks and corrections since 2009, and isn't really "due". Chart 1 takes a different approach, but reaches the same conclusion. At 15 months (325 days) since the end of the last 10% correction, the current bull market is right of the middle of the pack of all bull markets since 1932. Table 1Six S&P 500 Corrections Of 10% Or More Since March 2009: We're Not "Due" Still Awaiting The Next Pullback Still Awaiting The Next Pullback Chart 1Current Equity Bull Market Is Not Long In The Tooth Still Awaiting The Next Pullback Still Awaiting The Next Pullback Our view remains that any pullback in U.S. equities will be bought, not sold, and we favor stocks over bonds in 2017. There are few notable imbalances in the U.S. or global economies and we see an acceleration in both over the remainder of 2017. The Fed will raise rates gradually this year, and there is general agreement between the Fed and the market on the pace of hikes at least for 2017. The Fed and the market remain far apart on hikes in 2018. Our view of the economy and labor market suggests that the market will ultimately move toward the Fed's view. The U.S. corporate earnings outlook remains solid, after a very good Q1 earnings season and favorable guidance for Q2 2017 and beyond. Bottom Line: Equity pullbacks - even during bull markets - are normal and healthy. We do not believe that the market is especially "overdue" for a pullback, but when the inevitable pullback or correction occurs, we expect that investors will take the opportunity to add to equity positions and not turn the pullback into a bear market. Dr. Copper? Chart 2Metals Prices Are Rolling Over...##BR##But Is It A Signal? Metals Prices Are Rolling Over... But Is It A Signal? Metals Prices Are Rolling Over... But Is It A Signal? The recent setback in the commodity pits has added to investor angst regarding global growth momentum. The LMEX base metals index is up almost 20% on a year-ago basis, but has fallen by 8% since February (Chart 2). From their respective peaks earlier this year, zinc and copper are down about 10%, nickel has dropped by 22% and iron ore has lost almost half of its value. Is the venerable "Dr. Copper" sending an important warning about world growth? Some of our global leading economic indicators have edged lower this year, as we have discussed in recent Weekly Reports. Nonetheless, the decline in base metals prices likely has more to do with other factors, such as an unwinding of the surge in speculative demand that immediately followed the U.S. election last autumn. Speculators may be disappointed by the lack of progress on Republican promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending. The main story for base metals demand and prices, however, is the Chinese real estate sector. China accounts for roughly 50% of world consumption for each of the major metals. The Chinese authorities are trying to cool the property market and transition to a more consumer spending-oriented economy, thereby reducing the dependence on exports, capital spending and real estate as growth drivers. Fiscal policy tightened last year and new regulations were introduced to limit housing speculation. The effect of policy tightening can be seen in our Credit and Fiscal Spending Impulse indicator, which has been softening since mid-2016 (Chart 3). The economy held up well last year, but the policy adjustment resulted in a peaking of the PMI at year-end. Growth in housing starts also appears to be rolling over (annual growth is shown on a 12-month moving-average basis in Chart 4 because of the extreme volatility in the series). Both the PMI and housing starts are correlated with commodity prices. Chart 3China is The Main Story##BR##For Base Metals Demand China is The Main Story For Base Metals Demand China is The Main Story For Base Metals Demand Chart 4Direct Fiscal Spending And Infrastructure##BR##Have Picked Up Recently Direct Fiscal Spending And Infrastructure Have Picked Up Recently Direct Fiscal Spending And Infrastructure Have Picked Up Recently The good news is that BCA's China Investment Strategy service does not expect a major downshift in Chinese real GDP growth this year, which means that commodity import demand should rebound: Chart 5Dr. Copper Is Not Signaling##BR##A Slowdown in Global Growth Dr. Copper Is Not Signaling A Slowdown in Global Growth Dr. Copper Is Not Signaling A Slowdown in Global Growth There is no incentive for the authorities to crunch the economy given that consumer price inflation is still low and the surge in producer price inflation appears to have peaked. Monetary conditions have tightened a little in recent months, but overall conditions are not restrictive. Moreover, both direct fiscal spending and infrastructure investment have picked up noticeably in recent months (Chart 4). Export growth will continue to accelerate based on our model (not shown). The upturn in the profit cycle and firming output prices should boost capital spending. Robust demand will ensure that housing construction will continue to grow at a healthy pace. Households' home-buying intentions jumped to an all-time high last quarter. Tighter housing policies in major cities will prevent a massive boom, but this will not short-circuit the recovery in housing construction. This all adds up to a fairly benign outlook for base metals. Our commodity strategists do not see the conditions for a major bull or bear phase on a 6-12 month horizon. Within commodity portfolios, they recommend a benchmark allocation to base metals, an underweight in agricultural products and an overweight in oil. We intend to update our view on oil prices in the May 22, 2017 edition of this report. Bottom Line: From a broader perspective, our key message is that "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Chart 5 highlights that the LMEX base metals index has a high positive correlation with the U.S. stock-to-bond total return ratio on a daily change basis. However, in terms of trends and turning points, base metals are far from a reliable indicator for the stock-to-bond ratio. Where To Hide In A Stock Market Correction Over the past several years, BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy service has periodically recommended that investors add a variety of investments as portfolio "insurance" to help guard against the possibility of a material correction in equities. More recently, we have highlighted two specific forms of insurance: our yield and protector portfolios. We last discussed the protector portfolio in the October 17, 2016 and November 7, 2016 Weekly Reports2, and in today's report we revisit the issue by comparing both portfolios to a more common form of insurance: shifting from cyclical to defensive stocks within an equity allocation. Charts 6, 7, and 8 show a breakdown of the relative performance of S&P 500 defensives along with our yield and protector portfolios. Panels 2 and 3 of Charts 6, 7 and 8 present the rolling 1-year beta and alpha of each strategy vs. the S&P 500. Here, we present alpha as the difference between the actual year-over-year excess return of the portfolio (vs. short-term Treasury bills) and what would have been expected given the portfolio's beta. This measure is sometimes referred to as "Jensen's alpha". Chart 6A Modestly Low-Beta Option A Modestly Low-Beta Option A Modestly Low-Beta Option Chart 7A Lower Beta Than Defensives A Lower Beta Than Defensives A Lower Beta Than Defensives Chart 8A Negative Beta, And Positive Alpha A Negative Beta, And Positive Alpha A Negative Beta, And Positive Alpha There are several noteworthy observations from the charts: Based on the historical beta of the three portfolios vs. the S&P 500, defensive stocks are the most correlated with the overall equity market. Our protector portfolio has a negative correlation to the broad market, and our yield portfolio is somewhere in between, with a positive but relatively low beta. This is consistent with the equity composition of the three portfolios (shown in Table 2); with our protector portfolio composed entirely of non-equity assets. Table 2A Breakdown Of Three##BR##Portfolio Insurance Options Still Awaiting The Next Pullback Still Awaiting The Next Pullback After accounting for their lower beta, all three portfolios have tended to outperform the S&P in risk-adjusted terms since the onset of the global economic recovery. But this outperformance has been more significant for our yield and protector portfolios: the top panel of Charts 7 and 8 highlight that both portfolios have generated essentially the same return as equities have since the end of the recession (since the relative profile has been flat), despite exhibiting considerably less volatility than stocks. All three portfolios have experienced a relative decline vs. the S&P 500 since the election, but this has largely occurred due to passive rather than active underperformance. In other words, they have underperformed due to a failure to keep up with the S&P 500 rather than because of losses in absolute terms. There are two important conclusions from Charts 6, 7 and 8 for U.S. multi-asset investors. First, the lower beta of our yield and protector portfolios compared with S&P defensives means that the former represent a better insurance bet against a sell-off in the equity market than the latter. Second, the persistently positive volatility-adjusted returns for our insurance portfolios highlights an investor preference for these assets over the past few years, which is likely to persist over the coming 6-12 months. But investors should also recognize that this preference could eventually be subject to a reversal if the long-term economic outlook significantly improves, an event that could be catalyzed either by organic economic developments or policy decisions by the Trump administration. For now, our investment bias towards equities over government bonds makes us less inclined to favor a low beta position within a balanced portfolio. But our analysis suggests that clients who anticipate the need for portfolio insurance over the coming year should favor our yield and protector portfolios over a defensive sector allocation within an equity portfolio, and we are likely to recommend an allocation to these portfolios for all clients were we to see any material progression towards the sell-off triggers that we identified earlier in the report. Bottom Line: Investors seeking some protection against a potential equity market sell-off should favor our yield and protector portfolios over defensive sector positioning. We do not currently recommend these portfolios for all clients, but we are likely to do so if our key sell-off trigger "red lines" are breached. What's Up With Wage Growth? On the surface, the April jobs report-released in early May seemed to send mixed signals to investors and the Fed about the health of the labor market3. Our view remains that the economy is growing fast enough to tighten the labor market, push up wages and ultimately inflation, which will lead the Fed to raise rates twice more in 2017. But even though the economy is very close to full employment and the output gap has nearly closed, patience is required. Although it's a close call, the next hike is likely to come next month. Markets remain somewhat skeptical of this view, and have only priced in 39 bps of tightening by the end of the year, and have not yet fully priced in a June rate hike. The lack of wage growth (up just 2.5% year-over-year in April according to average hourly earnings (AHE)) remains a key source of the market's skepticism about the pace and timing of Fed rate hikes. Many investors cite the monthly report on average hourly earnings as evidence that the Fed has it wrong on the economy and the labor market. Does the Fed see something the market does not? Or is it the other way around? Markets tend to focus on data that are timely. That requirement certainly fits the AHE. The monthly wage measure is the most timely data point on labor compensation. While timeliness is an important factor when assessing the health of the labor market, it is also critically important to watch what the Fed watches. Investors should note that the AHE data is only one of at least four measures of labor compensation the Fed mentions in its Semi Annual Monetary Report to Congress. Since Fed Chair Yellen took office in 2014, the Fed has specifically referenced (and charted together) three measures of labor compensation in the report: Average hourly earnings Employment Cost Index and Compensation per Hour in the nonfarm business sector, and Chart 9The Fed Tracks All Four Of##BR##These Compensation Measures The Fed Tracks All Four Of These Compensation Measures The Fed Tracks All Four Of These Compensation Measures The Atlanta Fed's Wage Tracker was mentioned in the June 2016 Monetary Policy Report, and the Fed added it to the chart of the other three metrics in the most recent report, released in February 2017. As Chart 9 shows, all have moved higher in recent years, although it is clear that AHE has lagged the others. Given the attention it receives in the financial news media on and just after "Employment Friday" each month, it may surprise investors to learn that neither AHE nor wages were directly mentioned in any of the FOMC statements since Yellen took charge. However, wage growth (or lack thereof) has been a topic of discussion at all but a few of the 13 post FOMC press conferences Yellen has held. When asked about wages, she is careful to note that the Fed watches a wide range of indicators of labor compensation, but has lamented the lack of progress on wages. In her most recent press conference, Yellen noted that "I would describe some measures of wage growth as having moved up some. Some measures haven't moved up, but there's some evidence that wage growth is gradually moving up, which is also suggestive of a strengthening labor market." Average hourly earnings are routinely mentioned in the FOMC minutes, but only alongside mentions of the other metrics noted above. On balance, average hourly earnings are viewed by the Fed - and therefore should be viewed by the market - as one of several indicators of the health of the labor market, but not the only indicator. Chart 10 shows that only a third of industries have seen an acceleration in wage increases over the past year, which supports the market's view that the economy is not growing quickly enough to push up wages and inflation. A recent report by the Kansas City Fed4 takes a different view. Using a bottom-up approach, the author points out that only a few industries (mostly in the goods producing sector of the economy) have accounted for much of the rise in wages, notably manufacturing, construction and wholesale trade. Financial services, retail trade, professional and business services and leisure and hospitality - all service sector industries - have been the laggards. The study done by the economists at the Kansas City Fed shows that although earnings growth has lagged in those more service-oriented industries since 2015, hours worked have seen faster growth than in the mainly goods producing sector (chart not shown). This suggests to the author - and we concur - that labor demand has been strong in the past few years in areas that have not seen much wage growth. As the labor market continues to tighten, wages in these industries may accelerate, but patience may be required. Chart 11 shows that it takes two to three years after a bottom in the output gap for a decisive turn higher in ECI or AHE. While this cycle has seen a more shallow recovery - especially in AHE - both have moved higher since the output gap bottomed out in 2009/2010. Chart 10Only 33% Of Industries Have Seen##BR##Wage Acceleration Over The Past 12 Months Only 33% Of Industries Have Seen Wage Acceleration Over The Past 12 Months Only 33% Of Industries Have Seen Wage Acceleration Over The Past 12 Months Chart 11Measures Of Labor Compensation Move##BR##Higher After Output Gap Bottoms Out Measures Of Labor Compensation Move Higher After Output Gap Bottoms Out Measures Of Labor Compensation Move Higher After Output Gap Bottoms Out Bottom Line: Investors are always wise to watch what the Fed watches. The evolution of wage growth will be critical to FOMC policymakers, because a clear acceleration will confirm that the economy is truly at full employment and, thus, at risk of overheating. We do not expect a surge in wages, but a steady upward trend will keep the Fed on a gradual tightening path. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Growth, Inflation And The Fed", dated May 8, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Reports "Portfolio Insurance: What, How, When?", dated October 17, 2016 and "Policy, Polls, Probability", dated November 7, 2016, both available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Growth, Inflation And The Fed" dated May 8, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 See "Wage Leaders and Laggards; Decomposing the Growth in Average Hourly Earnings" The Macro Bulletin, February 15, 2017; Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

Dear Client, In addition to an abbreviated Weekly Report that you will receive later tonight, I am sending you this Special Report written by my colleague Mark McClellan of our monthly Bank Credit Analyst publication. Following up on many of the themes discussed in our latest Quarterly Strategy Outlook, Mark makes a convincing case that most of the factors that have suppressed global interest rates since the financial crisis could begin to unwind or even reverse over the coming years. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The fundamental drivers of the low rate world are considered by many to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields quite depressed by historical standards for years to come. However, some of the factors behind ultra-low interest rates have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. The age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. Global investment needs will wane along with population aging, but the majority of the effect on equilibrium interest rates is in the past. In contrast, the demographic effects that will depress desired savings are still to come. The net impact will be bond-bearish. Moreover, the massive positive labor supply shock, following the integration of China and Eastern Europe into the world's effective labor force, is over. Indeed, this shock is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power, sparking a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby placing upward pressure on global real bond yields. It is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. This could be inflationary if it disrupts global supply chains. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. As for China, the fundamental drivers of its savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Technological advance will remain a headwind for real wage gains, but at least the transition to a world that is less labor-abundant will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We are not making the case that real global bond yields are going to quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations for bond yields are too low. Investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Feature In the September 2016 The Bank Credit Analyst, we summarized the key drivers behind the major global macroeconomic disequilibria that have resulted in deflationary pressure, policy extremism, dismal productivity, and the lowest bond yields in recorded history (Chart 1). The disequilibria include income inequality, the depressed wage share of GDP, lackluster capital spending, and excessive savings. Chart 1Global Disequilibria Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds The fundamental drivers of the low bond yield world are now well documented and understood by investors. These drivers generally are considered to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields and interest rates at historically low levels for years to come according to the consensus. Based on discussions with BCA clients, it appears that many have either "bought into" the secular stagnation thesis or, at a minimum, have adopted the view that growth headwinds preclude any meaningful rise in bond yields. However, bond investors might have been lulled into a false sense of security. Yields will not return to pre-Lehman norms anytime soon, but some of the factors behind the low-yield world have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. Most importantly, the age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. We have reached the tipping point. Equilibrium real bond yields will gradually move higher as a result. But before we discuss what is changing, it is important to review the drivers of today's macro disequilibria. Several of them predate the Great Financial Crisis, including demographic trends, technological advances, and the integration of China's massive workforce and excess savings into the global economy. Ultra-Low Rates: How Did We Get Here? (A) Demographics And Global Savings Chart 2Global Shifts In The Saving And Investment Curves Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds The so-called Global Savings Glut has been a bullish structural force for bonds for the past couple of decades. We won't go through all of the forces behind the glut, but a key factor is population aging in the advanced economies. Ex-ante desired savings rose as baby boomers entered their high-income years. The Great Financial Crisis only served to reinforce the desire to save, given the setback in the value of boomers' retirement nest eggs.1 The corporate sector also began to save more following the crisis. Even more importantly, the surge in China's trade surplus since the 1990s had to be recycled into the global pool of savings. While China's rate of investment was very high, its propensity to save increased even faster, resulting in a swollen external surplus and a massive net outflow of capital. Other emerging economies also made the adjustment from net importers of capital to net exporters following the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. By leaning into currency appreciation, these countries built up huge foreign exchange reserves that had to be recycled abroad. In theory, savings must equal investment at the global level and real interest rates shift to ensure this equilibrium (Chart 2). China's excess savings, together with a greater desire to save in the developed countries, represented a shift in the saving schedule to the right. The result was downward pressure on global interest rates. (B) Demographics And Global Capital Spending Demographics and China's integration also affected the investment side of the equation. A slower pace of labor force growth in the developed countries resulted in a permanently lower level of capital spending relative to GDP. Slower consumer spending growth, as a result of a more moderate expansion in the working-age population, meant a reduced appetite for new factories, malls, and apartment buildings. Chart 3 shows that the growth rate of global capital spending that is required to maintain a given capital-to-output ratio has dropped substantially, due to the dramatic slowdown in the growth of the world's working-age population.2 Keep in mind that this estimate refers only to the demographic component of investment spending. Actual capital expenditure growth will not be as weak as Chart 3 suggests because firms will want to adopt new technologies for competitive or environmental reasons. Nonetheless, the point is that the structural tailwind for global capex from the post-war baby boom has disappeared. Chart 3Demographics Are A Structural Headwind For Global Capex Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds (C) Labor Supply Shock And Global Capital Spending While the working-age population ratio peaked in the developed countries years ago, it is a different story at the global level (Chart 4). The integration of the Chinese and Eastern European workforces into the global labor pool during the 1990s and 2000s resulted in an effective doubling of global labor supply in a short period of time. Relative prices must adjust in the face of such a large boost in the supply of labor relative to capital. The sudden abundance of cheap labor depressed real wages from what they otherwise would have been, thus incentivizing firms to use more labor and less capital at the margin. The combination of slower working-age population growth in the advanced economies and a surge in the global labor force resulted in a decline in desired global capital spending. In terms of Chart 2, the leftward shift of the investment schedule reinforced the impact of the savings impulse in placing downward pressure on global interest rates. (D) Labor Supply Shock And Income Inequality The wave of cheap labor also aggravated the trend toward greater inequality in the advanced economies and the downward trend in labor's share of the income pie (Chart 5). In theory, a surge in the supply of labor is a positive "supply shock" that benefits both developed and developing countries. However, a recent report by David Autor and Gordon Hanson3 highlighted that trade agreements in the past were incremental and largely involved countries with similar income levels. The sudden entry of China to the global trade arena, involving a massive addition to the effective global stock of labor, was altogether different. The report does not argue that trade has become a "bad" thing. Rather, it points out that the adjustment costs imposed on the advanced economies were huge and long-lasting, as Chinese firms destroyed entire industries in developed countries. The lingering adjustment phase contributed to greater inequality in the major countries. Management was able to use the threat of outsourcing to gain the upper hand in wage negotiations. The result has been a rise in the share of income going to high-income earners in the Advanced Economies, at the expense of low- and middle-income earners (Chart 6). The same is true, although to a lesser extent, in the emerging world. Chart 4Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Chart 5Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Chart 6Hollowing Out Hollowing Out Hollowing Out Greater inequality, in turn, has weighed on aggregate demand and equilibrium interest rates because a larger share of total income flowed to the "rich" who tend to save more than the low- and middle-income classes. (E) The Dark Side Of Technology Advances in technology also contributed to rising inequality. In theory, new technologies hurt some workers in the short term, but benefit most workers in the long run because they raise national income. However, there is evidence that past major technological shocks were associated with a "hollowing out" or U-shaped pattern of employment. Low- and high-skilled employment increased, but the proportion of mid-skilled workers tended to shrink. Wages for both low- and mid-skilled labor did not keep up with those that were highly-skilled, leading to wider income disparity. Today, technology appears to be resulting in faster, wider and deeper degrees of hollowing-out than in previous periods of massive technological change. This may be because machines are not just replacing manual human tasks, but cognitive ones too. A recent IMF report made the case that technology and global integration played a dominant role in labor's declining fortunes. Technology alone explains about half of the drop in the labor share of income in the developed countries since 1980.4 Falling prices for capital goods, information and communications technology in particular, have facilitated the expansion of global value chains as firms unbundled production into many tasks that were distributed around the world in a way that minimized production costs. Chart 7 highlights that the falling price of capital goods in the advanced economies went hand-in-hand with rising participation in global supply chains since 1990. Falling capital goods prices also accelerated the automation of routine tasks, contributing especially to job destruction in the developed (high-wage) economies. In other words, firms in the developed world either replaced workers with machinery in areas where technology permitted, or outsourced jobs to lower-wage countries in areas that remained labor-intensive. Both trends undermined labor's bargaining power, depressed labor's share of income, and contributed to inequality. The effects of technology, global integration, population aging and China's economic integration are demonstrated in Chart 8. The world working-age-to-total population ratio rose sharply beginning in the late 1990s. This resulted in an upward trend in China's investment/GDP ratio, and a downward trend in the G7. The upward trend in the G7 capital stock-per-capita ratio began to slow as a result, before experiencing an unprecedented contraction after the Great Recession and Financial Crisis. Chart 7Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Chart 8Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock The result has been a deflationary global backdrop characterized by demand deficiency and poor potential real GDP growth, both of which have depressed equilibrium global interest rates over the past 20 to 25 years. Transition Phase Chart 9Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China It would appear easy to conclude that these trends will be with us for another few decades because the demographic trends will not change anytime soon. Nonetheless, on closer inspection the global economy is transitioning from a period when cyclical economic pressures and all of the structural trends were pushing equilibrium interest rates in the same direction, to a period in which the economic cycle is becoming less bond-friendly and some of the secular drivers of low interest rates are gradually changing direction. First, the massive labor supply shock of the past few decades is over. The world working-age population ratio has peaked according to United Nations estimates. This ratio is already declining in the major advanced economies and is in the process of topping out in China. The absolute number of working-age people will shrink in China and the G7 countries over the next five years, although it will continue to grow at a low rate for the world as a whole (Chart 9). Unions are unlikely to make a major comeback, but a backdrop that is less labor-abundant should gradually restore some worker bargaining power, especially as economies regain full employment. The resulting upward pressure on real wages will support capital spending as firms substitute toward capital and away from (increasingly expensive) labor. Consumer demand will also receive a boost if inequality moderates and the labor share of income begins to rise. Globalization On The Back Foot Chart 10Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Second, it is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. Global exports appear to have peaked relative to GDP and average tariffs have ticked higher (Chart 10). The World Trade Organization has announced that the number of new trade restrictions or impediments outweighed the number of trade liberalizing initiatives in 2016. The U.K. appears willing to sacrifice trade for limits to the free movement of people. The new U.S. Administration has ditched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is threatening to impose punitive tariffs on some trading partners. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. If the U.S. were to impose high tariffs on China, for example, it would make a part of the Chinese capital stock redundant overnight. In order for the global economy to produce the same amount of goods and services as before, the U.S. and other countries would need to invest more. Any unwinding of globalization would also be inflationary as it would disrupt international supply chains. Demographics And Saving: From Tailwind To Headwind... Third, the impact of savings in the major advanced economies and China on global interest rates will change direction as well. In the developed world, aggregate household savings will come under downward pressure as boomers increasingly shift into retirement. Economists are fond of employing the so-called life-cycle theory of consumer spending. According to this theory, consumers tend to smooth out lifetime spending by accumulating assets during the working years in order to maintain a certain living standard after retirement. The U.N. National Transfer Accounts Project has gathered data on spending and labor income by age cohort at a point in time. Chart 11 presents the data for China and three of the major advanced economies. The data for the advanced economies suggest that spending tends to rise sharply from a low level between birth and about 15 years of age. It continues to rise, albeit at a more modest pace, through the working years. Other studies have found that consumer spending falls during retirement. Nonetheless, these studies generally include only private spending and therefore do not include health care that is provided by the government. The data presented in Chart 11 show that, if government-provided health care is included, personal spending rises sharply toward the end of life. The profile is somewhat different in China. Spending rises quickly from birth to about 20 years of age, and is roughly flat thereafter. Indeed, consumption edges lower after 75-80 years of age. These data allow us to project the impact of changing demographics on the average household saving rate in the coming years, assuming that the income and spending profiles shown in Chart 11 are unchanged. We start by calculating the average saving rate across age cohorts given today's age structure. We then recalculate the average saving rate each year moving forward in time. The resulting saving rate changes along with the age structure of the population. Chart 11Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds The results are shown in Chart 12. The saving rates for all four economies have been indexed at zero in 2016 for comparison purposes. The aggregate saving rate declines in all cases, falling between 4 and 8 percentage points between 2016 and 2030. Germany sees the largest drop of the four countries. Chart 12Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving The simulations are meant to be suggestive, rather than a precise forecast, because the savings profile across age cohorts will adjust over time. Moreover, governments will no doubt raise taxes to cover the rising cost of health care, providing a partial offset in terms of the national saving rate.5 Nonetheless, the simulations highlight that the major economies are past the point where the baby boom generation is adding to the global savings pool at a faster pace than retirees are drawing from it. The age structure in the major advanced economies is far enough advanced that the rapid increase in the retirement rate will place substantial downward pressure on aggregate household savings in the coming years. It is well known that population aging will also undermine government budgets. Rising health care costs are already captured in our household saving rate projection because the data for household spending includes health care even if it is provided by the public sector. However, public pension schemes will also be a problem. To the extent that politicians are slow to trim pension benefits and/or raise taxes, public pension plans will be a growing drain on national savings. Could younger, less developed economies offset some of the demographic trends in China and the Advanced Economies? Numerically speaking, a more effective use of underutilized populations in Africa and India could go a long way. Nevertheless, deep-seated structural problems would have to be addressed and, even then, it is difficult to see either of these regions turning into the next "China story" given the current backlash against globalization and immigration. ...And The Capex Story Is Largely Behind Us Demographic trends also imply less capital spending relative to GDP, as discussed above. In terms of the impact on global equilibrium interest rates, it then becomes a race between falling saving and investment rates. Some analysts point to the Japanese experience because it is the leading edge in terms of global aging. Bond yields have been extremely low for many years even as the household saving rate collapsed, suggesting that ex-ante investment spending shifted by more than ex-ante savings. Nonetheless, Japan may not be a good example because the deterioration in the country's demographics coincided with burst bubbles in both real estate and stocks that hamstrung Japanese banks for decades. A series of policy mistakes made things worse. Economic theory is not clear on the net effect of demographics on savings and investment. The academic empirical evidence is inconclusive as well. However, a detailed IMF study of 30 OECD countries analyzed the demographic impact on a number of macroeconomic variables, including savings and investment.6 They estimated separate demographic effects for the old-age dependency ratio and the working-age population ratio. Applying the IMF's estimated model coefficients to projected changes in both of these ratios over the next decade suggests that the decline in ex-ante savings will exceed the ex-ante drop in capex requirements by about 1 percentage point of GDP. This is a non-trivial shift. Chart 13Demographics And Capex Requirements Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Moreover, our simulations highlight that timing is important. The outlook for the household saving rate depends on the changing age structure of the population and the distribution of saving rates across age cohorts. Thus, the average saving rate will trend down as populations continue to age over the coming decades. In contrast, the impact of demographics on capital spending requirements is related to the change in the growth rate of the working-age population. Chart 13 once again presents our estimates for the demographic component of capital spending. The top panel presents the world capex/GDP ratio that is necessary to maintain a constant capital/output ratio, and the bottom panel shows the change in that ratio. The important point is that the downward adjustment in world capex/GDP related to aging is now largely behind us because most of the deceleration in the growth rate of the working-age population is done. This is in contrast to the household saving rate adjustment where all of the adjustment is still to come. China Is Transitioning Too China must be treated separately from the developed countries because of its unique structural issues. As discussed above, household savings increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s (Chart 14). This trend reflected a number of factors, including: the rising share of the working-age population; a drop in the fertility rate, following the introduction of the one-child policy in the late 1970s that allowed households to spend less on raising children and save more for retirement; health care reform in the early 1990s required households to bear a larger share of health care spending; and job security was also undermined by reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the late 1990s, leading to increased precautionary savings to cover possible bouts of unemployment. These savings tailwinds have turned around in recent years and the household saving rate appears to have peaked. China's contribution to the global pool of savings has already moderated significantly, as measured by the current account surplus. The surplus has withered from about 9% in 2008 to 2½% in 2016. A recent IMF study makes the case that China's national saving rate will continue to decline. The IMF estimates that for every one percentage-point rise in the old-age dependency ratio, the aggregate household saving rate will fall by 0.4-1 percentage points. In addition, the need for precautionary savings is expected to ease along with improvements in the social safety net, achieved through higher government spending on health care. The household saving rate will fall by three percentage points by 2021 according to the IMF (Chart 15). Competitive pressure and an aging population will also reduce the saving rates of the corporate and government sectors. Chart 14China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... Chart 15...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink Of course, investment as a share of GDP is projected to moderate too, reflecting a rebalancing of the economy away from exports and capital spending toward household consumption. The IMF expects that savings will moderate slightly faster than investment, leading to a narrowing in the current account surplus to almost zero by 2021. A lot of assumptions go into this type of forecast such that we must take it with a large grain of salt. Nonetheless, the fundamental drivers of China's savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Moreover, a return to large current account surpluses would likely require significant currency depreciation, which is a political non-starter given U.S. angst over trade. The risk is that China's excess savings will be less, not more, in five year's time. Tech Is A Wildcard It is extremely difficult to forecast the impact of technological advancement on the global economy. We cannot say with any conviction that the tech-related effects of "hollowing out", "winner-take-all" and the "skills premium" will moderate in the coming years. Nonetheless, these effects have occurred alongside a surge in the world's labor force and rapid globalization of supply chains, both of which reinforced the erosion of employee bargaining power. Looking ahead, technology will still be a headwind for some employees, but at least the transition from a world of excess labor to one that is more labor-scarce will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We will explore the impact of technology on productivity, inflation, growth, and bond yields in a companion report to be published in the next issue. Conclusion: Table 1Key Secular Drivers Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds The main points we made in this report are summarized in Table 1. All of the structural factors driving real bond yields were working in the same (bullish) direction over the past 30-40 years. Looking ahead, it is uncertain how technological improvement will affect bond prices, but we expect that the others will shift (or have already shifted) to either neutral or outright bond-bearish. No doubt, our views that globalization and inequality have peaked, and that the labor share of income has bottomed, are speculative. These factors may not place much upward pressure on equilibrium yields. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the demographic effect that has depressed capital spending demand is well advanced. We see it shifting from a positive factor for bond prices to a neutral factor in the coming years. It is also clear that the massive positive labor supply shock is over, and is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power and the resulting boost consumer spending will be negative for bonds. This may also spark a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby place additional upward pressure on global real bond yields. Admittedly, however, this last point requires more research because theory and empirical evidence on it are not clear. Perhaps most importantly, the aging of the population in the advanced economies has reached a tipping point; retirees will drain more from the pool of savings than the working-age population will add to it in the coming years. We have concentrated on real equilibrium bond yields in this report because it is the part of nominal yields that is the most depressed relative to historical norms. The inflation component is only a little below a level that is consistent with central banks meeting their 2% inflation targets in the medium term. There is a risk that inflation will overshoot these targets, leading to a possible surge in long-term inflation expectations that turbocharges the bond bear market. This is certainly possible, as highlighted by a recent Global Investment Strategy Quarterly Strategy Outlook. Pain in bond markets would be magnified in this case, especially if central banks are forced to aggressively defend their targets. Please note that we are not making the case that real global bond yields will quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. It will take time for the bond-bullish structural factors to unwind. It will also take time for inflation to gain any momentum, even in the United States. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations suggest that investors have adopted an overly benign view on the outlook for yields. For example, implied real short-term rates remain negative until 2021 in the U.S. and 2026 in the Eurozone, while they stay negative out to 2030 in the U.K. (Chart 16). We doubt that short-term rates will be negative for that long, given the structural factors discussed above. Another way of looking at this is presented in Chart 17. The market expects the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years to be only slightly above today's spot yield, which itself is not far above the lowest levels ever recorded. Market expectations are equally depressed for the 5-year forward rate for the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart 16Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Chart 17Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History The implication is that investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 It is true that observed household saving rates fell in some of the advanced economies, such as the United States, at a time when aging should have boosted savings from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. This argues against a strong demographic effect on savings. However, keep in mind that we are discussing desired (or ex-ante) savings. Ex-post, savings can go in the opposite direction because of other influencing factors. As discussed below, global savings must equal investment, which means that shifts in desired capital spending demand matter for the ex-post level of savings. 2 Arithmetically, if world trend GDP growth slows by one percentage point, then investment spending would need to drop by about 3½ percentage points of GDP to keep the capital/output ratio stable. 3 David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Vol 8, pp. 205-240 (October 2016). 4 Please see "Understanding The Downward Trend In Labor Income Shares," Chapter 3, IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2017). 5 In other words, while the household saving rate, as defined here to include health care spending by governments on behalf of households, will decline, any associated tax increases will blunt the impact on national savings (i.e., savings across the household, government, and business sectors). 6 Jong-Won Yoon, Jinill Kim, and Jungjin Lee, "Impact Of Demographic Changes On Inflation And The Macroeconomy," IMF Working Paper no. 14/210 (November 2014).

The fundamental drivers of the low rate world are considered by many to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields quite depressed by historical standards for years to come. However, some of the factors behind ultra-low interest rates have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. The age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. Global investment needs will wane along with population aging, but the majority of the effect on equilibrium interest rates is in the past. In contrast, the demographic effects that will depress desired savings are still to come. The net impact will be bond-bearish. Moreover, the massive positive labor supply shock, following the integration of China and Eastern Europe into the world's effective labor force, is over. Indeed, this shock is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power, sparking a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby placing upward pressure on global real bond yields. It is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. This could be inflationary if it disrupts global supply chains. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. As for China, the fundamental drivers of its savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Technological advance will remain a headwind for real wage gains, but at least the transition to a world that is less labor-abundant will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We are not making the case that real global bond yields are going to quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations for bond yields are too low. Investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. In the September 2016 The Bank Credit Analyst, we summarized the key drivers behind the major global macroeconomic disequilibria that have resulted in deflationary pressure, policy extremism, dismal productivity, and the lowest bond yields in recorded history (Chart II-1). The disequilibria include income inequality, the depressed wage share of GDP, lackluster capital spending, and excessive savings. Chart II-1Global Disequilibria May 2017 May 2017 The fundamental drivers of the low bond yield world are now well documented and understood by investors. These drivers generally are considered to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields and interest rates at historically low levels for years to come according to the consensus. Based on discussions with BCA clients, it appears that many have either "bought into" the secular stagnation thesis or, at a minimum, have adopted the view that growth headwinds preclude any meaningful rise in bond yields. However, bond investors might have been lulled into a false sense of security. Yields will not return to pre-Lehman norms anytime soon, but some of the factors behind the low-yield world have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. Most importantly, the age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. We have reached the tipping point. Equilibrium real bond yields will gradually move higher as a result. But before we discuss what is changing, it is important to review the drivers of today's macro disequilibria. Several of them predate the Great Financial Crisis, including demographic trends, technological advances, and the integration of China's massive workforce and excess savings into the global economy. Ultra-Low Rates: How Did We Get Here? (A) Demographics And Global Savings Chart II-2Global Shifts In The ##br##Saving And Investment Curves May 2017 May 2017 The so-called Global Savings Glut has been a bullish structural force for bonds for the past couple of decades. We won't go through all of the forces behind the glut, but a key factor is population aging in the advanced economies. Ex-ante desired savings rose as baby boomers entered their high-income years. The Great Financial Crisis only served to reinforce the desire to save, given the setback in the value of boomers' retirement nest eggs.1 The corporate sector also began to save more following the crisis. Even more importantly, the surge in China's trade surplus since the 1990s had to be recycled into the global pool of savings. While China's rate of investment was very high, its propensity to save increased even faster, resulting in a swollen external surplus and a massive net outflow of capital. Other emerging economies also made the adjustment from net importers of capital to net exporters following the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. By leaning into currency appreciation, these countries built up huge foreign exchange reserves that had to be recycled abroad. In theory, savings must equal investment at the global level and real interest rates shift to ensure this equilibrium (Chart II-2). China's excess savings, together with a greater desire to save in the developed countries, represented a shift in the saving schedule to the right. The result was downward pressure on global interest rates. (B) Demographics And Global Capital Spending Demographics and China's integration also affected the investment side of the equation. A slower pace of labor force growth in the developed countries resulted in a permanently lower level of capital spending relative to GDP. Slower consumer spending growth, as a result of a more moderate expansion in the working-age population, meant a reduced appetite for new factories, malls, and apartment buildings. Chart II-3 shows that the growth rate of global capital spending that is required to maintain a given capital-to-output ratio has dropped substantially, due to the dramatic slowdown in the growth of the world's working-age population.2 Keep in mind that this estimate refers only to the demographic component of investment spending. Actual capital expenditure growth will not be as weak as Chart II-3 suggests because firms will want to adopt new technologies for competitive or environmental reasons. Nonetheless, the point is that the structural tailwind for global capex from the post-war baby boom has disappeared. Chart II-3Demographics Are A Structural Headwind For Global Capex May 2017 May 2017 (C) Labor Supply Shock And Global Capital Spending While the working-age population ratio peaked in the developed countries years ago, it is a different story at the global level (Chart II-4). The integration of the Chinese and Eastern European workforces into the global labor pool during the 1990s and 2000s resulted in an effective doubling of global labor supply in a short period of time. Relative prices must adjust in the face of such a large boost in the supply of labor relative to capital. The sudden abundance of cheap labor depressed real wages from what they otherwise would have been, thus incentivizing firms to use more labor and less capital at the margin. The combination of slower working-age population growth in the advanced economies and a surge in the global labor force resulted in a decline in desired global capital spending. In terms of Chart II-2, the leftward shift of the investment schedule reinforced the impact of the savings impulse in placing downward pressure on global interest rates. (D) Labor Supply Shock And Income Inequality The wave of cheap labor also aggravated the trend toward greater inequality in the advanced economies and the downward trend in labor's share of the income pie (Chart II-5). In theory, a surge in the supply of labor is a positive "supply shock" that benefits both developed and developing countries. However, a recent report by David Autor and Gordon Hanson3 highlighted that trade agreements in the past were incremental and largely involved countries with similar income levels. The sudden entry of China to the global trade arena, involving a massive addition to the effective global stock of labor, was altogether different. The report does not argue that trade has become a "bad" thing. Rather, it points out that the adjustment costs imposed on the advanced economies were huge and long-lasting, as Chinese firms destroyed entire industries in developed countries. The lingering adjustment phase contributed to greater inequality in the major countries. Management was able to use the threat of outsourcing to gain the upper hand in wage negotiations. The result has been a rise in the share of income going to high-income earners in the Advanced Economies, at the expense of low- and middle-income earners (Chart II-6). The same is true, although to a lesser extent, in the emerging world. Chart II-4Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Chart II-5Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Chart II-6Hollowing Out Hollowing Out Hollowing Out Greater inequality, in turn, has weighed on aggregate demand and equilibrium interest rates because a larger share of total income flowed to the "rich" who tend to save more than the low- and middle-income classes. (E) The Dark Side Of Technology Advances in technology also contributed to rising inequality. In theory, new technologies hurt some workers in the short term, but benefit most workers in the long run because they raise national income. However, there is evidence that past major technological shocks were associated with a "hollowing out" or U-shaped pattern of employment. Low- and high-skilled employment increased, but the proportion of mid-skilled workers tended to shrink. Wages for both low- and mid-skilled labor did not keep up with those that were highly-skilled, leading to wider income disparity. Today, technology appears to be resulting in faster, wider and deeper degrees of hollowing-out than in previous periods of massive technological change. This may be because machines are not just replacing manual human tasks, but cognitive ones too. A recent IMF report made the case that technology and global integration played a dominant role in labor's declining fortunes. Technology alone explains about half of the drop in the labor share of income in the developed countries since 1980.4 Falling prices for capital goods, information and communications technology in particular, have facilitated the expansion of global value chains as firms unbundled production into many tasks that were distributed around the world in a way that minimized production costs. Chart II-7 highlights that the falling price of capital goods in the advanced economies went hand-in-hand with rising participation in global supply chains since 1990. Falling capital goods prices also accelerated the automation of routine tasks, contributing especially to job destruction in the developed (high-wage) economies. In other words, firms in the developed world either replaced workers with machinery in areas where technology permitted, or outsourced jobs to lower-wage countries in areas that remained labor-intensive. Both trends undermined labor's bargaining power, depressed labor's share of income, and contributed to inequality. The effects of technology, global integration, population aging and China's economic integration are demonstrated in Chart II-8. The world working-age-to-total population ratio rose sharply beginning in the late 1990s. This resulted in an upward trend in China's investment/GDP ratio, and a downward trend in the G7. The upward trend in the G7 capital stock-per-capita ratio began to slow as a result, before experiencing an unprecedented contraction after the Great Recession and Financial Crisis. Chart II-7Economic Integration And ##br##Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Chart II-8Macro Impact Of ##br##Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock The result has been a deflationary global backdrop characterized by demand deficiency and poor potential real GDP growth, both of which have depressed equilibrium global interest rates over the past 20 to 25 years. Transition Phase Chart II-9Working-Age Population ##br##To Shrink In G7 And China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China It would appear easy to conclude that these trends will be with us for another few decades because the demographic trends will not change anytime soon. Nonetheless, on closer inspection the global economy is transitioning from a period when cyclical economic pressures and all of the structural trends were pushing equilibrium interest rates in the same direction, to a period in which the economic cycle is becoming less bond-friendly and some of the secular drivers of low interest rates are gradually changing direction. First, the massive labor supply shock of the past few decades is over. The world working-age population ratio has peaked according to United Nations estimates. This ratio is already declining in the major advanced economies and is in the process of topping out in China. The absolute number of working-age people will shrink in China and the G7 countries over the next five years, although it will continue to grow at a low rate for the world as a whole (Chart II-9). Unions are unlikely to make a major comeback, but a backdrop that is less labor-abundant should gradually restore some worker bargaining power, especially as economies regain full employment. The resulting upward pressure on real wages will support capital spending as firms substitute toward capital and away from (increasingly expensive) labor. Consumer demand will also receive a boost if inequality moderates and the labor share of income begins to rise. Globalization On The Back Foot Chart II-10Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Second, it is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. Global exports appear to have peaked relative to GDP and average tariffs have ticked higher (Chart II-10). The World Trade Organization has announced that the number of new trade restrictions or impediments outweighed the number of trade liberalizing initiatives in 2016. The U.K. appears willing to sacrifice trade for limits to the free movement of people. The new U.S. Administration has ditched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is threatening to impose punitive tariffs on some trading partners. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. If the U.S. were to impose high tariffs on China, for example, it would make a part of the Chinese capital stock redundant overnight. In order for the global economy to produce the same amount of goods and services as before, the U.S. and other countries would need to invest more. Any unwinding of globalization would also be inflationary as it would disrupt international supply chains. Demographics And Saving: From Tailwind To Headwind... Third, the impact of savings in the major advanced economies and China on global interest rates will change direction as well. In the developed world, aggregate household savings will come under downward pressure as boomers increasingly shift into retirement. Economists are fond of employing the so-called life-cycle theory of consumer spending. According to this theory, consumers tend to smooth out lifetime spending by accumulating assets during the working years in order to maintain a certain living standard after retirement. The U.N. National Transfer Accounts Project has gathered data on spending and labor income by age cohort at a point in time. Chart II-11 presents the data for China and three of the major advanced economies. Chart II-11Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort The data for the advanced economies suggest that spending tends to rise sharply from a low level between birth and about 15 years of age. It continues to rise, albeit at a more modest pace, through the working years. Other studies have found that consumer spending falls during retirement. Nonetheless, these studies generally include only private spending and therefore do not include health care that is provided by the government. The data presented in Chart II-11 show that, if government-provided health care is included, personal spending rises sharply toward the end of life. The profile is somewhat different in China. Spending rises quickly from birth to about 20 years of age, and is roughly flat thereafter. Indeed, consumption edges lower after 75-80 years of age. These data allow us to project the impact of changing demographics on the average household saving rate in the coming years, assuming that the income and spending profiles shown in Chart II-11 are unchanged. We start by calculating the average saving rate across age cohorts given today's age structure. We then recalculate the average saving rate each year moving forward in time. The resulting saving rate changes along with the age structure of the population. The results are shown in Chart II-12. The saving rates for all four economies have been indexed at zero in 2016 for comparison purposes. The aggregate saving rate declines in all cases, falling between 4 and 8 percentage points between 2016 and 2030. Germany sees the largest drop of the four countries. Chart II-12Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving The simulations are meant to be suggestive, rather than a precise forecast, because the savings profile across age cohorts will adjust over time. Moreover, governments will no doubt raise taxes to cover the rising cost of health care, providing a partial offset in terms of the national saving rate.5 Nonetheless, the simulations highlight that the major economies are past the point where the baby boom generation is adding to the global savings pool at a faster pace than retirees are drawing from it. The age structure in the major advanced economies is far enough advanced that the rapid increase in the retirement rate will place substantial downward pressure on aggregate household savings in the coming years. It is well known that population aging will also undermine government budgets. Rising health care costs are already captured in our household saving rate projection because the data for household spending includes health care even if it is provided by the public sector. However, public pension schemes will also be a problem. To the extent that politicians are slow to trim pension benefits and/or raise taxes, public pension plans will be a growing drain on national savings. Could younger, less developed economies offset some of the demographic trends in China and the Advanced Economies? Numerically speaking, a more effective use of underutilized populations in Africa and India could go a long way. Nevertheless, deep-seated structural problems would have to be addressed and, even then, it is difficult to see either of these regions turning into the next "China story" given the current backlash against globalization and immigration. ...And The Capex Story Is Largely Behind Us Demographic trends also imply less capital spending relative to GDP, as discussed above. In terms of the impact on global equilibrium interest rates, it then becomes a race between falling saving and investment rates. Chart II-13Demographics And Capex Requirements May 2017 May 2017 Some analysts point to the Japanese experience because it is the leading edge in terms of global aging. Bond yields have been extremely low for many years even as the household saving rate collapsed, suggesting that ex-ante investment spending shifted by more than ex-ante savings. Nonetheless, Japan may not be a good example because the deterioration in the country's demographics coincided with burst bubbles in both real estate and stocks that hamstrung Japanese banks for decades. A series of policy mistakes made things worse. Economic theory is not clear on the net effect of demographics on savings and investment. The academic empirical evidence is inconclusive as well. However, a detailed IMF study of 30 OECD countries analyzed the demographic impact on a number of macroeconomic variables, including savings and investment.6 They estimated separate demographic effects for the old-age dependency ratio and the working-age population ratio. Applying the IMF's estimated model coefficients to projected changes in both of these ratios over the next decade suggests that the decline in ex-ante savings will exceed the ex-ante drop in capex requirements by about 1 percentage point of GDP. This is a non-trivial shift. Moreover, our simulations highlight that timing is important. The outlook for the household saving rate depends on the changing age structure of the population and the distribution of saving rates across age cohorts. Thus, the average saving rate will trend down as populations continue to age over the coming decades. In contrast, the impact of demographics on capital spending requirements is related to the change in the growth rate of the working-age population. Chart II-13 once again presents our estimates for the demographic component of capital spending. The top panel presents the world capex/GDP ratio that is necessary to maintain a constant capital/output ratio, and the bottom panel shows the change in that ratio. The important point is that the downward adjustment in world capex/GDP related to aging is now largely behind us because most of the deceleration in the growth rate of the working-age population is done. This is in contrast to the household saving rate adjustment where all of the adjustment is still to come. China Is Transitioning Too Chart II-14China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China must be treated separately from the developed countries because of its unique structural issues. As discussed above, household savings increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s (Chart II-14). This trend reflected a number of factors, including: the rising share of the working-age population; a drop in the fertility rate, following the introduction of the one-child policy in the late 1970s that allowed households to spend less on raising children and save more for retirement; health care reform in the early 1990s required households to bear a larger share of health care spending; and job security was also undermined by reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the late 1990s, leading to increased precautionary savings to cover possible bouts of unemployment. These savings tailwinds have turned around in recent years and the household saving rate appears to have peaked. China's contribution to the global pool of savings has already moderated significantly, as measured by the current account surplus. The surplus has withered from about 9% in 2008 to 2½% in 2016. A recent IMF study makes the case that China's national saving rate will continue to decline. The IMF estimates that for every one percentage-point rise in the old-age dependency ratio, the aggregate household saving rate will fall by 0.4-1 percentage points. In addition, the need for precautionary savings is expected to ease along with improvements in the social safety net, achieved through higher government spending on health care. The household saving rate will fall by three percentage points by 2021 according to the IMF (Chart II-15). Competitive pressure and an aging population will also reduce the saving rates of the corporate and government sectors. Chart II-15...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink Of course, investment as a share of GDP is projected to moderate too, reflecting a rebalancing of the economy away from exports and capital spending toward household consumption. The IMF expects that savings will moderate slightly faster than investment, leading to a narrowing in the current account surplus to almost zero by 2021. A lot of assumptions go into this type of forecast such that we must take it with a large grain of salt. Nonetheless, the fundamental drivers of China's savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Moreover, a return to large current account surpluses would likely require significant currency depreciation, which is a political non-starter given U.S. angst over trade. The risk is that China's excess savings will be less, not more, in five year's time. Tech Is A Wildcard It is extremely difficult to forecast the impact of technological advancement on the global economy. We cannot say with any conviction that the tech-related effects of "hollowing out", "winner-take-all" and the "skills premium" will moderate in the coming years. Nonetheless, these effects have occurred alongside a surge in the world's labor force and rapid globalization of supply chains, both of which reinforced the erosion of employee bargaining power. Looking ahead, technology will still be a headwind for some employees, but at least the transition from a world of excess labor to one that is more labor-scarce will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We will explore the impact of technology on productivity, inflation, growth, and bond yields in a companion report to be published in the next issue. Conclusion: The main points we made in this report are summarized in Table II-1. All of the structural factors driving real bond yields were working in the same (bullish) direction over the past 30-40 years. Looking ahead, it is uncertain how technological improvement will affect bond prices, but we expect that the others will shift (or have already shifted) to either neutral or outright bond-bearish. Table II-1Key Secular Drivers May 2017 May 2017 No doubt, our views that globalization and inequality have peaked, and that the labor share of income has bottomed, are speculative. These factors may not place much upward pressure on equilibrium yields. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the demographic effect that has depressed capital spending demand is well advanced. We see it shifting from a positive factor for bond prices to a neutral factor in the coming years. It is also clear that the massive positive labor supply shock is over, and is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power and the resulting boost consumer spending will be negative for bonds. This may also spark a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby place additional upward pressure on global real bond yields. Admittedly, however, this last point requires more research because theory and empirical evidence on it are not clear. Perhaps most importantly, the aging of the population in the advanced economies has reached a tipping point; retirees will drain more from the pool of savings than the working-age population will add to it in the coming years. We have concentrated on real equilibrium bond yields in this report because it is the part of nominal yields that is the most depressed relative to historical norms. The inflation component is only a little below a level that is consistent with central banks meeting their 2% inflation targets in the medium term. There is a risk that inflation will overshoot these targets, leading to a possible surge in long-term inflation expectations that turbocharges the bond bear market. This is certainly possible, as highlighted by a recent Global Investment Strategy Quarterly Strategy Outlook.7 Pain in bond markets would be magnified in this case, especially if central banks are forced to aggressively defend their targets. Please note that we are not making the case that real global bond yields will quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. It will take time for the bond-bullish structural factors to unwind. It will also take time for inflation to gain any momentum, even in the United States. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations suggest that investors have adopted an overly benign view on the outlook for yields. For example, implied real short-term rates remain negative until 2021 in the U.S. and 2026 in the Eurozone, while they stay negative out to 2030 in the U.K. (Chart II-16). We doubt that short-term rates will be negative for that long, given the structural factors discussed above. Chart II-16Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Another way of looking at this is presented in Chart II-17. The market expects the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years to be only slightly above today's spot yield, which itself is not far above the lowest levels ever recorded. Market expectations are equally depressed for the 5-year forward rate for the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart II-17Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History The implication is that investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 It is true that observed household savings rates fell in some of the advanced economies, such as the United States, at a time when aging should have boosted savings from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. This argues against a strong demographic effect on savings. However, keep in mind that we are discussing desired (or ex-ante) savings. Ex-post, savings can go in the opposite direction because of other influencing factors. As discussed below, global savings must equal investment, which means that shifts in desired capital spending demand matter for the ex-post level of savings. 2 Arithmetically, if world trend GDP growth slows by one percentage point, then investment spending would need to drop by about 3½ percentage points of GDP to keep the capital/output ratio stable. 3 David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 205-240 (October 2016). 4 Please see "Understanding The Downward Trend In Labor Income Shares," Chapter 3 in the IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2017). 5 In other words, while the household savings rate, as defined here to include health care spending by governments on behalf of households, will decline, any associated tax increases will blunt the impact on national savings (i.e. savings across the household, government and business sectors). 6 Jong-Won Yoon, Jinill Kim, and Jungjin Lee, "Impact Of Demographic Changes On Inflation And The Macroeconomy," IMF Working Paper no. 14/210 (November 2014). 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook: Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Financial markets have returned to 'risk on' in late April, after becoming overly gloomy on the growth, political and policy outlooks in recent months. There are also some worrying signs in our global forward-looking growth indicators for 2018, and Chinese policy is tightening. Nonetheless, investors read too much into the distorted U.S. first-quarter economic data. They also went too far in pricing out U.S. fiscal action. It is positive for risk assets that centrist candidate Macron is poised to win the French election and we do not see much risk for markets lurking in the German election. Italian elections could be troublesome, but that is a story for next year. The fact that China finally appears willing to apply pressure to Pyongyang is good news. North Korea might be persuaded to freeze its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for a non-aggression pact from the U.S. and a lifting of sanctions. Disappointing U.S. Q1 real GDP growth largely reflects weather and seasonal adjustment factors. The deceleration in bank credit growth is also temporary. The window for reflation trades will remain open for most of this year because the underlying economic and profit fundamentals remain constructive. Importantly, signs of improving pricing power in the U.S. corporate sector are finally emerging, which should allow margins to expand somewhat in the coming quarters. The bond rally has depressed yields to a level that makes fixed-income instruments highly vulnerable to a reversal of the factors that sparked the rally. Market expectations for the fed funds rate are far too benign. The ECB will announce the next tapering step later this year, and may remove the negative deposit rate. But the central bank will not be in a position to lift the refi rate for some time. Yield spreads will shift in a way that allows one last upleg in the U.S. dollar. The recent pullback in oil prices will not last, as OPEC and Russia manage global stockpiles lower this year. Feature Chart I-1Reflation Trades Returning? Reflation Trades Returning? Reflation Trades Returning? Traders and investors gave up on the global reflation story in early April, sending the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield below the year's trading range. Missile strikes, European elections and U.S. saber rattling regarding North Korea lifted the allure of safe havens such as government bonds (Chart I-1). At the same time, the Fed was unwilling to revise up the 'dot plot', doubts grew over the ability of the Trump Administration to deliver any stimulus and U.S. data releases disappointed. The major equity indexes held up well against the onslaught of bad news, but looked increasingly vulnerable as April wore on. The market gloom was overdone in our view, and it appears that financial markets have now returned to a 'risk on' phase. It is difficult to forecast the ebb and flow of geopolitical news so we cannot rule out another bout of risk aversion. Nonetheless, the global economic backdrop remains upbeat and tensions regarding North Korea have eased. President Trump also unveiled his Administration's tax reform plan, raising hopes of a fiscal boost to the economy. Moreover, investors have read too much into the distorted U.S. first quarter data, and our corporate pricing power indicators support our constructive earnings view in 2017. There are clouds hanging over the outlook for 2018, but the backdrop will favor risk assets for most of this year. Investors should remain overweight equities versus bonds and cash, and bullish the dollar. Geopolitics Weigh On Risk Tolerance President Trump's military show of force in Asia and comments about "losing patience" with North Korea have the world on edge. The U.S. has acted tough with the regime before, but nothing beyond economic sanctions ever materialized. The balance of power vis-à-vis China and the military threat to South Korea made North Korea a stalemate. Nonetheless, our geopolitical team argues that the calculus of the standoff is changing. Most importantly, the rogue regime is getting closer to being capable of hitting the U.S. with long-range missiles. Second, China is unhappy with the increased U.S. military presence in its backyard that North Korea is inviting. China also sees North Korea's missile tests as a threat to its own security. Third, the U.S. is prepared to use the threat of trade sanctions as leverage with Beijing. It is demanding that China use its own economic leverage to convince North Korea to freeze its nuclear and missile programs. We do not believe that an attack on North Korea is imminent. But doing nothing is not an option either. Our base case is that the U.S. military's muscle-flexing is designed to force North Korea to the negotiating table. The fact that China finally appears willing to apply pressure to Pyongyang is good news. Over the next four years, the North might be persuaded to freeze its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for a non-aggression pact from the U.S. and a lifting of sanctions. The safe-haven bid in the Treasury market will moderate if Kim Jong-un agrees to negotiations. That said, this is probably North Korea's last chance to show it can be pragmatic. A failure of negotiations would induce a real crisis in which the U.S. contemplates unilateral action. It would be a bad sign if North Korea's long-range missile tests continue, are successful, and show greater distances. Chart I-2Macron Appears Set For Victory Macron Appears Set For Victory Macron Appears Set For Victory Turning to Europe, investors breathed a sigh of relief following the first round of the French Presidential election. The pre-election polls turned out to be correct, and our Geopolitical Team has no reason to doubt the polls regarding the second round (Chart I-2). We expect Macron to sweep to victory on May 7 because Le Pen will struggle to get any voters from the candidates exiting the race. What should investors expect of a Macron presidency? A combination of President Macron and a right-leaning National Assembly should be able to accomplish some reforms. Several prominent center-right figures have already come out in support of Macron, perhaps to throw their name in the ring for the next prime minister. This is positive for the markets as it means that French economic policy will be run by the center-right, with an ultra-Europhile as president. Over in the U.K., the big news in April was Prime Minister Theresa May's decision to hold a snap election, which reduces the risk of a "hard Brexit". The current slim 12-seat majority that the Conservatives hold in Parliament has made May highly dependent on a small band of hardline Tories who would rather see negotiations break down than acquiesce to any of the EU's demands, including that the U.K. pay the remaining £60 billion portion of its contribution to the EU's 2014-20 budget. If the Conservatives are able to increase their seats in Parliament - as current opinion polls suggest is likely - May will have greater flexibility in reaching an agreement with Brussels and will face less of a risk that Parliament shoots down the final deal. U.S. Fiscal Policy: Positive For 2017, But Long-Term Negative Chart I-3Long-Term U.S. Budget Pressures Long-Term U.S. Budget Pressures Long-Term U.S. Budget Pressures The drama will be no less interesting in Washington in the coming weeks. As we go to press, Congress is struggling to pass a bill to keep the U.S. government running through the end of fiscal year 2017 (the deadline is the end of April). We expect a deal will get done, but a partial government shutdown lasting a few weeks could occur. Separately, Congress will need to approve an increase in the debt ceiling by July-September in order for the Treasury to avoid defaulting on payments. Both events could see temporary safe-haven flows into Treasurys. However, markets may have gone too far in pricing-out tax cuts or fiscal stimulus. For example, high tax-rate companies have given back all of their post-election equity gains. Even if Republicans are unable to overhaul the tax code, this will not prevent them from simply cutting corporate and personal taxes. "Dynamic scoring" will be used to support the argument that the tax cuts will self-funding through faster growth. We also expect that Trump will get his way on at least a modest amount of infrastructure spending. The so-called Trump trades may wither again in 2018, but we see a window this year in which the stock-to-bond total return ratio lifts as growth expectations rebound. Looking further ahead, it seems likely that the U.S. budget deficit is headed significantly higher. Health care and pension cost pressures related to population aging are well known (Chart I-3). A recent Special Report by BCA's Martin Barnes highlighted that "it is not reasonable to believe that there can be tax cuts and increases in defense spending and domestic security, while protecting entitlement programs and preventing a massive rise in the budget deficit."1 There is simply not enough non-defense discretionary spending to cut. Larger U.S. Federal budget deficits could lead to a widening fiscal risk premium in Treasury yields, although that may take years to show up. Perhaps more importantly, the U.S. government sector will be a larger drain on the global pool of available savings in the coming years. We highlight in this month's Special Report, beginning on page 20, that there are several key macro inflection points under way that will temper the "global savings glut" and begin to place upward pressure on global bond yields. A Temporary Soft Patch Or Something Worse? The first quarter GDP report for the U.S. is due out as we go to press, and growth is widely expected to be quite weak. The retail sales and PCE consumer spending data have fed concerns that the U.S. economy is running out of gas, despite the surge in the survey data such as the ISM. We believe that growth fears are overdone. Financial markets should be accustomed to weak readings on first quarter GDP. Over the past 22 years, the first quarter has been the weakest of the four on 12 occasions, or 55% of the time. Second quarter GDP growth has been faster than Q1 growth 70% of the time. A large part of the depressed Q1 GDP growth rate and lackluster "hard data" readings likely reflect poor seasonal adjustment and weather distortions. The "soft" survey data are more consistent with the labor market. Aggregate hours worked managed to increase by 1.5% at an annualized rate in Q1. If GDP growth really was barely above zero, this would imply an outright decline in the level of labor productivity. Even in a world where structural productivity growth is lower than it was in the past, this strikes us as rather implausible. The March reading of the Conference Board's Leading Economic Indicator provided no warning that underlying growth is about to trail off, although a couple of the regional Fed surveys have pulled back from their recent highs. With April shaping up to be warmer than usual across the U.S., we expect a bounce back in the weather-impacted "hard" data in May and June. What about the slowdown in commercial and industrial loan growth and corporate bond issuance late in 2016 and into early 2017? This is a worry, but it partly reflects the lagged effects of the contraction in capital spending in the energy patch. C&I loan growth is still responding to the surge in defaults that resulted from the energy sector's 2014 collapse. Now that the defaults have waned, this process will soon go into reverse. Higher profits more recently have permitted these firms to pay back old bank loans, while also enabling them to finance new capital expenditures using internally-generated funds. In addition, the rising appetite for corporate debt has allowed more companies to access the bond market. According to Bloomberg, the U.S. leveraged-loan market saw $434 bn in issuance in Q1, the highest level on record (Chart I-4). The rest we chalk up to uncertainty surrounding the U.S. election. The recent spikes in the political uncertainty index correspond with the U.K.'s vote to leave the European Union as well as the U.S. election in November. There has been a close correlation between these spikes and the deceleration in C&I loan growth. CEOs are also holding back on capex in anticipation of new tax breaks from Congress. The good news is that bond issuance has rebounded strongly in January and February of this year (Chart I-5). The soft March U.S. CPI release also appeared to be quirky, showing a rare decline in the core price level in March (Chart I-6). However, the March reading followed two months of extremely strong gains and it still appears as though measures of core inflation put in a cyclical bottom in early 2015. While our CPI diffusion index is still below zero, signaling that inflation is likely to remain soft during the next couple of months, it would be premature to suggest that the gradual uptrend in core inflation has reversed. Chart I-4U.S. Bank Credit Slowdown Is Temporary U.S. Bank Credit Slowdown Is Temporary U.S. Bank Credit Slowdown Is Temporary Chart I-5U.S. Corporate Bond Issuance Is Rebounding U.S. Corporate Bond Issuance Is Rebounding U.S. Corporate Bond Issuance Is Rebounding Chart I-6U.S. Inflation: Sogginess Won't Last U.S. Inflation: Sogginess Won't Last U.S. Inflation: Sogginess Won't Last Global Economic Data Still Upbeat For the major industrialized economies as a group, the so-called "hard" data are moving in line with the "soft" survey data for the most part. For example, retail sales growth continues to accelerate, reaching 4½% in February on a year-over-year basis (Chart I-7). This follows the sharp improvement in consumer confidence. Manufacturing production growth is also accelerating to the upside, in line with the PMIs. The global manufacturing sector is rebounding smartly after last year's recession that was driven by the collapse in oil prices and a global inventory correction. Readers may be excused for jumping to the conclusion that the rebound is largely in the energy space, but this is not true. Production growth in the energy sector is close to zero on a year-over-year basis, and is negative on a 3-month rate of change basis (Chart I-8). The growth pickup has been in the other major sectors, including consumer-related goods, capital goods and technology. In the U.S., non-energy production has boomed over the six months to March (Chart I-9). Chart I-7Global Pick-Up On Track Global Pick-Up On Track Global Pick-Up On Track Chart I-8Manufacturing Rebound Is Not About Energy Manufacturing Rebound Is Not About Energy Manufacturing Rebound Is Not About Energy Chart I-9U.S.: Non-Energy Production Surging U.S.: Non-Energy Production Surging U.S.: Non-Energy Production Surging The weak spot on the global data front has been capital goods orders (Chart I-7). We only have data for the big three economies - the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone - but growth is near zero or slightly negative for all three. These data are perplexing because they are at odds with an acceleration in the production of capital goods (noted above) and a pickup in capital goods imports for 20 economies (Chart I-7, third panel). Improving CEO sentiment, accelerating profit growth and activity surveys all suggest that capital goods orders will catch up in the coming months. That said, one risk to our positive capex outlook in the U.S. is that the Republicans fail to deliver on their promises. This is not our base case, but current capex plans could be cancelled or put on indefinite hold were there to be no corporate tax cuts or immediate expensing of capital spending. As for China, the economic data are holding up well and deflationary pressures have eased. Fears of a debt crisis have also ebbed somewhat. That said, fiscal and monetary stimulus is fading and it is a worrying sign that money and credit growth have decelerated because they tend to lead production. Our China experts believe that growth will be solid in the first half of the year, but they would not be surprised to see a deceleration in real GDP growth in the second half that would weigh on commodity prices. Bond Market Vulnerable To Fed Re-Rating A rebound in the U.S. activity data in the coming months should keep the Fed on track to raise rates at least two more times in 2017. A May rate hike is unlikely, but we would not rule out June. The bond market is vulnerable to a re-rating of the path for the fed funds rate because only 45 basis points of tightening is priced for the next 12 months. This is far too low if growth rebounds as we expect. The FOMC also announced that it intends to start shrinking its balance sheet later this year by ceasing to reinvest both its MBS and Treasury holdings. Our bond strategists do not think this by itself will have much of an impact on Treasurys because yields will continue to be closely tied to realized inflation and the expected number of rate hikes during the next 12 months (Chart I-10). Fed policymakers are trying to de-emphasize the size of the balance sheet and would rather investors focus on the fed funds rate to assess the stance of monetary policy. It is a different story for mortgage-backed securities, however, where spreads will be pressured wider by the lack of Fed purchases. All four of our main forward-looking global economic indicators appear to have topped out, except the Global Leading Economic Indicator (GLEI), suggesting that the period of maximum growth acceleration has past (Chart I-11). Nonetheless, all four are still consistent with robust growth. They would have to weaken significantly before they warned of a sustained bond bull market. Chart I-10Shrinking Fed Balance Sheet: ##br##Bearish For Bonds? Shrinking Fed Balance Sheet: Bearish For Bonds? Shrinking Fed Balance Sheet: Bearish For Bonds? Chart I-11Leading Indicators: ##br##Some Worrying Signs Leading Indicators: Some Worrying Signs Leading Indicators: Some Worrying Signs The rapid decline in the diffusion index, based on the 22 countries that comprise our GLEI, is the most concerning at the moment. The LEIs for two major economies and two emerging economies dipped slightly in February, such that roughly half of the country LEIs rose and half fell in the month. While it is too early to hit the panic button, the diffusion index is worth watching closely; a decline below 50 for several months would indicate that a peak in the GLEI is approaching. The bottom line is that global bond yields have overshot on the downside: underlying U.S. growth is not as weak as the Q1 figures suggest; market expectations for the fed funds rate are too benign; the Republicans will push ahead with tax cuts and infrastructure spending; the global economy has healthy momentum, and the majority of the items on our Duration Checklist suggest that the bond bear market will resume; the ECB will announce another tapering of its asset purchase program this autumn, placing upward pressure on the term premium in bond yields across the major markets; and the Treasury and bund markets no longer appear as oversold as they did after the rapid run-up in yields following last November's U.S. elections. Large short positions have largely unwound. For the U.S., we expect that the 10-year yield to rise to the upper end of the recent 2.3%-2.6% trading range in the next couple of months, before eventually breaking out on the way to the 2.8%-3% area by year-end. We recommend keeping duration short of benchmarks within fixed-income portfolios. One Last Leg In The Dollar Bull Market Chart I-12ECB In No Hurry To Lift Rates ECB In No Hurry To Lift Rates ECB In No Hurry To Lift Rates While we see upside for the money market curve in the U.S., the same cannot be said in the Eurozone. The economic data have undoubtedly been robust. The composite PMI is booming and capital goods orders are in a clear uptrend. Led by gains in both manufacturing and services, the composite PMI rose from 56.4 in March to 56.7 in April, a six-year high. The current PMI reading is easily consistent with over 2.0% real GDP growth (Chart I-12). This compares favorably to the sub-1% estimates of trend growth in the euro area. Private sector credit growth reached 2½% earlier this year, the fastest pace since July 2009. Despite this good news, the ECB is in no rush to lift interest rates. The central bank will taper its asset purchase program further in 2018, but ECB President Draghi has made it clear that he will not raise the refi rate until well after all asset purchases have been completed, which probably will not be until late 2019 at the earliest (although the ECB could eliminate the negative deposit rate to ease the pressure on banks). Unemployment is still a problem in Spain and Italy, while core CPI inflation fell back to just 0.7% in March. The euro could strengthen further in the near term if Macron wins the second round of the French elections, easing euro break-up fears. Nonetheless, we expect the euro to trend lower on a medium-term horizon versus the dollar as rate expectations move further in favor of the greenback. Some real rate divergence is already priced into money and currency markets, but there is room for forward real spreads to widen further, possibly pushing the euro to parity versus the dollar before this cycle is over. We are also bullish the dollar versus the yen for similar reasons. On a broad trade-weighted basis, we still expect the dollar to rally by another 10%. Positive Signs For U.S. Corporate Pricing Power Chart I-13U.S. Corporations Gaining Pricing Power U.S. Corporations Gaining Pricing Power U.S. Corporations Gaining Pricing Power Turning to the equity market, it is still early days for Q1 U.S. earnings, but the results so far are positive for a pro-risk asset allocation. After a disappointing Q4, positive Q1 earnings surprises for the S&P 500 are on track to match their highest level in two years, with revenue surprises also materially higher than previous quarters. At the industry level, banks and capital goods companies stand out: the former registered an earnings beat of nearly 8%, and it was nearly 12% for the latter. We highlighted the positive 2017 outlook for U.S. corporate profits in our March 2017 Monthly Report. Earnings growth is in a catch-up phase following last year's profit recession, which was related to energy prices and a temporary slowdown in nominal GDP growth relative to aggregate labor costs. Proprietary indicators from our sister publication, the U.S. Equity Sectors Strategy service, confirm our thesis. First, deflation pressures appear to be abating. A modest revival in corporate pricing power is underway according to our Pricing Power Proxy (Chart I-13). It is constructed from proxies for selling prices in almost 50 industries. Importantly, the rise in the Proxy is broadly-based across industries (as shown by the diffusion index in the chart). As a side note, the Profit Proxy provides some evidence that recent softness in core CPI inflation will not last. Second, the upward march of wage growth appears to be taking a breather (Chart I-13). Average hourly earnings growth has softened in recent months. Broader measures, such as the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker, tell a similar story. We do not expect wage growth to decelerate much given tightness in the labor market. Nonetheless, the combination of firming pricing power and contained wage growth (for now) suggests that margins will continue to expand modestly in the first half of the year. Our model even suggests that U.S. EPS growth has a very good shot at matching perpetually-optimistic bottom-up estimates for 2017 (Chart I-14). Many companies have supported per share profits in this expansion via share buybacks, often funded through debt issuance. This has generated some angst that companies are sacrificing long-term earnings growth potential for short-term EPS growth. This appeared to be the case early in the expansion, but the story is less compelling today. Chart I-15 compares the cumulative dollar value of equity buybacks and dividends in this expansion with the previous three expansion phases. The cumulative dollar values are divided by cumulative nominal GDP to make the data comparable across cycles. By this metric, capital spending has lagged previous expansion, but not by much. While capital spending growth has been weak, the same is true for GDP. Chart I-14U.S. Profit Model Is Very Upbeat U.S. Profit Model Is Very Upbeat U.S. Profit Model Is Very Upbeat Chart I-15U.S. Corporate Finance Cycle Comparison May 2017 May 2017 Dividend payments have been stronger than the three previous expansions. Buyback activity was also more aggressive compared with the 1990s and 2000s, although repurchase activity has been roughly in line with the expansion that ended in 2007. Net equity issuance since 2009, which includes the impact of IPOs, share buybacks and M&A activity, has not been out of line with previous expansions (positive values shown in Chart I-15 represent net equity withdrawals). CFOs have not been radically different in this cycle in terms of apportioning funds between capital spending and returning cash to shareholders. Nonetheless, buybacks have boosted EPS growth by almost 2% over the past year according to our proxy (Chart I-16). We expect this tailwind to continue given the positive reading from our Capital Structure Preference Indicator (third panel). Firms have a financial incentive to issue debt and buy back shares when the indicator is above zero. Stronger global growth should continue to power an acceleration in corporate earnings outside the U.S. over the remainder of the year. Chart I-17 shows that the global earnings revision ratio has turned positive for the first time in six years, implying that analysts have been behind the curve in revising up profit projections. Our profit indicators remain constructive for the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. Chart I-16Incentive To Buy Back ##br##Stock Remains Strong Incentive To Buy Back Stock Remains Strong Incentive To Buy Back Stock Remains Strong Chart I-17Global Profit ##br##Growth On The Upswing Global Profit Growth On The Upswing Global Profit Growth On The Upswing It is disconcerting that the rally in oil prices has faltered in recent days as investors worry that increased U.S. shale production will thwart OPEC's plans to trim bloated inventories. A breakdown in oil prices could spark a major correction in the broader equity market. Indeed, commercial oil inventories finished the first quarter with a minimal draw. The aim of last year's agreement between OPEC and Russia to remove some 1.8mn b/d of oil production from the market in 2017 H1 was to get visible inventories down to five-year average levels. They are well short of that goal. Without trimming stockpiles to more normal levels, storage capacity remains too close to topping out, which raises the risk of another price collapse. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like Saudi Arabia, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector. This is the reason why our commodity strategists expect the OPEC/Russia production cuts to be extended when OPEC meets on May 25. This will significantly raise the odds that OECD commercial oil stocks will be drawn down to more normal levels. We expect WTI and Brent to trade on either side of $60/bbl by December, and to average $55/bbl to 2020. Investment Conclusions Financial markets have returned to 'risk on' in late April, after becoming overly gloomy on the growth, political and policy outlooks in recent months. Admittedly, some of the U.S. data have been disappointing given the extremely upbeat survey numbers. There are also some worrying signs in our global forward-looking growth indicators, and Chinese policy is tightening. Nonetheless, investors read too much into the distorted U.S. economic data in the first quarter. They also went too far in pricing out U.S. fiscal action. As for European political risk, centrist candidate Macron is poised to win the French election and we do not see much risk for markets lurking in the German election. There are legitimate reasons to be concerned about the economic and profit outlook in 2018. Nonetheless, we believe that the window for reflation trades will remain open for most of this year because the underlying economic and profit fundamentals are constructive. The passage of market-friendly fiscal policies in the U.S. later in 2017 will be icing on the cake. Perhaps more importantly, we are finally seeing signs that pricing power in the U.S. corporate sector is improving, allowing margins to expand somewhat in the coming quarters. Our profit models remain upbeat for the major advanced economies and for China. It has been frustrating for those investors looking for an equity buying opportunity. Despite the surge in defensive assets such as gold and Treasurys, the major equity bourses did not correct by much. Value remains stretched in all of the risk asset classes. Nonetheless, investors should stay positioned for another upleg in the stock-to-bond total return ratio in the coming months. Perhaps the largest risk lies in the bond market. The rally has depressed yields to a level that makes bonds highly vulnerable to a reversal of the factors that sparked the rally. Within an underweight allocation to fixed-income in balanced portfolios, investors should overweight investment- and speculative-grade corporate bonds in the U.S. and U.K. We are more cautious on Eurozone corporates as the ECB's support for that sector will moderate. Looking ahead to next year, our bond strategists foresee a shift to underweight credit given the advanced nature of the releveraging cycle in the U.S. corporate sector. Our other recommendations include: Within global government bond portfolios, overweight JGBs and underweight Treasurys. Gilts and core Eurozone bonds are at benchmark. Underweight the periphery of Europe. Overweight European and Japanese equities versus the U.S. in currency-hedged terms. Continue to favor defensive over cyclical equity sectors in the U.S. for now, but a shift may be required later this year. Overweight the dollar versus the other major currencies. Stay cautious on EM bonds, stocks and currencies. Overweight small cap stocks versus large in the U.S. market. Recent underperformance is a buying opportunity. Value has improved and cyclical conditions favor small caps. Stay exposed to oil-related assets, and favor oil to base metals within commodity portfolios. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst April 27, 2017 Next Report: May 25, 2017 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "U.S. Fiscal Policy: Facts, Fallacies and Fantasies," dated April 5, 207, available at bca.bcaresearch.com II. Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds The fundamental drivers of the low rate world are considered by many to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields quite depressed by historical standards for years to come. However, some of the factors behind ultra-low interest rates have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. The age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. Global investment needs will wane along with population aging, but the majority of the effect on equilibrium interest rates is in the past. In contrast, the demographic effects that will depress desired savings are still to come. The net impact will be bond-bearish. Moreover, the massive positive labor supply shock, following the integration of China and Eastern Europe into the world's effective labor force, is over. Indeed, this shock is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power, sparking a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby placing upward pressure on global real bond yields. It is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. This could be inflationary if it disrupts global supply chains. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. As for China, the fundamental drivers of its savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Technological advance will remain a headwind for real wage gains, but at least the transition to a world that is less labor-abundant will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We are not making the case that real global bond yields are going to quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations for bond yields are too low. Investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. In the September 2016 The Bank Credit Analyst, we summarized the key drivers behind the major global macroeconomic disequilibria that have resulted in deflationary pressure, policy extremism, dismal productivity, and the lowest bond yields in recorded history (Chart II-1). The disequilibria include income inequality, the depressed wage share of GDP, lackluster capital spending, and excessive savings. Chart II-1Global Disequilibria May 2017 May 2017 The fundamental drivers of the low bond yield world are now well documented and understood by investors. These drivers generally are considered to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields and interest rates at historically low levels for years to come according to the consensus. Based on discussions with BCA clients, it appears that many have either "bought into" the secular stagnation thesis or, at a minimum, have adopted the view that growth headwinds preclude any meaningful rise in bond yields. However, bond investors might have been lulled into a false sense of security. Yields will not return to pre-Lehman norms anytime soon, but some of the factors behind the low-yield world have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. Most importantly, the age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. We have reached the tipping point. Equilibrium real bond yields will gradually move higher as a result. But before we discuss what is changing, it is important to review the drivers of today's macro disequilibria. Several of them predate the Great Financial Crisis, including demographic trends, technological advances, and the integration of China's massive workforce and excess savings into the global economy. Ultra-Low Rates: How Did We Get Here? (A) Demographics And Global Savings Chart II-2Global Shifts In The Saving ##br##And Investment Curves May 2017 May 2017 The so-called Global Savings Glut has been a bullish structural force for bonds for the past couple of decades. We won't go through all of the forces behind the glut, but a key factor is population aging in the advanced economies. Ex-ante desired savings rose as baby boomers entered their high-income years. The Great Financial Crisis only served to reinforce the desire to save, given the setback in the value of boomers' retirement nest eggs.1 The corporate sector also began to save more following the crisis. Even more importantly, the surge in China's trade surplus since the 1990s had to be recycled into the global pool of savings. While China's rate of investment was very high, its propensity to save increased even faster, resulting in a swollen external surplus and a massive net outflow of capital. Other emerging economies also made the adjustment from net importers of capital to net exporters following the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. By leaning into currency appreciation, these countries built up huge foreign exchange reserves that had to be recycled abroad. In theory, savings must equal investment at the global level and real interest rates shift to ensure this equilibrium (Chart II-2). China's excess savings, together with a greater desire to save in the developed countries, represented a shift in the saving schedule to the right. The result was downward pressure on global interest rates. (B) Demographics And Global Capital Spending Demographics and China's integration also affected the investment side of the equation. A slower pace of labor force growth in the developed countries resulted in a permanently lower level of capital spending relative to GDP. Slower consumer spending growth, as a result of a more moderate expansion in the working-age population, meant a reduced appetite for new factories, malls, and apartment buildings. Chart II-3 shows that the growth rate of global capital spending that is required to maintain a given capital-to-output ratio has dropped substantially, due to the dramatic slowdown in the growth of the world's working-age population.2 Keep in mind that this estimate refers only to the demographic component of investment spending. Actual capital expenditure growth will not be as weak as Chart II-3 suggests because firms will want to adopt new technologies for competitive or environmental reasons. Nonetheless, the point is that the structural tailwind for global capex from the post-war baby boom has disappeared. Chart II-3Demographics Are A Structural Headwind For Global Capex May 2017 May 2017 (C) Labor Supply Shock And Global Capital Spending While the working-age population ratio peaked in the developed countries years ago, it is a different story at the global level (Chart II-4). The integration of the Chinese and Eastern European workforces into the global labor pool during the 1990s and 2000s resulted in an effective doubling of global labor supply in a short period of time. Relative prices must adjust in the face of such a large boost in the supply of labor relative to capital. The sudden abundance of cheap labor depressed real wages from what they otherwise would have been, thus incentivizing firms to use more labor and less capital at the margin. The combination of slower working-age population growth in the advanced economies and a surge in the global labor force resulted in a decline in desired global capital spending. In terms of Chart II-2, the leftward shift of the investment schedule reinforced the impact of the savings impulse in placing downward pressure on global interest rates. (D) Labor Supply Shock And Income Inequality The wave of cheap labor also aggravated the trend toward greater inequality in the advanced economies and the downward trend in labor's share of the income pie (Chart II-5). In theory, a surge in the supply of labor is a positive "supply shock" that benefits both developed and developing countries. However, a recent report by David Autor and Gordon Hanson3 highlighted that trade agreements in the past were incremental and largely involved countries with similar income levels. The sudden entry of China to the global trade arena, involving a massive addition to the effective global stock of labor, was altogether different. The report does not argue that trade has become a "bad" thing. Rather, it points out that the adjustment costs imposed on the advanced economies were huge and long-lasting, as Chinese firms destroyed entire industries in developed countries. The lingering adjustment phase contributed to greater inequality in the major countries. Management was able to use the threat of outsourcing to gain the upper hand in wage negotiations. The result has been a rise in the share of income going to high-income earners in the Advanced Economies, at the expense of low- and middle-income earners (Chart II-6). The same is true, although to a lesser extent, in the emerging world. Chart II-4Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Chart II-5Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Chart II-6Hollowing Out Hollowing Out Hollowing Out Greater inequality, in turn, has weighed on aggregate demand and equilibrium interest rates because a larger share of total income flowed to the "rich" who tend to save more than the low- and middle-income classes. (E) The Dark Side Of Technology Advances in technology also contributed to rising inequality. In theory, new technologies hurt some workers in the short term, but benefit most workers in the long run because they raise national income. However, there is evidence that past major technological shocks were associated with a "hollowing out" or U-shaped pattern of employment. Low- and high-skilled employment increased, but the proportion of mid-skilled workers tended to shrink. Wages for both low- and mid-skilled labor did not keep up with those that were highly-skilled, leading to wider income disparity. Today, technology appears to be resulting in faster, wider and deeper degrees of hollowing-out than in previous periods of massive technological change. This may be because machines are not just replacing manual human tasks, but cognitive ones too. A recent IMF report made the case that technology and global integration played a dominant role in labor's declining fortunes. Technology alone explains about half of the drop in the labor share of income in the developed countries since 1980.4 Falling prices for capital goods, information and communications technology in particular, have facilitated the expansion of global value chains as firms unbundled production into many tasks that were distributed around the world in a way that minimized production costs. Chart II-7 highlights that the falling price of capital goods in the advanced economies went hand-in-hand with rising participation in global supply chains since 1990. Falling capital goods prices also accelerated the automation of routine tasks, contributing especially to job destruction in the developed (high-wage) economies. In other words, firms in the developed world either replaced workers with machinery in areas where technology permitted, or outsourced jobs to lower-wage countries in areas that remained labor-intensive. Both trends undermined labor's bargaining power, depressed labor's share of income, and contributed to inequality. The effects of technology, global integration, population aging and China's economic integration are demonstrated in Chart II-8. The world working-age-to-total population ratio rose sharply beginning in the late 1990s. This resulted in an upward trend in China's investment/GDP ratio, and a downward trend in the G7. The upward trend in the G7 capital stock-per-capita ratio began to slow as a result, before experiencing an unprecedented contraction after the Great Recession and Financial Crisis. Chart II-7Economic Integration And ##br##Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Chart II-8Macro Impact Of ##br##Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock The result has been a deflationary global backdrop characterized by demand deficiency and poor potential real GDP growth, both of which have depressed equilibrium global interest rates over the past 20 to 25 years. Transition Phase Chart II-9Working-Age Population ##br##To Shrink In G7 And China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China It would appear easy to conclude that these trends will be with us for another few decades because the demographic trends will not change anytime soon. Nonetheless, on closer inspection the global economy is transitioning from a period when cyclical economic pressures and all of the structural trends were pushing equilibrium interest rates in the same direction, to a period in which the economic cycle is becoming less bond-friendly and some of the secular drivers of low interest rates are gradually changing direction. First, the massive labor supply shock of the past few decades is over. The world working-age population ratio has peaked according to United Nations estimates. This ratio is already declining in the major advanced economies and is in the process of topping out in China. The absolute number of working-age people will shrink in China and the G7 countries over the next five years, although it will continue to grow at a low rate for the world as a whole (Chart II-9). Unions are unlikely to make a major comeback, but a backdrop that is less labor-abundant should gradually restore some worker bargaining power, especially as economies regain full employment. The resulting upward pressure on real wages will support capital spending as firms substitute toward capital and away from (increasingly expensive) labor. Consumer demand will also receive a boost if inequality moderates and the labor share of income begins to rise. Globalization On The Back Foot Chart II-10Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Second, it is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. Global exports appear to have peaked relative to GDP and average tariffs have ticked higher (Chart II-10). The World Trade Organization has announced that the number of new trade restrictions or impediments outweighed the number of trade liberalizing initiatives in 2016. The U.K. appears willing to sacrifice trade for limits to the free movement of people. The new U.S. Administration has ditched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is threatening to impose punitive tariffs on some trading partners. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. If the U.S. were to impose high tariffs on China, for example, it would make a part of the Chinese capital stock redundant overnight. In order for the global economy to produce the same amount of goods and services as before, the U.S. and other countries would need to invest more. Any unwinding of globalization would also be inflationary as it would disrupt international supply chains. Demographics And Saving: From Tailwind To Headwind... Third, the impact of savings in the major advanced economies and China on global interest rates will change direction as well. In the developed world, aggregate household savings will come under downward pressure as boomers increasingly shift into retirement. Economists are fond of employing the so-called life-cycle theory of consumer spending. According to this theory, consumers tend to smooth out lifetime spending by accumulating assets during the working years in order to maintain a certain living standard after retirement. The U.N. National Transfer Accounts Project has gathered data on spending and labor income by age cohort at a point in time. Chart II-11 presents the data for China and three of the major advanced economies. Chart II-11Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort The data for the advanced economies suggest that spending tends to rise sharply from a low level between birth and about 15 years of age. It continues to rise, albeit at a more modest pace, through the working years. Other studies have found that consumer spending falls during retirement. Nonetheless, these studies generally include only private spending and therefore do not include health care that is provided by the government. The data presented in Chart II-11 show that, if government-provided health care is included, personal spending rises sharply toward the end of life. The profile is somewhat different in China. Spending rises quickly from birth to about 20 years of age, and is roughly flat thereafter. Indeed, consumption edges lower after 75-80 years of age. These data allow us to project the impact of changing demographics on the average household saving rate in the coming years, assuming that the income and spending profiles shown in Chart II-11 are unchanged. We start by calculating the average saving rate across age cohorts given today's age structure. We then recalculate the average saving rate each year moving forward in time. The resulting saving rate changes along with the age structure of the population. The results are shown in Chart II-12. The saving rates for all four economies have been indexed at zero in 2016 for comparison purposes. The aggregate saving rate declines in all cases, falling between 4 and 8 percentage points between 2016 and 2030. Germany sees the largest drop of the four countries. Chart II-12Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving The simulations are meant to be suggestive, rather than a precise forecast, because the savings profile across age cohorts will adjust over time. Moreover, governments will no doubt raise taxes to cover the rising cost of health care, providing a partial offset in terms of the national saving rate.5 Nonetheless, the simulations highlight that the major economies are past the point where the baby boom generation is adding to the global savings pool at a faster pace than retirees are drawing from it. The age structure in the major advanced economies is far enough advanced that the rapid increase in the retirement rate will place substantial downward pressure on aggregate household savings in the coming years. It is well known that population aging will also undermine government budgets. Rising health care costs are already captured in our household saving rate projection because the data for household spending includes health care even if it is provided by the public sector. However, public pension schemes will also be a problem. To the extent that politicians are slow to trim pension benefits and/or raise taxes, public pension plans will be a growing drain on national savings. Could younger, less developed economies offset some of the demographic trends in China and the Advanced Economies? Numerically speaking, a more effective use of underutilized populations in Africa and India could go a long way. Nevertheless, deep-seated structural problems would have to be addressed and, even then, it is difficult to see either of these regions turning into the next "China story" given the current backlash against globalization and immigration. ...And The Capex Story Is Largely Behind Us Demographic trends also imply less capital spending relative to GDP, as discussed above. In terms of the impact on global equilibrium interest rates, it then becomes a race between falling saving and investment rates. Chart II-13Demographics And Capex Requirements May 2017 May 2017 Some analysts point to the Japanese experience because it is the leading edge in terms of global aging. Bond yields have been extremely low for many years even as the household saving rate collapsed, suggesting that ex-ante investment spending shifted by more than ex-ante savings. Nonetheless, Japan may not be a good example because the deterioration in the country's demographics coincided with burst bubbles in both real estate and stocks that hamstrung Japanese banks for decades. A series of policy mistakes made things worse. Economic theory is not clear on the net effect of demographics on savings and investment. The academic empirical evidence is inconclusive as well. However, a detailed IMF study of 30 OECD countries analyzed the demographic impact on a number of macroeconomic variables, including savings and investment.6 They estimated separate demographic effects for the old-age dependency ratio and the working-age population ratio. Applying the IMF's estimated model coefficients to projected changes in both of these ratios over the next decade suggests that the decline in ex-ante savings will exceed the ex-ante drop in capex requirements by about 1 percentage point of GDP. This is a non-trivial shift. Moreover, our simulations highlight that timing is important. The outlook for the household saving rate depends on the changing age structure of the population and the distribution of saving rates across age cohorts. Thus, the average saving rate will trend down as populations continue to age over the coming decades. In contrast, the impact of demographics on capital spending requirements is related to the change in the growth rate of the working-age population. Chart II-13 once again presents our estimates for the demographic component of capital spending. The top panel presents the world capex/GDP ratio that is necessary to maintain a constant capital/output ratio, and the bottom panel shows the change in that ratio. The important point is that the downward adjustment in world capex/GDP related to aging is now largely behind us because most of the deceleration in the growth rate of the working-age population is done. This is in contrast to the household saving rate adjustment where all of the adjustment is still to come. China Is Transitioning Too Chart II-14China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China must be treated separately from the developed countries because of its unique structural issues. As discussed above, household savings increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s (Chart II-14). This trend reflected a number of factors, including: the rising share of the working-age population; a drop in the fertility rate, following the introduction of the one-child policy in the late 1970s that allowed households to spend less on raising children and save more for retirement; health care reform in the early 1990s required households to bear a larger share of health care spending; and job security was also undermined by reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the late 1990s, leading to increased precautionary savings to cover possible bouts of unemployment. These savings tailwinds have turned around in recent years and the household saving rate appears to have peaked. China's contribution to the global pool of savings has already moderated significantly, as measured by the current account surplus. The surplus has withered from about 9% in 2008 to 2½% in 2016. A recent IMF study makes the case that China's national saving rate will continue to decline. The IMF estimates that for every one percentage-point rise in the old-age dependency ratio, the aggregate household saving rate will fall by 0.4-1 percentage points. In addition, the need for precautionary savings is expected to ease along with improvements in the social safety net, achieved through higher government spending on health care. The household saving rate will fall by three percentage points by 2021 according to the IMF (Chart II-15). Competitive pressure and an aging population will also reduce the saving rates of the corporate and government sectors. Chart II-15...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink Of course, investment as a share of GDP is projected to moderate too, reflecting a rebalancing of the economy away from exports and capital spending toward household consumption. The IMF expects that savings will moderate slightly faster than investment, leading to a narrowing in the current account surplus to almost zero by 2021. A lot of assumptions go into this type of forecast such that we must take it with a large grain of salt. Nonetheless, the fundamental drivers of China's savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Moreover, a return to large current account surpluses would likely require significant currency depreciation, which is a political non-starter given U.S. angst over trade. The risk is that China's excess savings will be less, not more, in five year's time. Tech Is A Wildcard It is extremely difficult to forecast the impact of technological advancement on the global economy. We cannot say with any conviction that the tech-related effects of "hollowing out", "winner-take-all" and the "skills premium" will moderate in the coming years. Nonetheless, these effects have occurred alongside a surge in the world's labor force and rapid globalization of supply chains, both of which reinforced the erosion of employee bargaining power. Looking ahead, technology will still be a headwind for some employees, but at least the transition from a world of excess labor to one that is more labor-scarce will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We will explore the impact of technology on productivity, inflation, growth, and bond yields in a companion report to be published in the next issue. Conclusion: The main points we made in this report are summarized in Table II-1. All of the structural factors driving real bond yields were working in the same (bullish) direction over the past 30-40 years. Looking ahead, it is uncertain how technological improvement will affect bond prices, but we expect that the others will shift (or have already shifted) to either neutral or outright bond-bearish. Table II-1Key Secular Drivers May 2017 May 2017 No doubt, our views that globalization and inequality have peaked, and that the labor share of income has bottomed, are speculative. These factors may not place much upward pressure on equilibrium yields. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the demographic effect that has depressed capital spending demand is well advanced. We see it shifting from a positive factor for bond prices to a neutral factor in the coming years. It is also clear that the massive positive labor supply shock is over, and is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power and the resulting boost consumer spending will be negative for bonds. This may also spark a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby place additional upward pressure on global real bond yields. Admittedly, however, this last point requires more research because theory and empirical evidence on it are not clear. Perhaps most importantly, the aging of the population in the advanced economies has reached a tipping point; retirees will drain more from the pool of savings than the working-age population will add to it in the coming years. We have concentrated on real equilibrium bond yields in this report because it is the part of nominal yields that is the most depressed relative to historical norms. The inflation component is only a little below a level that is consistent with central banks meeting their 2% inflation targets in the medium term. There is a risk that inflation will overshoot these targets, leading to a possible surge in long-term inflation expectations that turbocharges the bond bear market. This is certainly possible, as highlighted by a recent Global Investment Strategy Quarterly Strategy Outlook.7 Pain in bond markets would be magnified in this case, especially if central banks are forced to aggressively defend their targets. Please note that we are not making the case that real global bond yields will quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. It will take time for the bond-bullish structural factors to unwind. It will also take time for inflation to gain any momentum, even in the United States. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations suggest that investors have adopted an overly benign view on the outlook for yields. For example, implied real short-term rates remain negative until 2021 in the U.S. and 2026 in the Eurozone, while they stay negative out to 2030 in the U.K. (Chart II-16). We doubt that short-term rates will be negative for that long, given the structural factors discussed above. Chart II-16Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Another way of looking at this is presented in Chart II-17. The market expects the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years to be only slightly above today's spot yield, which itself is not far above the lowest levels ever recorded. Market expectations are equally depressed for the 5-year forward rate for the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart II-17Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History The implication is that investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 It is true that observed household savings rates fell in some of the advanced economies, such as the United States, at a time when aging should have boosted savings from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. This argues against a strong demographic effect on savings. However, keep in mind that we are discussing desired (or ex-ante) savings. Ex-post, savings can go in the opposite direction because of other influencing factors. As discussed below, global savings must equal investment, which means that shifts in desired capital spending demand matter for the ex-post level of savings. 2 Arithmetically, if world trend GDP growth slows by one percentage point, then investment spending would need to drop by about 3½ percentage points of GDP to keep the capital/output ratio stable. 3 David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 205-240 (October 2016). 4 Please see "Understanding The Downward Trend In Labor Income Shares," Chapter 3 in the IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2017). 5 In other words, while the household savings rate, as defined here to include health care spending by governments on behalf of households, will decline, any associated tax increases will blunt the impact on national savings (i.e. savings across the household, government and business sectors). 6 Jong-Won Yoon, Jinill Kim, and Jungjin Lee, "Impact Of Demographic Changes On Inflation And The Macroeconomy," IMF Working Paper no. 14/210 (November 2014). 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook: Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The modest correction in April did not improve equity valuation by much in any of the major markets. Our U.S. valuation metric is still hovering just below the +1 sigma mark, above which would signal extreme overvaluation. Measures such as the Shiller P/E ratio are flashing red on valuation, but our indicator takes into consideration 11 different valuation measures. Technically, the U.S. equity market still has upward momentum, while our Monetary indicator is neutral for stocks. The Speculation index indicates some froth, although our Composite Sentiment indicator has cooled off, suggesting that fewer investors are bullish. The U.S. net revisions ratio is hovering near zero, but it is bullish that the earnings surprise index jumped over the past month. First-quarter earnings season in the U.S. has got off to a good start, while the global earnings revisions ratio has moved into positive territory for the first time in six years (see the Overview section). Our U.S. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator continues to send a positive message for the S&P 500, although it is now so elevated that it suggests that there could be little 'dry power' left to buy the market. This indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. In contrast to the U.S., the WTP indicators for both the Eurozone and Japan are rising from a low level. This suggests that a rotation into these equity markets is underway and has some ways to go. We remain overweight both the Eurozone and Japanese markets relative to the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. April's rally in the U.S. bond market dragged valuation close to neutral. However, we believe that the market is underestimating the amount of Fed rate hikes that are likely over the next year. Now that oversold technical conditions have been absorbed, this opens the door the next upleg in yields. Bonds typically move into 'inexpensive' territory before the monetary cycle is over. The trade-weighted dollar remains quite overvalued on a PPP basis, although less so by other measures. Technically, the dollar has shifted down this year to meet support at the 200-day moving average and overbought conditions have largely, but not totally, been worked off. We still believe there is more upside for the dollar, despite lofty valuation readings, due to macro divergences. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China