Canada

Special Report

Highlights US Election & Duration: We estimate that there is an 80% probability of a US election result that will give a lift to US Treasury yields via increased fiscal stimulus. Those are strong enough odds to justify a move to a below-benchmark cyclical US duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. US Treasuries: We anticipate a moderate bear market in US Treasuries to unfold during the next 6-12 months. In addition to below-benchmark portfolio duration, investors should overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, hold nominal and real yield curve steepeners, and hold inflation curve flatteners. Non-US Country Allocation: Within global government bond portfolios, downgrade the US to underweight. Favor countries that have lower sensitivity to rising US Treasury yields with central banks that are likely to be more dovish than the Fed in the next few years. That means increasing allocations to core Europe and Japan, while reducing exposure to Canada and Australia. Stay neutral on the UK given the near-term uncertainties over the final Brexit outcome. Feature With the US presidential election just two weeks away, public opinion polls continue to show that Joe Biden is the favorite to win the White House. However, the odds of a “Blue Sweep” - combining a Biden victory with the Democratic Party winning control of both the US Senate and House of Representatives - have increased since the end of September according to online prediction markets. US Treasury yields have also moved higher over that same period (Chart 1), which we interpret as the bond market becoming more sensitive to the likelihood of a major increase in US government spending under single-party Democratic control. Chart 1A Blue Sweep Is Bond Bearish According to a recent analysis done by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, President Trump’s formal policy proposals would increase US federal debt by $4.95 trillion between 2021 and 2030, while Biden’s plan would increase the debt by $5.60 trillion (Table 1).1 While those are both massive fiscal stimulus plans, there is a stark difference in the policy mix of their proposals that matters for the future path of US bond yields. Table 1A Comparison Of The Candidates' Budget Proposals Under Biden, spending is projected to increase by a cumulative $11.1 trillion, partially offset by $5.8 trillion in revenue increases and savings with the former vice-president calling for tax hikes on corporations and high-income earners. On the other hand, Trump’s plan includes $5.45 trillion of spending increases and tax cuts over the next decade, offset by $0.75 trillion in savings. Conclusion: Biden would increase spending by over twice that of a re-elected Trump, with much of that spending expected to be front-loaded in the early part of his first term. Outright spending is more reflationary than tax cuts because it puts more money in the pockets of consumers (spenders) relative to producers (savers). The Biden plan would be more stimulating for overall activity even if the increase in debt is about the same. Another analysis of the Biden and Trump platforms was conducted by Moody’s in September, based on estimates of how much of each candidate’s promises could be successfully implemented under different combinations of White House and Congressional control.2 The stimulus figures were run through the Moody’s US economic model, which is similar to the budget scoring model of the US Congressional Budget Office, to produce a year-by-year path for the US economy over the next decade (Chart 2). Chart 2The Biden Platform Is Highly Stimulative Moody’s concluded that the US economy would return to full employment in the second half of 2022 under a President Biden – especially if the Democrats win the Senate - compared to the first half of 2024 under a re-elected President Trump. Such a rapid closing of the deep US output gap that opened up because of the COVID-19 recession would likely trigger a reassessment of the Fed’s current highly dovish policy stance. The US output gap would close more rapidly under a President Biden, likely triggering a reassessment of the Fed’s current highly dovish policy stance.  At the moment, the US overnight index swap (OIS) curve discounts one full 25bp Fed hike by late 2023/early 2024, and two full hikes by late 2024/early 2025 (Chart 3). This pricing of the future path of interest rates has occurred even with the Fed promising to keep the funds rate anchored near 0% until at least the end of 2023. The likelihood of some form of increased fiscal spending after the election will cause the bond market to challenge the Fed’s current forward guidance even more, putting upward pressure on Treasury yields. Chart 3US Fiscal Stimulus Will Pull Forward Fed Liftoff Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy see a Blue Sweep as the most likely outcome of the US election, although their forecasting models suggest that the race for control of the Senate will be much closer than the Biden vs Trump battle (there is little chance that control of the House of Representatives would switch back to the Republicans).3 Their scenarios for each of the White House/Senate combinations, along with their own estimated probability for each, are the following: Biden wins in a Democratic sweep: BCA probability = 45%. The US economy will benefit from higher odds of unfettered fiscal stimulus in 2021, although financial markets will simultaneously have to adjust for the negative shock to US corporate earnings from higher taxes and regulation. Government bond yields should rise on the generally reflationary agenda. Trump wins with a Republican Senate: BCA probability = 30%. In this status quo scenario, a re-elected President Trump would still face opposition from House Democrats on most domestic economic issues, forcing him to tilt towards more protectionist foreign and trade policies in his second term. Fiscal stimulus would be easy to agree, though not as large as under a Democratic sweep. US Treasury yields would rise, but would later prove volatile due to the risk to the cyclical recovery from a global trade war, as Trump’s tariffs will not be limited to China and could even affect the European Union. Biden wins with the Senate staying Republican: BCA probability = 20%. This is ultimately the most positive outcome for financial markets - reduced odds of a full-blown trade war with China, combined with no new tax hikes. Bond yields would drift upward over time, but not during the occasional fiscal battles that would ensue between the Democratic president and Republican senators. The first such battle would start right after the election. Treasuries would remain well bid until financial market pressures forced a Senate compromise with the new president sometime in H1 2021. Trump wins with a Democratic Senate: BCA probability = 5%. This is the least likely scenario but one that could produce a big positive fiscal impulse. Trump is a big spender and will veto tax hikes, but will approve populist spending on areas where he agrees. The Democratic Senate would not resist Trump’s tough stance on China, however, thus keeping the risk of US-China trade skirmishes elevated. This is neutral-to-bearish for US Treasuries, depending on the size of any bipartisan stimulus measures and Trump’s trade actions. The key takeaway is that the combined probability of scenarios that will put upward pressure on US Treasury yields is 80%, versus a 20% probability of a more bond-neutral outcome. That is a bond-bearish skew worth positioning for by reducing US duration exposure now, ahead of the November 3 election. Of this 80%, 35 percentage points come from scenarios in which President Trump would remain in power. Hence his trade wars would eventually undercut his reflationary fiscal policy. This would become the key risk to the short duration view after the initial market response. Bottom Line: The most likely scenarios for the US election will give a cyclical lift to US Treasury yields via increased fiscal stimulus. This justifies a move to a below-benchmark US duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. If Trump is re-elected, the timing of Trump’s likely return to using broad-based tariffs will have to be monitored closely. A Moderate Bear Market Chart 4Less Election-Day Upside Than In 2016 While our anticipated Blue Sweep election outcome will lead to a large amount of fiscal spending in 2021 and beyond, we anticipate only a modest increase in bond yields during the next 6-12 months. In terms of strategy, our recommended reduction in portfolio duration reflects the fact that fiscal largesse meaningfully reduces the risk of another significant downleg in bond yields and strengthens our conviction in a moderate bear market scenario for bonds. This does raise the question of how large an increase in US Treasury yields we expect during the next 6-12 months. We turn to this question now. Not Like 2016 First, we do not expect a massive election night bond rout like we saw in 2016 (Chart 4). For one thing, the Fed was much more eager to tighten policy in 2016 than it is today, and it did deliver a rate hike one month after the Republicans won the House, Senate and White House (Chart 4, bottom panel). This time around, the Fed has made it clear that it will wait until inflation is running above its 2% target before lifting rates off the zero bound and will not respond directly to expectations for greater fiscal stimulus. A complete re-convergence to long-run fed funds rate estimates would impart 80 – 100 bps of upward pressure to the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield. Second, 2016’s election result was mostly unanticipated. This led to a dramatic adjustment in market prices once the results came in. The PredictIt betting market odds of a “Red Sweep” by the Republicans in 2016 were only 16% the night before the election. As of today, the betting markets are priced for a 58% chance of a Blue Sweep in 2020. Unlike in 2016, bonds are presumably already partially priced for the most bond-bearish election outcome. A Slow Return To Equilibrium To more directly answer the question of how high bond yields can rise, survey estimates of the long-run (or equilibrium) federal funds rate provide a useful starting point. In a world where the economy is growing at an above-trend pace and inflation is expected to move towards the Fed’s target, it is logical for long-maturity Treasury yields to settle near estimates of the long-run fed funds rate. Indeed, this theory is borne out empirically. During the last two periods of robust global economic growth (2017/18 & 2013/14), the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield peaked around levels consistent with long-run fed funds rate estimates (Chart 5). As of today, the median estimates of the long-run fed funds rate from the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants and Survey of Primary Dealers are 2% and 2.25%, respectively. In other words, a complete re-convergence to these equilibrium levels would impart 80 – 100 bps of upward pressure to the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield. We expect this re-convergence to play out eventually, but probably not within the next 6-12 months. In both prior periods when the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield reached these equilibrium levels, the Fed’s reaction function was much more hawkish. The Fed was hiking rates throughout 2017 & 2018 (Chart 5, panel 4), and the market moved quickly to price in rate hikes in 2013 (Chart 5, bottom panel). The Fed’s new dovish messaging will ensure that the market reacts less quickly this time around. Also, continued curve steepening will mean that the 5-year/5-year forward yield’s 80 – 100 bps of upside will translate into significantly less upside for the benchmark 10-year yield. The 10-year yield and 5-year/5-year forward yield peaked at similar levels in 2017/18 when the Fed was lifting rates and the yield curve was flat (Chart 6). But, the 10-year peaked far below the 5-year/5-year yield in 2013/14 when the Fed stayed on hold and the curve steepened. Chart 5How High For Treasury Yields? Chart 6Less Upside In 10yr Than In 5y5y The next bear move in bonds will look much more like 2013/14. The Fed will keep a firm grip over the front-end of the curve, leading to curve steepening and less upside in the 10-year Treasury yield than in the 5-year/5-year forward. In addition to shifting to a below-benchmark duration stance, investors should maintain exposure to nominal yield curve steepeners. Specifically, we recommend buying the 5-year note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes (Chart 6, bottom panel).4 TIPS Versus Nominals We have seen that a full re-convergence to “equilibrium” implies 80 – 100 bps of upside in the 5-year/5-year forward nominal Treasury yield. Bringing TIPS into the equation, we have also observed that long-maturity (5-year/5-year forward and 10-year) TIPS breakeven inflation rates tend to settle into a range of 2.3 – 2.5 percent when inflation is well-anchored and close to the Fed’s target (Chart 7). The additional fiscal stimulus that will follow a Blue Sweep election makes it much more likely that the economic recovery will stay on course, leading to an eventual return of inflation to target and of long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates to a 2.3 – 2.5 percent range. However, as with nominal yields, this re-convergence will be a long process whose pace will be dictated by the actual inflation data. To underscore that point, consider that our Adaptive Expectations Model of the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate – a model that is driven by trends in the actual inflation data – has the 10-year breakeven rate as close to fair value (Chart 8).5 This fair value will rise only slowly over time, alongside increases in actual inflation. Chart 7Overweight TIPS Versus Nominals Chart 8Real Yields Have Likely Bottomed All in all, we continue to recommend an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. TIPS breakeven inflation rates will move higher during the next 6-12 months, but are unlikely to reach our 2.3 – 2.5 percent target range within that timeframe. TIPS In Absolute Terms As stated above, we expect nominal yields to increase more than real yields during the next 6-12 months, but what about the absolute direction of real (aka TIPS) yields? Here, our sense is that real yields have also bottomed. If we consider the extreme scenario where the 5-year/5-year forward nominal yield returns to its equilibrium level and where long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates return to our target range, it implies about 80 bps of upside in the nominal yield and 40 bps of upside in the breakeven. This means that the 5-year/5-year real yield has about 40 bps of upside in a complete “return to equilibrium” scenario. While we don’t expect this “return to equilibrium” to be completed within the next 6-12 months, the process is probably underway. The only way for real yields to keep falling in this reflationary world is for the Fed to become increasingly dovish, even as growth improves and inflation rises. After its recent shift to an average inflation target, our best guess is that Fed rate guidance won’t get any more dovish from here. Real yields fell sharply this year as the market priced in this change in the Fed’s reaction function, but the late-August announcement of the Fed’s new framework will probably mark the bottom in real yields (Chart 8, bottom panel).6 Two More Curve Trades Chart 9Own Inflation Curve Flatteners And Real Curve Steepeners In addition to moving to below-benchmark duration, maintaining nominal yield curve steepeners and staying overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, there are two additional trades that investors should consider in order to profit from the reflationary economic environment. The first is inflation curve flatteners. The cost of short-maturity inflation protection is below the cost of long-maturity inflation protection, meaning that it has further to run as inflation returns to the Fed’s target (Chart 9). In addition, if the Fed eventually succeeds in achieving a temporary overshoot of its inflation target, then we should expect the inflation curve to invert. Real yield curve steepeners are in some ways the mirror image of inflation curve flatteners. Assuming no change in nominal yields, the real yield curve will steepen as the inflation curve flattens. But what makes real yield curve steepeners look even more attractive is that increases in nominal yields during the next 6-12 months will be concentrated in long-maturities. This will impart even more steepening pressure to the real yield curve. Investors should continue to hold inflation curve flatteners and real yield curve steepeners. Bottom Line: We anticipate a moderate bear market in US Treasuries to unfold during the next 6-12 months. In addition to below-benchmark portfolio duration, investors should overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, hold nominal and real yield curve steepeners, and hold inflation curve flatteners. Non-US Government Bonds: Reduce Exposure To US Treasuries The mildly bearish case for US Treasuries that we have laid out above not only matters for our recommended duration stance, but also for our suggested country allocation within global government bond portfolios. Simply put, the risk of rising bond yields is much higher in the US than elsewhere, both for the immediate post-election period but also over the medium-term. Thus, the immediate obvious portfolio decision is to downgrade US Treasuries to underweight. The move higher in US Treasury yields that we expect is strictly related to spillovers from likely US fiscal stimulus. While other countries in the developed world are contemplating the need for additional fiscal measures, particularly in Europe where there is a renewed surge in coronavirus infections and growing economic restrictions, no country is facing as sharp a policy choice as the US with its upcoming election. The Fed has purchased 57% of all US Treasuries issued since late February of this year, in sharp contrast to the ECB and Bank of Japan that have purchased over 70% of euro area government bonds and JGBs issued. We can say with a fair degree of certainty that the US will have a relatively more stimulative fiscal policy stance than other developed economies over at least the next couple of years. This implies a higher relative growth trajectory for the US that hurts Treasuries more on the margin than non-US government debt. Chart 10The Fed Will Gladly Trade Less QE For More Fiscal Stimulus In addition, the likely path of relative monetary policy responses are more bearish for US Treasuries. As described above, the scope of the US stimulus will cause bond investors to further question the Fed’s commitment to keeping the funds rate unchanged for the next few years. That also applies to the Fed’s other policy tools, like asset purchases. The Fed is far less likely to continue buying US Treasuries at the same aggressive pace it has for the past eight months if there is less need for monetary stimulus because of more fiscal stimulus. According to the IMF, the Fed has purchased 57% of all US Treasuries issued since late February of this year, in sharp contrast to the ECB and Bank of Japan that have purchased over 70% of euro area government bonds and JGBs issued (Chart 10). If US Treasury yields are rising because of improving US growth expectations, fueled by fiscal stimulus, the Fed will likely tolerate such a move and buy an even lower share of Treasuries issued – particularly if the higher bond yields do not cause a selloff in US equity markets that can tighten financial conditions and threaten the growth outlook. The fact that US equities have ignored the rise in Treasury yields seen since the end of September may be a sign that both bond and stock investors are starting to focus on a faster trajectory for US growth. In terms of country allocation, beyond downgrading US Treasuries to underweight, we recommend upgrading exposure to countries that are less sensitive to changes in US Treasury yields (i.e. countries with a lower yield beta to changes in US yields). In Chart 11, we show the rolling beta of changes in 10-year government bond yields outside the US to changes in 10-year US Treasury yields. This is a variation of the “global yield beta” concept that we have discussed in the BCA Research bond publications in recent years. Here, we modify the idea to look at which countries are more or less correlated to US yields, specifically. A few points stand out from the chart: Chart 11Reduce Exposure To Bond Markets More Correlated To UST Yields All countries have a “US yield beta” of less than 1, suggesting that Treasuries are a consistent outperformer when US yields fall and vice versa. This suggests moving to underweight the US when US yields are rising is typically a winning strategy in a portfolio context. The list of higher beta countries includes Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the UK and Germany; although Canada stands out as having the highest yield beta in this group. The list of lower beta countries includes France, Italy, Spain, and Japan. In Chart 12, we show what we call the “upside yield beta” that is estimated only using data for periods when Treasury yields are rising. This gives a sense of which countries are more likely to outperform or underperform during a period of rising Treasury yields, as we expect to unfold after the election. From this perspective, the “safer” lower US upside yield beta group includes the UK, France, Germany and Japan. The riskier higher US upside yield beta group includes Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Italy and Spain. Chart 12Favor Bond Markets Less Correlated to RISING UST Yields Spain and Italy are less likely to behave like typical high-beta countries as US yields rise, however, because the ECB is likely to remain an aggressive buyer of their government bonds as part of their asset purchase programs over the next 6-12 months. We also do not recommend trading UK Gilts off their yield beta to US Treasuries in the immediate future, given the uncertainties over the negotiations over a final Brexit deal. Both sets of US yield betas suggest higher-beta Canada, Australia and New Zealand are more at risk of relative underperformance versus lower-beta France, Germany and Japan. In terms of government bond country allocation, we recommend reducing exposure to the former group and increasing allocations to the latter group. Bottom Line: Within global government bond portfolios, downgrade the US to underweight. Favor countries that have lower sensitivity to rising US Treasury yields, especially those with central banks that are likely to be more dovish than the Fed in the next few years. That means increasing allocations to core Europe and Japan, while reducing exposure to “higher-beta” Canada and Australia.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 http://www.crfb.org/papers/cost-trump-and-biden-campaign-plans 2 https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2020/the-macroeconomic-consequences-trump-vs-biden.pdf 3 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Introducing Our Quantitative US Senate Election Model”, dated October 16, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4 For more details on this recommended steepener trade please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Positioning For Reflation And Avoiding Deflation”, dated August 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 For more details on our Adaptive Expectations Model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For a detailed look at the implications of the Fed’s policy shift please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “A New Dawn For US Monetary Policy”, dated September 1, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Currency markets remain vulnerable to the upcoming US election, Brexit, and a resurgence of Covid-19 infections. Meanwhile, President’s Trump suggested “piecemeal” fiscal deal increases the odds of a correction in the near term. Stay short USD/JPY as a core holding. We eventually expect the passage of a fiscal deal, regardless of who is in the White House. This will favor pro-cyclical trades. CAD/USD is likely to continue strengthening versus the dollar, but underperforming at the crosses. The key reason is that, in the short term, even with an oil price recovery, Canadian crude will remain trapped in Alberta, keeping the WCS-to-WTI discount wide. Meanwhile, domestically, while the Canadian economy has bottomed, a resurgence in new Covid-19 cases puts this recovery at risk. We therefore expect the loonie to touch 80-82 cents but underperform the Australian dollar, Swedish krona, and Norwegian krone. Go short CAD/NOK for a trade. Feature Chart I-1The CAD Has Been A Laggard Since the DXY index peaked on March 19, the Canadian dollar has been an underperformer. Among its G10 peers, only the safe-haven currencies such as the Swiss franc and Japanese yen trail behind the loonie. This is remarkable since other commodity currencies such as the Norwegian krone and Australian dollar have posted very handsome returns since the March lows (Chart I-1). The natural question is whether the loonie’s underperformance is a sign of mispricing, or if other fundamental factors are at play? If the latter, then what are the key drivers of this underperformance and what sort of returns can we expect from the loonie over the next six to 12 months? Finally, are there any opportunities at the crosses that investors can capitalize on? The Loonie: Key Drivers The key drivers of the Canadian dollar are what happens to natural resource prices, specifically crude oil, and the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy stance relative to the Federal Reserve. As a major oil-producing nation, it is well known that an important driver of the loonie has been the price of crude oil. This is because rising domestic income from higher oil prices boosts aggregate demand. This comes both from the private sector through increased capital spending, more hiring and increased wages, and from government spending afforded by higher tax revenues and royalty income. As a result, the higher aggregate demand provides room for the BoC to hike interest rates. As a major oil-producing nation, it is well known that an important driver of the loonie has been the price of crude oil. Meanwhile, an increase in oil prices also implies rising terms of trade. This improves balance-of-payment dynamics, allowing the fair value of the exchange rate to rise in the process. As such, the rise in the currency does not necessarily tighten financial conditions. It is quite remarkable that for most of the last two decades, the difference between Canadian and US interest rates can be explained by swings in the oil price. This in turn has been a powerful driver of the Canadian dollar (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Policy Rates Follow The Oil price Chart I-3A Significant Resource Sector In Canada This should not come as a surprise. As a share of GDP, resources account for almost 20% of the Canadian economy (Chart I-3). The share of commodity exports is also a quite significant at 23%. While the share of services in the economy has risen, much of this is in the orbit of mining and oil and gas extraction support services. In a nutshell, the Canadian economy remains a resource-based one, making the outlook for resources, specifically crude oil, an important consideration. Where To Next For Canadian Crude? The oil industry has been hit by multiple tectonic shocks, including a sudden stop in economic activity, a fallout from the OPEC cartel, divestment from ESG funds, and falling oil intensity in many economies. Just over a decade ago, the price of crude oil was firmly above $100 per barrel. Fast forward to today and many blends are trading south of $45 per barrel (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Many Blends Are Trading Below Going forward, the path for oil prices will be highly dependent on the interplay between demand and supply. Oil demand tends to follow the ebbs and flows of the business cycle, with over 60% of global petroleum consumed by the transportation sector. As a result, crude oil prices have largely tracked Apple mobility data (Chart I-5). Many countries are now entering renewed restrictions due to the second wave of the pandemic, which is showing up in a slowdown in traffic. However, as we discussed last week, the economic effects should be far less lethal that what we experienced in the first half of this year. The reasons include the potential for a vaccine soon and a substantial drop in mortality rates. Our commodity strategists expect oil prices to average $65 per barrel next year, much more than is currently priced in the futures curve. Crude oil prices have largely tracked Apple mobility trends data.  From a bird’s-eye view, oil prices are more likely to enter a broad trading range, as they did in the ‘80s and ‘90s, than a structural bull market. On the positive side, we have probably seen a bottom in oil prices, in that it is unlikely we will revisit negative price territory. However, history suggests that it takes quite a long time for excesses to clear in the oil market. The bull market of the 1970s was followed by a 20-year bear market, as OPEC production surged (Chart I-6). This time around, US shale production has gained significant market share, and with the electrification of the modern economy, a lot of barrels may need to be taken off the market to induce a genuine bull market. Chart I-5Oil Prices Have Tracked The Recovery In Traffic Chart I-6A Secular View On ##br##Oil Prices Canadian players suffer from two additional hiccups: First, the International Maritime Organization has introduced new standards for bunker fuel since January 2020 (IMO 2020). According to the new standards, sulphur content must be cut from 3.5% to 0.5%. Canada’s Western Canadian Select (WCS) blend is one of the world’s heavier crudes with a sulphur content north of 3.5%. This is expected to significantly widen the discount between WCS and light sweet crude. This is bad news for Canadian oil producers. Second, pipeline capacity remains a major hurdle to getting Canadian crude to US refineries. This leads to a transportation discount for Canadian crude oil. The Enbridge Line 3 replacement is facing delays from the state of Minnesota (390K additional barrels). The future of the Keystone XL pipeline, a major release valve for Canadian oil (830K barrels a day in capacity), rests on the US election. Former Vice President Joe Biden has opposed the project, calling Alberta’s oil “tar sands that we don’t need.” The Trans Mountain Expansion project (690K additional barrels), connecting Alberta to the Westridge Marine Terminal and Chevron refinery in Burnaby, is slated to be competed only by the end of 2022. All this could widen the discount between WCS and WTI crude oil, hurting the Canadian dollar in the process (Chart I-7). There are offsetting factors. The drop in Venezuelan oil production has allowed Canadian producers to gain market share in the heavy crude oil market. Production cuts in Alberta have also helped mitigate the oversupply of heavy crude. Canadian oil exports are near record highs, despite the fact that the US is rapidly becoming energy independent (Chart I-8). As a share of imports, Canadian crude represents about half of the US’s intake (Chart I-9). This highlights the importance of heavy crude in oil market dynamics. Specifically, a lot of refining capacity in the US has been fine-tuned to handle the cheaper but heavier blend from Canada. Chart I-7Canadian Oil Discount Could Widen Chart I-8Big US Demand For Canadian Oil Chart I-9Big US Demand For Canadian Oil Netting it all out, we will expect crude oil prices to head to $65 per barrel, while the Canadian discount to widens to $20 per barrel before slowly recovering. This should provide modest upside for the Canadian dollar as terms of trade continue to improve. A Regime Shift Chart I-10Oil Production: US Versus Canada There has been a paradigm shift in oil production, with US shale producers aggressively grabbing market share from both OPEC and non-OPEC producers. Currently, Canada produces only 5.5% of global crude versus 15% for US production. Admittedly, the Canadian market share has also been rising, but the tectonic shift in US production has severely dampened the positive correlation between crude prices and the loonie (Chart I-10). In statistical terms, petrocurrencies had a near-perfect positive correlation with oil around 2010 when US production was about to take off. Since then, that correlation fell from around 0.9 to about 0.2 (Chart I-11). The loss of shale output during the recent downturn has somewhat re-established a strong correlation between petrocurrencies and the crude oil price (bottom panel). But more importantly, should global demand pick up, US shale output will rise again and redistribute market share away from both OPEC and other non-OPEC members and towards the US. Chart I-11Negative Correlation Between Petrocurrencies And Crude Oil Restored Take the Mexican peso as an example. Since 2013, Mexico has become a net importer of oil, as the US moves towards becoming a net exporter. This explains why the positive correlation between the peso and oil prices has weakened significantly in recent years. Put another way, rising oil prices benefit US domestic income much more than they did in the past, while the benefits for countries like Canada and Mexico are slowly fading. The Canadian crude market share has been rising, but the tectonic shift in US production has severely dampened the positive correlation between crude prices and the loonie.  The second seismic shift in oil markets has been the ESG wave. With awareness towards global warming and climate change gaining mainstream support, divestments from energy assets has picked up steam. Currency markets react to net portfolio flows, and divestments from the energy sector in particular and the commodity sector in general have been behind the huge underperformance of the Canadian dollar since 2011 (Chart I-12). Chart I-12Huge Underperformance Of Canadian Equities The good news is that a lot has already been priced in. First, global energy stocks have been in a 12-year bear market in relative performance terms. This represents a 70% peak-to-trough decline, with the latest selloff being symptomatic of a capitulation phase. Second, at a price-to-book discount of 64% and a dividend yield of 7%, energy stocks are very cheap (Chart I-13). Chart I-13A Capitulation In Energy Stocks? It is remarkable that long-term portfolio flows into Canadian assets have started picking up, a sign of bargain hunting by international investors (Chart I-14). This should provide a modest tailwind to the Canadian dollar over the next six to 12 months. Chart I-14A Recovery In Canadian Portfolio Inflows Improving Domestic Conditions The Canadian domestic economy has been holding up well, despite lower oil prices. This has occurred on the back of massive fiscal stimulus, in addition to the BoC dropping rates to 0.25% and engaging in quantitative easing. During his Throne Speech a fortnight ago, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau vowed to do “whatever it takes” to support people and businesses throughout the crisis. Fitch Ratings estimates that the budget deficit in Canada will remain wide going into 2022 (Chart I-15). Meanwhile, as lockdown measures have eased since April, incoming data has been robust. Chart I-15Lots Of Fiscal Stimulus In Canada Canada continues to create record employment, with 246,000 new jobs added in August. This is leading to the fastest recovery in the unemployment rate on record (Chart I-16). The manufacturing and resources sectors in Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia, which bore the brunt of the employment declines, are rebounding. Chart I-16Best Job Recovery In Decades Most measures of household confidence are in a V-shaped recovery. Retail sales in Canada have rebounded, reaching above pre-pandemic levels. Mortgage credit has also picked up strongly. Correspondingly, housing starts have overtaken their pre-pandemic peak as well, with new home construction at its highest level since 2007. Working from home has led to a surge in renovation projects. Meanwhile, low rates and rising home prices have encouraged new construction. Residential investment is almost 7% of Canadian GDP, a significant chunk of aggregate demand (Chart I-17). Despite the improvement in domestic conditions, inflationary pressures remain moribund. The output gap measure according to the BoC remains wide at -3.2% of GDP. The latest inflation print shows that domestic prices in Canada still remain anchored below the midpoint of the BoC’s target band. This means that the BoC will be in no rush to normalize policy anytime soon (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Residential Construction Is Important Chart I-18Canadian Inflation Is Below Target Given the government’s commitment to step in as a spender of last resort, real rates in Canada will remain depressed as inflation starts to recover. This will not be as pronounced versus the US, where the Fed is trying to asymmetrically generate inflation, but more so against its commodity peers such as Australia and Norway, where the number of new Covid-19 cases remains under control, giving the governments there less incentive to significantly increase spending. This suggests that while the loonie may have upside against the dollar, it could underperform at the crosses. Investment Implications We expect the CAD/USD to gravitate higher in the next few months. The key catalysts are favorable interest rates versus the US and a gradual recovery in WCS oil prices as global economic activity picks up. From a fundamental perspective, the CAD is still undervalued by 7.3% on a trade-weighted basis (Chart I-19). This puts 80-82 cents within striking distance. Chart I-19The CAD Is Still Cheap Chart I-20Sell CAD/NOK Relative to other commodity currencies, transportation bottlenecks in Canada will prove to be a formidable hurdle in closing the current discount between WCS and WTI and/or Brent. While Canadian crude is likely to remain trapped in the oil sands for now, North Sea crude will face fewer transportation bottlenecks in the near term. This suggests that the path of least resistance for the CAD/NOK is down (Chart I-20). Sell CAD/NOK for a trade. An improvement in economic activity in Asia relative to the West will also favor AUD/CAD. Rising oil prices are a terms-of-trade boost for oil exporters but lead to demand destruction for oil importers. In general, a strategy for playing oil upside is to be long a basket of energy producers versus energy consumers. This suggests that the CAD has upside against the euro, the Indian rupee, and the Turkish lira. We are already long a basket of petrocurrencies versus the euro. Finally, we are long CAD/NZD as a play on policy divergences between the Reserve Bank Of New Zealand and the BoC. However, our conviction on this trade is low due to the resurgence of new cases in Canada. We recommend maintaining tight stops on this position.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data from the US have been positive: The unemployment rate fell from 8.4% to 7.9% in September. Nonfarm payrolls increased by 661K. The ISM Non-manufacturing Index increased from 56.9 to 57.8 in September. The Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index jumped from 74.1 to 80.4 in September. The trade deficit widened from $63.4 billion to $67.1 billion in August. Initial jobless claims increased by 840K for the week ending on October 3. The DXY index fell initially but then recouped the loss, ending flat this week. Trump’s tweet on Tuesday about “halting COVID-19 relief talks until after election” largely reduced the likelihood of any imminent fiscal stimulus. While pre-election uncertainties have been dominant recently, we remain dollar bears in the cycle, especially in a post-election and post-vaccine world. Report Links: Tail Risks In FX Markets - October 2, 2020 The Message From Dollar Sentiment And Technical Indicators - Sept. 25, 2020 Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mixed: Headline inflation declined from -0.2% to -0.3% year-on-year in September. Core inflation also decreased from 0.5% to 0.2%. The Markit Services PMI edged up from 47.6 to 48 in September. The Sentix Investor Confidence Index increased from -9.5 to -8.3 in October. Retail sales grew by 3.7% year-on-year in August. The euro rose by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. The slip in core inflation this week reinforced the concern about deflation. In the recent strategic review, Christine Lagarde kept a dovish tone and reiterated a desire to keep policy accommodative. We believe that the PEPP with a total envelope of €1,350 billion through the end of June 2021 will continue to support euro area economic recovery. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been positive: The Jibun Bank Services PMI increased from 45 to 46.9 in September. The current account surplus surged from ¥1.5 trillion to ¥2.1 trillion in August. The Eco Watchers Survey Outlook Index increased from 42.4 to 48.3 in September. The Current Conditions Index also grew from 43.9 to 49.3. The Japanese yen declined by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. Incoming data confirms that the Japanese economy is recovering from pre-pandemic lows. Apart from being a cheap safe-haven hedge, the Japanese yen is also supported by lower COVID infection rates and fewer political uncertainties. Stay short on USD/JPY. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data from the UK have been positive: The Markit Services PMI increased from 55.1 to 56.1 in September. House prices grew by 2.3% year-on-year in July. Unit labor costs surged by 27.4% year-on-year in Q2. The British pound has been flat against the US dollar this week. Despite ongoing Brexit chaos, the pound managed to remain well above 1.27 in recent months. Our bias is that a Brexit deal will eventually be reached. We favor the British pound relative to the euro since the pound is tremendously undervalued against the euro. Besides, risk reversals also suggest that the pound is deeply oversold. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data from Australia have been mixed: The Commonwealth Bank Services PMI increased from 50 to 50.8 in September. Exports declined by 4% month-on-month in August while imports expanded by 2%. The trade surplus narrowed from A$4.65 billion to A$2.6 billion.   The NAB Business Confidence Index increased from -8 to -4 in September. The Australian dollar fell by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. On Tuesday, the RBA kept its interest rate steady at 0.25%. Governor Philip Lowe acknowledged the weakness in Australia’s labor market and highlighted that the RBA continues to consider various measures designed to support job growth as the economy opens further. We remain positive on the Australian dollar. Report Links: An Update On The Australian Dollar - September 18, 2020 On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: The ANZ Business Confidence Index improved from -28.5 to -14.5 in October. The Activity Outlook index also shifted from -5.4 to 3.6 in October. The New Zealand dollar fell by 1.1% against the US dollar this week. While still well below pre-pandemic levels, the ANZ Business Confidence Index has undoubtedly improved in October. Investment and employment intensions both moved higher, lifting profit expectations. That said, the services sector is still under severe pressure resulting from strict lockdown measures. Markets are now pricing in a higher than 50% probability of a further rate cut by early next year, which contributes to the relative weakness in the New Zealand dollar. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been negative: The trade deficit marginally narrowed from C$2.53 billion to C$2.45 billion in August. The Ivey PMI declined from 67.8 to 54.3 in September. Housing starts increased by 209K in September, down from 261.5K in the previous month. The Canadian dollar appreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. As an important oil producer and exporter, the Canadian dollar shifts along with the price of oil. In this week’s report, we discuss the key drivers behind the Canadian dollar and discover why it has underperformed other G10 pro-cyclical currencies. Please refer to our front section for more detailed research. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data from Switzerland have been positive: Total sight deposits continue to increase from CHF 704.5 billion to CHF 705.1 billion for the week ending on October 2. The unemployment rate declined from 3.4% to 3.3% in September. The Swiss franc appreciated by 0.2% against the US dollar this week and nearly 6% since January. The unwanted appreciation has been a headache for the SNB, which warrants more intervention against a pricey franc. Interestingly, the franc has been flat against the euro year-to-date. We are looking to buy EUR/CHF on weakness due to the SNB’s intervention and the CHF’s lower beta to growth. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data from Norway have been positive: The industrial production index increased by 1.1% month-on-month in August.  Manufacturing output increased by 3% month-on-month in August. The Norwegian krone rose by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. Incoming data from Norway is consistent with the recent economic recovery there, especially in the resources sector. Industrial production of mining and quarrying, basic metals, and machinery equipment jumped, respectively, by 10.1%, 8.8% and 15.7% month-on-month in August. We continue to favor the Norwegian krone and are looking to purchase the Nordic basket again at a more favorable price. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data from Sweden have been positive: Industrial production increased by 0.2% year-on-year in August, or 7% month-on-month. Manufacturing new orders was unchanged year-on-year in August, but that’s up from a 6.9% contraction in the previous month. The budget balance shifted from a surplus of SEK 19.8 billion to a deficit of SEK 13.1 billion in September. The Swedish krona increased by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. As a bellwether of global growth, Swedish manufacturing activity is one of the indicators we monitor closely in order to gauge where we are in a cycle. Despite recent uncertainties, the Swedish manufacturing sector is showing budding signs of recovery, which is bullish for the Swedish krona. Kelly Zhong Research Analyst Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

To all clients, Next week, in lieu of publishing a regular report, I will be hosting a webcast on September 15th at 10 am EDT, discussing our latest views on global fixed income markets.  Sign up details for the Webcast will arrive in your inboxes later this week.   Best regards, Robert Robis, Chief Fixed Income Strategist   Feature Much of the global rebound in economic activity, and recovery in equity and credit markets, seen since the COVID-19 shock earlier this year can be attributed to historic levels of monetary and fiscal stimulus. However, the effective transmission of various monetary policy measures such as liquidity injections and refinancing operations, and by extension a sustained global recovery, is dependent on the continued smooth flow of credit from lenders to borrowers. As such, the tightening in bank lending standards seen across developed markets in the second quarter of 2020 could imperil the recovery if banks remain cautious with borrowers (Chart 1). Chart 1Credit Standards Across Developed Markets This week, we are introducing the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) Global Credit Conditions Chartbook—a review of central bank surveys of bank lending standards and loan demand.  We will be publishing this chartbook on an occasional basis going forward to help inform our fixed income investment recommendations. Where it is relevant to our analysis, we will also make special note of the one-off questions asked in some of these surveys that are germane to the economic situation at hand. Where To Find The Bank Lending Surveys A number of central banks publish regular surveys of bank lending conditions in their domestic economies. The surveys, and the details on how they are conducted, can be found on the websites of the central banks: US Federal Reserve:  https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/sloos.htm European Central Bank: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/bank_lending_survey/html/index.en.html Bank of England: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/credit-conditions-survey/ Bank of Japan: https://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/dl/loan/loos/index.htm/ Bank of Canada: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/publications/slos/ Reserve Bank of New Zealand: https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/c60-credit-conditions-survey US Chart 2US Credit Conditions Overall credit standards for US businesses, measured as an average of standards faced by small, medium and large firms, tightened dramatically in Q2/2020 (Chart 2). Unsurprisingly, gloomier economic outlooks, reduced risk tolerance, and worsening industry-specific problems were the top reasons cited by US banks for tightening standards. US banks reported that commercial and industrial (C&I) loan demand from all firms also weakened in Q2, owing to a decrease in customers’ inventory financing and fixed investment needs. This suggests that the surge in actual C&I loan growth data during the spring was fueled by companies drawing down credit lines to survive the lack of cash flow during the COVID-19 lockdowns and should soon peak. Standards for consumer loans tightened significantly in Q2, as well. A continuation of this trend would pose a major risk to the US economic recovery, given the still fragile state of US consumer confidence. Business lending standards typically lead US high-yield corporate bond default rates by about one year, suggesting that defaults will continue to climb over the next few quarters (Chart 2, top panel). Tightening US junk bond spreads have ignored the rising trend in defaults and now provide no compensation for the likely amount of future default losses, suggesting poor value in the overall US high-yield market (Chart 3). Turning to the real estate market, lending standards have tightened significantly for both commercial and residential mortgage loans (Chart 4). In a special question asked in the Q2 survey, US banks indicated that lending standards for both those categories are at the tighter end of the range that has prevailed since 2005. Business lending standards typically lead US high-yield corporate bond default rates by about one year, suggesting that defaults will continue to climb over the next few quarters. Chart 3US Junk Spreads Do Not Compensate For Default Risk Chart 4The White Picket Fence Is Looking Out Of Reach Euro Area Italy is seeing the greater benefit from ECB support, however, with loan growth now at a new cyclical high. Chart 5Euro Area Credit Conditions In contrast to the US, credit standards actually eased slightly in the euro area in Q2/2020 (Chart 5). Banks reported increased perceptions of overall risk from a worsening economic outlook, but that was more than offset by the massive liquidity and loan guarantee programs that were part of the policy response to the COVID-19 recession. Going forward, banks expect lending standards to tighten as the maximum impact of those policies begins to fade. Credit demand from firms rose in Q2, driven by acute liquidity needs during the COVID-19 lockdowns. At the same time, demand for longer-term financing for capital expenditure was very depressed. Banks expect credit demand to normalize in Q3, as easing lockdown restrictions dampen the immediate need for liquidity. Credit demand from euro area households plummeted in Q2. Banks reported that plunging consumer confidence was the leading cause of decline in credit demand, followed closely by reduced spending on durable goods. Consumer confidence has already rebounded and banks expect demand to follow suit, as economies re-open and spending opportunities return. Chart 6HY Spreads In The Euro Area Are Unattractive As with the US, we expect that tighter credit standards to firms will drive up euro area high-yield default rates. Current euro area high-yield spreads offer little compensation for the coming increase in default losses, suggesting a similar poor valuation backdrop to US junk bonds (Chart 6). Looking at the four major euro area economies, credit standards eased across the board in Q2, with the largest moves seen in Italy and Spain (Chart 7). The ECB’s liquidity operations have helped support lending in those countries, each with a take-up from long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) equal to around 14% of total bank lending (Chart 8). Italy is seeing the greater benefit from ECB support, however, with loan growth now at a new cyclical high and Spanish banks projecting a much sharper tightening of lending standards in Q3 relative to Italian banks.   Chart 7Loan Growth Accelerating Across Most Of The Euro Area Chart 8Italy & Spain Taking Full Advantage Of LTROs UK For consumers, UK banks are projecting loan demand to improve in Q3, although that will require a sharper rebound in consumer confidence than has been seen to date. Chart 9UK Credit Conditions In the UK, corporate credit standards eased significantly in Q2 2020 thanks to the massive liquidity support programs provided by the UK government (Chart 9). Lenders reported a larger proportion of loan application approvals from all business sizes, with the greatest improvements seen in small businesses and medium-sized private non-financial corporations (PNFCs). However, lenders indicated that average credit quality on new PNFC borrowing facilities had actually declined, with default rates increasing, for all sizes of borrowers. This divergence between increased lending and declining borrower creditworthiness attests to the impact of the UK’s substantial liquidity provisions in response to the COVID-19 shock.   The credit demand side mirrors the supply story with a massive spike in Q2 2020. In contrast to euro area counterparts, UK businesses reportedly borrowed primarily to facilitate balance sheet restructuring. However, as with the euro area, the story for Q3 is much more bearish. Banks are projecting credit standards to turn more restrictive as stimulus programs run out and borrowers rein in credit demand. Going forward, decreasing risk appetite of UK banks will likely contribute to a tightening in lending standards. For consumers, UK banks are projecting loan demand to improve in Q3, although that will require a sharper rebound in consumer confidence than has been seen to date. UK banks surprisingly reported that the average credit quality of new consumer loans improved in Q2, suggesting that consumer loan demand could rebound strongly in Q3 as lockdown restrictions fade.   Japan Perversely, the latest improvement in Japanese business optimism could translate to lower business loan demand going forward. Chart 10Japan Credit Conditions Before the pandemic hit, credit standards in Japan were in a structural tightening trend for both firms and households (Chart 10). Fiscal authorities have taken a number of measures to ease conditions for businesses, including low interest rate loan programs and guarantees for large businesses as well as small and medium-sized enterprises, which has translated into the easiest credit standards for Japanese firms since 2005. The correlation between business loan demand and business conditions is not as clear-cut in Japan compared to other countries. Japanese firms tend to borrow more when the economic outlook is poor, indicating that loans are being used to meet emergency funding or restructuring needs rather than being put towards capital expenditure or inventory financing. Perversely, the latest improvement in Japanese business optimism could translate to lower business loan demand going forward. However, the consumer picture is a bit more conventional—consumer loan demand and confidence tend to track quite closely. While consumer confidence has yet to stage a convincing rebound, it has clearly bottomed. The more positive projections for consumer loan demand from the Japan bank lending survey seem to confirm this message.  Canada And New Zealand In Canada, business lending standards tightened in Q2/2020 as loan growth slowed (Chart 11). Although loan growth is far from contracting on a year-on-year basis, further tightening in conditions could pose an obstacle to Canadian recovery. On the mortgage side, the Canadian government has been active in easing pressures for lenders by relaxing loan-to-value requirements for mortgage insurance, making it easier for them to collateralize and sell their assets to the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). Although this has yet to translate to the standards faced by borrowers, residential mortgage growth remains buoyant. In New Zealand, credit standards for firms (including both corporates and SMEs) tightened significantly in Q2 (Chart 12). Many banks expect to apply tighter lending standards to borrowers in industries most impacted by the pandemic, such as tourism, accommodation, and construction. Demand for credit from firms was driven by working capital needs while capital expenditure funding demands fell drastically. Chart 11Canada Credit Conditions Chart 12New Zealand Credit Conditions   On the consumer side, residential mortgage standards increased somewhat, and banks expect to perform more due diligence on income and job security. The hit to credit demand was broad-based across credit card, secured, and unsecured lending and coincided with a sharp fall in loan demand.     Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index ​​​​​​​ Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns