China

Highlights We cannot predict how China will manage Evergrande precisely but we have a high conviction that it will do whatever it takes to prevent contagion across the property sector. However, China’s stimulus tools are losing their effectiveness over time. The country is due for a prolonged struggle with financial and economic instability regardless of whether Evergrande defaults. A messy default would obviously exacerbate the problem. China’s regulatory crackdowns target private companies and will continue to weigh on animal spirits in the private sector. The government will be forced to use fiscal policy to compensate. The US’s and China’s switch from engagement to confrontation poses a persistent headwind for investor sentiment toward China. The new consensus that investors should buy into China’s “strategic sectors” to avoid arbitrary regulatory crackdowns is vulnerable to its own logic and to sanctions by the US and its allies. Feature China poses a unique confluence of domestic and foreign political risks and global markets are now pricing them. Property giant Evergrande could default on $120 million in onshore and offshore interest payments as early as September 23, or next month, prompting investors to run for cover. Is this crisis fleeting or part of a larger systemic failure? It is a larger systemic failure. We expect a slow-motion, Japanese-style crisis over the coming decade, marked with periodic bailouts and stimulus packages. We recommend investors stay the course: steer clear of China and stay short the renminbi and Taiwanese dollar. Tactically, stick with large caps, defensive sectors, and developed markets within the global equity universe. Strategically, prefer emerging markets that benefit from forthcoming Chinese (and American) stimulus. 1. A “Minsky Moment” Cannot Be Ruled Out The chief fear is whether the approaching default of Evergrande marks China’s “Minsky Moment.” Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis held that long periods of stable revenues lead to risky financial deals and large accumulations of systemic risk that are underpriced. When revenues cannot cover interest payments, a crash ensues followed by deleveraging. Minsky’s hypothesis speaks to debt crises in an entire economy, yet nobody knows for sure whether China’s economy has reached such a breaking point. China’s national savings rate stands at 45.7% of GDP and nominal growth exceeds the long-term government bond yield. However, a sharp drop in asset prices, especially in the property sector, could change everything, as it could lead to balance sheet recession among corporates and a fall in national income. Evergrande is supposed to make an $84 million interest payment on offshore debt and a $36 million payment on onshore debt this week, and after 30 days it would default. It owes $37 billion in debt payments over the next 12 months but only has $13 billion cash on hand (as of June 30, 2021). Authorities can opt for a full bailout or a partial bailout, in which the company defaults on offshore bonds but not onshore. They could even let the company fail categorically, though that would produce exactly the kind of precipitous drop in property asset prices that would lead to wider financial contagion. State intervention to smooth the crisis is more likely – and the government can easily pressure other companies into acquiring Evergrande’s assets and business divisions. Chart 1Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Chart 1 shows that China’s corporate debt-to-GDP ratio stands head and shoulders above other countries that experienced financial crises in recent decades, courtesy of our Emerging Markets Strategy. While China can undoubtedly bear large debts due to its savings, the implication is that China has large enough financial imbalances to suffer a full-fledged financial crisis, even if the timing is hard to predict. Household credit is also elevated at 61.7% of GDP, and the household debt-to-disposable-income ratio is now higher than in the United States. About two-thirds of China’s corporate debt is held by state-owned or state-controlled entities, prompting some investors to dismiss the gravity of the risk. However, financial crises often involve the transfer of debt from the state to private sector or vice versa. 59% of bond defaults in H1 2021 have involved state companies. Total debt is the main concern. Don’t take our word for it: China’s Communist Party has warned for the past decade about the danger of “implicit guarantees” and “moral hazard” that encourage financial excesses in the corporate sector. The Xi Jinping administration has tried to induce a deleveraging process since it came to power in 2012-13. Xi’s “three red lines” for the property sector precipitated the current turmoil. Even if Evergrande’s troubles are managed, China’s systemic risks will continue to boil over as its potential growth rate slows and the government continues trying to wring out financial excesses. Chart 2Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher More broadly China is experiencing an unprecedented overlap of economic and political crises: The population is aging and labor force is shrinking; The economic model since 2009 has been changing from export-manufacturing to domestic-oriented, investment-driven growth; Indebtedness is spreading from corporates to households and ultimately the government; The governance model is shifting from “single-party rule” to “single-person rule” or autocracy; The population is reaching middle class status and demanding better quality of life; The international trade environment is turning from hyper-globalization to hypo-globalization; The geopolitical backdrop is darkening with the US and its allies attempting to contain China’s ambitions of regional supremacy. Almost all of these changes bring more risks than opportunities to China over the long haul. The need for rapid policy shifts provides the ostensible reasoning for President Xi Jinping’s decision not to step down but to remain president for the foreseeable future. He will clinch this position at the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. The implication is that policy uncertainty will continue climbing up to at least 2019 peaks while offshore equity markets will continue to trend lower, as they have done since the onset of the US trade war (Chart 2). Credit default swap rates have so far been subdued but they are showing signs of life. A sharp rise in policy uncertainty and property sector stress would pull them up. Domestic equities (A-shares) have rallied since 2019 but we would expect them to fall back given China’s historic confluence of structural and cyclical challenges, which will create further negative surprises (Chart 2, bottom panel). 2. Beijing Will Provide Bailouts And Stimulus Ad Nauseum Evergrande’s future may be in doubt but Beijing will throw all its power at stopping nationwide financial contagion. True, a policy miscalculation is possible. A tardy or failed intervention cannot be ruled out. However, investors should remember that a clear pattern of bailouts and stimulus has emerged over the course of the Xi Jinping administration whenever a “hard landing” or financial collapse loomed. The government tightens controls on bloated sectors until the financial fallout threatens to undermine general economic and social stability, at which point the government eases policy. It is often forced to stimulate the economy aggressively. Chart 3 shows these cycles in two ways: China’s control of credit through the state-controlled banks, and the frequency of news stories mentioning important terms associated with financial and economic distress: defaults, layoffs, and bankruptcies. These three terms used to be unheard of among China watchers. Under the Xi administration, a higher tolerance of creative destruction has served as the way to push forward reform. The current rise in distress is not extended, suggesting that more bad news is coming, but it also shows that the government has repeatedly been forced to provide stimulus even under the Xi administration. Chart 3Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Could this time be different? Not likely. The American experience and the pandemic will also force China’s government to ease policy: China learns from US mistakes. The US lurched from Lehman’s failure into a financial crisis, an impaired credit channel, a sluggish economic recovery, a spike in polarization, policy paralysis, a near-default on the national debt, a surge in right- and left-wing populism, the tumultuous Trump presidency, widespread social unrest, a contested leadership succession, and a mob storming the nation’s capitol (Chart 4). This is obviously the nightmare of any Chinese leader and a trajectory that the Xi administration will avoid at any cost. Chart 4Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Chinese households store their wealth in the property sector, so any attempt at policy restraint or austerity faces a massive constraint. Only a few countries are comparable to China with respect to the share of non-financial household wealth (property and land) within total household wealth. All of them are hosts of property sector bubbles, including the bubbles in Spain and Ireland back in 2007 (Chart 5). A property collapse would destroy the savings of the Chinese people over four decades of prosperity. Chart 5Property Is The Bedrock Of Chinese Households Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis Social instability is already flaring up. Almost all China experts agree that “social stability” is the Communist Party’s bottom line. But note that the Evergrande saga has already led to protests, not only at the company’s headquarters in Shenzhen but also in other cities such as Shenyang, Guangzhou, Chongqing. Protests were filmed and shown on social media (posts have been censored). Protesters demanded repayment for wealth management products gone sour and properties they are owed that have not been built. This is only a taste of the cross-regional protests that would emerge if the broader property sector suffered. The lingering COVID-19 pandemic is still relevant. Investors should not underrate the potential threat that the pandemic poses to the regime. Severe epidemics have occurred about 11% of the time over the course of China’s history and they often have major ramifications. Disease has played a role in the downfall of six out of ten dynasties – and in four cases it played a major role. It would be suicidal for any regime to add self-inflicted economic collapse to a lingering pandemic (Table 1). Table 1Disease Threatens Chinese Dynasties – Not A Time To Self-Inflict A Recession Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis Easing policy does not necessarily mean bringing out the “bazooka” and splurging on money and credit growth, though that is increasingly likely as the crisis intensifies. Notably the July Politburo statement specifically removed language that said China would “avoid sharp turns in policy.” In other words, sharp turns might be necessary. That can only mean sharp reflationary turns, as there is very little chance of doubling down on policy tightening. A counterargument holds that the Chinese government is now exclusively focused on power consolidation to the neglect of financial and economic stability. Perhaps the leadership is misinformed, overconfident, or thinks a financial collapse will better purge its enemies – along the lines of the various political purges under Chairman Mao Zedong. Wealthy tech magnates and property owners could conceivably challenge the return of autocracy. After all, the US political establishment almost “fell” to a rich property baron – why couldn’t China’s Communist Party? Political purges should certainly be expected ahead of next year’s party congress. But not to the point of killing the economy. The government would not be trying to balance policy tightening and loosening so carefully if it sought to induce chaos. It must be admitted, however, that the change to autocracy means that the odds of irrational or idiosyncratic policy have gone up substantially and permanently. Of course, the high likelihood that Beijing will provide bailouts and stimulus should not be read as a bullish investment thesis, even though it would create a pop in oversold assets. The Chinese system is saturated with money and credit, which have been losing their effectiveness in driving growth. Financial imbalances get worse, not better, with each wave of credit stimulus. Beijing is caught between a rock and a hard place. Hence stimulus comes only reluctantly and reactively. But it does come in the end because a financial crash would threaten the life of the regime and preclude all other policy priorities, domestic and foreign. 3. Yes, China’s Regulatory Crackdown Targets The Private Sector Global growth and other emerging economies will get most of the benefit once China stimulates, since China’s own firms will still face a negative domestic political backdrop. Bullish investors argue that the government’s regulatory tightening is misunderstood and overblown. The claim is that China is not targeting the private sector generally but only isolated sectors causing social problems. Costs need to be reduced in property, education, and health to improve quality of life. China shares the US’s and EU’s desire to rein in tech giants that monopolize their markets, abuse consumer data and privacy, and benefit from distorted tax systems. Most of these arguments are misleading. China does not have a strong record on data privacy, equality, social safety nets, rule of law, or “sustainable” growth (as opposed to “unsustainable,” high-debt, high-polluting growth). China actively encourages state champions that monopolize key sectors. Many developed markets have better records in these areas, notably in Europe, yet China is eschewing these regulatory models in preference for an approach that is arbitrary and absolutist, i.e. negative for governance. As for the private sector, animal spirits have been in a long decline throughout the past decade. This is true whether judging by money velocity – i.e. the pace of economic activity relative to the increase in money supply – or by households’ and businesses’ marginal propensity to save (Chart 6). The 2015-16 period shows that even periodic bouts of government stimulus have not reversed the general trend. Regulatory whack-a-mole and financial turmoil will not improve the situation. Chart 6Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Chart 7Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Surveys of sentiment confirm that the latest developments will have a negative effect (Chart 7). Cumulatively, the changes in China’s domestic and international policy context are being interpreted as negative for business, entrepreneurship, and economic freedom – notwithstanding the government’s claims to expand opportunity in its “common prosperity” plan. 4. The Withdrawal Of US Friendship Is A Headwind For China Chart 8Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired All of the successful Asian economies – including China for most of the past forty years of prosperity – have tried to stay on the good side of the United States. By contrast, China and the US today are shifting from engagement to confrontation and breaking up their economic ties (Chart 8). This is a problem for China because the US and to some extent its allies will seek to undermine China’s economy and its autocratic model as part of this great power competition. The rise in geopolitical risk is underscored by the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) agreement, by which the US will provide Australia with nuclear submarines over the next decade. This was a clear demonstration of the US’s “pivot to Asia” and the fact that the US and China are preparing for war – if only to deter it. China’s return to autocracy and clash with the US and Asian neighbors is also leading to a deterioration of its global image, particularly over issues of transparency and information sharing. The dispute over the origins of COVID-19 is a major source of division with the US and other countries. Transparency is important for investors. The World Bank has discontinued its “Ease of Doing Business” rankings after a scandal was revealed in which China’s ranking was artificially bumped up. The last-published trend is still downward (Chart 9). Most recently China has stepped up censorship of its financial news media amid the current market turmoil, which makes it harder for investors to assess the full extent of property and financial risks.1 The US political factions agree on China-bashing if nothing else. The Biden administration has little political impetus to eschew tariffs and export controls. One important penalty will come from the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is likely to ban Chinese firms from US stock exchanges unless they conform to common accounting standards. Hence the dramatic fall in the share prices of Chinese companies listed via American Depository Receipts (ADRs), in both absolute and relative terms (Chart 10, top panel). This threat prompted China’s recent crackdown on its own firms that were attempting to hold initial public offerings on US exchanges. Chart 9US Conflict Exposes China’s Global Influence Campaign Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis The Quadrilateral Forum – the US, Japan, Australia, and India – has agreed to link the semiconductor supply chain to human rights standards, foreclosing China’s participation in that supply chain. US semiconductor firms are among the most exposed to China but they have not suffered over the course of the US-China tech war, suggesting that US vulnerabilities are limited (Chart 10, bottom panel). Chart 10US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down The point is not to exaggerate the strength of the US and its allies but rather the costs to China of actively opposing them. The US has a difficult enough time cobbling together a coalition of states to impose sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, not to mention forming any coalition that would totally exclude and isolate China. China is far more important to US allies than Iran – it is irreplaceable in the global economy (Chart 11). The EU and China’s Asian neighbors will typically restrain the US’s more aggressive impulses so as not to upset the global recovery or end up on the front lines of a war.2 Chart 11No Substitute For China In Global Economy Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis This diplomatic constraint on the US is probably positive for global growth but not for China per se. American allies are still able to increase the costs on China for pursuing its own state-backed development path and geopolitical sphere of influence. Japan, Australia, and others are likely to veto China’s application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), while the UK and eventually the US are likely to join it. Investors should view US-China ties as a headwind at least until the two powers manage to negotiate a diplomatic thaw, i.e. substantial de-escalation of tensions. A thaw is unlikely in the lead-up to Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and the US midterm elections in fall 2022. Presidents Biden and Xi are still working on a bilateral summit, not to mention a more substantial improvement in ties. We doubt a diplomatic thaw would be durable anyway but the important point is that until it happens China will face periodic bouts of negative sentiment from the emerging cold war. Other Asian economies thrived under US auspices – China is sailing in uncharted waters. 5. Global Investors Cannot Separate Civilian From State And Military Investments The word on Wall Street is that investors should align their strategies with those of China’s leaders so as not to run afoul of arbitrary and draconian regulators. For example, instead of “soft tech” or consumer-oriented companies – like those that give people rides, deliver food, or make creative video games – investors should invest in “hard tech” or strategic companies like those that make computer chips, renewable energy, biotechnologies, pharmaceuticals, and capital equipment. There is no question that the trend in China – and elsewhere – is for governments to become more active in picking winners and losers. Industrial policy is back. Investors have no choice but to include policy analysis in their toolbox. However, for global investors, an investment strategy of buying whatever the government says is far from convincing. The most basic investment strategy in keeping with the Xi administration’s goals would be to invest in state-owned enterprises in domestic equity markets. So SOEs should have outperformed the market, right? Wrong. They were in a downtrend prior to the 2015 bubble, the burst of which caused a further downtrend (Chart 12, top panel). Similarly, the preference for “hard tech” over “soft tech” is promising in theory but complicated in practice: hard tech is flat-to-down over the decade and down since COVID-19 (Chart 12, middle panel). It has underperformed its global peers (Chart 12, bottom panel). China’s policy disposition should be beneficial for industrials, health care, and renewable energy. First, China is doubling down on its manufacturing economy. Second, the population is aging and health care is a critical part of the common prosperity plan. Third, green energy is a way of diversifying from dependency on imported oil and natural gas. However, the profile of these sectors relative to their global counterparts is only unambiguously attractive in the case of industrials, which began to outperform even during the trade war (Chart 13). Chart 12State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks Chart 13Beware 'State Approved' Trades Beware 'State Approved' Trades Beware 'State Approved' Trades In Table 2 we outline the valuations and political risks of onshore equity sectors. Valuations are not cheap. Domestic and foreign risks are not fully priced. Table 2China Onshore Equities, Valuations, And (Geo)Political Risks Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis There is a bigger problem for global investors, especially Americans: investing in China’s strategic sectors directly implicates investors in the Communist Party’s domestic human rights practices, state-owned enterprises, and national security goals. “Civil-military fusion” is a well-established doctrine that calls for the People’s Liberation Army to have access to the cutting-edge technology developed by civilians and vice versa. These investments will eventually be subject to punitive measures since the US policy establishment believes it can no longer afford to let US wealth buttress China’s military and technological rise. Investment Takeaways China may or may not work out a partial bailout for Evergrande but it will definitely provide state assistance and fiscal stimulus to try to prevent contagion across the property sector and financial system. Bad news in the coming weeks and months will be replaced by good news in this sense. However, the fact that China will eventually be forced to undertake traditional stimulus yet again will increase its systemic financial risks, in a well-established pattern. The best equity opportunities will lie outside of China, where companies will benefit from global recovery yet avoid suffering from China’s unique confluence of domestic and foreign political risks. We prefer developed markets and select emerging markets in Latin America and Asia-ex-China. Chinese households and businesses are downbeat. This behavior cannot be separated from the historic changes in the economy, domestic politics, and foreign policy. It is hard to see an improvement until the government boosts growth and the 2022 political reshuffle is over. American opposition is a bigger problem for China than global investors realize. Not only are the two economies divorcing but other democracies will distance themselves from China as well – not because of US demands but because their own manufacturing, national security, and ideological space is threatened by China’s reversion to autocracy and assertive foreign policy. Investing in China’s “hard tech” and strategic sectors with government approval is not a simple solution. This approach will directly funnel capital into China’s state-owned enterprises, domestic security forces, and military. As such the US and West will eventually impose controls. Investments may not be liquid since China would suffer if capital ever fled these kinds of projects. Both American and Chinese stimulus is looming this winter but the short run will see more volatility. We are closing our long JPY-KRW tactical trade for a gain of 4.4%   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We have often noted in these pages over the past decade that multilateral organizations overrated improvements in China’s governance based on policy pronouncements rather than structural changes. 2 Still, tensions among the allies should not be overrated since they share a fundamental concern over China’s increasing challenge to the current global order. The EU is pursuing trade talks with Taiwan, and there are ways that the US can compensate France over the nullification of its submarine sales to Australia (most of which are detrimental to China’s security).

Highlights Global growth is peaking, but US growth is losing momentum relative to its peers. This has historically been negative for the greenback. Chinese monetary policy is no longer on a tightening path, and might ease going forward. As discounting mechanisms, cyclical currencies should outperform. Our bias is that non-US growth will outperform growth in the US over the next 12-18 months. This will lead to capital reallocation away from the US dollar. While US bond yields could rise towards 2%, real interest rates will remain low compared to history. Our recommendations remain the same: the DXY will struggle to punch above the 94-95 level, but will ultimately touch 80. Feature Chart I-1US Growth Momentum And The Dollar US Growth Momentum And The Dollar US Growth Momentum And The Dollar The DXY index is up for the year, but has twice failed to punch the 94 level. The first leg of the rally from January to March occurred within a context of rising global yields, led by the US. The second leg, starting in June was triggered by a perceived hawkish shift from the Federal Reserve. The common denominator for both legs of the rally was that US growth was outperforming growth in the rest of the world. But that is beginning to change. Bloomberg consensus forecasts show a sharp reversal in US growth momentum, relative to its peers (Chart I-1). Historically, this has put a firm ceiling on the greenback. Cycles And The US Dollar The dollar tends to fare worse early in the cycle when growth is rising but inflation is falling (Chart I-2). Admittedly, inflation prints in some developed markets like the US and Canada have been rather strong. But to the extent that these prints reflect transitory factors, it should allow global central banks to remain accommodative, supporting growth. The remarkable thing about Chart I-1 is that the rotation in growth from the US towards other countries has been broad based. Countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Brazil and Mexico are seeing a bottoming in growth momentum relative to the US (Chart I-3). Chart I-2The Dollar Fares Poorly Early In The Cycle Why The Ultimate Low In The Dollar Is Nigh Why The Ultimate Low In The Dollar Is Nigh Chart I-3A Rotation Of Growth From The US A Rotation Of Growth From The US A Rotation Of Growth From The US This bottoming in growth momentum is occurring at the same time as local central banks are becoming more orthodox about monetary policy. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has ended quantitative easing. The Bank of Canada has cut asset purchases in half. Brazil, Mexico and Russia, among other emerging market countries are hiking interest rates. While it is true that inflation in some developed and emerging markets like Canada, the UK, Brazil and Russia is perking up, for most developed markets as a whole, inflation is actually surprising to the upside in the US (Chart I-4). China has been tightening policy amidst very low inflation. Currencies tend to be driven by real rates. A growth rotation away from the US, in addition to more orthodox monetary policies outside the US, will be negative for the greenback. Chart I-4US Relative Inflation And The Dollar US Relative Inflation And The Dollar US Relative Inflation And The Dollar What About Chinese Growth? Chinese growth expectations are still cratering relative to the US. The fiasco around the China Evergrande Group has also led to speculation that this could become a systemic event. For developed market currencies, especially those linked to China like the Australian dollar, this is a market-relevant event. Admittedly, offshore markets have started discounting a bigger depreciation in the RMB (Chart I-5). That said, the RMB has been rather resilient against the dollar suggesting that the risk of this becoming a systemic event is rather low (Chart I-6). Chart I-5The Evergrande Risk Is Not Yet Systemic The Evergrande Risk Is Not Yet Systemic The Evergrande Risk Is Not Yet Systemic Chart I-6Chinese Equities And The RMB Have Decoupled. Chinese Equities And The RMB Have Decoupled. Chinese Equities And The RMB Have Decoupled. We believe currency markets are sending the right signal. For one, the Evergrande debacle is occurring at a time when China is no longer tightening monetary policy. Chart I-7 shows that cyclical currencies in developed markets tend to be coincident with the Chinese credit impulse. As such, any easing in monetary policy will put a bottom in these currencies. Over the years, the Chinese bond market has become more and more liberalized. This two-way risk implies that zombies companies should be allowed to fail while unicorns flourish. It is true that regulatory control has been front and center in the current Chinese equity market malaise. That said, our bias is that liberalization is a reason why portfolio inflows into China continue to accelerate, as the economy moves closer to market-determined prices (Chart I-8). This has supported the RMB, a big weight in the Fed trade-weighted dollar. Chart I-7Chinese Policy And DM Currencies Chinese Policy And DM Currencies Chinese Policy And DM Currencies Chart I-8An Unrelenting Increase In Chinese Inflows An Unrelenting Increase In Chinese Inflows An Unrelenting Increase In Chinese Inflows A lot of EM debt is denominated in US dollars, which could be reprised for default risk. But on this basis, the Fed is ahead of the curve. This was the very reason the Federal Reserve introduced swap lines in 2020 with foreign emerging market central banks and made swapping FX reserves for dollars a permanent facility in its toolkit for monetary policy this year. Non-US domestic authorities have ample ability to decide which entities they allow to fail, and which they bail out from their USD obligations. Cross-currency basis swaps, a proxy for the cost of obtaining dollars offshore, remain well behaved (Chart I-9). Chart I-9No USD Funding Stress So Far In Developed Markets No USD Funding Stress So Far In Developed Markets No USD Funding Stress So Far In Developed Markets For developed market currencies, the implication is that China risks are currently overstated, while any upside surprise has not been meaningfully discounted. Gauging Investor Positioning The dollar tends to be a momentum currency. But at turning points, it pays to be a contrarian. Let’s begin with what is priced in. First, the overnight index swap curve (OIS) suggests that markets expect the Fed to hike interest rates faster than other G10 central banks (Chart I-10). This will not occur in a world where growth is stronger outside the US, and other central banks are well ahead in their tapering of asset purchases, pursuing much more orthodox monetary policy. Chart I-10The Market Remains Bullish On Fed Rate Hikes The Market Remains Bullish On Fed Rate Hikes The Market Remains Bullish On Fed Rate Hikes Chart I-11Speculators Are Bullish On ##br##The Dollar Speculators Are Bullish On The Dollar Speculators Are Bullish On The Dollar Second, at the beginning of this report, we highlighted the fact that the dollar is up this year. Part of the reason has been a pilling in of speculators into long greenback positions (Chart I-11). As a trading rule, it has usually been profitable to wait for net speculative positioning and moving averages to roll over before entering fresh dollar short positions (Chart I-12). On this basis, tactical investors might be a bit early, but its is also the case that the macroeconomic environment is moving against the dollar. Once markets start paying attention to the fact that global growth will rotate from the US, pinning the Fed into a more dovish stance, the dollar will quickly depreciate.   Chart I-12A Sentiment Trading Rule Will Wait For The Dollar To Roll Over More Broadly A Sentiment Trading Rule Will Wait For The Dollar To Roll Over More Broadly A Sentiment Trading Rule Will Wait For The Dollar To Roll Over More Broadly Often forgotten is that the dollar has tended to move in long cycles, usually 10 years between bull and bear markets. The US trade deficit (excluding oil) is hitting new fresh highs this year. These deficits need to be financed by foreign purchases of US securities, either by debt issued or equity raised. Investors could demand a discount to keep financing these deficits. Should the Congressional Budget Office estimates of the current trajectory of US deficits hold true, the dollar has about 10-15% downside from current levels (Chart I-13). Chart I-13Balance Of Payments Bode Negatively For The Greenback Balance Of Payments Bode Negatively For The Greenback Balance Of Payments Bode Negatively For The Greenback Our geopolitical strategists assign 80% odds to the passage of a bipartisan infrastructure bill, and 65% odds to the passage of a reconciliation bill. Either way, the US fiscal picture is set to deteriorate at a time when the Fed is comtemplating scaling back Treasury purchases. Interestingly, 10-15% downside in the US dollar is exactly what is needed to realign the currency competitively (Chart I-14). Consumer prices have been rising globally, but this has been especially pronounced in the US. To the extent that we live in a globalized world with flexible exchange rates, this should allow more competitive countries to see an increase in their trade balances. This is exactly what is occurring, with the US trade deficit hitting new lows. Chart I-14The Dollar Is Expensive On A PPP Basis The Dollar Is Expensive On A PPP Basis The Dollar Is Expensive On A PPP Basis Risks To The View Currency forecasts are obviously fraught with risks. The biggest risk to the view is a broad-based equity market correction, that reinvigorates inflows into US safe-haven bonds. We are cognizant that this is a risk worth monitoring. For example, investors are preferring to park cash in US Treasurys over gold, two competing safe-haven assets (Chart I-15). This has usually been positive for the greenback. But it also suggests investors view the Fed is going to be orthodox in monetary settings, tightening policy faster than the market expects. This boils down to a judgment call. The US market is much more vulnerable to rate changes than other markets (Chart I-16). As such, a hawkish shift by the Federal Reserve could significantly tighten financial conditions (through a stock market correction), setting the stage for an ultimate low in the dollar equity outflows. Chart I-15Safe-Haven Dollar Flows Face Technical Resistance Safe-Haven Dollar Flows Face Technical Resistance Safe-Haven Dollar Flows Face Technical Resistance Chart I-16Higher Bond Yields Will Be Negative For The US Market. Higher Bond Yields Will Be Negative For The US Market. Higher Bond Yields Will Be Negative For The US Market. Given this two-way risk, we are reintroducing our long CHF/NZD position that correlates well with currency volatility (Chart I-17). We are also long the yen on this basis. In terms of housekeeping, our long AUD/NZD trade was stopped out for a loss. As we iterated in our Aussie report, a lot of pessimism is embedded in the AUD, making it a potent candidate for a powerful mean-reversion rally. We recommend reinstating this position at current levels (a nudge above our stop loss). Chart I-17Buy CHF/NZD As A Hedge Buy CHF/NZD As A Hedge Buy CHF/NZD As A Hedge Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Data out of the US this week was strong: PPI continues to accelerate in the US, rising 8.3% year on year in August while CPI also remains strong at 5.3% on the headline print. Pricing pressures remain acute in the US. The empire manufacturing survey surprised to the upside in September. The headline number was 34.2 versus expectations of a 17.9 reading. Admittedly, this was driven by an increase in selling prices. Retail sales were surprisingly strong in August, with the control group rising 2.5% month on month versus expectations of a flat number. The US dollar DXY index was relatively flat this week. The markets are at a crossroads, gauging whether strong US data will maintain momentum or revert to a lower equilibrium. Our bias is towards the latter, but admittedly, there are two-way risks to this view.  Report Links: Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears - March 19, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Euro area data remains robust: Industrial production printed a solid 7.7% year-on-year growth in July. The trade surplus for July rose to €20.7 bn. The euro fell by 0.6% this week. The ECB has engineered a dovish tapering of asset purchases, but it remains the case as the interest rate expectations between the euro area and the US are at bombed out levels. This should support positive euro area surprises. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward - April 2, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent Japanese data has been on the weak side: Core machinery orders rose 11.1% year on year in July. Exports were strong in August, rising 34% while imports rose 40%. The yen was flat against the dollar this week. Currency volatility is currently depressed, and Japan has been performing poorly economically. To the extent that this is pandemic related, it sets the JPY up for a playable coil spring rebound. Report Links: The Case For Japan - June 11, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 UK data remains on the mend: Industrial production came in at 3.8% year on year, above expectations. Average weekly earnings, including bonus payments, are rising 8.3% year on year as of July. Job gains continue. The July report pushed the unemployment rate from 4.7% to 4.6%. CPI and RPI remain rather sticky around the 3-5% level. House prices rose 8% year on year in July. The pound fell by 0.4% this week. The broad trend in the pound will now be dictated by what happens to both the dollar and the euro. The BoE is more hawkish than the Fed and the ECB should support gilt yields and the pound. A slowing in US economic momentum is also bullish for the sterling. Report Links: Why Are UK Interest Rates Still So Low? - March 10, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Thoughts On The British Pound - December 18, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Australian data was slated to slow as we expected, and recent numbers highlight this: There were 146K job losses in August. This was well split between part time and full time. NAB business confidence and current conditions moderately improved in August. House price inflation is tracking the global wave, rising 16.8% year on year in Q2. The AUD fell 1% this week. We discussed the AUD at length in our report two weeks ago and believe current weakness is unwarranted. We are reinstating our long AUD/NZD trade this week. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 The was scant data out of New Zealand this week: The current account deficit widened in Q2 to -3.3% of GDP. Q2 GDP was an upside surprise but will likely be torpedoed in Q3 by COVID-19. The NZD was down 0.25% this week. We continue to believe the NZD will fare well cyclically, likely touching 75 cents, but our bias remains that hawkish expectations from the RBNZ are already well priced. This will make the kiwi lag other commodity currencies like the Aussie. We are reinstating our long AUD/NZD trade. Report Links: How High Can The Kiwi Rise? - April 30, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Data out of Canada this week has been robust: The labor report was strong. Hiring came in at 90K, with a favorable tilt towards full-time work. The unemployment rate fell from 7.5% to 7.1%. The CPI report was equally robust. Core CPI was at 3.5% year on year with most measures of the BoC’s underlying gauge inching higher. Housing starts remained strong in August at 260K, a slight dip from July’s 271K. The CAD was up by 0.44% this week. Last week’s currency report was dedicated to the loonie. With strong oil prices, a relatively hawkish central bank, and easing on tightening pressures from China, the loonie should remain well bid. A minority government will also be bullish for the loonie, as we highlighted last week. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 The Outlook For The Canadian Dollar - October 9, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Switzerland this week: PPI came in at 4.4% in August, an increase from July. The Swiss franc was down 0.22% this week. We are going long CHF/NZD as a hedge against rising currency volatility. Being long the yen also makes sense in this environment. However, given our view that risk sentiment will stay ebullient, the franc will lag the bounce in other cyclical currencies on a longer-term horizon. Report Links: An Update On The Swiss Franc - April 9, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Norwegian data is surprising to the upside: CPI was 3.4% year on year in August, above expectations. PPI rose 50% year on year in August. The trade balance posted a healthy surplus of NOK 42.6bn in August. The NOK was up 0.5% this week. We continue to be bullish Scandinavian currencies as a cyclical play on a lower US dollar. The NOK benefits from bombed-out valuations and a more orthodox central bank. Report Links: The Norwegian Method - June 4, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 The most important data from Sweden this week was the CPI report: CPI rose from 1.7% to 2.1% in August. CPIF, the Riksbank’s preferred measure, accelerated to 2.4%. The SEK was flat this week. A bottoming in the Chinese credit impulse will be a positive impact on growth-sensitive Sweden. Meanwhile, this week’s positive CPI report should pare back expectations of more stimulus from the Riksbank. We are short both EUR/SEK and USD/SEK as reflation plays. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 Sweden Beyond The Pandemic: Poised To Re-leverage - March 19, 2020 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Strategic Holdings Tactical Holdings Limit Orders Closed Trades

Dear Client, Next week, in lieu of our regular weekly report, I will be hosting two webcasts where I will discuss our view on China’s economy and financial markets. I will also address the topics that our clients are most concerned about, including China’s regulatory developments, inflation, and policy direction. The webcasts will be held on Wednesday, September 22 at 10:00 am EDT (English), and Thursday, September 23 at 9:00 am HKT (Mandarin). I look forward to discussing with you during the webcast. We will return to our regular publishing schedule on Wednesday, September 29. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist Highlights China is facing cyclical inflationary pressures more than disinflationary ones. Prices of mining, raw materials and manufacturing goods have been rising at record rates. Chinese manufacturers are operating at close to full production, which suggests that there is little slack in demand. Despite soft headline readings in consumer prices, the costs of goods and services have rebounded to pre-pandemic levels. Prices for home durable goods, fuel and utilities have surged to multiyear highs. Measures to boost domestic demand will be limited as long as inflationary pressures continue and manufacturers produce at close to full capacity. Near-term policy support will likely focus on reducing costs for manufacturers and improving wage growth for lower-income households. We are initiating a trade: long industrial stocks/short A-shares.  Feature China’s Producer Price index (PPI) registered a 13-year high in August, at the time when the domestic economy continued to slow. On the other hand, consumer prices (CPI) - both headline and core CPI - have been lackluster. The acceleration in producer inflation and the demand dynamics raise the question whether China is in a stagflation, a situation in which prices climb but wages and demand do not follow. Consequentially, economy policy faces a dilemma between boosting demand and containing inflation. Inflationary pressures have been driven by pandemic-related factors and the supply-side constraints will likely continue into Q1 next year. These inflationary pressures, and more importantly, undercurrents in the inflation prints, will constrain Chinese policymakers’ efforts to reflate the economy. The recent rebound in Chinese infrastructure stocks is overdone. Material stocks are also vulnerable to price setbacks. Global commodity prices will soften, although from very elevated levels. Meanwhile, we are initiating a trade: long Chinese industrial stocks relative to the A-share market. Despite falling profit growth in recent months, China’s leadership is increasing its support, both cyclically and structurally, to the manufacturing sector. Inflation Or Deflation? The details in both the PPI and CPI readings indicate that China is facing more inflationary pressures than disinflationary ones. Producers are raising prices across the board. Although consumer prices will likely remain well below the PBoC's 3% inflation target for the year mainly due to low food prices, prices in some of the key consumer goods segments are rising at an alarming pace. The inflationary pressures will continue for producers, at least through the first quarter of 2022. The strength in August’s PPI was concentrated in mining and raw materials (Chart 1, top panel). Robust global demand and tight supply conditions supported high oil and base metals prices, while pushing up coal prices. Chart 1Chinese Mining And Manufacturing Goods Prices Accelerated To Record Highs Chinese Mining And Manufacturing Goods Prices Accelerated To Record Highs Chinese Mining And Manufacturing Goods Prices Accelerated To Record Highs Chart 2Commodity Prices Held Up Despite A Slowing China Commodity Prices Held Up Despite A Slowing China Commodity Prices Held Up Despite A Slowing China We do not expect China’s infrastructure investment growth to pick up and support industrial metal prices. However, this year’s unsynchronized recovery in global demand and severe supply shortages have delayed the global commodity market’s price reaction to slowing Chinese demand (Chart 2). Moreover, as China’s environmental policy remains stringent during the upcoming winter, supply-side constraints from production cuts will partially offset the slowdown in China’s demand for mining and raw materials (Chart 3A and 3B). Chart 3ASupply-Side Constraints And Chinese Production Cuts Likely To Continue Into Early 2022 Supply-Side Constraints And Chinese Production Cuts Likely To Continue Into Early 2022 Supply-Side Constraints And Chinese Production Cuts Likely To Continue Into Early 2022 Chart 3BSupply-Side Constraints And Chinese Production Cuts Likely To Continue Into Early 2022 Supply-Side Constraints And Chinese Production Cuts Likely To Continue Into Early 2022 Supply-Side Constraints And Chinese Production Cuts Likely To Continue Into Early 2022 Manufacturing goods inflation registered its topmost annual growth since data collection started in 1996 (Chart 1, bottom panel). Moreover, capacity utilization rates in the industrial and manufacturing sectors are at the highest levels since 2007, well above their means (Chart 4). Changes in manufacturing capacity are highly correlated with China’s export growth and tightly linked to PPI (Chart 5). Therefore, manufacturing goods prices will remain lofty as long as external demand stays robust and China’s manufacturers continue to produce near maximum output. Chart 4Chinese Manufacturers Are Producing Near Their Max Capacity Chinese Manufacturers Are Producing Near Their Max Capacity Chinese Manufacturers Are Producing Near Their Max Capacity Chart 5Robust Exports Have Been Supporting Strong Chinese Manufacturing Output Robust Exports Have Been Supporting Strong Chinese Manufacturing Output Robust Exports Have Been Supporting Strong Chinese Manufacturing Output The PPI’s weakest component has been consumer goods, which inched up by a mere 0.3% from a year ago (Chart 6). However, consumer goods only account for 25% of PPI, whereas industrial and manufacturing producer goods are 75%. In addition, the underlying data shows that among the four sub-components in the PPI’s consumer goods, only food prices have remained below their pre-pandemic levels (Chart 7, top panel). Prices in durable goods have rebounded strongly since March last year and clothing and daily sundry articles have recovered to their end-2019 rate of growth (Chart 7, mid and bottom panels).  Chart 6Producer Prices For Consumer Goods Remain Soft... Producer Prices For Consumer Goods Remain Soft... Producer Prices For Consumer Goods Remain Soft... Chart 7...But Food Prices Have Been The Main Drag ...But Food Prices Have Been The Main Drag ...But Food Prices Have Been The Main Drag The PPI’s price forces are consistent with the CPI, in which food has been the main drag. Core CPI, along with prices for consumer goods and services, have returned to pre-pandemic growth rates (Chart 8). Durable goods prices, such as home appliances, increased to a multiyear high in August. Fuel and utilities costs have also risen. This suggests that despite the soft CPI readings, inflation has flowed from producers to Chinese consumers through manufacturing goods. The passthrough will likely intensify into Q4 when domestic COVID-cases have been largely brought under control and the September – October holiday season will boost consumption for both goods and services. Chart 8Prices For Other Consumer Goods Categories Have Recovered Prices For Other Consumer Goods Categories Have Recovered Prices For Other Consumer Goods Categories Have Recovered Table 1A Look At China’s CPI Basket – Food Dominates Inflation, Deflation, Or Stagflation? Inflation, Deflation, Or Stagflation? We still expect that headline CPI will remain below the PBoC’s 3% inflation target for the year. Consumer durable goods prices are lightly weighted in China’s CPI, therefore, an acceleration in inflation passthroughs in this component is unlikely to significantly push up the CPI aggregates (Table 1). Chart 9Prices For Healthcare And Education Services On A Structural Downshift Prices For Healthcare And Education Services On A Structural Downshift Prices For Healthcare And Education Services On A Structural Downshift In addition, there are some structural headwinds that will affect prices in the education and healthcare and medical services components, which together account for about 15% of the CPI. Healthcare prices have been on a policy-driven structural downshift since late 2017 and recent regulatory changes in the education industry will depress pricing power in that sector (Chart 9). Despite sluggish aggregate consumer prices, climbing prices in consumer durable goods, services and particularly, fuel and utilities, will likely force China’s leadership to take action on policy. Bottom Line: Price pressures for Chinese producers remain intense and consumers will feel the heat of escalating prices in durable goods, fuel and utilities. Inflation is threatening domestic demand, which is already slowing from its peak earlier this year. Implications On Policy Response Inflation readings –even though they are lagging economic indicators –bear significant forward-looking market implications because changes in inflation dynamics herald various policy responses. Despite slower economic growth, higher inflation coupled with accommodative monetary and fiscal policies may indicate that the economy is in a “goldilocks” stage and corporate profits can still benefit (Chart 10). Chinese onshore stocks reached record high recently (Chart 11). Chart 10Are Chinese Corporates In A 'Sweet Spot'? Are Chinese Corporates In A 'Sweet Spot'? Are Chinese Corporates In A 'Sweet Spot'? Chart 11Accommodative Monetary Conditions Propelled Chinese Stock Prices To Highest Since 2015 Accommodative Monetary Conditions Propelled Chinese Stock Prices To Highest Since 2015 Accommodative Monetary Conditions Propelled Chinese Stock Prices To Highest Since 2015 However, underlying trends in China’s producer and consumer inflation prints raise the risks that policymakers may not deliver the ingredients needed for a “just right” scenario. Even though China has kept a loose monetary policy that we expect to extend into next year, inflationary pressures may force policymakers to either delay or reduce the magnitude of stimulus. Recent policy moves show that the authorities are focused on reducing input cost burdens and bumping up support for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are highly concentrated in mid- to downstream manufacturing and services sectors. In our view, the recent rhetoric from policymakers further reduces the odds of any broadly based stimulus to boost demand. Our view is based on the following observations: The elevated global input costs and limited price passthroughs to consumers are depressing Chinese manufacturers’ profit margins and incentives to expand production capacity. Despite strong exports and production, manufacturing investment has lagged that in infrastructure and real estate this year (Chart 12). Consumers, particularly lower-income households, are bearing most of the burdens; rising costs and slow wage growth are weakening their propensity to spend (Chart 13). Chart 12Slower Manufacturing Investment Recovery Than Infrastructure And Real Estate So Far This Year Slower Manufacturing Investment Recovery Than Infrastructure And Real Estate So Far This Year Slower Manufacturing Investment Recovery Than Infrastructure And Real Estate So Far This Year Chart 13Slow Wage Growth Limits The Pace Of Consumption Recovery Slow Wage Growth Limits The Pace Of Consumption Recovery Slow Wage Growth Limits The Pace Of Consumption Recovery The inflation prints came at the time when China’s top leadership shifted its structural policy goals to reduce income inequality and stabilize manufacturing share in the aggregate economy. The structural goals will likely be reflected in policy responses to the cyclical challenge.  Moreover, this year’s manufacturing production volume was growing twice as fast as producer prices, a reversal from 2017 when price increases outpaced production (Chart 14). Price changes are much more important to corporate profits than volume changes. A strong RMB and sharply escalating shipping costs have also reduced exporters’ pricing power and profits (Chart 15). In contrast, mounting prices across various commodities have allowed the upstream industrial sectors, which are dominated by SOEs, to deliver much stronger profits than the downstream and private sector (Chart 16). Chart 14Growth In Manufacturing Output And Prices Starting To Converge Growth In Manufacturing Output And Prices Starting To Converge Growth In Manufacturing Output And Prices Starting To Converge Chart 15Strong RMB And Rising Shipping Costs Have Reduced Chinese Exporters' Profitability Strong RMB And Rising Shipping Costs Have Reduced Chinese Exporters' Profitability Strong RMB And Rising Shipping Costs Have Reduced Chinese Exporters' Profitability   It is unsurprising that authorities are increasing support to the private sector in order to maintain manufacturing share in the economy and keep the export sector competitive (Chart 17). A boost in infrastructure investment, on the other hand, would exacerbate upward pressure on commodity prices and mostly benefit upstream SOEs. Chart 16Upstream Industries Disproportionally Benefited From Surging Commodity Prices Upstream Industries Disproportionally Benefited From Surging Commodity Prices Upstream Industries Disproportionally Benefited From Surging Commodity Prices Chart 17Private Sector: Lower Profit Margin, Higher Costs Private Sector: Lower Profit Margin, Higher Costs Private Sector: Lower Profit Margin, Higher Costs Furthermore, stimulating the traditional sectors would not revive household consumption. The subdued recovery in consumption and prices for consumer staple goods is due to slow growth in lower-income household wages and a disrupted recovery in the services sector. Ramping up infrastructure investment can support headline GDP growth, but will do little to provide jobs and wages since China’s private sector provides 80% of all jobs and 90% of annual job creations. Lower-income households have a higher marginal propensity to consume. We expect the government to accelerate fiscal support measures to fortify wages among lower-income households. Bottom Line: Ongoing inflationary pressures and the underlying forces will likely thwart policymakers from stepping up their efforts to stimulate the old economy sectors. Investment Conclusions Chart 18Rebound In Infrastructure Stocks Should Be Short-Lived Rebound In Infrastructure Stocks Should Be Short-Lived Rebound In Infrastructure Stocks Should Be Short-Lived Chinese onshore stocks in the infrastructure, materials, and industrial sectors recently advanced strongly in the expectation that policymakers will ramp up their fiscal support in the old economy sectors, particularly infrastructure. Although we agree that infrastructure investment will improve, we maintain our view that a sizable rebound is highly unlikely this year. Hence, we do not expect that the rally in infrastructure stocks will be long-lasting (Chart 18).  We are probably too late in the cycle to re-initiate our long material/broad market trade in the onshore and offshore equity markets (Chart 19). We closed the trade in December last year when Chinese policymakers started pulling back stimulus, and in expectations that raw material prices would tumble. However, we underestimated the intensity of China’s de-carbonization efforts and protracted global supply-side constraints. Although global commodity prices will remain elevated into 2022, the price rallies from this year are not sustainable on a cyclical (6- to 12-month) basis. Therefore, we do not recommend material stocks as a cyclical play.  Chart 19Price Rally In Materials Stocks Unlikely To Sustain Price Rally In Materials Stocks Unlikely To Sustain Price Rally In Materials Stocks Unlikely To Sustain Chart 20Industrial Stocks May Be On A Structural Upcycle Industrial Stocks May Be On A Structural Upcycle Industrial Stocks May Be On A Structural Upcycle Instead, we recommend a long industrial/broad A-share market trade (Chart 20). Even though China is in a late business cycle and the upcoming stimulus will be mediocre at best, we think that the industrial sector will benefit from policy support for investment in the manufacturing sector and a faster pace in the sector’s capacity expansion.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance