China
China’s capital outflows will likely remain substantial at least through the next few quarters. This wave of capital outflows will likely be more chronic, albeit less acute than the 2015-16 episode. Persistent capital outflows will exert downward pressure on the RMB.
US and Chinese oil-demand strength will offset EU weakness next year. Incremental supply growth from non-OPEC 2.0 producers, coupled with a lower risk of the US enforcing its sanctions on Iranian oil exports, reduces our 2024 Brent price forecast by $6/bbl, and takes it to $112/bbl.
Many commentators have attributed the latest increase in Chinese interest rates to an improving economy, the large issuance of government bonds, the tax payments season, and other technical factors. Yet, these explanations are missing the key point: the PBoC has steered interbank rates higher to defend the currency. Higher borrowing costs are the last thing the mainland economy now needs.
Amid a range of geopolitical narratives, what matters is that the US strategy of economic engagement with its rivals is failing, giving rise to a new strategy of containment that will reinforce the secular rise in geopolitical risk. Our market-based quantitative indicators of geopolitical risk are set to rise in the coming year.
Labor markets are softening in most developed economies, as is usually the case in the lead-up to recessions. Our base case is that the global recession will begin in the second half of 2024, but we will be monitoring our MacroQuant model on a daily basis for confirmation.
