China Stimulus

Highlights Both the massive inventory accumulation and robust underlying consumption have been driving Chinese crude imports in recent years. Chinese crude oil import growth will decelerate in 2021 due to a slower pace in the country’s oil inventory accumulation. The country’s underlying crude oil consumption growth will remain robust this year, which will support a still positive growth in Chinese crude oil imports this year. Strong Chinese crude oil imports are positive to global oil prices this year. Feature The gap between China’s total crude oil supply and its domestic crude oil consumption has been widening in recent years, due to a massive buildup in Chinese crude oil inventory (Chart 1A and 1B). In fact, China’s crude oil inventories have quadrupled in the past five years, exceeding two billion barrels as of November 2020 and are equal to about 70% of OECD total inventory (Chart 2). Chart 1AA Massive Buildup In Chinese Crude Oil Inventory A Massive Buildup In Chinese Crude Oil Inventory A Massive Buildup In Chinese Crude Oil Inventory Chart 1BChina: Total Crude Oil Supply Growth Has Exceeded Its Domestic Consumption Growth China: Total Crude Oil Supply Growth Has Exceeded Its Domestic Consumption Growth China: Total Crude Oil Supply Growth Has Exceeded Its Domestic Consumption Growth In addition, China’s crude oil import growth has been outpacing domestic oil consumption growth, while domestic production remains stagnant (Chart 3). Chart 2Crude Oil Inventories In China Have Quadrupled In The Past Five Years Crude Oil Inventories In China Have Quadrupled In The Past Five Years Crude Oil Inventories In China Have Quadrupled In The Past Five Years Chart 3China: Crude Oil Import Growth Has Been Stronger Than Its Domestic Consumption Growth China: Crude Oil Import Growth Has Been Stronger Than Its Domestic Consumption Growth China: Crude Oil Import Growth Has Been Stronger Than Its Domestic Consumption Growth Will China maintain its strong crude oil import growth this year? How will the interplay between domestic consumption and imports evolve in 2021? We expect China’s crude oil consumption growth to remain solid in 2021, growing at an annual rate of about 6-7% and up from the 4.5% growth rate reached in 2020. However, China’s crude oil imports are likely to increase by 4-6% in 2021 from the previous year, slower than the 7.2% growth seen in 2020. The moderation in Chinese oil imports in 2021 will mainly be due to a slower pace of crude oil inventory buildup. Understanding The Surge In Crude Oil Inventory Chart 4China's Crude Oil Inventory Buildup: One Major Driver Behind Its Strong Imports Since 2016 China's Crude Oil Inventory Buildup: One Major Driver Behind Its Strong Imports Since 2016 China's Crude Oil Inventory Buildup: One Major Driver Behind Its Strong Imports Since 2016 The massive buildup in domestic crude oil inventory has been one major driving force behind the strong growth in China's crude oil imports since 2016 (Chart 4). As oil prices continue to rebound, and given China’s existing large oil inventories, we think the pace of inventory accumulation in China will slow in 2021. Therefore, growth in Chinese oil imports this year will likely moderate. China’s crude oil imports currently account for about 75% of the country’s total crude oil supply. Since China’s domestic crude oil production has been stagnant in the last decade, the fluctuations in Chinese crude oil imports are largely driven by the change in the country’s total demand, which includes both domestic consumption and changes in inventories. China’s crude oil import growth has significantly outpaced domestic consumption growth in the past five years, leading to a buildup in inventory. China’s crude oil inventory includes Commercial Petroleum Reserves (CPR), which are held by refiners and traders; and Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR), which are held by the government. Our Chinese crude oil inventory proxy1 was constructed based on the crude oil flow diagram shown in Chart 5.  Chart 5How Did We Derive Our Chinese Crude Oil Inventory Proxy? Chinese Commodities Demand: An Unsustainable Boom? Part III: Crude Oil Chinese Commodities Demand: An Unsustainable Boom? Part III: Crude Oil Our research has suggested that since 2016, most of the buildup has occurred in CPR. This is due to the following: The government in 2015 required refiners to keep their inventory level at no less than their 15-days requirement for operation use. Chinese refinery capacity had been expanded at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.8% during 2016-2019. These existing and new refineries have been building their inventories to meet government regulations in the past several years.  In addition, the government started to allow independent refineries to import crude oil by setting a quota in mid-2015, and the import quotas have been increased every year. In 2020, the quota reached 184.6 million tons, equaling to about 3,700 kbpd, nearly five times the quota in 2015. The total increase in imports of these independent refiners over the past five years was about 2,950 kbpd, accounting for 70% of the increase in the country’s total crude oil imports during the same period. Chart 6China: Rising Run Rates For Its Independent Refineries China: Rising Run Rates For Its Independent Refineries China: Rising Run Rates For Its Independent Refineries Independent refiners import crude oil for both refinery purposes and to meet the new inventory requirement. Over the last several years, the increased amount of quota has improved Chinese independent refiners’ profitability and refinery capacity run rate, as the import quota allows these private sector refiners to save operating costs by cutting out the “middleman” and by actively managing their own feedstocks. For example, Shandong has the largest number of independent refineries among all provinces. Chart 6 shows that the run rate of the region’s independent refineries has surged since 2016, from about 40% in that year to 75% this year. In addition, since 2016, the fluctuations in their run rates have become much more closely correlated with global oil prices.   Commercial crude oil users have much larger physical reserve space than the SPR. Notably, they tend to sharply increase their imports when crude oil prices are low.  In addition, inventory accumulation often occurs when credit/financing is available with low costs and refiners expect higher prices ahead. Meanwhile, our research shows the SPR development has been slowing considerably in recent years, resulting in little inventory buildup in SPR. The last time the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported the SPR data was December 29, 2017. It showed the SPR was about 37.73 million tons by mid-2017, not far from the country’s target of 40 million tons for the first two phases2 of SPR. This suggests that the country was at least close to finishing its second phase of the SPR in 2017. Since then, there has been little information about the third phase of the SPR progress. We have only been able to find two pieces of news on that subject, and both suggest the construction of the third phase of SPR has been stagnant, and the planning of two sites only started in 2019. As the average construction time for projects in the second phase of SPR was about four years, we do not think these sites were completed in 2020. The NBS data shows that even during the period of mid-2015 and mid-2017, the SPR had only increased by 234 kbpd, about 117 kbpd per year. In comparison, the Chinese total crude oil inventory increased by 600-700 kbpd per year in 2016 and 2017. Clearly, SPR only accounted for a small share of the Chinese total crude oil inventory. Looking forward, we expect a much slower pace of crude oil inventory buildup in China in 2021. Our forecast is based on the following factors: Current Chinese crude oil inventories (CPR and SPR combined) are already in the upper range when comparing the OECD countries (Chart 7). Although the IEA data shows that Japan and Korea have oil stocks of 200 days and 193 days of their respective crude oil net imports, Chinese oil inventories are currently equivalent to 195 days of crude oil net imports and much higher than the 90 days the IEA requires OECD countries to hold. With Brent oil prices having risen by a lot from the April 2020 trough and elevated domestic crude oil inventories, both government and commercial users will likely slow their purchases of overseas oil for inventory accumulation. In comparison, Chinese crude oil inventory accumulation growth slowed sharply in 2018 when Brent oil prices rose by 95% from their trough in mid-2017 (Chart 8), A significant portion of Chinese oil inventory buildup was accumulated over the past five years. At 1,170 kbpd, the largest annual accumulation was in 2020, higher than the 700-900 kbpd fill per year during 2017-2019. Chart 7China's Crude Oil Inventory: No Longer Low China's Crude Oil Inventory: No Longer Low China's Crude Oil Inventory: No Longer Low Chart 8China: Rising Oil Prices Will Likely Slow Down Its Pace Of Crude Oil Inventory Accumulation China: Rising Oil Prices Will Likely Slow Down Its Pace Of Crude Oil Inventory Accumulation China: Rising Oil Prices Will Likely Slow Down Its Pace Of Crude Oil Inventory Accumulation We do not expect the fast inventory accumulation of 2020 to repeat in 2021. Instead, a mean-reversal in the inventory accumulation pace will likely occur. Table 1Our Estimates Of The Scale Of Chinese Crude Oil Inventory In 2021 Chinese Commodities Demand: An Unsustainable Boom? Part III: Crude Oil Chinese Commodities Demand: An Unsustainable Boom? Part III: Crude Oil Our baseline estimate based on China’s 2021 import quota and refinery capacity3 is that Chinese crude oil inventory will increase to 207-210 days of Chinese crude oil imports by this year-end, up from 192 days at last year-end (Table 1). With already-elevated crude oil inventory, the pace of the inventory accumulation in China will be slower than last year. Bottom Line: After a massive buildup over recent years, the pace of inventory accumulation in China will slow in 2021 and probably onwards as well. As a result, Chinese oil import growth will converge with the pace of domestic consumption growth. China’s Robust Crude Oil Consumption Growth In 2021 Chart 9China: Resilient Domestic Crude Oil Consumption Growth In 2020 China: Resilient Domestic Crude Oil Consumption Growth In 2020 China: Resilient Domestic Crude Oil Consumption Growth In 2020 Despite the pandemic outbreak, last year’s underlying consumption of crude oil in China was resilient at a year-on-year growth of 4.5%, even though the rate was smaller than the average growth of 6-7% in 2018-2019 (Chart 9).  The growth in oil consumption last year was mainly from the non-transportation sector. The output of non-transportation fuels, including fuel oil, naphtha, petroleum coke, and petroleum pitch, are mostly having impressive growth, suggesting strong consumption in sectors like chemical products, steel sector and infrastructure (Chart 10). For example, naphtha is the primary feedstock for ethylene production. Ethylene is the building block for a vast range of chemicals from plastics to antifreeze solutions and solvents. Transportation fuel consumption was weak in 2020, with the output of major transportation fuels including gasoline, diesel oil and kerosene in contraction (Chart 11). Chart 10Strong Consumption In Non-Transportation Sectors in 2020 Last Year Strong Consumption In Non-Transportation Sectors in 2020 Last Year Strong Consumption In Non-Transportation Sectors in 2020 Last Year Chart 11Transportation Fuel Consumption Was Weak In 2020 Transportation Fuel Consumption Was Weak In 2020 Transportation Fuel Consumption Was Weak In 2020 In 2021, we expect the underlying consumption growth of crude oil in China to increase to 6-7% from last year’s 4.5%. This will be in line with its growth in both 2018 and 2019 (Chart 9 on page 7). First, the consumption of transportation fuels will likely recover this year. Transportation fuels are the largest consuming sector for Chinese petroleum products. Based on British Petroleum data, gasoline, diesel and kerosene accounted for 55% of total Chinese oil consumption in 2019. We expect the transportation fuel consumption growth to be stronger (i.e., 6-7%) than its five-year compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.1% during 2015-2019. Chart 12China's Automobile Sales Correlated Well With Its Crude Oil Imports China s Automobile Sales Correlated Well With Its Crude Oil Imports China s Automobile Sales Correlated Well With Its Crude Oil Imports Automobile sales in China correlated well with the country’s crude oil imports (Chart 12, top panel). Despite a year-on-year contraction of 2% for the whole year of 2020, automobile sales had been strong with a double-digit growth nearly every month since May. Only 5% of these automobiles are new energy vehicles (NEV). About 80% of them are gasoline cars and 15% are diesel automobiles. Annual total car sales still account for about 9% of total existing automobiles (Chart 12, bottom panel). This means a 6-7% growth in the transportation consumption of passenger cars and commercial cars is very possible in 2021. The number of airports and airplanes are still on the uptrend in China. The CAGR of Chinese kerosene consumption rose from 10.1% during 2010-2014 to 10.6% during 2015-2019. This suggests that the kerosene consumption growth in China could reach 11% in 2021. Domestic gasoline and diesel prices are near decade lows (Chart 13). This will encourage consumption of these fuels. Second, the oil consumption growth in the industry sector will likely be larger than the 5% in the recent years (Chart 14). Based on the NBS data, the industry sector accounts for about 36% of China’s petroleum product consumption. Chart 13Low Domestic Gasoline And Diesel Prices Encourage Fuel Consumption This Year Low Domestic Gasoline And Diesel Prices Encourage Fuel Consumption This Year Low Domestic Gasoline And Diesel Prices Encourage Fuel Consumption This Year Chart 14Robust Oil Consumption Growth In The Industry Sector In 2021 Robust Oil Consumption Growth In The Industry Sector In 2021 Robust Oil Consumption Growth In The Industry Sector In 2021 Third, infrastructure spending and property market construction will slow in 2H2021 given the credit, fiscal, and regulatory tightening that has been taking place. However, construction only accounts for about 6% of Chinese petroleum product consumption.  Given all of this, achieving a 6-7% underlying consumption growth of crude oil in China this year is possible. Taking into consideration the slower pace of inventory buildup, we expect China’s crude oil imports to increase by 4-6% in 2021 over the previous year, slower than last year’s 7.2% growth. Bottom Line: The underlying consumption growth of crude oil in China is likely to increase to 6-7% in 2021 from last year’s 4.5%, providing solid support to China’s crude oil imports. What About Other Factors Affecting Chinese Crude Oil Imports? Currently, both domestic crude oil production and net exports of Chinese petroleum products exports are small contributors to the growth of Chinese crude oil imports. However, as the Chinese petroleum export sector becomes more competitive in the global market, it will likely take a bigger share of China’s crude oil imports going forward. Chart 15Net Exports Of Chinese Petroleum Products Are On The Uptrend Net Exports Of Chinese Petroleum Products Are On The Uptrend Net Exports Of Chinese Petroleum Products Are On The Uptrend We expect domestic crude oil output to be stagnant in 2021. The breakeven prices for most domestic oil fields are US$50-60 per barrel. Without a considerable rally in oil prices, the total domestic crude oil output is unlikely to pick up. Moreover, due to the massive crude oil inventory buildup in recent years, Chinese oil producers may constrain their output. In this scenario, a reduction in domestic crude oil output by 1-2% in 2021 from 2020 is possible. Nonetheless, this will only increase China’s oil imports by a small amount of about 40-80 kbpd. The net exports of Chinese petroleum products are on the uptrend (Chart 15). Currently net exports of Chinese petroleum products account for only about 6% of Chinese crude oil imports.  However, Chinese refineries are increasingly competitive in global gasoline and diesel markets, since most of the new refineries in the country are high technology equipped and highly efficient. In addition, last July, China started issuing export licenses to private refiners, and we expect the trend to continue. According to Bloomberg, China is set to surpass the US to become the world’s largest oil refiner in 2021. As such, in the coming years we expect rising Chinese exports of petroleum products will demand more imports of crude oil.  We expect Chinese petroleum products net exports to rise by 100-150 kbpd in 2021 15-20% growth from last year), which may increase our estimate of China’s year-on-year crude oil import growth from 4-6% to 5-7% in 2021. However, increasing Chinese petroleum product exports does not increase global final demand for oil. It cannot be viewed as a fundamentally bullish factor for oil prices. Bottom Line: Stagnant domestic crude oil output and rising net exports of Chinese petroleum products will also lead to an increase of China’s crude oil imports.  Investment Implications Chart 16China: An Increasingly Important Factor For Global Oil Demand China: An Increasingly Important Factor For Global Oil Demand China: An Increasingly Important Factor For Global Oil Demand Strong crude oil imports by China have supported global oil prices in recent years. China has become an increasingly important driving force of global oil demand. Its oil imports currently make up about 12% of global oil demand, more than doubled from a decade ago (Chart 16). The country’s crude oil imports will continue expanding this year. Even at a slower rate, the robust oil consumption and imports from China will remain a positive factor for global oil prices in 2021. Beyond 2021, however, the country’s crude oil import growth outlook is facing increasing downside risks. Demand that is due to inventory accumulation is ultimately finite and non-recurring. Moreover, more oil accumulations in 2021 on top of China’s already elevated oil inventories may weigh on Chinese oil imports beyond 2021. In the meantime, US crude oil producers may benefit from continuing strong purchases from China. In 2020, China significantly ramped up its crude oil imports from the US, as the country has pledged to boost purchases of US energy products under the phase one trade deal signed with President Trump in January 2020. Chart 17Chinese Imports Of US Crude Oil May Continue To Rise In 2021 Chinese Imports of US Crude Oil May Continue To Rise In 2021 Chinese Imports of US Crude Oil May Continue To Rise In 2021 In 2020, Chinese imports of US crude oil in volume terms were 155% higher from a year before (Chart 17, top panel). Its share of total Chinese crude oil imports also spiked from 1-2% in late 2019 to 7-8% in the past several months (Chart 17, bottom panel). In the meantime, China’s share of US crude oil export also jumped from 4.6% in 2019 to 14.7% last year. In 2021, our baseline view is that China will want to show goodwill to the newly elected Biden administration by continuing to boost its crude oil purchase from the US. This will benefit US crude oil producers. However, if China buys more from the US, it may buy less from other countries.   Ellen JingYuan He  Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1By deducting crude oil used in refineries and in direct final consumption from the total supply, we derived the flow of inventory and the level of changes in inventory. By using the cumulative value of the flow inventory data, we were able to derive the stock of inventory. We assume the initial inventory in 2006 was zero. This assumption is reasonable as the first fill of the SPR was in 2007 and the stock of CPR was extremely low at that time as well. In addition, based on the data from the National Bureau of Statistics, we found out that the direct final consumption of crude oil without any transformation only accounted for about 1-2% of total supply. 2 In 2004, the government planned three phases of SPR construction, targeting 10-12 million tons of crude oil SPR for the first phase, 28 million tons for the second phase, and another 28 million tons for the third phase. 3The import quota for independent refiners in 2021 has been increased by 20% (about 823 kbpd), and the country’s refinery capacity will expand at about 500 kbpd per year over 2021-2025. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Feature Chart 1Stock Prices Are Struggling To Break Out Of Their Recent Highs Stock Prices Are Struggling To Break Out Of Their Recent Highs Stock Prices Are Struggling To Break Out Of Their Recent Highs Stock prices in China's onshore and offshore markets rallied into the New Year (Chart 1). Despite the strong performance in the last couple of days, as we pointed out in our 2021 Outlook Report, the biggest obstacle that Chinese stock prices face is their elevated valuations against tightening macro policy. Recent liquidity injections by the PBoC have prompted a sharp drop in the 7-day repo rate. However, slightly loosened liquidity conditions in the interbank system do not signify a shift in monetary policy, i.e. financial conditions will continue to tighten in 2021, albeit at a slower rate than in the second half of 2020. The Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) wrapped up its December meeting with a pledge to maintain continuity, stability and sustainability in macroeconomic policy without making any “sudden turns”.  The conference release also stated that China “must use the valuable time window to focus on reform and innovation — achieving a good start for the 14th five-year plan in terms of high-quality development.” The CEWC’s messages align with our baseline view that Chinese policymakers are not yet in a deleveraging mood. The country’s macro leverage level should be kept stable in 2021 and the growth of credit creation will decelerate gradually (Chart 2, Scenario 1). The pullback in this year’s fiscal support will also be gentle: we expect newly issued special purpose bonds (SPBs) to reach 3.2-3.5 trillion in 2021, about 10% less than the 3.75 trillion issued in 2020.  This will put the 2021 SPB quota in the same range as in 2016, but higher than in 2017, 2018 or 2019 (Chart 3).   Chart 2Credit Growth Will Decelerate In 2021 Credit Growth Will Decelerate In 2021 Credit Growth Will Decelerate In 2021 Chart 3Fiscal Cliff In 2021 Unlikely China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review A credit or fiscal cliff is unlikely this year. Instead, we expect the authorities to accelerate key reforms such as a clampdown on market monopolies and housing speculation in large cities, heavier penalties on capital market violations and a reduction in carbon emissions. In the long run, these reforms may help to rebalance China’s economic structure, but in the near term, a more stringent policy backdrop will probably hinder investors’ appetites for Chinese risk assets. In early December, we downgraded Chinese equities from overweight to neutral for the next 0-3 months, in both absolute and relative terms. We will evaluate our cyclical call on Chinese stocks in the coming weeks. Qingyun Xu, CFA Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Below is a set of market relevant charts along with our comments: The PBoC has injected large amounts of liquidity into the interbank system since mid-November, helping to sharply lower the short-term interbank repo rate. We pointed out previously that policy rates had breached their pre-pandemic levels by November while the economy had barely expanded from the end of 2019. Thus, we expected the PBoC to slow the pace of interest rate normalization in Q4. Recent liquidity injections likely were related to preventing a year-end cash crunch in the financial system, not a change in the PBoC’s planned pace of policy tightening. While the 7-day interbank repo rate is back to its June 2020 level, the 3-month SHIBOR (the de facto policy rate) has only slightly moderated. The divergence between the 7-day and the 3-month interbank rates was also apparent during the monetary tightening cycle in 2017-2018. During that cycle, the jump in the 3-month SHIBOR pushed up government bond yields and bank lending rates, while the 7-day repo rate remained stable. As shown in a previous report, the 3-month SHIBOR more tightly correlates with bond yields and is a better measure of China’s monetary policy stance.  Chart 4The Short-Term Interbank Repo Rate Dropped Sharply Since Mid-November … The Short-Term Interbank Repo Rate Dropped Sharply Since Mid-November The Short-Term Interbank Repo Rate Dropped Sharply Since Mid-November Chart 5… But The Declines In The 3-Month SHIBOR And Bond Yields Have Been Much Milder But The Declines In The 3-Month SHIBOR And Bond Yields Have Been Much Milder But The Declines In The 3-Month SHIBOR And Bond Yields Have Been Much Milder Chinese onshore stock prices trended sideways for most of December, even as the PBoC loosened interbank liquidity conditions in mid-November. Chinese offshore stocks have also failed to break out from highs reached in November, as tech giants such as Alibaba and Tencent have come under tough scrutiny from regulators. Chinese stocks will continue to experience a tug-of-war between tailwinds and headwinds in the next three months. The relatively well-contained domestic pandemic and improving economic growth will support investors’ sentiments towards Chinese risk assets. At the same time, stock prices will face headwinds such as elevated valuations, a more restrictive policy environment and wider corporate credit spreads. For now, the downside risks to Chinese stocks prevail.  Chart 6ADomestic Stocks Are No Longer Cheap China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Chart 6BElevated Valuations In Investable Stocks China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Tailwinds Supporting Chinese Stocks: Economic Recovery To Continue In 1H21 Chart 7China’s EPS Recovery To Continue In 1H21 China EPS Recovery To Continue In 1H21 China EPS Recovery To Continue In 1H21 China’s business cycle will remain resilient in the first half of 2021 while existing stimulus measures continue to work their way into the real economy. In the next six months, some laggards in the economic recovery, such as the service sector and household consumption, will likely pick up momentum, while the manufacturing and export sectors remain robust.  China’s export sector should maintain strong growth momentum in the first half of the year. A rising RMB exchange rate may eventually impede the price competitiveness of some labor-intensive export goods , but Chinese manufacturers will continue to fill the gap between global demand and supply before the COVID-19 vaccines are widely distributed and the global supply chains are fully recovered. Moreover, China’s global share of exports gradually rose in both 2018 and 2019 despite the Sino-US trade war. Data from Q4 show that Chinese exports have been robust beyond pandemic-related goods. As the global economy and demand growth pick up next year, Chinese exports should also benefit from the trade recovery.   Chart 8The Strength In Chinese Exports Has Expanded Beyond Pandemic-Related Goods … The Strength In Chinese Exports Has Expanded Beyond Pandemic-Related Goods The Strength In Chinese Exports Has Expanded Beyond Pandemic-Related Goods Chart 9… And Will Benefit From Recovering Global Demand In 2021 And Will Benefit From Recovering Global Demand In 2021 And Will Benefit From Recovering Global Demand In 2021 Chart 10The Acceleration In Completed Housing Will Support Construction In 1H21 The Acceleration In Completed Housing Will Support Construction In 1H21 The Acceleration In Completed Housing Will Support Construction In 1H21 An acceleration in completing existing projects should support the construction sector in the first half of 2021, despite a slower expansion rate in new development projects.  Floor space completed has significantly lagged floor space started and sold during the past two years, while real estate developers rushed to acquire new projects, land and down payments to expand their market share. Property developers will need to speed up the completion process of existing projects to bring leverage in line with the “three red lines” imposed since August 2020 (housing presales need to be excluded from the liability-to-asset ratio calculation). Hence, we expect the growth in real estate investment and construction activities to remain stable through the first half.    Chart 11Smaller Cities Face Less Upward Price Pressure on Housing Prices Than Big Cities Smaller Cities Face Less Upward Price Pressure on Housing Prices Than Big Cities Smaller Cities Face Less Upward Price Pressure on Housing Prices Than Big Cities Chart 12Housing Restrictions Will Be Most Stringent In Top-Tier Cities Housing Restrictions Will Be Most Stringent In Top-Tier Cities Housing Restrictions Will Be Most Stringent In Top-Tier Cities Chart 13The Laggards In The Economy Are Firming Up The Laggards In The Economy Are Firming Up The Laggards In The Economy Are Firming Up The laggards in the economy are firming up. Recent economic data show that growth momentum is shifting from leaders in the economic recovery, especially old-economy sectors such as infrastructure and real estate, to the coincident and lagging sectors such as manufacturing and consumer sectors. While an increase in these sectors is positive for the economy and the growth of corporate profits, it also implies that the economic recovery has entered a late phase and a peak in the business cycle is near. Therefore, the improvements do not necessarily provide enough impetus for stock prices to trend higher, and prices may be at risk from a policy overkill.   Chart 14Household Consumption Still Has Room To Improve Household Consumption Still Has Room To Improve Household Consumption Still Has Room To Improve Chart 15Sales Of Discretionary Goods Have Surged Sales Of Discretionary Goods Have Surged Sales Of Discretionary Goods Have Surged   Downside Risks To Chinese Equity Prices China’s domestic policy environment has turned less favorable for risk assets.  A new round of policy tightening is well underway as suggested by a slew of events, ranging from the recent SOE bond payment defaults to regulators suspending the Ant Group IPO and cracking down on market monopolies. Investors will likely be risk averse in the near term.   Chart 16Stringent Scrutiny On Tech Companies Hammered Their Stock Performance … Stringent Scrutiny On Tech Companies Hammered Their Stock Performance Stringent Scrutiny On Tech Companies Hammered Their Stock Performance Chart 17… Bringing Down Their Sector Performance Bringing Down Their Sector Performance Bringing Down Their Sector Performance   Rising corporate bond yields in China’s onshore bond market are not an impediment to increasing Chinese share prices as long as forward EPS net revisions are also climbing. Not only have onshore corporate bond yields recently risen, but forward EPS net revisions have rolled over. Such a combination does not bode well for Chinese equities.  Chart 18Red Flag For Chinese Equities Red Flag For Chinese Equities Red Flag For Chinese Equities The impact from stricter lending regulations in the real estate sector may start impeding home sales and new real estate investment into the second half of the year. Effective January 1, 2021, China imposed caps on bank loans to real estate developers. Loans will be capped at 40% for the largest state-owned lenders, while banks’ mortgage lending should be no more than 32.5% of their outstanding credit. The regulations are even more rigorous for smaller banks.1 The new rules highlight the authorities’ determination to curb financial risks derived from the housing market and are a step up from the existing deleveraging pressures faced by property developers. Bank loan quotas under the new rules are in line with ones used in 2020.2 However, based on our projections that overall credit growth will decelerate by at least 2 percentage points in 2021 compared with 2020, there will be a corresponding decrease in real estate sector’s borrowing from banks. Bank loans account for roughly 14% of real estate developers’ total funding sources and household mortgages accounted for 16% in 2020. When deleveraging pressures are on and financing resources are capped from both the supply and demand sides, real estate investment growth will likely peak no later than mid-2021.  Chart 19The New Rules May Exacerbate The Downward Trend In Bank Loans To The Real Estate Sector This Year The New Rules May Exacerbate The Downward Trend In Bank Loans To The Real Estate Sector This Year The New Rules May Exacerbate The Downward Trend In Bank Loans To The Real Estate Sector This Year Deflationary pressures may resurface in the second half, which would be a downside risk to China’s corporate profit growth. The producer prices contraction will continue to narrow and even turn mildly positive in the next six months, supported by the uptrend in the business cycle and a low base factor in 1H20. However, both consumer and producer prices may face renewed downward pressures in the second half of 2021 when the business cycle is expected to peak and the effects of stimulus gradually fade. Moreover, the RMB appreciation will add to headwinds faced by producer prices in 2021.  Chart 20While The Ongoing Economic Recovery Will Support Prices In 1H21 … While The Ongoing Economic Recovery Will Support Prices In 1H21 While The Ongoing Economic Recovery Will Support Prices In 1H21 Chart 21… Lower Money Growth And Higher RMB Value May Start To Hurt Prices In 2H21 Lower Money Growth And Higher RMB Value May Start To Hurt Prices In 2H21 Lower Money Growth And Higher RMB Value May Start To Hurt Prices In 2H21 Chart 22Resurfaced Deflationary Pressure Will Create Downside Risk To China’s Corporate Profit Growth In 2H21 Resurfaced Deflationary Pressure Will Create Downside Risk To China Corporate Profit Growth In 2H21 Resurfaced Deflationary Pressure Will Create Downside Risk To China Corporate Profit Growth In 2H21 Chart 23The Outperformance In Cyclical Stocks Versus Defensives Has Rolled Over The Outperformance In Cyclical Stocks Versus Defensives Has Rolled Over The Outperformance In Cyclical Stocks Versus Defensives Has Rolled Over The outperformance in cyclical stocks relative to defensives in the investable stocks recently rolled over. Historically, there is a strong link between forward earnings and stock price performance of cyclical sectors, while defensives have a low equity return beta and are market neutral. A switch in outperformance from cyclicals to defensives usually corresponds with the economy shifting from an expansionary to contractionary phase. Therefore, the recent rollover in the outperformance of cyclical stocks versus defensives may be an early sign that Chinese stock performance has lost its momentum in the current cycle. In relative terms, as breakthroughs in vaccines make the pandemic less threatening to the global economy, cyclical stocks outside of China will start to benefit from improvements in business activities. This will make Chinese risk assets relative to global ones less appealing.  Table 1China Macro Data Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review   Footnotes 1For second-tier banks, including state-owned Agricultural Development Bank of China and Exim Bank of China, and 12 joint-stock holding commercial banks, caps on loans to developers and mortgage loans are 27.5% and 20% respectively. Meanwhile, the ratios are capped at 22.5% and 17.5% respectively for smaller city and rural commercial banks, rural cooperative banks and credit cooperatives. The strictest limits apply to small village banks, which can lend only 12.5% of their portfolios to real estate developers and 7.5% to homeowners. 2Currently, outstanding loans to the real estate sector (including household mortgage loans) account for about 29% of total loans from China’s financial institutions, while the ratio of housing mortgage loans is 22%. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights With a vaccine already rolling out in the UK and soon in the US, investors have reason to be optimistic about next year. Government bond yields are rising, cyclical equities are outperforming defensives, international stocks hinting at outperforming American, and value stocks are starting to beat growth stocks (Chart 1). Feature President Trump’s defeat in the US election also reduces the risk of a global trade war, or a real war with Iran. European, Chinese, and Emirati stocks have rallied since the election, at least partly due to the reduction in these risks (Chart 2). However, geopolitical risk and global policy uncertainty have been rising on a secular, not just cyclical, basis (Chart 3). Geopolitical tensions have escalated with each crisis since the financial meltdown of 2008. Chart 1A New Global Business Cycle A New Global Business Cycle A New Global Business Cycle Chart 2Biden: No Trade War Or War With Iran? Biden: No Trade War Or War With Iran? Biden: No Trade War Or War With Iran? Chart 3Geopolitical Risk And Global Policy Uncertainty Geopolitical Risk And Global Policy Uncertainty Geopolitical Risk And Global Policy Uncertainty Chart 4The Decline Of The Liberal Democracies? The Decline Of The Liberal Democracies? The Decline Of The Liberal Democracies? Trump was a symptom, not a cause, of what ails the world. The cause is the relative decline of the liberal democracies in political, economic, and military strength relative to that of other global players (Chart 4). This relative decline has emboldened Chinese and Russian challenges to the US-led global order, as well as aggressive and unpredictable moves by middle and small powers. Moreover the aftershocks of the pandemic and recession will create social and political instability in various parts of the world, particularly emerging markets (Chart 5). Chart 5EM Troubles Await EM Troubles Await EM Troubles Await Chart 6Global Arms Build-Up Continues Global Arms Build-Up Continues Global Arms Build-Up Continues   We are bullish on risk assets next year, but our view is driven largely from the birth of a new economic cycle, not from geopolitics. Geopolitical risk is rapidly becoming underrated, judging by the steep drop-off in measured risk. There is no going back to a pre-Trump, pre-Xi Jinping, pre-2008, pre-Putin, pre-9/11, pre-historical golden age in which nations were enlightened, benign, and focused exclusively on peace and prosperity. Hard data, such as military spending, show the world moving in the opposite direction (Chart 6). So while stock markets will grind higher next year, investors should not expect that Biden and the vaccine truly portend a “return to normalcy.” Key View #1: China’s Communist Party Turns 100, With Rising Headwinds Investors should ignore the hype about the Chinese Communist Party’s one hundredth birthday in 2021. Since 1997, the Chinese leadership has laid great emphasis on this “first centenary” as an occasion by which China should become a moderately prosperous society. This has been achieved. China is deep into a structural economic transition that holds out a much more difficult economic, social, and political future. Chart 7China: Less Money, More Problems China: Less Money, More Problems China: Less Money, More Problems The big day, July 1, will be celebrated with a speech by General Secretary Xi Jinping in which he reiterates the development goals of the five-year plan. This plan – which doubles down on import substitution and the aggressive tech acquisition campaign – will be finalized in March, along with Xi’s yet-to-be released vision for 2035, which marks the halfway point to the “second centenary,” 2049, the hundredth birthday of the regime. Xi’s 2035 goals may contain some surprises but the Communist Party’s policy frameworks should be seen as “best laid plans” that are likely to be overturned by economic and geopolitical realities. It was easier for the country to meet its political development targets during the period of rapid industrialization from 1979-2008. Now China is deep into a structural economic transition that holds out a much more difficult economic, social, and political future. Potential growth is slowing with the graying of society and the country is making a frantic dash, primarily through technology acquisition, to boost productivity and keep from falling into the “middle income trap” (Chart 7). Total debt levels have surged as Beijing attempts to make this transition smoothly, without upsetting social stability. Households and the government are taking on a greater debt load to maintain aggregate demand while the government tries to force the corporate sector to deleverage in fits and starts (Chart 8). The deleveraging process is painful and coincides with a structural transition away from export-led manufacturing. Beijing likely believes it has already led de-industrialization proceed too quickly, given the huge long-term political risks of this process, as witnessed in the US and UK. The fourteenth five-year plan hints that the authorities will give manufacturing a reprieve from structural reform efforts (Chart 9). Chart 8China Struggles To Dismount Debt Bubble China Struggles To Dismount Debt Bubble China Struggles To Dismount Debt Bubble Chart 9China Will Slow De-Industrialization, Stoking Protectionism China Will Slow De-Industrialization, Stoking Protectionism China Will Slow De-Industrialization, Stoking Protectionism Chart 10China Already Reining In Stimulus China Already Reining In Stimulus China Already Reining In Stimulus A premature resumption of deleveraging heightens domestic economic risks. The trade war and then the pandemic forced the Xi administration to abandon its structural reform plans temporarily and drastically ease monetary, fiscal, and credit policy to prevent a recession. Almost immediately the danger of asset bubbles reared its head again. Because the regime is focused on containing systemic financial risk, it has already begun tightening monetary policy as the nation heads into 2021 – even though the rest of the world has not fully recovered from the pandemic (Chart 10). The risk of over-tightening is likely to be contained, since Beijing has no interest in undermining its own recovery. But the risk is understated in financial markets at the moment and, combined with American fiscal risks due to gridlock, this familiar Chinese policy tug-of-war poses a clear risk to the global recovery and emerging market assets next year. Far more important than the first centenary, or even General Secretary Xi’s 2035 vision, is the impending leadership rotation in 2022. Xi was originally supposed to step down at this time – instead he is likely to take on the title of party chairman, like Mao, and aims to stay in power till 2035 or thereabouts. He will consolidate power once again through a range of crackdowns – on political rivals and corruption, on high-flying tech and financial companies, on outdated high-polluting industries, and on ideological dissenters. Beijing must have a stable economy going into its five-year national party congresses, and 2022 is no different. But that goal has largely been achieved through this year’s massive stimulus and the discovery of a global vaccine. In a risk-on environment, the need for economic stability poses a downside risk for financial assets since it implies macro-prudential actions to curb bubbles. The 2017 party congress revealed that Xi sees policy tightening as a key part of his policy agenda and power consolidation. In short, the critical twentieth congress in 2022 offers no promise of plentiful monetary and credit stimulus (Chart 11). All investors can count on is the minimum required for stability. This is positive for emerging markets at the moment, but less so as the lagged effects of this year’s stimulus dissipate. Chart 11No Promise Of Major New Stimulus For Party Congress 2022 No Promise Of Major New Stimulus For Party Congress 2022 No Promise Of Major New Stimulus For Party Congress 2022 Not only will Chinese domestic policy uncertainty remain underestimated, but geopolitical risk will also do so. Superficially, Beijing had a banner year in 2020. It handled the coronavirus better than other countries, especially the US, thus advertising Xi Jinping’s centralized and statist governance model. President Trump lost the election. Regardless of why Trump lost, his trade war precipitated a manufacturing slowdown that hit the Rust Belt in 2019, before the virus, and his loss will warn future presidents against assaulting China’s economy head-on, at least in their first term. All of this is worth gold in Chinese domestic politics. Chart 12China’s Image Suffered In Spite Of Trump 2021 Key Views: No Return To Normalcy 2021 Key Views: No Return To Normalcy Internationally, however, China’s image has collapsed – and this is in spite of Trump’s erratic and belligerent behavior, which alienated most of the world and the US’s allies (Chart 12). Moreover, despite being the origin of COVID-19, China’s is one of the few economies that thrived this year. Its global manufacturing share rose. While delaying and denying transparency regarding the virus, China accused other countries of originating the virus, and unleashed a virulent “wolf warrior” diplomacy, a military standoff with India, and a trade war with Australia. The rest of Asia will be increasingly willing to take calculated risks to counterbalance China’s growing regional clout, and international protectionist headwinds will persist. The United States will play a leading part in this process. Sino-American strategic tensions have grown relentlessly for more than a decade, especially since Xi Jinping rose to power, as is evident from Chinese treasury holdings (Chart 13). The Biden administration will naturally seek a diplomatic “reset” and a new strategic and economic dialogue with China. But Biden has already indicated that he intends to insist on China’s commitments under Trump’s “phase one” trade deal. He says he will keep Trump’s sweeping Section 301 tariffs in place, presumably until China demonstrates improvement on the intellectual property and tech transfer practices that provided the rationale for the tariffs. Biden’s victory in the Rust Belt ensures that he cannot revert to the pre-Trump status quo. Indeed Biden amplifies the US strategic challenge to China’s rise because he is much more likely to assemble a “grand alliance” or “coalition of the willing” focused on constraining China’s illiberal and mercantilist policies. Even the combined economic might of a western coalition is not enough to force China to abandon its statist development model, but it would make negotiations more likely to be successful on the West’s more limited and transactional demands (Chart 14). Chart 13The US-China Divorce Pre-Dates And Post-Dates Trump The US-China Divorce Pre-Dates And Post-Dates Trump The US-China Divorce Pre-Dates And Post-Dates Trump Chart 14Biden's Grand Alliance A Danger To China Biden's Grand Alliance A Danger To China Biden's Grand Alliance A Danger To China The Taiwan Strait is ground zero for US-China geopolitical tensions. The US is reviving its right to arm Taiwan for the sake of its self-defense, but the US commitment is questionable at best – and it is this very uncertainty that makes a miscalculation more likely and hence conflict a major tail risk (Chart 15). True, Beijing has enormous economic leverage over Taiwan, and it is fresh off a triumph of imposing its will over Hong Kong, which vindicates playing the long game rather than taking any preemptive military actions that could prove disastrous. Nevertheless, Xi Jinping’s reassertion of Beijing and communism is driving Taiwanese popular opinion away from the mainland, resulting in a polarizing dynamic that will be extremely difficult to bridge (Chart 16). If China comes to believe that the Biden administration is pursuing a technological blockade just as rapidly and resolutely as the Trump administration, then it could conclude that Taiwan should be brought to heel sooner rather than later. Chart 15US Boosts Arms Sales To Taiwan 2021 Key Views: No Return To Normalcy 2021 Key Views: No Return To Normalcy Chart 16Taiwan Strait Risk Will Explode If Biden Seeks Tech Blockade 2021 Key Views: No Return To Normalcy 2021 Key Views: No Return To Normalcy Bottom Line: On a secular basis, China faces rising domestic economic risks and rising geopolitical risk. Given the rally in Chinese currency and equities in 2021, the downside risk is greater than the upside risk of any fleeting “diplomatic reset” with the United States. Emerging markets will benefit from China’s stimulus this year but will suffer from its policy tightening over time. Key View #2: The US “Pivot To Asia” Is Back On … And Runs Through Iran Most likely President-elect Biden will face gridlock at home. His domestic agenda largely frustrated, he will focus on foreign policy. Given his old age, he may also be a one-term president, which reinforces the need to focus on the achievable. He will aim to restore the Obama administration’s foreign policy, the chief features of which were the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and the “Pivot to Asia.” The US is limited by the need to pivot to Asia, while Iran is limited by the risk of regime failure. A deal should be agreed. The purpose of the Iranian deal was to limit Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions, stabilize Iraq, create a semblance of regional balance, and thus enable American military withdrawal. The US could have simply abandoned the region, but Iran’s ensuing supremacy would have destabilized the region and quickly sucked the US back in. The newly energy independent US needed a durable deal. Then it could turn its attention to Asia Pacific, where it needed to rebuild its strategic influence in the face of a challenger that made Iran look like a joke (Chart 17). Chart 17The "Pivot To Asia" In A Nutshell The "Pivot To Asia" In A Nutshell The "Pivot To Asia" In A Nutshell It is possible for Biden to revive the Iranian deal, given that the other five members of the agreement have kept it afloat during the Trump years. Moreover, since it was always an executive deal that lacked Senate approval, Biden can rejoin unilaterally. However, the deal largely expires in 2025 – and the Trump administration accurately criticized the deal’s failure to contain Iran’s missile development and regional ambitions. Therefore Biden is proposing a renegotiation. This could lead to an even greater US-Iran engagement, but it is not clear that a robust new deal is feasible. Iran can also recommit to the old deal, having taken only incremental steps to violate the deal after the US’s departure – manifestly as leverage for future negotiations. Of course, the Iranians are not likely to give up their nuclear program in the long run, as nuclear weapons are the golden ticket to regime survival. Libya gave up its nuclear program and was toppled by NATO; North Korea developed its program into deliverable nuclear weapons and saw an increase in stature. Iran will continue to maintain a nuclear program that someday could be weaponized. Nevertheless, Tehran will be inclined to deal with Biden. President Hassan Rouhani is a lame duck, his legacy in tatters due to Trump, but his final act in office could be to salvage his legacy (and his faction’s hopes) by overseeing a return to the agreement prior to Iran’s presidential election in June. From Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s point of view, this would be beneficial. He also needs to secure his legacy, but as he tries to lay the groundwork for his power succession, Iran faces economic collapse, widespread social unrest, and a potentially explosive division between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the more pragmatic political faction hoping for economic opening and reform. Iran needs a reprieve from US maximum pressure, so Khamenei will ultimately rejoin a limited nuclear agreement if it enables the regime to live to fight another day. In short, the US is limited by the need to pivot to Asia, while Iran is limited by the risk of regime failure. A deal should be agreed. But this is precisely why conflict could erupt in 2021. First, either in Trump’s final days in office or in the early days of the Biden administration, Israel could take military action – as it has likely done several times this year already – to set back the Iranian nuclear program and try to reinforce its own long-term security. Second, the Biden administration could decide to utilize the immense leverage that President Trump has bequeathed, resulting in a surprisingly confrontational stance that would push Iran to the brink. This is unlikely but it may be necessary due to the following point. Third, China and Russia could refuse to cooperate with the US, eliminating the prospect of a robust renegotiation of the deal, and forcing Biden to choose between accepting the shabby old deal or adopting something similar to Trump’s maximum pressure. China will probably cooperate; Russia is far less certain. Beijing knows that the US intention in Iran is to free up strategic resources to revive the US position in Asia, but it has offered limited cooperation on Iran and North Korea because it does not have an interest in their acquiring nuclear weapons and it needs to mitigate US hostility. Biden has a much stronger political mandate to confront China than he does to confront Iran. Assuming that the Israelis and Saudis can no more prevent Biden’s détente with Iran than they could Obama’s, the next question will be whether Biden effectively shifts from a restored Iranian deal to shoring up these allies and partners. He can possibly build on the Abraham Accords negotiated by the Trump administration smooth Israeli ties with the Arab world. The Middle East could conceivably see a semblance of balance. But not in 2021. The coming year will be the rocky transition phase in which the US-Iran détente succeeds or fails. Chart 18Oil Market Share War Preceded The Last US-Iran Deal Oil Market Share War Preceded The Last US-Iran Deal Oil Market Share War Preceded The Last US-Iran Deal Chart 19Still, Base Case Is For Rising Oil Prices Still, Base Case Is For Rising Oil Prices Still, Base Case Is For Rising Oil Prices Chart 20Biden Needs A Credible Threat Biden Needs A Credible Threat Biden Needs A Credible Threat The lead-up to the 2015 Iranian deal saw a huge collapse in global oil prices due to a market share war with Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the US triggered by US shale production and Iranian sanctions relief (Chart 18). This was despite rising global demand and the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq. In 2021, global demand will also be reviving and Iraq, though not in the midst of full-scale war, is still unstable. OPEC 2.0 could buckle once again, though Moscow and Riyadh already confirmed this year that they understand the devastating consequences of not cooperating on production discipline. Our Commodity and Energy Strategy projects that the cartel will continue to operate, thus drawing down inventories (Chart 19). The US and/or Israel will have to establish a credible military threat to ensure that Iran is in check, and that will create fireworks and geopolitical risks first before it produces any Middle Eastern balance (Chart 20). Bottom Line: The US and Iran are both driven to revive the 2015 nuclear deal by strategic needs. Whether a better deal can be negotiated is less likely. The return to US-Iran détente is a source of geopolitical risk in 2021 though it should ultimately succeed. The lower risk of full-scale war is negative for global oil prices but OPEC 2.0 cartel behavior will be the key determiner. The cartel flirted with disaster in 2020 and will most likely hang together in 2021 for the sake of its members’ domestic stability. Key View #3: Europe Wins The US Election Chart 21Europe Won The US Election Europe Won The US Election Europe Won The US Election The European Union has not seen as monumental of a challenge from anti-establishment politicians over the past decade as have Britain and America. The establishment has doubled down on integration and solidarity. Now Europe is the big winner of the US election. Brussels and Berlin no longer face a tariff onslaught from Trump, a US-instigated global trade war, or as high of a risk of a major war in the Middle East. Biden’s first order of business will be reviving the trans-Atlantic alliance. Financial markets recognize that Europe is the winner and the euro has finally taken off against the dollar over the past year. European industrials and small caps outperformed during the trade war as well as COVID-19, a bullish signal (Chart 21). Reinforcing this trend is the fact that China is looking to court Europe and reduce momentum for an anti-China coalition. The center of gravity in Europe is Germany and 2021 faces a major transition in German politics. Chancellor Angela Merkel will step down at long last. Her Christian Democratic Union is favored to retain power after receiving a much-needed boost for its handling of this year’s crisis (Chart 22), although the risk of an upset and change of ruling party is much greater than consensus holds. Chart 22German Election Poses Political Risk, Not Investment Risk German Election Poses Political Risk, Not Investment Risk German Election Poses Political Risk, Not Investment Risk However, from an investment point of view, an upset in the German election is not very concerning. A left-wing coalition would take power that would merely reinforce the shift toward more dovish fiscal policy and European solidarity. Either way Germany will affirm what France affirmed in 2017, and what France is on track to reaffirm in 2022: that the European project is intact, despite Brexit, and evolving to address various challenges. The European project is intact, despite Brexit, and evolving to address various challenges. This is not to say that European elections pose no risk. In fact, there will be upsets as a result of this year’s crisis and the troubled aftermath. The countries with upcoming elections – or likely snap elections in the not-too-distant future, like Spain and Italy – show various levels of vulnerability to opposition parties (Chart 23). Chart 23Post-COVID EU Elections Will Not Be A Cakewalk Post-COVID EU Elections Will Not Be A Cakewalk Post-COVID EU Elections Will Not Be A Cakewalk Chart 24Immigration Tailwind For Populism Subsided Immigration Tailwind For Populism Subsided Immigration Tailwind For Populism Subsided The chief risks to Europe stem from fiscal normalization and instability abroad. Regime failures in the Middle East and Africa could send new waves of immigration, and high levels of immigration have fueled anti-establishment politics over the past decade. Yet this is not a problem at the moment (Chart 24). And even more so than the US, the EU has tightened border enforcement and control over immigration (Chart 25). This has enabled the political establishment to save itself from populist discontent. The other danger for Europe is posed by Russian instability. In general, Moscow is focusing on maintaining domestic stability amid the pandemic and ongoing economic austerity, as well as eventual succession concerns. However, Vladimir Putin’s low approval rating has often served as a warning that Russia might take an external action to achieve some limited national objective and instigate opposition from the West, which increases government support at home (Chart 26). Chart 25Europe Tough On Immigration Like US Europe Tough On Immigration Like US Europe Tough On Immigration Like US Chart 26Warning Sign That Russia May Lash Out Warning Sign That Russia May Lash Out Warning Sign That Russia May Lash Out Chart 27Russian Geopolitical Risk Premium Rising Russian Geopolitical Risk Premium Rising Russian Geopolitical Risk Premium Rising The US Democratic Party is also losing faith in engagement with Russia, so while it will need to negotiate on Iran and arms reduction, it will also seek to use sanctions and democracy promotion to undermine Putin’s regime and his leverage over Europe. The Russian geopolitical risk premium will rise, upsetting an otherwise fairly attractive opportunity relative to other emerging markets (Chart 27). Bottom Line: The European democracies have passed a major “stress test” over the past decade. The dollar will fall relative to the euro, in keeping with macro fundamentals, though it will not be supplanted as the leading reserve currency. Europe and the euro will benefit from the change of power in Washington, and a rise in European political risks will still be minor from a global point of view. Russia and the ruble will suffer from a persistent risk premium. Investment Takeaways As the “Year of the Rat” draws to a close, geopolitical risk and global policy uncertainty have come off the boil and safe haven assets have sold off. Yet geopolitical risk will remain elevated in 2021. The secular drivers of the dramatic rise in this risk since 2008 have not been resolved. To play the above themes and views, we are initiating the following strategic investment recommendations: Long developed market equities ex-US – US outperformance over DM has reached extreme levels and the global economic cycle and post-pandemic revival will favor DM-ex-US. Long emerging market equities ex-China – Emerging markets will benefit from a falling dollar and commodity recovery. China has seen the good news but now faces the headwinds outlined above. Long European industrials relative to global – European equities stand to benefit from the change of power in Washington, US-China decoupling, and the global recovery. Long Mexican industrials versus emerging markets – Mexico witnessed the rise of an American protectionist and a landslide election in favor of a populist left-winger. Now it has a new trade deal with the US and the US is diversifying from China, while its ruling party faces a check on its power via midterm elections, and, regardless, has maintained orthodox economic policy. Long Indian equities versus Chinese – Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a single party majority, four years on his political clock, and has recommitted to pro-productivity structural reforms. The nation is taking more concerted action in pursuit of economic development since strategic objectives in South Asia cannot be met without greater dynamism. The US, Japan, Australia, and other countries are looking to develop relations as they diversify from China.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights China’s trade strategy toward the U.S. is not greatly affected by the early U.S. Democratic Party primary election. The sea change in American policy toward China began before Donald Trump and is grounded in U.S. grand strategy. Yet Trump is staging a tactical retreat in his trade war and China is reciprocating, suggesting that Beijing would rather avoid a “lame duck” Trump on the warpath. Beijing will not implement structural changes that would vindicate Trump’s negotiating strategy and set a precedent that is harmful to China’s national interests in the long run. Feature A U.S.-China trade ceasefire is in the works, based on the outcome of the latest high-level talks in Washington. President Trump, paying a surprise visit to the top Chinese negotiator, Vice Premier Liu He, agreed to pause the October 15 tariff hike in exchange for assurances that China would buy $40-$50 billion worth of agricultural goods to ease the economic pressure on Trump’s political base. Trump is now confirmed to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Santiago, Chile on November 16-17, where he hopes to cement this “phase one deal” with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Chart 1Global Policy Uncertainty To Fall Global Policy Uncertainty To Fall Global Policy Uncertainty To Fall Our market-based GeoRisk Indicator for Taiwan island – which calculates Taiwanese political risk based on any excessive deviation of the Taiwanese dollar from economic fundamentals – is a good proxy for Sino-American trade tensions due to Taiwan’s high level of exposure to China and the United States. At the moment it is signaling a sharp drop in tensions. We expect global uncertainty to follow over the coming month as Trump and Xi agree to some kind of ceasefire (Chart 1). Our Taiwan risk measure tracks closely with the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, which measures risk via the word count of key terms in influential global newspapers, because Taiwan is highly exposed to the world economy and trade. Taiwan is also uniquely vulnerable to the biggest source of global policy uncertainty today: the Sino-American trade war. Not only are U.S.-China relations slightly thawing, but also the risk of the U.K. leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement has collapsed. This will reinforce Europe’s underlying political stability despite the manufacturing recession and help create a drop in global uncertainty (Chart 2). Chart 2American Policy Uncertainty To Buck The Trend American Policy Uncertainty To Buck The Trend American Policy Uncertainty To Buck The Trend Uncertainty will remain elevated beyond the fourth quarter, however, for two main reasons. First, U.S. uncertainty will rise, not fall, as a result of the impending 2020 election. Second, the trade ceasefire is highly unlikely to resolve the slate of disagreements and underlying strategic distrust plaguing U.S.-China relations. This will cap the rebound we expect in global business sentiment. How can we be so sure that the U.S. and China will not strike a historic deal? We answer this question in this report, with particular reference to an important corollary question that has emerged in numerous client meetings: wouldn’t China rather deal with the “transactional” Trump than an “ideological” President Elizabeth Warren?   Trump Is Not A “Lame Duck” Yet, Hence The Ceasefire President Trump is a uniquely commercial president. He did not become president through experience in military or government, but because he was a bold businessman who claimed he could negotiate better deals for the United States, including on immigration and trade. So he is even more vulnerable to an economic downturn than the average U.S. president. Industrial production, manufacturing, and core capital goods new orders are contracting, and sentiment is souring among both business leaders and average consumers (Chart 3). Trump faces a distinct risk that the manufacturing slowdown and psychological effects will morph into a general slowdown. Even if not outrightly recessionary, a generalized slowdown in the U.S. economy could easily lead to rising unemployment during the election year, which would all but ensure Trump’s loss of the White House. The degree of correlation between presidential approval and the unemployment rate fluctuates over time, but our survey of post-World War II presidents shows that the unemployment rate is the best indicator of the direction the approval rating will ultimately go by the end of the term in office. While Trump’s approval is highly correlated with unemployment, it is also very low – resembling President Obama’s at this point in his first term. Yet that was in the aftermath of the Great Recession, and Trump’s approval is declining as a result of the impeachment inquiry into his alleged attempt to convince Ukraine to interfere in the 2020 election in his favor. And his approval is low despite an incredibly low rate of unemployment, at 3.5%, that can hardly get better (Chart 4). Chart 3Trump Needs A Sentiment Boost For 2020 Trump Needs A Sentiment Boost For 2020 Trump Needs A Sentiment Boost For 2020 Chart 4Rising Unemployment Would Doom Trump 2020 Rising Unemployment Would Doom Trump 2020 Rising Unemployment Would Doom Trump 2020 In short, Trump has very little wiggle room. To be reelected he must not only keep unemployment from rising much, but also achieve some other policy wins in order to draw closer to the average approval rate among post-World War II presidents (top panel, Chart 5). Even the Republican-friendly pollster Rasmussen shows that Trump’s general approval is dangerously eroding (bottom panel, Chart 5). One way Trump can achieve a political and economic victory would be to agree to a trade deal with China. Chart 5 One clear way to achieve a policy victory and a boost to the economy would be to agree to a trade deal with China. Passing the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement through Congress is out of his control. Policy toward China, by contrast, is entirely within his control. Just as he raised the tariffs unilaterally, so he can roll them back unilaterally to encourage the financial markets and CEO confidence – as long as talks are making progress. The downside of this argument is that if Trump becomes a “lame duck,” with a falling economy and/or approval rating virtually ensuring that he cannot get reelected, he is no longer constrained by financial markets or the economy. He would have an incentive to initiate “Cold War 2.0” with China right here and now – or some other foreign conflict – and encourage Americans to rally around the flag amid a historic confrontation with a foreign enemy. This is a huge risk to the 2020 outlook, but it runs afoul of the economic constraint, so we expect Trump to try the “Art of the Deal” one last time.     What about impeachment? When the House of Representatives brings formal impeachment articles against Trump, the Senate will hold the trial. Republicans have a 53-47 majority in the Senate, requiring 20 to defect against the president to generate the 67 votes needed to make him the first president in U.S. history to be removed from office in this way. A total of 16 senators hail from states that Trump won by less than 10% in the 2016 election – so 20 defectors is a strong political constraint. Chart 6 Unless, of course, grassroots Republican support for Trump collapses. Right now it is falling but in line with the average (top panel, Chart 6). Republicans are not warming to the idea of impeachment and removal from office (middle panel, Chart 6). We will reassess the risk of removal if Trump’s intra-party approval heads further south and begins to look like Richard Nixon’s (bottom panel, Chart 6). Bear in mind that the election is one year away – it is easier for Republicans to kick the decision over to voters than to remove one of their own from the Oval Office. A scandal big enough to prompt an exodus of Republican support will doom any chances of Republicans retaining the White House through Vice President Mike Pence or other candidates. Bottom Line: Trump’s approval rating is in dangerously low territory but he is not yet a “lame duck” freed from the shackles of political and economic constraints. He still has a shot at extending the business cycle and saving his election campaign. This is driving him to retreat from tariffs and pursue a trade ceasefire with China. The result should be a decline in global policy uncertainty in Q4. However, this decline will not last long, as American uncertainty will skyrocket during the election year and U.S.-China tensions will reemerge once the economic constraint has been reduced. China Will Accept A Ceasefire In a special report in these pages in August, we raised a critical question: if Trump is forced to retreat from his trade war, will President Xi Jinping reciprocate? Or will he refuse to bargain, leaving Trump overextended to suffer the negative economic repercussions of the trade war without the political benefit of striking a new deal? We now have our answer, at least for the near term. China resumed negotiations in October and has confirmed that progress was made. Beijing is continuing to offer some accommodation of U.S. demands in both domestic and foreign policy (e.g. financial sector opening, enforcement of sanctions on Iran). In Hong Kong SAR, not only has Beijing avoided a violent intervention and suppression of civilian protesters, but there are rumors that Chief Executive Carrie Lam is on the way out by March (which we find highly plausible). There are still plenty of risks across the broad range of U.S.-China disputes, but from the past month’s developments we can infer that President Xi is not going on the offensive in order to destroy Trump’s latest “deal-making” bid. How far will Xi go to accommodate Trump? Not so far as to implement major structural concessions. And this will limit the positive impact of the deal. Xi does not face an electoral constraint, or the loss of office (having removed term limits), nor does he face a domestic political constraint on a 12-month time frame (the twentieth national party congress is not until 2022). Economically China is much more vulnerable – this is a valid constraint. But tariffs do not force Beijing to make major structural concessions and implement them rapidly, certainly not on Trump’s time frame. The economy is slowing but not plummeting (Chart 7). China does not face conditions like 2015-16 and policymakers have decided it is best to save ammunition in case they need to use “bazooka” stimulus later. Chart 7China's Economy Holding Up China's Economy Holding Up China's Economy Holding Up Chart 8China Not Reflating Property Bubble (Yet) China Not Reflating Property Bubble (Yet) China Not Reflating Property Bubble (Yet) The fact that Beijing has maintained restrictions on the property sector and not allowed reflation to fuel the property bubble (Chart 8) underscores the current policy disposition: some parts of the economy need to be shored up but there is no need to panic. When it comes to tariffs, China ultimately has the option of depreciating the currency to offset the impact. The fact that the CNY-USD exchange rate has not fallen as far as the headline tariff numbers suggest it should fall indicates that Beijing is still maintaining a negotiation rather than letting the currency absorb the full impact (Chart 9). Chart 9China Can Depreciate To Offset Tariffs China Can Depreciate To Offset Tariffs China Can Depreciate To Offset Tariffs Since China is still capable of “irrigation-style” fiscal stimulus, the economic constraint can be mitigated further. Beijing can continue to fight if Trump returns to the offensive. Hence we do not expect major new trade concessions beyond what is already on the table – and many of the current offerings consist of promises more so than concrete actions (Table 1). Chart Chart 10Beijing Throws Trump A Bone Beijing Throws Trump A Bone Beijing Throws Trump A Bone We do expect China to try to avoid the worst-case scenario, since it would be destabilizing for China’s medium and long-term economy and single-party rule. Stimulus will increase as necessary to ensure that growth rebounds as Beijing seeks to improve the job market and manufacturing sector. And this also supports the logic for agreeing to a ceasefire with Trump. That China is reciprocating is apparent from the U.S.’s rebounding market share in China’s agricultural imports (Chart 10). The relevant constraint for China is that Trump could be rendered a “lame duck” and go ballistic on China, activating the full slate of threats – from high-tech export controls, to banking sanctions, to capital controls. The U.S. is still the more powerful nation in absolute terms, with enormous financial, economic, military, and technological leverage over China. Beijing also sees the danger in deliberately thwarting Trump only to have him somehow win reelection. He would then have a renewed passion for punitive measures, yet he would lack the first term’s electoral constraints. Hence there is a clear basis for President Xi to accept Trump’s tactical trade retreat. Bottom Line: President Xi does not face an imminent domestic political constraint, which gives him greater leverage than President Trump. Nevertheless he does face short term economic pressures, and enough of a geopolitical and economic constraint from a full-blown escalation of tensions to accept Trump’s offer of a ceasefire. Wouldn’t China Rather Deal With Trump Than Warren? What about the upside risk? What are the chances that Xi offers additional concessions – structural concessions – in order to achieve a groundbreaking deal with the American president? A grand compromise will not occur. Republicans and Communist Party leaders have a history of such deals, which pave the way for a new multi-year stint of deepening bilateral economic engagement. We have a high conviction view that such a grand compromise will not occur. But could the U.S. 2020 election change China’s calculus? In particular, wouldn’t China prefer to deal with Trump than Senator Elizabeth Warren? More and more investors are asking this last question as the early U.S. Democratic Party primary election heats up. Warren is a democratic progressive who aims to revolutionize U.S. trade policy to promote human rights, organized labor, and strict environmental standards. She is seen as more “ideological,” whereas Trump is more “transactional” – i.e. willing to make business tradeoffs while staying away from sensitive issues affecting China’s internal affairs. Moreover Trump is a known quantity, whereas Warren would represent an unknown – a progressive populist as president and another revolution in U.S. policy, reducing predictability for Beijing.  Our assessment is that the U.S. election process is too early and too uncertain to serve as a driver of Beijing’s trade negotiating strategy over the fourth quarter. Moreover there is not a clear basis for China to favor Trump to Warren. Chart 11Trade Dispute Precedes Trump Trade Dispute Precedes Trump Trade Dispute Precedes Trump There are three major trends to bear in mind: The sea change in U.S. policy toward China began under the Obama administration. President Obama entered office by slapping tire tariffs on Beijing. He endorsed Congress’s “Buy American” provisions in the fiscal stimulus package to fight the Great Recession. Under his administration, the U.S. effectively capped steel imports from China (Chart 11). The Obama administration orchestrated the “Pivot to Asia,” a diplomatic and military initiative to rebalance U.S. strategic commitment to focus on China and the western Pacific more than the Middle East. This included the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an advanced trade deal that deliberately excluded China. It eventually also included a robust reassertion of U.S. maritime supremacy via bulked up Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, a critical global sea lane where Beijing had become increasingly assertive (Diagram 1). Chart Chart 12U.S.-China THAAD Dispute Under Obama U.S.-China THAAD Dispute Under Obama U.S.-China THAAD Dispute Under Obama The Obama administration’s attempt to install the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea caused a strategic showdown with China, emblematized by Chinese sanctions against the Korean economy (Chart 12). Obama’s one major policy handover to President Trump was to focus attention on North Korea’s advancing nuclear weaponization and missile capabilities – another source of friction with China. There can be little doubt that if the Democrats win the 2020 election, they will return to some or all of these policies. But this says more about U.S. national policy than it does about which political party China should favor in 2020, because … 2. The Trump administration is unpredictable and disruptive to both the global status quo and China’s economy. President Trump’s significance is that he shifted the Republican Party from its traditional pro-corporate, pro-free trade, pro-China orientation to a more populist, protectionist, and China-bashing approach. He stole the thunder of protectionist Democrats in the manufacturing heartland. He continued the pivot to Asia, albeit by another name (a “free and open Indo-Pacific”). This approach emphasized coercive unilateral “hard power” rather than multilateral “soft power” and resulted in a negative impact on China’s economy. This change, while it has pros and cons, demonstrates that a harder line on China has policy consensus across administrations. Few doubt that this is the new bipartisan consensus in Washington. Trump has executed this policy shift in a way that is fundamentally unsettling and unpredictable for China: sweeping unilateral tariffs against China on national security grounds (Chart 13); sanctions on tech companies critical for China’s economic future (Chart 14); and tightening relations with Taiwan. This policy eschews traditional diplomacy, which is where China thrives, and it unsettles global supply chains, where China once enjoyed centrality. To some extent Trump is even prisoner to his own logic: as he softens policy to get a trade ceasefire, he faces challenges from Congress on everything from tech export controls to Hong Kong human rights to Chinese corporate listings on U.S. stock exchanges. The Democrats will accuse him of caving to China if he agrees to a deal. Still, if China were to grant Trump deep trade concessions, it would effectively vindicate Trump’s approach. Future American presidents could always threaten across-the-board tariffs whenever they want to extract rapid structural changes from China’s policymakers. This is an intolerable precedent to set. A hard line on China has policy consensus across U.S. administrations. Chart 13Trump's Trade Policy Highly Disruptive Trump's Trade Policy Highly Disruptive Trump's Trade Policy Highly Disruptive Chart 14China's Tech Sector Under Threat China's Tech Sector Under Threat China's Tech Sector Under Threat   3. China cannot predict the outcome of U.S. primary or general elections. No one knows who will win the Democratic Party’s primary election. Joe Biden is the frontrunner and has clear advantages in terms of electability versus Trump. But Elizabeth Warren is gaining on him and her chief progressive rival, Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, is likely to continue flagging in the polls and feeding her rise due to his ill health. It is highly unlikely that Xi Jinping will make decisions regarding a ceasefire with Trump, as early as next month, based on up-and-down developments in a primary election that has not technically even begun (the first vote is in February). Once Biden or Warren have clinched the nomination, it is not clear who will win in November 2020. President Trump narrowly seized the electoral college in 2016 and the risks to his reelection are extreme, as outlined above. Yet he is the incumbent and BCA Research does not expect a recession next year, which should create a baseline case of reelection. Meanwhile Biden’s debate performances and polling are lackluster, despite being the establishment pick and front runner. Warren’s far-left ideology is a liability, although she is at least capable of beating Trump. Chinese policymakers will assess the developments, but Beijing will conduct strategy to be prepared for any outcome. Summing up the above, all that China knows for certain is that Trump is the current standard-bearer of a broader sea change in the Republican Party and Washington. The new consensus is broadly antagonistic toward China’s growing global influence. Hence China is preparing for “protracted struggle” regardless of whether Trump or a Democrat sits in the Oval Office after 2020. The logical conclusion is to continue negotiating with Trump, and offer some concessions to maintain credibility, but not to capitulate to his gunboat diplomacy. Finally, there are a two key arguments that work against the argument that China prefers Warren to Trump: Democrats will need time to build a multilateral anti-China coalition: Trump’s greatest mistake in the trade war is arguably his failure to form a “coalition of the willing” among western nations to take on China’s mercantilist trade practices together. Chart 15Trump Missed Chance To Build Grand Coalition Trump Missed Chance To Build Grand Coalition Trump Missed Chance To Build Grand Coalition Such a coalition would have represented a much greater economic constraint for Chinese leaders (Chart 15), making structural concessions more likely. A future Democratic president would have better luck in galvanizing such a coalition. Thus, by favoring Trump, Beijing could perpetuate the division between “America First” and “the liberal Western order.” Yet western nations will still be reluctant to confront China and it will take years of diplomacy to build such a concerted effort. These are years in which China can improve its economic self-sufficiency and use diplomacy to undermine western cohesion. By contrast, a second-term Trump could pursue punitive measures immediately (beyond tariffs) and could also pursue more western alignment, for instance on tech sanctions. A Chinese policy focused on overall stability would not clearly prefer the latter. As for a Warren presidency, her trade policy has more in common with Trump’s than with Biden’s or the status quo. It is not at all clear that she would be able to unify the West against China on the issue of trade. Hence there is no clear advantage to China of preferring Trump. Biden is probably a greater threat to China on this front, since he would “renegotiate” (i.e. rejoin) the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and court the Europeans, while likely maintaining Obama’s line on China. Yet Biden is viewed as the most pro-China candidate of all.  In short, trade policy is a wash from China’s point of view. The U.S. has already taken a more protectionist turn. From China’s view, the U.S. as a whole has taken a protectionist turn. Democrats will not prioritize China: Trump will be unshackled from concerns about bear markets and recessions if he is reelected to a second term due to the two-term limit. Warren would enter as a first-term president and would therefore face the reelection constraint that has hindered Trump’s own trade policy. If Trump loses, Warren faces an implicit threat should she clash with China. Chart 16Market Sees Warren As Health Care Risk Market Sees Warren As Health Care Risk Market Sees Warren As Health Care Risk Warren will also, like President Obama, spend the majority of her first term engrossed in an ambitious domestic policy agenda. Her policy priority is a universal single-payer health care system, which is a much more dramatic undertaking than Biden’s proposal of restoring and enhancing Obamacare, which is why health sector equities are sensitive to Warren’s election chances (Chart 16). Obama did not devote his full attention to Iran and China until his second term, and it is normal for the second term to be the “foreign policy term” due to the absence of electoral constraints. Several of Warren’s policy priorities would also be more favorable to China. In particular, Warren’s desire to impose tougher restrictions on U.S. financials, energy companies, and tech companies is broadly beneficial to China’s efforts to create globally competitive champions. At the same time, Trump is more likely to continue the buildup in U.S. military spending, which, combined with the unlikelihood that Trump will ultimately abandon U.S. allies in Asia, poses a strategic threat for China (Chart 17). China cannot calculate its trade negotiations according to the ups and downs of volatile U.S. politics. Instead it has an incentive to play both sides: to give Trump promises while hesitating to implement them, so as not to render him a dangerous “lame duck” (Chart 18) but also not to gift-wrap the election for him. Chart 17Trump's Military Buildup Trump's Military Buildup Trump's Military Buildup Chart 18 The one thing that can be expected over the next two years is that China will try to maintain economic stability to attract Europe and Asia deeper into its orbit. This means incrementally more stimulus, as mentioned above. China cannot allow itself to risk debt-deflation while encouraging other economies to become less reliant on Chinese demand. Bottom Line: China cannot predict the future. Its best play is to try to undermine the emerging U.S. policy consensus to be tough on China. This means agreeing to a ceasefire to pacify Trump without giving him major structural concessions that improve his chances of reelection. If he loses, future presidents will be afraid of tackling China aggressively. If he wins, yes, China can try to exploit his “America First” policy to keep the U.S. divided within itself and with the rest of the West. If a Democrat wins, China will have set a precedent that gunboat diplomacy fails. It can try to bind the Democrat to the Trump ceasefire terms. If the Democrats tear up the deal then China will have a basis to begin negotiations as an aggrieved party. Investment Conclusions The problem for President Trump is that a weak, short-term ceasefire – in which China does not verifiably implement structural concessions and the threat of “tech war” continues to loom – will not have as positive of an impact on global and American economic sentiment as Trump hopes. Moreover it could collapse under the weight of Sino-American strategic distrust in areas outside trade. Thus while we expect global policy uncertainty to drop off – as we outlined at the beginning of this report – we expect the reduction to be moderate rather than dramatic and not to last all the way to the U.S. election.  Our colleagues Bob Ryan and Hugo Belanger have demonstrated that a rise in global policy uncertainty is correlated with a rise in the trade weighted dollar (Chart 19). If uncertainty falls, it will help the dollar ease, which improves global financial conditions and cultivates a rebound in global growth and trade. Chart 19Policy Uncertainty Boosts The Dollar Policy Uncertainty Boosts The Dollar Policy Uncertainty Boosts The Dollar Chart 20Falling Uncertainty Hurts US Outperformance Falling Uncertainty Hurts US Outperformance Falling Uncertainty Hurts US Outperformance This is corroborated by the U.S. trade policy uncertainty index, which reinforces not only the point about the dollar but also the implication that global equities can begin to outperform U.S. equities (Chart 20). With trade sentiment recovering, and U.S. domestic political risk rising due to the election, there is a basis for equity rotation. This assumes that China’s growth does incrementally improve, as we expect.   Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights On a national level, China’s foreign currency debt does not seem excessive. Nevertheless, foreign currency debt is concentrated in the weakest sectors: property developers, banks and non-bank financial companies. The authorities can resort to FX swaps to smooth China’s currency depreciation. This will assure there is no currency turmoil. Yet, these FX swaps transactions will only defer downward pressure on the local currency, but will not eliminate it. Feature Chart I-1China's Aggregate FX Debt China's Aggregate FX Debt China's Aggregate FX Debt China’s foreign debt has increased dramatically over the past 10 years, from $390 billion to $1.83 trillion currently (Chart I-1). With the RMB’s recent depreciation, the pressure on Chinese debtors to service foreign currency debt is rising. In this week's report, we gauge the size of the nation’s foreign currency debt, assess its vulnerability and discuss how policymakers will manage potential downside risks to the exchange rate. Quantifying The Size Of External Debt The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) currently reports foreign currency denominated liabilities amounting to $1.97 trillion. This includes debts of general (central and local) government, the central bank, commercial banks and other enterprises. However, SAFE does not record foreign currency debt of offshore subsidiaries of Chinese companies. For example, if a subsidiary of a Chinese company in Hong Kong issued bonds denominated in foreign currency, this amount will not be captured in SAFE’s data. To get a more complete picture of China’s total foreign currency debt, we included the foreign debt of offshore subsidiaries to the SAFE figure. Also, we exclude banks' foreign currency deposits from foreign debt. Table I-1 is a comprehensive profile of China’s foreign currency debt. Table I-1Who Owes FX Debt In China China’s Foreign Debt, And A Secret Weapon China’s Foreign Debt, And A Secret Weapon The key takeaways are as follows: China’s aggregate foreign currency debt is $1.83 trillion, or 13% of GDP. Public sector foreign currency debt stands at $263 billion, or 0.2% of GDP. Such a low number suggests one should not worry about the government’s foreign currency indebtedness. Companies’ and banks’ foreign indebtedness as of the end of March 2019 amounted to $436 billion and $1.3 trillion, respectively, totaling $1.7 trillion (or 12.5% of GDP) (Chart I-2A and I-2B). Chart I-2AFX Debt Of Companies And Banks FX Debt Of Companies And Banks FX Debt Of Companies And Banks Chart I-2BFX Debt Of Companies And Banks FX Debt Of Companies And Banks FX Debt Of Companies And Banks   For banks, we deducted foreign currency deposits from the SAFE numbers – in other words, banks’ foreign currency debt excludes their foreign currency deposits. For instance, a mainland bank operating in Hong Kong has a large number of Hong Kong dollar deposits, yet the latter does not really constitute a foreign currency debt, as it is an inherent part of banking operations and is counterbalanced by Hong Kong dollar assets. A foreign borrowing binge by banks and companies began in 2009, paused in 2015 and took off again in 2016. Overseas financing regulation was loosened in September 2015. The idea was to facilitate foreign currency borrowing so that the proceeds would offset the rampant capital outflows during that period and stabilize the exchange rate. This relaxation of regulation contributed to the overseas borrowing binge, especially short-term debt, which does not require approval from SAFE. The fact that U.S. dollar rates have been below mainland RMB interest rates have enticed foreign currency borrowing by mainland entities over this decade. In addition, the authorities’ deleveraging campaign since late 2016 constrained domestic credit creation relative to the boom of the previous years and drove enterprises to seek capital overseas. For companies, foreign debt constitutes 5% of their aggregate debt (Chart I-3). As to banks, foreign debt is equal to 3% of non-deposit liabilities (Chart I-4).  Chart I-3Companies Reliance On FX Debt Has Risen But Remains Low Companies Reliance On FX Debt Has Risen But Remains Low Companies Reliance On FX Debt Has Risen But Remains Low Chart I-4Banks Reliance On FX Debt Is Low Banks Reliance On FX Debt Is Low Banks Reliance On FX Debt Is Low   The currency of China’s aggregate foreign debt is mostly USD (85% of total) and HK$ (10% of total). Provided the latter is pegged to the greenback – something we do not expect to change anytime soon – the overwhelming portion of foreign currency debt is de facto in U.S. dollars. ­­Companies’ and banks’ foreign indebtedness as of the end of March 2019 amounted to $436 billion and $1.3 trillion, respectively, totaling $1.7 trillion (or 12.5% of GDP). Bottom Line: While small as a share of total debt, the absolute size of foreign currency debt held by Chinese companies and banks is not trivial. Meaningful currency depreciation poses risks for industries where foreign currency debt is concentrated. Vulnerability Assessment We examine China’s vulnerability stemming from foreign currency debt on the national level as well as on the level of both banks and enterprises. National Level On the national level, China’s foreign currency debt does not seem problematic. Total foreign currency debt accounts for 70% of exports and 58% of foreign currency reserves at the central bank (Chart I-5). These ratios are lower than those of many other EM countries. Foreign debt service obligations (FDSOs) are the sum of interest payments and amortization of all types of external debt over the next 12 months. China’s current FDSOs stand at 11% relative to its exports of goods and services, and at 24% relative to the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves (Chart I-6). These numbers are also somewhat lower than in other emerging countries. Chart I-5Macro Metrics For Foreign Debt Macro Metrics For Foreign Debt Macro Metrics For Foreign Debt Chart I-6Foreign Debt Service Obligations Foreign Debt Service Obligations Foreign Debt Service Obligations Chart I-7Foreign Funding Requirements Foreign Funding Requirements Foreign Funding Requirements Exports are a country’s foreign currency earnings (cash flow) that can be used to service foreign exchange-denominated debt. Central banks’ foreign exchange reserves are a stock of liquid foreign currency assets that can be used by the central bank to plug the gap in the balance of payments, if needed. Foreign funding requirements (FFRs) are calculated as the current account deficit plus FDSOs in the next 12 months. FFRs measure the amount of net foreign capital inflows required in the next 12 months for a country to cover any potential shortfall in its current account balance, as well as to service and repay its foreign currency debt coming due (both principal and interest). Chart I-7 illustrates the Chinese mainland’s FFRs over the next 12 months exceed the current account surplus by $600 billion. The fact that U.S. dollar rates have been below mainland RMB interest rates have enticed foreign currency borrowing by mainland entities over this decade. The yuan has depreciated by 12% since April 2018. This has raised foreign debt burdens relative to GDP as well as made debt servicing more expensive. Please refer to Box I-1 that elaborates why currency depreciation is more damaging than a rise in interest rates for debtors with foreign currency borrowing. Box I-1 China’s Foreign Debt, And A Secret Weapon China’s Foreign Debt, And A Secret Weapon Companies And Banks Table I-3 illustrates the industry composition of non-government external debt. This also includes foreign debt of offshore subsidiaries. Table I-3 China’s Foreign Debt, And A Secret Weapon China’s Foreign Debt, And A Secret Weapon Non-policy banks have the highest amount of outstanding private external debt, at $367 billion, followed by real estate companies at $240 billion and financial service companies at $172 billion. Overall, foreign currency debt is concentrated in the weakest links of the Chinese economy: First, revenues and cash flows of property developers, banks and non-bank finance companies are predominantly in yuan. Hence, RMB currency depreciation reduces their cash flow in U.S. dollar terms, hurting their ability to service foreign debt. The yuan has depreciated by 12% since April 2018. This has raised foreign debt burdens relative to GDP as well as made debt servicing more expensive. Second, debt stress recedes in economic upswings and rises in economic downturns. The reason is that companies’ cash flows shrink in downturns and grow in economic expansions. Property developers, banks and non-bank finance companies are not only the largest foreign currency debtors in China, but also have the weakest profit/cash flow outlooks. Chart I-8Chinese Real Estate: Starts Outpacing Completions Chinese Real Estate: Starts Outpacing Completions Chinese Real Estate: Starts Outpacing Completions Property developers’ cash flow positions will deteriorate further as the lack of policy stimulus for real estate in this cycle will constrain housing demand. Chart I-8 illustrates property developers have had many starts, but few completions and generally weak sales. This is due to the fact that they use starts to raise cash through pre-sales (down payments). Once they have raised the cash, they slow the pace of construction, as demand as well as their own cash positions are weak. As to banks and non-bank financial companies, their total assets skyrocketed until the 2016 deleveraging campaign kicked in. Since then, their asset growth has been relatively tame. This along with rising non-performing loans is hurting their profits, and consequently their debt-servicing ability. Third, for non-policy banks, short-term debt is very high at $234 billion. The same measure for property developers and non-bank finance companies is $31 billion and $33 billion, respectively. Finally, companies and banks in aggregate will be confronted with $438 billion of U.S. dollar debt maturing over the coming two years. In particular, real estate companies and financial services companies are faced with repayment pressures of $99 billion and $79 billion, respectively. Risks From Currency Hedging Prior the RMB breaking below the important 7 CNY/USD technical level, it was safe to assume that there was no pressure to hedge currency risks by debtors with FX debt. Odds are that following the breaching of this technical level and in anticipation of further devaluation, many of these debtors have begun hedging their foreign currency exposure. In turn, demand to hedge currency risk for $1.3 trillion foreign currency debt by companies and non-policy banks could exert further downward pressure on the exchange rate. Do the authorities have the tools to avoid self-feeding currency depreciation? A Secret Defense Weapon: FX Swaps Chart I-9Few FX Reserves Compared With RMB Money Supply Few FX Reserves Compared With RMB Money Supply Few FX Reserves Compared With RMB Money Supply China’s central bank has about $3 trillion of foreign exchange (FX) reserves that can be used to intervene in the spot market. However, the authorities are very reluctant to use these reserves. One of the primary reasons is that these FX reserves are equal to only 12% of broad money supply and RMB deposits (Chart I-9). These are very low numbers in comparison with other countries. In addition, when a central bank sells its international reserves and buys local currency, the banking system’s liquidity/excess reserves at the central bank shrink, leading to higher interbank rates. Hence, defending the currency with FX reserves comes at the expense of tighter liquidity. This is unacceptable for Chinese policymakers because the economy remains very weak and extremely reliant on credit to grow. The good news is that the authorities have another tool – FX swaps – and are likely already using it to defend the yuan. Other EM countries have used FX swaps to defend their currencies as well, most notably Brazil in 2014-‘15. Media reports on several occasions have speculated that Chinese state banks sold U.S. dollars in the forward foreign exchange market in a bid to defend the forward rate and thus influence the spot market. We suspect this may be true, even though there is no available information on the amount and counterparties of FX swaps. What are the mechanisms and implications of FX swap interventions? In a FX swap transaction, a bank (the central bank or a state-owned bank) sells U.S. dollars to a company in the forward market. There is no flow of dollars or yuan in the spot market. If by the maturity date of the FX swap, the RMB depreciates more than what was implied by forwards on the date of the transaction, the bank suffers a loss. Otherwise, the bank makes a profit. The bad news is that a lot of FX debt is concentrated in the most vulnerable segments of the Chinese economy. In a nutshell, the authorities (state banks or the central bank) could hypothetically support the yuan by selling unlimited amounts of dollars in the forward market. Unlike the sale of U.S. dollars from the People’s Bank of China’s FX reserves, this would entail neither a depletion of foreign currency reserves nor a withdrawal of yuan liquidity. Chart I-10Large Bank Stocks Have Broken Down Large Bank Stocks Have Broken Down Large Bank Stocks Have Broken Down These interventions are positive as they smooth the exchange rate trend and rule out a sharp tumble in the currency value. However, this strategy still has several shortcomings: (1) These FX swap operations can lead to large losses at state-owned banks. Barring the Ministry of Finance or the PBoC writing a check to these state banks to cover these losses, the latter will dampen banks’ earnings. Consequently, their share prices will slump (Chart I-10). (2) These FX swaps transactions only delay demand for dollars in the spot market and thereby defer downward pressure on the local currency, but they do not eliminate it forever. Conclusions The bad news is that a lot of FX debt is concentrated in the most vulnerable segments of the Chinese economy: property developers, banks and finance companies. They have little FX revenues so they are exposed to RMB depreciation. Given the exchange rate has broken below the psychological level of 7 CNY/USD (Chart I-11), odds are they will try to hedge their currency risk by buying U.S. dollars in the forward market. This will heighten depreciation pressure on the yuan. Chart I-11RMB And Its Volatility RMB And Its Volatility RMB And Its Volatility The good news is that the authorities have a tool to smooth the currency depreciation via FX swaps. This will assure there is no currency turmoil in China, even if demand for dollars escalates. The costs of defending will be losses at large state-owned banks. Yet, those losses can ultimately be borne by the central government, which has little debt (20% of GDP). Downward pressure on the RMB will persist because of: Large demand for dollars from companies and banks with large FX debt levels as they attempt to hedge their FX risks; Weak economic activity, U.S. import tariffs and deflationary pressures - warranting currency depreciation; Potentially large demand for dollars from resident capital outflows. Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes

Highlights It will be impossible for China to undertake even mild deleveraging and simultaneously accelerate household income growth. All deposits in the banking system have been created by banks “out of thin air” and have not been engendered by household savings. Contrary to widespread beliefs, mainland households are highly leveraged. Cyclically, high equity valuations, crowded investor positioning and the delayed cyclical recovery in the Chinese economy pose downside risks to consumer stocks. Structurally, real income growth per capita is contingent on productivity growth. The latter will slow in China but remain relatively elevated. Overall, investors should consider buying Chinese consumer plays on weakness. Feature Deliberations about China’s successful rebalancing often boils down to whether one believes that consumers will be able to offset the slowdown in investment and exports and keep overall real GDP growth close to current levels. The narrative typically presumes that Chinese households are not spending enough and can boost their spending counteracting the ongoing slowdowns in capital spending as well as in exports. This conjecture is fallible. Chart I-1The Myth Of Deficient Consumer Demand In China The Myth Of Deficient Consumer Demand In China The Myth Of Deficient Consumer Demand In China Consumer spending in China has in fact been booming over the past 20 years – it has been growing at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10% in real terms since 1998 (Chart I-1, top panel). Hence, the imbalance in China has not been sluggish consumer spending. Rather, capital expenditure has been too strong for too long (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Healthy rebalancing entails a slowdown in investment spending – not an acceleration in household demand. Hence, the market relevant question is: Can the growth rate of household expenditure accelerate above 10% CAGR in real terms as capital spending and exports decelerate? Our hunch is that this is unlikely. As the authorities attempt to contain credit and investment excesses and trade war-induced relocation of manufacturers out of China gathers steam, the pertinent question is whether the slowdown in household expenditures in real terms will be mild (from the current 10% pace to 7.5-9% CAGR), medium (6-7.5%) or material (below 6%). In our opinion, the medium scenario has the highest odds of playing out. There are many positives about the vitality of Chinese consumers and we do not mean to downplay them. Nevertheless, many of these positives are well known, and the objective of our report is to reveal misconceptions about this segment.  Deleveraging And Consumers If and when deleveraging does transpire in China, the household income growth rate will decelerate, resulting in weaker spending growth. It will be impossible for the mainland economy to undertake even mild deleveraging and simultaneously accelerate household income growth. Chart I-2Capital Spending Is Much More Important Than Exports Capital Spending Is Much More Important Than Exports Capital Spending Is Much More Important Than Exports Our focus for this report is on a slowdown in credit and capital spending rather than exports. The basis is that the latter in general, and shipments to the U.S. in particular, have a much smaller impact than investment expenditures (Chart I-2). In turn, capital spending is mostly financed by credit. It is crucial to understand the significance of credit in driving national and household income growth in China since 2008. Currently, 2.5 yuan of new credit is needed to generate one yuan of GDP growth. This certifies that the mainland economy has become addicted to credit. As we have argued in depth in past reports, commercial banks do not intermediate savings into credit, but rather create new money/credit “out of thin air” when they lend to or buy securities from non-banks. This entails that output and income growth would have been much weaker had banks not provided credit equal to RMB 19 trillion over the past 12 months. For instance, a company affiliated with the provincial government has borrowed money from banks to build three bridges over the past 10 years, accumulating a lot of debt in the process. Ostensibly, operating these bridges does not generate enough cash flow to service its debt – a common occurrence in China. With the three bridges completed, the company would then apply for a new loan to build a fourth bridge. Should banks lend additional money to construct it? Notwithstanding this hypothetical company’s low creditworthiness, if banks provide additional financing, the credit bubble will become larger, and the issue of overcapacity will intensify. On the other hand, household income and spending growth will remain robust. If banks do not finance the construction of the fourth bridge, labor income growth in the province – employees of this company and its suppliers – will slump. Thus, if for whatever reason banks are unable or unwilling to extend as much in new credit as last year, output and income growth in this province will decelerate, all else equal. Given credit has been playing an enormous role in driving China’s economic growth over the past 10 years, it will be almost impossible to slow down credit without a downshift in household income growth. This example and analysis is not meant to suggest that bank credit origination is the sole growth driver in China. Theoretically, GDP can expand even with bank credit/money contracting. According to the quantity theory of money: Nominal GDP = Money Supply x Velocity of Money This means nominal GDP can grow even when the supply of money/credit is shrinking. For this to happen, the velocity of money should rise faster than the pace of decline in the supply of money/credit. From a practical perspective, this requires enterprises and consumers to increase the turnover (velocity) of their bank deposits and cash on hand (money supply). We have deliberated in past reports that the velocity of money and the savings rate are inversely related: A rising velocity of money entails a declining savings rate, and vice versa. Going back to our example of bridge construction, the relevant question is: Will companies and households in that province increase their spending (i.e., reduce their savings rate) if banks do not finance the construction of the fourth bridge? The realistic answer is not likely. If the fourth bridge does not receive financing, weaker income growth in that province – due to employment redundancies among construction companies and their suppliers – would lead to slower spending growth. Faced with slowing demand growth, other enterprises and households would likely turn cautious and increase their savings rates – i.e., reduce the velocity of money supply. In short, reduced credit origination will mostly likely generate slower household income growth and, consequently, spending. Chart I-3China: No Deleveraging So Far China: No Deleveraging So Far China: No Deleveraging So Far Broadly speaking, household income growth has not yet downshifted because deleveraging in China has not started. Chart I-3 illustrates that aggregate domestic credit – including public sector, enterprises and households – continues to grow above 10% and well above nominal GDP growth. In fact, credit growth has exceeded nominal GDP growth since 2008. This is local currency credit and does not include foreign currency debt, but the latter is small at 14.5% of GDP (or about US$ 2 trillion). To us, deleveraging implies credit growth that is no greater than nominal GDP growth – i.e., a flat or declining credit-to-GDP ratio for at least several years. If China is serious about deleveraging and curbing its money/credit bubble, the pace of credit expansion should decline to or below nominal GDP growth – which is presently 8%. If and when this occurs it will dampen household income and spending growth. Bottom Line: Chinese household income and spending will inevitably slow if money/credit growth slumps, given the Chinese economy’s excessive reliance on new credit origination over the past 10 years. Do Households Have A Savings Or Debt Glut? What about households’ enormous savings in China? Why wouldn’t households reduce their savings and boost spending? When referring to household savings, most allude to bank deposits. But in conventional economic theory – and according to the way household savings are statistically calculated at a national level – savings actually have no relation to bank deposits. Chart I-4No Empirical Evidence That Deposits = Savings No Empirical Evidence That Deposits = Savings No Empirical Evidence That Deposits = Savings Chart I-4 illustrates that in China, the annual change in household deposits is not equal to household savings (Chart I-4, top panel). Similarly, the annual rise in all deposits (based on central bank data) is vastly different from annual national savings (as defined by conventional macroeconomics and calculated by the National Bureau of Statistics) (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Bank deposits are a monetary concept that we will refer to as “money savings.” Deposits are created by banks “out of thin air,” as illustrated in our past reports.Meanwhile, the term “savings” in conventional macroeconomics denotes goods and services that are produced but not consumed, which is a real economic (not monetary) variable. Not surprisingly, there is no relationship between these “real savings” and “money savings,” as illustrated in Chart I-4. To illustrate that household “savings” (as defined by conventional macroeconomics) are not related to money supply/deposits, let us go back to the example of the company building bridges in China. When the company wire transfers a salary of RMB 1,000 to an employee, the amount of money supply in the banking system does not change. Suppose this employee decides to save 100% of her income this month. Will the supply of money increase or decrease? The answer is that it will not change: the deposit will remain at her bank account. Alternatively, if she decides to spend all RMB 1,000 (100% of her income), the supply of money also will not change – deposits will be transferred to other banks where her suppliers have their accounts.  If she cashes out her deposit and puts it under her mattress, the amount of bank deposits will decline, but cash in circulation will rise by the same amount. Provided money supply is equal to the sum of all bank deposits and cash in circulation, the amount of money supply will not change. The only way the supply of money will decline is if she pays down her loan to a bank. Conversely, the supply of money only rises when banks originate loans or buy assets from non-banks. In short, saving/not spending does not alter the amount of money supply. Rather, broad money supply is equal to the cumulative net money creation “out of thin air” primarily by commercial banks and less so by the central bank over the course of their history. This has nothing to do with household and national “savings.” The latter stand for goods and services produced but not consumed. We have discussed what “savings” mean in conventional economics in past reports. Chart I-5Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones Critically, Chinese households presently carry more debt as a share of their disposable income than American households (Chart I-5). This chart compares household debt to disposable income using official data from both China and the U.S. In the case of China, we add Peer-to-Peer (P2P) credit to consumer credit data published by the People’s Bank of China to calculate household debt. The argument by many commentators that consumers in China are not highly leveraged is grounded on the comparison of their debt to GDP. However, in all countries, household debt is assessed versus disposable income – not GDP. The income available to households to service their debt is their disposable income – not GDP. It is correct that Chinese households’ assets have surged in the past two decades as they have purchased significant amounts of real estate, and property prices have skyrocketed. A survey by China Economic Trend Institute holds that property accounts for 66% of household assets in China. To assess creditworthiness, investors should not rely on debtors’ asset values. If debtors are en masse forced to sell their assets to service debt, equity prices would tumble well beforehand. Rather, creditworthiness should be assessed based on recurring cash flow (income) available to debtors to service their debt. One should not be surprised as to why real estate prices are very high in China. Money and credit have been surging – have grown four-fold – over the past 10 years (Chart I-6) and are still expanding at close to a 10% pace. In particular, household debt is still growing at a whopping 15.5% annually (Chart I-7). If and as money/credit growth downshifts, property prices will deflate. Chart I-6Helicopter Money In China Helicopter Money In China Helicopter Money In China Chart I-7Household Credit Is Expanding Twice As Fast As Income Growth Household Credit Is Expanding Twice As Fast As Income Growth Household Credit Is Expanding Twice As Fast As Income Growth Importantly, housing affordability is low and households’ ability to service their mortgages is troubling. Chart I-8 exhibits the nationwide house price-to-income ratio for China and the U.S. In the Middle Kingdom, it is currently about 7.2, while in the U.S. the ratio has never been above 4. It only approached 4  at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006. Chart I-8House Prices Are Very Expensive In China House Prices Are Very Expensive In China House Prices Are Very Expensive In China Chart I-   In turn, Table I-1 illustrates mortgage interest-only payments as a share of household disposable income. The national average is 25.5%. These are very high ratios, suggesting an average new home buyer will have to allocate about a quarter of her or his household income just to pay the interest on a mortgage. These averages do not divulge enormous variations among households. High-income and rich households probably do not have much debt, and debt sustainability is not an issue for them. This also implies that there are many low-income households for whom the interest payments on mortgages absorb more than 25% of their disposable income.  Bottom Line: All deposits in the banking system have been created by banks “out of thin air” and have not been engendered by household savings. Contrary to widespread beliefs, mainland households have a lot of debt, and the latter is still expanding faster than nominal disposable income growth (Chart I-7 above). Positives And The Cyclical Outlook This section lists some positives for household incomes and spending, while also highlighting inherent risks: In the long run, per-capita real income growth in any country is equal to productivity growth. Productivity in China is still booming, justifying high real income growth. The question is whether such buoyant productivity growth can be sustained at a high level to justify robust real-income per-capita growth. Typically, easy money breeds complacency, misallocation of capital and ultimately lower productivity growth. Can China sustain productivity growth of 6% to assure a similar growth rate in real income per capita if the nation continues to experience easy money and a misallocation of capital? Forecasting productivity is not easy; only time will tell. Chart I-9Nominal Household Income, Wages And Salaries Nominal Household Income, Wages And Salaries Nominal Household Income, Wages And Salaries Per capita aggregate income as well as both wages and salaries are still expanding briskly – by about 8.5% in nominal terms from a year ago (Chart I-9). This is a formidable growth rate and entails vigorous spending power. The cyclical and long-term concern is whether the current rate of income growth is sustainable. So far there has been few redundancies, despite the fact that corporate revenue and profits have slumped. There is anecdotal evidence that the authorities are actively discouraging dismissals among both state-owned and private enterprises. If layoffs are avoided in this cycle, it will imply that the full pain of the slowdown is absorbed by shareholders. As a result, wages and salaries will rise as a share of GDP, causing a profit margin squeeze for companies. Will private shareholders be willing to invest in the future? Over the past year,  authorities have targeted the stimulus at consumers by cutting personal income taxes. However, this has not boosted consumption: First, the individual taxpayers’ base was very small; only one quarter of total employment (or 16% of the population) was paying personal income taxes before the most recent cut. Second, personal income tax savings have amounted to less than 2% of disposable income.   Finally, the savings from tax cuts are unevenly distributed across households. High-income families will probably get higher tax savings than lower-income ones, whereas the propensity to spend is higher for the latter than the former. Household deposit expansion has accelerated at the expense of enterprises (Chart I-10). This confirms that companies have not slowed the payments to employees (wage bill). Consequently, households have firepower which can be unleashed at any time.  However, there are presently no signs of a growing appetite to spend. Quite the contrary, our proxy for household marginal propensity to spend is falling (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Households Are Hoarding Money, Not Spending Households Are Hoarding Money, Not Spending Households Are Hoarding Money, Not Spending Chart I-11Household Marginal Propensity To Spend Is Still Falling Household Marginal Propensity To Spend Is Still Falling Household Marginal Propensity To Spend Is Still Falling Non-discretionary consumer spending has remained very robust. In contrast, discretionary spending has been extremely weak and shows no signs of recovery (Chart I-12). Finally, the impulses of non-government credit, broad money and household credit are weak (Chart I-13). Without these improving substantially and households’ marginal propensity to spend rising, it is difficult to expect a meaningful recovery in consumption. Chart I-12Discretionary Spending Is Sluggish Discretionary Spending Is Sluggish Discretionary Spending Is Sluggish Chart I-13Credit/Money Impulses Are Much Weaker Than In Previous Stimulus Credit/Money Impulses Are Much Weaker Than In Previous Stimulus Credit/Money Impulses Are Much Weaker Than In Previous Stimulus Bottom Line: A cyclical recovery in consumer spending hinges on another round of major credit and fiscal stimulus as well as improvement in households’ willingness to spend. Structurally, real income growth is contingent on China’s ability to sustain high productivity growth. Investment Implications If and as capital spending and exports growth slow further, the pace of expansion in consumer expenditure will also moderate. In such a scenario, overall economic growth in China will inevitably downshift. Structurally, Chinese consumer spending will slow from the torrid pace of 10% CAGR of the past 10 years to around 6-7.5% CAGR in real terms. This is a formidable growth rate, and warrants a bullish stance on the consumer sector. We identified Chinese consumers as a major investment theme for the current decade in our 2010 report titled How To Play EM This Decade? 1 In that report, we recommended selling commodities and sectors exposed to Chinese construction and instead favoring consumer plays, especially in the health care and tech sectors. This structural theme has played out well and has further to go. Chinese household spending on health care, education and other high-value services will rise as income per capita expands, albeit at a slower rate than before. Chart I-14 demonstrates that Chinese imports of medical and pharmaceutical products are surging, even though overall imports are currently contracting. Domestically, profit margins are expanding within the medical and pharmaceuticals industries but stagnating for the overall industrial sector (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Surging Demand For Medical Products/Goods Surging Demand For Medical Products/Goods Surging Demand For Medical Products/Goods Chart I-15Continue Favoring Companies In Health Care/Medical Space Continue Favoring Companies In Health Care/Medical Space Continue Favoring Companies In Health Care/Medical Space All that said, a bullish growth story does not always translate into strong equity returns. Charts I-16A and I-16B reveal that share prices of Chinese investible consumer sub-sectors have had mixed performance. With the exception of Alibaba and Tencent, a few of consumer equity sub-sectors have generated strong equity returns. Chart I-16AChinese Consumer Stocks: Mixed Performance Chinese Consumer Stocks: Mixed Performance Chinese Consumer Stocks: Mixed Performance Chart I-16BChinese Consumer Stocks: Mixed Performance Chinese Consumer Stocks: Mixed Performance Chinese Consumer Stocks: Mixed Performance Such poor equity performance given strong headline consumption growth has often been due to bottom-up problems such as profit margins squeeze, overexpansion, over-indebtedness, equity dilution, quality of management and other issues. Chart I- Apart from company specific risks, investors should also consider valuations. Buying good companies in great industries at very high equity multiples will probably produce meager returns. Table I-2 shows the trailing P/E ratio for various consumer sub-sectors. The majority of them trade at a trailing P/E ratio of above 20 and in some cases above 30. Besides, China’s consumer story has been well known for some time, and many portfolios are overweight China consumer plays. Consequently, investor positioning adds to near-term risks. Cyclically, high equity valuations, crowded investor positioning and the delayed cyclical recovery in the Chinese economy pose downside risks to consumer stocks as well. However, such a selloff will create conditions for selectively investing in reasonably valued high quality companies.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “How To Play Emerging Market Growth In The Coming Decade”, dated June 10, 2010, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights The chance of a U.S.-China trade agreement is still only 40% – but an upgrade may be around the corner. Trump is on the verge of a tactical trade retreat due to fears of economic slowdown and a loss in 2020. Xi Jinping is now the known unknown. His aggressive foreign policy is a major risk even if Trump softens. Political divisions in Greater China – Hong Kong unrest and Taiwan elections – could harm the trade talks. Maintain tactical caution but remain cyclically overweight global equities. Feature “I am the chosen one. Somebody had to do it. So I’m taking on China. I’m taking on China on trade. And you know what, we’re winning.” – U.S. President Donald J. Trump, August 21, 2019 On August 1, United States President Donald Trump declared that he would raise a new tariff of 10% on the remaining $300 billion worth of imports from China not already subject to his administration’s sweeping 25% tariff. Then, on August 13, with the S&P 500 index down a mere 2.4%, Trump announced that he would partially delay the tariff, separating it into two tranches that will take effect on September 1 and December 15 (Chart 1). Chart 1Trump's Latest Tariff Salvo Trump's Latest Tariff Salvo Trump's Latest Tariff Salvo Chart 2 Six days later Trump’s Commerce Department renewed the 90-day temporary general license for U.S. companies to do business with embattled Chinese telecom company Huawei, which has ties to the Chinese state and is viewed as a threat to U.S. network security. Trump’s tendency to take two steps forward with coercive measures and then one step back to control the damage is by now familiar to global investors. Yet this backpedaling reveals that like other politicians he is concerned about reelection. After all, there is a clear chain of consequence leading from trade war to bear market to recession to a Democrat taking the White House in November 2020. Trump’s approval rating is already similar to that of presidents who fell short of re-election amid recession (Chart 2) – an actual recession would consign him to the dustbin of history. Will Trump Stage A Tactical Retreat On Trade? Yes. Trump’s predicament suggests that he will have to adjust his policies. Global trade, capital spending, and sentiment have deteriorated significantly since the last escalation-and-delay episode with China in May and June. Beijing’s economic stimulus measures disappointed expectations, exacerbating the global slowdown (Chart 3). This leaves him less room for maneuver going forward. Chart 3China's Gradual Stimulus Yet To Revive Global Economy China's Gradual Stimulus Yet To Revive Global Economy China's Gradual Stimulus Yet To Revive Global Economy Chart 4Trump's Economy Grew Slower Than Thought Despite Fiscal Stimulus Trump's Economy Grew Slower Than Thought Despite Fiscal Stimulus Trump's Economy Grew Slower Than Thought Despite Fiscal Stimulus Even “Fortress America” – consumer-driven and relatively insulated from global trade – has seen manufacturing, private investment, and business sentiment weaken. GDP growth is slowing and has been revised downward for 2018 despite a surge in budget deficit projections to above $1 trillion dollars (Chart 4).   Q4 may be Trump’s last chance to save the business cycle and his presidency. The U.S. Treasury yield curve inversion is deepening. While we at BCA would point out reasons that this may not be a reliable signal of imminent recession, Trump cannot afford to ignore it. He is sensitive to the widening talk of “recession” in American airwaves and is openly contemplating stimulus options (Chart 5). His approval rating has lost momentum, partly due to his perceived mishandling of a domestic terrorist attack motivated by racist anti-immigrant sentiment in El Paso, Texas, but negative financial and economic news have likely also played a part (Chart 6). Chart 5Trump Fears Growing Talk Of Recession Trump Fears Growing Talk Of Recession Trump Fears Growing Talk Of Recession Chart 6 In short, the fourth quarter of 2019 may be Trump’s last chance to save the business cycle and his presidency. The core predicament for Trump continues to be the divergence in American and Chinese policy. Chart 7Trump's Fiscal Policy Undid His Trade Policy Trump's Fiscal Policy Undid His Trade Policy Trump's Fiscal Policy Undid His Trade Policy In the U.S., the stimulating effect of Trump’s Tax Cut and Jobs Act is wearing off just as the deflationary effect of his trade policy begins to bite. In China, the lingering effects of Xi’s all-but-defunct deleveraging campaign are combining with the trade war, and slowing trend growth, to produce a drag on domestic demand and global trade. The result is a rising dollar, which increases the trade deficit – the opposite of what Trump wants and needs (Chart 7). The United States is insulated from global trade, but only to a point – it cannot escape a global recession should one develop, given that its economy is still closely linked to the rest of the world (Chart 8). With global and U.S. equities vulnerable to additional volatility in the near term, Trump will have to make at least a tactical retreat on his trade policy over the rest of the year. First and foremost this would mean: Chart 8If Total Trade War Causes A Global Relapse, The U.S. Economy Cannot Escape If Total Trade War Causes A Global Relapse, The U.S. Economy Cannot Escape If Total Trade War Causes A Global Relapse, The U.S. Economy Cannot Escape Expediting a trade deal with Japan – this should get done before a China deal, possibly as early as September. Ratifying the U.S.-Mexico-Canada “NAFTA 2.0” agreement – this requires support from moderate Democrats in Congress. The window for passage is closing fast but not closed. Removing the threat to slap tariffs on European car and car part imports in mid-November. There is some momentum given Europe’s need to boost growth and recent progress on U.S. beef exports to the EU. Lastly, if financial and economic pressure are sustained, Trump will be forced to soften his stance on China. The problem for global risk assets – in the very near term – is that Trump’s tactical retreat has not fully materialized yet. The new tariff on China is still slated to take effect on September 1. This tariff hike or other disagreements could result in a cancellation of talks or failure to make any progress.1 Even if Trump does pivot on trade, China’s position has hardened. It is no longer clear that Beijing will accept a deal that is transparently designed to boost Trump’s reelection chances. Thus, the biggest question in the trade talks is no longer Trump, but Xi. Is Xi prepared to receive Trump kindly if the latter comes crawling back? How will he handle rising political risk in Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan island,2 and will the outcome derail the trade talks? Bottom Line: Global economic growth is fragile and President Trump has only tentatively retracted his latest salvo against China. Nevertheless, the clear signal is that he is sensitive to the financial and economic constraints that affect his presidential run next year – and therefore investors should expect U.S. trade policy to turn less market-negative on the margin in the coming months. This is positive for the cyclical view on global risk assets. But the risk to the view is China: whether Trump will take a conciliatory turn and whether Xi will reciprocate. Can Xi Jinping Accept A Deal? Yes. It is extremely difficult for Xi Jinping to offer concessions in the short term. He is facing another tariff hike, U.S. military shows of force, persistent social unrest in Hong Kong, and a critical election in Taiwan. Certainly, he will not risk any sign of weakness ahead of the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, which will be a nationalist rally in defiance of imperialist western powers. After that, however, there is potential for Xi to be receptive to any Trump pivot on trade. China’s strategy in the trade talks has generally been to offer limited concessions and wait for Trump to resign himself to them. Concessions thus far are not negligible, but they can easily be picked apart. They consist largely of preexisting trends (large commodity purchases); minor adjustments (e.g. to car tariffs and foreign ownership rules); unverifiable promises (on foreign investment, technological transfer, and intellectual property); or reversible strategic cooperation (partial enforcement of North Korean and Iranian sanctions) (Table 1). Many of these concessions have been postponed as a result of Trump’s punitive measures. Table 1China’s Offers Thus Far In The Trade War Big Trouble In Greater China Big Trouble In Greater China It is unlikely that Beijing will offer much more under today’s adverse circumstances. The exception is cooperation on North Korea, which should improve. So the contours of a deal are generally known. This is what Trump will have to accept if he seeks to calm markets and restore confidence in the economy ahead of his election. But this slate of concessions is ultimately acceptable for the U.S. China’s demands are that Trump roll back all his tariffs, that purchases of U.S. goods must be reasonable in scale, and that any agreement be balanced and conducted with mutual respect. Of these three, the tariffs and the “balance” pose the most trouble. Trade balance: Washington and Beijing can agree on the terms of specific purchases. China can increase select imports substantially – it remains a cash-rich nation with a state sector that can be commanded to buy American goods. Tariff rollback: This is tougher but can be done. The U.S. will insist on some tariffs – or the threat of tech sanctions – as an enforcement mechanism to ensure that Beijing implements the structural concessions necessary for an agreement. But China might accept a deal in which tariffs were mostly rolled back – say to the original 25% tariff on $50 billion worth of goods. This would likely offset the degree of yuan appreciation to be expected from the likely currency addendum to any agreement. Balance and respect: This qualitative demand is the sticking point. Fundamentally, China cannot reward Trump for his aggressive and unilateral protectionist measures. This would be to set a precedent for future American presidents that sweeping tariffs on national security grounds are a legitimate way of coercing China into making economic structural reforms. Moreover if the U.S. wants to improve the trade balance, China thinks, it cannot embargo Chinese high-tech imports but must actually increase its high-tech exports. Clearly this is a major impasse in the talks. The last point is the likeliest deal-breaker. It may ultimately hinge on strategic events outside of the realm of trade. But before discussing it further, it is important to recognize that China is not invincible – it has a pain threshold. The threat of a divorce from the U.S. is a danger to China’s economy and the Communist regime. Chart 9China's Ultimate Economic Constraint China's Ultimate Economic Constraint China's Ultimate Economic Constraint Deterioration in China’s labor market is of utmost seriousness to any Chinese leader (Chart 9). And the economy is still struggling to revive. Xi’s reform and deleveraging campaign of 2017-18 has been postponed but the lingering effects are weighing on growth and the property sector remains under tight regulation. Moreover the removal of implicit guarantees, and rare toleration of creative destruction (Chart 10), have left banks and corporations afraid to take on new risks. The state’s reflationary measures, including a big boost to local government spending, have so far been merely sufficient for domestic stability. These problems can be addressed by additional policy easing. But the domestic political crackdown and the break with the U.S. have shaken manufacturers and private entrepreneurs to the bone, suppressing animal spirits and reducing the demand for loans. Chart 10Creative Destruction In China Creative Destruction In China Creative Destruction In China Ultimately a short-term trade deal to ease this economic stress would make sense for Xi Jinping, even though he knows that U.S. protectionism and the conflict over technological acquisition will persist beyond 2020 and beyond Trump. The threat of a sharp and destabilizing divorce from the U.S. is a real and present danger to the long-term stability of China’s economy and the Communist regime. Xi is a strongman leader, but is he really ready for Mao Zedong-style austerity? Is he not more like former President Jiang Zemin (ruled 1993-2003), who imposed some austerity while prizing domestic economic and political stability above all? To this question we now turn. Bottom Line: China has become the wild card in the trade war. Trump’s need to prevent a recession is known. Beijing has a higher pain threshold and could walk away from the deal to punish Trump (upsetting the global economy and diminishing Trump’s reelection prospects). This would set the precedent for future American presidents that China will not bow to gunboat diplomacy. Will Xi Jinping Overplay His Hand? Be Afraid. For decades China’s main foreign policy principle has been to “lie low and bide its time,” to paraphrase former leader Deng Xiaoping. In the current context this means maintaining a willingness to engage with the U.S. whenever it engages sincerely. This approach implies making the above concessions to minimize the immediate threat to stability from the trade war, while biding time in the longer run rivalry against the United States. Such an approach would also imply assisting the diplomatic process on the Korean peninsula, avoiding a military crackdown in Hong Kong, and refraining from aggressive military intimidation ahead of Taiwan’s election in January. Chart 11China's Vast Market Its Most Persuasive Tool China's Vast Market Its Most Persuasive Tool China's Vast Market Its Most Persuasive Tool After all, there is no better way for the Communist Party to undercut dissidents in Hong Kong and Taiwan than to strike a deal with the United States. This would demonstrate that Xi is a pragmatic leader who is still committed to “reform and opening up.” It would help generate an economic rebound that would bring other countries deeper into Beijing’s orbit (Chart 11). China’s vast domestic market is ultimately its greatest strength in its contest with the United States. In short, conventional Chinese policy suggests that Xi should perpetuate the long success story since 1978 by striking another deal with another Republican president. The catch is that Xi Jinping is not conventional. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has eschewed the subtle strategies of Sun Tzu and Deng Xiaoping in favor of a more ambitious approach: that of declaring China’s arrival as a major power and leveraging its economic and military heft to pursue foreign policy and commercial interests aggressively. Xi’s reassertion of Communist rule and state-guided technological acquisition is the biggest factor behind the new U.S. political consensus – entirely aside from Trump – that China is foe rather than friend. There are several empirical reasons to think that Xi might overplay his hand: Xi failed to make substantive concessions with President Barack Obama’s administration on North Korea, the South China Sea, and cyber security, resulting in Obama’s decision to harden U.S. policy toward both China and North Korea in 2015 – a trend that predates Trump. Xi formally removed presidential term limits from China’s constitution even though he could have attracted less negative attention from the West by ruling from behind the scenes after his term in office, like Deng Xiaoping or Jiang Zemin. China has mostly played for time in negotiations with the Trump administration, as mentioned, and this aggravated tensions. Deep revisions to the draft agreement, which was supposedly 90% complete, broke the negotiations in May, sparking this summer’s standoff. Aggressive policies in territorial disputes have alienated even China’s potential allies. This includes regional states whose current ruling parties have courted China in recent years, in some cases obsequiously – South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The East and South China Seas remain a genuine source of “black swans” – unpredictable, low-probability, high-impact events – due to their status as critical sea lanes for the major Asian economies. China continues to militarize the islands there and aggressively prosecute its maritime-territorial disputes. We calculate that $6.4 trillion worth of goods flowed through this bottleneck in the year ending April 2019, 8% of which consists of energy goods from the Middle East that are vital to China and its East Asian neighbors, none of whom can stomach Chinese domination of this geographic space (Diagram 1). Even if Washington abandoned the region, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would see Chinese control as a threat to their security. Diagram 1The South China Sea As The World’s Traffic Roundabout Big Trouble In Greater China Big Trouble In Greater China Ultimately, however, China’s adventures in its neighboring seas are a matter of choice. Not so for Greater China – in Hong Kong and Taiwan, political risk is rapidly mounting in a way that enflames the U.S.-China strategic distrust and threatens to prevent a trade agreement. Hong Kong: The Dust Has Not Settled Mass protests in Hong Kong have lost some momentum, based on the size of the largest rally in August versus June. But do not be fooled: the political crisis is deepening. A plurality of Hong Kongers now harbors negative feelings toward mainland Chinese people as well as the government in Beijing – a trend that is spiking amid today’s protests but began with the Great Recession and has roots in the deeper socioeconomic malaise of this capitalist enclave (Chart 12A & 12B). Chart 12 Chart 12 Chart 13 A majority also lacks confidence in the political arrangement that ensures some autonomy from Beijing – known as “One Country, Two Systems” (Chart 13). This is a particularly worrisome sign since this is the fundamental basis for stable political relations with Beijing. With clashes continuing between protesters and police, students calling for a boycott of school this fall, and Beijing openly drilling its security forces in Shenzhen for a potential intervention, Hong Kong’s unrest is not yet laid to rest and could flare up again ahead of China’s sensitive National Day celebration. U.S. tariffs and sanctions are already in effect, reducing the ability of the U.S. to deter China from using force if it believes instability has gone too far. And as President Trump has warned – and would be true of any U.S. administration – a violent crackdown on civilian demonstrators would greatly reduce the political viability of a trade deal in the United States. Taiwan: The Black Swan Arrives Since Taiwan’s 2016 election, we have argued that it is a potential source of “black swans.” Mass protests in Hong Kong may have taken the cake. But these protests are now affecting the Taiwanese election dynamic and potentially the U.S.-China trade talks. Chart 14U.S. Approves Big New Arms Sale To Taiwan U.S. Approves Big New Arms Sale To Taiwan U.S. Approves Big New Arms Sale To Taiwan On August 20, the United States Department of Defense informed Congress that it is proceeding with an $8 billion sale of F-16 fighter jets and other military arms and equipment to Taiwan – the largest sale in 22 years and the largest aircraft sale since 1992 (Chart 14). This sale is not yet complete and delivered, but ultimately will be – the question is the timing. Arms sales to Taiwan are a perennial source of tension between the United States and China – and China is increasingly assertive in using economic sanctions to get its way over such issues, as it showed in the lead up to South Korea’s election in 2017. This sale is not a military “game changer” – the U.S. did not send over fifth-generation F-35s, for instance – but China will respond vehemently. It is threatening to impose sanctions on American companies like Lockheed Martin and General Electric for their part in the deal. The sale does not in itself preclude the chance of a trade agreement but it contributes to a rise in strategic tensions that ultimately could. The context is Taiwan’s hugely important election in January. Four years ago, President Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party swept to power on the back of a popular protest movement – the “Sunflower Movement” – that opposed deeper cross-strait economic integration. It dangerously resembled the kind of anti-Communist “color revolutions” that motivate Xi Jinping’s hardline policies. Tsai shocked the world when she called Trump personally to congratulate him after his election, which violated diplomatic protocol given that Taiwan is a territory of China and not an independent nation-state. Since then Trump has largely avoided provoking the Taiwan issue so as not to strike at a core Chinese interest and obliterate the chance of a trade deal. But the U.S. has always argued that the provision of defensive arms to Taiwan is a condition of the U.S.-China détente – and Trump is so far moving forward with the sale. Chart 15A 'Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis' Would Have A Seismic Equity Impact A 'Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis' Would Have A Seismic Equity Impact A 'Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis' Would Have A Seismic Equity Impact How will Xi Jinping react if the sale goes through? In 1995-96, China’s use of missile tests to try to intimidate Taiwan produced the opposite effect – driving voters into the arms of Lee Teng-hui, the candidate Beijing opposed. This was the occasion of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, in which U.S. President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to the region, one that sailed through the Taiwan Strait. The negative effect on markets at that time was local, whereas anything resembling this level of tensions would today be a seismic global risk-off (Chart 15). Since the 1990s, leaders in Beijing have avoided direct military coercion ahead of elections. But Xi Jinping has hardened his stance on Taiwan throughout his term. He has dabbled with such coercion in his use of military drills that encircle Taiwan in recent years. While one must assume that he will use economic sanctions rather than outright military threats – as he did with South Korea – saber-rattling cannot be ruled out. The pressure on him is rising. Prior to the Hong Kong unrest, Taiwan’s elections looked likely to return the pro-mainland Kuomintang (KMT) to power and remove the incumbent President Tsai – a boon for Beijing. That outlook has changed and Tsai now has a fighting chance of staying in power (Chart 16). The prospect of four more years of Tsai would not be too problematic for Beijing if not for the fact that the U.S. political establishment is now firmly in agreement on challenging China. But even if Tsai loses, Taiwan’s outlook is troublesome. And this makes Xi’s decision-making harder to predict. Chart 16 Chart 17 It is not that Tsai or her party will necessarily prevail. The manufacturing slowdown will take a toll and third-party candidates, particularly Ko Wen-je, would likely split Tsai’s vote. Moreover her Democratic Progressives still tie the KMT in opinion polling (Chart 17). The Taiwanese people are primarily concerned about maintaining the strong economy and cross-strait peace and stability, which her reelection could jeopardize (Chart 18). Tsai could very well lose, or she could be a lame duck presiding over the KMT in the legislature. Chart 18 Chart 19 Rather, the problem for Xi Jinping is that the Taiwanese people clearly sympathize with the protesters in Hong Kong (Chart 19). They fear that their own governance system faces the same fate as Hong Kong’s, with the Communist Party encroaching on traditional political liberties over time. While Hong Kong ultimately has zero choice as to whether to accept Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan has much greater autonomy – and the military support of outside forces. It is not a foregone conclusion that Taiwan must suffer the same political dependency as Hong Kong. Indeed, Taiwan has a long history of exercising the democratic vote and has even dabbled into the realm of popular referendums. In short, Taiwan has a lot more dry powder for a political crisis in the long run than Hong Kong. But the Hong Kong events have accentuated this fact, for two key reasons: First, Taiwanese people identify increasingly as exclusively Taiwanese, rather than as both Taiwanese and Chinese (Chart 20). The incidents in Hong Kong reveal that this sentiment is tied to immediate political relations and therefore deterioration would encourage further alienation from the mainland. Chart 20 Chart 21 Second, while a strong majority of Taiwanese wish to maintain the political status quo to avoid conflict with the mainland, a substantial subset – approaching one-fourth – supports eventual or immediate independence (Chart 21). This means that relations with the mainland will eventually deteriorate even if the KMT wins the election. The KMT itself must respond to popular demand not to cozy up too much with Beijing, which is how it fell from power in 2016. Taiwan has a lot more dry powder for a political crisis than Hong Kong. Meanwhile, under KMT rule, Taiwan’s progressive-leaning youth are likely to set about reviving their protest movement in the subsequent years and imitating their Hong Kong peers, especially if the KMT warms up relations too fast with the mainland. Ultimately these points suggest that Xi Jinping will strive to avoid a violent crackdown in Hong Kong. A crackdown would be the surest way for him to harm the KMT in the Taiwanese election and to hasten the rebuilding of U.S.-Taiwan security ties. Call The President The best argument for Xi to lie low and avoid a larger crisis in Greater China is that it would unify the West and its allies against China. So far Xi’s foreign policy has not been so aggressive as to lead to diplomatic isolation. Europe is maintaining a studied neutrality due to its own differences with the United States; Asian neighbors are wary of provoking Chinese sanctions or military threats. A humanitarian crisis in Hong Kong or a “Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis” would change that. For markets, the best-case scenario is that Xi Jinping exercises restraint. This would help Hong Kong protests lose steam, North Korean diplomacy get back on track, and Taiwanese independence sentiment simmer down. China would be more likely to halt U.S. tariffs and tech sanctions, settle a short-term trade agreement, and delay the upgrade in U.S.-Taiwan defense relations. China would still face adverse long-term political trends in both the U.S. and Taiwan, but an immediate crisis would be averted. The worst-case scenario is that Xi indulges his ambition. Hong Kong protests could explode, relations with Taiwan would deteriorate, and U.S.-China relations would move more rapidly in their downward spiral. Trade talks could collapse. Xi Jinping would face the possibility of a unified Western front, instability within Greater China, and a global recession. This might get rid of Donald Trump, but it would not get rid of the U.S. Congress, Navy, or Department of Defense. The choice seems pretty clear. Xi, like Trump, faces constraints that should motivate a tactical retreat from confrontation, at least after October 1. While this does not necessarily mean a settled trade agreement, it does suggest at least a ceasefire or truce. Our GeoRisk indicators show that market-based political risk in Taiwan – and less so South Korea – moves in keeping with global economic policy uncertainty. The underlying U.S.-China strategic confrontation and trade war are driving both (Chart 22). A deterioration in this region has global consequences. Chart 22U.S.-China Strategic Conflict Fuels Global Economic Uncertainty And Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk In Tandem U.S.-China Strategic Conflict Fuels Global Economic Uncertainty And Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk In Tandem U.S.-China Strategic Conflict Fuels Global Economic Uncertainty And Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk In Tandem Xi is a markedly aggressive “strongman” Chinese leader who has not been afraid to model his leadership on that of Chairman Mao. He could still overplay his hand. This is why we maintain that the odds of a U.S.-China trade agreement remain 40%, though we are prepared to upgrade that probability if Trump and Xi make pro-market decisions. Investment Implications On the three-month tactical horizon, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy is paring back our tactical safe-haven trades: we are closing our “Doomsday Basket” of long gold and Swiss bonds for a gain of 13.6%, while maintaining our simple gold portfolio hedge going forward. Trump has not yet decisively staged his tactical retreat on trade policy, while rising political risk in Greater China increases uncertainty over Xi Jinping’s next moves. On the cyclical horizon, the above suggests that there is a light at the end of the tunnel – if both Trump and Xi recognize their political constraints. This means that there is still a political and geopolitical basis to reinforce BCA’s House View to remain optimistic on global and U.S. equities over the next 12 months, with the potential for non-U.S. equities to recover and bond yields to reverse their deep dive.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Negotiations between Trump and Xi are slated for September in Washington. There is a prospect for Trump to hold another summit with Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in late September and at the APEC summit in Chile in mid-November. 2 Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, while Taiwan is recognized as a province or territory.

Highlights China’s infrastructure investment growth rate could rebound moderately from its current nominal 3% pace, but will remain well below the double-digit rate it has registered for most of the past decade.  A lack of funding for local governments and their financing vehicles will somewhat cap the upside in infrastructure fixed-asset investment (FAI) in the next six to nine months. Special bond issuance will be insufficient to ensuring a major recovery in infrastructure spending. Investors should tread cautiously on infrastructure plays in financial markets. Feature Chart I-1Chinese Infrastructure Investment: Double-Digit Growth Again? Chinese Infrastructure Investment: Double-Digit Growth Again? Chinese Infrastructure Investment: Double-Digit Growth Again? Nominal infrastructure investment growth in China has slowed from over 15% in 2017 to 3% currently (Chart I-1). This is the weakest growth rate since 2005 excluding the late 2011-early 2012 period. Over the past decade, each time the Chinese economy experienced a considerable slowdown, infrastructure construction was ramped up to revive growth. Infrastructure spending growth skyrocketed in 2009 and was also boosted in 2012. In 2015-2016, it was not allowed to decelerate with the issuance of nearly RMB 2 trillion of special infrastructure bonds. This time the government has also reacted. Since mid-2018, the Chinese authorities have dramatically raised local governments’ special bonds balance limits, prompted local governments to front-load their issuance this year, and also encouraged the private sector to participate in public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects. Will Chinese infrastructure FAI growth accelerate over the next six to nine months from its current nominal 3% pace to double digits? The short answer is no. Chart I-2 We believe Chinese infrastructure investment growth could rebound moderately in the next six to nine months, but will still remain below the double-digit growth seen in the past and well below the 18% average growth of the past 15 years. For purposes of this report, the composition of “infrastructure” includes three categories – (1) Transport, Storage and Postal Service, (2) Water Conservancy, Environment & Utility Management, and (3) Electricity, Gas & Water Production and Supply. Chart I-2 presents the breakdown of the nominal infrastructure FAI by category. Funding Constraint Preceding both the 2011-2012 and 2018 infrastructure investment slumps, the Chinese central government increased its scrutiny on local government debt and tightened funding conditions for infrastructure projects. As a result, all three categories of infrastructure spending experienced a sharp deceleration (Chart I-3). Overall, financing and qualitative limitations that Beijing imposes on local government infrastructure spending hold the key to the outlook. We believe Chinese infrastructure investment growth could rebound moderately in the next six to nine months, but will still remain below the double-digit growth seen in the past and well below the 18% average growth of the past 15 years. Looking forward, without a considerable recovery in available financing, there will be no meaningful rebound in Chinese infrastructure investment and construction activity. For now, we are not very optimistic on financing. Chart I-4 shows the breakdown of the major funding sources of Chinese infrastructure investment. All of them are likely to face considerable funding constraints over the next six to nine months. Chart I-3Chinese Infrastructure Investment Growth Has Decelerated Across The Board Chinese Infrastructure Investment Growth Has Decelerated Across The Board Chinese Infrastructure Investment Growth Has Decelerated Across The Board Chart I-4   1. Self-Raised Funds Self-raised funds contribute nearly 60% of overall infrastructure funding. They include net local government special bond issuance, PPP financing and government-managed funds’ (GMFs) revenues excluding proceeds from special bond issuance. A. Local government special bond issuance, which is exclusively used to fund infrastructure projects, has been the major source of financing for local governments in the past 12 months. The authorities significantly boosted net local government bond issuance to RMB 1.2 trillion in the first six months of this year from only RMB 361 billion in the same period in 2018. However, the amount of special bond issuance in the second half of this year will unlikely be significant enough to boost infrastructure FAI greatly. First, the central government has not only set a limit on the aggregate local government special bond balance, but it also set limits for each of the 31 provinces/provincial-level cities.1 In the past three years, nearly all provinces did not use up their special bond issuance quotas. This resulted in an outstanding aggregate amount of special bonds of only about 85% of the limit.2 In both 2017 and 2018, local governments were left with RMB 1.1 trillion special bond issuance quota unused for that year. Second, based on the limit on outstanding amount special bonds set by the central government for the end of 2019, local governments could issue another RMB 0.8-1 trillion of special bonds in the second half of this year. In comparison, in 2018, the issuance was heavily concentrated in the second half of the year with RMB 1.6 trillion. Our estimate shows there will be only RMB 400-600 billion increase in net total special bond issuance in 2019 versus 2018.3 This will translate into a merely 2-3% growth in Chinese infrastructure investment. Third, net local government special bond issuance made up only 15% of overall infrastructure FAI over the past 12 months. Hence, there is still a huge financing gap to be filled (Chart I-5). B. Public-private partnerships (PPP) are unlikely to meet the financing shortage either. PPPs have become an important financing model for Chinese local governments to fund infrastructure investments since 2014. Nevertheless, to control rising local government debt risks, the central government has tightened regulations on PPP projects since early last year. A series of tightened rules have resulted in a sharp deceleration in both PPP investment and overall infrastructure investment growth. Consequently, PPPs contributions to total infrastructure FAI have plunged from over 30% in 2017 to 10% currently (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Special Bond Issuance Accounted For Only 15% Of Infrastructure FAI Special Bond Issuance Accounted For Only 15% Of Infrastructure FAI Special Bond Issuance Accounted For Only 15% Of Infrastructure FAI Chart I-6Public-Private Partnerships: Too Small To Meet The Financing Shortage Public-Private Partnerships: Too Small To Meet The Financing Shortage Public-Private Partnerships: Too Small To Meet The Financing Shortage   So far, the rules on PPP projects on local governments remain tight. In March, the central government tightened its rule on local government participation in PPP projects. The new rule states that, if a local government has already spent more than 5% of its overall general expenditures on PPP projects excluding sewage and waste disposal PPP projects, it will not be allowed to invest in any new PPP projects. Before March, the threshold was over 10%. In early July, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) demanded all PPP projects undertake a thorough feasibility study. The NDRC emphasized that PPP projects that do not follow standard procedures will not be allowed. Chart I-7Government-Managed Funds: Headwinds From Falling Land Sales Government-Managed Funds: Headwinds From Falling Land Sales Government-Managed Funds: Headwinds From Falling Land Sales C. Government-managed funds (GMF) excluding special bond issuance accounts, which contribute about 15% of overall infrastructure financing, are also facing constraints. According to the country’s Budget Law, the GMF budget refers to the budget for revenues and expenditures of the funds raised for specific developmental objectives. In brief, GMFs constitute de-facto off-balance-sheet government revenues and spending. Land sales by local governments are one major revenue source for GMFs. Contracting property floor space sold is likely to depress real estate developers’ land purchases, further reducing local governments’ revenues from selling land (Chart I-7). This will curb local governments’ ability to finance their infrastructure projects through GMFs. 2. Domestic Loans Domestic loans contribute to about 15% of overall infrastructure financing. Infrastructure projects are generally long term in nature. Presently, the impulse of non-household medium- and long-term (MLT) lending has stabilized but has not yet improved (Chart I-8). While not all of MLT loans are used for infrastructure, sluggish MLT lending reflects commercial banks’ reluctance to finance infrastructure projects. We believe a decelerating economy, mounting local government debt, and often-low returns on infrastructure projects will continue to constrain loan funding of infrastructure projects from both banks and the private sector. 3. General Government Budget The general government budget (which includes central and local governments) accounts for about 15% of overall infrastructure financing. The general budget is also facing headwinds from declining revenue due to recent tax cuts and lower corporate profit growth (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Sluggish Medium/Long-Term Bank Lending Sluggish Medium/Long-Term Bank Lending Sluggish Medium/Long-Term Bank Lending Chart I-9Government General Budget: Large Deficit Government General Budget: Large Deficit Government General Budget: Large Deficit   Bottom Line: Funding constraints will likely linger, making any recovery in Chinese infrastructure investment growth moderate over the next six to nine months. Local government special bonds will not be a game-changer. Their net issuance accounted for only 15% of overall infrastructure FAI over the past 12 months. While local governments could issue another RMB 0.8-1 trillion of special bonds in the second half of 2019, it would be well below the RMB 1.4 trillion of special bond issuance that was rolled out in the second half of 2018. FAI In Transportation: In Nominal Terms… The transportation sector accounts for about 31% of total Chinese infrastructure investment. It includes railway, highway, urban public transit, air and water transport. Table I-1 shows the 13th five-year (2016-2020) transportation investment plan released by the government in February 2017,4 which excludes urban public transit. Chart I- The authorities planned to invest RMB 15 trillion in the transportation sector over the five-year period between 2016 and 2020, with highways accounting for over half of the investment, followed by railways (23%), air transportation (4.3%) and water transportation (3.3%). The table also shows our calculation of the realized investment amount in these four sub-sectors for the period of January 2016 to June 2019. Local government special bonds will not be a game-changer. Their net issuance accounted for only 15% of overall infrastructure FAI over the past 12 months. Table I-1 suggests the remaining FAI for the transportation sector for the July 2019 to December 2020 period will be considerably smaller than the FAI amount over the past 18 months. This entails a major drag on infrastructure investment at least over the next 18 months. It is important to emphasize that this is conditional on the central planners in Beijing sticking to their five-year plan for infrastructure FAI. As of now, there has been no announcement of revisions to these five-year FAI targets. Bottom Line: China has already completed the overwhelming majority of its planned transportation FAI for 2016-2020. Consequently, without revisions to the targets and budgets by central planners in Beijing, transportation investment will likely contract year-on-year over the next 18 months. …And Real Terms Table I-2 summarizes the 2020 targets for major Chinese infrastructure development (urban rail transit, railway, highway and airport) in real terms. Chart I- Chart I-10Transportation 2020 Targets: Not Far Away Transportation 2020 Targets: Not Far Away Transportation 2020 Targets: Not Far Away In real terms, the annual growth of transportation infrastructure will likely be 4.2% in both 2019 and 2020. We illustrated in the previous section that the five-year budget plan had been front-loaded, leaving a very small budget for transportation investment over the next 18 months. This may suggest that without considerably exceeding the budget, transportation infrastructure will fail to achieve the 4.2% annual growth in real terms both this year and next. In brief, more funding should be dispatched/allowed by the central planners in Beijing for infrastructure FAI not to shrink. Second, urban rail transit, high-speed railways, highways and airports will reach their respective 2020 targets, while non-high-speed railway construction will likely be a little bit off its 2020 target. Third, based on the 2020 targets, urban rail transit will enjoy very fast growth over the next one and a half years. Fourth, the growth of high-speed railways and highways will be very low, at around 1-2% in real terms (Chart I-10). Finally, while the number of airports will increase at a faster pace, their contribution to overall infrastructure investment will remain insignificant as they only account for about 1.4% of overall infrastructure investment. Bottom Line: In real terms, transport infrastructure growth will likely be only about 4% over the next six to nine months. Future Infrastructure Investment Focus Urban rail transit, environmental management and public utility management will likely be the major driving forces for Chinese infrastructure investment over the next 18 months. Urban rail transit line length will likely register fast growth of around 10% over the next six to nine months. As the central government enforces increasingly stringent rules on environmental protection, investment in environmental management will likely experience continued growth acceleration (Chart I-11). China has already completed the overwhelming majority of its planned transportation FAI for 2016-2020. Consequently, without revisions to the targets and budgets by central planners in Beijing, transportation investment will likely contract year-on-year over the next 18 months. Meanwhile, as the country’s urbanization continues and more townships and city suburbs become urbanized,5 public utility management investment will also grow moderately. Public utility management investment, contributing a massive 45% of overall infrastructure investment, includes sewer systems, sewer treatment facilities, waste treatment and disposal, streetlights, city roads construction, parks, bridges and tunnels in the city. Investment Implications Investors should not hold their breath expecting a major upswing in infrastructure FAI and a major rally in related financial markets. Chinese steel demand is sensitive to construction of railways and urban rail transit lines (Chart I-12, top panel). In turn, mainland cement demand is dependent on highway construction (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Chart I-11Environment Management: Will Continue Booming Environment Management: Will Continue Booming Environment Management: Will Continue Booming Chart I-12Chinese Infrastructure Spending Will Moderately Boost Steel & Cement Demand... Chinese Infrastructure Spending Will Moderately Boost Steel & Cement Demand... Chinese Infrastructure Spending Will Moderately Boost Steel & Cement Demand...   Chart I-13...And Steel & Cement Prices At The Margin ...And Steel & Cement Prices At The Margin ...And Steel & Cement Prices At The Margin The infrastructure sector accounts for about 10-15% of total Chinese steel use, and about 30-40% of Chinese cement consumption. Nevertheless, given that we believe Chinese infrastructure spending will only have a moderate recovery, the positive effect on steel and cement prices will be muted as well (Chart I-13). The same holds true for spending on industrial machinery, equipment, chemicals and various materials. Notably, risks to this baseline scenario of a muted recovery are to the downside because of the lack of funding. Barring a substantial increase in the special bond issuance quota this year or a major credit binge, infrastructure FAI growth could in fact stall. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please note that the central government only set the special bond balance limit (not the quota) for local governments. The often-cited “quota” in the news is derived by calculating the difference between the current limit and the previous year’s limit. The “quota” used in this report is the difference between the current special bond balance limit and the actual special bond balance of the previous year end. 2  At the end of 2018, Chinese special bond balance was RMB 7.4 trillion, only 85.8% of the special bond balance limit of RMB 8.6 trillion. This ratio was 84.6% in 2017 and 85.5% in 2016. On average, the ratio was 85.3% in the past three years. 3  Given that the central government is aiming to somewhat stimulate infrastructure spending by increasing special bond issuance, we assume special bond balance at the end of 2019 to reach 88%-90% of the limit (RMB 10.8 trillion) that it has set for 2019. This will be higher than the 85% average of the past three years. In turn, this means that the special bond balance at the end of this year will likely be RMB 9.5-9.7 trillion. Since the balance at the end of last year was RMB 7.4 trillion, this results that net special bond issuance will be around RMB 2.1-2.3 trillion in 2019. Given the net special bond issuance last year was RMB 1.7 trillion, it follows that there will only be a RMB 400-600 billion increase in total special bond issuance in 2019 versus 2018. 4  Please see www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-02/28/content_5171576.htm, published February 28, 2017, by the Chinese central government website. 5  Please see Emerging Markets Strategy/China Investment Strategy Special Report “Industrialization-Driven Urbanization In China Is Losing Steam,” dated January 2, 2019, available on ems.bcaresearch.com

Highlights The report reviews our framework for predicting broad market earnings in China based on the experience of the past decade, and documents the relationship between sector earnings and broad market earnings for both the investable and domestic market. We also review the cyclicality of earnings in each sector, and highlight the sectors where relative earnings have been successful at predicting relative performance. Energy and consumer discretionary in both markets, along with real estate and financials in the domestic market, have historically been the best candidates for a classic top-down fundamental “sector rotation” strategy. Compared with these sectors, investable telecom stocks have exhibited a weaker link between sector and index earnings, but this has occurred because of relatively steady, low volatility earnings growth. As such, telecom stocks are reliably defensive, but only in the investable market. We conclude by noting the extreme nature of long-term de/re-rating trends that have occurred for several of China’s equity sectors, and argue that the strength of the relationship between earnings and stock prices for these sectors is set to rise over a secular time horizon. Over the coming few years, investors should focus nearly exclusively on the earnings outlook for high flying and beaten down sectors, as further multiple expansion/contraction is unlikely to drive future returns (without an earnings catalyst). Feature Last week’s joint report with our Geopolitical Strategy service provided investors with an update on the trade war in the lead up to the G20 meeting in Osaka.1 While a new tariff ceasefire may emerge from the meeting, the report underscored why the odds are skewed against a positive outcome over the coming 18 months. Our bet is that investors are unlikely to assume that a deal will occur merely in response to a new timetable for talks, implying that any near-term boost to stock prices will be minimal until negotiators provide market participants with evidence (rather than hope) that a deal is achievable. This means that a financial market riot point remains likely over the coming few months, and that a cyclically bullish stance towards Chinese stocks rests on the likelihood of a major policy response in China to counter the likely shock to its export sector. During times of high policy uncertainty, we often take the opportunity to review and update our framework for key asset drivers. In today’s report we review our framework for predicting broad market earnings in China based on the experience of the past decade, and then document the relationship between sector earnings and broad market earnings for both the investable and domestic market. We review the cyclicality of earnings in each sector, and highlight the sectors where relative earnings have been successful at predicting relative performance. We conclude with a summary of what our results would imply over the tactical and cyclical investment horizons given our view of China’s likely growth trajectory, and highlight why several sectors may see a stronger relationship between their earnings and stock prices over the secular horizon. The report illustrates our key conclusions in the body of the text, but reference charts for each sector/industry group in both the investable and domestic market are provided as a convenience on pages 12 - 23. Predicting Chinese Equity Index Earnings Our framework for predicting index EPS is straightforward but reliable. Chart 1Stronger Economic Activity = Stronger Investable Earnings Stronger Economic Activity = Stronger Investable Earnings Stronger Economic Activity = Stronger Investable Earnings Chart 1 presents the first element of our framework for predicting Chinese investable earnings per share (EPS) growth. The chart illustrates the strong leading relationship between our BCA China Activity Indicator and the year-over-year growth rate of investable EPS, which underscores that the fundamental performance of Chinese equities is still predominantly driven by China’s “old economy”. The leading nature of our activity index partly reflects the fact that earnings per share are measured on a trailing basis; the key point for investors is that indicators such as our Activity Index have been more successful at capturing the coincident trend in China’s economy than, for example, real GDP growth has over the past several years. Chart 2illustrates that the earnings cycle for the investable and domestic equity markets is the same, with the magnitude of a given cycle accounting for the difference between the two markets. This means that investors exposed to the Chinese equity market should be focused heavily on predicting the coincident trend in the economy, as doing so will lead investors to the same conclusion about the trend in H- and A-share EPS growth. Chart 2Same Earnings Cycle In The Investable And Domestic Markets Same Earnings Cycle In The Investable And Domestic Markets Same Earnings Cycle In The Investable And Domestic Markets Chart 3Our Leading Indicator Reliably Predicts Economic Activity Our Leading Indicator Reliably Predicts Economic Activity Our Leading Indicator Reliably Predicts Economic Activity In turn, Chart 3 presents our framework for predicting Chinese economic activity, which we originally laid out in our November 30, 2017 Special Report.2 The chart shows that our leading activity indicator has reliably predicted inflection points in actual activity over the past several years, including the slowdown of the past two years (the leading indicator peaked in Q1 2017). As detailed in the report, our indicator is based on monetary conditions and money & credit growth. Panel 2 of Chart 3 shows that monetary conditions are very easy and credit growth is picking up, though it needs to continue to improve alongside a forceful pickup in money growth in order for the economy to strengthen. The key takeaway for investors is that the overall earnings cycle in China is strongly linked to “old economy” economic activity, which in turn appears to reliably predicted by our indicator. This provides us with a stable platform from which we can examine (and ultimately predict) equity sector EPS. Sector Earnings: Predictability And Cyclicality Given the strong link between Chinese economic activity and equity market EPS that we noted above, the question for equity-oriented investors is then to identify the relationship between sector and overall index EPS. In other words, to what degree are sector EPS in China linked to the overall earnings trend (versus being driven by idiosyncratic factors), and is this relationship pro- or counter-cyclical in nature? Charts 4 and 5 present the answers to these questions, based on the 2011 – 2018 period.3 The charts present the highest R-squared value resulting from a regression of detrended sector EPS versus broad market EPS for both the investable and domestic markets, after accounting for any leading/lagging relationships. The color/shading of each bar denotes whether the beta of the relationship for each sector or industry group is above or below 1. Chart 4 Chart 5 The charts present a mix of surprising and unsurprising results. Among the latter in the investable market, the cyclicality of typically high-beta sectors such as energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and technology would be readily accepted by most investors, as would the defensive characteristics of financials, telecom services, health care, utilities, and consumer staples. Investable consumer staples, health care, and utilities EPS are driven by either bottom-up/industry-specific factors or macro factors that are not fully captured by the trend in China’s business cycle. However, there were several less-intuitive results that emerged from our analysis, related to both the investable and domestic markets: Chart 6 Within the investable market, the low predictability of health care, utilities, and consumer staples EPS is somewhat difficult to explain. A weak relationship would easily be explained if EPS growth for these sectors were somewhat constant in the face of fluctuations in overall index EPS, but Chart 6 shows that the volatility in EPS growth for these sectors are not bottom-ranked (see also pages 16, 17 and 22). In fact, utilities EPS growth vol has been relatively high, and it is higher for health care and consumer staples than it is for financials and banks, whose EPS growth are highly linked to the overall earnings cycle. This result suggests that the determinants of earnings for these sectors are driven by either bottom-up/industry-specific factors or macro factors that are not fully captured by the trend in China’s business cycle. The low predictability of consumer staples and utilities EPS observed in the investable market is also evident in the domestic market, suggesting that this finding is not the result of quirky data. We noted earlier that overall index earnings are highly correlated with our BCA China Activity Index, and we have noted in past reports that China’s business cycle continues to be subject to its “old” growth model centered on investment and exports rather than the services and consumer sectors.4 This may explain the relatively idiosyncratic EPS profile for consumer staples, although it still fails to explain the low predictability and relatively high volatility of utilities earnings. Telecom services and technology earnings also have a very low correlation with overall earnings in the domestic market, which is similar to the investable market but more extreme. On the tech front, this is explained by the fact that Alibaba and Tencent, China’s tech giants, are not listed in the domestic market, underscoring that investable tech and domestic tech should be considered by investors to be distinctly separate sectors. In the investable market the low predictability and defensive characteristic of telecom services EPS can be explained by stable, low-volatility growth, but this is not true in the domestic market. In fact, over the past several years the volatility of domestic telecom EPS growth has been among the highest of any of China’s domestic equity sectors, and it has been cyclical rather than defensive in nature. These findings are difficult to explain from a top-down perspective. Finally, while Charts 4 and 5 show a difference in the cyclicality of real estate earnings between the investable and domestic markets, the difference is not substantial: the beta of the former is 1.03 versus 0.94 for the latter. The truly surprising result from real estate stocks is that their EPS growth is not considerably high-beta, given the boom & bust nature of Chinese property prices and the enormous amount of activity that has occurred in Chinese real estate over the past decade. Given that beta is determined relative to the overall index, this is emblematic (and an important reminder) of the underlying cyclicality of China’s economy and its financial markets relative to its global counterparts. Sector Earnings: Relevance For Stock Prices Following our review of the predictability and cyclicality of Chinese sector EPS, Charts 7 and 8 illustrate the relationship between relative EPS and relative stock price performance for these sectors. The charts highlight several notable points: Chart 7 Chart 8 In both the investable and domestic markets, the relative performance of energy and consumer discretionary stocks have been highly explained by the trend in relative EPS. Both of these sectors have also shown reasonably high EPS predictability (based on overall index EPS), suggesting that these two sectors have historically been the best candidates for a classic top-down fundamental “sector rotation” strategy. The relative re-rating of consumer staples and de-rating of banks reflects the existence of a long consumer economy / short industrial economy trade. Chart 9Multiples Have Been More Important In Driving The Returns Of These Sectors Multiples Have Been More Important In Driving The Returns Of These Sectors Multiples Have Been More Important In Driving The Returns Of These Sectors Within the investable market, relative EPS has not been successful at predicting relative stock price performance for financials/banks, health care, consumer staples, and industrials. This means that multiple expansion/contraction has been a relatively more important factor in driving returns, which can clearly be seen in Chart 9. The chart shows that investable banks, health care, and industrials have been meaningfully de-rated over the past several years, whereas the relative P/E ratio for consumer staples stocks has risen (albeit in a choppy fashion). Domestic consumer staples have also benefited from re-rating, although it has occurred entirely within the past three years and has merely made up for the substantial de-rating that took place in 2012 (Chart 9, panel 2). Taken together, the relative re-rating of consumer staples and de-rating of banks and industrials reflects, at least in part, the existence of a long consumer economy / short industrial economy trade. The relative EPS trend of utilities in both markets and that of telecom services stocks in the investable market have done a decent-to-good job of predicting relative stock price performance. We noted earlier that investable telecom services earnings appear to have a weak relationship with overall index earnings because of their low variability, meaning that they have also been a good top-down rotation candidate on the defensive side of the spectrum. The high responsiveness of the relative equity performance of Chinese utilities to relative EPS raises the importance of predicting the latter, which is likely to be a topic of future reports for BCA’s China Investment Strategy service. Finally, Chart 7 shows that the most important sector trend in the investable market over the past several years, the outperformance of information technology, has been strongly explained by the trend in relative EPS. This is good news for investors, as it suggests that relative tech returns can be reasonably predicted by accurate earnings analysis. From a top-down perspective, we noted earlier that the relationship between tech and overall index EPS has not been extremely high, which raises the bar for investors to understand the idiosyncratic drivers of earnings for the BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) stocks. Chinese consumer spending remains the most important macro factor for these stocks, but our understanding of this relationship is not complete and is an area of ongoing research at BCA. Investment Conclusions Chart 10 summarizes the results of Charts 4-5 and 7-8, by grouping investable and domestic equity sectors into four quadrants based on top-down EPS predictability (x-axis) and the impact of the trend in relative EPS on relative stock price performance (y-axis): Chart 10 Over a multi-year time horizon, the relationship between relative earnings and relative stock prices is likely to rise for several sectors. As we noted above, energy and consumer discretionary in both markets along with real estate and financials in the domestic market have had the strongest relationship across both dimensions (top-right quadrant). The EPS relationship is cyclical in both markets in the case of energy and consumer discretionary, whereas it is modestly cyclical for domestic real estate and defensive for domestic financials. Sectors in the top-left quadrant have shown a strong link between earnings and stock price performance, but a weaker link between sector and index earnings. This is the case for telecom services because of relatively steady, low volatility earnings growth, meaning that telecom stocks are reliably defensive. Fluctuations in the growth of index EPS do not explain the majority of changes in investable tech EPS, but it is an important driver in a cyclical relationship. Sectors in the bottom-right quadrant have a predominantly strong and defensive relationship with index earnings growth (with the exception of domestic industrials), but have experienced significant changes in multiples over the past several years that have materially impacted their relative stock price performance. We showed in Chart 9 that banks have been meaningfully de-rated over the past several years; this process appears to have halted at the end of 2017, suggesting that the relationship between relative earnings and relative stock prices may be stronger going forward. Chart 11Investable Real Estate And Materials Stocks Trade At A Huge Discount Investable Real Estate And Materials Stocks Trade At A Huge Discount Investable Real Estate And Materials Stocks Trade At A Huge Discount Finally, sectors in the bottom left quadrant have had relatively idiosyncratic earnings trends, and relative EPS have not explained a majority of the trend in relative performance. We would draw a distinction between investable industrials, real estate, and materials and the rest of the sectors shown, as they are on the cusp of being in the top-right or bottom-right quadrants, and all three appear to have suffered from meaningful de-rating. Investable real estate and materials now trade at over a 40% discount to the overall index (Chart 11), raising a serious question as to whether relative P/Es can continue to compress and explain the majority of relative equity performance. However, investable consumer staples and health care, along with domestic technology and telecom services stocks, do appear to be legitimately idiosyncratic, suggesting that an equity beta approach (regressing sector returns against index returns) is the best top-down method available to investors when allocating to these sectors. For investable staples and health care their equity return betas are clearly defensive, whereas domestic tech and telecom services stocks are market neutral. What does this all mean for investors? Our findings above lead us to some specific conclusions over the tactical (0-3 months), cyclical (6-12 months), and secular (multi-year) horizons: Over the cyclical horizon, we expect Chinese co-incident economic activity to pick up and for overall index EPS to improve, suggesting that global investors have a fundamental basis to be overweight investable energy, consumer discretionary, materials, media & entertainment (within the new communication services sector) and industrial stocks, at the expense of telecom services and financials.5 Investable health care, consumer staples, and utilities stocks are also likely to underperform, although this view is based on a statistical/empirical relationship rather than a fundamental one. In the domestic market, our findings support substituting real estate for technology in comparison to the investable sectors we listed above, but we are concerned that policymakers may crack down more heavily on the property sector if they allow overall credit growth to rise meaningfully as part of a stimulative response. For now, we would not recommend aggressive bets in favor of the domestic real estate sector. Chart 12Flagging Earnings Growth Heightens Tactical Risks To Chinese Stocks Flagging Earnings Growth Heightens Tactical Risks To Chinese Stocks Flagging Earnings Growth Heightens Tactical Risks To Chinese Stocks Over the tactical horizon, however, we would advise either the opposite stance, or a benchmark sector allocation. In addition to our view that a financial market riot point remains likely over the coming few months to force policymakers to address the economic weakness that an escalated tariff scenario would entail, broad-market Chinese EPS growth continues to decelerate (Chart 12). We see this continued slowdown as a lagged response to past economic weakness, which we expect will be reversed over the coming year due to stronger money & credit growth. However, sectors with pro-cyclical earnings growth may fare poorly in the near term until investors gain confidence that the (inevitable) policy response will stabilize the earnings outlook. Over the secular horizon, the most important conclusion is that there have been several long-term sectoral de/re-rating trends within China’s equity market. In the investable market, health care, consumer staples, and consumer discretionary (of which Alibaba is heavily represented) trade at 100-200% of a premium relative to the broad equity market on a trailing earnings basis, whereas financials, materials, and real estate stocks trade at a 40-60% discount. These divergences also exist in the domestic market, although the range is somewhat less extreme. A simple contrarian instinct might be to strategically overweight/underweight expensive/cheap sectors, but to us the simpler conclusion is that the extreme nature of these trends means that the strength of the relationship between EPS and stock prices for these sectors is set to rise. Over the coming few years, investors should focus nearly exclusively on the earnings outlook for high flying and beaten down sectors, a question that is very likely to be the topic of additional China Investment Strategy reports this year. Stay tuned!   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com     Reference Charts Energy Chart 13 Energy Energy Chart 14 Energy Energy Materials Chart 15 Materials Materials Chart 16 Materials Materials   Industrials Chart 17 Industrials Industrials Chart 18 Industrials Industrials   Consumer Discretionary Chart 19 Consumer Discretionary Consumer Discretionary Chart 20 Consumer Discretionary Consumer Discretionary   Consumer Staples Chart 21 Consumer Staples Consumer Staples Chart 22 Consumer Staples Consumer Staples   Health Care Chart 23 Health Care Health Care Chart 24 Health Care Health Care   Financials Chart 25 Financials Financials Chart 26 Financials Financials   Banking Chart 27 Banking Banking Chart 28 Banking Banking   Information Technology Chart 29 Information Technology Information Technology Chart 30 Information Technology Information Technology   Telecom Services Chart 31 Telecom Services Telecom Services Chart 32 Telecom Services Telecom Services   Utilities Chart 33 Utilities Utilities Chart 34 Utilities Utilities   Real Estate Chart 35 Real Estate Real Estate Chart 36 Real Estate Real Estate   Footnotes 1      Please see Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Another Phony G20? And A Word On Hong Kong”, dated June 14, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China’s Business Cycle”, dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3      S&P Dow Jones and MSCI Inc. implemented major structural changes to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) in Q4 2018 that substantially altered the sector composition of the MSCI China Investable index. The weight of the information technology sector in the investable index dropped dramatically after the GICS changes occurred. Investors should note that we used Q3 2018 as the end date of our analysis in order to remove any impact from the GICS sector change; the reference charts shown on pages 12 – 23 provide all data since 2011. 4     Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “The Three Pillars Of China’s Economy”, dated May 16, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5      Due to the changes to the GICS classification structure noted in footnote 3, the tech sector relationships that we highlighted above now apply to the consumer discretionary sector (level 1) and media & entertainment industry-group (level 2, within the new level 1 communication services sector. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Dear Client, Credit in China has expanded at an exponential pace, with the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio climbing from 143% to more than 250% over the last decade. The speed and scale of China’s debt surge dwarfs Japan and the U.S.’ respective credit binges in the 1980’s and 2000’s, each of which ultimately led to financial market meltdowns. Why should China’s experience be any different? Given that China has pursued a different economic model whereby the banking sector is largely state-sponsored and the currency is tightly managed by the central bank, the answer to this pressing question for global markets is the subject of spirited debate at BCA and within the investment community at large. Clients are already aware that my colleagues, Peter Berezin and Arthur Budaghyan, disagree on the macro and market ramifications of China’s decade-long credit boom. The aim of this report is to provide visibility on the root sources of the view divergence, not to reconcile the gaps. We hope these insights will help shape your own conviction about this important topic. Caroline Miller Global Strategy Feature   Caroline: Arthur, your cautious outlook towards emerging markets in general and China’s prospects in particular stems from your belief that China’s economy is dangerously addicted to credit as a growth driver. Please explain why you dismiss the more sanguine view that China’s elevated debt burden is a function of an equally unusually high household savings rate. Arthur: It is simple: When people use the word “savings,” they typically and intuitively refer to bank deposits or securities investments; but this is incorrect. Chart 1 (Arthur)No Empirical Evidence That Deposits = 'Savings' No Empirical Evidence That Deposits = 'Savings' No Empirical Evidence That Deposits = 'Savings' Money supply/deposits in the banking system have no relationship with the savings rate of a nation in general or households in particular (Chart 1). When households save, they do not change the amount of money supply and deposits. Hence, households’ decision to save neither alters liquidity in the banking system nor helps banks to originate loans. In fact, banks do not intermediate deposits into loans or savings into credit.1 The terms “savings” in economics does not denote an increase in the stock of money and deposits. The term “savings” in economics means the amount of goods and services produced but not consumed. When an economy produces a steel bar, it is registered as national “savings.” We cannot consume (say, eat or expense) a steel bar. Therefore, once a steel bar or any equipment is produced, economic statistics will count it as “savings.” Besides, the sole utilization of a steel bar is in capital goods and construction, and hence, it cannot be consumed. Once a steel bar is produced, both national savings and investment will rise. That is how the “savings” = “investment” identity is derived. Chart 2 (Arthur)Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones It would avoid confusion and help everyone if economists were to call it “excess production” not “excess savings.” Banks do not need “excess production” – i.e., national “savings” – to create loans. Critically, the enormous amount of bank deposits in China is not due to household “savings” but is originated by banks “out of thin air.” In fact, Chinese households are now more leveraged than U.S. ones (Chart 2). Chart 3 The surge of credit and money supply in China during the past 10 years has been due to animal spirits running wild among lenders and borrowers on the mainland, not its households’ “savings.” In short, the root of China’s credit bubble is not any different from Japan’s (in the 1980s), or the U.S.’ (in the 2000s) and so on. Peter: Yes, banks can create deposits “out of thin air,” as Arthur says. However, people must be willing to hold those deposits. The amount of deposits that households and businesses wish to hold reflects many things, including the interest rate paid on deposits and the overall wealth of the society. The interest rate is a function of savings. The more people save, the lower interest rates will be. And the lower interest rates are, the more demand for credit there will be (Chart 3). It’s like asking what determines how many apples are consumed. Is it how many apple trees farmers want to plant or how many apples people want to eat? The answer is both. Prices adjust so that supply equals demand. How about national wealth? To a large extent, wealth represents the accumulation of tangible capital – factories, plant and machinery, homes and office buildings: the sort of stuff that banks can use as collateral for lending. And what determines how much tangible capital a country possesses? The answer is past savings, of the exact sort Arthur is referring to: the excess of production over consumption. So this form of “economic” savings also plays an important indirect role in determining the level of bank deposits. Chart 4 (Peter)China: From Exporting Savings To Investing Domestically And Building Up Debt China: From Exporting Savings To Investing Domestically And Building Up Debt China: From Exporting Savings To Investing Domestically And Building Up Debt I think the main problem with Arthur’s argument is that he is observing an accounting identity, which is that total bank assets (mostly loans) must equal liabilities (mostly deposits and capital) in equilibrium, without fully appreciating the economic forces – savings being one of them – that produce this equilibrium. In any case, the whole question of whether deposits create savings or savings create deposits misses the point. China’s fundamental problem is that it does not consume enough of what it produces. In the days when China had a massive current account surplus, it could export its excess savings abroad (Chart 4). It can’t do that anymore, so the government has consciously chosen to spur investment spending in order to prop up employment. Since a lot of investment spending is financed through credit, debt levels have risen. It really is just that simple.   Arthur: First, neither the stock nor the flow of credit and deposits has any relevance to (1) the economic term “savings;” (2) a country’s capital stock; or (3) national wealth, contrary to what Peter claims. China’s broad money supply (M2) now stands at 190 trillion yuan, equivalent to US$28 trillion (Chart 5, top panel). It is equal to the size of broad money supply in the U.S. and the euro area combined (US$14 trillion each). Yet, China’s nominal GDP is only two-thirds the size of the U.S. Does the level of China’s wealth and capital stock justify it having broad money supply (US$28 trillion) equivalent to the U.S. and the euro area combined? Chart 5 (Arthur)“Helicopter” Money In China “Helicopter” Money In China “Helicopter” Money In China Second, are Chinese households and companies willing to hold all RMB deposits that banks have created “out of thin air”? The answer: not really. Without capital controls, a notable portion of these deposits would have rushed into the foreign exchange markets and caused currency depreciation. Another sign of growing reluctance to hold the yuan is that households have been swapping their RMB deposits for real assets (property) at astronomical valuations. There is a bubble in China but people are looking for reasons to justify why it is different this time. Caroline: OK, let’s get away from the term “savings,” and agree that China continues to generate a chronic surplus of production of goods and services relative to consumption, and that how China chooses to intermediate that surplus is the most market-relevant issue. Arthur, you have used the terms “money bubble” and “helicopter money” in relation to China. This implies that banks are unconstrained in their ability to make loans. Just because savings don’t equal deposits, and banks can create deposits when they make loans doesn’t mean there is no relationship between the flow of credit and the stock of deposits. Arthur: Money supply and deposits expand only when banks originate a loan or buy an asset from a non-bank. In short, both credit and money/deposits are created by commercial banks “out of thin air.” This is true for any country.2 Consider a loan transaction by a German commercial bank. When it grants a €100 loan to a borrower, two accounting entries occur on its balance sheet. On the assets side, the amount of loans, and therefore total assets, increases by €100. Simultaneously, on the liabilities side, this accounting entry creates €100 of new deposits “out of thin air” (Figure 1). Hence, new purchasing power of €100 has been created via a simple accounting entry, which otherwise would not exist. Chart Critically, no one needed to save for this loan and money to be originated. The bank does not transfer someone else’s deposits to the borrower; it creates a new deposit when it lends. Banks also create deposits/money “out of thin air” when they buy securities from non-banks. In China, fiscal stimulus is largely financed by commercial banks – banks purchase more than 80% of government-issued bonds. This also leads to money creation. In short, when banks originate too much credit – as they have in China – they generate a money bubble. The money bubble is the mirror image of a credit bubble. Chinese banks have created 141 trillion yuan (US$21 trillion) of new money since 2009, compared with $8.25 trillion created in the U.S., euro area, and Japan combined over the same period (Chart 5, bottom panel). This is why I refer to it as “helicopter” money. Caroline: If banks need capital and liquidity to make loans, and deposits are one potential source of funds, don't these capital and liquidity constraints drive banks’ willingness and ability to lend, creating a link between the two variables? Arthur: Let me explain how mainland banks were able to circumvent those regulatory lending constraints. In 2009, they expanded their credit assets by about 30%. Even though a non-trivial portion of those loans were not paid back, banks did not recognize NPLs and instead booked large profits. By retaining a portion of those earnings, they boosted their equity, say, by 20%. As a result, the next year they were able to expand their credit assets by another 20% and so on. If banks lend and do not recognize bad loans, they can increase their equity and continue lending. With respect to liquidity, deposits are not liquidity for banks; excess reserves at the central bank are true liquidity for them. The reason why banks need to attract deposits is not to appropriate the deposits themselves, but to gain access to the excess reserves that come with them. When a person shifts her deposit from Bank A to Bank B, the former transfers a similar amount of excess reserves (liquidity) to the latter. When expanding their credit assets aggressively, banks can: (1) create more loans per one unit of excess reserves/liquidity, i.e., expand the money multiplier; and (2) borrow excess reserves/liquidity from the central bank or other banks. Chinese banks have used both channels to expand their balance sheets over the past 10 years (Chart 6). Chart 6 (Arthur)Broad Money Can Expand Without Growing Banks' Excess Reserves At The Central Bank Broad Money Can Expand Without Growing Banks' Excess Reserves At The Central Bank Broad Money Can Expand Without Growing Banks' Excess Reserves At The Central Bank Crucially, commercial banks create deposits, but they cannot create excess reserves (liquidity).3 The latter are issued only by central banks “out of thin air.” So, neither deposits nor excess reserves have any relevance to household or national “savings.” Caroline: Peter, Arthur argues that Chinese credit policy has been unconstrained by the traditional metrics of capital adequacy that prevail in capitalist, free-market economies. In other words, there is no connection between the availability of funds to lend via deposits in the banking system, and the pace of credit creation. Rather, the central bank has controlled the terms and volume of lending via regulation and fiat reserve provisioning. You’ve argued that credit creation has served the greater good of propping up employment via investment spending. Moreover, you posit that countries with a surplus of production over consumption will invariably experience high levels of credit creation. Our colleague, Martin Barnes, has analyzed national savings rates (as a proxy for over-production) relative to debt-GDP ratios in other countries. The relationship doesn’t look that strong elsewhere (Chart 7). Please elaborate on why you see credit growth as an inevitable policy response to the dearth of aggregate demand we observe in China? Chart 7 Peter: I would not say that countries with a surplus of production over consumption will invariably experience high levels of credit creation. For example, if most business investment is financed through retained earnings, you can have a lot of investment with little new debt. Debt can also result from activities not directly linked to the intermediation of savings. For instance, if you take out a mortgage to buy some land, your consumption and savings need not change, even though debt will be created. I think Arthur and I agree on this point. Thus, I am not saying that debt is always and everywhere the result of savings. I am simply pushing back against Arthur’s extremist position that debt never has anything to do with savings. Caroline: So what determines the level of debt in an economy in your view, Peter? Peter: In general, debt levels will rise if there are large imbalances between income and spending within society and/or if there are significant differences in the mix of assets people wish to hold. Think about the U.S. in the pre-financial crisis period. First, there was a surge in income inequality beginning in the early 1980s. For all intents and purposes, rich households with excess savings ended up lending their surplus income to poor households struggling to pay their bills. Overall savings did not rise, but debt levels still increased. That’s one reason why Martin’s chart doesn’t show a strong correlation between the aggregate savings rate and debt-to-GDP. Sometimes you need to look beneath the aggregate numbers to see the savings intermediation taking place. Unlike in the U.S., even poor Chinese households are net savers (Chart 8). Thus, the aggregate savings rate in China is very high4 (Chart 9). Much of these savings are funnelled to finance investment in the corporate and public sectors. This fuels debt growth. Chart 8 Chart 9 (Peter)Chinese Households Have More Savings Than The U.S., Europe And Japan Combined Chinese Household Savings Are More Than The U.S., Europe And Japan Combined Chinese Household Savings Are More Than The U.S., Europe And Japan Combined The second thing that happened in the U.S. starting in 2000 was a massive housing boom. If you bought a second home with credit, you ended up with one more asset (the house) but one more liability (the mortgage). The person who sold you the home ended up losing one asset (the house) but gaining another asset (a bigger bank deposit). The net result was both higher debt and higher bank deposits. Lending to finance asset purchases has also been a big source of debt growth in China, as it was in the U.S. before the crisis. The U.S. mortgage boom ended in tears, and so the question that we should be asking is whether the Chinese debt boom will end the same way. Arthur: We agreed not to use the term “savings,” yet Peter again refers to “savings” being funnelled into credit. As I explained above, banks do not funnel “savings” (i.e., “excess production”) into credit. China, Japan, and Germany have high “savings” rates because they produce a lot of steel, chemicals, autos, and machinery that literally cannot be consumed and, thus, are recorded as “savings.” The U.S. produces too many services that are consumed/expensed and, hence, not recorded as “savings.” That is why the U.S. has a lower “savings” rate. Chart 10 (Arthur)The Myth Of Deficient Demand In China The Myth Of Deficient Demand In China The Myth Of Deficient Demand In China Economic textbook discussions on “savings” and “investment” are relevant for a barter economy where banks do not exist. When this framework is applied to modern economies with banks, it generates a lot of confusion.5 Caroline: OK, so Peter argues that an imbalance between spending and income CAN be a marker for high debt levels. Arthur, please explain why you see no relationship between China’s chronic shortfall in demand and authorities’ explicit decision to support growth via credit creation. Arthur: First, China does not have deficient demand – consumer spending and capital expenditures have been growing at 10% and 9.4%, respectively, in real terms annually compounded for the past 10 years (Chart 10). The mainland economy has been suffering from excess production, not a lack of demand. China has invested a lot (Chart 11) and ended up with too much capacity to produce steel, cement, chemicals and other materials as well as machinery and industrial goods. So, China has an excess production of goods relative to firms’ and households’ underlying demand. In a market economy, these producers would become non-profitable, halt their investments, and shut down some capacity. Chart 11 (Arthur)China Has Been Over-Investing On An Unprecedented Scale China Has Been Over-Investing On An Unprecedented Scale China Has Been Over-Investing On An Unprecedented Scale In China, to keep the producers of these unwanted goods operating, the government has allowed and encouraged banks to originate loans creating new purchasing power literally “out of thin air” to purchase these goods. This has created a credit/money bubble. In a socialist system, banks do not ask debtors to repay loans and government officials are heavily involved in resource and capital allocation. China’s credit system and a growing chunk of its economy have been operating like a typical socialist system. Socialism leads to lower productivity growth for well-known reasons. With labor force growth set to turn negative, productivity is going to be the sole source of China’s potential growth rate. If the nation continues expanding this money/credit bubble to prop up zombie enterprises, its potential growth rate will fall considerably. As the potential growth rate drops, recurring stimulus will create nominal but not real growth. In short, the outcome will be stagflation. Caroline: The theoretical macro frameworks that you have both outlined make for interesting thought experiments, and spirited intellectual debate. However, investors are most concerned about the sustainability of China’s explosive credit growth, implications for the country’s growth rate, and the return on invested capital. Arthur, given your perspective on how Chinese credit policy has been designed and implemented, please outline the contours of how and when you see the music stopping, and the debt mountain crumbling. Arthur: Not every credit bubble will burst like the U.S. one did in 2008. For example, in the case of the Japanese credit bubble, there was no acute crisis. The bubble deflated gradually for about 20 years. In the cases of the U.S. (2008), Japan (1990), the euro area (2008-2014), Spain (2008-2014) and every other credit bubble, a common adjustment was a contraction in bank loans in nominal terms (Chart 12). Chart 12 (Arthur)All Credit Booms Have Been Followed By Contracting Bank Loans (I) All Credit Booms Have Been Followed By Contracting Bank Loans All Credit Booms Have Been Followed By Contracting Bank Loans Chart 12 (Arthur)All Credit Booms Have Been Followed By Contracting Bank Loans (II) All Credit Booms Have Been Followed By Contracting Bank Loans All Credit Booms Have Been Followed By Contracting Bank Loans Why do banks stop lending? The reason is that banks’ shareholders absorb the largest losses from credit booms. Given that banks are levered at least 20-to-1 at the peak of a typical credit boom, every $1 of non-performing loans leads to a $20 drop in their equity value. Bank shareholders halt the flow of credit to protect their wealth. Chart 13 (Arthur)China: Deleveraging Has Not Yet Begun China: Deleveraging Has Not Yet Begun China: Deleveraging Has Not Yet Begun Chart 14 In fact, credit in China is still growing at a double-digit rate, above nominal GDP growth (Chart 13). Hence, aggregate deleveraging in China has not yet begun. If banks do not curtail credit origination, the music will not stop. However, uninterrupted credit growth happens only in a socialist system where banks subsidize the economy at the expense of their shareholders. But even then, there is no free lunch. Credit origination by banks also expands the money supply as discussed above. An expanding money bubble will heighten devaluation pressure on the yuan in the long run. The enormous amount of money supply/deposits – the money bubble – in China is like “the sword of Damocles” hanging over the nation’s currency. Chinese households and businesses are becoming reluctant to hold this ballooning supply of local currency. Continuous “helicopter” money will only increase their desire to diversify their RMB deposits into foreign currencies and assets. Yet, there is an insufficient supply of foreign currency to accommodate this conversion. The nation’s current account surplus has almost vanished while the central bank carries US$3 trillion in foreign exchange reserve representing only 11% of the yuan deposits and cash in circulation (Chart 14). It is inconceivable that China can open its capital account in the foreseeable future. “Helicopter” money also discourages innovation and breeds capital misallocation, which reduces productivity growth. A combination of slowing productivity growth, and thus potential GDP, and strong money growth ultimately lead to stagflation – the dynamics endemic to socialist systems. Peter: Arthur’s answer implicitly assumes that private investment would increase if the government removed credit/fiscal stimulus. But where is the evidence for that? We had just established that the Chinese economy suffers from a lack of aggregate demand. Public-sector spending, to the extent that it increases employment and incomes, crowds in private-sector investment rather than crowding it out. Ask yourself what would have happened if China didn’t build that “bridge to nowhere.” Would those displaced construction workers have found more productive work elsewhere or would they have remained idle? The answer is almost certainly the latter. After all, the reason the Chinese government built the bridge in the first place was to increase employment in an economy that habitually struggles to consume enough of what is produces. Arthur talks about the “misallocation” of resources. But doesn’t an unemployed worker also represent a misallocation of resources? In my view, it certainly does – and one that is much more threatening to social stability than an underutilized bridge or road. If you understand the point above, you will also understand why Arthur’s comparison between Chinese banks and say, U.S. banks is misplaced. The Chinese government is the main shareholder in Chinese banks. The government cares more about social stability than anything else. There is no way it would let credit growth plunge. Moreover, as the main shareholder, the government has a strong incentive to raise the share price of Chinese banks. After all, it is difficult to have a reserve currency that rivals the U.S. dollar, as China aspires to have, if your largest banks trade like penny stocks. My guess is that the Chinese government will shut down a few small banks to “show” that it is concerned about moral hazard, but then turn around and allow the larger banks to sell their troubled loans to state-owned asset management companies on very favourable terms (similar to what happened in the early 2000s). Once investors get wind that this is about to happen, Chinese bank shares will rally like crazy. Caroline: Isn’t shuffling debt from one sector of the economy to another akin to a shell game? Wouldn’t rampant debt growth eventually cause investors to lose confidence in the currency? Peter: China has a problem with the composition of its debt, not with its total value. Debt is a problem when the borrower can’t or won’t repay the loan. Chart 15 (Peter)China Is On Course To Lose More Than 400 Million Workers China On Course To Lose More Than 400 Million Workers China On Course To Lose More Than 400 Million Workers I completely agree that there is too much shadow bank lending in China. There is also too much borrowing by state-owned enterprises. Ideally, the Chinese government would move all this quasi-public spending onto its own balance sheet. It would significantly raise social spending to discourage precautionary household savings. It would also adopt generous pro-natal policies — free childcare, education, government paid parental leave, and the like. The fact that the Chinese working-age population is set to shrink by 400 million by the end of the century is a huge problem (Chart 15). If the central government borrowed and spent more, state-owned companies and local governments would not have to borrow or spend as much. Banks could then increase their holding of high-quality central government bonds. Debt sustainability is only a problem if the interest rate the government faces exceeds the growth rate of the economy.6 That is manifestly not the case in China (Chart 16). And why are interest rates so low in relation to growth? Because Chinese households save so much! We simply can’t ignore the role of savings in the discussion. Chart 16 (Peter)China: High Levels Of Household Savings Have Kept Interest Rates Below The Growth Rate Of The Economy China: High Levels Of Household Savings Have Kept Interest Rates Below The Growth Rate Of The Economy China: High Levels Of Household Savings Have Kept Interest Rates Below The Growth Rate Of The Economy As far as the currency is concerned, if debt growth rose so much that the economy overheated and inflation soared, then yes, the yuan would plunge. But that’s not what we are talking about here. We are talking about bringing debt growth to a level that generates just enough demand to achieve something resembling full employment. No one is calling for raising debt growth beyond that point. Curbing debt growth in a demand-deficient economy, as Arthur seems to be recommending, would cause unemployment to rise. Investors would then bet that the Chinese government would try to boost net exports by engineering a currency devaluation. Capital outflows would intensify. Far from creating the conditions for a weaker yuan, fiscal/credit stimulus obviates the need for a currency depreciation. Caroline: Peter, even if we accept your argument that the counterfactual of curbing credit growth in a demand-deficient economy would be a more deflationary outcome than sustaining the government-sponsored credit growth engine, how is building bridges to nowhere a positive sum for investors? Even if this strategy maintains social stability in the interests of the CCP’s regime preservation, won’t investors eventually recoil at the retreat to socialism that Arthur outlines, reducing the appeal of holding the yuan, even if, as you both seem to agree, no apocalyptic debt crisis is at hand? In other words, isn’t two times nothing still nothing? Peter: First of all, many of these infrastructure projects may turn out to be quite useful down the road, pardon the pun. Per capita vehicle ownership in China is only one one-fifth of what it is in the United States, and one-fourth of what it is in Japan (Chart 17). A sparsely used expressway today may be a clogged one tomorrow. Chart 17 (Peter)The Automobile Ownership Rate Is Still Quite Low In China The Automobile Ownership Rate Is Still Quite Low In China The Automobile Ownership Rate Is Still Quite Low In China Would China really be better off if it had fewer infrastructure projects and more big screen TVs? An economy where people are always buying stuff they don’t need, with money they don’t have, to impress people they don’t like, is hardly a recipe for success. I am not sure what these references to socialism are supposed to accomplish. You want to see a real retreat to socialism? Try creating millions of unemployed workers with no jobs and no hope. All sorts of pundits decried Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal as creeping socialism. The truth is that the New Deal took the wind out of the sails of the fledgling U.S. communist movement at the time. Arthur: I believe that Peter is confusing the structural and cyclical needs for stimulus. When an economy is in a recession – banks are shrinking their balance sheets and property prices are deflating – the authorities must undertake fiscal and credit stimulus. Chart 18 (Arthur)What Will Productivity Growth Look Like If Public Officials Allocate 55%-60% Of GDP? What Will Productivity Growth Look Like If Public Officials Allocate 55%-60% Of GDP? What Will Productivity Growth Look Like If Public Officials Allocate 55%-60% Of GDP? Credit and fiscal stimulus made sense in China in early 2009 when growth plunged. However, over the past 10 years, we have witnessed credit and property market booms of gigantic proportions. Does this economy warrant continuous stimulus? What will productivity growth look like if government bureaucrats continuously allocate 55-60% of GDP each year (Chart 18)? Caroline: Arthur and Peter, you can both argue with one another about the semantic economic definition of the term ‘savings’, the implications of chronic excess production (relative to consumption), and the root drivers of credit growth in China long past the expiry of every BCA client’s investment horizon. Clients benefit from understanding your distinct perspectives only to the extent that they inform your outlook for markets. Will each of you now please outline how you see high levels of credit in China’s economy impacting the following over a cyclical (6-12 month) and structural (3-5 year) horizon: Global growth Commodity prices China-geared financial assets Peter: Regardless of what one thinks about the root causes of China’s high debt levels, it seems certain to me that the Chinese are going to pick up the pace of credit/fiscal stimulus over the next six months in response to slowing growth and trade war uncertainties. If anything, the incentive to open the credit spigots this time around is greater than in the past because the Chinese government wants to have a fast-growing economy to gain leverage over trade negotiations with the U.S. Chart 19 (Peter)Stronger Chinese Credit Growth Bodes Well For Commodity Prices Stronger Chinese Credit Growth Bodes Well For Commodity Prices Stronger Chinese Credit Growth Bodes Well For Commodity Prices Chart 20 (Peter)The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Stronger Chinese growth will boost growth in the rest of the world. Commodity prices will rise (Chart 19). As a counter-cyclical currency, the U.S. dollar will likely peak over the next month or so and then weaken in the back half of 2019 and into 2020 (Chart 20). The combination of stronger Chinese growth, higher commodity prices, and a weaker dollar will be manna from heaven for emerging markets. If a trade truce between China and the U.S. is reached, investors should move quickly to overweight EM equities. European stocks should also benefit. Looking further out, China’s economy will slow in absolute terms. In relative terms, however, Chinese growth will remain near the top of the global rankings. China has one of the most educated workforces in the world (Chart 21). Assuming that output-per-hour reaches South Korean levels by the middle of the century, Chinese real GDP would need to expand by about 6% per year over the next decade (Chart 22). That’s a lot of growth – growth that will eventually help China outgrow its debt burden. Chart 21 Chart 22 (Peter)China Has More Catching Up To Do China Has More Catching Up To Do China Has More Catching Up To Do Keep in mind that credit growth of 1% when the debt-to-GDP ratio is 300% yields 3% of GDP in credit stimulus, compared with only 1% of stimulus when the debt-to-GDP ratio is 100%. That does not mean that more debt is intrinsically a good thing, but it does mean that China will eventually be able to slow debt growth even if excess savings remains a problem. Structurally, Chinese and EM equities will likely outperform their developed market peers over a 3-to-5 year horizon. The P/E ratio for EM stocks is currently 4.7 percentage points below that of developed markets, which is below its long-term average (Chart 23). While EM EPS growth has lagged DM earnings growth over the past eight years, the long-term trend still favors EM (Chart 24). EM currencies will appreciate over this period, with the RMB leading the way. Chart 23 (Peter)EM Stocks: Valuations Are Attractive EM Stocks: Valuations Are Attractive EM Stocks: Valuations Are Attractive Chart 24 (Peter)Earnings Growth In EM Has Outpaced That Of DM Over The Long Haul Earnings Growth In EM Has Outpaced That Of DM Over The Long Haul Earnings Growth In EM Has Outpaced That Of DM Over The Long Haul Arthur: China is facing a historic choice between two scenarios. Medium- and long-term macro outcomes will impact markets differently in each case. Table 1 shows my cyclical and structural investment recommendations for each scenario. Table 1 (Arthur)Arthur’s Recommended Investment Strategy For China-Geared Financial Assets China’s Credit Cycle: A Spirited Debate China’s Credit Cycle: A Spirited Debate Allowing Markets to Play A Bigger Role = Lower credit growth (deleveraging), corporate restructuring, and weaker growth (Chart 25). This is bearish for growth and financial markets in the medium term but it will make Chinese stocks and the currency structural (long-term) buys. Credit/Money Boom Persists (Socialist Put) = Secular Stagnation, Inflation and Currency Depreciation: The structural outlook is downbeat but there are mini-cycles that investors could play (Chart 26). Cyclically, China-geared financial assets still remain at risk. However, lower asset prices and more stimulus in China could put a floor under asset prices later this year. Timing these mini-cycles is critical. A buy-and-hold strategy for Chinese assets will not be appropriate in this scenario. In short, capitalism is bad but socialism is worse. I hope China will pursue the first path. Chart 25 Chart 26 Caroline: Thank you both for clarifying your perspectives. Over a multi-year horizon, markets will render the ultimate judgement on whether China’s credit boom has represented a reckless misallocation of capital, or a rational policy response to an imbalance between domestic spending and income. In the meantime, we will monitor the complexion of Chinese stimulus and evidence of its global growth multiplier effect over the coming weeks and months. These will be the key variables to watch as we determine when and at what level to upgrade BCA’s cyclical outlook for China-geared assets. Can’t wait for that debate. Footnotes 1 For a detailed discussion of these issues, please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports, “Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses,” dated October 26, 2016 and “The True Meaning Of China's Great 'Savings' Wall,” dated December 20, 2017. 2 For a detailed discussion of these issues, please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports, “Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses,” dated October 26, 2016 and “The True Meaning Of China's Great 'Savings' Wall,” dated December 20, 2017. 3 For a detailed discussion of these issues, please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB,” dated November 23, 2016. 4 For a discussion on the reasons behind China’s high savings rate, please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “China’s Savings Problem,” dated January 25, 2019. 5 For a detailed discussion of these issues, please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “Is Investment Constrained By Savings? Tales Of China And Brazil,” dated March 22, 2018. 6 For a detailed discussion of these issues, please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Is There Really Too Much Government Debt In The World?” dated February 22, 2019 and “Chinese Debt: A Contrarian View,” dated April 19, 2019.