China Stimulus

Highlights Odds are that the recently improved access to financing will allow property developers to boost construction volumes modestly in the coming months. Yet, the outlook for new credit origination and government tolerance of another credit binge is highly uncertain. For now, the completion of previously launched projects will help construction-adjacent industries in the short run. However, these activities will consume real estate developers’ cash augmenting both their liquidity needs and financial vulnerability. That is a basis to underweight the Chinese real estate sectors within both the Chinese MSCI investable universe and the onshore A-share indexes. Feature The emergent divergence among Chinese property sales, starts and completions constitutes an exceptionally bizarre phenomenon. The gaps between these three indicators are currently unprecedented (Chart I-1). Understanding these divergences is critical to correctly gauging the outlook for the Chinese real estate market. This report aims to assess the growth outlook of these three variables. Odds are that these gaps will narrow going forward. Over the next three to six months, the Chinese property market is likely to be characterized by a contraction in floor space sold, a considerable relapse in floor space starts, and a rebound in floor space completions (Chart I-2). Chart I-1An Unprecedented Divergence… The Unprecedented Divergence The Unprecedented Divergence Chart I-2…But A Convergence Looms Convergence Ahead Convergence Ahead   In terms of the strength of construction activity in the Chinese property market, the real estate developers’ access to funding has been and remains the key. Over the next three to six months, the Chinese property market is likely to be characterized by a contraction in floor space sold, a considerable relapse in floor space starts, and a rebound in floor space completions. For now, we reckon the improved access to financing in recent months should help property developers to boost construction volumes modestly in the coming months (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Construction Activity Will Modestly Improve In The Coming Few Months Further Credit Easing Will Likely Lead To Rising Construction Activity Further Credit Easing Will Likely Lead To Rising Construction Activity That said, the current round of credit stimulus has probably been front-loaded in the first quarter, and property developers’ access to funding will begin to deteriorate again going forward. This will weigh on their ability to raise construction volumes materially. Understanding The Construction Cycle In China Floor space sold, starts and completions generally move in tandem. Specifically, strong sales lead rising starts, which then with a time lag result in increased completions. However, over the past 15 months, the growth rate of property starts has accelerated to over 20%, while sales have mildly contracted and floor space completions have been shrinking dramatically (Chart I-2). The key reason for these divergences has been the considerable financing difficulties facing property developers. Tighter monetary policy and credit beginning in late 2016 severely impaired developers’ ability to raise funds. This made Chinese real estate developers desperate for any source of possible revenue or financing. Launching new projects aggressively last year – i.e., more property starts – allowed real estate developers to pre-sell and get cash at a time when credit was tight.  Property developers were also aiming to conserve cash flow amid tight credit. After investing 25% of the total investment required for a property project (excluding the value of the land), they received a presale permit from the authorities. The permits allowed them to sell housing units in advance. Home-buyers had to pay at least 30% of the total property value at the time they signed the presale contract. This way, developers were able to obtain both deposits and advance payments1 (Chart I-4). This was a welcome addition to scarce financing last year. After this phase, property developers then slowed their investment in construction, installation and equipment purchases – because these would consume precious, limited cash. This depressed construction activity has resulted in a material contraction in floor space completed (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Developers’ Funding Has Improved Due To Deposits & Advanced Payments Rising Funding From Deposits And Advance Payments Rising Funding From Deposits And Advance Payments Chart I-5   Bottom Line: Launching new projects and pre-selling housing units while shrinking construction enabled Chinese real estate developers to stay afloat last year amid tight access to credit. What Does This Mean? There are two important implications related to this unprecedented divergence among property sales, starts and completions. The first is that raising funds via launching property starts along with shrinking completions has resulted in a significant increase in Chinese property developers’ liabilities. This is a form of borrowing money for property developers, and it has been occurring on top of very poor financial health. Specifically, Chinese real estate developers’ debt-to-equity ratio is currently above 4, and continues to surge (Chart I-6). Further, in 2018, 54 out of 131 Chinese property developers had negative free cash flow. This scheme of raising funding via new launches along with postponing building and completions is becoming unsustainable. The divergence between surging property starts and contracting completions suggests that real estate developers have raised funds through selling more uncompleted buildings instead of completed properties (Chart I-7, top panel). Chart I-6Chinese Property Developers Are Very Leveraged Chinese Property Developers Are Very Leveraged Chinese Property Developers Are Very Leveraged Chart I-7A Big Increase In Sales Of Uncompleted Buildings A Big Increase In Sales Of Uncompleted Buildings A Big Increase In Sales Of Uncompleted Buildings   Specifically, some 87% of total residential floor space sold in the past 12 months has been sold in advance, much higher than the approximate 77% total recorded in the years prior to 2018 (Chart I-7, bottom panel). The second important implication is that property developers’ ability to raise financing will determine the strength of property construction activities in China going forward. Chinese real estate developers are facing massive funding requirements this year. Developers need considerable amounts of funding this year to speed up their construction activities on delayed projects (launched but not completed ones). It generally takes about two years for real estate developers to complete a construction project and deliver the presold properties. Developers had already slowed their construction progress last year. They must accelerate the pace this year to ensure deliveries are made on time. Developers also need to roll over or repay significant amounts of debt coming due in 2019. On the whole, they have issued nearly RMB3.9 trillion of bonds so far, with most in the three- to five-year duration. Chart I-3 on page 2 shows that further improvements in credit flows in the economy will likely lead to ameliorating construction activity. Credit easing has allowed developers to raise funds through bank loans, bond issuances (both domestic and overseas) and other forms of borrowing (Chart I-8). Property developers’ ability to raise financing will determine the strength of property construction activities in China going forward. As a result, real estate investment in construction, installation and equipment purchases have all ameliorated in recent months (Chart I-9). This reflects a true pickup in real estate construction activities since the beginning of this year. Chart I-8Marginal Credit ##br##Easing Marginal Credit Easing Marginal Credit Easing Chart I-9   However, whether or not this latest improvement develops into full-fledged recovery is contingent on credit flows in the economy in general, and property developers’ access to financing in particular. If the overflow of credit decelerates after the massive binge that took place in the first quarter, it will weigh on construction activity. If the first-quarter credit binge persists, Chinese property developers will likely be able to raise sufficient funds to speed up property completions and roll over their maturing debt this year. In this scenario, construction activity will gather speed, facilitating a recovery in the overall economy.  At the current juncture, it is impossible to make a definite conclusion. The outlook for new credit flows and government tolerance of another credit binge is highly uncertain. On the one hand, the Politburo last month reiterated that China will push forward structural deleveraging and prevent speculation in the property market. Preliminary credit flow numbers for April appear to be very weak, not confirming blockbuster credit in the first quarter. Besides, the banking regulator has renewed pressure on banks to recognize non-performing loans and provision for them.2 This will curb banks’ ability to originate new loans and buy corporate bonds. On the other hand, an escalation of tensions between China and the U.S. and the uncertainty it is instilling in the economy and financial markets could lead the authorities to keep the credit taps open for longer, allowing credit to flow into the broader economy. Bottom Line: Real estate developers are extremely leveraged and lack cash to complete launched projects. Hence, property developers’ ability to raise financing holds the key in terms of the strength of property construction activities in China. Further easing in credit will likely lead to rebounding property completions and rising construction activity, and vice versa. What About Chinese Property Demand? Easy credit may alleviate the financing stress facing Chinese real estate developers and lift construction activity temporarily. However, the most important and sustainable source of funding for real estate developers is property sales. Chart I-10 shows that funding from property sales, including deposits, advance payments and mortgages assumed by property buyers, contributes nearly half of the sources of funds raised in that year. Chart I-10 Self-raised funds are the second-largest component of the source of funds, with a share of 34%. One major component of self-raised funds – retained earnings – are also closely related to property sales. The other major component is equity and bond issuance. Bank loans and foreign investment (including direct equity injections, sales of bonds and equity, and borrowing from foreign banks) together account for only about 15%. Even though there has been some credit easing for Chinese real estate developers, the bad news is that property sales are still in a structural downtrend. Chart I-11Slower PSL Injections Will Negatively Impact Property Demand Diminishing PSL Scheme Will Be Negative To Property Demand Diminishing PSL Scheme Will Be Negative To Property Demand As discussed in our previous reports,3 China’s property market is currently facing structural impediments. Low affordability, slowing rural-to-urban migration, demographic changes, the promotion of the housing rental market and the government’s continuing emphasis on clamping down speculation are together generating strong structural headwinds for property demand in China. Importantly, surging property demand between late 2015 and 2017 was mainly driven by the Chinese central bank’s direct lending to the real estate sector, which is not sustainable. Our calculations indicate that about 20% of floor space sold (in volume terms) in 2017 was due to the Pledged Summary Lending (PSL) facility designed for slum area reconstruction.4 Indeed, the central bank’s PSL injections have already decelerated considerably since last year (Chart I-11). This has resulted in contracting overall property sales. Late last month, the authorities significantly cut their slum-area reconstruction target by more than one-half – from 6.4 million units last year to 2.85 million units this year. This suggests the amount of PSL injections will decline correspondingly (Chart I-12). Chart I-12 Besides the diminishing PSL scheme, some other factors are also signaling a dismal outlook for Chinese property demand. A deep and long contraction in property demand in rich provinces indicates demand saturation (Chart I-13). Sales outside eastern provinces track PSL injections very closely, as per Chart I-11, and are facing headwinds. Chinese households are more leveraged than U.S. ones, with the former’s debt-to-disposable income ratio having surpassed that of the latter (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Demand Is Saturated In China’s (Richer) Eastern Provinces Demand Saturation In Rich Eastern Provinces Demand Saturation In Rich Eastern Provinces Chart I-14China’s Household Debt Burden Is Very Elevated Escalated Household Debt In China Escalated Household Debt In China   Chart I- In addition, mortgage rates in China have not dropped much, despite monetary policy easing in the past 12 months. Recent data shows the average mortgage rate paid by first-time homebuyers has fallen from 5.71% last November to 5.56% this March, a still-high number. With respect to the ability to service mortgage payments, on a 90-square-meter house with a 30% down payment, our calculations show that annual interest costs account for about 27% of average household disposable income levels (Table I-1). Overall, poor affordability for Chinese homebuyers will constrain property demand in the coming years. Finally, the government is quite determined to implement its property tax in a few years. Local governments’ financing needs will become more acute as revenue from land sales decline substantially. China’s property market is on the way to becoming the market dominated by second-hand properties instead of new buildings – similar to many developed countries. Critically, the progress in establishing property tax laws in China seems to be accelerating. There have been more high-level meetings and discussions about the property tax law, and these meetings/discussions are becoming more detailed and concrete. Bottom Line: Chinese housing demand will be in a structural downtrend, weighing on construction activity beyond any near-term rebound. Investment Implications Based on the above findings, we draw the following investment strategy conclusions: It is reasonable to expect a slight pickup in real estate construction activity in China over the next few months. This will be marginally positive for construction-related commodities demand. Consequently, construction-related commodities markets (steel, cement, and glass) may be supported in the near term (Chart I-15). However, over the longer term, we remain fundamentally negative on construction activity within China’s property markets, as property sales will be in a structural downtrend. BCA’s Emerging Market Strategy service recommends equity investors underweight Chinese property developers within the Chinese equity indexes (Chart I-16). Chart I-15Construction-Related Commodities May Marginally Benefit From A Pickup In Activity Contraction Commodities Prices May Marginally Benefit Contraction Commodities Prices May Marginally Benefit Chart I-16Underweight Real Estate Stocks Relative To The Domestic And Investable Benchmarks Underweight Real Estate Stocks Within Respective Chinese Investable Universes Underweight Real Estate Stocks Within Respective Chinese Investable Universes   The completion of previously launched projects will help construction-related industries. Yet, these activities will consume real estate developers’ cash augmenting their liquidity needs and amplifying their financial vulnerability. This is a basis for our recommendation to underweight property stocks, especially following their significant outperformance in the past six months.  Further, property stocks respond to marginal changes in financing conditions rather than housing sales or construction activities. The basis is that they are extremely leveraged, and access to funding is key. In the coming months, if credit conditions tighten at a time when real estate developers must commit cash to complete previously launched projects, their cash flow will deteriorate. This will be reflected in their share prices, which will underperform the Chinese broader onshore and offshore indexes. This is likely to occur regardless of the absolute performance of Chinese stocks. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Chinese real estate developers could also slow the construction activity after completing 50% of a property project, which allows them to receive at least 60% of the presold property value from house buyers. 2      https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-06/china-is-said-to-imp… 3      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report “China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble?” dated April 6, 2018 and China Investment Strategy Special Report “China’s Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?” dated September 13, 2018. 4      Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “China’s Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?” dated September 13, 2018. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights So what? The U.S.-China deal is not shaping up as well as the consensus holds. Why? The odds of reaching a deal by June are rising, but no higher than 50%. Unemployment is a constraint on the Chinese side but stimulus reduces urgency. Structural concessions on currency and foreign investment are limited in scope. Strategic concessions are limited to North Korea; Taiwan risks are rising. Stay overweight U.S. and Chinese equities on a relative basis at least until the deal is signed.   Feature Once again investors are faced with a stream of headlines suggesting that a U.S.-China trade deal is all but finished, only to find critical caveats buried on page six. For instance, President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping have not yet scheduled a summit to sign a trade agreement, though Trump insists a summit is necessary. Chief U.S. negotiator Robert Lighthizer says that he is “hoping but not necessarily hopeful.”1 There is still room for U.S. and Chinese bourses to outperform on a relative basis while negotiations continue. Still, the news flow is encouraging. Trump has said “we’ve agreed to far more than we have left to agree to,” while Xi Jinping has called for an “early conclusion of negotiations.” The other negotiators are also making positive sounds, with Vice Premier Liu He saying that a “new consensus” has been reached on a text of the trade agreement. National Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow says that key structural issues are on the table and that negotiations are continuing by videoconference after two successful rounds of direct talks in Beijing and Washington. Even the notorious China hawk, Peter Navarro, Director of the U.S. National Trade Council, has begrudgingly admitted that the two sides are in the final stage of the talks, saying, “the last mile of the marathon is actually the longest and the hardest.”2 Readers know that we take a pessimistic view of U.S.-China relations over the long run. We were skeptical about the possibility of a tariff truce on December 1. However, the signs are stacking up in favor of a deal. While we would not be surprised if talks extended to the June 28-29 G20 summit in Osaka, Japan, President Trump has suggested that a summit could come as early as May 5-19. Chart 1Still Some Room To Run Still Some Room To Run Still Some Room To Run Judging by the performance of U.S. and Chinese equities relative to the rest of the world since the first tariffs were imposed on June 14, 2018, there is still room for these two bourses to outperform on a relative basis while negotiations continue. Relative to global equities excluding China and U.S., Chinese stocks have retraced 78% of the ground they lost, while U.S. stocks have not surpassed the high points reached at the peak of the global economic divergence in 2018 (Chart 1). Once a deal is reached, will investors that bought equities on the rumor sell the news? We would buy, though equity leadership should rotate away from the U.S. and China depending on the timing and external conditions discussed below. As a House we are overweight global equities on a 12-month horizon. Xi Is Not Mao China’s economic stimulus is a key swing factor for global growth and the corporate earnings outlook this year. Our China Investment Strategy has highlighted that the BCA Activity Indicator has now fully registered the negative impact of trade tariffs as well as the broader slowdown (Chart 2). Chart 2Slowdown Fully Priced In Slowdown Fully Priced In Slowdown Fully Priced In Previously it was more buoyant than our leading indicator suggested it should be, largely because companies placed orders throughout the second half of 2018 to front-run Trump’s tariffs and this artificially boosted China’s exports and manufacturing activity. Now that this front-running is over, any improvement or deterioration in underlying monetary conditions, money supply, and lending should be reflected in the BCA Activity Indicator itself. Hence a stout credit number for March will cause an uptick that will confirm that China’s economy is recovering. We expect this to occur because, to be blunt, President Xi Jinping is not truly a modern-day Chairman Mao Zedong. While he has revived aspects of Maoism, he has responded pragmatically, rather than ideologically, to the Communist Party’s Number one political constraint: the tradeoff between productivity and employment. When Xi consolidated power in 2017, he launched a deleveraging campaign and doubled down on various structural reforms in order to make progress in rebalancing China’s economy. The result was renewed weakness in the labor market as the stimulus measures of 2015-16 wore off (Chart 3). Labor “incidents,” or protests, particularly those sparked by the relocation of workers from closed factories, began to rise again (Chart 4). Significantly, the number of bankruptcies also increased, demonstrating that the government was willing to tolerate some economic pain in order to make the allocation of capital more efficient (Chart 5). Chart 3A Key Constraint On Xi Jinping A Key Constraint On Xi Jinping A Key Constraint On Xi Jinping Chart 4Labor Incidents On The Rise Labor Incidents On The Rise Labor Incidents On The Rise Chart 5 China’s policymakers pursued these reforms while believing that President Trump’s threat of a trade war was largely bluster. But when Trump proceeded to impose tariffs, confidence collapsed and China’s private sector found itself sandwiched between stricter government at home and an impending squeeze of demand abroad. The labor and business indicators in Charts 3-5 suffered further deterioration in 2018 as animal spirits evaporated across the economy. President Xi’s response could have been to close China’s doors to trade and to the West and undertake an even more aggressive purge of “capitalist roaders.” The possibility is inherent in his cult of personality, aggressive anti-corruption campaign, and cyber-security state apparatus. This would have meant a dramatic reckoning with the country's economic and financial imbalances, but it would have given the hardliners in the Communist Party an opportunity to establish absolute control and national “self-sufficiency.” Instead, Xi entered into talks with Trump and launched supply-side, tax-and-tape-cutting measures to stimulate private economic activity, and boosted fiscal spending. He chose reflation rather than revolution. Chinese stimulus does not make a trade deal more likely in itself, as it gives President Xi more leverage in negotiations. But without a trade deal, private sector sentiment and animal spirits will remain depressed and stimulus measures will eventually falter. So it makes sense that Xi wants a deal. China will be the center of two market-positive outcomes in the near term: more domestic reflation and less conflict with the United States. To put this into context: if China’s credit impulse turns positive it will push the overall fiscal-and-credit impulse higher than 2% of GDP (Chart 6), foreshadowing a rebound in Chinese imports and global growth and enabling China’s own corporate earnings to recover. Our China Investment Strategy estimates that if the past three months’ rate of credit growth continues, while manufacturing sentiment improves on a trade deal and the renminbi remains flat, then the probability of an earnings recession on the MSCI China Index falls from 92% to 21%, as shown in Chart 7. From a policy perspective this looks conservative, as the actual rate of credit growth will probably be faster than that of the past three months. Chart 6Credit Will Add To Fiscal Boost Credit Will Add To Fiscal Boost Credit Will Add To Fiscal Boost Chart 7Earnings Unlikely To Contract Earnings Unlikely To Contract Earnings Unlikely To Contract Of course, President Trump has even more acute political constraints than President Xi urging him toward a deal. A deterioration in the U.S. manufacturing sector is a serious liability, especially in the Midwestern battleground states (Chart 8), and Trump has apparently calculated that a tailored infusion of Chinese cash and promises is a better reelection strategy than a continuation of trade war amid a slowdown.   Chart 8A Key Constraint On Donald Trump A Key Constraint On Donald Trump A Key Constraint On Donald Trump The implication of all of the above is that China will be the center of two market-positive outcomes in the near term: more domestic reflation and less conflict with the United States. The former is not yet consensus, while the latter is lacking in specifics. Yet both are beneficial for Chinese equities on an absolute and relative basis. And once there is a concluded trade deal and clarity over stimulus, emerging markets can also outperform their developed market counterparts. Note that we do not expect China to launch a massive 2008-09-style stimulus unless the tariff war reignites. Such an outcome would only be bullish for some EMs, since beneath the initial surge in Chinese imports would lie the disruption of the global supply chain and broader de-globalization. Bottom Line: Unemployment is a key political constraint suggesting both that China’s stimulus will surprise to the upside and that a trade deal is forthcoming. We are reducing the odds of an extension of trade talks beyond June from 35% to 20%, leaving a 50% chance for some kind of trade deal to emerge by the end of that month (Table 1). Table 1Updated Trade War Probabilities (April 2019) U.S.-China Conflict: The End Of The Beginning U.S.-China Conflict: The End Of The Beginning Trump Is Not Nixon If Xi is not Mao, then Trump is not Nixon. Despite a likely trade deal, we are not on the verge of a historic 1972-esque “grand compromise” that will usher in a new era of U.S.-China engagement. This should temper enthusiasm regarding the long-term durability of the trade truce, highlighting that China’s credit data is the more important factor for the 12-month horizon, though the trade issue is an impediment that needs to be removed for a sustainable rally. China may be increasingly willing to embrace structural concessions, but the depth of the structural change should be doubted until the details of the trade deal prove otherwise. For example, at the moment there is still no agreement on tariff levels. And there can be no “enforcement mechanism” to satisfy the U.S. side other than the perpetual threat of tariffs, which erodes trust and discourages Chinese implementation of structural changes. Two structural issues highlight the conundrum: currency and foreign investment. First, while the details of the currency agreement are unknown, the U.S. will definitely not get anything comparable to what it got from Japan after the Plaza Accord in 1985. The Japanese were a subordinate ally to the U.S. in the midst of the Cold War; they did not negotiate with the suspicion that the U.S. secretly wanted to destroy their economy. China has neither the security guarantee nor the economic trust. The implication is that the CNY-USD may rise by about 10% or so from current levels (Chart 9), as opposed to the 54% that the JPY-USD witnessed from 1985-88. The upside for the U.S. is that Trump may get some yuan appreciation, while the upside for China is that limited appreciation means no excessively deflationary impact. Chart 9Currency Agreement: Far From A Plaza Accord Currency Agreement: Far From A Plaza Accord Currency Agreement: Far From A Plaza Accord Second, China’s new foreign investment law, which received a rubber stamp from the legislature in March, is not an unqualified success for American negotiators. We have illustrated this in Table 2 by denoting white flags for aspects of the law that are genuine concessions and red flags for aspects that will raise new suspicions about China’s foreign investment framework. It is a mixed bag. Moreover, the law itself has no power and will depend entirely on the central government’s dedication to imposing strict adherence down through the local layers of government, where forced technology transfer actually takes place. Table 2New Foreign Investment Law: A Mixed Bag U.S.-China Conflict: The End Of The Beginning U.S.-China Conflict: The End Of The Beginning American negotiators will also want bilateral agreements on tech transfer and intellectual property protection since otherwise they will not receive any particular benefit from a law that applies equally to all foreign investors (e.g. Europeans). But it is not yet clear that they will get anything more concrete. The upside for the U.S. is that it will have some means of redress for forced tech transfer and intellectual property theft, while the upside for China is that foreign direct investment should improve. The strategic conflicts between the U.S. and China are even less likely to be dealt with than the economic issues. How can we be sure? Peer Competition: The U.S.-China détente under Nixon occurred at a time when a vast asymmetry between U.S. and Chinese national power existed, whereas today China’s power increasingly rivals that of the U.S., making it easier for China to write its own rules for global interactions and to resist U.S. pressure (Chart 10). Unilateralism: Trump did not leverage American alliances and partnerships across the world to create a “coalition of the willing” to confront China over its mercantilist trade and investment practices. There is some cooperation but it has been inconsistent and tentative, even on deep national security concerns like Huawei’s involvement in 5G networks and the Internet of Things. Had the U.S. created such a coalition and then set out to prosecute its claims, the threat to China’s economy would have been so immense that much greater structural changes could be expected than is the case today (Chart 11). Chart 10The Era Of U.S.-China Detente Is Over The Era Of U.S.-China Detente Is Over The Era Of U.S.-China Detente Is Over Chart 11Trump Eschewed A Coalition Of The Willing Trump Eschewed A Coalition Of The Willing Trump Eschewed A Coalition Of The Willing Core Interests: The trade talks only nominally address dangerous conflicts in China’s near abroad. China’s enforcement of sanctions on North Korea has produced limited results so far but we ultimately expect diplomacy to bear fruit (Chart 12). However, Taiwan is more rather than less likely to be the site of conflict. This is not because of pro-independence sentiment, which is actually on decline in public opinion relative to pro-unification sentiment (Chart 12, second panel). It is because the lame duck Tsai Ing-wen administration may attempt to secure last-minute benefits from the U.S., while an unexpected primary election challenge could lead to the nomination of Lai Ching-te (William Lai), a more outspoken pro-independence candidate, on April 24. Either could provoke Beijing. There is zero chance that any trade deal in the coming months will reduce the threat of reunification of Taiwan by force. Underlying distrust will remain. Chart 12Geopolitical Risk Down In Korea But Up In Taiwan Geopolitical Risk Down In Korea But Up In Taiwan Geopolitical Risk Down In Korea But Up In Taiwan Furthermore, the South China Sea is not a “red herring” but a potential “black swan,” as it is connected to Taiwan’s security and more broadly to U.S. alliance security. After all, 96%-97% of Taiwan’s, South Korea’s, and Japan’s oil imports flow through these sea lanes. Critical supplies become vulnerable if China expands its military’s capabilities there (Diagram 1). The U.S. and China will likely be just as provocative as before in this area after they sign a deal. Technology: The tech conflict is more likely to limit the trade deal than vice versa. The sanctions and embargoes on Chinese companies like ZTE, Fujian Jinghua, and Huawei have operated on a separate track from the trade talks, and it is not at all clear that the U.S. will embrace Huawei as part of any final deal. The initial actions of the newly beefed-up Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) send warning signals. CFIUS is largely a vehicle for U.S. oversight of China (Table 3) and, if anything, that country-specific focus is intensifying. For instance, the U.S. has deemed Chinese ownership of a gay and lesbian hook-up app, Grindr, to pose an excessive national security risk.3 This is not a high bar for intervention and it suggests that any trade deal will fail to improve China’s investment options in the U.S. tech sector. Diagram 1South China Sea As Traffic Roundabout U.S.-China Conflict: The End Of The Beginning U.S.-China Conflict: The End Of The Beginning Table 3CFIUS Is Mostly About China U.S.-China Conflict: The End Of The Beginning U.S.-China Conflict: The End Of The Beginning The takeaway is that while both sides want a deal over the short term, it will not mark the end of the trade war. It is more likely the end of the beginning of a cold war. As long as China’s economy and industrial capabilities continue to grow relative to the United States, its geographic periphery remains a cauldron of geopolitical risks, and its technological advancement remains rapid, the competition will continue. Bottom Line: There is no substantial evidence from the current trade talks that underlying strategic conflicts will be resolved. This implies that the U.S. and China will shift their focus to these conflicts in the weeks and months after any trade deal. That process will be a nuisance to global equity markets expecting a clean deal; Chinese and American tech stocks in particular will remain exposed to tail risks. The status of Chinese tech companies is a critical risk, as a deal for the U.S. to admit Huawei would be a game-changer. Investment Conclusions Ironically, an early resolution of the trade war – in April or May – offers less of a benefit for Chinese equities and other risk assets than a later resolution in June or thereafter. While we expect to have greater clarity on China’s stimulus magnitude from the March data, it is still possible that stimulus will remain mixed or disappointing. Stimulus measures may also be toned down after a deal is approved, which means that an earlier deal would reduce the total stimulus by the end of 2019. The Trump administration will use the new flexibility gained from a China deal to toughen its policies in other areas, potentially with negative market consequences. The decision to designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization is an important example. This decision is squarely within the Trump administration’s policy of pressuring Iran, which is a high-risk policy with substantial market-relevance. Trump may have made the decision in order to save face while planning to renew waivers on Iranian oil sanctions on May 4 – we would be extremely surprised if he did not renew. Sanctioning the IRGC involves a string of consequences but it is not a direct attack on oil supply that could produce an oil shock dangerous to Trump’s re-election prospects in 2020 (Chart 13). Of course, Iran will retaliate to the IRGC blacklisting – and one way it could do so would be through oil production in various places, including Iraq. The result would be oil volatility and higher prices. Chart 13 Further, an early deal could encourage Trump to instigate a trade war with Europe. Trump’s four-to-six week time frame for the conclusion of talks with China is conspicuously close to the tentative May 18 deadline by which he is required to determine whether to impose tariffs on foreign auto and auto part imports (Chart 14). Such tariffs would be pursuant to the Section 232 investigation that likely found such imports a threat to national security. We have argued that a U.S.-China deal raises the risk of tariffs on European cars to 35%, with Japanese and Korean cars less at risk, progressively. The EU is ready to retaliate so this would be a drawn-out trade conflict. Chart 14 Chart 15   By contrast, we are less concerned about the market impact of Trump’s recent threats to close the border with Mexico or include Mexico in car tariffs (Chart 15). True, Trump could close the border and generate a temporary drag on trade and the border economy. However, the Republicans have limited patience for the economic blowback of an extended border closure, and Trump cannot afford to jeopardize passage of his USMCA trade deal as long as he has alternative ways of looking tough on the border. Geopolitical Strategy would view the U.S. and China as good overweights relative to global equities and within their respective developed and emerging market contexts. What about a later resolution of the trade deal, in June or later in the summer? This would remove some risks. By that time, the Iran decision and possibly the car tariff decision will be past and there will be greater clarity on the magnitude of China’s stimulus. More extensive negotiations could also suggest that the ensuing trade deal will resolve deeper disagreements – unless the talks drag on without consequence amid signs of declining trust. Given the risk of trade war with Europe, oil volatility, and uncertainties about China’s stimulus, Geopolitical Strategy would view the U.S. and China as good overweights relative to global equities and within their respective developed and emerging market contexts. When and if the above political hurdles are cleared, the emphasis can shift to other bourses. Geopolitical Strategy’s preferred emerging market plays are EM energy producers and EM Asian states like Thailand and Indonesia.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See Ailsa Chang, “U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer Discusses Ongoing Trade Talks With China,” National Public Radio, March 25, 2019, www.npr.org. 2 For the above quotations see Andrew Mayeda, Xiaoqing Pi, and Margaret Talev, “Kudlow Sees No Letup in China Talks as Both Sides Cite Progress,” Bloomberg, April 4, 2019, www.bloomberg.com. 3 See David E. Sanger, “Grindr Is Owned by a Chinese Firm, and the U.S. Is Trying to Force It to Sell,” March 28, 2019, www.nytimes.com.

Highlights In their current form and size, perpetual bonds issuance and the central bank bills swap program are unlikely game-changers for the banking system in China. However, this mechanism constitutes monetization of banks’ capital and bad assets, i.e., recapitalization of banks, by the PBoC via quantitative easing. Hence, this scheme can be presently viewed as a bazooka that has not yet been loaded by the government. If the authorities pursue this program on a large scale without forcing banks to acknowledge and write off bad assets, banks would regain power to expand their balance sheets, fostering a cyclical economic recovery. Nevertheless, the growth model based on continuous “out of thin air” money and credit expansion inevitably leads to falling productivity growth and rising inflation. Therefore, the economic outcome over the course of several years would be stagflation, which is profoundly bearish for the currency. Feature The Chinese authorities recently launched a Central Bank Bills Swap (CBS) program to boost liquidity and facilitate issuance of commercial banks’ perpetual bonds. Box I-1 on pages 12-13 elaborates on the scheme and provides more detail about the program. Under the CBS program, Chinese banks can buy each other’s perpetual bonds, then exchange these bonds for central bank bills and pledge those bills at the People Bank of China (PBoC) to receive funding. Insurance companies are also allowed to purchase perpetual bonds, but they cannot pledge them with the central bank for funding. What are the macro implications of this program? Can the government use this scheme to recapitalize the banking system? Does the CBS program amount to quantitative easing? Will it be sufficient to boost credit growth in China in 2019? We have conditional answers to these questions – i.e., they all depend on the extent to which the scheme is actually utilized by the authorities. On the one hand, the CBS program could potentially become a proverbial bazooka used by the government to recapitalize the banking system via the PBoC monetizing banks’ bad assets. By doing so, the PBoC would be expanding its balance sheet by injecting excess reserves into the banking system – i.e., quantitative easing. Consequently, it could help banks accelerate credit and money growth, in turn helping the economy. The long-run collateral damage in this scenario, however, would be an RMB depreciation. On the other hand, the authorities could limit the usage of the scheme via various regulatory approvals and norms. In such a case, the impact of the program on money/credit growth and the real economy as well as on the exchange rate would be limited. In other words, it might end up being no more than a tool to help the four large banks meet BIS's TLAC requirements. At the moment, there is not enough information to determine whether the program will be a game changer for the banking system in China, leading to a surge in credit and broader economic recovery. Both total assets and broad credit growth among banks remain very weak for now (Chart I-1). In other words, it is a bazooka that has not been loaded, and may never be loaded because of the potential for seriously negative ramifications over the long term. Chart I-1Chinese Banks: Total Assets And Broad Credit Growth Chinese Banks: Total Assets And Broad Credit Growth Chinese Banks: Total Assets And Broad Credit Growth Consequently, we maintain our view that China’s growth will continue to disappoint in the first half of 2019, and that China-related plays, including many emerging markets (EM), remain at risk of a renewed selloff. Bank Recapitalization? In theory, the issuance of perpetual bonds along with the CBS program can be used to recapitalize the banking system. Each bank can buy perpetual bonds issued by other banks up to 10% of their core Tier-1 capital. These banks can get cheap financing from the PBoC by swapping these perpetual bonds with central bank bills, and then pledging those bills at the central bank to get funding. Hence, under this scheme, the PBoC will be financing purchases of perpetual bonds, which means the monetary authorities will indirectly be funding banks’ recapitalization. It is an “open secret” that Chinese banks would be considerably undercapitalized if they were forced to recognize non-performing assets. The non-performing loan (NPL) ratio currently stands at 1.9%, and the special-mention loans ratio is at 3.2%; and the sum of both is at 5.1% of total loans (Chart I-2, top panel). NPL provisions presently amount to 3.4% of total loans. Chart I-2Chinese Banks Are Massively Under-Provisioned Chinese Banks Are Massively Under-Provisioned Chinese Banks Are Massively Under-Provisioned When expressed as a share of total risk-weighted assets, the aggregate NPLs and special-mention loans are equal to 4.2% (Chart I-2, bottom panel). At 2.8% of risk-weighted assets, NPL provisions are extremely inadequate. Assuming non-performing assets turn out to be 10% of total risk-weighted assets, some 40% of banks' capital would be wiped out, according to our simulation presented in Table I-1. This is after accounting for existing provisions and assuming a 20% recovery rate of non-performing assets. Chart I- Provided that risk-weighting assigns a zero weight to banks’ claims on the government, a 50% risk weight to claims on households and a 100% weight to claims on companies, the assumption of 10% of non-performing assets in total risk-weighted assets is reasonable. This is especially the case when the enormous credit boom of the past 10 years is taken into consideration. As a result, in this scenario the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) will drop from its current level of 13.8% to 9.4%. This will bring the CAR below the regulatory minimum of 11%. To raise the CAR to the regulatory minimum of 11%, the banking system would require RMB 2 trillion of capital. This is greater than the maximum potential demand for perpetual bonds that we estimate to be up to RMB 1.4 trillion. To estimate this number, we assumed all banks purchase perpetual bonds in amounts equal to 5% of their core Tier-1 capital and all insurance companies buy perpetual bonds in an amount equal to 5% of assets. This is not an underestimation of potential demand for perpetual bonds since there are currently limitations on banks’ ability to issue and purchase these bonds as elaborated in Box I-1 on pages 12-13. In short, it is not clear if perpetual bond issuance and the CBS will be sufficient to undertake full recapitalization of the banking system and allow banks to accelerate their balance sheet expansion to finance an economic recovery. Bottom Line: In their current form and shape, perpetual bonds and the CBS program are unlikely to be a game-changer for the banking system in China. However, if the authorities eliminate limitations and change regulatory norms, the scheme could potentially be used to recapitalize China’s banking system. This is why this scheme can presently be viewed as a bazooka that has not yet been loaded by the government. Does CBS Represent QE? Its Impact On Liquidity And Money Supply The CBS program is a form of quantitative easing (QE). It will expand the PBoC’s balance sheet and banking system liquidity (excess reserves at the central bank), as elaborated in Box I-1 and Diagram I-1 on pages 12-14. If pursued on a large scale, this scheme would constitute monetization of banks’ capital and their bad assets by the central bank. The mechanism is already in place, but the extent to which authorities will use it to recapitalize banks remains unclear. Even though the CBS program will expand banking system liquidity – i.e., excess reserves at the central bank – it will not – however - affect broad money supply. The basis is simple: Banks’ excess reserves at the central bank are not part of the broad money supply in any country. Banks use excess reserves to settle payments between one another and with the central bank. Banks do not lend out excess reserves. Further, only a central bank can create excess reserves, and it does so “out of thin air.” In brief, excess reserves rather than corporate and individual deposits constitute genuine banking system liquidity. Barring lending to or buying assets from non-banks – which does not typically occur outside of QE programs – central banks do not create broad money or deposits.1 Money/deposits, the ultimate purchasing power for economic agents, is created by commercial banks “out of thin air,” as we have discussed and illustrated in our series of reports on money, credit and savings.2 Having adequate capital and liquidity as well as positive risk appetite, banks can expand their balance sheets, i.e., originate loans and buy various securities. When banks make loans or purchase assets from non-banks, they simultaneously create deposits and new purchasing power. Chart I-3 demonstrates that in recent years, excess reserves in China’s banking system have been flat, yet banks’ assets and the supply of money has expanded tremendously. The opposite can also occur: Banks’ excess reserves can mushroom, but banks may actually be reluctant to grow their balance sheets. This was the case after the Lehman crisis with U.S. banks and in the wake of the European debt crisis with euro area banks. Chart I-3China: Excess Reserves And Broad Money China: Excess Reserves And Broad Money China: Excess Reserves And Broad Money Finally, we have elaborated at great length in our past reports that China’s money and credit excesses do not stem from its high household savings rate. Rather, like any credit bubble in any country, China’s leverage is due to the creation of credit/money “out of thin air.”2 Bottom Line: Perpetual bond issuance and the CBS program will expand the banking system’s excess reserves, but not broad money supply. Besides, it is not certain that excess reserves will accelerate loan growth. Credit origination by banks depends on many other factors such as banks’ willingness to expand their risk assets, loan demand and the regulatory regime and norms. Deleveraging Has Not Yet Started One cannot discuss the potential for a monetary bazooka in China without an update on the status of deleveraging. The fact is that deleveraging in China has not even begun: Credit is still expanding faster than nominal GDP growth. The most common way to measure leverage/debt is to compare it with the cash flow that is used to service debt. Nominal GDP is a measure of cash flow in an economy from a macro perspective. The debt-to-asset ratio is a poor measure of leverage because asset valuations are often subjective: Assets are valued by debtors themselves. Besides, apart from distressed credit investors, one does not want to be a creditor to a country or company that has to sell assets to service its debt. Stock and bond prices of debtor countries or companies tailspin when the latter have to sell assets to service debt. The top panel of Chart I-4 illustrates that China’s enterprise and household domestic credit/debt is still expanding at an annual rate of close to 10% at a time when nominal GDP growth has slowed to 8%. Chart I-4China: Deleveraging Has Not Even Begun China: Deleveraging Has Not Even Begun China: Deleveraging Has Not Even Begun Consistently, the debt to GDP ratio has not declined at all (Chart I-4, bottom panel). In this context, a rhetorical question is in order: Should China ramp up money/credit growth and monetize banks’ NPLs, given that deleveraging has yet to take place? Economic Ramifications Of Deploying The Bazooka What would be the economic ramifications if the Chinese authorities once again promote and allow unrelenting money/credit expansion “out of thin air” to bail out zombie banks and companies? Cyclically: If the authorities compel banks to acknowledge NPLs and write them off as and when the PBoC finances their recapitalization, banks may not be in a position to accelerate loan growth. This scenario entails that credit growth and hence cyclical sectors in China would remain weak for a while. In contrast, if the authorities pursue recapitalization of banks without forcing them to acknowledge and write off bad assets, banks would regain their power to expand their balance sheets, fostering a cyclical economic recovery. Structurally (in the long term): The growth model based on continuous “out of thin air” money and credit expansion inevitably breeds economic inefficiencies, falling productivity growth and rising inflation. In short, the economic outcome over the course of several years would be stagflation. Chart I-5 illustrates that China’s ICOR (incremental capital-to-output ratio) is rising, or inversely that the output-to-capital ratio is falling. This entails worsening economic efficiency and slowing productivity growth. Chart I-5Symptoms Of Rising Inefficiencies Symptoms Of Rising Inefficiencies Symptoms Of Rising Inefficiencies Chart I-6 shows a potential stylized roadmap for the Chinese economy in the years ahead if the credit and money bubbles are inflated further without corporate restructuring, bankruptcies, the imposition of hard budget constraints and meaningfully improved capital/credit allocation. The red line represents potential GDP growth, and the dotted red line is our projection. Chart I-6 In any economy, the potential growth rate is equal to the sum of growth rates of the labor force and productivity. China’s labor force is no longer expanding and will begin shrinking in the coming years (Chart I-7). Hence, going forward, the sole source of potential GDP growth in China will be productivity growth. Productivity growth has been slowing and will continue to do so if structural market-oriented reforms are not implemented (Chart I-8, top panel). Besides, the industrialization ratio has already risen a lot (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-7China: No Tailwind From Labor Force China: No Tailwind From Labor Force China: No Tailwind From Labor Force Chart I-8China: Productivity Is Slowing China: Productivity Is Slowing China: Productivity Is Slowing With the potential GDP growth rate in China declining, future fiscal and credit stimulus may lead to higher nominal – but not real – growth. The latter will be constrained by a slowing rate of potential real GDP growth. Higher nominal but weaker potential (real) growth entails rising inflation. The combination of higher inflation along with the need to maintain very low nominal interest rates to assist debtors is bearish for the currency. In such a scenario, there will be intensifying depreciation pressure on the yuan from the tremendous overhang of RMBs in the banking system (Chart I-9). The PBoC’s foreign exchange reserves of $3 trillion will not be sufficient to backstop the enormous amount of RMB (money) supply of RMB 210 trillion – which is equivalent to US$30 trillion (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Helicopter Money In China Helicopter Money In China Helicopter Money In China Chart I-10PBoC FX Reserves Are Equal To 10% Of Broad Money Supply PBoC FX Reserves Are Equal To 10% Of Broad Money Supply PBoC FX Reserves Are Equal To 10% Of Broad Money Supply If broad money supply continues to expand at an annual rate of close to 9-10% or above, downward pressure on the yuan will escalate immensely, and the Chinese authorities will have no choice but to close the capital account completely and also heavily regulate current account transactions. Bottom Line: If the authorities do not restrain the PBoC’s financing of perpetual bond issuance via the CBS and in the interim do not force banks to write off bad assets, the upshot will be the monetization of banks’ bad assets by the PBoC. This will constitute the ultimate socialist put for banks and zombie debtors, as well as for the entire economy. Business cycle swings, bankruptcies and deflation are inherent features of a market-driven/capitalist economy. A socialist put via promoting unlimited money and credit creation entails long-term stagflation – lower productivity growth and rising inflation. This is very bearish for the currency. Investment Conclusions To be sure, the above analysis suggests that the bazooka has not been loaded and the Chinese economy is not about to stage an imminent recovery. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team maintains its bearish stance on China-related plays worldwide. We are closely monitoring China’s money and credit aggregates as well as indicators from the real economy to gauge when China’s business cycle will revive. So far, these indicators continue to point south. EM risk assets and currencies have recently been boosted by the Federal Reserve’s dovish turn. But as we argued in last week’s report, this will prove short-lived. Global trade, China’s growth and commodities prices are the key drivers of EM financial markets, not the Fed. Provided our negative outlook for these three factors due to the ongoing slowdown in China, we continue to recommend a negative stance on EM in absolute terms, and underweighting EM stocks and credit versus their U.S. peers. The dollar’s weakness stemming from the downshift in U.S. interest rate expectations is running out of steam. Chart I-11 shows that the broad trade-weighted dollar is trying to find support at its 200-day moving average. Conversely, the EM stocks index and copper prices are struggling to break above their 200-day moving averages (Chart I-11, middle and bottom panels). Chart I-11Dollar And EM / Commodities: Mirror Images Dollar And EM / Commodities: Mirror Images Dollar And EM / Commodities: Mirror Images We believe the dollar is poised for a breakout, and EM and copper are due for a breakdown. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com   Box 1 Issuance Of Perpetual Bonds And CBS Program The authorities are promoting the issuance of perpetual bonds and the CBS program as a scheme for the country’s big-four banks to raise capital to meet BIS ’s Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) requirements for globally systemically important banks. Limitations and other details on the perpetual bonds issuance and CBS program: 24 out of 30 banks listed on the A-share market are presently qualified to issue perpetual bonds as their assets exceed RMB 200 billion, a threshold established by the PBoC. Perpetual bonds will boost the Tier-1 capital of issuing banks. Banks are allowed to purchase perpetual bonds issued by other banks in amounts up to 10% of their core Tier-1 capital. Only primary dealers (46 banks and 2 brokers) can exchange qualified perpetual bonds they hold for PBoC bills, with a maximum exchange period of three years. The incentive for banks to purchase perpetual bonds will for now be low because these bonds consume large amounts of capital. The risk weights for these perpetual bonds ranges between 150-250%. How Does It Work? As Diagram I-1 on page 14 illustrates, when Bank B purchases perpetual bonds from Bank A, the former transfers excess reserves to the latter. The amount of outstanding deposits, i.e., money supply, is not affected at all. Hence, there is no direct impact on the broad money supply. Chart I- Banks do not require deposits to make loans and buy securities. Banks need excess reserves at the central bank to pay for or settle payments with other banks. When Bank B transfers excess reserves to Bank A, the aggregate amount of excess reserves in the banking system does not change. Bank B can swap these perpetual bonds with central bank bills, and then pledge these bills at the PBoC to get excess reserves. As it does so, Bank B will replenish its excess reserves. Consequently, the amount of excess reserves in the banking system will expand, as will the PBoC’s balance sheet. Overall, the issuance of perpetual bonds and CBS swaps lead to both bank recapitalization and banking system liquidity (excess reserves) expansion. Why has the PBoC decided to fund the issuance of perpetual bonds? Without PBoC funding, demand for perpetual bonds might be very low, and yields on them could spike. Higher yields could lure away capital from other corporate bonds, producing higher borrowing costs in credit markets. On the positive side, the monetary authorities will not only recapitalize a number of large banks but will also do so by capping borrowing costs in the credit markets and injecting more liquidity into the banking system. On the negative side, yields of these perpetual bonds will not be determined by the market. Rather they will be artificially suppressed by potential open-ended PBoC funding. This will preserve China’s inefficient credit allocation system and misallocation of capital in general. In a market economy, the authorities will typically force banks to raise capital in securities markets or privately. More issuance, especially when it comes from many banks simultaneously, typically pushes down the prices of bank stocks and bonds. The basis is securities issuance often dilutes existing shareholders and is also negative for bondholders. This threat of dilution and losing money incentivizes existing shareholders and bondholders of a bank to impose discipline on the bank’s management. Consequently, banks would be better run and capital allocation would be more efficient than it would otherwise be in a system where such oversight and incentives are absent. In brief, the market mechanism deters banks from risky and speculative behavior and contributes to the long-term health of the banking system, as well as the efficiency of capital allocation in the real economy. By allowing banks to purchase each other’s bonds, and with the PBoC financing it, China is not imposing the much-needed market discipline on bank shareholders, bondholders and by extension, bank management. This does not promote efficient capital allocation and higher productivity growth in the long run. Footnotes 1      Money supply is the sum of all deposits in the banking system. Hence, we use terms money and deposits interchangeably. 2      Please see the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report “Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses”, dated October 26, 2016, Special Report “China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB?”, dated November 23, 2016, Special Report “Do Credit Bubbles Originate From HIgh National Savings?”, dated January 18, 2017, Special Report “The True Meaning Of China's Great 'Savings Wall'”, dated December 20, 2017 Special Report “Is Investment Constrained By Savings? Tales Of China and Brazil”, dated March 22, 2018, available at www.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights So What? Ongoing reforms will drag on China's policy easing measures. Why? Xi Jinping is not abandoning his "Three Tough Battles" against leverage, pollution, and poverty. China is striving to contain leverage, despite the shift of rhetoric away from deleveraging. China's anti-pollution targets have eased, but in a pragmatic way. Barring a sharp economic deceleration, China's stimulus measures will be about stability rather than reacceleration. Feature China's leader Xi Jinping has clearly focused on two systemic risks: leverage and pollution (Table 1). Xi redoubled his efforts to address these risks in 2017 when he launched the "Three Tough Battles" against financial systemic risk, pollution, and poverty that will last through 2020. In this Special Report we provide a "status update" on the three battles, particularly the anti-pollution campaign. Investors should not mistake China's policy easing for a wholesale reversal of reform in order to stimulate growth. Today's policy environment and response is different from what investors are familiar with, which is large-scale fiscal and credit injections that pump up infrastructure and property construction and materially reaccelerate global and Chinese demand. Table 1Central Government Spending Preferences (Under Leader's Immediate Control) China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" The First Battle: Financial Systemic Risk First, a word about financial systemic risk, which is of the utmost importance to China's economic trajectory, the global investment outlook, and Xi Jinping's other two policy battles. We have now had two months of full data - August and September - since China's top leaders announced in late July that they would ease economic policy. The data show that there has not been a major acceleration in total private credit growth. This is based on the adjusted total social financing measure used by BCA's China Investment Strategy, which now includes the special purpose bonds that local governments have been issuing rapidly in response to central government demands to ease policy (Chart 1). Chart 1No Credit Spike ... Yet No Credit Spike ... Yet No Credit Spike ... Yet We also closely watch China's money supply. Monetary impulses are bottoming and the M2 impulse is now positive (Chart 2). This is a marginal positive for both the Chinese and global economic outlook in 2019, though it is at odds with China's credit impulse. Chart 2Money And Credit Impulses At Odds Money And Credit Impulses At Odds Money And Credit Impulses At Odds While bank loan growth remains steady, informal lending growth is starting to pick up (Chart 3). This could herald a relaxation of controls on shadow banking, although that is by no means clear yet. Chart 3Shadow Banking Crackdown Is Easing Shadow Banking Crackdown Is Easing Shadow Banking Crackdown Is Easing Fiscal spending is also becoming more proactive, as is apparent from the spike in local government bond issuance (Chart 4). However, these new bonds hardly make a dent in the total credit picture, as shown in Chart 1 above. Chart 4Fiscal Policy Becomes More Proactive China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" We expect China to stimulate more if internal or external conditions worsen. That looks likely, as we also have a structurally bearish view of the U.S.-China relationship. The trade war could prompt the U.S. to extend tariffs to all Chinese imports at the 25% rate that will apply to $200 billion worth of imports as of January 1, 2019. To be prudent, investors need to be prepared for even a 45% tariff rate on all Chinese imports, as President Trump first threatened on the campaign trail. People's Bank of China Governor Yi Gang has recently implied that benchmark interest rates could be cut if necessary, in addition to further cuts to the required reserve ratio. These measures would have the additional effect of weakening CNY/USD, which could also be stimulative for China, but may first disrupt emerging markets and worsen the trade war. The foregoing data reveal that, while the government has clearly toned down its rhetoric about deleveraging, it continues to try to contain the rise in leverage. China's administration - in contrast to many bullish investors - views leverage as a form of systemic risk. The top leaders perceive that excess leverage is bad for productivity. It delays China's adjustment to a more sustainable, consumer-driven economic model. And it exacerbates quality-of-life problems that could lead to socio-political instability, such as land appropriation and environmental degradation. China's economy can only reaccelerate sharply if Xi Jinping and his deputies - namely his top economic adviser Liu He and also Guo Shuqing, the party secretary of the PBOC - throw in the towel and allow total credit to skyrocket. President Xi is pragmatic and ultimately may have to do this - if conditions get bad enough. But for now, the pace of deceleration is not so quick that throwing in the towel is warranted. Furthermore, the trade war provides Xi with ample domestic political "coverage" to blame the U.S. for any economic pain incurred while pursuing badly needed domestic restructuring. Bottom Line: The Chinese administration wants to contain leverage, and this policy imperative will not easily waver. Data shows that the policy shifts announced in July were indeed evidence of "fine-tuning" rather than wholesale stimulus. The U.S. trade war provides the Xi administration with a scapegoat to absorb public anger when the pain of long-needed economic adjustments sets in. We remain data-dependent and will alter our global asset allocation recommendation - long DM / short EM - if evidence of a wholesale policy shift occurs. The Second Battle: Pollution What about Xi's second battle, the anti-pollution campaign? Is China already throwing out its new environmental regulations in order to stimulate growth? No, but it is compromising them for the sake of stability. Chart 5China Is Resource Intensive China Is Resource Intensive China Is Resource Intensive China's rapid rise from an agrarian society to an industrial power came at a devastating environmental cost. The heavy resource intensity of its economy (Chart 5) translates to extremely high pollution levels (Chart 6). Chart 6A Highly Polluting Economy A Highly Polluting Economy A Highly Polluting Economy To some extent, this is a natural phase of development. The "environmental Kuznets curve" hypothesizes that as economies industrialize they become increasingly polluting - and yet at a certain level of income the relationship reverses and economic growth becomes associated with environmental improvement (Diagram 1).1 Diagram 1The 'Environmental Kuznets Curve' Applies To Air Pollution China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" Chart 7China Following In The Footsteps Of Less Resource-Intensive Neighbors China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" As China transitions to a services-led economy, its appetite for commodities will slow. This is what happened in the advanced economies - and China is already on this path (Chart 7). The transition points away from export-manufacturing, which means that the share of electricity consumed by the industrial sector - currently disproportionately large - will ease (Chart 8). Chart 8Manufacturing Intensity Will Moderate China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" Chart 9Reliance On Coal Power Will Fall China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China's consumption of coal, on which it depends very heavily (Chart 9), will continue to fall as a share of total energy consumption. And coal is significantly more polluting than other forms of energy (Table 2). Table 2Natural Gas Emits Less Carbon China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" Already, growth in the service sector - the so-called tertiary industries - now outpaces manufacturing growth and accounts for more than half of Chinese GDP (Chart 10). Chart 10Rising Service Sector Means Less Pollution Rising Service Sector Means Less Pollution Rising Service Sector Means Less Pollution However, the pace of change is too slow for the Chinese public, which has been suffering from the health-related costs of rapid industrialization. The World Health Organization reports that in 2016, over a million deaths in China were attributed to ambient air pollution.2 Chart 11There Is A Reason Xi Jinping Cracked Down On Corruption And Pollution China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" The Pew Research Center finds that 76% of survey respondents would classify air pollution as a "big problem," and nearly half of which a "very big problem" (Chart 11). On top of that, a 2016 survey shows that the Chinese public favors clean air over industry if forced to make a tradeoff (Chart 12). Chart 12The Public Understands The Tradeoff China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" To prevent public discontent from boiling over, China launched a sweeping effort to restrain pollution when Xi Jinping took power in 2012-13 - particularly after the appallingly smoggy winter of 2013, known as "airpocalypse." Chart 13Air Pollution Is Trending Downwards Air Pollution Is Trending Downwards Air Pollution Is Trending Downwards These measures have broadly been effective. Readings of China's preferred measure of air pollution - PM2.5 concentration3 - have fallen steadily (Chart 13). The goals were achieved by means of overcapacity cuts in the coal and steel sectors - including shutting down low-quality steel plants - and replacing coal with cleaner forms of energy, particularly natural gas (Chart 14). Chart 14Coal Reliance Is Declining Coal Reliance Is Declining Coal Reliance Is Declining However, pollution is a structural challenge, not one that can be solved in a single five-year plan. Though PM2.5 emissions have fallen by 35% in 2017 compared to 2012, the current concentration of 47.3 µm/m3 remains well above China's national standard for maximum annual average exposure of 35 µm/m3. China's standards are also lax relative to international peers. The World Health Organization recommends a much lower annual mean for the concentration level at 10 µm/m3. Furthermore, air pollution is not equally concentrated throughout the country. The industrialized north is significantly more polluted than the rest of the country (Map 1). The provinces of Shanxi and Shaanxi saw PM2.5 levels rise from 2015-17, reaching the highest alert levels. Map 1China's Air Pollution By Province China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" As a result, the Xi administration has doubled down on its anti-pollution goals. The 13th Five Year Plan, covering 2016-20, was the first national economic blueprint to include air pollution targets. It got off to a rocky start because China had to stimulate the economy aggressively in 2015-16 to fend off a destabilizing slowdown. Pumping credit and fiscal spending into the industrial economy led to a rebound in high-polluting activity (Chart 15). Yet, as mentioned, when Xi consolidated power in 2017, he elevated the war on pollution to the "second battle" of the three battles. Chart 15Excess Credit Means Excess Pollution Excess Credit Means Excess Pollution Excess Credit Means Excess Pollution Pursuant to this 2018-20 framework, the latest action plan for air pollution reinforces the targets of the Five Year Plan and its 2020 deadline: The plan applies to all cities of prefectural or higher level, and thus expands the government's actions beyond the major cities in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, and Pearl River Delta areas. Furthermore, the Pearl River Delta is no longer one of the key regions, having made substantive progress. It has been replaced by the Fen-Wei Plains, which include Xi'an and parts of Shaanxi, Henan, and Shanxi provinces. These provinces rely on coal for energy and contain polluting industries. PM2.5 levels must fall by at least 18% from 2015 baseline levels in cities of prefectural or higher level and anywhere else where standards have not been met. Targets for reducing volatile organic compounds (VOC) and nitrogen oxide emissions are set to 10% and 15%, respectively, by the end of the period. The number of good-air days should reach 80 percent annually and the percentage of heavily polluted days should decrease by more than 25 percent from 2015 levels. The new air pollution goals are not as aggressive as those of the 2012-17 plan. For instance, the 18% cut in PM2.5 levels is less than the maximum 25% cut in the previous plan. However, the new goals are more precise and targeted. Rather than impose further declines in regions where air pollution has been successfully reduced, the plan aims to prevent heavy industries from migrating to other parts of China to evade environmental restrictions. After all, many of China's coal producers are located in the Fen-Wei Plains, which will no longer escape the regulator's eye (Chart 16). Chart 16The Fen-Wei Plain Now Under Scrutiny China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" What is the market implication of the above? In our view, some market participants have misread the new anti-pollution targets as a form of economic stimulus because they are less aggressive than those of the previous five years. While it is true that China faces a tradeoff between clean air and economic growth (Chart 17), the regulatory easing looks like an attempt to make the anti-pollution goals more realistic and achievable rather than abandoning the overarching anti-pollution push (see Box 1). In net terms, China is still tightening regulation. Chart 17Heavy Industrial Model Drives Pollution Heavy Industrial Model Drives Pollution Heavy Industrial Model Drives Pollution Box 1 Easing Up On winter Curbs? China has recently relied on heavy industry production curbs to limit pollution during the especially smog-prone winter months. The 2017-18 season saw the first of these wintertime cuts. Production in highly polluting industries such as coal, aluminum, and steel was slashed by up to 50% in 28 northern cities between mid-November 2017 and mid-March 2018. As a result, fine particle emissions fell. The year-on-year change in emissions peaked with the start of the cuts and troughed with their end, falling by an average 18% y/y over the period (Chart 18). Chart 18Last Winter's Anti-Pollution Crackdown China Sticks To The "Three Battles" China Sticks To The "Three Battles" Cuts will continue this winter, in theory limiting steel and aluminum production as well as coal consumption. However, the impact looks to be less dramatic this time around: While the August draft plan reportedly set PM2.5 reduction targets at 5% y/y for the 2018-19 winter, the final plan, released by the newly formed Ministry of Ecology and Environment, set a less ambitious objective of a 3% reduction in emissions. Blanket production cuts are being replaced by more flexible measures that will be overseen by local governments. Central government inspection teams will be dispatched less frequently. The new changes reflect the fact that Chinese policymakers are fine-tuning their policies to minimize the negative impact on industry as well as households that use coal-fired heating: The revision of emissions cuts from 5% in the August draft to 3% in the final plan reflects a more realistic cut than the 15% cut last year. But it is still a cut. The scrapping of blanket measures, in favor of more flexible cuts determined by regional emissions levels, will avoid penalizing producers who have already abided by the targets. It will also reward producers who have upgraded their facilities to be more eco-friendly. While year-on-year changes in emissions fell in northern China last winter, they spiked in the rest of the country, as economic agents shifted to areas not covered by the new rules. The same pattern emerged in the steel industry: steel production cuts in northern China were offset by a ramp-up in steel production from other regions (Chart 19). The newest plan expands the coverage of the regulations even as its demands are less draconian. Chart 19Polluters Know How To Evade Controls Polluters Know How To Evade Controls Polluters Know How To Evade Controls Last winter, local governments frantically shut down coal usage in order to meet strict 2017 deadlines for the plan to convert 20 million rural households from coal-heating to gas-heating by 2020. However, natural gas supplies could not pick up the slack - storage capacity, LNG import capacity, internal distribution, Central Asian imports, and bureaucratic coordination all fell short.4 Millions of households lost heating during the winter months, the authorities were forced to backtrack and allow coal imports, and a massive public backlash ensued. It is not surprising, then, that the government is compromising its coal-to-gas requirements for the coming winter.5 While the gas crunch is not expected to be as bad this winter, the underlying problems with natural gas storage, import, or distribution problems remain unresolved. So it makes sense for Beijing to give local governments more flexibility. A total conversion to natural gas heating is still supposed to be accomplished by 2020 in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region as well as in Shanxi and Shaanxi.6 The goal post may be moved but policies will still push in this direction. Ultimately, pollution is a cross-regional phenomenon - and it has proven to generate significant political opposition movements over time. Many developed nations have gone through a period of political upheaval sparked by popular backlash against the excesses of industrialization - including pollution.7 China does not have voters who can vote on environmental demands, but it greatly fears the political ramifications of widespread protests due to unbearable living and health conditions. As with the anti-corruption and anti-leverage campaigns, the Xi administration is trying to catch up to the magnitude of the problem and mitigate it before something snaps and triggers a general uproar. Bottom Line: China has pared back its emissions cuts for 2018-20 and softened its pollution curbs for the winter. These actions are less negative for economic growth than earlier curbs and proposals would have been. However, they still amount to a net increase in China's environmental regulation, which is in keeping with Xi Jinping's overarching policy priorities. The Third Battle: Poverty Poverty rates have collapsed in China since its opening up and reform in 1979. Xi's third battle is to eliminate rural poverty by 2020. This is the only battle of the three that is growth-enhancing rather than growth-constraining. It lifts China's growth by transferring government funds to the poorest citizens, who have the highest propensity to consume. At the average rate of rural poverty reduction over the past several years, there will still be around 11-12 million rural poor by the end of 2020 (Chart 20). Thus China will have to spend more to meet the target, creating a net increase in fiscal spending. Chart 20Anti-Poverty Campaign Requires Spending Anti-Poverty Campaign Requires Spending Anti-Poverty Campaign Requires Spending The war on poverty underscores a constraint on the previous two battles: growth and stability. Financial and environmental regulation cannot be imposed so aggressively as to lead to a sharp drop in growth or employment. This is China's "Socialist Put" - and it remains in place despite the fact that the government has a higher threshold for economic pain since 2017. While Xi has signaled that China will do away with annual GDP growth targets, he has not discarded them immediately. The leadership is still bound by the economic targets due in 2020 - the doubling of GDP from 2010 levels and the doubling of rural and urban incomes (Chart 21). Chart 21Stimulus Necessary If 2020-21 Goals In Jeopardy Stimulus Necessary If 2020-21 Goals In Jeopardy Stimulus Necessary If 2020-21 Goals In Jeopardy These targets are especially important because they more or less coincide with the "centenary goal" of making China a "moderately prosperous society" by 2021. The latter year will mark the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party; the administration will want to make sure that the economy is in good shape. The Chinese leadership takes its two centenary goals (2021 and 2049) seriously.8 As long as headline GDP growth does not fall too far below the average of 6.5% per year in 2018-20, the first centenary goals will be met. New tax cuts worth an estimated 1% of GDP, and other targeted measures, will help reach the goal for urban income, which is the one most at risk. If these goals look to be met, China can save its biggest stimulus measures for later. In recent years, China's economic "mini-cycles" have lasted about 1.4-to-2 years, from the trough of the total credit impulse to the peak of nominal GDP (Chart 22). If China launches a large-scale stimulus now, peak output will occur in 2020 and the economy will be decelerating into 2021. This would be bad timing for the centenary. It would make more sense for China to save some dry powder for 2019 or 2020 to ensure a positive economic backdrop in 2021. Chart 22Economy Peaks Two Years Post-Stimulus Economy Peaks Two Years Post-Stimulus Economy Peaks Two Years Post-Stimulus Bottom Line: We would need to see a much bigger shock to the economy than is currently in the offing for Xi to abandon his reform agenda for a traditional fiscal-and-credit splurge that exacerbates the credit bubble, fires up overbuilt industries, and annihilates all the hard work of his recent financial and environmental regulations. Investment Conclusions The above findings suggest that coal prices can rise in the near term.Demand will be supported by more flexibility on pollution curbs, while supply will be constrained by the ongoing supply-side cuts in coal production. Steel prices may fall, as production will rise amid less stringent environmental rules. More broadly, however, investors should understand what the recent tactical "easing" measures suggest about China's policy settings overall. China's political system is a system of single-party rule, in which the Communist Party explicitly rejects the legitimacy of "checks and balances" or political liberalism. However, the government cannot do whatever it wants. Its authoritarian model still requires it to address public pressure and maintain general popular approval - otherwise it would lose legitimacy and ultimately power. For the past four decades, the Communist Party has maintained legitimacy by providing economic growth and rising incomes - and these are still essential. But as the economy matures and growth rates naturally fall, it becomes more important to re-establish the party's legitimacy on improving quality of life. Xi Jinping made this point official in his address to the nineteenth National Party Congress last October, but it has driven his administration since 2012.9 The Communist Party is flush with tax revenues and maintains absolute control over government branches, banks, key corporations, security forces, and most forms of civil association. With these tools it can, for the most part, maintain its rule against regional or topical challenges. What it fears are systemic risks - challenges to its authority that span ideological, ethnic, class, or regional divides. Here the government is behind the curve, as quality of life has been entirely neglected during the country's high-growth phase of economic development. Thus Xi has tried to make up for lost time and tackle the most flagrant quality-of-life concerns. His anti-corruption campaign, for instance, sought to address the chief source of public discontent from the moment he came into office - as well as to recentralize power into his own hands so that he could tackle the other major grievances with zero resistance from the party or state bureaucracy. Now his top priorities are leverage and pollution, both of which pose systemic risks and hence the forthcoming improvement in fiscal and credit indicators will not proceed unchecked. Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com 1 There is a large body of literature on the Environmental Kuznets Curve; the important point for this study is that it holds up well to empirical scrutiny when it comes to modeling air pollution concentrations. Please see David I. Stern, "The Environmental Kuznets Curve After 25 Years," Australian National University, CCEP Working Paper 1514 (December 2015), available at ageconsearch.umn.edu. 2 The death rate attributable to ambient air pollution is 81 per 100,000 people, which places China among the most dangerously polluted countries, alongside North Korea, Russia, and several developing eastern European countries. Please see the WHO's Global Health Observatory data repository, available at www.who.int/gho/en. 3 PM2.5 is a general term for particles and liquid droplets in the atmosphere with aerodynamic diameters less than or equal to 2.5 microns (µm). Short- or long-term exposure to these particles has been found to lead to adverse cardiovascular effects such as heart attacks and strokes. 4 Please see David Sandalow, Akos Losz, and Sheng Yan, "A Natural Gas Giant Awakens: China's Quest for Blue Skies Shapes Global Markets," Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, July 27, 2018. 5 Please see Yujing Liu, "China scrambles to avoid a repeat of last winter's botched coal-to-gas conversion programme in highly polluting northern rural areas," SCMP, September 24, 2018, available at www.scmp.com. 6 Please see "China coal city vows 'no-coal zones' in bid to curb pollution," Reuters, October 11, 2018, available at reuters.com. 7 The Great London Smog of 1952 is a classic example, but for a detailed study please see Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies (Cambridge: Polity, 1990). 8 The first goal is to create a "moderately prosperous society in all respects," namely by doubling real GDP and rural and urban per capita income from 2010 levels by 2020. The second goal is to make China into a "modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious," with the GDP per capita of a moderately developed country at around $55,000 in 2014 dollars. Please see "CPC Q&A: What are China's two centennial goals and why do they matter?" Xinhua, October 17, 2017, available at www.xinhuanet.com. 9 Xi, in his work report at the party congress in 2017, said, "what we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing needs for a better life." This is a new formulation of the "principal contradiction" facing Chinese society, by contrast with the earlier formulation, which emphasized "the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and the low level of social production," according to former President Hu Jintao in 2007.

Highlights We have deciphered global trade linkages to determine which countries are most at risk from a slowdown in EM/China imports. Our analysis takes into account not only the destinations of shipments but also the types of goods. Peru, Chile, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand are the most vulnerable to a slowdown in industrial sectors in EM and China. The least vulnerable emerging economies to this theme are Mexico, Turkey, Colombia, India and Russia. Feature The growth desynchronization1 currently taking place between developing and advanced economies warrants a detailed analysis of trade flows by countries as well as types of goods to assess the vulnerability of various economies to the global trade slowdown. This report's objective is to reveal which countries are most vulnerable to a slowdown in domestic demand in emerging markets, including China. Our main macro theme remains a considerable slowdown in EM/China capital spending, and a moderate slowdown in their consumer spending. We used these macro assumptions to produce a vulnerability ranking for both developing and developed countries. Why Do China And EM Matter? Annual imports by emerging markets including China stand at a combined $7 trillion. This overshadows both U.S. and EU imports, which collectively stand at $4.6 trillion, and underscores the importance of EM and China in global trade (Chart I-1). Chinese imports excluding processing trade - inputs that are imported, then processed and re-exported - make up $1.6 trillion, i.e., constituting 23% of the $7 trillion total of EM plus China imports. Furthermore, the most vulnerable part of the EM/Chinese economies are capital expenditures. The latter represent a significant portion of the global economy (Chart I-2). Aggregate investment expenditures in developing countries including China are as large as those of the U.S. and EU together. China itself accounts for half of EM investment expenditures. Moreover, capital spending is the largest component of the Chinese economy, constituting 42% of GDP. By comparison, Chinese exports to the U.S. and EU together account for only 7% of GDP. Chinese shipments to the U.S. constitute a mere 3.6% of mainland GDP (Chart I-3). Chart I-1EM/China Imports Are Much Larger ##br##Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Imports Are Much Larger Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Imports Are Much Larger Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined Chart I-2EM/China Capex Is As Large ##br##As U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Capex Is As Large As U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Capex Is As Large As U.S.'s And EU's Combined Chart I-3Structure Of Chinese##br## Economy Structure Of Chinese Economy Structure Of Chinese Economy In turn, Chinese imports are much more leveraged to the country's capital spending than to household expenditures. Table I-1 shows that imports of consumer goods excluding autos account for a mere 15% of total Chinese foreign goods intake. Table I-1Import Composition Of Chinese Imports Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages With construction and infrastructure spending being a substantial part of mainland capital expenditures, China's investment cycle is very sensitive to the money/credit cycle. This is because no construction or infrastructure investment can be undertaken without credit (loans, bonds and other types of financing). Therefore, China's credit cycle - which drives its domestic capex cycle - is a key predictor of Chinese imports and many commodity prices (Chart I-4). Despite the latest liquidity easing in China, the cumulative effect of previous liquidity tightening as well as the ongoing regulatory clampdown on the financial system are still working their way through the banking and shadow banking systems. Our assessment is that it will take some time before the cumulative effect from the recent liquidity easing takes hold and helps growth recover. China accounts for a significant portion of total EM exports (Chart I-5). Shipments to China constitute 18% of emerging Asia's and 22% of South America's total exports. As the mainland's capex cycle and imports continue to decelerate, EM ex-China exports will slump. This will not only generate a negative income shock in EM economies but will also result in currency depreciation, which will push up local interest rates and tighten banking system liquidity (Chart I-6). Overall, a major downturn in the EM ex-China capex cycle and a moderate slowdown in household consumption will ensue. Chart I-4Chinese Imports ##br##To Decelerate Chinese Imports To Decelerate Chinese Imports To Decelerate Chart I-5Importance China For Emerging Asia ##br##And South America Importance Of China For Emerging Asia And South America Importance Of China For Emerging Asia And South America Chart I-6EM Ex-China: Currency Depreciation##br## = Higher Local Rates EM Ex-China: Currency Depreciation = Higher Local Rates EM Ex-China: Currency Depreciation = Higher Local Rates How are different countries exposed to these forces? Methodology The global marketplace for goods is a complex system. Modern trade is dominated by the exchange of intermediate goods within different supply chains.2 Furthermore, trade flows between countries are dependent on the types of goods that are traded (industrial versus consumption goods, for instance). Our objective is to compute each country's exposure to China and the rest of the EM industrial sectors that are at the epicenter of a slowdown, as we elaborated above. We have developed the following methodology, summing up the following three parameters3 for each major economy in the world: 1) Exports to China that are used for industrial purposes (Table I-2). Table I-2Vulnerability Ranking Of Exports To China Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages In order to adjust for the sensitivity a certain export has to China's industrial sector, we assigned three coefficients to them: 0, 0.5 and 1. Agricultural commodities and non-durable consumer goods are assigned a coefficient of 0, and are therefore omitted from this aggregation. The basis for this is that agricultural goods are not sensitive to the industrial sector, and we do not expect a slump in China's consumption of non-durable goods. A coefficient of 0.5 is assigned to industrial fuels and semi-durable goods. This entails a moderate slowdown in these imports by China. Our rationale is that demand for industrial fuels is somewhat sensitive to the industrial sector, but not significantly as they are also consumed by the consumer sector. Industrial metals, capital goods and durable consumer goods are assigned a coefficient of 1, meaning maximum vulnerability. The former two are directly tied to the industrial sector, (construction and infrastructure, in particular) while the latter one will suffer as discretionary big-ticket item spending will weaken in the wake of a potential decline in financial assets and real estate values. We also have made an adjustment to account for goods that are exported to China and then re-exported to developed markets for final consumption. We assume these goods are not vulnerable, as we are not negative on U.S. and EU final domestic demand. Based on our estimates, around 30% of intermediate manufacturing goods shipments to China from Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand are actually re-exported from China to developed markets for final consumption. We therefore removed this amount from the aggregation to properly reflect the vulnerable portion of their exports. 2) Exports to EM ex-China that are used for industrial purposes (Table I-3). Table I-3Vulnerability Ranking Of Exports To EM Ex-China Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages In order to adjust for the sensitivity of certain exports to the EM ex-China industrial sector, we assigned the same coefficients as above. The reason is that agricultural goods and non-durable consumer goods (a coefficient of zero) will not be sensitive to a slowdown in EM ex-China industrial sectors. Industrial metals, capital goods and durable goods, on the other hand, will be very vulnerable (a coefficient of one). Industrial fuels and semi-durable goods will be modestly affected (a coefficient of 0.5). 3) Exports to complex economies4 (i.e. Germany, Japan, Korea, Sweden and Switzerland) that are susceptible of being re-exported to emerging markets. We estimate that 30% of intermediate exports that are shipped to these very advanced economies end up being re-exported to EM and China. So, 30% of any country's intermediate goods exports to the complex economies is considered vulnerable. Vulnerability Ranking Chart I-7 sums up the three variables introduced above - total amount of vulnerable exports - and ranks countries based on their exports that are susceptible to an EM/China industrial slowdown as a share of total imports. Chart I-7Vulnerable Exports To China And EM As A Share Of Total Exports Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Chart I-8 lists countries based on the size of their vulnerable exports as a share of their GDP from highest to lowest. Chart I-8Vulnerable Exports To China And EM As A Share Of GDP Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Chart I-9 presents our ultimate trade vulnerability ranking which combines both parameters - vulnerable exports as a share of total exports and GDP. Peru, Chile, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand are the most vulnerable to a slowdown in industrial sectors in EM and China. The least vulnerable emerging economies are Mexico, Turkey, Colombia, India and Russia. Chart I-9Overall Vulnerability Assessment Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages These macro themes and rankings constitute an important but not sole part of our country view formation. There are many other factors - both global and domestic - that enter the formulation of our country views. That is why this ranking is not entirely consistent with our country recommendations. The lists of our overweights and underweights across EM equities, fixed-income, credit and currencies as well as specific trades that we recommend can be found on pages 9-10. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Pease see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "Desynchronization Compels Currency Adjustments", dated September 20, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2109 3 All values are measured in US$ and are measured as % of total exports. The data is from the United Nations and dated as of December 31, 2017. 4https://www.media.mit.edu/projects/oec-new/overview/ Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights The odds of a significant reversal in the current structural downtrend of China's manufacturing productivity growth are low. Meanwhile, the country's manufacturing sector remains highly competitive in the global goods markets. The extent of China's manufacturing productivity growth will largely rely on the scale of its research and development (R&D) investment. China's high-tech sector will likely experience higher productivity growth than other traditional manufacturing sectors, including textiles and metals manufacturing. Feature By definition, increases in productivity1 allow a country to produce greater output for the same level of input, which boosts profits and ultimately improves economic growth and household living standards. In the context of the post-1990 "economic miracle" in China, persistently positive productivity growth has indeed drastically improved the nation's wealth and living standards. Over the past 10 years, however, China's productivity growth has actually decelerated significantly, which carries worrying implications for the future (Chart I-1). Given that productivity is a country's key source of economic growth and competitiveness, two important questions arise: 1. Will there be meaningful improvement in China's productivity growth over the next five years (Chart I-2)? Chart I-1China: Decelerating Productivity Growth China: Decelerating Productivity Growth China: Decelerating Productivity Growth Chart I-2Any Possibility Of A Productivity Boom Ahead? Any Possibility Of A Productivity Boom Ahead? Any Possibility Of A Productivity Boom Ahead? 2. Is China's competitiveness on a declining trajectory (Chart I-3)? In this report we focus on answering these questions as they pertain to China's manufacturing sector, which is still a very important part of the country's economic engine. We conclude that while the odds of a meaningful reversal of the downtrend in China's manufacturing productivity growth are low, Chinese manufacturers are unlikely to experience major losses in global market share. Yet, this underscores the importance of re-orienting China away from the "old economy" model and the difficulty policymakers continue to face in doing so. A long-term shift away from the country's investment-intensive economic sectors is a clear negative for traditional "China plays" such as industrial commodities and emerging market stocks. China's Productivity Growth Downtrend: A Meaningful Reversal Ahead? When examining trends in productivity, measurement issues frequently come into play. For China, we have presented three measures of labor productivity growth (Chart I-1 on the first page). All three exhibit a similar pattern since the early 1990s. However, in the past two years, some divergences have occurred among the three, with the National Bureau Of Statistics (NBS) and Conference Board data showing slight improvement, as opposed to the World Bank data, which declined sharply in 2017. We tend to rely on the Conference Board data over the World Bank, and the recent rebound in the former seems to better reflect both improved manufacturing output and a significant reduction in the number of employees since late 2015 (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Will China's Competitiveness Decline? Will China's Competitiveness Decline? Will China's Competitiveness Decline? Chart I-4Significant Reduction In Manufacturing Workers Significant Reduction In Manufacturing Workers Significant Reduction In Manufacturing Workers In order to understand the outlook for labor productivity, it is first and foremost important to understand what has already occurred. Chart I-1 on page 1 shows that the Conference Board's estimate of Chinese labor productivity growth decelerated significantly from 2008 to 2015, which in our judgement was caused by strong growth in employment, falling manufacturing output growth due to weaker global demand for goods following the 2008 global financial crisis, and, finally, diminishing returns from global technological innovation in the past 30 years. Looking forward over the next five years, several factors point to the conclusion that productivity growth will stay positive but that the odds of a meaningful reversal of the downtrend is low: First, further declines in the number of manufacturing-sector workers are likely to be limited. The manufacturing sector accounts for nearly 90% of total jobs in the industrial sector. Since December 2015, China's supply side reform efforts as well as the increased adoption of automation and technology have already resulted in a 15% decline in the number of manufacturing sector jobs, with employee cuts occurring across all 30 manufacturing sub-sectors covered by the NBS. As such, the lion's share of productivity gains from job cuts has probably occurred already. In fact, since the beginning of this year, the number of employees in the manufacturing sector has actually increased by 0.5%, with positive growth in two-thirds of the 30 manufacturing sub-sectors. Second, overall improvement in manufacturing output volume has been moderate in the past two years, a period when global import volumes have accelerated. Production volumes in nearly half of the 90 major manufacturing product categories contracted during the economic downturn period of 2014-2015. In comparison, about 40% still had negative output growth over the recovery period of 2015-2017 (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Manufacturing Output: Moderate Improvement China's Manufacturing Sector: Don't Bet On A Productivity Boom China's Manufacturing Sector: Don't Bet On A Productivity Boom The likelihood of continued de-leveraging and restructuring will constrain domestic demand growth, while escalating trade wars may even cut external demand for Chinese products. This will create tough headwinds for the Chinese manufacturing sector over the next several years. Third, we examined productivity growth of a sample of nine manufacturing sub-sectors (out of 30) by using key product output volumes divided by the number of employees in each respective sector. The results show that productivity growth for nearly all of the sub-sectors is currently running below 5%, while in some sectors it is actually contracting. The "computers, communication and other electronic equipment" sector is the biggest export sector for China, accounting for over 40% of total export value in U.S. dollars. This is one of the most important high-tech sectors the country is aiming to develop. However, even within this sector, different products show diverging productivity growth. For example, semiconductor integrated circuits are growing at a strong 15% rate, while mobile handsets are contracting at a 13% rate (Chart I-6). Chart I-7 and Chart I-8 drive home the point: productivity growth was positive in four high-value-added manufacturing sectors and four low-value-added commodity process sectors, but most of these sectors' productivity growth was less than 5%. Chart I-6Diverging Productivity Growth Diverging Productivity Growth Diverging Productivity Growth Chart I-7Low Productivity Growth In High-Value-Added ##br##Manufacturing Sectors... Low Productivity Growth In High-Value-Added Manufacturing Sectors... Low Productivity Growth In High-Value-Added Manufacturing Sectors... Chart I-8...And In Low-Value-Added Sectors As Well ...And In Low-Value-Added Sectors As Well ...And In Low-Value-Added Sectors As Well Fourth, we expect Chinese R&D expenditure growth to strengthen, given the government's goal of turning the country into a global leader in digital technology and innovation (Chart I-9, top and middle panels). Chart I-9Rebounding R&D Expenditures Vs. Falling FAIs Rebounding R&D Expenditures Vs. Falling FAIs Rebounding R&D Expenditures Vs. Falling FAIs However, in terms of fixed asset investment (FAI) in the manufacturing sector, which is a much broader investment measure than the R&D investment, its growth already dropped to 3% last year, significantly lower than the compound annual growth rate of 24% over the 2004-2014 period (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Manufacturing FAI growth will likely stay within the range of 0-5% and to some extent will counteract any increases in productivity growth from increased R&D spending. Bottom Line: The recent improvement in China's labor productivity reflects - at least in part - short-term factors that appear to have run their course. China's manufacturing productivity growth will stay low over the coming years, and a meaningful reversal of this downtrend is unlikely. Sustaining Competitiveness Faltering productivity growth, however, does not mean fading competitiveness. For instance, while China's productivity growth plunged from 14.3% in 2007 to 7% in 2017, the country's contribution to global exports climbed from 7.3% to 10.5% during the same period (Chart I-3 on page 2). Meanwhile, Chinese high-tech exports have also gained global market share (Chart I-10). More recently, however, China's exports have lost some global market share both in overall terms and in the high-tech sector over the past two years. Does this herald a declining trajectory in China's manufacturing competitiveness? In our view, the answer is no. We believe China's manufacturing sector will remain highly competitive in the global marketplace: While clearly trending lower, China's productivity growth was the highest among major developed and emerging economies last year (Chart I-11, top panel). It also has always been well above the global average (Chart I-11, bottom panel). Chart I-10Competitive Chinese High-Tech Products Competitive Chinese High-Tech Products Competitive Chinese High-Tech Products Chart I-11China's Productivity Growth: Higher ##br##Than Most Major Economies China's Productivity Growth: Higher Than Most Major Economies China's Productivity Growth: Higher Than Most Major Economies China's manufacturing labor costs are also much lower than many other major exporters (Chart I-12, top panel). In addition, growth of average annual nominal wages in the Chinese manufacturing sector has declined to the lowest since 1997 (Chart I-12, bottom panel). China's R&D investment as a share of GDP is relatively high among major emerging economies (Chart I-13, top panel). With the country allocating more R&D investment into high-tech manufacturing, the pace of technology innovation is set to increase (Chart I-13, middle and bottom panels). Currently, China is already the biggest producer in several high-tech industries, including new energy vehicles, smart phones, communication equipment, solar cells and wind turbines. Chart I-12China's Manufacturing Labor Costs: ##br##Lower Than Most Major Economies China's Manufacturing Labor Costs: Lower Than Most Major Economies China's Manufacturing Labor Costs: Lower Than Most Major Economies Chart I-13China's R&D Spending: ##br##Higher Than Most EM Economies China's R&D Spending: Higher Than Most EM Economies China's R&D Spending: Higher Than Most EM Economies Even in low-value-added export sectors like textiles and metals, China's competitiveness is still strong. This has likely occurred in part due to supply side reforms - which have accelerated the consolidation of domestic industries - reducing costs and increasing production efficiencies. The 8% depreciation in China's currency versus the U.S. dollar over the past three months will also help improve the country's competitiveness. Bottom Line: China's manufacturing sector will remain highly competitive in the global goods market, despite faltering productivity growth. Investment Conclusions BCA's China Investment Strategy service has previously written about how China's export-enabled, catch-up growth phase in the early-2000s came to an abrupt end after the global financial crisis, and how policymakers were subsequently faced with a hard choice: China could either replace exports as a growth driver with debt-fueled domestic demand in order to buy the economy time to move up the value-added chain and transition to a services-led economy, or it could allow the labor market to suffer the consequences of a sharp slowdown in export growth while preserving fiscal and state-owned firepower for some uncertain future opportunity.2 This report highlights the difficulty experienced by China's manufacturing sector at reversing a downtrend in its productivity growth, which can be viewed as a microcosm of China's struggle to reorient itself and move away from its "old economy" towards one that is led by services. For investors, there are two key implications from this: First, the inherent difficulty of transitioning China's economy suggests that it will continue to experience economic mini-cycles around an uncertain primary growth trend, as policymakers periodically shift between aggressive supply-side reforms and demand-side countercyclical policies. In fact, some investors have come to believe that China is about to enter another mini-cycle upswing in response to recent stimulus announcements, but we have noted that the stimulus proposed so far falls short of a "big bang" response that would not only reverse the underlying slowdown and any trade shock but also reaccelerate the growth rate above trend.3 Second, to us the prospect of a potentially long, grinding shift away from China's investment-intensive economic sectors does not present an attractive risk-reward trade-off for traditional "China plays", such as industrial commodities and emerging market equities, over the coming few years. While it is true that periodic mini-cycle upswings may provide tactical opportunities for investors to go long these assets, the China "transition" theme suggests that an investors' strategic allocation to traditional China plays should be below benchmark. Chart I-14Prominence Of Investable ##br##Tech Ex-Internet Stocks Will Rise Prominence Of Investable Tech Ex-Internet Stocks Will Rise Prominence Of Investable Tech Ex-Internet Stocks Will Rise As a final point, periods of economic transition typically create both winners and losers, and China's continued focus on R&D spending suggests that the overlooked elements of China's tech sector may be winners. Chart I-14 highlights that over 90% of China's investable technology sector market capitalization is made up of companies in the internet software and services (ISS) industry, suggesting that investable tech ex-ISS may rise in prominence over time. More generally, identifying potential winners from increased Chinese R&D spending is an area of ongoing research at BCA, and is a theme that we hope to revisit in the future. Stay tuned! Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy ellenj@bcaresearch.com 1 The most common productivity measure is labor productivity, typically calculated as a ratio of real gross domestic product (GDP) to hours worked or employed persons. 2 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Legacies Of 2017," dated December 21, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China Is Easing Up On The Brake, Not Pressing The Accelerator," dated July 26, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights The scale of "de-capacity" reforms is diminishing considerably - old, inefficient capacity shutdowns are declining. Sizable new technologically advanced and ecologically friendly capacity is coming on stream for both steel and coal in 2018 and 2019. We project this will boost steel and coal output by 5.2% and 4.7% respectively, this year at a time when demand is set to slow. Steel, coal, iron ore and coke prices are all vulnerable to the downside. Share prices of the companies and currencies of countries that supply these commodities to China are most at risk. Feature Last November, our report titled, "China's "De-Capacity" Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," painted a negative picture for steel and coal prices over 2018 and 2019.1 Since then, after having peaked in December and February respectively, both steel and thermal coal prices have so far declined by about 20% from their respective tops (Chart 1). In the meantime, iron ore and coking coal have also exhibited meaningful weakness (Chart 2). Chart 1More Downside In Steel And Coal Prices More Downside In Steel And Coal Prices More Downside In Steel And Coal Prices Chart 2Iron Ore And Coking Coal Prices Are Also At Risk Iron Ore And Coking Coal Prices Are Also At Risk Iron Ore And Coking Coal Prices Are Also At Risk In this report, we revisit the topic of de-capacity reforms and examine how Chinese supply side reforms in 2018 will affect steel and coal prices. The key message is as follows: Having implemented aggressive capacity reduction over the past two years, the authorities are shifting the focus of supply side reforms from "de-capacity" to "replacement" of already removed capacity with technologically advanced capacity. This means the scale of "de-capacity" reforms is diminishing considerably - old, inefficient capacity shutdowns are declining. In addition, sizable new technologically advanced and ecologically friendly capacity is coming on stream for both steel and coal in 2018 and 2019. From an investing standpoint, this means both steel and coal prices are still vulnerable to the downside. Both could drop by more than 15% from current levels over the course of 2018. Diminishing Scale Of "De-Capacity" Reforms Reducing capacity (also called "de-capacity") in the oversupplied steel and coal markets has been a key priority within China's structural supply side reforms over the past two years. Steel Table 1 shows that the capacity reduction target for steel in 2018 is 30 million tons, which is much lower than the 45 million tons in 2016 and 50 million tons in 2017. Table 1Capacity Reduction: Target And Actual Achievement Revisiting China's De-Capacity Reforms Revisiting China's De-Capacity Reforms In addition, between May and September 2017, the "Ditiaogang"2 removal policy eliminated about 120 million tons of steel capacity, and sharply reduced steel products production. Most of Ditiaogang capacity was completely dismantled last year. Therefore, there is not much downside to steel production from Ditiaogang output cutbacks going forward. Furthermore, between October and December 2017, environmental policies aimed at fighting against winter smog also cut steel products output substantially, which pushed steel prices to six-year highs in December (Chart 3). Chart 3Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Steel Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Steel Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Steel Sector In particular, in the last quarter of 2017, to ensure fewer smog days around the Beijing area, Tianjin's steel products output was reduced by 50% from a year earlier. The second biggest contribution to total steel output decline occurred in Hebei - the largest steel-producing province in China - where steel output plummeted by 7%. Excluding Tianjin and Hebei, national steel products output fell only by 3.9% from a year ago. As a long-term solution to ameliorate ecology and air quality around Beijing, the government is aiming to reduce the heavy concentration of steel production in Tianjin and Hebei by shifting a considerable portion of steel capacity to other regions in 2018 and following years. These two provinces together accounted for about 30.6% of the nation's steel products output in 2016; their share dipped to 27.6% in 2017. As a result, next winter the required production reduction from these regions to achieve the air quality targets in Beijing will be smaller. In short, the scale of specific policy driven steel output reduction in 2018 will be meaningfully lower than last year. Coal For coal, despite the same target as last year (150 million tons), the actual capacity cut this year will be much less than last year's actual reduction of 250 million tons, which exceeded the 150 million-ton target. Amid still-high coal prices, the authorities will be more tolerant of producers not cutting too much capacity. Plus, with nearly two-thirds of the 2016-2020 target for capacity cuts having already been achieved in the past two years, there is much less outdated capacity in the industry (Table 1 above). In addition, the government's environment-related policies also led to a decline in total national coal output between October-December 2017 (Chart 4), with Hebei posting the biggest cut in coal output among all provinces. Chart 4Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Coal Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Coal Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Coal Sector However, the authorities shortly thereafter relaxed restrictions on coal output, as the country was severely lacking gas supply for heating. In January and February of this year, the authorities reversed course, demanding that producers accelerate new advanced capacity replacement and increase coal production. Bottom Line: The scale of China's "de-capacity" reforms are diminishing, resulting in a lessening production cuts. Installing Technologically Advanced Capacity China's supply side reforms have included two major components - reducing inefficient capacity and low-quality supply that damaged the environment while boosting medium-to-high-quality production that is economically efficient and ecologically friendly. In brief, having removed significant obsolete capacity in the past two years, the policy focus is now shifting to capacity replacement. The latter enables China to upgrade its steel and coal industries to become more efficient and competitive worldwide, as well as ecologically safer. To guard against excessive production capacity of steel and coal, the authorities are reinforcing the following replacement principle: the ratio of newly installed-to-removed capacity should be less or equal to one. Two important points need to be noted: First and most important, the zero or negative growth of total capacity of steel and coal does not necessarily mean zero or negative growth in steel and coal output. For example, while total capacity for crude steel and steel products declined 4.8% and 1.8% year-on-year in 2016 respectively, output actually increased 0.5% and 1%. Despite falling total capacity, rising operational capacity could still contribute to an increase in final output. Total capacity (measured in tons) for steel and coal production includes both operational capacity and non-operational capacity, the latter representing obsolete/non-profitable capacity. As more technologically advanced capacity is installed to replace the already-removed one, both the size of operational capacity and the capacity utilization rate (CUR) will rise. Typically, advanced technologies have a higher CUR - consequently, production will grow. Second, an increase in the CUR of existing operational capacity will also result in rising output. In 2018, odds are that both the steel and coal industries in China will have non-trivial output increases as a result of new advanced capacity coming on stream. Steel Since late 2015, in environmentally sensitive areas of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, steel plants have been required to add no more than 0.8 tons of new capacity for every 1 ton of outdated capacity removed. For other areas, the same ratio is 1 or less. Electric furnace (EF) steel-producing technology - which is cleaner, more advanced and used to produce high-quality specialized steel products - has become the major type of new capacity addition. This technology is favored by both the government and steel producers. Chinese EF-based steel production accounted for only 6.4% of the nation's total steel output in 2016, far lower than the world average of 25.7% (Chart 5). The EF technology uses scrap steel as raw materials, graphite electrodes and electricity to produce crude steel. Graphite electrodes, which have high levels of electrical conductivity and the capability of sustaining extremely high levels of heat, are consumed primarily in electric furnace steel production. Chart 6 demonstrates that prices of both graphite electrode and scrap steel have surged since mid-2017. This signifies that considerable new EF production capacity has been coming on stream. Chart 5Chinese Electric Furnace Crude Steel ##br##Production Will Go Up Revisiting China's De-Capacity Reforms Revisiting China's De-Capacity Reforms Chart 6Considerable New Addition Of##br## Chinese Electric Furnace Capacity Considerable New Addition Of Chinese Electric Furnace Capacity Considerable New Addition Of Chinese Electric Furnace Capacity Indeed, in 2017 alone, 44 units of EF were installed. In comparison, between 2014 and 2016, only 47 units of EF were installed. As the completion of a new EF installation in general takes eight to 10 months, all of EF capacity installed in 2017 - about 31 million tons of crude steel production capacity - will be operational in 2018. In addition, a report from China's Natural Resource Department indicates that as of mid-December there have been 54 replacement projects with total new steel production capacity of 91 million tons (including new EF capacity, new traditional capacity and recovered capacity). This compares to 120 million tons of capacity removed in 2016-'17. Assuming 60% of this 91 million tons capacity will be operating throughout 2018 at a utilization rate of 80% (the NBS 2017 CUR for the ferrous smelting and pressing industry was 75.8%), this alone will result in 43.6 million tons more output in 2018 from a year ago (5.2% growth from 2017 output) (Table 2). Table 2Strong Profit Margins Will Encourage Steel Production Revisiting China's De-Capacity Reforms Revisiting China's De-Capacity Reforms At the same time, strong profit margins will encourage steel makers to produce as much as possible to maximize profits (Chart 7). This will be especially true if the incumbent companies have to absorb liabilities of firms that were shutdown (please refer to page 14 for the discussion on this point). Facing more debt from shutdowns of other companies, steel incumbent producers would have an incentive to ramp up their production to generate more cash. Yet, we do not assume a rise in CUR for existing steel capacity. Hence, crude steel output growth in 2018 will likely be around 5.2%, higher than the 3% growth in 2017. This is in line with the top 10 Chinese steel producers' projected crude steel output growth in 2018 of 5.5%, based on their published production guidance data. The Ditiaogang and environmental policy caused a significant contraction in steel products growth in 2017, but will have limited impact in 2018 as discussed above. Eventually, increasing crude steel output will translate into strong growth in steel products output3 (Chart 8). Chart 7Strong Profit Margins ##br##Will Encourage Steel Production Strong Profit Margins Will Encourage Steel Production Strong Profit Margins Will Encourage Steel Production Chart 8Steel Products Production ##br##Will Rebound In 2018 Steel Products Production Will Rebound In 2018 Steel Products Production Will Rebound In 2018 Coal China's current coal capacity is about 5310 million tons, with 4780 million tons as operational capacity and the remaining 530 million tons as non-operational capacity, which has not produced coal for some time. As in general it takes roughly three to five years to build a coal mine, it will take a long time to replace the obsolete capacity. Yet there is hidden coal capacity in China. The China Coal Industry Association estimated last year that there was about 700 million tons of new technologically advanced capacity that has already been built and is ready to use, but has not yet received government approval. This is greater than the 530 million tons of coal production removed in the past two years by de-capacity reforms - equivalent to about 20% of China's total 2017 coal output. This hidden capacity originated from the fact that coal producers in China historically began building mines before applying for approval. However, since 2015, all applications for new coal mines have been halted. Consequently, in the past three years a lot of capacity has already been built but has not been put into operation. Some 70% of this hidden capacity includes large-scale coal mines, each with annual capacity of above 5 million tons. In comparison, China has about 126 million tons of small mines with annual capacity of 90,000 tons that will be forced to exit the market this year as they are non-competitive due to their small scale and inferior technology. Why do we expect this hidden capacity to become operational going forward? The authorities now allows trading in the replacement quota for coal across regions. Producers having these ready-to-use high-quality mines can buy the replacement quota from the producers who have eliminated the outdated capacity. The government wants to accelerate the process of allowing the advanced capacity to be in operation as fast as possible. The following policy initiative supports this: A new policy directive released this past February does not even require coal producers with advanced capacity to pay the quota first in order to apply for approval - they can apply for approval to start the replacement process first, and then have one year to pay for it. Economically, quotas trading makes sense. The mines with advanced technology that have lower costs and higher profit margins should be able to pay a reasonably high (attractive) price for quotas to companies with inferior technologies, so that the latter will be better off selling their quotas than continuing operations. The proceeds from the selling quotas will be used to settle termination benefits for employees of low-quality coal mines. Regarding our projections for coal output in 2018, assuming 30% of the 700 million tons of capacity among high-quality mines will be operational this year at a CUR of 78% (the NBS 2017 coal industry CUR was 68.2%), this alone will bring a 164 million-ton increase in coal output (4.7% of the 2017 coal output) (Table 3). Table 3Chinese Coal Output Will Rise By 4.7% In 2018 Revisiting China's De-Capacity Reforms Revisiting China's De-Capacity Reforms In addition, still-high profit margins could encourage existing coal producers to increase their CUR this year (Chart 9). Yet, we do not assume a rise in CUR for existing coal mining capacity. In total, Chinese coal output may increase 4.7% this year, higher than last year's 3.2% growth (Chart 10). Chart 9Strong Profit Margins Will Boost Coal Production Strong Profit Margins Will Boost Coal Production Strong Profit Margins Will Boost Coal Production Chart 10Coal Output Is Already Rising Coal Output Is Already Rising Coal Output Is Already Rising Bottom Line: Sizable technologically advanced new capacity is coming on stream for both steel and coal. This will boost both steel and coal output by about 5.2% and 4.7%, respectively, this year. Impact On Global Steel And Coal Prices In addition to diminishing capacity cuts and new technologically advanced capacity additions, the following factors will also weigh on steel prices: Relatively high steel product inventories (Chart 11, top panel) Weakening steel demand, mainly due to a potential slowdown in the property market4 Declining infrastructure investment growth (Chart 11, bottom panel). Chinese net steel product exports contracted 30% last year as steel producers opted to sell steel products domestically on higher domestic steel prices (Chart 12). Chart 11Elevated Steel Product Inventory##br## And Weakening Demand bca.ems_sr_2018_04_26_c11 bca.ems_sr_2018_04_26_c11 Chart 12China's Steel Product Exports ##br##Will Rebound China's Steel Product Exports Will Rebound China's Steel Product Exports Will Rebound Falling domestic steel prices may lead steel producers to ship their products overseas. In addition, the government has reduced steel products export tariffs starting January 1, 2018, which may also help increase Chinese steel product exports this year. This will pass falling Chinese domestic steel prices on to lower global steel prices. Between 2015 and 2017, about 1.6% of all Chinese steel exports were shipped to the U.S. Even if U.S. tariffs dampen its purchases of steel from China, mainland producers will try to sell their products to other countries. In a nutshell, U.S. tariffs will not prevent the transmission of lower steel prices in China to the global steel market. With respect to coal, in early April the Chinese government placed restrictions on Chinese coal imports at major ports in major imported-coal consuming provinces including Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong (Chart 13). The government demanded thermal power plants in those areas to limit their consumption of imported coal and use domestically produced coal. Clearly the government is trying to avoid cheaper imports flooding into the domestic coal market amid still elevated prices. This will help prevent a big drop in domestic coal prices but will be bearish for global coal prices. For example, 40% and 30% of Chinese coal imports are from Indonesia and Australia, respectively (Chart 14). These economies and their currencies are at risk from diminishing Chinese coal imports. Chart 13Chinese Coal Imports Will Decline Chinese Coal Imports Will Decline Chinese Coal Imports Will Decline Chart 14Indonesia and Australia May Face Falling ##br##Coal Demand From China Indonesia and Australia May Face Falling Coal Demand From China Indonesia and Australia May Face Falling Coal Demand From China For the demand side, continuing strong growth in non-thermal power supplies such as nuclear, wind and solar will curb thermal power growth in the long run and thus limit thermal coal consumption growth in China. This may also weigh on domestic coal prices and discourage coal imports. Bottom Line: The downtrend in domestic steel and coal prices will weigh on the global steel and coal markets. What About Iron Ore And Coking Coal? Iron ore and coking coal prices are also at risk: Chart 15Record High Chinese Iron Ore Inventory Record High Chinese Iron Ore Inventory Record High Chinese Iron Ore Inventory Given about 40% of newly installed steel capacity is advanced electric furnace (EF) based - which requires significant amounts of scrap steel rather than iron ore and coke - rising steel output will increase demand for iron ore and coke disproportionally less. As more Chinese steel producers shift to EF technology, mainland demand for iron ore and coke will diminish structurally in the years to come. Despite weakness in both domestic iron ore production and iron ore imports, Chinese iron ore inventories at major ports, expressed in number of months of consumption, have still reached record highs (Chart 15). This suggests rising EF capacity has indeed been constraining demand for iron ore. Increasing coal output will bring more coking coal and a corresponding rise in coke supply, thereby further depressing coke prices. Bottom Line: Global iron ore and coking coal prices are also vulnerable to the downside. Investment Implications From a macro perspective, investors can capitalize on these themes via a number of strategies: Shorting iron ore and coal prices, or these commodities producers' stocks. Chart 16Chinese Steel And Coal Shares:##br## Puzzling Drop Amid High Profit Chinese Steel And Coal Shares: Puzzling Drop Amid High Profits Chinese Steel And Coal Shares: Puzzling Drop Amid High Profits Going short the Indonesian rupiah (and possibly the Australian dollar) versus the U.S. dollar. Australia and Indonesia are large exporters of coal and industrial metals to China - they account for 30% and 40% of Chinese coal imports, respectively, so their currencies are vulnerable. Notably, although steel and coal prices are still well above their 2015 levels and producers' profit margins are very elevated, share prices of Chinese steel makers and coal producers have dropped almost to their 2015 levels (Chart 16). From a top-down standpoint, it is hard to explain such poor share price performance among Chinese steel and coal companies when their profits have been booming. Our hunch is that these companies have been forced by the government to shoulder the debt of the peer companies that were shut down. This is an example of how the government can force shareholders of profitable companies to bear losses from restructuring by merging zombie companies into profitable ones. On a more granular level, rapidly expanding EF steel-making capacity in China will lead to outperformance of stocks related to EF makers, graphite electrode producers and domestic scrap steel collecting companies. First, demand for graphite electrodes continues to rise, as EF steel production expands. Prices of graphite electrodes may stay high for quite some time (Chart 6 above, top panel). Second, scrap steel prices may go higher or stay high to encourage more domestic scrap steel collection. Companies who collect domestic scrap steel may soon have beneficial policy support, which will create huge potential for expansion (Chart 6 above, bottom panel). Third, EF makers will also benefit due to strong sales of electric furnaces. As a final note, equity investors should consider going long thermal power producers versus coal producers as thermal power producers will benefit from falling coal prices. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President Frontier Markets Strategy EllenJ@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed", dated November 22, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 "Ditiaogang" is low-quality steel made by melting scrap metal in cheap and easy-to-install induction furnaces. These steel products are of poor quality, and also lead to environmental degradation. 3 The big divergence between crude steel production expansion and steel products output contraction last year was due to both the removal of "Ditiaogang" and statistical issues. "Ditiaogang" is often converted into steel products like rebar and wire rods. As steel produced this way is illegal, it is not recorded in official crude steel production data. However, after it is converted into steel products, official steel products production data do include it. 4 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "China Real Estate: A New-Bursting Bubble?", dated April 6, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights In China, the central bank and commercial banks conducted outright monetization of real estate inventories, which caused the property markets' recovery post 2015. Despite destocking, aggregate property inventories remain excessive. Elevated inventories, poor affordability, and policy tightening will depress property demand and lead to a contraction in construction activity. Slumping construction, along with a slowdown in infrastructure investment, pose downside risks to China's demand for commodities, materials and industrial goods. This is the main risk to EM stocks and currencies and the primary reason we maintain our negative stance on EM risk assets. Continue shorting Chinese property developers stocks versus U.S. homebuilders. Feature With a flurry of policy tightening directed at the real estate market in the past year, property demand in China has weakened. The latter typically leads property starts and real estate investment, and is coincident with real estate prices (Chart I-1). Is China entering another property downturn, and if so will it be shallow, or severe? Answers to these questions are important not only for Chinese stocks, but also for China-plays throughout the rest of the world. To shed light on this issue, this week we re-examine how large the imbalances in the Chinese real estate market actually are - with respect to both affordability and supply (the stock of housing and inventories). We also discuss policy objectives and investment implications. Proper Measures Of Inventories And Housing Stock Both purchases and prices of Chinese residential properties surged between 2015 and 2017, when the authorities implemented a property de-stocking policy. As a result, housing inventories declined significantly. Does this mean that one of the major imbalances, namely swelling inventories, has been eliminated? If imbalances, namely inventories and prices, in a property market are very minor, one can expect an ensuing adjustment to be benign. Conversely, if imbalances are large, it is reasonable to bet on a meaningful property market downturn. With respect to China's real estate inventory levels, data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) which many analysts follow, indicates inventories of residential buildings have indeed declined, with a significant 33% drop in residential vacant floor space for sale (Chart I-2). The term "vacant" is used by the data provider to denote the floor space completed but not sold. Clearly, China's de-stocking strategy since 2015 has worked well. Chart I-1China: Real Estate Is Slowing Down China: Real Estate Is Slowing Down China: Real Estate Is Slowing Down Chart I-2Property Developers' Inventories: ##br##Completed But Not Sold Property Developers' Inventories: Completed But Not Sold Property Developers' Inventories: Completed But Not Sold However, data from the NBS on vacant space for sale is not all-encompassing. First, it includes only commodity buildings - i.e., those developed by real estate developers - and does not include buildings built by non-real estate developers. For example, companies, universities, organizations and even a group of individuals can construct both residential and non-residential buildings for their own use. Commodity buildings are just a small subset of total constructed buildings in China. According to NBS data, residential buildings by property developers account for only 26% of total constructed residential buildings in terms of floor space area completed. In brief, the inventory data that the majority of analysts use covers only a part of property construction (Figure I-1). Figure I-1The Breakdown Of Residential ##br##Real Estate Inventory China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble? China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble? Second, the vacant floor space data - shown in Chart I-2 and used by many analysts - only measures commodity buildings that have been completed but not sold. It does not account for those units that are under construction and have not been sold. The latter should also be counted as inventory because in China both residential and non-residential properties can be sold even when they are in the construction phase. Unlike advanced economies, in China the housing market is by far dominated by new construction. In particular, about 80% of residential commodity floor space sold are properties that are still under construction. This is drastically different from real estate markets in the U.S. and other developed countries, where the secondary housing market is a major source of supply. Given the above,1 we propose several alternative measures that aim to more accurately reflect the real picture of Chinese property inventory. Real Estate Inventory To capture the flow of the entire residential property supply in China, we calculate the difference between cumulative floor space started and cumulative floor space sold over the period of 1995-2017. This produces a new measure of total space not yet sold (i.e., available for sale), which includes areas both under construction and completed. This is a much more comprehensive measure of the total inventory than other commonly used measures. It is important to note that this measure takes into account both types of floor space available for sale: under construction and completed. The top panel of Chart I-3 illustrates that our derived measure of residential inventory - cumulative floor space started minus cumulative floor space sold - currently stands at 2.5 billion square meters or 27 billion square feet. This is about eight times greater than the NBS measure of vacant floor space - completed by property developers but not sold, which presently amounts to only 0.3 billion square meters or 3.23 billion square feet. On the bottom panel of Chart I-3, we estimate how many months of sales it will take to clear this housing inventory. Our findings reveal that even though our new inventory measure for the residential sector has fallen sharply due to the de-stocking policy, it still takes 22 months of last year sales to clear it. This is much higher than the completed by property developers but unsold vacant space, which presently stands at 2.5 months of last year sales. Provided that (1) most housing for sale in China is new construction, and (2) it can be sold at any stage of the construction cycle, we believe our new estimate of residential inventory that is equal to 22 months of last year sales is a more accurate reflection of reality. We computed a similar measure of inventory for non-residential properties that includes malls, offices, and warehouses. The top panel of Chart I-4 shows that the proper inventory levels for the non-residential sector have kept rising to new record highs in absolute terms. Relative to floor space sold last year, inventories still stand at 170 months of sales (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Chart I-3Our Measure Of Residential Inventories: ##br##Floor Space Available For Sale Our Measure Of Residential Inventories: Floor Space Available For Sale Our Measure Of Residential Inventories: Floor Space Available For Sale Chart I-4Our Measure Of Non-Residential Inventories: ##br##Floor Space Available For Sale Our Measure Of Non-Residential Inventories: Floor Space Available For Sale Our Measure Of Non-Residential Inventories: Floor Space Available For Sale Clearly, China's non-residential markets still carry excessive inventories. It would be misleading to use completed but unsold data for the non-residential sector, which accounts for roughly 14 months of sales. Similar to the residential commodity buildings market, about 65% of non-residential commodity buildings sold are those that are still under construction. In short, despite the decline from 2015's exceptionally high levels, inventories for both residential and commercial properties are still extremely elevated. Furthermore, the inventory-to-sales ratio is not a good indicator for the property market outlook because it is heavily influenced by sales. When sales - the denominator of this ratio - are weak, this inventory ratio is high, and vice versa. In particular, this ratio has been a poor indicator for the property market in China, where sales of properties have been deeply influenced by government policies. Whenever sales dropped and this ratio surged, the authorities would begin easing policies, spurring sales to rise and allowing the market - prices, floor space starts and construction - to recover. As a final note, these inventory data show floor space built by property developers only. Stock Of Housing The measure of per-capita living space gauges the existing stock of housing. Hence, it is a structural measure. Still being a low-income country, China is often perceived to offer enormous construction potential. However, some statistics on per-capita living space are revealing. The NBS data show that the 2016 per-capita living space for both urban and rural area has risen to 36.6 square meters and 45.8 square meters, respectively (Chart I-5). By comparison, in Korea and Japan, living space per capita (the entire population average) is only 33 and 22 square meters, respectively. Chart I-5China: Per Capita Living ##br##Has Grown Dramatically China: Per Capita Living Has Grown Dramatically China: Per Capita Living Has Grown Dramatically Our calculation of per-capita urban living space based on the NBS building construction data also show similar results - 38 square meters for 2017. Consequently, these statistics on per-capita living space are supported by historical construction data, and hence are reliable. Both NBS per-capita living space data and our calculated per-capita living space data confirm that there is already massive stock of residential property in China - the nation's current existing residential floor space area already amounts to 30.8 billion square meters (332 billion square feet). Furthermore, the stock of housing is relatively new with 88% of this living space built in the past 20 years. Assuming the floor space area of each house is on average 90 square meters (970 square feet), we infer that on average every urban household already owns 1.3 houses. This is actually in line with the results of several domestic household surveys, which conclude that 20-25% of houses owned by urban residents are neither being used for living nor for renting out. Provided not every household in China owns a house, and that a meaningful share of the population still lives in smaller and older housing, these data suggest there have been considerable speculative/investor purchases of housing over the past 10 years. Many high-income individuals own multiple properties (that are often kept vacant) while a still-considerable number of families live in poor conditions. Bottom Line: China has constructed enormous amounts of real estate since 2002. Furthermore, inventories are vast for residential and non-residential sectors alike. Such an oversupply of properties poses a considerable risk to construction activity going forward. Property Demand Weakness: Cyclical Or Structural? Very poor affordability, slowing rural-to-urban migration, demographic changes, tightening mortgage lending, a successful government-led clampdown on speculative activity and the promotion of the rental housing all point to both a cyclical and structural slippage in housing purchases in China. House Price-Income Ratios and Affordability House prices in China remain extremely high relative to disposable income. By using NBS 70-city residential average price, our calculation shows for an average household (assuming double income earners) it will take 10.5 years of its disposable income to buy a 90-square-meter (equivalent to 970 square feet) house at current prices (Chart I-6). The same ratio for the U.S. is presently 3.4 and at the peak of U.S. housing bubble in 2006 it was 4. In regard to the ability to service mortgage payments, annual interest costs account for 45% of average household disposable income (assuming a double income household) when buying a 90 square meter house and assuming 20% down payment (Table I-1). Chart I-6House Price-Income Ratio: ##br##China & The U.S. House Price-Income Ratio: China & The U.S. House Price-Income Ratio: China & The U.S. Table I-1House Price-To-Income Ratios ##br##And Affordability China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble? China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble? If we use another data provider - Choice, covering 100 cities, house price per a square meter is 60% higher than the NBS 70-city residential average price. Using Choice house price data, the house price-to-income ratio is 17, and affordability - the share of interest payments as a percentage of disposable household income - is 72%. Clearly, there is a huge gap between these two aggregate measures of residential property prices. In this report, we use conservative (low) prices from the NBS, which still reveals that house prices and interest payments are exceptionally high relative to disposable income for a double-income family. Table I-1 contains house price-to-income ratios and affordability ratios for 31 provinces using the house prices from NBS. Given the average urban household already owns more than one property, it is reasonable to expect that a considerable proportion of potential future demand for housing will come from rural residents as urbanization continues, or as rural residents seek to buy homes in the city for access to better quality education in the urban areas for their children. However, rural residents' current and potential (when they move to cities) disposable income is much lower than the urban's. Therefore, housing affordability is a bigger challenge for them. Rural-to-Urban Migration Even though urbanization is an ongoing process in China and will continue for many years, the pace is slowing (Chart I-7). The number of individuals moving from rural areas to cities as a percentage of the urban population is decreasing. This will translate into decelerating growth rate in demand for urban residential properties. Chart I-7China: The Pace Of Urbanization Is Slowing China: The Pace Of Urbanization Is Slowing China: The Pace Of Urbanization Is Slowing The second panel of Chart I-7 illustrates that rural-to-urban net migration accelerated in the early 1990s and has been between 15-18 million people per year over the past 20 years. However, as a share of the urban population, net migration has fallen from 4.5% in the late 1990s to 2% today (Chart I-7, third panel). Overall, urban population growth has slowed below 3% (Chart I-7, bottom panel). In brief, the slowdown in net migration and, consequently, decelerating urban population growth will cap structural housing demand that has been booming over the past 20 years. Poor Demographics The Chinese population is aging rapidly. The proportion of citizens who are over the age of 65 has risen from 8% of the population in 2007 to 11.4% as of last year and will continue rising rapidly. Given Chinese life expectancy is currently at about 76 years, senior citizens cohort will leave a large number of houses to their children or grandchildren over the next 10-15 years. The reason behind this is because the former demographic cohort (11.4% of the total population) is larger than the 10-19-year-age group which accounts for only 10.5% of the total population. The latter would have been a major source of property demand over the next 10 years, as Chinese tradition requires them to own a house before marriage. However, this is no longer the case. For this generation - born in the late 1990s and 2000s and by the time they get married (in general at the age of around 25 or a bit later), each newly-formed family could potentially inherit four houses from their parents and grandparents. Tightening mortgage lending As part of the current property related restrictive policies, mortgage interest rates have been on the rise for both first- and second-home buyers. Mortgage rates have risen by 74 basis points in the past 12 months - from 4.52% to 5.26%. Additionally, banks have been tightening credit standards. Given house prices are very high relative to income, a small increase in mortgage rates meaningfully increases the share of disposable income that must be allocated to interest payments on mortgages. For example, with the house price-to-income ratio at 10.5 and down payment of 20% of house price for the average home buyer in China, a 75-basis-point increase in mortgage rates would lift the share of interest payments on a mortgage from 45% to 51% of disposable income. Hence, higher borrowing costs over the past year as well as the ongoing tightening in credit standards will continue to discourage property buyers. Mortgage loan growth has rolled over after booming between 2015 and 2017, yet at a 22% annual growth rate, it remains very high (Chart I-8). Policy-led clamp-down of speculation President Xi Jinping's mantra that "housing is for living in, not for speculation" - proclaimed in December 2016 - is the focal point of the government's current policies. Many regulations implemented by both the central government and local governments over the past 15 months have been aimed at reducing speculative purchases. The promotion of the housing rental market In large cities residential rental yields fluctuate between 1-2.5% (Chart I-9). This compares with mortgage rate of 5.3%. Currently, renting is significantly cheaper than buying. This may encourage renting in the long term. Rising demand for rental housing might be met by the available stock of empty apartments that investors have been accumulating over the years. If this occurs, it will reduce demand for new home purchases. Chart I-8China: Mortgage Lending Has Been Booming China: Mortgage Lending Has Been Booming China: Mortgage Lending Has Been Booming Chart I-9China: Residential Rental Yields Are Very Low China: Residential Rental Yields Are Very Low China: Residential Rental Yields Are Very Low Meanwhile, the central government is determined to develop a rental market by constructing rental housing. If building of rental housing offsets the potential decline in property construction, it will make our negative view on construction volumes widely off the mark. The crucial factor to watch is financing. If credit supply slows meaningfully, there will be less available financing for overall construction, including rental. Any gains by rental construction will be overwhelmed by a decline in the building of residential and commercial real estate. In turn, financing is contingent on the government deleveraging campaign. If the authorities adhere to their pledge of deleveraging, a slowdown in credit growth will dampen overall construction activity. There can be no construction without credit. Furthermore, it takes only a deceleration in credit growth, i.e., a negative credit impulse, to depress construction volumes. That is why we cover China's credit cycle dynamics in such details in our regular reports. Bottom Line: Chinese property demand is facing numerous cyclical and structural headwinds. Policy Driven Market China's central and local government policies have over time and in different combinations substantially influenced the country's housing market on both the supply and demand sides. Over the past two decades, each time the government implemented restrictive policies (for example, raising down-payment ratios, increasing policy or mortgage rates, setting restrictions on mortgage lending, and so on), the real estate market slowed and housing prices softened. The opposite has also held true - each time the government introduced stimulus, housing prices surged as buyers quickly dove into the market. Chart I-10 illustrates the interaction between government property related regulations and the domestic housing market. Chart I-10China: Policy-Driven Property Market China: Policy-Driven Property Market China: Policy-Driven Property Market The biggest problem with such policies in the long run is that the authorities want to control both prices and volume - they want flat prices and moderately rising volumes. However, no government can control both prices and volumes simultaneously in any industry. China's real estate market is not an exception. Even in a completely closed socialist system, controlling prices and volume simultaneously is almost impossible. As the authorities adhere to their policy objectives of controlling financial risks and unwinding financial excesses, thereby focusing on property price control over the next 12 months, we believe property starts and construction activity will shrink. Monetization of Housing Inventories In 2015-'17 Understanding what was behind the housing market's strong recovery since late 2015 is critical to assessing the outlook. Since the summer of 2015, authorities were not only easing purchasing restrictions and lowering mortgage rates, but they were also implementing outright monetization of housing inventories. After inventories of both residential and non-residential properties swelled, the central government commenced a de-stocking strategy in 2015, mainly through a monetized slum reconstruction program and by encouraging migrant workers to buy housing in smaller cities near their hometowns. The de-stocking strategy focused on smaller cities where inventories had mushroomed. Given tier-1 cities account for only 6% of floor space started by property developers, and most construction in recent years has been taking place in tier-2 and smaller cities, these policies had a substantial positive impact on national sales, as well as drawing down inventories - ultimately spurring a construction recovery. 1. The government's slum area reconstruction policy has been the major driver behind de-stocking within the residential property market. The People's Bank of China (PBoC) has provided a significant amount of financing in the form of pledged supplementary lending (PSL) directly to homebuyers that was intermediated by three policy banks (China Development Bank, Agricultural Development Bank of China and Export-Import Bank of China). To shed more detail on the PSL mechanism, the central bank lends credit to the three policy banks at very low interest rates. These policy banks in turn lend directly to local government and regional property developers (mainly in tier-2 and smaller cities). These entities then turn and buy slums from their owners which puts cash in the hands of these sellers. Consequently, a large number of households suddenly receive large cash infusions - essentially disbursed by the central bank - that can be used to purchase new and better properties. The outstanding amount - total financing - via the PSL has risen from RMB 383 billion in 2014 to RMB 971 billion in 2016. The total amount of the PSL disbursed for the slum reconstruction program over 2014-2017 amounted to 3 trillion, or 3.6% of 2017 GDP, as of March 31, 2018. The interest rate on the PSL currently stands at a mere 2.75%. It appears that huge amounts of cheap money have been directly injected into the real estate market by the central bank alone. This slum reconstruction program has had a material impact on construction activity. Chart I-11 portends that slum area reconstruction accounted for about 20% of floor space sold in 2017. Chart I-11China: Slum Reconstruction ##br##Has Had Meaningful Impact China: Slum Reconstruction Has Had Meaningful Impact China: Slum Reconstruction Has Had Meaningful Impact 2. In addition to the PSL financing, Chinese housing mortgages have increased by 85%, or by 11 trillion RMB in the past two and a half years - since the beginning of China's de-stocking policy. The sum of PSL financing and mortgage lending has been RMB 14 trillion (or $2.2 trillion) during the same period. Hence, not only has the PBoC financed the real estate market directly, but it has also allowed banks to flood the system with money to liquidate housing inventories. As we have argued in our series of reports, bank credit does not come from anyone's savings. Commercial banks originate loans out of thin air.2 In short, altogether these actions constitute outright monetization of real estate inventories and that caused the property markets' recovery post 2015. A Downturn Ahead? Since early 2017 and especially in the wake of last October's Party Congress, the authorities have shifted their policy focus from "de-stocking" to "eliminating speculative demand". Recent weakness in both demand and prices are a reflection of the current policy focus. This time, the government seems to have more determination to break popular perception that property prices will rise forever, and that investing in property markets cannot go wrong. Therefore, we sense the government's objective is to achieve flat or mildly declining property prices to prevent the return of speculators. In order to avoid a further ballooning of the real estate bubble, the government will raise the bar for another round of property stimulus. Therefore, if the authorities are successful in persuading speculators that prices will not rise much further in the years to come, speculative demand will wane. At the same time, not many first-time homebuyers can afford to buy at current prices. This will create an air pocket in sales and prices will deflate, at least modestly. Facing shrinking revenues and being overleveraged, real estate developers will reduce new starts, and property construction volumes will likely contract by 10% or so. Notably, floor space started by property developers in aggregate declined by 27% between 2012 and 2016 (Chart I-12). The construction slump in China, in tandem with rising supplies of commodities, led to a collapse in commodities prices in 2012-'15 (Chart 12). Hence, a decline in property construction is not unprecedented, even amid robust national income growth. We believe the acute structural imbalances will likely result in a property market downturn commensurable if not worse than those that occurred in 2011-'12 and 2014-'15. While the government will try to avoid a sudden bust, a 10% decline in both property prices and construction volumes in the next 12-18 months is our baseline scenario. The budding contraction in cement and plate glass production suggests that overall construction activity is already decelerating (Chart I-13). Chart I-12China: Property Cycles ##br##And Commodities Prices China: Property Cycles And Commodities Prices China: Property Cycles And Commodities Prices Chart I-13China: Nascent Contraction In Cement ##br##And Plate Glass Production China: Nascent Contraction In Cement And Plate Glass Production China: Nascent Contraction In Cement And Plate Glass Production Bottom Line: The Chinese authorities will for now maintain their current restrictions on the property market to contain financial excesses and risks in the system. This, amid lingering elevated inventories and price excesses, poses considerable downside risks to the mainland real estate market. Investment Implications Our view remains that construction activity in China is set to slump from a cyclical perspective, at least. At 13.2 billion square-meter (142 billion square-feet) the total 2017 residential and non-residential floor area under construction was immense (Chart I-14). This, along with a slowdown in infrastructure investment due to tighter control on local government finances, pose downside risks to China's demand for commodities, materials and industrial goods. This is the reason why we have been and remain bearish on commodities, Asian trade and EM risk assets. It appears that several commodities prices are finally beginning to roll over which is consistent with a slowdown in the mainland's construction activity (Chart I-15). Chart I-14China's Total Building Construction: ##br##Level And Annual Growth China's Total Building Construction: Level And Annual Growth China's Total Building Construction: Level And Annual Growth Chart I-15A Budding Downtrend In ##br##Commodities Prices A Budding Downtrend In Commodities Prices A Budding Downtrend In Commodities Prices China's construction activity is much larger than exports to the U.S. and EU combined. Hence, overall industrial activity in China is set to decelerate dragging down Asian trade flows and commodities prices despite robust domestic demand in the U.S. and EU. This heralds underweighting/shorting EM stocks, currencies and credit versus their DM counterparts. We also reiterate our long-standing recommendation of shorting Chinese property developers versus U.S. homebuilders. Chart I-16 depicts that the Chinese property developers listed in A-share market have a debt-to-equity ratio of 6 and the cash flow from operations for the median of 76 property developers has begun contracting again. Further relapse in property sales will cause their financial position to deteriorate and limit their ability to launch new or complete existing construction. In regard to U.S. homebuilders, the fundamentals in the U.S. housing market are much better than those in China. While rising U.S. interest rates could be a headwind for U.S. homebuilder share prices, they stand to resume their outperformance versus Chinese property developers (Chart I-17). Chart I-16China: Median Property Developer's ##br##Financial Ratios Are Worsening China: Median Property Developer's Financial Ratios Are Worsening China: Median Property Developer's Financial Ratios Are Worsening Chart I-17Short Chinese Property Developers / ##br##Long U.S. Homebuilders Short Chinese Property Developers / Long U.S. Homebuilders Short Chinese Property Developers / Long U.S. Homebuilders Ellen JingYuan He Senior Editor/Associate Vice President EllenJ@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Other oft-used measures of inventories are not correct either. Some analysts use floor space under construction data as a proxy for inventory - this is technically not correct as the data includes both the area that has already been sold in advance and the area that has been completed and sold. Others use cumulative floor space started minus cumulative floor space completed - this is also not correct as cumulative floor space completed includes areas that have not yet been sold. 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "Is Investment Constrained By Savings? Tales Of China And Brazil," dated March 22, 2018, the link is available on page 20. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights China and Brazil are two extremes in regard to investment and savings - the former saves and invests a lot, the latter very little. The key difference between Brazil and China is neither the existing amount of deposits nor their propensity to save. Rather, it is their real economies' capacity to produce goods and services. Regardless of how capital expenditures are financed, when inputs for capital spending are procured domestically it is recorded as national "savings," but when they are imported there is no change in the level of national "savings." In China, policymakers are currently being forced to walk a very thin line between inflation and deflation. Brazilian consumers do not need to save more for companies to get financing for their investments. Instead, businesses - along with facilitation from the government - should build the supply side. Banks can finance the latter by originating loans "out of thin air." However, the natural consequence of this adjustment in Brazil will be considerable currency deprecation. Feature The Fallacy This is the fifth report in our series on money, credit, savings and investment. Its objective is to show that financing of investments is not constrained by national and foreign savings. This report argues against a postulate in mainstream economic literature which holds that in order to invest, nations with low savings rates need to either reduce consumption and boost national savings or to borrow foreign savings. Some examples of this economic thesis can be seen here: As Lindner neatly summarizes: "Many economists hold the position that "saving finances investment." They argue that saving - a reduction of consumption relative to income - is necessary for the provision of loans and the financing of investment." (Lindner 2015).1 Linder also provides other examples suggesting that this thesis is well entrenched in the economic theory and analysis. For example, he cites Gregory Mankiw's influential introductory macroeconomics textbook that upholds: "Saving is the supply of loans - individuals lend their saving to investors, or they deposit their saving in a bank that makes the loan for them. [. . . ] At the equilibrium interest rate, saving equals investment, and the supply of loans equals the demand." (1997, p. 63) (Lindner 2015).2 This mainstream economic thesis - that financing is constrained by savings - is intuitive, and not surprisingly many investors take it for granted. Yet this is a false proposition. This thesis is correct for barter economies but is not pertinent to modern economies with their own banking systems and national currencies. Further, Lindner (2015)3 argues: "The fallacies loanable funds theory commits might be explainable by the mis-application of some ideas and concepts of neoclassical growth models - especially the Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956) and Diamond (1965) models - to the sphere of money and finance... The Ramsey and Solow models are models of real investment only. Financial markets, financial assets and financial saving do not play any role in those models. There is only one good which, for simplicity, will be called "corn". Corn has three functions: it can be consumed, invested and used as a means of payment since wages and interest payments are made with it..." Clearly, modern economies with their fiat money systems are much more complicated than a barter economies with no banks and money. The Veracity: Financing Is Different From "Savings" This and previous reports4 clarify and elaborate on the following aspects of banking, money creation and financing as well as savings and investments: 1. Attributing the lack of investment in many emerging market (EM) economies to their low savings is a major fallacy. Borio (2015)5 argues: "Crucially, the provision of financing does not require someone to abstain from consuming. It is purely a financial transaction and hence distinct from saving... The equality of saving and investment is an accounting identity that always holds ex post and reveals nothing about financing patterns. In ex post terms, being simply the outcome of expenditures, saving does not represent a constraint on how much agents are able to spend ex ante. If we step back from comparative statics and consider the underlying dynamics, it is only once expenditures take place that income and investment, and hence saving, are generated." 2. Banks do not need deposits or "savings" to lend. They create money/deposits when they originate loans or buy assets from non-banks. To settle payments with their peers as well as the central bank, they require reserves at the central bank. Reserves at the central bank - not client deposits - constitute true liquidity for banks. For a more detailed discussion on loan origination and money creation in absence of new deposits entering into the banking system, please refer to Appendix 1 and 2 on pages 14 and 18. Certainly, there are several factors such as regulations and shareholder preferences that can curtail banks' ability to expand their balance sheets. However, households' or nations' "savings" do not constrain banks' ability to originate new loans/create deposits. 3. In an economy where banks exist, "savings" and financing are very different things. Many investors use the term "savings" to refer to bank deposits. Yet, in macroeconomics, national and household "savings" are not related to deposits or money in the banking system at all. Chart I-1 demonstrates that there is no relationship between the savings and changes in the amount of money in the banking system. Chart I-1Savings And New Money ##br##Creation Do Not Correlate Savings And New Money Creation Do Not Correlate Savings And New Money Creation Do Not Correlate The confusion between national "savings" and financing creation is dealt with nicely again by Fabian Lindner. Having modelled it, Lindner argues: "... the aggregate economy's saving is equal to the newly produced tangible assets and inventories. That total saving is equal to just the increase in tangible assets ... (because) all changes in net financial assets in the economy add up to zero... Thus, for every economic agent increasing her net financial assets, there is a corresponding decrease in net financial assets of all other economic agents in the economy (Lindner 2015).6 Put in more general terms: An economic agent can only save financially if other agents dis-save financially by the same amount... That is why in the entire economy (that is the world economy or a closed economy) only the increase in tangible assets, thus investment, is saving...." In another paper, Lindner asserts: "Investment is the production of any non-financial asset in an economy and thus is always directly and unambiguously savings: it increases the economy's net worth... The economy as a whole cannot change its net financial wealth since it always equals zero. The aggregate economy can only save in the form of non-financial assets...The only way an economy can save is by increasing its non-financial wealth, i.e., its physical capital stock" (Lindner 2012).7 On the whole, deposits are a monetary concept; they represent money savings. Deposits are created by banks "out of thin air," as illustrated in Appendix 1 on page 14. Meanwhile, "savings" are a net addition to capital stock. Not surprisingly, there is no relationship between "real savings" and money savings, as illustrated in Chart I-1. In a nutshell, "savings" is an addition to the capital stock of a nation, which is the same as investment. Hence, the Savings = Investment identity for a closed economy is nothing other than a tautology as it de-facto means Investment = Investment. That is why in this report we use "savings" in quotations whenever we refer to it in the traditional sense of economic theory. 4. Households' (or businesses') propensity to save alters the velocity of money, not the amount of deposits/money in the banking system. A decision by a household to spend more rather than save does not change the amount of deposits in the banking system and does not affect the banking system's ability to provide more financing. When households or companies decide to spend their deposits, the velocity of money rises. Conversely, when households and companies decide to save (retain) their deposits, the velocity of money drops. The amount of deposits in the banking system stays constant. In turn, the amount of deposits and hence broad money supply in any banking system equals the cumulative net money creation by banks and the central bank over the course of their history. This has nothing to do with household and national "savings," which form the country's capital stock. 5. In a country with its own national currency, the true macro constraint on commercial banks' ability to expand financing infinitely are inflation and currency depreciation - not "savings." This is of course apart from demand for loans, regulations and shareholder preferences that can limit commercial banks' capacity to expand their balance sheets. Bottom Line: In an economy with banks, one does not need to save in the form of a deposit in a bank for the latter to lend money to another entity. Tales Of Brazil And China Chart I-2Two Extremes Of Investment ##br##And Savings: China And Brazil Two Extremes Of Investment And Savings: China And Brazil Two Extremes Of Investment And Savings: China And Brazil We use China and Brazil solely for illustrative purposes. One can use any country with a low savings rate instead of Brazil or a high savings rate economy such as Korea, Taiwan or Singapore in place of China. China has enjoyed a very high national savings rate and has been investing substantially (Chart I-2). In contrast, both the national savings rate and the investment-to-GDP ratio in Brazil have been depressed. It is very tempting to argue that Brazil has been experiencing very low investment because it saves so little. The narrative goes like this: Brazil's national savings rate is low because households save so little and the public sector dis-saves a lot - i.e., the government runs enormous fiscal deficits. This constrains the pool of available "savings" to finance private capital expenditures. This typical analysis concludes that Brazil needs to boost its "savings" - i.e., reduce its spending. This will allegedly enlarge the pool of available "savings" for investment and allow the country to invest, and consequently boost productivity and its potential growth rate. This narrative is misplaced in our view, because as we have shown in the past and in this report, banks do not need households, businesses or the government to save in order to provide financing. Banks can provide financing by simply expanding the money multiplier, among other things (see a more detailed discussion about the money multiplier below). So what is the true difference between Brazil and China? How has the latter achieved such high savings and investment rates, while the former has failed to finance its capital spending? Why have Brazilian banks not expanded their balance sheets more rapidly to finance investment (Chart I-3)? Chart I-3Snapshot Of Bank Assets-To-GDP Ratios Snapshot Of Bank Assets-To-GDP Ratios Snapshot Of Bank Assets-To-GDP Ratios Let's consider a hypothetical example. For simplicity and illustrative purposes, we assume there are two economies of equal size and have the same level of investment: savings and net exports. In short, they have identical starting points. We refer to these economies as Brazil and China. Now, commercial banks in both countries provide new financing of $50 - or equal to 5% of their respective GDP - to businesses for infrastructure building. This is new purchasing power created by commercial banks "out of thin air" in both economies. We assume that the only difference between these two countries is that in China, 100% of inputs for infrastructure (materials, machinery/equipment and so on) are produced/purchased domestically. In contrast, in Brazil, 100% of the inputs for infrastructure construction are imported, because this economy lacks production capacity. Table I-1 illustrates this hypothetical numerical example. As this infrastructure project is implemented, Brazil's imports will surge, and its net exports will deteriorate. Chart I-4 shows that this indeed is the case in Brazil - when capital spending expands, its current accounts deficit widens, entailing that Brazil imports a considerable portion of inputs for its investments. Table I-1A Hypothetical Example Of Investment - Saving Dynamics Is Investment Constrained By Savings? Tales Of China And Brazil Is Investment Constrained By Savings? Tales Of China And Brazil Chart I-4Foreign Content Of Brazil's ##br##Capital Spending Is High Foreign Content Of Brazil's Capital Spending Is High Foreign Content Of Brazil's Capital Spending Is High If there is no matching rise in foreign investor demand for Brazilian assets, the nation's currency will depreciate. Consequently, to support the plunging currency, Brazilian interest rates would have to rise. As a result, higher borrowing costs short-circuit the credit cycle. In China, because inputs for infrastructure are sourced and procured locally, there is no impact on its exchange rate or interest rates. If there is excess capacity in China to produce these inputs for infrastructure building, this new purchasing power will not lift inflation. A caveat is in order: Similar dynamics in trade balance deterioration, currency depreciation and inflation will prevail if there is a rise in consumer spending instead of capital expenditures. Importantly, the outcome will be the same in both economies if investment spending is done using existing money savings (deposits), not new credit. This example illustrates that a similar amount of capital expenditures financing via money creation "out of thin air" in both economies has increased national savings in China from $250 to $300, yet Brazilian savings stayed at $250 (Table I-1). In terms of savings rate, China will record a rise in its national savings rate from 25% to 28.6% of GDP (Table I-1). In Brazil, however, the national savings rate will remain at 25% of GDP, even though its banks, like Chinese ones, originated money "out of thin air" to finance infrastructure spending. The starting-point difference between China and Brazil is neither their banking systems' ability to expand their balance sheets nor the existing amount of deposits and assets. Rather, it is their real economies' capacity to produce goods and services. Therefore, we conclude: Regardless of how capital expenditures are financed - via new borrowing from banks or non-banks or using the investing company's own financial resources - when inputs for capital spending are procured domestically it is recorded as an increase in national "savings" level, but when they are imported there is no change in the level of national "savings." Over the decades, China, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan have all aggressively expanded their capacity to produce goods and services. They funded this capacity build-up via both money creation "out of thin air" and by attracting foreign capital. In the meantime, their large exports shielded their currencies from abrupt depreciation - as and when local bank financing was used to acquire foreign inputs. In the past decade, in China, loans - which banks have originated to build infrastructure - were largely spent on domestic inputs: cement, steel, chemicals, machinery and equipment all produced in the mainland. Even though some of that money/loans was used to purchase foreign inputs (commodities and equipment), China had large U.S. dollar revenues from exports that acted as an offset in its balance of payments. In short, Brazil and other low "savings" rate nations do not need to raise interest rates to curtail consumption and boost savings in order to release funds for financing capital expenditures. Chart I-5 demonstrates that there has been no positive relationship between real interest rates and the national savings rate in Brazil. Remarkably, real interest rates in this nation were often very high but that still did not lead to high "savings." Chart I-5Real Interest Rates And Savings Are Not Positively Correlated As They Are Supposed To Be Real Interest Rates And Savings Are Not Correlated Real Interest Rates And Savings Are Not Correlated What Brazil and other low "savings" rate economies need is to build efficient and competitive productive capacity - i.e., they need changes in the supply side of their economies. Only then can their banks expand their balance sheets and provide financing similar to how banks in high "savings" countries do. However, to shield the exchange rate from depreciation, these nations need to boost their exports first. This can be done by depreciating the currency and developing their global competitiveness. This is in effect what China has done in the past 25-30 years. Bottom Line: The key difference between Brazil and China is not their propensity to consume versus save, but their ability to produce goods and services domestically. So long as a nation builds and maintains excess productive capacity, its banks can originate loans "out of thin air" and finance capital and consumer expenditures. Money Multiplier Versus "Savings" Redundancy of the mainstream economic view that a pool of "savings" represents a constraint on financing investments becomes apparent when one applies the money multiplier concept, which is in fact accepted by mainstream economic theory. The money multiplier is the ratio of broad money relative to excess reserves. A rise in the money multiplier will lead to more money creation and financing in an economy per one unit of excess reserves (liquidity provided by the central bank), everything else held constant. In brief, money supply/the amount of deposits in the banking system will change regardless of the level of national or household "savings." Let's assume two countries with the same level of income per capita and GDP have identical national savings and investment rates as well as money supply and excess reserves. In short, they have indistinguishable macro parameters. Now suppose their banking systems in the past year had different money multipliers. The monetary authorities in both countries maintain the banking system's excess reserves at 10 units. If the money multiplier were to remain constant, say at 15, the money supply/deposits in both banking systems would remain at 150 units (10x15). Let's assume the money multiplier increased to 20 in Country A while held constant at 15 in Country B. In such a case, broad money supply would have risen to 200 units (10x20) in Country A and would stay at 150 (10x15) units in Country B. This entails that banks in Country A increased their funding yet those in Country B did not. That is despite the fact that the savings rates (and amount of savings) were identical before the change in the money multipliers occurred. This is one way to prove that a nation does not need to cut consumption for its banks to provide financing. The reason why the money multipliers could vary in these two countries with otherwise similar macro-economic parameters is due to animal spirits: In Country A, banks may have felt increasingly confident to lend more per one unit of their excess reserves, and there was demand for credit from borrowers. In the meantime, the money multiplier remained the same in Country B. In China, the money multiplier - the ratio of broad money to excess reserves - has risen dramatically since 2013 (Chart I-6). Interestingly, the amount of excess reserves at the People's Bank of China has been broadly the same over the past five years, yet broad money has grown by an enormous 75% (Chart I-6, middle and bottom panel). The exponential money/credit creation in China since 2009 has to a large extent been due to the rising money multiplier - wild animal spirits among bankers and borrowers - rather than high national "savings." Bottom Line: In any country, banks can provide more financing simply by expanding the money multiplier. This can happen regardless of the country's savings rate. Investment Relevance Why is this analysis pertinent to investors? First, this issue is critical to assess whether China's excessive credit expansion is an outcome of the nation's high savings - like many economists and investors claim - or due to the enormous amount of money/deposits and credit originated by the mainland's banks "out of thin air." If it is the former, investors have no need to worry about China's money and credit dynamics. If it is the latter, we are facing a typical banking and money/credit bubble. This report corroborates that it is the latter. Chart I-7 shows that China's broad money has grown 4-fold since January 2009 and has reached RMB 200 trillion, or the equivalent of $30 trillion. Chart I-6China: Money Multiplier Has Risen A Lot China: Money Multiplier Has Risen A Lot China: Money Multiplier Has Risen A Lot Chart I-7A Money Bubble In China? A Money Bubble In China? A Money Bubble In China? Does this enormous quantity of RMBs pose an inflation and/or currency depreciation risk? Or will the ongoing policy tightening cause another deflationary slump in China? It is clear that Chinese policymakers are currently being forced to walk a very thin line: On the one hand, the immense amount of money created "out of thin air" could stoke inflation or currency depreciation. It may not take much of a rise in the velocity of money for inflation to become a problem. On the other, tightening policy amid high leverage in an economy that is addicted to money and credit could push it into a growth slump and deflation. There is always a chance that policymakers will get it right and manage it perfectly so that neither inflation/currency depreciation nor a growth slump transpire. We would assign a 25-30% probability to this benign outcome. Hence, in our opinion there are 70-75% odds of either inflation or deflation in China in the next 12-24 months. Given these odds, we have been and remain reluctant to chase the rally in EM and China-related plays. In particular, the Chinese authorities have been tightening liquidity and banking/shadow banking regulation as well as projecting the ongoing anti-corruption campaign into the financial industry. This poses a meaningful risk given the existing macro imbalances. Second, this analysis re-shapes how investors should think about economic development and understand how nations with low savings can grow without relying on foreign funding. This provides us with a framework to assess the developmental path and the sustainability of growth in various developing economies. These include but are not limited to nations with low national savings rates such as Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Russia, Colombia and many others. Finally, this analysis leads us to argue that Brazil does not need to maintain high real interest rates as a way to force consumers to cut spending and boost savings. In fact, this is the wrong prescription for Brazil. The most optimal macro adjustment path for Brazil is to reduce interest rates much further and encourage banks to finance private investment. Brazil needs to build an efficient supply side, and banks can provide funding by originating loans "out of thin air." Brazilian consumers do not need to save more for companies to get financing for their projects and invest. The natural causality of this adjustment will be considerable currency deprecation. However, Brazil is currently suffering from low inflation and high real interest rates (Chart I-8). Hence, reflationary policies are the right policy prescription. Chart I-8Brazil Needs To Reduce ##br##Interest Rates Much Further Brazil Needs To Reduce Interest Rates Much Further Brazil Needs To Reduce Interest Rates Much Further Foreign investors are therefore at risk due to potential currency depreciation. The new leaders to be elected in the October presidential elections may well adopt such a macro policy mix. Markets will front run this by pushing the real down and this will be negative for foreign investors. However, there will be a buying opportunity after the currency finds a floor. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Appendix 1: Loan Origination, Deposits/Money Creation And Settlement The amount of deposits is not a constraint on a banking system's ability to make loans and buy assets from non-banks. Figure I-1 and I-2 present stylized cases of how commercial banks can originate new loans without requiring a new deposit or extra excess reserves entering the banking system. Specifically Figure I-1 illustrates how commercial banks can originate loans with the subsequent net settlements among themselves taking place via inter-bank borrowing/lending. In this stylized example, the banking system is comprised of three commercial banks. These commercial banks hold all deposits in the system. Cash does not exist and all payments are done via wire transfers. Figure I-1Money Creation By Banks With Net Settlement Among Banks Via Inter-Bank Lending/Borrowing Is Investment Constrained By Savings? Tales Of China And Brazil Is Investment Constrained By Savings? Tales Of China And Brazil Figure I-2Money Creation By Banks With Net Settlement Between Banks & Central Bank Is Investment Constrained By Savings? Tales Of China And Brazil Is Investment Constrained By Savings? Tales Of China And Brazil 1. Loan Origination/Money Creation In the morning, Bank 1 originates a new loan worth $100 for Client 1. This transaction creates a new asset and, for the balance sheet to balance, Bank 1 should also increase the liabilities side of its balance sheet. Therefore, it simultaneously credits Client 1's chequing account by $100. Bank 1 does not transfer other depositors' money to Client 1's chequing account; it creates a new $100 deposit. The rest of the bank's depositors still have their full deposits, which they can draw on. In a nutshell, both assets and liabilities of Bank 1 rose by $100 - this was done "out of thin air" by just pressing the enter button on the computer. That also means that a $100 of new money was created by Bank 1 which increases the overall money stock in the banking system. Meanwhile, Bank 2 lends $200 to Client 2 and Bank 3 lends $300 to Client 3. Let's assume these were the only lending transactions during that day. In aggregate, the three banks originated $600 of new loans, and consequent new deposits/money "out of thin air." 2. Money Transfer / Payments Debtors do not borrow money and leave it sitting idle. They borrow money to pay their suppliers and others they owe. Even though Clients 1, 2 and 3 wire their payments to their respective suppliers on the same day, the total amount of deposits in the banking system does not change: Deposits simply move from one bank to another or from one bank client to another. In Figure I-1, Client 1 wires its $100 from Bank 1 to Supplier B that has an account at Bank 2; Client 2 pays its $200 invoice to Supplier C which in turn has an account at Bank 3; and finally Client 3 transfers $300 to Supplier A, who holds an account at Bank 1. The amount of money/deposits in the overall banking system has not changed as a result of these wire transfers. 3. Multilateral Net Settlement At the end of the day, banks should settle with other banks. Many countries employ a multilateral net settlement system typically operated by the central bank. In a multilateral net settlement system, at the end of the day, each bank pays (receives from) the system only the net amount they are due to pay to (receive from) other banks combined. Importantly, banks settle their payments with other banks using their excess reserves (herein called reserves) at the central bank, not the deposits of their clients. This entails that banks do not need deposits to pay their dues to other banks or the central bank. Figure I-1 illustrates the impacts on the banks' reserves under the multilateral net settlement system: Bank 1's reserves at the central bank change as follows: -$100 (Client 1's wire transfer out) + $300 (this is the amount that Supplier A with an account in Bank 1 gets from Client 3) = $200. The impact on Bank 2's reserves is as follows: -$200 (Client 2's wire transfer out) + $100 (this is the amount that Supplier B with an account in Bank 2 gets from Client 1) = -$100. The net change in Bank 3's reserves is: -$300 (Client 3's wire transfer out) + $200 (this is the amount that Supplier C with an account in Bank 3 gets from Client 2) = -$100. If we assume that all banks had no excess reserves before this day, then how do they settle their accounts? There are various alternatives, but we highlight two: Figure I-1 demonstrates the case of interbank lending. As a result of the settlements, Bank 1 has $200 in extra reserves, while Bank 2 and Bank 3 each have a $100 deficit in reserves. As such, Bank 1 lends $100 to each of Bank 2 and Bank 3. Why does it lend to other banks rather than keeping these reserves at the central bank? Because interbank rates are typically slightly above the central bank's rate - the rate Bank 1 would get if it were to lend the $200 to the central bank. Figure I-2 portends the same transactions with the sole difference being the reserves flow. Unlike Figure I-1, here banks do not lend to/borrow from each other. Banks lend excess reserves to the central bank as well as borrow deficient reserves from the central bank. This is done to settle their payments with other banks. Bank 1 lends its free reserves of $200 to the central bank. Bank 2 and Bank 3 each borrow $100 reserves from the central bank to settle with the system at the end of the day. As a result, the aggregate amount of reserves at the central bank does not change. On the whole, banks created $600 of new deposits/money/loans during the day without requiring savings from households, companies, the government or foreigners. Thereby, the money supply was expanded and new financing in the amount of $600 was provided "out of thin air." Appendix 2: Deposits Versus Liquidity Below are additional questions that we seek to answer to provide further elaboration on the issues of banks creating money and the difference between deposits and liquidity: 1. Why would central banks provide reserves to banks? When a central bank targets interest rates, which is nowadays the most common policy framework in both advanced and developing countries, it must provide liquidity to banks: the latter is required to preclude interbank rates from deviating from the policy rate. Under an interest rate targeting regime, the central bank does not have complete control over banks' reserves nor broad money supply. A central bank can control either the quantity of money or the price of money (interest rates), but not both simultaneously. The following two quotes from the New York Federal Reserve Chairman William Dudley and the European Central Bank confirm that central banks nowadays provide banks with reserves on demand - i.e., the amount of reserves is determined by demand from banks. "The Federal Reserve has committed itself to supply sufficient reserves to keep the fed funds rate at its target. If banks want to expand credit and that drives up the demand for reserves, the Fed automatically meets that demand in its conduct of monetary policy. In terms of the ability to expand credit rapidly, it makes no difference whether the banks have lots of excess reserves or not." (Dudley, 2009) European Central Bank (2012), May 2012 Monthly Bulletin: "The Eurosystem ... always provides the banking system with the liquidity required to meet the aggregate reserve requirement. In fact, the ECB's reserve requirements are backward-looking, i.e. they depend on the stock of deposits (and other liabilities of credit institutions) subject to reserve requirements as it stood in the previous period, and thus after banks have extended the credit demanded by their customers." 2. Why do banks compete for deposits if they create deposits themselves? The true reason banks compete for deposits is not that they require more deposits, but because they require more reserves. When a bank attracts a deposit from another bank, the latter must transmit to the former reserves equal to the amount of the deposit transferred. When a bank is experiencing a liquidity shortage, more deposits are of no help. Banks can always create more deposits themselves, but they cannot create reserves at the central bank. The true liquidity for banks is their reserves at the central bank - not deposits. Reserves are solely created by central banks "out of thin air." A central bank may decide not to provide funding to certain banks in some cases when the authorities deem these banks insolvent and/or in breach of regulations. Otherwise, if the central bank wants to keep policy rates stable, it must provide all liquidity (reserves) banks require. 3. Why do banks attract deposits if the central bank provides liquidity on demand? The primary reason why banks seek to attract deposits instead of borrowing from the central bank is due to the cost of funding and duration of liabilities as well as regulatory requirements. Deposits may be cheaper and have longer duration than short-term funding from the central bank. 1 Lindner, F. (2015), "Does Savings Increase the Supply of Credit? A Critique of Loanable Funds Theory", Macroeconomic Policy Institute, World Economic Review 4, 2015. 2 Lindner, F. (2015), "Did Scarce Global Savings Finance the US Real Estate Bubble? The Global Saving Glut thesis from a stock flow Consistent Perspective", Macroeconomic Policy Institute, Working Paper 155, July 2015. 3 Lindner, F. (2015), "Does Savings Increase the Supply of Credit? A Critique of Loanable Funds Theory", Macroeconomic Policy Institute, World Economic Review 4, 2015. 4 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November 23, 2016, January 18, 2017 and December 20, 2017; available on ems.bcaresearch.com 5 Borio, C. and Disyatat, P. (2015), "Capital flows and the current account: Taking financing (more) seriously", BIS Working Papers, No. 525, October 2015. 6 Lindner, F. (2015), "Did Scarce Global Savings Finance the US Real Estate Bubble? The Global Saving Glut thesis from a stock flow Consistent Perspective", Macroeconomic Policy Institute, Working Paper 155, July 2015. 7 Lindner, F. (2012), "Savings does not finance Investment: Accounting as an indispensable guide to economic theory", Macroeconomic Policy Institute, Working Paper 100, October 2012. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights The financial system / banks cannot and do not lend out or intermediate national or households "savings". In any economy, new money/new purchasing power is originated by commercial banks "out of thin air". The term "savings" in macroeconomics denotes an increase in the economy's capital stock, not deposits at the banks. The Chinese banking system has enormous amount of deposits because banks have created them "out of nothing" not because households save a lot. Hence, the narrative that justifies China's money, credit and property market excesses by high national and household "savings" is incorrect. The maneuvering room for China is diminishing as inflationary pressures are rising, productivity is slowing and speculative leverage is high. Feature The debate on China's macro outlook continues to linger both within and outside BCA. The focal point of the debate centers on the role of national "savings" in China in spurring credit origination and debt formation. Many of my colleagues at BCA and the majority of commentators outside BCA argue that China's high "savings" rate, or so-called "excess savings", has been an important contributor to its exponential credit and money growth. Contrary to this narrative, we within BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team maintain that the dramatic surge in credit and money in China has been the result of speculative behavior by banks and debtors. As such, the boom in money and credit growth has produced large imbalances and excesses, if not outright bubbles (Chart I-1). Chart I-1An Unprecedented Credit ##br##And Money Boom In China An Unprecedented Credit And Money Boom In China An Unprecedented Credit And Money Boom In China Every financial bubble in history has had its justifications. Last decade, the common narrative about U.S. real estate was that nationwide, U.S. house prices had historically never deflated in nominal terms. In the late 1990s, the tech bubble was vindicated by the "new productivity" era. In the meantime, in the 1980s in Japan and the mid-1990s in Hong Kong, sky high property prices were rationalized by limited amounts of land, given that these are islands. Despite these validations, all of these bubbles ultimately burst. We feel that vindicating China's enormous credit, money and property market excesses - which are all interrelated - by the nation's high "savings" is another attempt to endorse overextended and unsustainable macro imbalances. This report is a continuation of our series discussing these issues in great depth.1 The objective of this piece is to illuminate on the confusion between national "savings" and credit / deposits / money. Intuitively, many investors and commentators use the term "savings" to refer to bank deposits. Yet, in macroeconomics, national and household "savings" are not about deposits or money in the banking system at all. The term "savings" in macroeconomics denotes an increase in the economy's capital stock. Therefore, the financial system in general, and banks in particular, cannot and do not lend out or intermediate national or households "savings." The Chinese banking system has enormous amount of deposits because banks have created them "out of nothing" not because households save a lot. In an economy where banks exist, "savings" and financing are very different things. Commercial banks (hereafter referred to as banks) provide financing by expanding their balance sheets - creating deposits "out of thin air" as and when they originate loans. We previously elaborated on this money creation process,2 but given its importance to the topic of this report, we revisit it here. Banks Create New Purchasing Power "Out Of Thin Air" When a bank originates a loan, it simultaneously creates a deposit, or new money. Importantly, this does not represent a transfer of an existing deposit to the new borrower. This is a new deposit - new purchasing power - that did not previously exist (Figure 1). Figure I-1Credit / Money Creation Process The True Meaning Of China's Great 'Savings' Wall The True Meaning Of China's Great 'Savings' Wall The borrower can immediately use this new deposit to purchase goods and services or buy assets. At the same time, all owners of existing deposits at the bank still have their deposits too, and can use them as, when, and how they prefer. Thereby, the bank has created new purchasing power "out of nothing" when it originated a loan. Traditional macroeconomic theory presumes that for a person or company to invest in productive capacity, another person/unit must save. This assumption is true for a barter economy with no banks and money - where some entities produce but do not consume, so that others can acquire their output (goods) and in turn use them as investment. Nevertheless, in an economy with banks, one does not need to save in the form of a deposit in a bank in order for the latter to lend money to another entity. When a bank grants a loan or acquires an asset, it simultaneously creates new deposit/money - which is de facto new purchasing power originated by the bank "out of thin air." We use the terms deposit and money interchangeably because broad money supply is computed as the sum of all deposits in the commercial banks. Let's consider an example of how a bank loan leads to new income creation. A company borrows from a bank to build a bridge, it then pays its suppliers and contractors for their work. As a result, the suppliers and contractors, and consequently their employees and shareholders, earn income. Without this loan, the bridge would not have been built, and the suppliers, their employees and business owners would not have received income. In short, the loan comes first, then the investment - and only after the investment is carried out do employees and business owners earn income. Thereafter, they can consume, acquire assets and save in forms of bank deposits. Critically, this income is realized because the bank originated a loan / new purchasing power "out of nothing." Chart I-2 illustrates that the Chinese banking system has created RMB 140 trillion of broad money/deposits since January 2009. This is equivalent to US$21 trillion at today's exchange rate. This is twice as much as aggregate broad money - equivalent to $10.5 trillion - generated by commercial and central banks in the U.S., the euro area and Japan combined since early 2009 - even amid their respective QE programs. Chart I-2Helicopter Money In China Helicopter Money In China Helicopter Money In China The unprecedented new purchasing power of Chinese companies and households has been primarily due to this enormous balance sheet expansion by mainland commercial banks (Chart I-3). Chart I-3China: Commercial Banks ##br##Assets And Money Multiplier China: Commercial Banks Assets And Money Multiplier China: Commercial Banks Assets And Money Multiplier Bank Versus Financial Intermediaries Banks perform a unique function in the economy and financial system. There are considerable differences between a bank lending money or buying assets and a non-bank doing the same. This is unfortunately not reflected in mainstream economic theory and macro models. Unlike banks, non-banks - such as pension funds, insurance companies, households, businesses and all other non-bank entities - do not create new money/new purchasing power when they grant a loan or acquire an asset. The act of lending by non-banks simply constitutes a transfer of an existing deposit from a creditor to a borrower. Banks are not intermediaries of deposits into loans as the Loanable Funds Theory (LFT) alleges. They create deposits themselves by making loans and acquiring assets. The LFT, nonetheless, applies to non-bank lenders - the latter are indeed financial intermediaries, i.e., they channel existing deposits into loans or other assets. The institutional and legal differences that make commercial banks unique and allow them to create money are discussed in detail in "How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same?," Werner (2014b).3 The theory of fractional banking is not applicable to modern banking as well.4 It is the theory of money creation by banks that we subscribe to and present here that accurately describes the process of money creation. Bottom Line: Banks differ vastly from non-bank financial institutions, and are unique in their ability to create money/new purchasing power by originating loans or acquiring assets. Money Versus Credit Remarkably, there is also an important analytical distinction between credit/leverage and money. New money matters when one is attempting to gauge the (nominal) growth outlook because it represents new purchasing power. New money can only be originated by banks, including the central bank. Central banks can create broad money in circulation (i.e. beyond central bank reserves) when they buy financial assets from or lend to non-bank entities. Doing so creates a deposit in the commercial banking system. By contrast, the degree of credit/leverage is critical when evaluating the risk of financial distress in both the economy and the financial system. Credit can be extended not only by banks but also by non-banks. Hence, lending or buying corporate bonds by non-banks creates leverage/credit but not new money. The banking system is the only one capable of originating new money, and in turn, new purchasing power. In China, the outstanding stock of total non-financial debt (private plus public) is close to the amount of money supply (Chart I-4). Even though non-bank credit growth has risen in importance since 2010, it seems that without banks' money creation, non-bank credit would not have expanded. Chart I-4China: Money Versus Credit/Debt China: Money Versus Credit/Debt China: Money Versus Credit/Debt On another note, household propensity to save alters the velocity of money, not the amount of money in the banking system. A decision by a household to spend more rather than save does not change the amount of deposits in the banking system. As an example, a person who gets paid $1000 might spend $800 of her income and decide to save the remaining $200. The amount of deposits in the banking system does not change; $800 will be transferred to another bank account as she pays for her purchases, while the remaining $200 stays in her existing bank account. Hence, there is no change in the amount of deposits and money supply in the banking system in this scenario. On the whole, the amount of deposits, and hence, broad money supply, in any banking system is equal to the cumulative net money creation by banks and the central bank over the course of their history. This has nothing to do with household and national "savings." The Chinese banking system has enormous amount of deposits because banks have created them "out of nothing" not because households save a lot. Interestingly, changes in household propensity to save are reflected not in money supply but in the velocity of money. When households or companies decide to spend their deposits, the velocity of money rises. Conversely, when households and companies decide to save (retain) their deposits, the velocity of money drops. Bottom Line: Money is distinct from credit and leverage. Changes in the propensity to save alter the velocity of money, but not the amount of deposits/money supply in the banking system. True Meaning Of "Savings" In Macroeconomics What is the true meaning of "savings"5 in macroeconomics, given the amount of deposits in the banking system has no bearing on "savings?" The confusion between national "savings" and deposit/money creation is dealt with nicely by Fabian Lindner. Having modelled it, Lindner6 argues: "... the aggregate economy's saving is equal to the newly produced tangible assets and inventories. That total saving is equal to just the increase in tangible assets ... (because) all changes in net financial assets in the economy add up to zero... Thus, for every economic agent increasing her net financial assets, there is a corresponding decrease in net financial assets of all other economic agents in the economy. Put in more general terms: An economic agent can only save financially if other agents dis-save financially by the same amount... That is why in the entire economy (that is the world economy or a closed economy) only the increase in tangible assets, thus investment, is saving (emphasis is added). Thus, saving and investment are equivalent in the aggregate... The equivalence of investment and saving however does not mean - as claimed by LFT - that household saving (or the sum of household and government saving) is equal to total saving and thus to investment. No matter how high one group's financial saving is, the financial dis-saving of the rest of the economy has to be just as high. The only thing remaining is the creation of tangible assets." (Lindner 2015) In another paper,7 Lindner asserts: "Investment is the production of any non-financial asset in an economy and thus is always directly and unambiguously savings: it increases the economy's net worth... The economy as a whole cannot change its net financial wealth since it always equals zero. The aggregate economy can only save in the form of non-financial assets...The only way an economy can save is by increasing its non-financial wealth, i.e., its physical capital stock." (Lindner 2012) Bottom Line: For a country to raise its domestic "savings" rate, it needs to build its capital stock by using domestically produced investment goods and raw materials. Thereby, domestic "savings" have nothing to do with the absolute level or changes in amount of deposits/money in the banking system. China's Great Wall Of "Savings" China has been investing tremendous amounts for many years, and its capital stock has been mushrooming (Chart I-5, top panel). Yet, the incremental capital-to-output ratio (ICOR) has surged and, its inverse, the output-to-capital ratio has plunged since 2010 (Chart I-5, middle and bottom panels). These developments signify deteriorating efficiency in the Chinese economy and worsening capital allocation. They also entail that companies might have difficulties servicing their debt. When its export machine faltered in 2008 due to the Global Financial Crisis, China offset it by boosting its domestic investments. These investments - incremental additions to the nation's capital stock - defined by macroeconomics as domestic "savings"- offset the decline in external "savings." As such, the composition of national "savings" has changed dramatically since 2008: the share of external "savings" (net exports) have declined while the share of domestic "savings" has risen (Chart I-6). Chart I-5China: Capital Stocks Has Surged China: Capital Stocks Has Surged China: Capital Stocks Has Surged Chart I-6China: Domestic And External 'Savings' China: Domestic And External 'Savings' China: Domestic And External 'Savings' In China, the augmentation of its capital stock and, hence, its domestic "savings," have been largely financed by loans from Chinese banks. This may sound like nonsense, but only because we are using the term "savings" in a way used in macroeconomics. Yet, new purchasing power originated by the banking system is not in and of itself a sufficient condition to generate domestic "savings." The sufficient condition for having high domestic "savings" is the ability to produce domestic capital goods and raw materials that go into investment. If a country does not build its capacity to produce capital goods and raw materials, it would need to rely on imports - in other words it has to acquire foreign "savings" to invest. Encouraging domestic "savings" entails enhancing capacity to produce goods that are used in capital spending like raw materials, chemicals, steel, cement, machinery, and various equipment and instruments. This is what China has done exceptionally well over the past 20 years. The following points illustrate how China achieved very high "savings" and investment rates (Chart I-7): China devalued its currency in January 1994 by 32% and relied on a cheap currency to produce large trade surpluses (Chart I-8). It used the foreign currency proceeds to purchase foreign technologies and equipment to boost its capital stock. Chart I-7Savings And Investment Ratios Savings And Investment Ratios Savings And Investment Ratios Chart I-8China: The 1994 Currency ##br##Devaluation Started New Era China: The 1994 Currency Devaluation Started New Era China: The 1994 Currency Devaluation Started New Era It also attracted FDI to build its productive capacity both for consumer goods as well as capital goods. FDI inflows surged since China's acceptance into the WTO in 2001. Since 2009, however, China has been relying on new purchasing power created by banks to expand its industrial capacity to produce commodities, raw materials, industrial equipment and machinery. Meanwhile, mainland banks have been originating new loans, and hence deposits/money - new purchasing power - to finance real estate development and infrastructure construction, utilizing these domestically produced raw materials and machinery. This has allowed China to sustain high levels of domestic "savings." On the whole, China indeed has had "excess savings" as its economy has been suffering from excess industrial capacity. Initially, China invested to create such excess capacity. Then, its banking system originated enormous amount of money/new purchasing power to support and keep zombie companies alive in these industries with excess capacity. The banking system is still involved in this function up until today. While this is a reasonable economic policy in the short run, it is not a good growth strategy in the long term. The problem is that easy money and credit support inefficient enterprises and encourage unproductive investment. As a result, productivity growth will slow and potential growth will decelerate considerably. Bottom Line: The countries that produce a lot of goods and services for domestic investment are said to have high domestic "savings." By definition, the more excess industrial capacity a country has, the more "excess savings" that economy will carry. Yet, uncontrolled money/credit origination to support zombie enterprises in over-capacity sectors entails inefficient allocation of capital that necessarily slows productivity growth and hence economic growth potential in the long term. Limits On Money Creation A natural question that arise from all this is what are the limits on money creation? We list some of major ones here, but these issues have been addressed in our previous three reports,8 and we will address them again in forthcoming reports. Inflation and/or deprecation pressures on the currency that could lead to monetary tightening; Bank regulation and various regulatory ratios; Shareholders of banks - who are highly leveraged to non-performing assets/loans - might order reduced lending; Removing the implicit government "put" that encourage irresponsible borrowing and lending. Inflationary pressures are presently rising and more entrenched in China now than at any time in the past decade or so (Chart I-9). In the context of negative real interest rates (Chart I-10) and barring major growth slowdown, the authorities are unlikely to stimulate anytime soon. Chart I-9Beware Of Rising Inflation In China... Beware Of Rising Inflation In China... Beware Of Rising Inflation In China... Chart I-10...Making Interest Rates Negative ...Making Interest Rates Negative ...Making Interest Rates Negative Negative real local interest rates undermine Chinese households' willingness to hold the currency. China's foreign exchange reserves at $3 trillion, while high, are equal only to 10% broad money (M3) and 14% of official M2. This signifies how much money the banking system has created. At the moment, mainland banking regulations are being tightened. This as well as liquidity tightening by the People's Bank of China and the government's anti-corruption crackdown that is moving into the financial industry will further dampen money creation and leverage expansion. This triple tightening amid lingering money and credit excesses constitutes the main rationale behind our negative stance on China's growth and China-related plays in global financial markets. Policy tightening is especially dangerous amid the existing credit, money and property market imbalances and excesses. Downgrade Chinese Stocks From Overweight To Neutral The Chinese MSCI Investable equity index - which unlike H-shares includes mega-cap tech companies - has rallied massively and outperformed the EM benchmark (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Downgrade Chinese Investable Stocks ##br##From Overweight To Neutral Downgrade Chinese Investable Stocks From Overweight To Neutral Downgrade Chinese Investable Stocks From Overweight To Neutral Relative performance is overbought, and we recommend dedicated EM equity portfolios downgrade their allocation from overweight to neutral. Our overweight position was initiated on November 26, 2014, and has generated an 18.5% gain. The freed-up capital should be allocated proportionally to our remaining overweights, which are Taiwan, Thailand, Korean tech stocks, Russia and central Europe. We are contemplating upgrading Chile. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November 23, 2016 and January 18, 2017; available on ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 16, 2016, available on available on ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Werner, R. (2014b), "How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same?", International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 71-77. 4 Werner, R. (2014a), "Can banks individually create money out of nothing? -- The theories and the empirical evidence", International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 1-19. 5 We use "savings" in parenthesis because as this term does not really mean households' and companies' and governments' financial assets or deposits at the banks. "Savings" signifies the amount of goods and services produced but not consumed by an economy. 6 Lindner, F. (2015), "Did Scarce Global Savings Finance the US Real Estate Bubble? The Global Saving Glut thesis from a stock flow Consistent Perspective", Macroeconomic Policy Institute, Working Paper 155, July 2015. 7 Lindner, F. (2012), "Savings does not finance Investment: Accounting as an indispensable guide to economic theory", Macroeconomic Policy Institute, Working Paper 100, October 2012. 8 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November 23, 2016 and January 18, 2017; available on ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations