China Stimulus

Highlights We estimate total Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) investment will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020. The size of BRI investments is about 47 times smaller than China's annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). Therefore, a slump in domestic capital spending in China will fully offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets from BRI. Investors should consider buying these bourses in sell-off. On a positive note, BRI leads to improved global capital allocation, allows China to export its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, and boosts recipient countries' demand for Chinese exports. Feature China's 'Belt and Road' Initiative (BRI) is on an accelerating path (Chart I-1), with total investment expected to rise from US$120 billion to about US$170 billion over the next three years. Chart I-1Accelerating BRI Investment From China bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c1 bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c1 The BRI has been one of the central government's main priorities since late 2013. The primary objectives of the BRI are: To export China's excess capacity in heavy industries and construction to other countries - i.e., build infrastructure in other countries; To expand the country's international influence via a grand plan of funding investments into the 69 countries along the Belt and the Road (B&R) (Chart I-2); To build transportation and communication networks as well as energy supply to facilitate trade and provide China access to other regions, especially Europe and Africa; To facilitate the internationalization of the RMB; To speed up the development of China's poor (and sometimes restive) central and western regions, namely by turning them into economic hubs between coastal China and the BRI countries in the rest of Asia; To boost China's strategic position in central, south, and southeast Asia through security linkages arising from BRI cooperation, as well as from assets (like ports) that could provide military as well as commercial uses in the long run. From a cyclical investment perspective, the pertinent questions for investors are: How big is the current scale of BRI investment, and where is the funding coming from? Will rising BRI investment be able to offset the negative impact from a potential slowdown in Chinese capex spending? Which frontier markets will benefit most from Chinese BRI investment? Chart I-2The Belt And Road Program China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's BRI: Scale And Funding Scale China has been implementing its strategic BRI since 2013. To date it has invested in 69 B&R countries through two major approaches: infrastructure project contracts and outward direct investment (ODI). The first approach - investment through projects - is the main mechanism of BRI implementation. BRI projects center on infrastructure development in recipient countries, encompassing construction of transportation (railways, highways, subways, and bridges), energy (power plants and pipelines) and telecommunication infrastructure. The cumulative size of the signed contracts with B&R countries over the past three years is US$383 billion, of which US$182 billion of projects are already completed. However, the value of newly signed contracts in a year does not equal the actual project investment occurred in that year, as generally these contracts will take several years to be implemented and completed. Table I-1 shows our projection of Chinese BRI project investment over the years of 2017-2020, which will reach US$168 billion in 2020. This projection is based on two assumptions: an average three-year investing and implementation period for BRI projects from the date of signing the contract to the commercial operation date (COD) of the project, and an average annual growth rate of 10% for the total value of the annual newly signed contracts over the next three years. Table I-1Projection Of Chinese BRI Project Investment Over The Years 2017-2020 China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? The basis for the first assumption is that the majority of the completed BRI projects were by and large finished within three years, and most of the existing and future BRI projects are also expected to be completed within a three-year period.1 The second assumption of the 10% future growth rate is reasonable, given the 13.5% average annual growth rate for the past two years, but from a low base. These large-scale infrastructure projects were led mainly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and often in the form of BOTs (Build-Operate Transfers), Design-Build-Operate (DBOs), BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfers), BOO (Build-Own-Operate) and other types of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). After a Chinese SOE successfully wins a bid on an infrastructure project in a hosting country, the company will typically seek financing from a Chinese source to fund the project, and then execute construction of the project. After the completion of the project, depending on the terms pre-specified in the contract, the company will operate the project for a number of years, which will generate revenues as returns for the company. The second approach - investing into the recipient countries through ODI - is insignificant, with an amount of US$14.5 billion last year. This was only 12% of BRI project investment, and only 8.5% of China's total ODI. Chinese ODI has so far been mainly focused on tertiary industries, particularly in developed countries that can educate China in technology, management, innovation and branding. Besides, most of the Chinese ODI has been in the form of cross-border M&A purchases by Chinese firms, with only a small portion of the ODI targeted at green-field projects, which do not lead to an increase in demand for commodities and capital goods. Therefore, in this report we will only focus on the analysis of project investment as a proxy of Chinese BRI investment, as opposed to ODI. The focal point of this analysis is to gauge the demand outlook for commodities and capital goods originating from BRI. The Sources Of Chinese Funding The projected US$120 billion to US$170 billion BRI investment every year seems affordable for China. This is small in comparison to about US$3-3.5 trillion of new money origination, or about US$3 trillion of bank and shadow-bank credit (excluding borrowing by central and local governments) annually in the past two years. The financing sources for China's BRI investment include China's two policy banks (China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China), two newly established funding sources (Silk Road Fund and Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank), Chinese commercial banks, and other financial institutions/funds. Table I-2 shows our estimate of the breakdown of BRI funding in 2016. Table I-2BRI Funding Sources In 2016 China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China Development Bank (CDB): As the country's largest development bank, the CDB has total assets of US$2.1 trillion, translating into more than US$350 billion of potential BRI projects over the next 10 years, which could well result in US$35 billion in funding annually from the CDB. The Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM): The EXIM holds an outstanding balance of over 1,000 BRI projects, and has also set up a special lending scheme worth US$19.5 billion over the next three years. This will increase EXIM's BRI lending from last year's US$5 billion to at least US$6.5 billion per year. Silk Road Fund (SRF): The Chinese government launched the SRF in late 2014 with initial funding of US$40 billion to directly support the BRI mission. This year, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged a funding boost to the SRF with an extra 100 billion yuan (US$15 billion). Therefore, SRF funding to BRI projects over the next three years will be higher than the US$6 billion recorded last year. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): The AIIB was established in October 2014 and started lending in January 2016. It only invested US$1.7 billion in loans for nine BRI projects last year. The BRI funding from the AIIB is set to accelerate as the number of member countries has significantly expanded from an original 57 to 80 currently. Chinese commercial banks: Chinese domestic commercial banks, the largest source of BRI funding, have been driving BRI investment momentum. Chinese commercial banks currently fund about 62% of BRI investment and the main financiers are Bank of China (BoC) and Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). After lending about US$60 billion over the past two years, the BOC plans to provide US$40 billion this year. The ICBC has 412 BRI projects in its pipeline, involving a total investment of US$337 billion over the next 10 years, which will likely result in an annual US$34 billion in BRI investment. The China Construction Bank (CCB) also has over 180 BRI projects in its pipeline, worth a total investment of US$90 billion over the next five to 10 years. Only three commercial banks will likely fund US$80 billion of BRI projects over the next three years. A few more words about the currency used in BRI funding. The U.S. dollar and Chinese RMB will be the two main currencies employed in BRI funding. Chinese companies can get loans denominated either in RMBs or in USDs from domestic commercial banks/policy banks/special funds/multilateral international banks to buy machinery and equipment (ME) from China. For some PPP projects that involve non-Chinese companies or governments (i.e. those of recipient countries), the local presence can use either USD loans or their central bank's Chinese RMB reserves from the currency swap deal made with China's central bank. China has long looked to recycle its large current account surpluses by pursuing investments in hard assets (land, commodities, infrastructure, etc.) across the world, to mitigate its structural habit of building up large foreign exchange reserves that are mostly invested in low-interest-bearing American government securities. Risky but profitable BRI infrastructure projects are a continuation of this trend. China had so far signed bilateral currency swap agreements worth an aggregate of more than 1 trillion yuan (US$150 billion) with 22 countries or regions along the B&R. The establishment of cross-border RMB payment, clearing and settlement has been gaining momentum, and the use of RMB has been expanding gradually in global trade and investment, notwithstanding inevitable setbacks. Bottom Line: We estimate total BRI investment with Chinese financing will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020, and Chinese financial institutions will be capable of funding it. Can BRI Offset A Slowdown In China's Capex? From a global investors' perspective, a pertinent question around the BRI program is whether the BRI-funded capital spending can offset the potential slowdown in China's domestic investment expenditure. This is essential to gauge the demand outlook for industrial commodities and capital goods worldwide. Our short answer is not likely. Table I-3 reveals that in 2016, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in China was estimated by the National Bureau of Statistics to be at RMB 32 trillion, or $4.8 trillion. Table I-3China's GFCF* Vs. China's BRI Investment Expenditures China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Meantime, China-funded BRI investment expenditure amounted to US$102 billion in 2016. In a nutshell, last year GFCF in China was about 47 times larger than BRI investment expenditures. The question is how much of a drop in mainland GFCF would need to take place to offset the projected BRI investment. The latter will likely amount to US$139 billion in 2018, US$153 billion in 2019 and US$168 billion in 2020. Provided estimated sizes of Chinese GFCF in 2017 are RMB 33.5 trillion (US$4.9 trillion), it would take only 0.4% contraction in GFCF in 2018, 0.3% in 2019 and 2020 to completely offset the rise in BRI-related investment expenditure (Table 3). Chart I-3Record Low Credit Growth... bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c3 bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c3 We derive these results by comparing the expected absolute change in BRI capital spending expenditures with the size of China's GFCF. The expected increases in BRI in 2018, 2019 and 2020 are US$20 billion, US$14 billion and US$15 billion. Given the starting point of GFCF in 2017 was US$4.9 trillion, it will take only about 0.4% of decline in $4.9 trillion to offset the $20 billion rise in BRI. In the same way, we estimated that it would take only an annual 0.3% contraction in nominal GFCF in China to completely offset the rise in BRI capital spending in both 2019 and 2020. To be sure, we are not certain that the GFCF will contract in each of the next three years. Yet, odds of such shrinkage in one of these years are substantial. As always, investors face uncertainty, and they need to make assessments. Is an annual 0.4% decline in China's GFCF likely in 2018? In our opinion, it is quite likely, based on our money and credit growth, as illustrated in Chart I-3. Importantly, interest rates in China continue to drift higher. A higher cost of borrowing and regulatory tightening on banks and shadow banking will lead to a meaningful deterioration in China's credit origination. The latter will weigh on investment expenditures. The basis is that the overwhelming portion of GFCF is funded by credit to public and private debtors, and aggregate credit growth has already relapsed. Chart I-4 and Chart I-5 demonstrate that money and credit impulses lead several high-frequency economic variables that tend to correlate with capital expenditure cycles. Chart I-4Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... ...Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... ...Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... Chart I-5...Slowing Capital Expenditure ...Slowing Capital Expenditure ...Slowing Capital Expenditure Therefore, we conclude that meaningful weakness in the GFCF is quite likely in 2018, and that it will spill out to 2019 if the government does not counteract it with major stimulus. By and large, odds are that a slump in domestic capital spending in China offset the rise in BRI-related capital expenditures. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service has written substantively on motives surrounding China's capital spending and how it is set to slow, and we will not cover these topics. Some reasons why investment spending is bound to slow include: considerable credit excesses/high indebtedness of companies; misallocation of capital and resultant weak cash flow position of companies; non-performing assets on banks' and other creditors' balance sheets and their weak liquidity position. To be sure, investors often ask whether or not material weakness in mainland growth will lead the authorities to stimulate. Odds are they will. Yet, before the slowdown becomes visible in economic numbers, financial markets will likely sell-off. In brief, policymakers are currently tightening and will be late to reverse their policies. Finally, should one compare the entire GFCF, or only part of it? There is a dearth of data to analyze various types of capital spending. In a nutshell, Chart I-6 reveals that installation accounts for roughly 70% of investment, while purchases of equipment account for the remaining 18%. Therefore, we guess the composition of BRI projects will be similar to structure of investment spending in China, and hence it makes sense to use overall GFCF as a comparative benchmark. In addition, the GFCF data is a better measure for Chinese capital spending over Chinese fixed asset investment (FAI) data, as the FAI number includes land values, which have risen significantly over the years and already account for about half of the FAI (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chart I-7GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI Bottom Line: While it is hard to forecast and time exact dynamics over the next several years, odds are that the next 12-24 months will turn out to be a period of a slump in China's capital spending. This will more than offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Implication For Frontier Markets The BRI, which currently covers 69 countries, will keep expanding its coverage for the foreseeable future. Insofar as it is a way for China to create new markets for its exports, Beijing has no reason to exclude any country. In practice, however, certain countries will receive greater dedication, for the simple reason that their development fits into China's political, military and strategic interests as well as economic interests. As most of the investments are infrastructure-focused, aiming to improve transportation, energy and telecommunication connectivity as well as special economic zones, the recipient countries, especially underdeveloped frontier markets, will benefit considerably from China's BRI. Table I-4 shows that Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets, as the planned BRI investment in those countries amounts to a significant amount of their GDP. Chart I-8 also shows that, in terms of current account deficit coverage by the Chinese BRI funding, the three countries that stand to benefit most are also Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana. Table I-1The B&R Countries That Benefit From ##br##China's BRI Investment (Ranged From High-To-Low) China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Chart I-8Chinese BRI Funding's Impact On ##br##External Account Of B&R Countries China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Of these, clearly Pakistan and Kazakhstan have the advantage of attracting China's strategic as well as economic interest: Kazakhstan offers China greater access into Central Asia and broader Eurasia; Pakistan is a large-population market that offers a means of accessing the Indian Ocean without the geopolitical complications of Southeast and East Asia. These states also neighbor China's restive Xinjiang, where Beijing hopes economic development can discourage separatist and terrorist activities. Pakistan Pakistan is a key prospect for China's exports in of itself, and in the long run offers a maritime waystation and an energy transit hub separate from China's other supply lines. For China, it is a critical alternative to Myanmar and the Malacca Strait. In April 2015, China announced a remarkable US$46.4 billion CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) investment plan in Pakistan, equal to 16.4% of Pakistani GDP. It is expected to be implemented over five years. In particular, the planned US$33.2 billion energy investment will increase Pakistan's existing power capacity by 70% from 2017 to 2023. On the whole, China's CPEC plan will be significantly positive to economic development in Pakistan in the long run, but in the near term it is still not enough to boost the nation's competitiveness (Chart I-9A, top panel). Chart I-9AOur Calls Have Been Correct Top 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most From Chinese BRI Investment Top 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most From Chinese BRI Investment Chart I-9BTop 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most ##br##From Chinese BRI Investment Our Calls Have Been Correct Our Calls Have Been Correct Also, as about 40% of the investment has already been invested over the previous two years, odds are that China's CPEC investment will go slower and smaller this year and over the next few years. BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service's recent tactical bearish call on Pakistani stocks has been correct, with a 25% decline in the MSCI Pakistan Index in U.S. dollar terms since our recommendation in March (Chart I-9B, top panel).2 We remain tactically cautious for now. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is a key transit corridor for Chinese goods to enter Europe and the Middle East. In June 2017, Chinese and Kazakh enterprises and financial institutions signed at least 24 deals worth more than US$8 billion. China's BRI investment in Kazakhstan facilitated the country's accelerated economic growth (Chart I-9A, middle panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service reiterates its positive view on Kazakhstan equities because of a recuperating economy, considerable fiscal stimulus and rising Chinese BRI investment (Chart I-9B, middle panel).3 Ghana Ghana is not strategic for China (it is a minor supplier of oil). Instead, it illustrates the fact that BRI is not always relevant to China's strategic or geopolitical interests. Sometimes it is simply about China's need to invest its surplus U.S. liquidity into hard assets around the world. Of course, Ghana itself will benefit considerably from the committed US$19 billion BRI investment, which was announced only a few months ago. This is a huge amount for the country, equaling 45% of Ghana's 2016 GDP. This massive fresh investment will boost Ghana's economic growth in both the near and long term (Chart I-9A, bottom panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service upgraded its stance on the Ghanaian equity market from negative to neutral in absolute terms at the end of July, and we also recommended overweighting the bourse relative to the broader MSCI EM universe (Chart I-9B, bottom panel).4 Our positive view on Ghana remains unchanged for now and we are looking to establish a long position in the absolute terms in this bourse amid a potential EM-wide sell-off. Other Macro Ramifications Industrial goods and commodities/materials are vulnerable. BRI will not change the fact that a potential relapse in capital spending in China will lead to diminishing growth in commodities demand. If there is a massive slowdown in property market like China experienced in 2015, which is very likely due to lingering excesses, Chinese commodity and industrial goods demand could even contract (Chart I-10). Notably, mainland's imports of base metals have been flat since 2010, and imports of capital goods shank in 2015 even though GDP and GFCF growth were positive (Chart I-11). The point is that there could be another cyclical contraction in Chinese imports of commodities and industrial goods, even if headline GDP and GFCF do not contract. Chart I-10Chinese Capital Goods Imports Could Contract Again bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c10 bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c10 Chart I-11Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further As China accounts for 50% of global demand of industrial metals and it imports about US$ 589 billion of industrial goods and materials annually, either decelerating growth or outright demand contraction will be negative news for global commodities markets and industrial goods producers. China's Exports Have A Brighter Outlook China's machinery and equipment (ME) exports account for 47% of total exports, and 9% of its GDP (Table I-5). The BRI investment will boost Chinese ME exports directly through large infrastructure projects. Table I-5Structure Of Chinese Exports (2016) China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Meantime, robust income growth in the recipient countries will boost their demand for household goods (Chart I-12). China has a very strong competitive advantage in white and consumer goods production, especially in low-price segments that are popular in developing economies. Therefore, not only is China exporting its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, but the BRI is also boosting recipient countries' demand for Chinese household and other goods exports. Adding up dozens of countries like Ghana can result in a meaningful augmentation in China's customer base. Notably, Chinese total exports have exhibited signs of improvement as Chinese ME exports and exports to the major B&R countries have contributed to a rising share of total Chinese exports since 2015 (Chart I-13). Chart I-12BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of ##br##Capital And Consumer Goods BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of Capital And Consumer Goods BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of Capital And Consumer Goods Chart I-13Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports ##br##Due To Rising BRI Investment Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports Due To Rising BRI Investment Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports Due To Rising BRI Investment BRI Leads To Improved Global Capital Allocation BRI is one of a very few global initiatives that improves the quality of global capital allocation. Therefore, it is bullish for global growth from a structural perspective. By shifting capital spending from a country that has already invested a lot in the past 20 years (China) to the ones that have been massively underinvested, BRI boosts the marginal productivity of capital. One billion dollars invested in the underinvested recipient countries will generate more benefits than the same amount invested in China. Risks To BRI Projects Notable deterioration in the health of Chinese banks may meaningfully curtail BRI funding, as Chinese non-policy banks will likely need to provide 60% of BRI projects' funding. Political stability/changes in destination countries: As most infrastructure projects have been authorized by the top government and need their cooperation, any changes in the recipient countries' governments or regimes may slow down or deter BRI projects. China already has a checkered past with developing countries where it has invested heavily. This is because of its employment of Chinese instead of local labor, its pursuit of flagship projects seen as benefiting elites rather than commoners, its allegedly corrupt ties with ruling parties, and perceived exploitation of natural resources to the neglect of the home nation. As China's involvement grows, local politics will be more difficult to manage, requiring China to suffer occasional losses due to political reversals or to defend its assets through aggressive economic sanctions, or even expeditionary force. For now, as there are no clear signs that any these risks are imminent, we remain positive on the further implementation of China's BRI program. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 China has long been known to use three-year periods - as distinct from its better known "five year plans" - for major domestic initiatives. In 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission re-emphasized three-year planning periods for "continuous, rolling" implementation. 2 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Pakistani Stocks: A Top Is At Hand", published March 13, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Kazakhstan: A Touch Less Dependent On Oil Prices", published March 28, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Ghana: Sailing On Chinese Winds", published July 31, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Unilateral economic sanctions show that geopolitical risks are rising in Asia Pacific; China is using sanctions to get its way with its neighbors; South Korea was the latest victim, and will be rewarded for its pro-China shift; Trump's Mar-a-Lago honeymoon with Xi Jinping is over; Tactically, go long South Korean consumers / short Taiwanese exporters. Feature Geopolitical risk is shifting to the Asia Pacific region - and the increasing use of economic sanctions is evidence of the trend. Korean stocks have rallied sharply since the leadership change from December 2016 through May of this year (Chart 1). The impeachment rally was entirely expected after a year of domestic political turmoil.1 The election is also eventually expected to decrease Korean geopolitical risks - the country's new President Moon Jae-in, of the left-leaning Democratic Party, aims to patch up relations with China and revive diplomacy with North Korea.2 Chart 1South Korean Impeachment Rally Over South Korean Impeachment Rally Over South Korean Impeachment Rally Over A key barometer of Moon's success will be whether he convinces China to remove economic sanctions imposed since last summer as punishment for his predecessor's agreement to host the U.S. THAAD missile defense system. Moon has suspended the system's deployment in a nod to China.3 South Korea is thus the latest example of an important trend in the region: China's successful use of "economic statecraft" to pressure wayward neighbors into closer alignment with its interests. Since 2014, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have each sought in different ways to reorient their foreign policies toward China, either to court Chinese assistance or get relief from Chinese pressure. Judging by our research below, the rewards are palpable, and a sign of Beijing's rising global influence. Because U.S.-China tensions are rising structurally, we see these country-by-country shifts toward China not as a decisive loss for the U.S. alliance but rather as the latest phase in a long game of tug-of-war that will intensify in the coming years.4 Hence the trend of unilateral economic sanctions will continue. Who is next on China's hit list? How will the U.S. respond? What countries are most and least likely to be affected? And what are the market implications? China's Economic Statecraft The United States launched a "pivot to Asia" strategy under the Obama administration to reassert American primacy in Asia Pacific and address the emerging challenge from China. The U.S.'s Asian partners largely welcomed this shift. Over the preceding decade, they had struggled with China's emergence as a military and strategic superior. The most prominent flashpoints came in the East and South China Seas. Beijing's newfound naval and air power caused regional anxiety. As the allies invited a larger U.S. role, Beijing began to assert its sovereignty claims over disputed waters and rocks, most ambitiously by creating artificial islands in the South China Sea and fortifying them with military capabilities. In three notable periods since the Great Recession, China's tensions with its neighbors have splashed over into the economic realm, prompting Beijing to impose punitive measures: Chart 2Japan's 2012 Clash With China Japan's 2012 Clash With China Japan's 2012 Clash With China Chart 3Chinese Boycotted Japanese Cars... Chinese Boycotted Japanese Cars... Chinese Boycotted Japanese Cars... Japan 2010-2012: In 2010, China and Japan clashed as the former challenged Japan's control of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in the East China Sea. In the September-November 2010 clash, China notoriously cut off exports of rare earths to Japan.5 A greater clash occurred from July-November 2012. Chinese people rose up in large-scale protests, damaging Japanese and other foreign property and assets. Impact: The growth of Japanese exports to China slowed noticeably between the 2010 and 2012 clashes, underperforming both that of China's neighbors and Europe (Chart 2). In particular, Chinese consumers stopped buying as many Japanese cars and switched to other brands (Chart 3). Chinese investment in Japan, which is generally very small, fell sharply in the year after the major 2012 clash, by contrast with the global trend (Chart 4). Chinese tourism to Japan also fell sharply after both incidents, though only for a short period of time (Chart 5). Chart 4...And Cut Investments In Japan... ...And Cut Investments In Japan... ...And Cut Investments In Japan... Chart 5...While Tourists Went Elsewhere ...While Tourists Went Elsewhere ...While Tourists Went Elsewhere Philippines 2012-2016: Tensions between China and the Philippines over the contested Spratly Islands and other rocks in the South China Sea have a long history. The latest round began in the mid-2000s, and the two countries have skirmished many times since then, including in a major showdown at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 that required the intercession of the United States to be resolved. The pressure intensified after January 2013, when the Philippines brought a high-profile case against China's maritime-territorial claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. The U.S. and the Philippines upped the ante in April 2014 by signing an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Ultimately, the court dealt a humiliating blow to China's maritime-territorial claims in July 2016, but a bigger confrontation was avoided because of what had happened in the remarkable May 2016 Philippine elections, which put China-friendly populist President Rodrigo Duterte in Manila on July 1. Impact: China tightened phytosanitary restrictions on Philippine bananas during the 2012 crisis and Philippine exports to China underperformed those of its neighbors after the onset of diplomatic crisis in 2013 (Chart 6). Nevertheless, the overall impact on headline exports is debatable. Tourism suffered straightforwardly both after the 2012 showdown at sea and after the new U.S.-Philippines military deal in 2014 (Chart 7). As with Japan, the impact was temporary. Chart 6Philippine Clash With China Over Sovereignty Philippine Clash With China Over Sovereignty Philippine Clash With China Over Sovereignty Chart 7Chinese Tourists Snub The Philippines Chinese Tourists Snub The Philippines Chinese Tourists Snub The Philippines Vietnam 2011-14: China's quarrels with Vietnam go back millennia, but in recent years have centered on the South China Sea. As with the Philippines, frictions began rising in the mid-2000s and flared up after the global financial crisis. In the summer of 2012, Vietnam and China engaged in a dispute over new laws encompassing their territorial claims. In May 2014, the two countries fought a highly unorthodox sea-battle near the Paracel Islands. Anti-Chinese protests erupted throughout Vietnam, prompting China to restrict travel.6 Impact: It is not clear that China imposed trade measures against Vietnam - export growth was plummeting in 2012 because of China's nominal GDP slowdown as well - but certainly exports skyrocketed after the two sides began tothaw diplomatic relations in August 2014 (Chart 8).7 Direct investment from China into Vietnam fell in 2014, even as that from the rest of the world rose. Chinese tourism to Vietnam shrank in the aftermath. Chart 8Vietnam Reboots China Trade Vietnam Reboots China Trade Vietnam Reboots China Trade The above incidents complement a growing body of academic research demonstrating China's use of unilateral economic sanctions and their trade and market impacts.8 Bottom Line: China has employed unilateral, informal, and discrete economic sanctions and has encouraged or condoned citizen boycotts and popular activism against Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and other states since at least the early 2000s. Moreover, three international confrontations since 2010 suggest that China's foreign policy is growing bolder - it is not afraid to throw its economic weight around to get what it wants politically or to deter countries from challenging its interests. How Significant Is China's Wrath? Both our evidence and the scholarly literature reveal that China-inflicted economic damage tends to be temporary and sometimes ambiguous from a macro-perspective.9 For instance, if there were negative trade effects of Vietnam's 2014 clash with China, they were overwhelmed by Vietnam's rising share of China's market in the following years (Chart 9). And, as hinted above, Chinese sanctions on Philippine banana exports in 2012 can be overstated according to close inspection of the data.10 Nevertheless, since 2016, three new episodes have reinforced the fact that China's punitive measures are a significant trend with potentially serious consequences for Asian economies: Taiwan 2016: Taiwanese politics have shifted away from mainland China in recent years. The "Sunflower Protests" of 2014 marked a shift in popular opinion away from the government's program of ever-deeper economic integration with the mainland. Local elections later that year set the stage for a sweeping victory by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), taking both the presidency and, for the first time, the legislature, in January 2016.11 Tsai is a proponent of eventual Taiwanese independence and dissents from key diplomatic agreements with the mainland, the "One China Policy" and "1992 Consensus." Within six months of the election Beijing had cut off diplomatic communication. Impact: The number of mainland visitors has nosedived, by contrast with global trends (Chart 10). Taiwan's exports and access to China's market are arguably weaker than they would otherwise be. Given the historic cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010, and the strong export growth in the immediate aftermath of that deal, it is curious that exports have been so weak since 2014 (Chart 11). Chart 9China Flings Open Doors To Vietnam China Flings Open Doors To Vietnam China Flings Open Doors To Vietnam Chart 10Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Chart 11So Much For Cross-Strait Trade Deals? So Much For Cross-Strait Trade Deals? So Much For Cross-Strait Trade Deals? South Korea 2016-17: China and South Korea are on the cusp of improving relations after a year of Beijing-imposed sanctions. The former government of President Park Geun-hye, who was impeached in December 2016 and removed from office in March this year, moved rapidly with the U.S. to deploy the THAAD missile defense system on South Korean soil while her government was collapsing, so as to make it a fait accompli for her likely left-leaning (and more China-friendly) successor. Her government agreed to the deployment in July 2016 and since then China has exacted substantial economic costs via Korean exports and Chinese tourism.12 The new President Moon Jae-in is now calling on China to remove these sanctions, while initiating an "environmental review" that will delay deployment of THAAD, possibly permanently. Impact: South Korean exports to China have underperformed the regional trend throughout the downfall of the Park regime and its last-minute alliance-building measures with both the U.S. and Japan (Chart 12). South Korea has also lost market share in China since agreeing to host THAAD in July 2016 (Chart 13). Furthermore, Korean car sales on the mainland have deviated markedly both from their long-term historical trend and from Japan's contemporary sales (Chart 14), the inverse of what occurred in 2012 (see Chart 3 above). Chinese tourism to South Korea has sharply declined. Chart 12China Cools On Korean Imports China Cools On Korean Imports China Cools On Korean Imports Chart 13China Hits South Korea Over THAAD China Hits South Korea Over THAAD China Hits South Korea Over THAAD Chart 14Korean Car Sales And Tourist Sales Slump Korean Car Sales And Tourist Sales Slump Korean Car Sales And Tourist Sales Slump North Korea 2016-17: Ironically, China brought sanctions against both Koreas last year - the South for THAAD, the North for its unprecedented slate of missile and nuclear tests. These provoked the United States into pressuring China via "secondary sanctions." Impact: China's sanctions on the North - which include a potentially severe ban on coal imports - are limited so far, according to the headline trade data, as China is wary of destabilizing the hermit kingdom (Chart 15). But if China does grant President Trump's request and increase the economic pressure on North Korea, it will be no less of a sign of a greater willingness to utilize economic statecraft, especially given that the North is China's only formal ally. Other countries will not fail to see the implications should they, like either Korea, cross Beijing's interests. Bottom Line: Doubts about China's new foreign policy "assertiveness" are overstated. China is increasing its unilateral use of economic levers to pressure political regimes in its neighborhood, including major EMs like Taiwan and South Korea over the past year. Korean President Moon Jae-in's rise to power is likely to produce better Sino-Korean relations, but neither it nor Taiwan is out of the woods yet, according to the data. Moreover, the rest of the region may be cautious before accepting new U.S. military deployments or contravening China's demands in other ways. The Asian "Pivot To China" Over the past two years, several Asian states have begun to vacillate toward China, not because they fear American abandonment but because the U.S. "pivot" gave them so much security reassurance that it threatened to provoke conflict with China - essentially risking a new Cold War. They live on the frontlines and wanted to discourage this escalation. At the same time, the growth slump in China/EM in 2014 - followed by China's renewed stimulus in 2015 - encouraged these states to improve business with China. Thailand began to shift in 2014, when a military junta took power in a coup and sought external support. China's partnership did not come with strings attached, as opposed to that of the U.S., with its demands about democracy and civil rights.13 The rewards of this foreign policy shift are palpable (Chart 16). China signed some big investment deals and improved strategic cooperation through arms sales. It did the same with Malaysia for similar reasons.14 China's "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) economic development initiative provided ample opportunities for expanding ties. Chart 15No Chinese Embargo On North Korea... Yet No Chinese Embargo On North Korea... Yet No Chinese Embargo On North Korea... Yet Chart 16China Opens Doors To Thai Junta China Opens Doors To Thai Junta China Opens Doors To Thai Junta The year 2016 was a major turning point. Three of China's neighbors - two of which U.S. allies - underwent domestic political transitions ushering in more favorable policies toward China: Vietnam: The Vietnamese Communist Party held its twelfth National Congress in January 2016. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, a pro-market reformer from the capitalist south, failed to secure the position of general secretary of the party and retired. The incumbent General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong retained his seat, and oversaw the promotion of key followers, strengthening Vietnam's pro-China faction. Since then Trong has visited President Xi in Beijing and signed a joint communique on improving strategic relations. As mentioned above, Vietnamese exports to China have exploded since tensions subsided in 2014. South Korea: In April 2016, South Korean legislative elections saw the left-leaning Democratic Party win a plurality of seats, setting the stage for the 2017 election discussed above, when Korea officially moved in a more China-friendly direction under President Moon. The Philippines: In May 2016, the Philippines elected Duterte, a firebrand southern populist who declared that the Philippines would "separate" itself from the U.S. and ally with Russia and China. Though Duterte has already modified his anti-American stance - as we expected - he is courting Chinese trade and investment at the expense of the Philippines' sovereignty concerns.15 Trump's election contributed to this regional trend. By suggesting a desire for the U.S. to stop playing defender of last resort in the region, Trump reinforced the need for allies like Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea to go their own way. And by canceling the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump forced Malaysia and Vietnam to make amends with China, while vindicating those (like Thailand and Indonesia) that had remained aloof. Bottom Line: Having brandished its sticks, China is now offering carrots to states that recognize its growing regional influence. These do not have to be express measures, given that China is stimulating its economy and increasing outbound investment for its own reasons. All China need do is refrain from denying access to its market and investment funds. Whom Will China Sanction Next? Geopolitical risk on the Korean peninsula remains elevated given that North Korea remains in "provocation mode" and Trump has prioritized the issue. However, we expect that Moon will cooperate with China enough to give a boost to South Korean exports and China-exposed companies and sectors. With South Korea's shifting policy, Beijing has a major opportunity to demonstrate the positive economic rewards of pro-China foreign policy. If a new round of international negotiations gets under way and North Korean risk subsides for a time (our baseline view),16 then East Asian governments will turn to other interests. We see two key places of potential confrontation over the next 12-24 months: Taiwan is the top candidate for Chinese sanctions going forward. The cross-strait relationship is fraught and susceptible to tempests. The ruling DPP lacks domestic political constraints, which could be conducive to policy mistakes. Moreover, Trump has signaled his intention to strengthen the alliance with Taiwan, which could cause problems. China is likely to oppose the new $1.4 billion package of U.S. arms more actively than in the past, given its greater global heft. Trump's initial threat of altering the One China Policy has not been forgotten. In terms of timing, China may not want to give a tailwind to the DPP by acting overly aggressive ahead of the 2018 local elections, which are crucial for the opposition Kuomintang's attempt to revive in time for the 2020 presidential vote. But this is not a hard constraint on Beijing's imposing sanctions before then. Japan is the second-likeliest target of Chinese economic pressure. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is up for re-election no later than December 2018 and is becoming more vulnerable as he shifts emphasis from pocketbook issues to Japan's national security.17 Needless to say, the revival of the military is the part of Abe's agenda that Beijing most opposes. China would like to see Abe weakened, or voted out, and would especially like to see Abe's proposed constitutional revisions fail in the popular referendum slated for 2020. China would not want to strengthen Abe by provoking Japanese nationalism. But if Abe is losing support, and Beijing calculates that the Japanese public is starting to view Abe and his constitutional revisions as too provocative and destabilizing, then a well-timed diplomatic crisis with economic sanctions may be in order.18 Next in line are Hong Kong and Singapore, though Beijing has already largely gotten its way in recent disputes with the two city-states.19 Other possibilities on the horizon: The eventual return to a fractious civilian government in Thailand, or improved U.S.-Thai relations, could spoil China's infrastructure plans and sour its willingness to support an otherwise lackluster Thai economy. Also, a surprise victory by the opposition in Malaysian general elections (either this year or next) could see the recent rapprochement with China falter. The latter would be cyclical tensions, whereas suppressed structural tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines could boil back up to the surface fairly quickly at any time and provoke Chinese retaliation. Bottom Line: The most likely targets of Chinese economic sanctions in the near future are Taiwan and Japan. South Korea could remain a target if events should force Moon to abandon his policy agenda, though we see this as unlikely. Hong Kong and Singapore also remain in the danger zone, as do Vietnam and the Philippines in the long run. Investment Implications Cyclical and structural macro trends drive exports and investment trends in Asia Pacific. The biggest immediate risk to EM Asian economies stems not from Chinese sanctions - given that most of these economies have adjusted their policies to appease China to some extent - but from China's economic policy uncertainty, which remains at very elevated levels (Chart 17). It was after this uncertainty surged in 2015 that China's neighbors took on a more accommodating stance with a focus on economic cooperation rather than strategic balancing. Chart 17Chinese Economic Policy Uncertainty Still Asia's Biggest Risk Does It Pay To Pivot To China? Does It Pay To Pivot To China? Currently Chinese economic policy uncertainty is hooking back up as a result of the decision by state authorities to intensify their financial crackdown - the so-called "deleveraging campaign." BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy has recently pointed out that China's slowing fiscal and credit impulse will drag down both Chinese import volumes and emerging market corporate earnings in the coming months (Chart 18). Already commodity prices and commodity currencies have dropped off, heralding a broader slowdown in global trade as a result of China's policy tightening. This trend will overwhelm the effect of almost any new geopolitical spats or sanctions. The same can be said for Chinese investment as for Chinese trade. Over the past couple of decades, China has emerged as one of the world's leading sources of direct investment (Chart 19). This is a secular trend. Thus while foreign relations have affected China's investment patterns - most recently in giving the Philippines a boost under Duterte - the general trend of rising Chinese investment abroad will continue regardless of temporary quarrels. This is particularly true in light of China's efforts to energize OBOR. Chart 18China: Stimulus Fading China: Stimulus Fading China: Stimulus Fading Chart 19China's Emergence As Major Global Investor Does It Pay To Pivot To China? Does It Pay To Pivot To China? The key question is how will China's political favor or disfavor impact neighboring economies on the margin, in relative terms, on a sectoral basis, or in the short term? The evidence above feeds into several trends in relative equity performance: China fights either Japan or Korea: Going long Korea / short Japan would have paid off throughout the major Sino-Japanese tensions 2010-12, and would have paid off again during the South Korean impeachment rally (Chart 20). Of course, geopolitics is only one factor. But even Japan's economic shift in 2012 (Abenomics) is part of the geopolitical dynamic. Chart 20China Fights Either Japan Or Korea China Fights Either Japan Or Korea China Fights Either Japan Or Korea Chart 21Taiwan's Loss = Japan's Gain Taiwan's Loss = Japan's Gain Taiwan's Loss = Japan's Gain Taiwan's loss is Japan's gain: China's measures against Japanese exporters from 2010-12 coincided with a period of intense cross-strait economic integration that benefited Taiwanese exporters. Then Japan adopted Abenomics and dialed down tensions with China, and Taiwan underwent a pro-independence turn, provoking Beijing's displeasure (Chart 21). If one of these countries ends up quarreling with China in the near future, as we expect, the other country's exporters may reap the benefit. If relations worsen with both, South Korea stands to gain. Favor EM reformers: Vietnamese and Philippine equities outperformed EM from 2011-16 despite heightened tensions in the South China Sea (Chart 22). During this time, we recommended an overweight position on both countries relative to EM, even though we took the maritime tensions very seriously, because we favored EM reformers and both countries were undertaking structural reforms.20 Later, in May 2016, we downgraded the Philippines to neutral, expecting a loss of reform momentum after Duterte's election. The Philippines has notably underperformed the EM equity benchmark since that time.21 The "One China Policy": We closed out our "long One China Policy" trade on June 14 as a result of China's persistence in its crackdown on the banks, which we see as very risky.22 However, we may reinitiate the trade in the future, as Hong Kong and Taiwan remain vulnerable both to the slowdown in globalization and to Beijing's sanctions over deepening political differences (Chart 23). Chart 22Reforms Pay... Even During Island Tensions Reforms Pay... Even During Island Tensions Reforms Pay... Even During Island Tensions Chart 23The 'One China Policy' As A Trade The 'One China Policy' As A Trade The 'One China Policy' As A Trade From Sunshine to Moonshine: South Korea's Moon Jae-in has substantial political capital and we expect that he will succeed in boosting growth, wages, and the social security net, all of which will be bullish for South Korean consumer stocks. Yet we remain wary of the fact that North Korea is not yet falling into line with new negotiations. A way to hedge is to go long the South Korean consumer relative to Taiwanese exporters (Chart 24), which will live under the shadow of Beijing's disfavor at least until the 2020 elections, if not beyond. Taiwan has also allowed its currency to appreciate notably against the USD since Trump's post-election phone call with President Tsai, which is negative for Taiwanese exporters. Chart 24Go Long Korean Consumer /##br## Short Taiwanese Exporter Go Long Korean Consumer / Short Taiwanese Exporter Go Long Korean Consumer / Short Taiwanese Exporter China's sanctions are essentially a "slap on the wrist" in economic terms. But sometimes they reflect deeper structural tensions, and thus they may foreshadow far more damaging clashes down the road that could have longer term consequences, just as the Sino-Japanese incident of 2012 demonstrated. That is all the more reason to hedge one's bets on Taiwan today. These sanctions are bound to recur and will provide investors with trading opportunities, if not long-term investment themes. It will pay to capitalize quickly at the outset of any serious increase in tensions going forward. As a final word, the Trump administration's recent moves to impose economic penalties on China - namely through "secondary sanctions" due to North Korea, but also through potential trade tariffs and/or penalties related to human trafficking and human rights - highlight the fact that the use of unilateral sanctions is not limited to China. Geopolitical risk is rising in Asia as a result of actions on both sides of the Pacific. Sino-American antagonism in particular poses the greatest geopolitical danger to global markets, as we have frequently emphasized.23 And as Trump's domestic agenda struggles he will seek to get tougher on China, as he promised to his populist base on the campaign trail. In the event of a major geopolitical crisis in the region, we recommend the same mix of safe-haven assets that we have recommended in the past: U.S. treasuries, Swiss bonds, JGBs, and gold.24 Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. For our longstanding investment theme of rising geopolitical risk in East Asia, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, and Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Market Equity Sector and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "South Korea: A Comeback For Consumer Stocks?" dated June 27, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 However, Moon is walking a tight rope in relation to the United States. During his visit to Washington on June 29, he assured Congressman Paul Ryan among others that he did not necessarily intend to reverse the THAAD agreement as a whole. That would depend on the outcome of the environmental review and due legal process in South Korea as well as on whether North Korea's behavior makes the missile defense system necessary. Please see Kim Ji-eun, "In US Congress, Pres. Moon Highlights Democratic Values Of Alliance With US," The Hankyoreh, July 1, 2017, available at English.hani.co.kr. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Jeffrey R. Dundon, "Triggers of Chinese Economic Coercion," Naval Postgraduate School, September, 2014, available at calhoun.nps.edu. 6 For a very conservative estimate of China's actions during the Haiyang Shiyou 981 incident, please see Angela Poh, "The Myth Of Chinese Sanctions Over South China Sea Disputes," Washington Quarterly 40:1 (2017), pp. 143-165. 7 Please see "Vietnam Party official heads to China to defuse tensions," Thanh Nien Daily, August 25, 2014, available at www.thanhniennews.com. 8 Please see Faqin Lin, Cui Hu, and Andreas Fuchs, "How Do Firms Respond To Political Tensions? The Heterogeneity Of The Dalai Lama Effect On Trade," University of Heidelberg Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series 628, August 2016, available at papers.ssrn.com. This study improves upon earlier ones, notably Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, "Paying A Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect On International Trade," Journal Of International Economics 91 (2013), pp 164-77. See also Christina L. Davis, Andreas Fuchs, and Kristina Johnson, "State Control And The Effects Of Foreign Relations On Bilateral Trade," October 16, 2016, MPRA Paper No. 74597, available at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74597/ ; Yinghua He, Ulf Nielsson, and Yonglei Wang, "Hurting Without Hitting: The Economic Cost of Political Tension," Toulouse School of Economics Working Papers 14-484 (July 2015), available at econpapers.repec.org; Raymond Fisman, Yasushi Hamao, and Yongxiang Wang, "Nationalism and Economic Exchange: Evidence from Shocks to Sino-Japanese Relations," NBER Working Paper 20089 (May 2014) available at www.nber.org; Scott L. Kastner, "Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of China's International Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 60:6 (2016), pp. 980-1007. 9 The "Dalai Lama effect," in which countries that host a visit from the Dalai Lama suffer Chinese trade retaliation, has been revised downward over the years - the trade costs are only statistically significant in the second quarter after the visit. Please see "How Do Firms Respond," cited in footnote 8. 10 See "Myth Of Chinese Sanctions," cited in footnote 6. Chinese sanctions on Norwegian salmon exports after Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 also fall under this category. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Taiwan's Election: How Dire Will The Straits Get?" dated January 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see Lee Ho-Jeong, "Thaad may lead to $7.5B in economic losses in 2017," Joongang Daily, May 4, 2017, available at www.joongangdaily.com. 13 Please see Ian Storey, "Thailand's Post-Coup Relations With China And America: More Beijing, Less Washington," Yusof Ishak Institute, Trends in Southeast Asia 20 (2015). 14 Malaysia began to move closer to China after its 2013 election, which initiated a period of political turbulence and scandal. This trend, along with economic slowdown, prompted the ruling coalition to turn to Beijing for support. 15 He is also, as current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), assisting China's negotiations toward settling a "Code of Conduct" in the South China Sea. This is not likely to be a binding agreement - China will not voluntarily reverse its strategic maritime-territorial gains - but it could dampen tensions for a time in the region and encourage better relations between China and Southeast Asia. For the 2016 Asian pivot to China discussed above, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, and Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 The LDP's dramatic defeat in Tokyo's local elections on July 2 is the first tangible sign that the constitutional agenda, Abe's corruption scandals, and the emergence of a competing political leader, Yuriko Koike, are taking a toll on the LDP. 18 Also, Beijing may at any point rotate its maritime assertiveness back to the East China Sea, where tensions with Japan have quieted since 2013-14. Further, Beijing will want to exploit worsening relations between Japan and South Korea, and drive a wedge between Japan and Russia as they attempt a historic diplomatic thaw. 19 Beijing is attempting to steal a march on these states, especially in finance, while putting pressure on them to avoid activities that undermine Beijing's regional influence. So far there is only small evidence that tensions have affected trade. First, Hong Kong saw a drop in tourists and a block on cultural exports amid the Umbrella Protests of 2014. China's central government has acted aggressively over the past year to suppress Hong Kong agitation, by excluding rebel lawmakers from office and by drawing a "red line" against undermining Chinese sovereignty. Yet agitation will persist because of the frustration of local political forces and the youth, both of which resent the mainland's increasing heavy-handedness. Meanwhile, China and Singapore are in the process this month of improving relations after the November-January spat relating to Singapore-Taiwanese military ties. But China's encroachment on Singapore's traditional advantages - finance, oil refining, freedom of navigation, strong military relations with the U.S. and Taiwan, political stability - is likely to continue. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Coming Bloodbath In Emerging Markets," dated August 12, 2015, "Geopolitical Risk: A Golden Opportunity?" dated July 9, 2014, and "In Need Of Global Political Recapitalization," dated June 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. See also Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report, "Buy Vietnamese Stocks," dated July 17, 2015, available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Has Europe Switched From Reward To Risk," dated June 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 24 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

The aim of this Special Report is to elaborate on and explain the different views on China that have coexisted at BCA in recent years. Although BCA strives to achieve consensus among its strategists, this is not always possible, as has been the case with China. Peter Berezin of the Global Investment Strategy service and Yan Wang of China Investment Strategy have been positive, while Arthur Budaghyan of Emerging Markets Strategy has been negative on both China's business cycle and China-related plays. The focal points of divergence are centered on how Peter, Yan, and Arthur view and explain the relationship between savings, debt, and the misallocation of capital, as well as how they see China's potential roadmap going forward. The debate is moderated by BCA Global Strategist Caroline Miller. Caroline: Peter and Yan, the world - including the Chinese government - is climbing a wall of worry about China's debt load. Why are you guys still smiling? How many Maotai did you have last night? Peter: I don't know what a Maotai is, but I am sure that if I had more than one I wouldn't be smiling this morning. But yes, I am not as worried as Arthur that China is in the midst of an unsustainable credit bubble. Genuine credit bubbles tend to happen during periods of euphoria. U.S., Spanish, and Irish banks all traded at lofty multiples to book value on the eve of the financial crisis, having massively outperformed their respective indices in the preceding years. That's obviously not the case for Chinese banks today, which remain one of the most loathed sectors in the global equity market (Chart 1). The U.S., Spanish, and Irish housing booms also occurred alongside ballooning current account deficits, something that doesn't apply to China (Chart 2). One can debate whether China is in the midst of a property bubble, but even if it is, it looks a lot more like the one Hong Kong experienced in the late 1990s. When that bubble burst, property prices plummeted by 70%. Yet, Hong Kong banks were barely affected (Chart 3). Chart 1Chinese Banks: Unloved And Unwanted Chinese Banks: Unloved And Unwanted Chinese Banks: Unloved And Unwanted Chart 2Recent Credit Bubbles Developed ##br##Amid Widening Current Account Deficits Recent Credit Bubbles Developed Amid Widening Current Account Deficits Recent Credit Bubbles Developed Amid Widening Current Account Deficits Chart 3Hong Kong Is The Correct Analogy Hong Kong Is The Correct Analogy Hong Kong Is The Correct Analogy Yes, there is a lot of debt in China. But there is a lot of savings too. In fact, to a large extent, China's high debt levels are just a function of its high saving rate. The evidence suggests that national saving rates and debt-to-GDP ratios are positively correlated across emerging economies (Chart 4). China sits close to the trend line, implying that its debt stock is roughly what you would expect it to be. Chart 4Positive Correlation Between National Savings And Indebtedness The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings? The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings? Arthur: Allow me to both agree and disagree with Peter. No, there is no bubble in Chinese equities, but yes, there is a bubble and euphoria in China's property market. Property prices have risen exponentially and are extremely high by any metric. Chinese bank equity valuations have already adjusted, but bank stocks could still sell off if their profits shrink considerably, as I expect. Bank shares are not expensive, but not cheap either, if one adjusts for non-performing loans. I concur that China's property market adjustment will likely resemble that of Hong Kong as opposed to that of the U.S. As Peter noted, in Hong Kong in the late 1990s, property prices plunged by 70%, but few homeowners defaulted on their mortgages. Yet property starts/construction also collapsed by 80% (Chart 5). Chart 5Hong Kong's Property: ##br##Few Mortgage Defaults ##br##But Collapse In Construction Hong Kong's Property: Few Mortgage Defaults But Collapse In Construction Hong Kong's Property: Few Mortgage Defaults But Collapse In Construction Presently in China, the risk is not mortgage defaults but a renewed drop in property construction as well as other types of capital spending. Less construction/capital spending entails less demand for commodities, materials/chemicals and industrial goods. China's residential and non-residential construction activity will contract anew as speculative/investment demand for property weakens. Yan: I agree with Peter that China's rising debt is fundamentally a function of the country's abundant savings. Moreover, the fact that the country's massive savings pool is primarily intermediated via the banking sector and other debt instruments exacerbates the debt buildup. If a country's savings are primarily intermediated by the stock market through equity financing, then high savings do not necessarily lead to high debt, as "savers" become "shareholders" rather than "creditors." In China's case, the country's still relatively undeveloped and volatile equity market has not yet been able to play a meaningful role in financial intermediation. Instead, banks still play a dominant role channeling financial resources. In other words, China's high savings and a banking-centric financial intermediation system are key drivers of the ever-rising debt level. In fact, as long as these two features persist, the country's debt will inevitably continue to rise, as it simply reflects the accumulated savings. Caroline: Arthur, does this line up with how you think about the relationship between savings and debt? Arthur: My thesis has been that China's abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative, euphoric behavior among Chinese banks and the shadow banking system - and not the natural result of the country's "excess savings," as Peter and Yan have argued. What economists call "savings" or "excess savings," non-economists refer to as "overproduction" or "excess capacity." This is about concepts, not about China. In economic science, the term "savings" is used to denote the number of goods and services that a nation has produced but not consumed - i.e., they can be used for investment or exports. Peter and Yan are using this textbook definition of "savings." Hence, by "savings" or "excess savings" they mean "excess production." Logically, the glut of goods and services does not flow to banks and create deposits. In brief, "savings" or "excess savings" are real economic variables and have nothing to do with bank deposits - i.e., "monetary savings." Peter, Yan and many other commentators make this mistake by mixing up national savings - which is literally output of goods and services that were not consumed by households and government - with "monetary savings," i.e., deposits in the banking system. I have no doubt China has had a high savings rate, i.e., it has had overcapacity and over-production in a number of sectors. The textbook concept of national savings is calculated as a residual from the national accounts and balance of payments. In particular: Savings - Investments = Current Account Balance and Savings = Investments + Current Account Balance A few remarks on the economic interpretation of this equation are in order. First, in any country, "excess" national savings over investment, i.e., current account surpluses, lead to an accumulation of net foreign assets, but has no implication on domestic loan creation.1 Second, a country that invests a lot and does not run a large current account deficit will have a high savings rate as per the economic textbook's definition of national savings. The opposite also holds true. Critically, national or household savings are in no way linked to the amount of deposits at banks. When households decide to save a part of their income, they do not create new deposits or "monetary savings." They save deposits that already exist in the banking system. To sum up, the amount of deposits in the banking system does not change as a result of households' decision to save a part of their income. When a person gets paid in cash and deposits that cash in a bank as a savings deposit, there is no new money created either. That cash was a deposit and was withdrawn from a bank a few days before, and now this cash returns to the banking system as a deposit again. In this case, the amount of total outstanding money supply in the economy (cash plus deposits) has not changed. In general, when a bank receives a deposit, it does not create new money, or "monetary savings." The deposit simply moves from one bank to another or from cash to deposit. The amount of money supply does not change. When a country enjoys a lot of overcapacity, strong bank loans or money growth will not cause inflation and interest rates will stay low, encouraging more borrowing. This is why in Peter's Chart 4 there is a positive correlation between the national savings rate and debt-to-GDP ratio across countries. Overcapacity entails low inflation; the latter keeps nominal interest rates low, which in turn entices more borrowing and debt build-up. In brief, the linkage between national savings/excess capacity and the credit-to-GDP ratio is indirect via subdued inflation and low interest rates that encourage debt build-up. Caroline: Arthur, you have made the case that savings are not a constraint to loan origination. Can you elaborate? Arthur: The banking system does not intermediate "savings" or "excess savings" from the real economy into loans. The commercial banking system as a whole creates deposits at the time it originates loans. This is true of all countries. Indeed, whenever commercial banks make a loan, they simultaneously create a matching deposit in the borrower's bank account, therefore creating new money in the process (Chart 6). In other words, bank loan origination creates deposits and money.2 Chart 6Commercial Banks: Credit Origination Creates Deposits The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings? The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings? China's banking system has a lot of deposits because banks have created too many loans. In addition, a bank does not need liquidity (reserves at the central bank) for each loan it originates. It still requires some liquidity to settle its net balance with other banks or to meet minimum reserve requirements. If a bank creates a loan but still has excess reserves at the central bank, it may not require liquidity to "back up" the loan. There are many variables that constrain bank loan origination, but they do not include national savings or "excess savings." We discussed these constraints in detail in our EMS report titled Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses.3 Finally, when central banks opt to keep short-term interest rates steady, they must provide commercial banks with as much liquidity as the latter demands. This point is greatly relevant to China. For the past few years, China's central bank has silently moved away from controlling money growth (the quantity of money) to targeting interest rates (the price of money) (Chart 7). As a result, nowadays the People's Bank of China (PBoC) has very little quantitative control over money/credit creation by commercial banks. Chart 7The PBoC Has Begun Targeting Rates In Recent Years The PBoC Has Begun Targeting Rates In Recent Years The PBoC Has Begun Targeting Rates In Recent Years It is Chinese commercial banks that effectively drive money/credit/deposit creation. The PBoC decides whether or not to accommodate banks' liquidity needs by allowing interest rates to rise or fall, or by keeping them steady.4 To conclude, what habitually drives credit booms in any country are the "animal spirits" of banks and borrowers - not national savings. This has been the case in China too. Caroline: Peter, do you agree with Arthur's assessment? Peter: I don't want to get bogged down in the weeds of monetary theory, but let me briefly address two distinct points that I think Arthur is making. The first is the claim that the ability of banks to create money "out of thin air" is somehow not constrained by the volume of bank reserves and cash in circulation (the so - called "monetary base"). The second is the claim that there is no meaningful link between savings and deposits. I think Arthur is wrong on both counts. On the first claim, it is true that when a bank issues a loan, it also creates a deposit. To the extent that bank deposits are treated as "money," this expands the money supply. This is simply the "money multiplier" taught in introductory economics classes. Where Arthur's logic falls short is in his implicit assumption that all lending translates into additional bank deposits. It doesn't have to. Some of the deposits will be withdrawn and kept as cash. Governments have complete control over how much cash there is in circulation by virtue of their monopoly over the printing press. As long as cash exists, central banks can influence the broad money supply via open market operations. By the way, this is true even in banking systems where there are no reserve requirements. Regarding Arthur's claim that lending can occur without savings, this is often true when someone is borrowing money to buy an asset. However, it is generally not true if they are borrowing money to finance new spending. Let me offer a concrete, albeit somewhat whimsical, example to illustrate this point. Suppose I am living in a closed economy where no one saves anything. Now, let's imagine that I decide to throw a party for myself and need to borrow $1000 to do this. Who is going to provide me with the resources? Well, we just said that no one wants to save, so "something" has to adjust for me to have my party. That "something" is the interest rate. In order to entice someone to spend a bit less, the bank (on my behalf) will offer depositors a higher interest rate. If rates rise by enough, someone will decide to forego a bit of consumption today in order to have more consumption tomorrow. In other words, my decision to borrow must result in someone else's decision to save. So do savings create debt or does debt create savings? The answer is both: interest rates adjust to ensure that the two end up being different sides of the same coin. Caroline: Yan, what's your perspective on China's high debt profile? What could you be missing? Yan: As you can see Arthur and I view China's debt profile through different theoretical lenses. I don't think we can fully reconcile our different frameworks on the matter, but we hope our debate can deepen clients' own understanding of this issue, so they can make up their own minds. What I do want to stress is that those analysts who fear that China's corporate debt problem constitutes an alarming systemic financial risk focus exclusively on the rapid increase in the country's debt-to-GDP ratio. While undoubtedly there is merit to this ratio, I think it is also important to validate this judgement by looking at other indicators. In our previous research, we looked beyond this widely cited conventional indicator for corroborating evidence of a "debt bubble." Our findings suggest that the level of Chinese corporate sector leverage is not as precarious as widely perceived. For example, in the Chinese corporate sector, the area of China's economy where investors worry most about leverage, the debt-to-asset ratio of China's industrial sector has been falling since the late 1990s, down to 56% from 62%, contrary to popular belief (Chart 8). State-owned enterprises have witnessed an increase in their debt-to-asset ratio since the global financial crisis, but it has barely reached late 1990s levels, and has actually rolled over in recent years. Meanwhile, SOEs are a shrinking part of the overall economy and therefore, when looked at in conjunction with the private sector, have not moved the needle on the broader trend of corporate balance sheet "deleveraging." This stands in stark contrast to Japan's corporate sector at the peak of its debt bubble. In the early 1990s, Japan's corporate sector debt-to-asset ratio topped out at 78% when the country's "balance sheet recession" began (Chart 9). Even after two decades of deleveraging, Japan's current corporate debt-to-asset ratio is comparable to China's. To validate this conclusion, we also calculated several other key ratios to compare the leverage situation of Chinese listed companies relative to their global peers. Ratios such as liability-to-assets, net debt-to-EBITDA and interest coverage assess both leverage levels and debt servicing capacity. As Chart 10 shows, our extensive survey, both from the top down and the bottom up, suggests that China's leverage situation is comparable if not superior to its global peers. Chart 8The Leverage Picture From A Balance Sheet Perspective The Leverage Picture From A Balance Sheet Perspective The Leverage Picture From A Balance Sheet Perspective Chart 9Japan's Debt Bubble And Deleveraging Japan's Debt Bubble And Deleveraging Japan's Debt Bubble And Deleveraging Chart 10Leverage Ratios: How China Compares The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings? The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings? Therefore, I think we should be skeptical about the widely held view that China's corporate sector leverage is precariously high. It is at a minimum inaccurate, if not misleading, to rely solely on the debt-to-GDP ratio to reach such an ominous conclusion. Caroline: Arthur, I take it you don't agree? Arthur: Since January 2009, China's corporate and household debt has risen by RMB 130 trillion (about US$ 19 trillion) or by 100% of GDP (Chart 11). I do not believe even the most sophisticated financial/credit systems can allocate such amounts of credit in such a short time and not misallocate capital. By capital misallocation, I am implying investments in projects that do not generate sufficient cash flow to service debt. The accounting value (valuation) of assets is irrelevant in these cases; the cash flow generation is critical. The debt-to-GDP ratio is a much more superior measure to debt-to-asset-ratio. The basis is that the GDP is a proxy for cash flow, while accounting value of assets could be extremely inflated during a credit bubble. To be sure, I am not suggesting that all investments in China have gone sour. Nobody knows the extent of capital misallocation in China. But I suspect it is large enough to make a difference for the macro outlook/business cycle. Caroline: Peter, you have made the comparison between China today and Japan in the 1990s. Could you expand on that? Peter: Starting in the early 1990s, Japan entered an extended era where the private sector was trying to spend less than it earned (Chart 12). In order to keep unemployment from rising, the Japanese government was forced to run large budget deficits. In effect, the government ended up having to absorb the private sector's excess savings through its own dissaving. The same sort of fiscal trap now stalks China. Up until the Great Recession, China was able to export much of its excess savings. The current account surplus hit a record high of nearly 10% of GDP in 2007. The subsequent appreciation of the RMB undermined this strategy, forcing the government to take steps to boost domestic demand. It is no surprise that China's debt stock began to grow rapidly just as its current account surplus started to dwindle (Chart 13). Chart 11China: The Credit Boom China: The Credit Boom China: The Credit Boom Chart 12Japan Relied On Fiscal Largesse And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Japan Relied On Fiscal Largesse And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Japan Relied On Fiscal Largesse And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Chart 13China: Debt Increased When ##br##The Current Account Surplus Began Its Descent China: Debt Increased When The Current Account Surplus Began Its Descent China: Debt Increased When The Current Account Surplus Began Its Descent Keep in mind that fiscal policy in China entails much more than adjustments to government spending and taxes. Central government spending accounts for a fairly small share of GDP. The vast majority of fiscal stimulus is done via the banking system. This makes Chinese fiscal policy nearly indistinguishable from credit policy. From this perspective, China's so-called "debt mountain" is not much different from Japan's debt mountain once we acknowledge that the bulk of China's corporate debt is, in fact, quasi-fiscal debt. As evidence, note that in sharp contrast to the SOE sector, the ratio of liabilities-to-assets among private Chinese companies has actually been trending lower over the past decade (please see Chart 8). In effect, China's money-losing SOEs are the equivalent of Japan's fabled "bridges to nowhere": They are a necessary evil. Caroline: Arthur, your thoughts? Arthur: What Peter and Yan in effect propose is that Chinese banks should continue creating credit/money "out of thin air" in order to create demand for these "excess" goods, i.e., overcapacity sectors. In a nutshell, a number of Chinese companies made bad decisions by over expanding capacity, and now banks have to continue lending/creating demand to justify these bad investments. As a result, persisting explosive credit growth has allowed these unviable or zombie enterprises to survive, and they are not compelled to restructure. This is not how capitalism and markets work. This is de facto socialism. Socialism usually does not lead to prosperity. One of the key reasons behind the failure of socialist economic models is that productivity growth in socialist systems is very low, often close to zero. The basis is that productivity growth is generated not by government officials but by the private sector and entrepreneurs. China's economic success over the past 35 years or so has been due to allowing private enterprises to function and flourish - not because government officials necessarily made correct business and investment decisions. I am for countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies. However, the credit boom in China has gone well beyond the countercyclical policy framework. The concept of countercyclical policies does not suggest that the government or public banks should continue to spend in perpetuity to support fundamentally unviable businesses that invested too much and created excess capacity. Besides, "countercyclical" means for a couple of years. China has been expanding bank/credit/money for about nine years - since January 2009. Peter and Yan argue that they should keep doing it further. If the authorities do what Peter and Yan propose, investors should be structurally - not cyclically - bearish on Chinese stocks. Chart 14There Has Been No Shortage ##br##Of Demand Since 2010 There Has Been No Shortage Of Demand Since 2010 There Has Been No Shortage Of Demand Since 2010 The basis is that a socialist growth model is not friendly for shareholders. Shareholders often lose money when companies operate for maximizing employment rather than profits. This is why Chinese SOEs and bank stocks trade at low multiples - because they destroy capital and value for their shareholders. Notably, "overproduction" and "excess capacity" could be an outcome of either a demand downturn or oversupply/overproduction. Keynes recommended countercyclical policies to fill the gaps when demand shrinks. Chart 15Fiscal Outlays & Credit Origination ##br##Are Close To 50% Of GDP Fiscal Outlays & Credit Origination Are Close To 50% Of GDP Fiscal Outlays & Credit Origination Are Close To 50% Of GDP In China's case, there has been no domestic demand downturn to warrant multi-year countercyclical policies. China did the right thing in early 2009 to offset its export plunge amid the Global Financial Crisis, and it helped the global economy recover. However, since 2010 global demand and mainland exports have been stable (Chart 14), making the extended and ongoing credit boom in China unwarranted and excessive. As to the argument that most credit should be counted as a form of fiscal spending, I do not think Chinese policymakers themselves would agree with this statement. In fact, if this is correct, it would mean that government officials are allocating about 50% of GDP each year. Chart 15 illustrates general (central plus local) government spending and annual credit origination as a share of GDP. How fast would productivity grow in an economy where government bureaucrats allocate 50% of GDP annually? It is true that China's central government has a low debt load so it can afford to take over a large chunk of corporate debt. If and when they do so, I will change my view. So far, they have not done this, and will likely only contemplate such a policy move when things get really messy. Investors do not want to be long China plays going into such a scenario. That said, a tactical buying opportunity could emerge when the government takes over a large chuck of corporate debt. Caroline: Yan, how worried should we be about the misallocation of capital in China? Yan: Every economy experiences some level of capital misallocation. The real question is whether China's level of capital misallocation is more serious than that of its global peers. Theoretically, if a country has a bigger capital misallocation problem than others, the economy should have systemically lower capacity utilization, weaker pricing power, and lower profitability. These metrics are easily cross-referenced: Chart 16 contextualizes China's industrial sector capacity utilization ratio relative to global peers. By and large, most countries' capacity utilization ratios hover around 80%, not much different from China's, especially since the 2000s. In fact, barring some obvious outliers, capacity utilization ratios across countries have been largely synchronized, reflecting the ebb and flow of the global business cycle. Chart 16Capacity Utilization: A Global Perspective Capacity Utilization: A Global Perspective Capacity Utilization: A Global Perspective Industrial sector output prices have shown similar swings (Chart 17). Almost all countries suffered producer price deflation in recent years, and are now experiencing a synchronized upturn in wholesale pricing power. China's falling PPI was widely regarded as a tell-tale sign of misallocation of capital. Conversely, this was in fact more a reflection of stagnating global aggregate demand and weak resource prices worldwide than structurally weak pricing power among Chinese manufacturers. Chart 17Producer Prices: A Global Perspective Producer Prices: A Global Perspective Producer Prices: A Global Perspective Similarly, Chinese listed companies' deteriorating Return on Equity (ROE) was again singled out as a sign of capital misallocation. This view is easily debunked by Chart 18, as ROEs have fallen in all major markets. In fact, Chinese companies' ROEs have been structurally higher than the global averages. Even some Chinese sectors that have been derided as being plagued by massive overcapacity and inefficiency such as materials and energy exhibit ROEs almost identical to their global peers. The important point is that we should put China in a global context, rather than analyzing it in isolation. Some Chinese firms' efficiency and profitability have weakened notably over the past several years, but to me, this is more of a reflection of the sluggish global macro backdrop, rather than an indictment of China's discrete growth model. Caroline: Turning to the investment implications, Yan, how does the debt bubble concern impact your view on Chinese equities? Yan: Global investors' widespread concerns over Chinese debt levels and other macro issues have contaminated Chinese stocks with a broad-brushed bearish undertone. Chinese equities have been unduly punished, underweighted and under-owned for many years. As shown in Chart 19, Chinese investable stocks' ROEs have been structurally higher than the global benchmark, and have followed similar cyclical fluctuations. However, their stock prices are trading at massive discounts to the global benchmarks, based on conventional yardsticks (Chart 19). This in my view represents the "China risk premium," which is unjustified and unsustainable. I expect the misperception will eventually unwind, and Chinese shares will be re-rated. This is the fundamental factor supporting my positive view on Chinese equities. Strategically it makes sense to overweight Chinese stocks against their global peers. Chart 18Chinese ROEs Are Not Inferior To Global Peers Chinese ROEs Are Not Inferior To Global Peers Chinese ROEs Are Not Inferior To Global Peers Chart 19Chinese Equities' Large Valuation Gap Chinese Equities' Large Valuation Gap Chinese Equities' Large Valuation Gap Caroline: Arthur, how does your view impact your outlook for investment prospects in China and the rest of the emerging markets space? Arthur: There has not been any adjustment in China's corporate leverage. Deleveraging in China has not yet started. On the contrary, the credit bubble is getting larger. I mean the credit-to-GDP ratio continues rising exponentially and credit and bank loan growth remain in double digits (Chart 20). It is very risky to be bullish on financial assets linked to a bubble when the adjustment has not yet begun. It is like running in front of a steamroller trying to collect pennies. Besides, when there is a major imbalance in the system like the credit bubble happening in China now, I tend to overplay the importance of marginal policy tightening and underplay the significance of easing. Recent marginal policy tightening in China - in particular the clampdown on shadow banking, including banks' off-balance-sheet asset expansion - will cause credit growth to decelerate. This is a major risk to Chinese and EM growth in the second half of this year (Chart 21). Chart 20China: Money/Credit Is Still Booming China: Money/Credit Is Still Booming China: Money/Credit Is Still Booming Chart 21Is China's Recovery At Risk? Is China's Recovery At Risk? Is China's Recovery At Risk? Even if China does not have a full-blown crisis, we are likely to experience another down leg in China plays, commodities and EM risk assets similar to the second half of 2015, when Chinese import volumes contracted and global markets tanked. A few words about the potential adjustment trajectory are in order. I have been negative on China's growth and China-related plays in global financial markets since 2010, but I have never used the word "crisis." China may or may not have a crisis, but investors holding risk assets exposed to China's growth will suffer considerable losses again similar to the 2011-16 period. It is essential to differentiate cyclical from structural growth drivers. If the government does not allow credit growth to slow, cyclical growth will hold up. However, in this scenario, China will move toward a socialist model and structural growth will tumble. That said, the growth deceleration would be gradual, as depicted in Chart 22. Chart 22Toward Socialism = Secular Stagnation And Inflation The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings? The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings? If we assume China's productivity is currently growing at a rate of about 5.5-6% (which is already very high and hard to sustain), and if the country embarks on a socialist path, odds are that productivity growth will drop by 50-100 basis points in each of the following years. In five years or so, productivity growth would be only around 1-3%. This path is the ultimate recipe for economic stagnation in China. The only thing the authorities can do in this scenario is to boost growth from time to time via credit and fiscal stimulus. This will produce mini-cycles around a falling primary growth trend. The latest acceleration in China's growth is probably one of these mini-cycles. How can investors invest in this scenario? The stylized mini-cycles depicted in Chart 22 look nice, because we drew them ourselves. In reality, they will not be symmetric or smooth. In short, investing around economic mini-cycles is difficult because it assumes near-perfect timing. Caroline: Peter, is it all that bad? Peter: I think Arthur is too pessimistic. Investors have been predicting a Japanese debt crisis for years. It hasn't materialized and probably won't. They are making the same mistake about China. If China averts a debt crisis, as I think is likely, that's good news for global equities. In the developed market universe, Europe and Japan stand to benefit the most, given the cyclical bent of their stock markets. We are overweight both regions in local-currency terms. For global bonds, the implications are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, the high probability that the Chinese government can maintain the status quo of continued credit expansion for the foreseeable future means that a hard landing for the economy - and the associated drop in safe-haven developed economy government bond yields that this would trigger - is unlikely to occur. On the other hand, high levels of Chinese savings will continue to fuel the global savings glut, keeping real long-term bond yields lower than they would otherwise be. On balance, investors should maintain a modest underweight allocation toward global bonds. Caroline: Yan, do domestic politics play into your outlook for the RMB versus the dollar and on a trade-weighted basis? What is your outlook for monetary policy given recent signs of improving economic momentum? Yan: How President Donald Trump will deal with China on the RMB issue is a wildcard. Recent rhetoric suggests that the new U.S. administration intends to follow normal legal protocol to decide if China is manipulating its currency. This is a significant departure from Candidate Trump's repeated campaign trail promises. If the U.S. Treasury follows the formal process laid out in the statute, it is unlikely to label China a currency manipulator in the next semi-annual assessment to be published in April, simply because the country does not meet all the criteria for that label at the moment. The odds of an immediate clash between the U.S. and China on the RMB have ebbed. From China's domestic perspective, how the People's Bank of China intends to manage the exchange rate is also a thorny issue. From a long term point of view, the PBoC clearly wants to achieve a free-floating exchange rate, but the recent downward pressure on the RMB due to elevated capital outflows has forced the PBoC to heavily intervene to prevent a vicious, disorderly cycle, in which currency depreciation and capital flight reinforce each other. In terms of monetary policy, China's improving economic momentum has allowed the PBoC to follow the Fed in raising short-term interest rates. However, tighter capital account control measures will remain in place until the downward pressure on the RMB from capital outflow dissipates. Moreover, investors have been overwhelmingly focused on the negative economic effects of a weaker RMB, somehow ignoring the reality that as the world's largest manufacturer and exporter, China also stands to benefit from a weaker currency. In my view, the depreciation of the trade-weighted RMB since 2015 has played a critical role in reflating the Chinese economy (Chart 23). A weaker RMB has helped producer prices to reflate, and lowered the real cost of funding for manufacturers, which in turn has eased China's monetary conditions and supported cyclical growth improvement. In this vein, the downside of the RMB should be self-limiting, as the reflationary impact of a weaker exchange rate will help boost Chinese growth, which in turn will reduce downward pressure on the currency. Caroline: Peter and Arthur, is rampant capital flight still a risk? Where do you see the RMB heading over the coming 12-18 months? Peter: I think the RMB will weaken somewhat over the coming year, but that is more a reflection of my bullish view on the dollar than a bearish view on the yuan. Much of the capital flight that China has experienced recently has just been an unwinding of the hot money flows that entered the country over the preceding four years. Despite all the talk about a credit bubble, Chinese corporate external debt has fallen by around $400 billion since its peak in mid-2014 - a decline of over 50% (Chart 24). At this point, most of the hot money has exited the country and hence, I expect the pace of capital outflows to subside. Chart 23A Weaker RMB Leads Cyclical Recovery A Weaker RMB Leads Cyclical Recovery A Weaker RMB Leads Cyclical Recovery Chart 24The Rise And Fall Of Corporate Foreign Credit The Rise And Fall Of Corporate Foreign Credit The Rise And Fall Of Corporate Foreign Credit Nevertheless, the chronic shortfall of domestic demand that I described earlier will keep pressure on the Chinese government to try to export excess production abroad by running a larger current account surplus. This requires a weak currency. Thus, while I don't expect the yuan to plummet, I don't expect it to soar either. Arthur: I believe the RMB is set to depreciate by 10% or more against the U.S. dollar in the next 12 months or so. The Chinese yuan is not expensive, but it will stay under downward pressure because the mainland banking system has created too many yuan. When the supply of money goes vertical, its price drops. It seems the Chinese people are sensing there is too much RMB floating around, and they are trying to get rid of local currency. They have been overpaying for properties and have been shifting their wealth into foreign currencies. Finally, in China, the real deposit rate has turned negative (Chart 25, top panel). In the past, when the real deposit rate turned negative, the central bank hiked interest rates (Chart 25, bottom panel). If households do not get a more attractive deposit rate, they will opt for foreign currency, real assets like property or riskier investments domestically. All of this entails negative consequences for China's financial stability. Chart 25Real Deposit Rate Is Negative Real Deposit Rate Is Negative Real Deposit Rate Is Negative In brief, I expect capital outflows to persist and policymakers to allow the currency to depreciate further. Caroline: Peter/Yan/Arthur: Final thoughts: What are each of you watching for signs that China's macro landscape is evolving as you expect? Conversely, what would signal that your assessment has missed the mark? Peter: I am watching for signs of a policy mistake. Until China can reorient its economy towards one that is more consumer-centric, it will have to rely on high levels of investment to sustain aggregate demand. Any attempt to aggressively curb debt growth will only backfire. Arthur talks about resource misallocation from subpar investment projects, but there is no worse resource misallocation than a person who wants a job but can't find one. I am also watching trade policy. I don't think a trade war between China and the U.S. is in the cards for the time being, but if the U.S. economy turns down in 2019, as I expect, Trump will be backed into a corner. And with another election looming, he will strike out at China. That could trigger a global trade war. Yan: I agree with Peter that we should watch for policy mistakes and some sort of "Trump shock," both of which constitute downside risks. A less talked-about risk is potential growth overheating, which could require much tighter policy, leading to greater economic volatility. In fact, some cyclical indicators that are tightly linked to industrial activity have rebounded sharply, which is also reflected in the rebound in some raw materials prices. If exports get a further boost from continued improvement in the U.S. economy, the possibility of China's economy overheating cannot be completely dismissed. Another potential trouble spot is the housing market. The Chinese authorities have begun to tighten housing policy, but developers appear to be gearing up for another construction cycle. Sales of construction equipment such as heavy trucks and excavators have soared. Historically, construction machine sales have been tightly correlated with real estate development (Chart 26). If history is any guide, the renewed strength in construction equipment sales could be a harbinger of an impending boom in new home construction. This is good news for business activity and GDP growth, but probably antithetical to policymakers' broad agenda. We will follow up on these issues closely in our future reports. Arthur: The key variables to watch are various interest rates, credit/loan growth and inflation - in addition to keeping an eye on lending standards and credit demand. Recent increases in borrowing costs amid the enormous credit overhang give me confidence to argue that China's credit origination and economic growth are bound to decelerate later this year. A billion-dollar question is whether the recent rise in China's consumer inflation is transitory or the beginning of a notable uptrend (Chart 27). If consumer price inflation rises to 3% and higher, the game will be over - interest rates will need to go up and credit growth will tumble. If interest rates do not rise amid intensifying inflationary pressures, capital outflows will escalate and the currency will depreciate a lot. Chart 26An Upturn In Housing Construction? An Upturn In Housing Construction? An Upturn In Housing Construction? Chart 27China: Inflation Is Picking Up China: Inflation Is Picking Up China: Inflation Is Picking Up I will be wrong if policymakers manage to slow down credit growth from 11-12% toward 7-8% or so without generating notable economic weakness. This can occur only if productivity growth in China accelerates meaningfully. It is difficult to observe productivity growth in real time - it is a black box. 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?" dated January 18, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB," dated November 23, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights In any country, excess national savings, i.e., current account surpluses, lead to an accumulation of net foreign assets, but have no implications on domestic loan creation. Savings are not necessary for the banking system to originate loans. Quite the opposite, new loans boost purchasing power and spending and, thereby, create new income and additional savings. Unlimited loan/money creation will ultimately lead to currency depreciation and/or inflation. The RMB is at major risk because Chinese banks continue creating enormous amount of credit/money "out of thin air." Feature This week we publish the third report in our trilogy series on money, credit, savings and investment, where we address several misconceptions that dominate mainstream macroeconomic thought as well as the investment industry. Our previous Special Reports were: Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses, and China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB.1 This third report focuses on: (1) Elaborating on the link - or lack thereof - between the investment-savings identity and domestic credit creation in any country; (2) Demonstrating how new loans lead to new income and ultimately new savings creation, and not, vice versa; (3) Discussing the macro limits to money/credit creation among banks. Macroeconomics has many areas that are not well understood or developed. We do not pretend to have all the answers related to savings and loan origination and their links to other factors. Even though all points of this report are applicable to any economy, the practical relevance and goal of our analysis is to demonstrate that China's credit excesses are not the natural outcome of its unique macro features such as a high savings rate. In fact, the leverage expansion that has been underway since early 2009 (Chart I-1) is nothing more than a credit bubble driven by banks willingness to create credit exponentially and policymakers' tolerance of it. Chart I-1Chinese Companies Are Extremely Leveraged Favor Indian Banks Versus Chinese Ones Favor Indian Banks Versus Chinese Ones That said, this does not mean that the Chinese credit bubble is about to burst. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service has been negative on China's credit cycle and growth since 2010, yet has never used the word "crisis". China may well experience one at some point, but it is impossible to time it. A more distinct possibility is that the country's growth could stagnate/slump further, and financial markets leveraged to its growth sell off materially - particularly in the wake of last year's rally. The investment implications are that there is more downside to Chinese financial markets and China-related plays globally. National Savings And Domestic Credit Creation One of the prevailing notions that justifies China's large credit excesses, as elaborated by some of my colleagues at BCA and others in the investment industry as well as academia is as follows: A current account surplus implies that national savings exceed investment. If a country generates a lot of national savings, as China does, it must either absorb those savings through domestic investment or, where possible, export the savings to the rest of the world by running a large current account surplus. As a reminder to readers, the investment-savings identity is as follows: Investment = Savings is an identity for a closed economy; and Savings (S) - Investment (I) = Current Account Balance (CA) holds true for an open economy. While on the surface this proposition might appear very intuitive, a deeper examination reveals there is no link at all between the national savings-investment identity (S - I = CA) and domestic credit creation in any country: S - I = CA is an identity of the real economy. It means an economy produces more goods and services than it consumes, and that the difference between production and consumption (excess supply) is being exported. Hence, "excess savings" here are "real excess savings" in the form of goods and services that were produced but not consumed in the economy, but rather sold abroad. These "real excess savings," or the CA surplus, have nothing to do with aggregate deposits in the country's banking system, or money/credit origination by its banks. As we elaborated in the first report of our three-part series, banks do create loans and deposits "out of thin air". Banks do not intermediate deposits into loans. They create deposits when they originate loans. For a more detailed discussion on this, readers should refer to our report titled, Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses.2 Consequently, banks can create as much in the way of loans as they like (subject to the regulatory capital constraints), regardless of the country's current account balance. Chart I-2 and Chart I-3 depict that, historically, in various countries there has been no correlation between the national and household savings rates and bank credit origination. Chart I-2China: Credit And Savings ##br##Are Not Correlated China: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated China: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated Chart I-3The U.S., Korea And Taiwan: ##br##Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated NPL Ratios In Perspective: India & China NPL Ratios In Perspective: India & China When a country runs a current account surplus, it does not mean it brings in "excess savings" and invests those funds domestically. A current account surplus (or an excess of national savings over investment) only means that the country's net foreign assets will rise - i.e., the nation's "excess savings" have to be exported in the form of capital outflows (more on this below). On the whole, the S - I = CA identity is derived from the national accounts and balance of payments, and it has no relationship to how loans and deposits are created within the domestic banking system. Empirical evidence supports neither positive nor negative correlation between the current account balance and loan origination. For example, Germany has had massive current account surpluses, but its non-financial debt-to-GDP ratio has been stable (Chart I-4). On the contrary, the U.S. and Turkey have been running large current account deficits, while their domestic credit and leverage has boomed (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-4Germany: National Savings And Debt India: Public Bank Loan Growth Has Slumped India: Public Bank Loan Growth Has Slumped Chart I-5U.S.: National Savings And Debt India's Capital Spending Is Sluggish India's Capital Spending Is Sluggish Chart I-6Turkey: National Savings And Debt Indian Consumer Health Is Strong Indian Consumer Health Is Strong As the popular argument goes, more national savings lead to more deposits within the domestic banking system and ultimately more domestic loans stem from the application of the intermediation of loanable funds (ILF) model of banking. The ILF model states that banks intermediate deposits (savings) into loans. Yet, as we argued in the first report of this series, the ILF model is simply wrong. Commercial banks create both loans and deposits, simultaneously, "out of thin air". Consequently, any macro thesis that uses or relies on the ILF model is misguided. Bottom Line: National savings is a real economy concept, and has no relevance to loan creation and leverage in the country in question. Below we show that current account (CA) surpluses ("excess savings") lead to an accumulation of net foreign assets, but have no implication for domestic leverage. CA Surplus = Accumulation Of Net Foreign Assets CA surpluses are consistent with a nation expanding its net foreign assets, while CA deficits are congruent with a reduction in a country's net foreign assets. They do not suggest anything about domestic credit origination and leverage. Chart I-7U.S. Net International Investment Position India's Employment Is Turning The Corner India's Employment Is Turning The Corner The mechanism of converting CA surpluses into net foreign assets (external assets minus external liabilities) is somewhat different between fully floating and managed exchange rate regimes, so we consider both cases: A fully flexible exchange rate (the central bank does not interfere in the currency market): Let's assume Country A had a current account surplus over a given period. Exporters can keep the proceeds abroad and buy foreign assets, or bring them back and sell these dollars to other domestic players who want to buy foreign assets. Alternatively, exporters can sell these dollars to foreigners who sold assets in Country A and want to repatriate capital out of Country A. In this case, the nation's net foreign assets still rise because foreigners' claims on its assets shrink. Provided the central bank does not intervene in the currency market and the balance of payments, by definition, equals zero, the current account surplus is offset by a deficit on capital/financial accounts. In brief, the sole result of an excess of national savings relative to domestic investment is net capital/financial outflows and an ensuing increase in a country’s net foreign assets. This does not lead to any change in the banking system’s local currency loans.3 Chart I-7 demonstrates that the U.S.'s net foreign assets have dropped from - US$ 0.4 trillion in 1995 to - US$ 6 trillion currently, because the U.S. has been running current account deficits - i.e., on a net basis, foreigners have accumulated enormous amounts of claims on America. In spite of these persistent CA deficits and a low national savings rate, the U.S. bank loan-to-GDP ratio has risen substantially over the same period, proving the lack of relationship between national savings and loan origination. In the case of a managed or fixed exchange rate system (i.e., when the central bank intervenes in the currency market, by buying/selling foreign exchange), the dynamics are somewhat different, yet the end result is the same. If Country B has a current account surplus and its central bank is involved in managing the exchange rate, the central bank could buy foreign currency and thereby accumulate net foreign assets. Hence, the dynamics are the same, but the nation's central bank, rather than other economic agents, amasses more net foreign assets. If foreign exchange interventions are not completely sterilized, the central bank’s accumulation of foreign assets will be accompanied by issuance of high-power money (banks' reserves at the central bank) and new money (bank deposit) creation, but not a loan creation.4 Some observers might argue that the increase of bank reserves at the central bank would lead commercial banks to originate more loans. However, in the first and second reports of our trilogy series, we documented that commercial banks in the majority of countries, including all advanced economies and China, do not require central bank liquidity to originate loans. On the contrary, banks originate loans first and then, if needed, ask the central bank for liquidity. Chart I-8The PBoC Has Begun ##br##Targeting Rates In Recent Years India: PMIs Are Positive India: PMIs Are Positive In the case of China, there is evidence that from early 2014 until very recently, the People's Bank of China (PBoC) was targeting short-term interest rates (Chart I-8). When any central bank targets the price of money (interest rates), it cannot steer/manage the quantity of money - i.e., it has to provide/withdraw as much liquidity as commercial banks desire at a given interest rate level. Therefore, since early 2014, the PBoC has met commercial banks' demand for liquidity by keeping interest rates at its preferred target. In such a case, commercial banks - not the PBoC - decide on the amount of loan origination at a given interest rate level. Even in this case, the CA balance has no bearing on loan origination by commercial banks. Central banks nowadays steer loan growth and economic growth primarily via interest rates. Unless the current account dynamics lead the monetary authorities to alter interest rates, balance of payments dynamics will not have direct impact on credit growth. Bottom Line: A CA surplus raises a nation's net foreign assets, while a CA deficit reduces its net foreign assets. CA balances do not affect or determine commercial banks' capacity for domestic credit creation. Savings Are Not A Constraint On Loan Origination Mainstream economic literature typically relies on treating deposits as savings - i.e., refraining from spending by households or enterprises. Then, it uses the Intermediation of Loanable Funds (ILF) model to argue those savings flow to the banking system to become deposits. In turn, banks intermediate these savings (deposits) into loans. We have to again emphasize that the ILF model is simply wrong - in reality, this is not how the banking system works in any country in the world. This was the focal point of the first report of our trilogy. In particular, Fabian Lindner states that "...saving does not finance investment. No saving and abstention of consumption is needed for any lending to take place since lending and borrowing money are pure financial transactions that only affect gross financial assets and liabilities."5 Similarly, Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof utter: "In the ILF model, bank loans represent the intermediation of real savings, or loanable funds, between non-bank savers and non-bank borrowers. But in the real world, the key function of banks is the provision of financing, or the creation of new monetary purchasing power through loans, for a single agent that is both borrower and depositor". 6 They also provide a further distinction between savings and financing: "...if the loan is for physical investment purposes, this new lending and money is what triggers investment and therefore, by the national accounts identity of saving and investment (for closed economies), saving. Saving is therefore a consequence, not a cause, of such lending. Saving does not finance investment, financing does." 6 Let's consider an example: Company A - which intends to build a production facility - requests a loan from Bank Z. After approving the loan request, Bank Z opens an account for Company A and grants a loan of $100 million by crediting Company A's bank account and in turn creating purchasing power for the company. Hence, Bank Z originated a loan and deposit of $100 million "out of thin air". As Company A uses this amount to pay for construction of production facility, it pays the builder, architects, engineers and various suppliers. These entities, in turn, pay their own suppliers as well as their employees, while the profits (dividends) are remitted to shareholders. All entities, and ultimately their employees and shareholders involved in the project, derived income from the original loan. Thus, their income was contingent on the loan that was originated by Bank Z and spent by Company A. Without it, these households, other companies and their shareholders would not have earned that income. In turn, these households and companies would spend/consume part of their income and save the other part. A few observations: Loan creation by Bank Z generated household income and enterprise profits that otherwise would not have occurred. This extra income would produce extra saving. In other words, without the loan origination by Bank Z, these extra savings would not have arisen. The fact that all companies and their employees involved in this project decided to save a part of their income does not mean they deposited new funds at their banks. Their "savings" already existed in the banking system. In fact, these deposits were created by Bank Z when the latter originated the loan. Ultimately, with banks willing to originate new loans, spending can exceed current income. Claudio Borio of the Bank for International Settlements corroborates this point: "Crucially, the provision of financing does not require someone to abstain from consuming. It is purely a financial transaction and hence distinct from saving... The equality of saving and investment is an accounting identity that always holds ex post and reveals nothing about financing patterns. In ex post terms, being simply the outcome of expenditures, saving does not represent a constraint on how much agents are able to spend ex ante. If we step back from comparative statics and consider the underlying dynamics, it is only once expenditures take place that income and investment, and hence saving, are generated".7 Bottom Line: Savings are not necessary for the banking system to originate loans and finance investment and consumption. Quite the opposite, new loans boost spending and create new income and additional savings (even though they may not impact the savings rate). Applying this to China, this means that the absolute amount of household savings is high because before 2008 booming exports, and since 2008 mushrooming loan growth, produced robust income growth. In sum, households decide on their savings rate, yet the credit boom since 2008 has tremendously boosted their income and has thereby expanded the absolute amount of their savings. Limits On Country Loan Origination Does this mean any country (specifically, its commercial banks) can originate unlimited amounts of loans/money, and thereby print their way to prosperity? To date, no country we are aware of has accomplished this. Indeed, if this were the case, there would be no poor countries. In the first report of our trilogy, we elaborated on the constraints banks face in originating loans, such as tighter monetary policy, lack of credit demand, government regulations and capital requirements, bank shareholders appetite to lend and liquidity constraints for banks. Chart I-9China: Signs Of Budding Inflation India's Share In Global Trade India's Share In Global Trade Herein we elaborate on limits at a macro level for banks to originate loans and finance investment and consumption. The supply side of an economy and its capacity to produce goods and services that are in demand is ultimately a macro constraint on credit/money issuance. China's ability to sustain such rapid money creation has been due to its strong supply side - i.e., its productive capacity. This makes China different from other emerging markets such as Turkey. China has low inflation and a CA surplus, while Turkey has had high inflation and a large CA deficit. Ultimately, a country's growth trajectory depends on its potential growth, which is the sum of labor force growth and productivity growth. China's "economic miracle" of the past 30 years has been due to its productivity, not credit/money creation. Money/credit origination greases the wheels of the supply side "machine" but does not replace it. Indeed, China's productivity boom over the past three-plus decades has been due to reforms that have allowed for the emergence and development of private enterprises, and attracting foreign technology/know-how. It has not been due to government control over the economy and credit creation. By and large, China is facing two potential growth trajectories, as depicted in Chart I-12 and Chart I-13 and explained in Box 1 on pages 13-15. A credit-driven economic downtrend entails deflation, while the path towards socialism warrants inflation. Barring a deflationary credit-driven growth slump, inflation in China will pick up sooner than later. The reason is that growing state control of the economy and resource allocation means poor capital allocation and much slower productivity - and in turn potential GDP growth. The latter, along with double-digit credit, creates fertile ground for an inflation outbreak (Chart I-9). If banks create too much money/credit, the price of money will go down- i.e., the currency will ultimately depreciate both versus foreign currencies as well as relative to goods/services and real assets like property. Chinese banks have created too much money (RMBs), and it is not surprising property prices have gone exponential and that the RMB is under downward pressure. In fact, Chinese households may be sensing there are too many RMBs floating around, and want to get rid of them by converting them into foreign currencies and buying real assets (real estate). On the whole, the exchange rate is a key to China's macro dynamics. If unrelenting credit creation persists, the yuan will continue to fall because Chinese households and companies will be reluctant to hold local currency. In such a case, credit origination will have to be curtailed to stabilize the exchange rate. Bottom Line: Unlimited credit/money creation will ultimately produce a major currency depreciation and/or inflation. These, in turn, will short-circuit the credit boom. Conclusions When investors and commentators justify exponential moves in credit or asset prices by the unique features of a particular economy - implying this time is really different - critical consideration is warranted. For example, Japan's 1980s bubble was justified by exclusive particularities of the Japanese economy; Hong Kong's real estate bubble of the 1990s was justified by limited land on the island; and the U.S. tech bubble of the late 1990s was explained by a "new era of productivity brought on by technology." Needless to say, in retrospect we know that these were bubbles, and they all deflated. Explaining away China's exponential surge in domestic leverage as a bi-product of its high savings rate makes us wary. The report explains why high national savings rates do not warrant high credit creation. China is facing two potential growth roadmaps, as depicted in Chart I-11 and Chart I-12 and elaborated in Box 1 (see page 13-15). Regardless of which way China's economy evolves, the medium-term outlook for mainland growth is downbeat. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team expects double-digit RMB depreciation in the next 12 months. We continue to recommend short positions in the RMB via 12-month NDFs. This is the rationale behind our negative stance on Asian currencies. We believe EM equities, credit markets and currencies will underperform their DM counterparts, regardless of the trajectory of share prices in the U.S./DM. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com BOX 1 Two Growth Path Forward For China1 1. Short-Term Pain / Long-Term Gain If the authorities were to allow market forces to prevail, the state should withdraw meaningfully from the credit allocation process. In that case, credit markets will bring discipline to both debtors and creditors - in effect, an emerging perception of potential losses rather than government-led bailouts will make creditors less willing to lend, and debtors less willing to borrow and expand. The result will be a considerable dampening in credit origination. In this scenario, it is very likely that credit growth slows from 12% currently to the level of potential nominal GDP growth of 7-8% or lower (Chart I-10), leading to a classic credit-driven economic downtrend (Chart I-11). In that case, cyclical growth will undershoot. Chart I-10China: Credit Is Outpacing ##br##GDP Growth By Wide Margin India Has Been Losing Export Market Share India Has Been Losing Export Market Share Chart I-11Capitalist-Style Credit-Driven Downtrend India's Education Improvement Has Stalled India's Education Improvement Has Stalled However, potential GDP growth (the red line in Chart I-11) - which has been falling in recent years - will stabilize and probably improve. The reason being that by allowing market forces to prevail in credit allocation and corporate restructuring/reorganization, China will ultimately improve its capital allocation and productivity. In brief, potential GDP growth - which equals productivity growth plus labor force growth - will stop falling and, in fact, could improve as productivity growth ameliorates. 2. No Short-Term Pain But Long-Term Stagnation It is essential to differentiate cyclical growth drivers from structural ones. If the government does not allow credit growth to slow, cyclical growth will hold up. However, in this scenario, structural growth will tumble and China will embark on a path of economic stagnation. That said, the growth deceleration would be gradual, as depicted in Chart I-12. Chart I-12Toward Socialism = Secular Stagnation And Inflation Upgrade Indian Bourse Within EM Universe Upgrade Indian Bourse Within EM Universe A rising role of state and government officials in capital allocation and business decision-making guarantees suboptimal capital allocation, resulting in poor efficiency and declining productivity growth. Since China's labor force growth is projected to be flat-to-negative, the sole source of potential GDP growth going forward will be productivity growth. Besides, it is much easier to achieve high productivity growth in manufacturing than in the service sector. Finally, high productivity growth is possible when the productivity level was low. From the current levels, it is hard to grow productivity more than 5-6% annually. Chart I-13Socialist Put Will Depress ##br##Productivity Growth Socialist Put Will Depress Productivity Growth Socialist Put Will Depress Productivity Growth If we assume China's productivity is now about 6% (which is already very high) (Chart I-13), and if the country embarks down this path, odds are that productivity growth might drop by 100 basis points in each of the following years. In five years or so, productivity growth would be only around 1%. Given that labor force growth will be zero, if not contracting, in five years' time, potential GDP will drop to 1% or so, as shown in Chart I-12 on page 14. Hence, this path is the ultimate recipe for economic stagnation in China. The only thing the authorities can do in this scenario is to boost growth from time to time via credit and fiscal stimulus. This will produce mini-recovery cycles around a falling primary growth trend. The latest acceleration in China's growth is probably the first mini-cycle. How can investors invest in this scenario? The mini-cycles depicted in Chart I-12 look nice, because we drew them ourselves. In reality, they will not be symmetric or smooth. Besides, financial market swings for China-related plays will differ from the economy's growth mini-cycles because markets can be driven by factors other than growth like politics, geopolitics, credit events, and other global variables such as the U.S. dollar and bond yields. In short, this analysis explains why we have been and remain bearish on China-related financial markets despite the stimulus that has been injected about a year ago. Investing around economic mini-cycles is difficult because it assumes near-perfect timing. Without that, investors cannot make money. 1 Originally published in January 11, 2017 EMS Weekly Report. 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB," dated November 23, 2016, the links are available on page 18. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, the link is available on page 18. 3 This example assumes that neither the central bank nor local commercial banks are buying foreign currency. In the case when a commercial bank buys foreign currency, that transaction creates new money/deposit in the banking system although it does not create a new loan. The opposite is also true: when a commercial bank sells foreign currency, existing money/deposits are destroyed. 4 This example assumes that the local commercial banks are not buying foreign currency and only the central bank buys foreign currency from non-banks. 5 Lindner, F. (2015), "Does Saving Increase the Supply of Credit? A Critique of the Loanable Funds Theory", World Economic Review 4: 1-26, 2015 6 Jakad, Z. and Kumhof, M. (2015), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", Bank of England, Working Paper 529, May 2015 7 Borio, C. and Disyatat, P. (2015), "Capital Flows and the Current Account: Taking Financing (more) Seriously", BIS Working Papers, No. 525, October 2015 Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights A central bank cannot control/target the quantity and price of money simultaneously. For the past few years, China's central bank has silently moved away from controlling money growth toward targeting interest rates. As such, the reserve requirements imposed on banks have not and will not be a constraint on Chinese commercial banks' ability to lend and create money if the PBoC continues to supply banks with reserves "on demand." China's banks have created too many RMBs (broad money/deposits) and the PBoC has accommodated them. Such enormous supply of RMBs and mainland households' and companies' desire to get rid of their RMBs will lead to further yuan depreciation. Continue shorting the RMB and Asian currencies versus the U.S. dollar. Re-instate a short Colombian peso trade; this time against an equal-weighted basket of the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble. Feature Following our October 26 Special Report titled, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses",1 some clients have asked us how our analysis squares with fact that the People's Bank of China (PBoC) conducts its monetary policy using a reserve requirement ratio. The relevant question being, why would the PBoC's reserve requirements not limit commercial banks' ability to create money/credit? In that Special Report, we wrote: "A commercial bank is not constrained in loan origination by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) to commercial banks "on demand." Given PBoC lending to banks has surged 5.5-fold over last three years (Chart I-1), we concluded that the reserve requirement ratio had, for all intents and purposes, lost its meaning in China. In this week's report we elaborate on this issue in detail. The main implication of our analysis today reinforces our conclusion from the previous report: namely, China's commercial banks have expanded credit enormously, and the PBoC has accommodated it. With respect to financial market implications, there are simply too many RMBs (broad money/deposits) in the system (Chart I-2). Chinese households and companies can instinctively sense this, and are opting to move their wealth into real assets, such as real estate, or foreign currencies. Hence, the oversupply of RMBs will continue to weigh on China's exchange rate, which will depreciate much further. We expect the US$/CNY to reach 7.8-8 over the next 12 months. Chart I-1The PBoC Has Provided Banks With Liquidity 'On Demand' bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c1 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c1 Chart I-2There Are Too Many RMBs Floating Around bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c2 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c2 Targeting Either The Quantity Or The Price Of Money Any central bank can target and control either the quantity of money or the price of money, but not both simultaneously. This holds true for any monopolist supplier of any good/service that does not have control over the demand curve. A demand curve for money is the function that ties the quantity demanded at various price points (the price being interest rates). Central banks - being monopolist suppliers of money, but unable to control money demand - must choose between controlling either the quantity of money or the price of money. The system of required reserves (RR) is a tool to control money supply (the quantity of money). When central banks reinforce the RR ratio, interbank interest rates typically swing enormously and often deviate considerably from the target policy rate (Chart 1). For example, when commercial banks expand loans too much and lack sufficient reserves at the central bank, they must borrow from the interbank market and thereby bid up interbank rates- i.e., short-term interest rates rise. This in turn restrains credit demand or the willingness to lend, and eventually reduces money growth. The opposite also holds true. When a central bank wants to target interest rates (the price of money), it cannot control money supply. To ensure that interbank/money market rates stay close to the policy rate - i.e., to reinforce its interest rate target - a central bank should provide the banking system with reserves "on demand." In other words, when interbank rates rise above the target policy rate, a central bank should inject sufficient liquidity into the system to bring interest rates down. Similarly, when interbank rates fall below the target policy rate, a central bank should withdraw enough liquidity from the banking system to assure interbank rates rise converging to its target policy rate. By supplying commercial banks with reserves (high powered money) "on demand" - i.e., providing as much reserves as they need - a central bank is de facto failing to enforce reserve requirements. As such, the central bank is giving up control over money creation. By and large, RRs lose their effectiveness if a central bank provides commercial banks with as much reserves as they request. In short, when a central bank opts for targeting interest rates, it cannot steer monetary aggregates - i.e., RRs and RR ratios lose their meaning. In the 1970s and 1980s, most central banks in advanced countries targeted money supply to achieve their policy goals such as inflation and sustainable economic growth. However, starting in the early 1990s, developed nations' central banks (the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, the Swiss National Bank and others) began to move away from controlling money supply (monetary aggregates) and toward targeting interest rates. Individual banks' limitations to borrow from the central bank often rests with the availability of collateral. So long as a commercial bank has eligible collateral (often government bonds), it can access central bank funding. This is true for Chinese commercial banks too. Bottom Line: Monetary authorities cannot control/target the quantity and price of money simultaneously. The Money Multiplier In An Interest Rate Targeting System When a central bank opts for targeting interest rates, commercial banks can originate an unlimited amount of loans and demand the central bank provide additional reserves, as long as they have eligible collateral. This corroborates our point from our previous report that a commercial bank's loan origination is not constrained by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) "on demand." In a fractional reserve system, the ability of commercial banks to create loans/money is defined by a money multiplier. A potential ceiling for a money multiplier (MM) is calculated as: MM = (1 / RR ratio) For example, when the RR ratio is 10%: The money multiplier MM = (1 / 0.1) = 10 In effect, the banking system can create up to 10 times more money/loans/deposits per one dollar of reserves. Under the current system of interest rate targeting – which has prevailed among most developed countries since the early 1990s and more recently in China (more on China below) – we can think of the RR ratio as heading towards zero because central banks provide banks with almost unlimited liquidity (reserves). The RR ratio is not zero because there are still limitations on banks' ability to borrow from central banks due the availability (or lack thereof) of eligible collateral or compliance with Basel III requirements. Yet as the RR ratio gets smaller in size, its reciprocal (1 / RR ratio) becomes very large (not infinite, but a plausibly very large number). Overall, when a central bank targets interest rates, the ceiling of the money multiplier is not set by the central bank. Rather, the money multiplier is de facto determined by commercial banks' willingness to originate loans. Thus, the money multiplier can potentially be very high when animal spirits among bankers and borrowers run wild. Consequently, the points discussed in our Special Report titled, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses"2 - namely that commercial banks create loans/money/deposits out of thin air - holds, and is relevant in a system where central banks target/control interest rates. Bottom Line: When central banks opt to control short-term interest rates, they must provide commercial banks with as much liquidity as the latter demands. In such a case, RRs and the RR ratio become almost irrelevant. Therefore, in an interest rate targeting system, banks' ability to originate loans/create money and deposits is not contingent on their reserves at the central bank. This point is greatly relevant to China. The PBoC: Shifting From Money To Interest Rate Targeting For the past few years, China’s central bank has silently moved away from controlling money growth to targeting interest rates. As a result, nowadays the PBoC has very little quantitative control over money/credit creation by commercial banks or the money multiplier. It is Chinese commercial banks that effectively drive money/credit/deposit creation. Chart I-3SHIBOR Crises In 2013 Forced PBoC ##br##To Start Targeting Interest Rates bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c3 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c3 We suspect this shift in China's monetary policy management has been occurring since early 2014 on the heels of the so-called SHIBOR crisis, which erupted in June 2013 when interbank rates surged and was followed by another spike in interbank rates in December 2013 (Chart I-3). During these episodes, the PBoC enforced reserve requirements and thus did not provide liquidity to banks that were running short on it. In essence, it did whatever a central bank targeting money growth via control over RR would do. However, as interbank rates surged and banks complained, policymakers backed off, and provided banks with as much liquidity as they demanded. This stabilized interbank rates and, importantly, appears to have marked the PBoC's shift toward interest rate targeting. Thus, by de facto moving to a monetary system of targeting interest rates, the PBoC cannot effectively reinforce reserve requirements because it must supply any amount of reserves that commercial banks require to preclude a major spike in interbank rates. A few points illustrate that in fact the PBoC has been targeting short-term money market rates, and banks have expanded loans enormously despite their excess reserves being flat: Volatility in interbank rates has dropped substantially (Chart I-4), as the PBoC's claims on commercial banks has exploded 5.5-fold since the early 2014. Even though commercial banks' excess reserves have been flat, their lending has been booming - i.e., the money/credit multiplier has been rising (Chart I-5). This is only possible when the PBoC has been supplying reserves "on demand" or when it cuts the RR ratio. Since the RR ratio has not been cut over the past two years, it means that the former is true. Chart I-4Interbank Rate Volatility Has Fallen As ##br##PBoC Injected A Lot Of Liquidity bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c4 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c4 Chart I-5China's Money/Credit Multiplier##br## Has Been Rising bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c5 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c5 Just like central banks in advanced economies, the only way the PBoC can alter money/credit growth is if it lifts or cuts its interest rate target. Barring any changes to its policy rate, commercial banks, not the PBoC, determine money/loan/deposit creation in China. As to other factors that determine the amount of credit/money creation by commercial banks in China, we elaborated on these in the above-mentioned report. Bottom Line: It appears the PBoC has shifted toward targeting interest rates. Consequently, the PBoC cannot pretend to control money/credit origination unless it changes its interest rate target. Moreover, we reiterate that China's abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative behavior among Chinese banks and borrowers, and not the natural result of the country's high savings rate. Oversupply Of RMBs = A Lower Currency As China's central bank has been printing RMBs and commercial banks have been "multiplying" them at a high rate (by originating loans), the supply of RMBs has continued to explode. Such an oversupply of local currency will continue to depress the value of the nation's exchange rate. The PBoC's liquidity injections have exploded in recent years (Chart I-6). The central bank has not only been offsetting the liquidity withdrawal due to its currency foreign exchange market interventions, but it has also been providing banks with as much liquidity as they require. The objective seems to have been to avoid a rise in interbank rates when corporate leverage is extremely high and banks are overextended. Since February 2015, the PBoC's international reserves have dropped by US$0.9 trillion, or 4.2 trillion RMB (Chart I-7). This means that the PBoC has withdrawn 4.2 trillion RMBs from the system. If the central bank did not re-inject these RMBs into the financial system, interbank rates would have skyrocketed. As the PBoC has injected RMBs into the system, it has effectively undone its RMB defense. The whole point of defending the exchange rate from falling or depreciating too fast is to shrink local currency liquidity. Yet, naturally, that would also lead to higher interbank rates. If the central bank chooses not to tolerate higher interest rates and continues to inject local currency into circulation, the RMB's depreciation will likely continue and accelerate. By injecting RMBs into the system, the monetary authorities have allowed banks to continue to lend, thereby creating enormous amounts of money and deposits. Banks create deposits when they lend. The Chinese banking system has a lot of deposits partially because commercial banks have lent too much. In short, the supply or quantity of money (RMBs) has continued to explode, despite massive capital outflows. Notably, if the PBoC did not lend RMBs to commercial banks, the latter's excess reserves would have plunged by 4 trillion RMB (Chart I-8) and banks would have been forced to pull-back their lending. Chart I-6PBoC's Liquidity Injections Have ##br##Exploded Since Early 2014 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c6 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c6 Chart I-7China: Foreign Exchange##br## Reserve Depletion bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c7 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c7 Chart I-8China: What Would Have Banks' Excess Reserves##br## Been Without Borrowing From PBoC? bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c8 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c8 Overall, in the current fiat money system, when a central bank targets interest rates, the monetary authorities can print unlimited high-powered money (bank reserves) and commercial banks can multiply it by creating enormous amounts of loans/deposits.3 However, there is no free lunch - no country can print its way to prosperity (otherwise all countries would have been very rich already). The negative ramifications of unlimited money creation are numerous, but this report focuses on the exchange rate implications. The growing supply of RMBs will lead to a much further drop in China's exchange rate. It seems Chinese retail investors and companies intuitively sense this, and are eager to get rid of their RMBs. This also explains Chinese investors' desire to overpay for any real or financial asset, domestically or abroad. We expect growing downward pressure on the RMB as capital outflows accelerate anew. Although China’s foreign exchange reserves are enormous in absolute U.S. dollar terms, they are low relative to money supply (Chart 9). The ratio of the central bank’s international reserves-to-broad money is 15% in China and it is relatively low compared with other countries (Chart 10). Chart I-9China: International Reserves Are Not##br## High Relative To Broad Money bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c9 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c9 Chart I-10International Reserves-To-Broad##br## Money Ratio China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB As a final note, the oversupply of local currency has not created inflation in the real economy because of massive overcapacity following years of booming capital spending. However, continued money creation will eventually lead to higher inflation. This does not seem imminent but we will be monitoring these dynamics carefully going forward. Bottom Line: China's banks have created too much RMBs and the PBoC has accommodated them. Such enormous supply of RMBs and mainland households' and companies' desire to get rid of their RMBs will lead to further yuan depreciation. Investment Implications: A Free-Fall For RMB And Asian Currencies The RMB's value versus the U.S. dollar will drop much further. Our new target range for US$/CNY is 7.8-8 over the next 12 months, or 11-14% below today's level. The forward market is discounting only 2.8% depreciation in the next 12 months (Chart I-11). We maintain our short RMB / long U.S. dollar trade (via 12-month NDF). A persistent relapse in the RMB's value will drag down other Asian currencies. In particular, the Korean won and the Taiwanese dollar have failed to break above important technical levels (their long-term moving averages), and have lately relapsed (Chart I-12). Chart I-11RMB Will Depreciate Much More##br## Than Priced In By Forwards RMB Will Depreciate Much More Than Priced In By Forwards RMB Will Depreciate Much More Than Priced In By Forwards Chart I-12Asian Currencies:##br##More Downside Ahead bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c12 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c12 For the Korean won, we believe there is considerable downside from current levels. Consistently, we recommended shorting the KRW versus the THB trade on October 19.4 Chart I-13EM ex-China Currencies Total Return##br## (Including Carry): Is The Rally Over? bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c13 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s1_c13 Traders who believe in continued U.S. dollar strength, like we do, should consider shorting the KRW versus the U.S. dollar outright. For DM currencies, this means that the drop in the JPY has further to go. In emerging Asia, we are also shorting the MYR and the IDR versus the U.S. dollar and also versus Eastern European currencies such as the ruble and the HUF, respectively. As emerging Asian currencies depreciate versus the U.S. dollar, other EM currencies will likely follow. It is hard to see the RMB and other Asian currencies plunging and the rest of EM doing well. The total return (including the carry) of the aggregate EM ex-China exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar (equity market-cap weighted index) has failed to break above a critical long-term technical resistance, and has rolled over (Chart I-13). This is a bearish technical signal, implying considerable downside from these levels. As such, we maintain our core short positions in the following EM currencies outside Asia: TRY, ZAR, BRL and CLP and add COP to this list today. This is based on an assumption of diminished foreign inflows to EM and lower commodities prices. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy & Frontier Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com Colombia: Headed Toward Recession In our May 4 Special Report on Colombia,5 we argued that despite a bright structural backdrop this Andean economy was headed for a growth recession (i.e. very weak but still positive growth). Domestic demand has buckled and now we believe the nation could be on the verge of its first genuine recession in two decades (Chart II-1). Colombia's Achilles heel is its low domestic savings rate, reflected by a still large current account deficit financed by FDI and portfolio capital inflows (Chart II-2). As a result, low oil prices and rising global interest rates have exposed the nation's main cyclical vulnerability. Given the trade deficit is still large (Chart II-3) and our bias is that oil prices will be flat-to-down, a further retrenchment in domestic demand is unavoidable. Chart II-1Colombia's First Recession##br## In 20 Years? bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c1 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c1 Chart II-2Colombia's Lingering Balance Of ##br##Payments Vulnerability bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c2 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c2 Chart II-3A Weaker COP Will Force The ##br##Necessary Adjustment bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c3 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c3 Going forward, the external funding constraint will continue to bite. Moreover, policymakers are trapped and will be unable to prevent growth from contracting. The central bank is stuck between the proverbial rock and hard place. Cutting interest rates will undermine the appeal of the peso to foreign investors. Raising rates to prop up the currency, however, will exacerbate the economy's downward momentum. In the end, downward pressure on the exchange rate and still high inflation mean the central bank will not cut rates soon (Chart II-4). Tight monetary policy in turn means that private sector credit will decelerate much more (Chart II-5). Chart II-4High (Well Above Target) Inflation Limits##br## Central Bank's Ability To Ease bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c4 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c4 Chart II-5Colombia: Credit Growth Is ##br##Headed Much Lower bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c5 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c5 Our marginal propensity to consume proxy, an excellent leading indicator for household spending, signals consumption is set to weaken even further (Chart II-6). Facing weakening demand, investment is set to continue contracting (Chart II-7) and, ultimately, unemployment will be much higher, reinforcing the downtrend in consumer expenditures. Chart II-6Colombian Domestic Demand##br## To Retrench Further bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c6 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c6 Chart II-7Contracting Investment Bodes ##br##Poorly For Employment bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c7 bca.ems_sr_2016_11_23_s2_c7 Meanwhile, fiscal policy will remain tight as Colombia's orthodox policymakers struggle to adjust the fiscal accounts to the structurally negative terms-of-trade shock in this oil-dependent economy. The current fiscal reform effort is very positive for sustainable long-run dynamics, as influential central bank board members have highlighted.6 Yet particular parts of the reform, such as raising VAT taxes from 16% to 19%, will almost inevitably lead to a drop in consumer demand. Furthermore, nominal government revenues are already contracting and a slumping economy means that the total fiscal effort will need to be greater than currently envisioned. Overall, with monetary and fiscal policy stimulus hamstrung by the nation's low domestic savings rate (i.e. large current account deficit), a mild recession seems very likely. And while a lot of weakness has already been priced into the nation's financial markets, we think there is still more downside ahead. For instance, the Colombian peso may be cheap in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, but it is highly vulnerable due to the nation's still wide current account deficit. This week we recommend re-instating a short position in the peso; this time against an equal-weighted basket of the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble.7 Turning to equities, Colombian stocks have fallen sharply since 2014, mostly a reflection of the collapse of the nation's energy plays. At present bank stocks account for 60% this nation's MSCI market cap, and though we believe they will fare better than many other EM banking systems,8 they will not go unscathed by a recession. Still, orthodox policymaking should limit the downside in the performance of this bourse and sovereign credit (U.S. dollar bonds) relative to their respective EM benchmarks. Meanwhile, fixed-income investors should continue to bet on yield curve flattening by paying 1-year/ receiving 10-year interest rate swaps, a trade we have recommended since September 16, 2015.9 The recent steepening in the yield curve will prove unsustainable as the economy tanks. Bottom Line: Colombia is probably headed toward recession and policymakers are straightjacketed and cannot ease monetary and fiscal policies to prevent it. As such, the currency will be the main release valve and it will depreciate further. Go short the COP versus an equal-weighted basket the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble. Dedicated EM equity and credit investors should maintain a neutral allocation to Colombia within their respective EM benchmarks. Continue to bet on flattening in the yield curve by paying 1-year/ receiving 10-year interest rate swaps. Santiago E. Gomez Associate Vice President santiago@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016. 3 As we argued in Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016, it is new loans that create new deposits and vice versa. 4 Please refer to the section on Thailand in our Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled " The EM Rally: Running Out Of Steam?" dated October 19, 2016. 5 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Special Report titled, "Colombia: A Cyclical Downturn Amid Structural Strength," dated May 4, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Cano, Carlos Gustavo "Monetary Policy in Colombia: Main Challenges 2016 -2017" Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Small Talks Symposium, October 7, 2016, Washington DC http://www.banrep.gov.co/sites/default/files/publicaciones/archivos/cgc_oct_2016.pdf 7 For more on the ruble please refer to the section on Russia in our Emerging Markets Weekly Report, dated November 16, 2016, titled, "Russia: Overweight Equities; Reinstate Long RUB / Short MYR Trade". 8 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Special Report titled, "Colombia: A Cyclical Downturn Amid Structural Strength" dated May 4, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 9 Please refer to the section on Colombia in our Emerging Markets Weekly Report, dated September 15, 2015, titled "Colombia: An Incomplete Adjustment", available at ems.bcareseach.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights China's abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative, high-risk behavior among Chinese banks - and not the natural result of the country's high savings rate. Banks do not intermediate savings into credit, and they do not need deposits to lend. Banks create deposits and money by originating loans. A commercial bank is not constrained in loan origination by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) to commercial banks 'on demand'. What habitually drives credit booms are the "animal spirits" of banks and borrowers. We are initiating a relative China bank equity trade: short listed medium-size banks / long large five banks. Continue shorting the RMB versus the U.S. dollar. Feature For some time, the consensus view has been that rampant credit growth in China and the resulting excesses have been the natural result of the country's high savings rate, particularly among Chinese households. We have long argued differently: abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative, high-risk behavior among Chinese banks and other creditors and borrowers. In this vein, China's credit bubble is no different than any other credit bubble in history. Although an adjustment in China might play out differently than it has in other countries where credit excesses became prevalent, China's corporate credit bubble is an imbalance that poses a non-trivial risk to both mainland and global growth (Chart I-1). Chart I-1China's Outstanding Credit Is Large Relative To Global GDP China's Outstanding Credit Is Large Relative To Global GDP China's Outstanding Credit Is Large Relative To Global GDP In a nutshell, Chinese banks have not channelled large amounts of household deposits into credit. Without mincing words, it is our view that banks have originated loans literally from "thin air" as banks do in any other country. In turn, credit has boosted spending, income and, consequently, savings. Do Deposits Create Loans, Or Do Loans Create Deposits? It is a widely held view among academics, investors and market commentators - including some of our colleagues here at BCA - that China's enormous credit expansion over the past several years has been a natural outcome of the nation's high savings rate. The argument goes like this: China has a very high savings rate, and it is inherent that household savings flow to banks as deposits. In turn, banks have little choice but to lend out on these deposits. The upshot of this reasoning is as follows: China's abnormally strong credit growth is a consequence of the country's abundant savings rather than an unsustainable excess. This argument hails from the Intermediate Loan Funds (ILF) model, otherwise known as the Loanable Fund Theory. This model suggests that deposits create loans - i.e., banks intermediate deposits into credit. Even though the ILF model is the most widespread theory of banking within academia and in textbooks, it unfortunately has little relevance to real-life banking - i.e., banking systems around the world do not function as the model posits. An alternative but much less recognized theory, the Financing Money Creation (FMC) model, asserts that banks create deposits from "thin air" when they originate a new loan. This is the model that banking systems in almost all countries in the world subscribe to. Indeed, whenever a bank makes a loan, it simultaneously creates a matching deposit in the borrower's bank account, therefore creating new money in the process (Chart I-2). In other words, bank loans create deposits and money. Chart I-2Commercial Banks: Credit Origination Creates Deposits Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Herein we cite various papers that discuss this matter and delineate the key points: "Banks do not, as many textbooks still suggest, take deposits of existing money from savers and lend it out to borrowers: they create credit and money ex nihilo - extending a loan to the borrower and simultaneously crediting the borrower's money account" (Turner, 2013). "When banks extend loans, to their customers, they create money by crediting their customer's accounts" (King, 2012). "Based on how monetary policy has been conducted for several decades, banks have always had the ability to expand credit whenever they like. They don't need a pile of "dry tinder" in the form of excess reserves to do so" (Dudley, 2009). "In a closed economy (or the world as a whole), fundamentally, deposits come from only two places: new bank lending and government deficits. Banks create deposits when they create loans." (Sheard, 2013). "Just as taking out a new loan creates money, the repayment of bank loans destroys money" (McLeay, 2014). The papers cited in the bibliography on page 18 elaborate on this topic in depth and readers are encouraged to review this literature. Bottom Line: Banks do not need deposits to lend. They create deposits and money by originating loans. Do Banks Lend Their Reserves At Central Banks? Another misconception about modern banking in general and China's banking system in particular is that banks lend out their excess reserves held at the central bank. Provided that Chinese banks have plenty of required reserves at the People's Bank of China (PBoC), some economists and analysts argue it is a matter of cutting the reserve requirement ratio to free up reserves (liquidity), which will allow banks to boost their loan origination. Again, we cite several papers as well as specific views from central bankers who reject the notion that banks lend out their reserves at the central bank: This comment by William C. Dudley (President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank) states "the Federal Reserve has committed itself to supply sufficient reserves to keep the fed funds rate at its target. If banks want to expand credit and that drives up the demand for reserves, the Fed automatically meets that demand in its conduct of monetary policy. In terms of the ability to expand credit rapidly, it makes no difference whether the banks have lots of excess reserves or not" (Dudley, 2009). "In fact, the level of reserves hardly figures in banks' lending decisions. The amount of credit outstanding is determined by banks' willingness to supply loans, based on perceived risk-return trade-offs, and by the demand for those loans. The aggregate availability of bank reserves does not constrain the expansion directly" (Borio et al., 2009). "While the institutional facts alone provide compelling support for our view, we also demonstrate empirically that the relationships implied by the money multiplier do not exist in the data ... Changes in reserves are unrelated to changes in lending, and open market operations do not have a direct impact on lending. We conclude that the textbook treatment of money in the transmission mechanism can be rejected..." (Carpenter et al., 2010). "...reserves are, in normal times, supplied 'on demand' by Bank of England to commercial banks in exchange for other assets on their balance sheets. In no way does the aggregate quantity of reserves directly constrains the amount of bank lending or deposit creation" (McLeay 2014). "Most importantly, banks cannot cause the amount of reserves at the central bank to fall by "lending them out" to customers. Assuming that the public does not change its demand for cash and the government does not make any net payments to the private sector (two things that are both beyond the direct control of the banks and the central bank), bank reserves have to remain "parked" at the central bank" (Sheard, 2013). More detailed analysis on this topic is available in the papers cited in the bibliography on page 18. Bottom Line: Banks do not lend out their reserves at the central bank. A commercial bank is not constrained in loan origination/money creation by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) to commercial banks 'on demand'. Empirical Evidence: Savings Versus Credit This section presents empirical evidence that there is no correlation between national and household savings rates and loan origination. This is true for any country, including China. Credit growth and credit penetration (the credit-to-GDP ratio) have little to do with a country's or with households' savings rates. Chart I-3 illustrates that there has been no correlation between China's national or household savings rates and the credit-to-GDP ratio. China's savings rate was high and rising before 2009, yet the credit bubble formation only commenced in January 2009 when the savings rate topped out. Looking at other countries such as Korea, Taiwan and the U.S., historically we find no correlation between their savings and credit cycles1 (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China: Credit And Savings ##br##Are Not Correlated China: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated China: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated Chart I-4The U.S., Korea And Taiwan:##br## Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated The U.S., Korea And Taiwan: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated The U.S., Korea And Taiwan: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated Importantly, a high or rising savings rate does not preclude deleveraging. There were many two- to four-year spans of deleveraging in China when the credit-to-GDP ratio was flat or falling (Chart I-5) - i.e., the growth rate of credit was at or below nominal GDP growth. This occurred despite the country's high and rising savings rate. So, not only is deleveraging not unusual for China but it has also occurred amid a high savings rate. This contradicts the commonly held view that Chinese credit has always expanded faster than nominal GDP because the nation saves a lot. Deleveraging at the current juncture will likely be very painful, because the size of credit flows is enormous and even a moderate and gradual deceleration in credit will produce a major drag on growth. Specifically, the credit impulse - the second derivative of outstanding credit that measures the impact of credit growth on GDP - will be equal to -2.2% of GDP if credit growth moderates from 11.3% now to 7.8% in the next 24 months (Chart I-6). Chart I-5There Were Periods Of ##br##Deleveraging In China Too There Were Periods Of Deleveraging In China Too There Were Periods Of Deleveraging In China Too Chart I-6China's Credit Impulse Will ##br##Likely Be Negative China's Credit Impulse Will Likely Be Negative China's Credit Impulse Will Likely Be Negative As Chart I-6 also demonstrates, China's credit impulse drives Chinese imports, the most critical variable for the rest of the world. Chart I-7China: A Growth Engine Shift Since 2009 China: A Growth Engine Shift Since 2009 China: A Growth Engine Shift Since 2009 Further, it is possible to argue that vigorous credit growth generates robust income growth. The latter, in turn, allows a nation as a whole and households in particular to save more. If Chinese banks had not originated as many loans since early 2009 as they have, many goods and services in China would not have been produced and sold, and income growth for all companies, households and even government would be much lower. Even if the savings rate were held constant, less income would entail lower absolute amounts of both national and household savings. In short, China's exponential credit growth since 2009 has helped boost both national and household income levels, and in turn the absolute level of their savings. Chart I-7 illustrates that before 2009, mainland economic and income growth were driven by exports, but since early 2009, credit has been instrumental in generating income growth and prosperity. Finally, many analysts rationalize strong loan growth among Chinese banks by their robust deposit growth. This logic is flawed: Chinese banks have substantial deposits on hand because they originate a lot of loans. Bottom Line: China's and any other country's national or household savings rate does not explain swings in credit creation. Banks do not intermediate savings into credit. Rather, banks create deposits and money. What Drives Bank Lending? If a credit boom is not driven by abundant savings, what is the foundation for a credit boom in general, and the one currently underway in China in particular? Loan origination by a bank depends on that bank's willingness to lend, as well as general demand for loans. Also, depending on policy priorities, regulators often try to encourage or limit banks' ability to lend by imposing and adjusting various regulatory ratios. Barring any regulatory constraints, so long as there is demand for loans and a bank is willing to lend, a loan will be originated. Hence, in theory, banks can lend to eternity unless shareholders and regulators constrain them. In the immediate wake of the Lehman crisis, the Chinese authorities encouraged banks to open the credit floodgates. Thus, there was a de facto deregulation in the nation's banking system in early 2009 - policymakers encouraged strong credit origination. The experience of many countries - documented by numerous academic papers on this topic - has demonstrated that banking sector deregulation typically leads to excessive risk-taking by banks, and abnormal credit growth. These episodes have not ended well, with multi-year workouts following in their wake. By and large, a credit boom often occurs when risk-taking by banks surges and shareholders and regulators do not constrain them. This has been no different in China - the credit boom since 2009 has been powered by speculative and excessive risk-taking among banks and their management teams in particular, amid complacency of regulators and shareholders. Bottom Line: What habitually drives excessive credit creation are the "animal spirits" of banks and borrowers. Banks' and borrowers' speculative behavior and reckless risk-taking typically degenerates into a credit boom that often ends in an economic and financial downturn. It has been no different in China. What Constrains Bank Lending? The following factors can limit bank credit origination: Monetary policy can limit credit growth via raising interest rates, which dampens loan demand. Also, banks can become more risk averse when interest rates rise as they downgrade creditworthiness of current and prospective borrowers. Government regulations can impose various restrictions on banks, restraining their risk-taking and ability to originate infinite amounts of credit. In China, to limit banks' ability to lend, regulators have imposed several mandatory ratios on commercial banks, and also practice 'Window Guidance'. First, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR=net capital / risk-weighted assets). This ratio limits banks' ability to originate infinite amounts of loans by imposing a minimum level CAR. In China, most banks comply comfortably with CAR. The CAR for the entire commercial banking system is currently 13.1%. While the minimum requirement is 8%. The caveat is that in China, banks' equity capital is nowadays considerably inflated because they have not provisioned for non-performing loans (NPLs). If banks were to fully provision for NPLs, their equity capital would shrink significantly, and they would probably not meet the minimum CAR. Table I-1 shows that in a scenario of 12.5% NPL ratio for banks' claims on companies and zero NPL on household loans and mortgages as well as a 20% recovery rate, a full provisioning by banks would erode 65% of their equity. In this scenario, the CAR ratio would drop a lot - probably below the required minimum of 8% and banks would be forced to raise new equity (dilute existing shareholders) or shrink their balance sheets - or a combination of both. Table I-1China: NPL Scenarios And Banks' Equity Capital Impairment Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Second, the leverage ratio - computed as net Tier-1 capital divided by on- and off-balance-sheet assets. According to government regulation, this ratio should be at least 4%. As of June 30, 2016, the leverage ratio for the entire commercial banking system was 6.4%, comfortably above its floor. Nevertheless, as with CAR, the leverage ratio is overstated at the moment because the numerator - net Tier-1 equity capital - is artificially inflated, as it is not adjusted for realistic levels of NPLs, as discussed above. If 65% of equity is eroded due to sensible loan-loss provisioning and write-offs (as per Table 1), the leverage ratio would drop to about 2.3%, below the required minimum of 4%. Hence, banks would need to raise new equity (dilute existing shareholders), shrink their balance sheets or do a combination of both. Equity dilution is bearish for bank stocks and, if and as banks moderate their assets/loan growth, the economy will suffer. Third, regulatory 'Window Guidance' is implemented through PBoC recommendations to banks on their annual and quarterly credit ceilings, and on their credit structures. There is no official disclosure of this measure, and it is done between the PBoC, the Chinese Banking Regulatory commission (CBRC) and banks' management. In recent years, the efficiency of 'Window Guidance' has declined dramatically. Banks have defied bank regulators' efforts to rein in credit growth by finding loopholes in regulations. What's more, they have de facto exceeded credit origination limits by moving credit risk off their balance sheets and classifying it differently than loans. The result has been mushrooming Non-Standard Credit Assets (NSCA). Table I-2 reveals that on- and off-balance-sheet NSCA stand at RMB 10 trillion and RMB 19 trillion, respectively. Furthermore, banks have lately expanded their lending to non-depositary financial organizations that include trust companies, financial leasing companies, auto financing companies and loan companies (Chart I-8). This has probably been done to circumvent government regulations. Hence, Chinese banks have taken on much more credit risk than regulators have wanted them to by reclassifying/renaming loans as NSCA, and parking these assets both on- and off-balance-sheet. Table I-2China: Five Largest Banks Hold ##br##Only 40% Of Credit Assets Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Chart I-8Non-Bank Financial Organizations##br## Are On A Borrowing Spree From Banks bca.ems_sr_2016_10_26_s1_c8 bca.ems_sr_2016_10_26_s1_c8 In short, regulatory measures in China have not been effective at restraining credit growth in recent years. Bank shareholders are the biggest losers when banks expand credit uncontrollably, and then their default rates rise. The reason being that banking is a business built on leverage. For example, if a bank's assets-to-equity ratio is 10 and 10% of assets go bad (default with no recovery), shareholders' equity will completely evaporate - i.e., they will lose their entire investment. Hence, it is in the best interests of bank shareholders to halt a credit expansion when they sense deteriorating credit quality ahead. Doing so will hurt the economy, but limit their losses. Why have shareholders of Chinese banks not stepped in to curb the credit boom and misallocation of capital? We believe they have either been satisfied with such a massive credit expansion, which has initially driven shareholder returns up, or weak institutional shareholder mechanisms have meant they have been unable to enforce credit discipline on their banks. All in all, if China's or any other credit system is driven by the principals of capitalism and markets, creditors are the ones who should curtail credit growth - regardless of what impact it will have on the economy. If a country's credit system in general and banks in particular do not operate on principals of capitalism and markets, banks can expand credit infinitely, thereby perpetuating capital misallocation and raising inefficiency, leading to stagnating productivity - in other words, a move to a more socialist bend. Only in a socialist system do banks expand their credit portfolios in perpetuity, since they are not run to maximize wealth for shareholders. On a related note, there is another misconception that all Chinese banks are state-owned and the government will be fast to bail them out by buying bad assets at par. Table I-3 illustrates the ownership structure of 16 Chinese banks listed the A-share market, including the large ones. The state (central and local governments) and SOEs have a large but not 100% ownership stake. In fact, foreign investors have considerable equity shares in many banks. Table I-3Chinese Banks: Shareholder Structure Is Diverse Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses Hence, a government bail-out of these banks at no cost to shareholders would mean the Chinese government is using taxpayer money to benefit domestic private as well as foreign shareholders. Given the considerable amounts involved, this will be politically difficult to achieve unless the benefits of doing so are explicitly greater than the costs of doing nothing. Chart I-9Commercial Banks Are On ##br##Borrowing Spree From PBoC Commercial Banks Are On Borrowing Spree From PBoC Commercial Banks Are On Borrowing Spree From PBoC We are not implying that a government bailout is impossible. Our point is that it will take material pain and considerable deterioration in the economy and financial markets before the central government bails out banks at no cost to other shareholders. No wonder the authorities have not recapitalized the banks so far. In the long run, if the Chinese government is serious about improving the credit/capital allocation process, it has to allow market forces to take hold so that creditors and debtors are not bailed out but instead assume financial responsibility for their decisions. This means short-term pain but long-term gain. The lack of demand for credit is an important constraint on credit origination. If there are no borrowers, banks will have a hard time making a sizable amount of loans. Liquidity constraints also limit banks' ability to expand their assets. Let's consider an example when liquidity constraints arise. Bank A originates a loan, and Borrower A wants to transfer money to its Supplier B, which has an account at Bank B. In theory, Bank A should reduce its excess reserves at the central bank by transferring money to Bank B's reserve account at the central bank. However, if too many borrowers of Bank A try to transfer their money/deposits to other banks, Bank A will run into liquidity constraints as its excess reserves dry up. In such a case, Bank A should borrow money from the central bank or the interbank market to replenish its excess reserves. Provided many G7 central banks are nowadays committed to supplying as much liquidity (reserves) as banks require, in these countries banks do not really face liquidity constraints in lending. The focus of advanced countries' central banks is to control short-term interest rates - i.e., they manage liquidity in a way to keep policy rates at the target. In the case of China, even though the PBoC has a high required reserves ratio (RRR) for banks, it apparently supplies commercial banks with whatever amounts of liquidity they require. Chart I-9 reveals that the PBoC's claims on commercial banks have surged by fivefold in the past three years. Given the Chinese monetary authorities have in the recent years been very generous in meeting banks' demands for liquidity, the high RRR has not constrained mainland banks' ability to originate loans. This contradicts some analysts' assertions that the PBoC can boost lending by cutting the RRR. As the PBoC presently fully accommodates banks' demands for liquidity, the significance and impact of required reserves has declined. On the whole, nowadays, commercial banks in China are not facing liquidity (reserves) constraints to expand credit. High debt servicing costs could constrain bank lending. Are there limits to the credit-to-GDP ratio? It is illustrative to consider a numerical example for China. Corporate and household debt presently stands at 220% of GDP and, according to Bank of Intentional Settlement (BIS) calculations, debt servicing costs (including interest payments and amortization) account for around 20% of disposable income (Chart I-10). If credit indefinitely expands at a rate well above nominal GDP growth (Chart I-11) and interest rates do not decline, debt servicing costs will rise substantially. For example, let's assume that mainland corporate and consumer leverage reaches 400% of GDP in the next several years. If and when this happens, debt servicing costs could double, approaching 40% of income assuming constant interest rates and debt maturity. Chart I-10China's Corporate And Household##br## Credit: The Sky'S The Limit? China's Corporate And Household Credit: The Sky'S The Limit? China's Corporate And Household Credit: The Sky'S The Limit? Chart I-11Will Credit Growth Slow Toward##br## Nominal GDP Growth? Will Credit Growth Slow Toward Nominal GDP Growth? Will Credit Growth Slow Toward Nominal GDP Growth? No debtor can continue to function under such debt burden. Hence, debtors will have to cut their spending (for companies it will be a reduction in capex budgets) or these debtors will need to borrow to pay interest and retire old debt. In short, this becomes an unsustainable Ponzi scheme, where debtors borrow to service their debt obligations. Anecdotal evidence suggests this is not rare in China nowadays. One way the authorities could reduce debt servicing is to cut interest rates to zero and lengthen the maturity of debt. This is what many advanced economies have done. If Chinese credit penetration does not stop rising, the PBoC will be forced to cut rates to close to zero. This in turn will lead to large capital outflows, and the RMB will depreciate versus the U.S. dollar. Bottom Line: The following factors can restrain bank credit origination: monetary policy (higher interest rates), government regulations, bank shareholders, lack of credit demand, liquidity constraints and high debt servicing costs. Investment Implications Chart I-12Short Small Banks / Long Large##br## Banks In China Short Small Banks / Long Large Banks In China Short Small Banks / Long Large Banks In China If banks' shareholders and other creditors in China act in accordance with their self-interests to preserve the value of their assets, they will have to reduce credit origination/lending. As a result, China will experience an acute economic downturn. This would constitute a capitalist-type adjustment, which in turn will lead to more efficiency, solid productivity growth, and reasonably high economic growth over the long term. However, it will also mean significant short-term pain. If the government bails out everyone, underwrites all credit risks, and gets even more involved in capital/credit allocation, the economy will not experience an acute slump for a while. However, this would represent a shift toward socialism and the potential growth rate will collapse in the next several years. With the labor force stagnating and probably contracting in the years ahead, China's potential growth will be equal to its productivity growth. In socialism, productivity growth is low, often close to zero. The growth trajectory in this scenario will follow mini-cycles around a rapidly falling potential growth rate. In brief, China's growth rate is bound to slow further, regardless of what scenario plays out over the next several years. Today, we are initiating a relative China bank equity trade: short listed small- and medium-size banks / long large five banks in the A-share market (Chart I-12). There has been more speculative high-risk lending from the small- and medium-size banks than the large ones. As we documented in our June 15, 2016 Special Report titled Chinese Banks' Ominous Shadow,2 the largest five banks have fewer non-standard credit assets than medium and small banks. If 12.5% of banks' claims on companies turn sour and the recovery rate is 20%, 100% of the equity of 11 listed small- and medium-sized banks will be wiped out. The same number for the large five banks is 42%. Hence, these 11 listed small- and medium-sized banks are more exposed to bad loans than the large five. Finally, mushrooming leverage entails that the monetary authorities should reduce interest rates drastically. However, lower interest rates will spur more capital outflows from the mainland. Hence, the RMB is set to depreciate further. We have been shorting the RMB versus the U.S. dollar since December 9, 2015, and this position remains intact. 1 We discussed this at length in Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "China: Imbalances And Policy Options", dated June 12, 2012, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Chinese Banks' Ominious Shadow", June 15, 2016, link available on page 22. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com Bibliography Borio, C. and Disyatat, P. (2009), "Unconventional Monetary Policy: An Appraisal", BIS Working Papers, No. 292, November 2009. Carpenter, S. and Demiralp, S. (2010),"Money, Reserves, and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Does the Money Multiplier Exist?", Finance and Economics Discussion Series, No. 2010-41, Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Washington, DC: Federal Reserve Board Dudley, W. (2009), "The Economic Outlook and the Fed's Balance Sheet: The Issue of "How" versus "When"", Remarks at the Association for a Better New York Breakfast Meeting, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2009/dud090729.html Jakad, Z. and Kumhof, M. (2015), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", Bank of England, Working Paper 529, May 2015 King, M. (2012), Speech to the South Wales Chamber of Commerce at the Millenium Centre, Cardiff, October 23. Ma, G., Xiandong, Y. and Xim L. (2011), "China's evolving reserve requirements", BIS Working Papers, No. 360, November 2011. Turner, A. (2013), "Credit, Money and Leverage", September 12. Sheard, Paul (2013), "Repeat After Me: Banks Cannot And Do Not 'Lent Out' Reserves", Standard & Poor's Rating Services, August 2013, New York Werner, R. (2014b), "How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same?", International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 71-77. See King (2012), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", pp. 6, cited in Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof, Bank of England Working Paper 529, May 2015. See Dudley (2009), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", pp. 13, cited in Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof, Bank of England Working Paper 529, May 2015. See Carpenter and Demiralp (2010), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", pp. 13, cited in Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof, Bank of England Working Paper 529, May 2015. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

In China and the majority EMs, credit impulses will be negative over the next 12 months as and if their credit growth converges towards their current nominal GDP growth. These negative credit impulses will dampen EM/China growth and their corporate profits. In the next 12 months, the credit cycle is most vulnerable in China, Brazil, Turkey, and Malaysia and least vulnerable in central Europe, the Philippines, and Mexico.

If China's credit growth decelerates below 9.4% by the end of 2016 from the current rate of 11.7%, the negative credit impulse will overwhelm any plausible fiscal spending impulse. This is quite a plausible scenario given the lingering credit excesses in China. This warrants a caution on China-related plays in financial markets.