Commodities & Energy Sector

Executive Summary China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic A greater-than-expected contraction in manufacturing and construction in China – evidenced by the latest PMI and home sales data – will keep pressure on copper prices. Higher inflation will continue to drive the cost of labor, fuels and materials higher. Lower copper prices and higher input costs will weaken margins, leading to reduced capex. This also will put pressure on the rate of spending on projects already sanctioned. Payouts to shareholders – buybacks and dividends – will fall, reducing the appeal of miners’ equities. Debt-service costs will rise as interest rates are pushed higher by central banks. Civil unrest in critically important metals-producing provinces is forcing some miners to suspend production guidance. This will be exacerbated in Chile by changing tax regimes, which likely will reduce capex as well. Bottom Line: As global demand for copper increases with the renewable-energy transition and higher arms spending in Europe, miners’ ability to expand supply is being seriously challenged. Falling prices and rising costs – along with higher tax burdens and civil unrest in key mining provinces – are forcing copper miners to lower production and capex guidance, which will redound to the detriment of supply growth. With demand expected to double by 2030-35, copper prices will have to move higher to keep capex flowing to support supply growth. We remain long the XME ETF as the best way to express our bullish, decade-long view. Feature Just as the world is scrambling to develop additional energy supplies in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, copper supplies – the critical element of the renewable-energy buildout – are being squeezed by an unusual convergence of fundamental, financial and social factors. Chart 1China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic Firstly, copper demand is weak, which, all else equal, is suppressing prices. This is largely down to China’s zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy, and uncertainty over whether the EU will be pushed into a massive recession, following the cutoff of its natural gas supplies from Russia. These are two of the three major pillars of the global economy, and their economies are entwined via trade in goods. China’s COVID-19 policy is hammering its critically important property market – sales were down almost 40% y/y in July – and forcing a contraction in manufacturing. Construction represents ~ 30% of total copper demand in China. Manufacturing is contracting, based on China’s official July PMI report, which showed the index fell below 50 to 49.0 for July.1 Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyOne Hot Mess: EU Energy Policy China accounts for more than half of global copper demand, and, because of its zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy, was the only major economy to register a year-on-year contractions in copper demand throughout the pandemic up to the present (Chart 1). The EU accounts for ~ 12.5% of global copper demand, which we expect will continue to be supported by the bloc’s renewable-energy and defense buildouts.2 We noted in earlier research the odds of the EU going into recession remain high as the bloc scrambles to prepare for winter, in the wake of its attempts to replace its dependence on Russian natural gas supplies.3 We continue to expect the EU will avoid a major recession, and that it will be able to navigate this transition, leaving it on a better energy footing in subsequent years.4 Lower Copper Prices Will Hurt Capex Chart 2Copper Price Rally Fades After bottoming in March 2020 at $2.12/lb on the COMEX, copper prices staged a 125% rally that ended in March of this year. This was due to the post-pandemic reopening of most economies ex-China, which was accompanied by massive fiscal and monetary stimulus that super-charged consumer demand. Copper prices have since fallen ~33% from their March highs on the back of a substantial weakening of demand resulting from China’s zero-tolerance COVID policy and a concerted global effort to rein in the inflation caused by governments’ largess (Chart 2). Most year-end 2021 capex expectations for 2022 and into the future among copper miners were drawn up prior to the price collapse in June. After that, fear of central-bank policy mistakes – chiefly over-tightening of monetary policy that pushes the global economy into recession – and weak EM demand took prices from ~ $4.55/lb down to less than $3.20/lb by mid-July. A strong USD also pushed demand lower during this time. Chart 3DRC Offsets Chile, Peru Weakness Following the copper-price rout, miners are re-thinking production goals, dividend policy and capex. Social and governance issues also are contributing to weaker copper output. Rio Tinto, for example, notified markets it would shave $500mm from its $8 billion 2022 capex budget. For 1H22, Rio cut its dividend to $2.67/share from $5.61/share in 1H21. Elsewhere, Glencore said copper output from its Katanga mine in the DRC now is expected to come in 15% lower this year, at 1.06mm MT, owing to geological difficulties. Separately, output guidance for Chinese miner MMG Ltd’s Las Bambas mine in Peru has been suspended, following a 60% drop in production. The company expected it would be producing up to 320k tons this year. Civil unrest at Las Bambas has been ongoing since production started in 2016, according to Reuters. Big producers like Chile and Peru – accounting for ~ 35% of global ore production – along with the DRC face multiple challenges. Chile accounts for ~ 25% of global copper ore production. Its output fell ~ 6% in 2Q22 vs year-earlier output due to falling ore quality, water-supply constraints, and rising input costs (Chart 3). Chile’s government expects copper ore output to decline 3.4% y/y in 2022, with many of the country’s premier mines faltering (Chart 4). Chart 4Chile Expecting Lower Copper Output Chile also is proposing to increase taxes and royalties, to raise money for its budget. However, this may have the effect of driving away investment in the country’s copper mining industry. Fitch notes, “Increased costs will decrease mining cash flows and discourage new mining investments in Chile, favoring the migration of investors to other copper mining districts.”5 BHP Billiton, on que, said it will reconsider further investment in Chile, if the new legislation is approved. Renewables Buildout Will Widen Copper Deficit Markets appear to be trading without regard for the huge increase in copper supply that will be required for the global renewable-energy transition, to say nothing of the upcoming re-arming of the EU and continued military spending by the US and China. In our modeling of supply-demand balances, we move beyond our usual real GDP-based estimates of demand, which estimates the cyclical copper demand, and include assumptions for the demand the green-energy transition will contribute. Hence, this additional copper demand for green energy needs to be added to the copper demand forecast generated by the model. Using projections for global supply taken from the Resource and Energy Quarterly published by the Australian Government’s Department of Industry, Science and Resources, we estimate there will be a physical refined copper deficit of 224k tons in 2022 and 135K tons next year (Chart 5). Among other things, we are assuming refined copper demand will double by 2030 and reach 50mm tons/yr by then. This is a somewhat more aggressive assumption than S&P Global’s estimate of demand doubling by 2035. If we assume refined copper production is 2% lower than the REQ’s estimate, we expect the physical deficit in the refined copper market rise to a ~ 532k-ton deficit in 2022 and ~ 677k-ton deficit in 2023. These results including renewables demand highlight the need to not only account for cyclical demand but also the new demand that will be apparent as the EU, the US and China kick their renewables investments into high gear. Importantly, this kick-off is occurring with global commodity-exchange inventories still more than ~ 35% below year-ago levels (Chart 6). Chart 5Coppers Deficit Will Narrow On Lower Demand​​​​​​ Chart 6Exchange Inventories Remain Exceptionally Low​​​​​​ Investment Implications Copper prices will have to move higher to keep capex flowing to support supply growth normal cyclical demand and renewable-energy demand will require over coming decades. Falling prices and rising costs – along with higher tax burdens and civil unrest in key mining provinces – are forcing copper miners to lower production and capex guidance, which will redound to the detriment of supply growth. This situation cannot persist unless governments call off their renewable-energy transition, and, in the case of the EU, their efforts to re-arm Europe’s militaries following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. We remain bullish base metals, particularly copper. We remain long the XME ETF as the best way to express this decade-long view. Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish OPEC 2.0 agreed a token increase in oil production Wednesday of 100k b/d, partly as a sop to the US following President Biden’s visit to the Kingdom last month. KSA will be producing close to 11mm b/d in 2H22. We have argued this is about all KSA will be willing to put on the market, in order to maintain some spare capacity in the event of another exogenous shock. OPEC 2.0 spare capacity likely falls close to 1.5mm b/d in 2023 vs. an average of 3mm b/d this year, which will limit the capacity of core OPEC 2.0 – KSA and the UAE – to backstop unforeseen production losses. Separately, the US EIA reported total US stocks of crude oil and refined products rose 3.5mm barrels (ex SPR inventory). Demand for refined products in the US was down 28mm barrels in the week ended 29 July, or 4mm b/d. We continue to expect prices to average $110/bbl this year and $117/bbl next year (Chart 7). Base Metals: Bullish China flipped from a net importer of refined zinc in 2021 to a net exporter for the first half of 2022, despite a high export tax on the metal. This is indicative of the premium Western zinc prices are commanding over the domestic price. Chinese zinc demand has fallen, following reduced manufacturing activity and an ailing property sector. Thursday’s Politburo meeting did little to encourage markets of a Chinese rebound later this year. A subdued Chinese recovery, along with European zinc smelters operating at reduced capacity, if at all, could see this reversal in trade flow perpetuate for the rest of the year. Precious Metals: Bullish As BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy highlighted, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan will increase tensions between the US and China but will not lead to war. For now. Increased uncertainty normally is good for gold and its rival, the USD. While geopolitical uncertainty from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine initially buoyed the yellow metal, gold has since dropped below the USD 1800/oz level. The greenback was the main beneficiary from the war (Chart 8). It is yet to be seen how this round of geopolitical risk will impact gold and USD, with the backdrop of increasing odds of a US recession and a hawkish Fed. Chart 7 Chart 8   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see China’s factory activity contracts unexpectedly in July as Covid flares up published by cnbc.com on July 31, 2022. The PMI summary noted contractions in oil, coal and metals smelting industries led the index’s decline. 2     Please see One Hot Mess: EU Energy Policy, which we published on May 26, 2022, for additional discussion. 3     Please see Copper Prices Decouple From Fundamentals, which we published on July 7, 2022. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4     Please see Energy Security Rolls Over EU's ESG Agenda published on July 28, 2022. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5     Please see Proposed Tax Reform Weakens Cost Positions for Chilean Miners (fitchratings.com), published by Fitch Ratings on July 7, 2022.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022

Special Report

Executive Summary Non-Commodity Enterprises: No Profit Expansion For 12 Years The past decade has seen a deterioration in the financial performance metrics of industrial Chinese companies. Declining efficiency of investments, rising labor compensation and slowing productivity growth will constitute formidable headwinds to the long-term profitability of China’s industrial sector. Potential deleveraging by local governments, companies and households will cap revenue growth for enterprises and, hence, weigh on their profitability. High commodity prices in the past 18 months have improved profitability and financial metrics for commodity producers. These strengths will reverse as commodity prices sink in the coming months. Corporate earnings are set to disappoint in 2H. Bottom Line: We maintain a neutral stance on Chinese onshore stocks and an underweight stance on investable stocks in a global equity portfolio. In absolute terms, risks to Chinese shares prices are to the downside. ​​​​Among Chinese industrial companies, underweight commodity producers and overweight food & beverage, autos and utilities.   The data for this report for industrial enterprises, which are sourced from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), encompass state-owned and holding enterprises (SOEs) and other forms of ownership, including private ones. It covers both listed and non-listed companies. The sectors included are construction materials, steel, non-ferrous metals, energy, coal, machinery, auto, tech hardware, food & beverage and utilities. An analysis based on this dataset shows that China’s corporate profitability and efficiency ratios have experienced a prolonged structural downturn since the early 2010s (Chart 1 and 2). Chart 1Chinese Industrial Companies: Structural Deterioration in Productivity... Chart 2… And Operational Efficiency Chart 3Cyclical Improvements Within Structural Downtrend In the past 10 years, these measures improved only modestly during recovery periods and stumbled during downturns (Chart 3). The structural deterioration in corporate profitability from 2011 onward has followed structural improvements from the late 1990s to 2010. Beyond cyclical upswings, China's corporate profitability will likely continue to face structural headwinds. Declining efficiency of investments, rising labor compensation and slowing productivity growth will constitute formidable headwinds to the long run profitability of China’s industrial sector. Furthermore, potential deleveraging by local governments, companies and households will curtail revenue growth for enterprises and, hence, weigh on profitability. Investigating The Financial Performance Of Industrial Enterprises Our analysis of corporates’ financial ratios shows the following: Corporate leverage: The total liabilities (debt)-to-sales ratio rose sharply from 2011 until 2021. However, the leverage ratio has declined in the past 18 months. A close examination suggests that the descent in the debt-to-sales ratio has been due to surging revenues of resource producing companies propelled by rising commodity prices. Chart 4 illustrates that the debt-to-sales ratio has dropped substantially for commodity producers, but much less so for other industrial companies. In the case of non-commodity industrial enterprises, the leverage ratio has not declined much because nominal sales have been lackluster. As resource prices continue to drop, revenues of commodity companies will be devastated, and their debt-to-sales ratios will spike. The thesis that corporate leverage has not yet dropped in China is corroborated by data on all companies. The country’s corporate leverage remains the highest worldwide (Chart 5). Chart 4The Decline In Debt-To-Sales Ratio For Commodity Producers Was Largely Due to Surging Commodity Prices Chart 5China's Corporate Leverage Remains The Highest In the World Chart 6Corporates' Debt servicing Ability Has Been propelled by falling interest rates Debt servicing: Even though debt levels of industrial companies remain elevated, their interest coverage ratios – operating profits-to-interest expense – have improved since late 2020. For all industries, interest expenses have dropped substantially because of falling interest rates (Chart 6). On the margin, this has also helped industrials’ profit margins.   Efficiency: Asset turnover (sales/assets), inventory turnover (sales/inventory) and receivables turnover (sales/receivables), have all have sunk in the past 10 years, as shown in Chart 2. Lower turnover indicates falling efficiency. Coal, steel and non-ferrous metals have been the only sectors experiencing an improvement in inventory turnover due to China’s capacity reduction campaign. Meanwhile, there has been no improvement in inventory turnover for non-commodity enterprises.   Profit margins: Net profit margins for industrial corporates have recently risen slightly. However, the entire improvement in industrial profit margins is attributable to commodity producers. With the exception of commodity producing sectors, there has not been any upturn in operating profit margins and/or net profit margins (Chart 7). Rising corporate income taxes from 2011 to 2020 were one of the reasons worsening profitability (Chart 8). Chart 7Improvement In Industrial Profit Margins Is Attributable To Commodity Producers Chart 8Rising Corporate Income Taxes Have Contributed The Divergency Between GPM And Net Profit Margin Profitability: The return on assets (RoA) and the return on equity (RoE) for industrial corporates have dwindled during the past decade (Chart 1 above). The spike in commodity prices in the past two years has helped profitability of commodity producers, but this is about to reverse. A DuPont analysis1 illustrates that the downturn in corporate profitability was driven by poor operating efficiency and a lack of improvement in net profit margins. Chart 9 shows that the profitability of non-commodity producers has worsened dramatically during the past 10 years. After more than a decade-long structural downturn, the RoA and RoE for commodity producers have recently strengthened along with asset turnovers and net profit margins (Chart 10). However, the commodity bonanza is over for now and profitability measures of resource companies are set to worsen significantly.2 Chart 9A DuPont Analysis: Non-Commodity Enterprises Chart 10A DuPont Analysis: Commodity Enterprises Bottom Line: The past decade has seen a deterioration in the financial performance metrics of industrial companies. The profitability of corporates has undergone a structural decline along with a prolonged slump in operating efficiency.  High commodity prices in the past 18 months have ameliorated profitability and efficiency parameters for commodity producers. Nevertheless, these improvements will vanish as commodity prices fall materially in the coming months. Structural Headwinds To Corporate Profitability The following factors will weigh on China’s corporate profitability in the long term: 1. Demographics and rising labor costs: A shrinking workforce since mid-2010s has led to higher wages that have weighed on the corporate sector’s profitability (Chart 11). This dynamic is also confirmed by rising labor compensation as a share of non-financial corporates’ value added, as illustrated in Chart 12. Chart 11China: Shrinking Labor Force Chart 12Labor Compensation As A Share Of Corporate Revenues In China, blue-collar labor shortages and upward pressures on wages will likely intensify in the coming decade. A rapid decline in the population’s natural growth rate with the third lowest fertility rate in the world (below Japan) foreshadows a decline in China’s working age population which started in 2015.  2. Common prosperity policies: The share of labor compensation in GDP has risen since 2011 at the expense of the share of corporate profits (Chart 13). China’s common prosperity policies will only reinforce this trend. These policies will encourage enterprises to assume more social duties, distributing a larger share of profits to society at the expense of shareholders. Chart 13Labor's Share Will Continue Rising In China's National Income Chart 14Output Per Unit Of Capex Is Falling 3. Declining efficiency of investments: A deteriorating output-to-capital ratio  indicates capital misallocation or falling efficiency (Chart 14). When a nation attempts to invest substantially for a long time, capital will likely be misallocated and the return on new investment will be low. This will drag down the overall return on capital. Falling efficiency ultimately entails lower productivity. 4. Slowing productivity growth: China’s productivity growth has downshifted, and total factor productivity growth slipped again recently. Notably, total factor productivity – a measure of productivity calculated by dividing economy-wide total production by the weighted average of inputs – has contributed less and less to China’s real GDP growth in the past decade. It is unrealistic to expect that China will reverse the downward trend in productivity growth in the next few years. 5. Deleveraging by companies and households: China’s corporate sector continues to face deleveraging pressures. Although some industrial enterprises underwent deleveraging in recent years, the country’s overall corporate debt is still very elevated. Remarkably, Chinese corporate debt as a share of nominal GDP is the highest in the world, as shown in Chart 5. China’s households are reducing debt. Depressed household income growth and deflating home prices have curbed borrowing. Deleveraging by households heralds weaker consumption, which is negative for corporates revenues. Bottom Line: Rising labor compensation and declining efficiency of investments constitute formidable headwinds to the profitability of China’s industrial sector. Moreover, the secular outlook of corporates’ profitability is also vulnerable to lower productivity growth and weaker top-line growth due deleveraging among companies and households. The Cyclical Outlook In our report two weeks ago, we discussed how China’s business cycle recovery in the second half of this year will be more U rather than V shaped. Both sluggish domestic demand and contracting external demand for Chinese exports will curb the rebound of the industrial sector in 2H. Industrial earnings are set to disappoint.  Chart 15Non-Commodity Enterprises: No Profit Expansion For 12 Years Manufacturing producers have not been able to fully pass on higher input prices to consumers given weak demand. This weakness together with elevated commodity prices has led to a substantial profit divergence between upstream and mid- and downstream industries since late 2020 (Chart 15).  However, upstream commodity producers face the headwind of commodity price deflation. At the margin, weakening resource prices will benefit mid- and downstream industries that use commodities. However, their revenue growth will remain fragile due to subdued domestic and external demand and a lack of pricing power. The tight correlation between industrial profits and raw material prices reinforces the importance of commodity prices as a driver of China’s industrial profit cycles Therefore, if commodity prices drop meaningfully in the second half of this year, then overall industrial profits in China will suffer markedly. Chart 16The share of loss-making industrial enterprise ventures has Rocketed Furthermore, overcapacity and operational inefficiencies persist despite supply-side reforms and a capacity reduction campaign implemented by China’s authorities. Chart 16 demonstrates that the share of loss-making industrial enterprise ventures has soared to 24%, implying capital misallocation.  With a further rising share of enterprises making losses as commodity prices plunge, the ability of companies to service debt will deteriorate and hence banks will experience climbing non-performing loans. Bottom Line: China’s recovery in the second half of this year will be more U than V shaped. Corporate earnings are set to disappoint in 2H. Investment Strategy The gloomy outlook for corporate profitability does not bode well for the performance of Chinese stocks. Chinese A-shares are struggling to bottom on the back of shaky economic fundamentals, while investable stocks are cheap for a reason. We maintain a neutral stance on Chinese onshore stocks and an underweight stance on investable stocks in a global equity portfolio. Lower profitability and return on equity have ramifications for the valuations of China’s industrial companies. Remarkably, China’s industrial profits have been flat in the past 12 years (Chart 15 above). That is a reason why many Chinese stocks have been de-rated. Among A-share industrial companies, sectors with higher profitability are coal, non-ferrous metals, auto, construction materials and food & beverage. However, coal, non-ferrous metals and construction materials are pro-cyclical sectors, and their profit growth is positively correlated with economic growth, which is facing downward pressure at least through the end of this year. In addition, resources and commodity plays are vulnerable in the next 6 to 12 months. We recommend to underweight these sectors.  Within the Chinese equity universe, we recommend overweighting autos, food & beverage, and utilities sectors. Food & beverage and utilities are interest rate-sensitive sectors, which will continue to benefit from lower onshore bond yields. In addition, utilities sector’s profit margin and earnings will improve as coal prices decline. The auto sector will gain an advantage from China’s stimulus for auto purchases, especially for new energy vehicles.   Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 The DuPont analysis breaks down return on equity in three distinct elements: net profit margin, operational efficiency, and leverage. This analysis enables to identify how various drivers impact return on equity. 2Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Global Copper Market: No Bottom Yet," dated July 27, 2022, and Emerging Markets Strategy Report "A Cocktail Of Falling Oil Prices And Surging US Wages," dated July 21, 2022, available at bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations

Dear Client, On Monday August 8, I will be sending you an abbreviated version of our monthly Chart Pack. Our regular publication will resume on August 15. Kind regards, Irene Tunkel Executive Summary The US Is Vulnerable: Only 10% Of Chips Are Manufactured At Home In the following report we continue answering questions from our “Bear Market 2.0” webcast, by reviewing recent US legislative actions, and their effects on semiconductor and energy stocks. Semiconductors Bill: Over the long term, the recently passed CHIPS+ bill will have a moderately positive effect on the supply of chips and will benefit a select group of companies with chip manufacturing capabilities. Semiconductors Overview: Semis are "growthy" and have surged on the back of falling yields. They are also highly cyclical, and slowing growth will become a headwind to performance. Demand for chips is fading, especially in the consumer electronics space, with sales slowing and inventories building up. We prefer more stable growth areas of the Technology sector and are overweight Software and Services as opposed to semis stocks. The bill is not enough to "move the needle". What To Do With Energy? The stars are aligning for the price of energy to turn down decisively – not only is demand for energy flagging on the back of slowing economic growth, but also the Inflation Act will likely further boost energy production. As a result, we downgrade the Exploration & Production segment, maintain our overweight in the Equipment & Services, and boost Storage & Transportation from underweight to neutral on the back of the upcoming new pipeline construction. Bottom Line: We remain underweight semis as the one-off boost from the CHIPS+ bill does not counterbalance demand headwinds. When it comes to Energy, the capex upswing will lower the price of oil which warrants an underweight stance in Exploration & Production names. Feature This week investors experienced a deluge of news and data, spanning the Fed rate decision, the Q2-2022 GDP estimate, and earnings reports from some of the largest US corporations, such as Apple, Amazon, and Facebook. To top it off, we had major developments on the legislation front after a multi-month hiatus. Two major bills, the Chips and Science Act of 2022 (aka CHIPS+) and the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (an incarnation of Build Back Better), are close to passage, after months and months of dithering. In this report, we will discuss the potential effects of these pieces of legislation on the two equity sectors most affected, Semiconductors and Energy. Since these sectors are also at the epicenter of recent market action, we hope that this report is timely and will help you make the right investment decisions. Sneak Preview: We maintain our underweight on Semiconductors, and downgrade Energy Exploration and Production to an underweight on the back of falling energy prices. Semiconductors: Is It Time To Close The Underweight? When it comes to semis stocks, the current bear market caused a deeper peak-to-trough correction (40%) than at the bottom of the pandemic, implying that, perhaps, much of the bad news was priced in. We have been underweight semis since early January and are up 14% relative to the S&P 500. With the industry bouncing 20% off its June lows, we question whether we have overstayed our welcome and it is time to close this underweight, especially in light of the imminent passage of the CHIPS+ bill. Let’s start by discussing the bill: Designed In The US, Made In Asia In a November 2021 “Semiconductors: Aren’t They Fab?!” Special Report, we highlighted that semiconductor production is divided among chip designers and manufacturers, a so-called “fabless model,” which has grown in prominence as the pace of innovation made it increasingly difficult for firms to manage both the capital intensity of manufacturing and the high levels of R&D spending for design. The entire semiconductor industry depends on cooperation between two regions: North America, which houses global leaders in designing the most sophisticated chips, and Asia, which is home to companies that have the technology to manufacture them (Charts 1 & 2). As a result, the US share of chip manufacturing has been falling steadily for the past 30 years, from 37% to 10% (Chart 3). Recent, supply chain disruptions and heightening geopolitical tensions have underscored this country’s vulnerability due to outsourcing of chip manufacturing, which led to renewed calls for chip independence and onshoring. Chart 1Chips Are Designed In The US... Chart 2...And Manufactured In Asia Objective Of The CHIPS+ Bill Congress has passed the CHIPS+ bill to alleviate the chip shortage and shore up US competitiveness with China. Money is earmarked for domestic semiconductor production and research, and factory construction. The bill will provide financial incentives for both US and non-US chip makers to open manufacturing plants in the US while restricting semiconductor companies’ activities “in specific countries that present a national security threat to the United States.” The provision ensures that China, which has also been recently striving for chip independence, will not be a beneficiary of US government funds. The bill also comes with strings attached: It states that it will not allow companies to use any of the funds to buy back stocks or issue dividends. Chart 3The US Is Vulnerable: Only 10% Of Chips Are Manufactured At Home Cost Of The Bill Preliminary analysis from the Congressional Budget Office assesses that the bill will trigger roughly $79 billion in new spending over the coming decade. The key provision in the bill is the $52.7 billion for chip makers. Of those funds, $39 billion is earmarked to “build, expand, or modernize domestic facilities” for chip-making, while $11 billion is set aside for research and development. Funds will be spread over five years. The bill also adds $24 billion in tax incentives and other provisions for semiconductor manufacturing. In addition, $2 billion is allocated to translate laboratory advances into military and other applications. While $79 billion sounds like a lot of money, we need to keep things in perspective. As Barron’s pointed out: “According to IC Insights, total semiconductor industry capital spending is estimated to grow 24% this year, to $190 billion. Assuming some growth over the next several years, the bill would be a modest single digit percentage of the aggregate spending over the five-year time period.” Therefore, the financial benefits the bill provides are modest. Key Beneficiaries US chip makers with fab facilities, such as Intel (INTC), Micron Technology (MU), and Texas Instruments (TXN) will be the key beneficiaries of the bill as they are offered financial incentives for opening new plants. Foreign companies, such as TSMC, Samsung, and Global Foundries, might also qualify for financial incentives to open chip production facilities in the US. In fact, Intel, TSMC, and Global Foundries have already announced plans to build plants in the US contingent on the bill’s passing. Fabless chip designers, such as Nvidia (NVDA), AMD, and Qualcomm are unlikely to benefit from the package in a major way. Over the long term, the bill will have a moderately positive effect on the supply of chips and will benefit a select group of companies with chip manufacturing capabilities. Demand For Chips Is Fading While the bill will have some positive effect on chip manufacturing, there is a lurking danger that production is being ramped up globally just at a time when, after prolonged shortages, demand for chips is starting to fade. Historically, this highly cyclical industry has gone through boom and boost cycles every three to four years. During the Q2 earnings call, TSMC Chief Executive Mr. Wei said that the broader industry is dealing with an “inventory correction” that has led customers to cut orders from some of its peers. After two years of pandemic-driven demand, “our expectation is for the excess inventory in the semiconductor supply chain to take a few quarters to rebalance to a healthier level.” This is not surprising. Semiconductors are highly economically sensitive with sales declining in lockstep with slowing global growth (Chart 4), while inventory levels are picking up (Chart 5). Chart 4Sales Are Declining In Lockstep With Slowing Global Growth Chart 5Chip Inventory Levels Are Picking Up Demand for two of the industry’s key markets, computers and mobile phones, which account for 50% of the overall chip demand, seems to be deteriorating rapidly amid the slowing global economy. Demand for consumer electronics is fading after a pandemic surge of buying, when consumers pulled forward their spending on phones and computers. Most of these items don’t need to be upgraded or replaced for years. COVID-related lockdowns in China, meanwhile, have also weighed on consumer demand. According to IDC, worldwide shipments of personal computers fell 15% in the June quarter from a year earlier, due to “macroeconomic headwinds.” IDC has also lowered its forecast for 2022 expecting computer shipments to retreat by 8.2%. Canalys said global shipments for mobile phones fell 9% year over year, following economic headwinds, sluggish demand, and inventory pile-up. Memory chips represent 28% of the industry, and DRAM accounts represent three-fifths of memory sales. DRAM prices are falling (Chart 6). According to TrendForce, the average contract price for a DRAM, used widely in consumer items ranging from cars to phones to fridges, fell by 10.6% during the second quarter, compared to a year ago, the first such decline in two years. DRAM prices are expected to slide by 21% in Q3-2022. Companies are telling us similar stories: Micron, the No. 3 player in memory, recently issued revenue guidance well below analysts’ estimates. Chief Executive Sanjay Mehrotra warned that “the industry demand environment has weakened,” with PC and smartphone sales declining. Lisa Su, Chief Executive of AMD, expects computer demand to be roughly flat. Nvidia is bracing for a slowdown in the crypto space and game consoles. Intel has reported disappointing results: PC customers are reducing inventory levels at a rate not seen in a decade, Chief Executive Pat Gelsinger said in a call with analysts. PC makers typically reduce inventory levels of chips when they are expecting lower sales. Chart 6DRAM Prices Are Falling Of course, there is significant variability in demand for chips across sectors: While demand for phones and computers is fading, there is still pent-up demand for auto chips, and servers (Chart 7). According to Ms. Su, demand remains hot for chips used in high-performance computers and servers. TSMC, which has Apple and Nvidia among its clients, seconds this notion: Quarterly revenue for high-performance computers, increased 13% from the previous quarter and was greater than the revenue from smartphones, which rose 3%. There are also significant shortages of less-advanced auto chips (Chart 8). In a recent Q2 earnings call, GM reported that it carries 95,000 unfinished cars in its inventory due to the auto chip shortage. According to Mr. Wei of TSMC, the company will continue investing in auto chips, a product that historically it didn’t emphasize as much as its cutting-edge chips, in response to strong demand. Texas Instruments, which reported stellar results, also said that while it saw strength in the auto and industrial segments, demand from the consumer electronics market remained weak in both the second quarter and the current quarter. Chart 7Demand For Servers Is Still Strong Chart 8More Chips Will Boost Auto Sales Demand for chips is fading, especially in the consumer electronics space, with sales slowing and inventories building up. Pricing power is also fading. However, there are still areas immune to the downturn, such as chips for servers, high-performance computers, and less advanced auto chips. Valuations and Fundamentals Earnings growth expectations have also come down significantly off their peak, and are currently at 5% for the next 12 months, which indicates negative real growth (Chart 9). Chart 9Earnings Growth Is Slowing Chart 10Valuations Are Above Pre-Pandemic Trough Semi valuations have pulled back from a 33x trailing multiple to 17x over the course of six months, only to bounce back another 3x since June 16, currently trading at 20x multiple. While valuations certainly moderated, they are still above the pre-pandemic trough in 2019 when the global economy was also slowing. The BCA Valuation Indicator, an amalgamation of various valuation metrics, indicates that semiconductors trade at fair value (Chart 10 & Chart 11). The rebound rally was fast and furious; at nearly 20% off market lows, it feels like much of the recovery from severely oversold conditions has run its course. Chart 11Chips Are Moderately Priced, While Investor Position Is Light Semis Investment Implications Semiconductors are somewhat unique in that they are both cyclical and “growthy” (Chart 12). Since semis are “growthy,” the past six-week rebound may be attributed to falling rates, which have led to multiple expansion of most growth sectors. However, we need to keep in mind that rates have stabilized because of signs of global slowdown, and that the cyclical nature of semis will get in the way of further outperformance. While we also believe that the CHIPS+ bill is a modest tailwind, it is hard to commit to an industry in the early innings of contraction. For investors who would like to top up their allocations to semis, we recommend companies most exposed to demand from industrial sectors (autos, servers, high performance computers), and staying away from companies most exposed to consumer electronics. Much of the performance of companies that have reported so far hinged on their product mix. Chart 12Semis Are Both "Growthy" And Cyclical Bottom Line We are reluctant to add to semis after the sector gained nearly 20% in just six weeks. Economic challenges remain – demand for chips is slowing, and the process of clearing inventory build-up may take several quarters. CHIPS+ is a positive but, in our opinion, is not enough to move the needle. We prefer more stable growth areas of the Technology sector and are overweight Software and Services. We also prefer semis most exposed to demand from non-consumer sectors. What To Do With Energy? We are currently equal-weight Energy. More specifically, we are overweight Energy Equipment and Services, equal weight Explorations and Production (we closed an overweight in March, booking a profit of 50%), and underweight Energy Transportation industry groups. With Brent down 18% and GSCI down 15%, and economic growth slowing, it is essential to review what is in store for the sector. Further, the Inflation Reduction Act, which is now on President Biden desk expecting his signature, has quite a few provisions relevant to the sector. Inflation Reduction Act And Its Effects On The Fossil Fuels Industry This bill is a true marvel of political negotiation and gives all parties something to be happy about and something to complain about. While the bill earmarks $370 billion for clean energy spending at the insistence of Senator Manchin (D, WV), the legislative package provides support for traditional sources of energy like oil, gas, and coal. Broadly speaking, the bill is a positive for expanding domestic energy production and supporting its nascent Capex cycle, which we called for in the “Energy: After Seven Lean Years” Special Report. Development of new wells has already picked up over the past few months (Chart 13). Chart 13New Energy CAPEX Cycle Here are a few important rules stipulated by the bill, highlighted by the Wall Street Journal: Expanding offshore wind and solar power development on federal land will now require the federal government to offer more access for drilling on federal territory. Under the bill, the Interior Department would be required to offer up at least two million acres of federal land and 60 million acres of offshore acreage to oil and gas producers every year for the next decade. It would be the first-ever required minimum acreage for offshore oil and gas leasing and would significantly increase the acreage requirements for onshore leasing. The bill would also effectively reinstate an 80-million-acre sale of the Gulf of Mexico to the oil drillers last year that a federal judge had invalidated. The bill is also a major positive for the natural gas industry, providing an accelerated timeline for building the pipelines and terminals needed to increase production and export of fossil fuels. In exchange for access to more federal territory, oil and gas companies would also have to pay higher royalty rates for drilling there. It would also require them to pay royalties on methane they burn off or let intentionally escape from their operations on federal lands. The bill aims to increase the supply of oil, gas, and coal, and return the US towards energy independence. Over the medium term, it should lead to a normalization of the price of energy. Demand Vs. Supply Naturally, the price of oil is all about supply and demand. And the performance of the energy sector is inextricably linked to the price of oil (Chart 14). Supply: According to our EM Strategist, Arthur Budaghyan, “fears that sanctions on Russia will considerably reduce global oil supply have not yet materialized.” According to International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates, Russia’s shipments of crude and oil products have declined by only about 5% since January (Chart 15). Clearly, despite the sanctions and logistical challenges that Western governments have enforced on Russia, the country’s oil exports have not collapsed. Chart 14Price Of Oil Is Important For The Energy Sector's Profitability Chart 15Russia's Supply Of Oil Has Decreased By Only 5% Demand: Meanwhile, global commodities and energy demand is downshifting in response to both high fuel prices and weakening global growth. US consumption of gasoline and other motor fuel has marginally contracted (Chart 16, top panel). In China, rolling lockdowns and weak income growth will continue to suppress the nation’s crude oil imports, which have already been depressed over the past 12 months (Chart 16, bottom panel). In the rest of EM (excluding China), a strong dollar and high oil prices are leading to demand destruction. Chart 16US And Chinese Oil Consumption Is Weak Prices Are To Trend Down: Hence, the supply of energy and commodities is stable, but demand is flagging, which does not bode well for the prices of energy and materials. Odds are that oil prices will decline further and recouple with industrial and precious metal prices. In addition, as the market anticipates a turn in inflation, there is a pronounced rotation away from Energy and Materials towards Technology and other growth pockets of the market (Charts 17 & 18). With a supply of energy staying steady or even expanding, while demand is slowing on the back of the global slowdown, we expect the price of energy to trend down. Chart 17Energy And Materials Were Biggest Winners In the "Inflation High And Rising" Regime... Chart 18...But They Gave Back Their Gains In "Inflation High But Falling" Regime Energy Investment Implications It appears that the stars are aligning for the price of energy to turn down decisively – not only is demand for energy flagging on the back of slowing economic growth, but also the Inflation Act will likely further boost energy production. As production is expanded and prices fall, the profitability of the Oil Exploration and Production industry (upstream) will decline. In addition, inflation is about to turn, and a change in market leadership has already ensued. We downgrade Exploration and Production to an underweight. In the meantime, the Equipment and Services industry will benefit from contracts to develop new wells and will thrive. We maintain an overweight. We are currently underweight the Energy Storage and Transportation industry (mid-stream) as historically, this industry was marred in multiple regulations and most expansion projects faced obstacles, especially if running through public land. However, under the provisions of the Inflation Act, midstream will benefit from rising production volumes and expedited construction the pipelines and terminals needed to increase production and exports of fossil fuels. We upgrade Storage and Transportation to an equal weight. Bottom Line The Inflation Reduction Act will create conditions favorable for expanding the production of fossil fuels and will support US energy independence. As supply grows while demand is slowing, the price of energy is likely to turn – while a boon for US consumers, this is a headwind to the performance of the Energy sector.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com   Recommended Allocation

Executive Summary   EU Will Prioritize Natgas Storage Russia’s reduction in natural gas flows through the Nord Stream 1 (NS1) pipeline to 20% of capacity will test the EU’s ability to keep the lights on going into winter. The EU’s plan to voluntarily reduce natgas consumption by 15% has a higher likelihood of becoming mandatory, following Russia’s cut in NS1 flows. Coal-fired generation in the EU will come online sooner on the back of the NS1 cutoff.  This will allow more natgas supplies to be directed to storage injection ahead of winter.  Global natgas supplies will remain tight until 2025, as liquified natural gas (LNG) export capacity is developed ex-EU. Bottom Line: EU energy security will be paramount going into the winter, particularly if Russia keeps gas flows through NS1 at or below 20% of capacity going into winter.  Russia most likely is seeking a significant reduction or the complete elimination of EU oil sanctions, which were imposed after it invaded Ukraine.  If fully enacted, the EU’s embargo will remove more than 3mm b/d of Russian oil exports to the continent by 1Q23.  The EU’s coal reserves and its 15% cut in demand could allow the bloc to get through the winter without a massive recession.  If, as we believe, these measures are successful, a strong rally in European equities and bonds could ensue. Feature Following Russia’s halving of NS1 gas flows to 20% of capacity yesterday – taking shipments to ~ 33mm cm/d – the EU will be forced to increase its reliance on coal-fired electricity generation sooner than expected, to ensure as much natgas as possible is directed to filling storage ahead of the coming winter. And it will have to count on high levels of cooperation in reducing natgas demand between August and March by 15%.1 There is nothing that more dramatically illustrates the bind the EU finds itself in than rolling over its ESG agenda to ensure it has sufficient gas supplies to heat homes, hospitals and other critical services over the course of the coming winter. Russia’s cutoff of NS1 supplies is being done to focus EU member states on their precarious energy position just as they are scrambling to fill natgas storage. The sense of urgency in this effort is heightened by relatively high odds (67%) of another La Niña event, which usually is accompanied by colder-than-normal winter temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere.2 Russia appears to be seeking a significant reduction or the complete elimination of EU oil import sanctions, which were imposed after it invaded Ukraine. If fully enacted as approved, this will embargo more than 3mm b/d of Russian oil exports to the continent by 1Q23. The EU was Russia’s largest oil customer prior to the sanctions being approved.3 Russia Deploys Its Gas Weapon The EU is aiming to have 80% of its gas storage capacity filled by November, to ensure it has sufficient supplies for the coming winter (Chart 1).4 Achieving this target will prove difficult and uncertain, since it hinges on 1) gas flows from Russia not dropping precariously low or completely cutting off; 2) higher non-Russian flows; and 3) reduced gas consumption, which, as we noted above, likely will become mandatory. We ran different simulations altering these variables to see how inventories could move for the rest of 2022 and into the winter (Chart 2). Chart 1EU Will Prioritize Natgas Storage Chart 2The EU Could Face A Cold Winter   In the simulations, if a variable changes more than we expect – e.g. Russian supplies drop by more than projected – one or both of the other variables will need to adjust to ensure the EU can sufficiently fill gas storage. This adjustment is not guaranteed, since all three variables will likely not move in accordance with policymakers’ expectations, especially gas flows from Russia as it seeks to imperil the bloc’s energy security. On the supply side, Russian flows can drop with little or no warning, while non-Russian supplies will need to remain ~ 30-35% higher relative to 2021, for the rest of the year to get natgas inventories to or slightly above 80%. On the demand side, the EU deal to cut gas consumption by 15% over the course of August-March was accepted with caveats for some member states. The debate and member states’ dissatisfaction over the initial agreement signals states may not implement this policy until they must, which could be too little too late. Of course, a complete cutoff of natural gas flows on the NS1 pipeline would result in inventories being pulled much harder and earlier, and likely would induce further rationing measures. This would produce a sharper economic contraction, since coal-fired generation and other energy usage likely would have maxed out prior to the sharp fall-off in natgas storage. Higher Coal Usage Buys EU Time Global natural gas markets are expected to remain tight into 2025, given the 5-year lead times required to develop LNG capacity export capacity.5 This is forcing EU member states – particularly Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands – to place an additional 14 GW of coal-fired generation capacity into its reserve fleet in the event of a complete cutoff of Russian supplies.6 Fossil fuels accounted for 34% of EU generation in 2021, or 1,069 TWh. The largest share of this generation was accounted for by coal (Chart 3). Fossil fuels and renewables provide the largest shares of electricity generation overall in the EU (Chart 4). Chart 3Coal Folded Back Into EU Power Stack The EU would like to see its natgas inventories 80% full by November. This translates to ~ 3.2 TCF of natgas in storage, which would put inventories at the higher end of the 5-year range for November. That’s a big assumption, but it does indicate why the combination of higher coal usage and – critically – the 15% cut in demand (vs. five-year average demand) in our simulations is so important. Together, these measures mean the EU will save almost 1.3 TCF of storage gas from August – March. This assumes, of course, that EU member states pull their weight on the conservation front in this economic war with Russia. If everything goes according to plan for the EU (scenario 2 in the Chart 2), then March 2023 inventories will be at the level of 2.5 Tcf. Compared to last year, that means inventories will be 1.3 Tcf higher. Of course that’s impossible to forecast, but there are realistic outcomes close to this outcome. Chart 4Fossil Fuels, Renewables Provide Most Of EU’s Power Investment Implications The EU and Russia are at a critical juncture as winter approaches. Our analysis indicates the EU can – using its coal reserves and getting full buy-in on the 15% conservation measures adopted this week – weather this storm without experiencing a massive recession. Markets will be watching this evolution carefully. By late January or early February, it will be apparent how well the EU managed this challenge. If, as we believe, these measures are successful, we could expect a strong rally in European equities and bonds.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com       Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The US became the largest exporter of LNG in 1H22 with outbound shipments averaging 11.2 Bcf/d, according to the EIA (Chart 5). US liquefaction peak capacity is estimated at 13.9 Bcf/d, with average capacity at 11.4 Bcf/d. The EU and UK are receiving most of the US LNG, which averaged 7.3 Bcf/d, or 64% of total exports over the January-May 2022 interval. Over 1H22, US exports accounted for close to half of the 15 Bcf/d imported by the EU and UK, making it the largest single exporter to Europe. Export volumes were dented in June with the loss of volumes from the Freeport LNG facility in Texas; this is expected to be restored by year-end. We are expecting exports to Europe to remain strong in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, especially as demand from Europe to replace Russian supplies stays strong. Base Metals: Bullish Chinese property stocks rallied on news that the government created a $44.4 billion fund to help alleviate the state’s property sector woes. Housing accounts for ~ 30% of copper consumption in China, and the fund should provide positive price action for the red metal in the face of slowing global growth this year and next. We remain bullish copper on the back of supply disruptions in Peru; increasing concern higher taxes in Chile will no longer support returns to miners that are sufficient to encourage capex, and extremely low global copper inventories, which have remained more than 25% below year-ago levels for more than a year (Chart 6). We will be updating our copper view next week. Ags/Softs: Neutral Russia and Ukraine signed a deal brokered by Turkey and the United Nations aimed at allowing some 22mm tons of grain exports from Ukraine, and some Russian grain and fertilizers to transit the Black Sea to end-use markets. These grain supplies are critically important to Middle East and North African markets. However, it could take weeks for Ukrainian ports to be cleared of mines and other obstacles – and, importantly, for a true cessation in Russian attacks on Black Sea port facilities – to resume operations.7 Chart 5 Chart 6     Footnotes 1     Please see EU allows get-out clause in Russian gas cut deal - BBC News, published by bbc.co.uk on July 27, 2022. 2     Please see the US Climate Prediction Center's most recent forecast, posted on July 14, 2022. 3    lease see Higher Gasoline, Diesel Prices Ahead, for discussion of the embargo on Russian crude and product imports to the EU.  Our assessment was published on June 2, 2022, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4    As of July 25, EU natgas inventories were ~ 67% full at 2.5 TCF. 5    The IEA estimates growth in global LNG supply will slow over its five-year 2021-25 forecast horizon, due to low capex, and COVID-19-induced delays.  Please see the IEA’s Gas Market Report, Q3-2022. 6    Please see Coal is not making a comeback: Europe plans limited increase, published by the European think tank Ember on July 13, 2022. 7     Please see Ukraine, Russia Sign Black Sea Grain Export Deal published by University Of Illinois, July 22, 2022.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed In 2022

Executive Summary If a loss of wealth persists for a year or more, it hurts the economy. The recent $40 trillion slump in global financial wealth is larger than that suffered in the pandemic of 2020, the global financial crisis of 2008, and the dot com bust of 2000-01. Partly countering this slump in global financial wealth is a $20 trillion uplift in global real estate wealth. However, Chinese home prices are already stagnating. And the recent disappearance of US and European homebuyers combined with a flood of home-sellers warns that US and European home prices will cool over the next 6 months. With the loss of wealth likely to persist, it will amplify a global growth slowdown already in train, aided and abetted by central banks that are willing to enter recession to slay inflation. The optimal asset allocation over the next 6-12 months is: overweight bonds, neutral stocks, and underweight commodities. A variation on this theme is: overweight conventional bonds and stocks versus inflation-protected bonds and commodities. Fractal trading watchlist: US telecoms versus utilities, and copper. We Have Just Suffered The Worst Loss Of Financial Wealth In A Generation Bottom Line: On a 6-12 month horizon, overweight bonds, neutral stocks, and underweight commodities. Feature Since the end of last year, the world has lost $40 trillion of financial wealth, evenly split between the crashes in stocks and bonds (Chart I-1). The slump in financial wealth, both in absolute and proportionate terms, is the worst suffered in a generation, larger than that in the pandemic of 2020, the global financial crisis of 2008, and the dot com bust of 2000-01.1 Chart I-1Global Stocks And Global Bonds Have Both Slumped By $20 Trillion Partly countering this $40 trillion slump in global financial wealth is a $20 trillion uplift in global real estate wealth. But in total, the world is still $20 trillion ‘asset poorer’ than at the end of last year. Given that global GDP is around $100 trillion, we can say that we are asset poorer, on average, by about one fifth of our annual income. Does this loss of wealth matter? A Loss Of Wealth Matters If It Persists For A Year Or More Some argue that we shouldn’t worry about the recent slump in our wealth, because we are still wealthier than we were, say, at the start of the pandemic (Chart I-2). Yet this is a facile argument. Whatever loss of wealth we suffer, there is always some point in the past against which we are richer! Chart I-2We Have Just Suffered The Worst Loss Of Financial Wealth In A Generation Another argument is that people do not care about a short-lived dip in their wealth. This argument has more truth to it. For example, in the extreme event of a flash crash, an asset price can drop to zero and then bounce back in the blink of an eyelid. In this case, most people would be oblivious, or unconcerned, by this momentary collapse in their wealth. But people do care if the slump in their wealth becomes more prolonged. How long is prolonged? The answer is, if the slump persists for a year or more. Why a year? Because that is the timeframe over which governments, firms, and households make their income and spending plans. Governments and firms do this formally in their annual budgets that set tax rates, wages, bonuses, and investment spending. Households do it informally, because their wages, bonuses, and taxes – and therefore disposable incomes – also adjust on an annual basis. Into this yearly spending plan will also come any change in wealth experienced over the previous year. For example, firms often do this formally by converting an asset write-down to a deduction from profits, which will then impact the firm’s future spending. This illustrates that what impacts your spending is not the level of your wealth, but the yearly change in your wealth. Spending Is Impacted By The Change In Wealth The intellectual battle here is between Economics and Psychology. The economics textbooks insist that it is the level of your wealth that impacts your spending, whereas the psychology and behavioural finance textbooks insist that it is the change in your wealth that impacts your spending. (Chart I-3and Chart I-4). In my view, the psychologists and behavioural finance guys have nailed this better than the economists, through a theory known as Mental Accounting Bias. Chart I-3The Change And Impulse Of Stock Market Wealth Are Both Negative Chart I-4The Change And Impulse Of Bond Market Wealth Are Both Negative Nobel Laureate psychologist Daniel Kahneman points out that we categorise our money into different accounts, which are sometimes physical, sometimes only mental – and that there is a clear hierarchy in our willingness to spend these ‘mental accounts’. Put simply, we are willing to spend our income mental account, but we are much less willing to spend our wealth mental account. Still, wealth can generate income through interest payments and dividends, which we are willing to spend. Clearly, the level of income generated will correlate with the amount of wealth – $10 million of wealth will likely generate much more income than $1 million of wealth. So, economists get the impression that it is the level of wealth that impacts spending, but the truth is that it is the income generated by the wealth that impacts spending.    We are willing to spend our income ‘mental account’, but we are much less willing to spend our wealth ‘mental account’. What about someone like Amazon founder Jeff Bezos who has immense wealth but seemingly negligible income – Mr. Bezos receives only a token salary, and his huge holding of Amazon shares pays no dividend – how then can we explain his largesse? The answer is that Mr. Bezos’ immense wealth generates tens of billions in trading income. So again, it is his income that is driving his spending. Wealth also generates an ‘income substitute’ via capital gains. For example, you should be indifferent between a $100 bond giving you $2 of income, or a $98 zero-coupon bond maturing in one year at $100, giving you $2 of capital gain. In this case the capital gain is simply an income substitute and fully transferred into the spending mental account. Nowhere is this truer than in China, where the straight-line appreciation in house prices through several decades has allowed homeowners to regard a reliable capital gain as an income substitute (Chart I-5). Which justifies rental yields on Chinese housing that are the lowest in the world and lower even than the yield on risk-free cash. In other words, which justifies a stratospheric valuation for Chinese real estate. Usually though, we tend to transfer only a proportion of our capital gains or losses into our spending mental account. As described previously, a firm will do this formally by transferring an asset write-down into the income statement. And households will do it informally by transferring some proportion of their yearly change in wealth into their spending mental account. The important conclusion is that spending is impacted by the yearly change in wealth. Meaning that spending growth is impacted by the yearly change in the yearly change in wealth, known as the wealth (1-year) impulse, where a negative impulse implies negative growth. Cracks Appearing In The Housing Market Given the recent slump in financial wealth, the global financial wealth impulse is in deeply negative territory. Yet by far the largest part of our wealth comprises housing, meaning the value of our homes2 (Chart I-6). In China, the recent stagnation of house prices means that the housing wealth impulse has turned negative. Elsewhere in the world though, the recent boom in house prices means that the housing wealth impulse is still positive, meaning a tailwind – albeit a rapidly fading tailwind – to spending (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-6Housing Comprises By Far The Largest Part Of Our Wealth Chart I-7Chinese House Prices Have Stagnated, US House Prices Have Surged Chart I-8The Chinese Housing Wealth Impulse Is Negative, The US Housing Wealth Impulse Is Fading In China, the recent stagnation of house prices means that the housing wealth impulse has turned negative. Still, as we explained in The Global Housing Boom Is Over, As Buying Becomes More Expensive Than Renting, the disappearance of homebuyers combined with a flood of home-sellers is a tried and tested indicator that US and European home prices will cool over the next 6 months. US new home prices have already suffered a significant decline in June (Chart I-9). Some of this is because US homebuilders are building smaller and less expensive homes. Nevertheless, it seems highly likely that the non-China housing wealth impulse will also turn negative later this year. Chart I-9US New Home Prices Fell Sharply In June To be clear, the wealth impulse is just one driver of spending growth. Nevertheless, it does have the potential to amplify the growth cycle in either direction. With global growth clearly slowing, and central banks willing to enter recession to slay inflation, the rapidly fading global wealth impulse will amplify the slowdown. Therefore, the optimal asset allocation over the next 6-12 months is: Overweight bonds. Neutral stocks. Underweight commodities. A variation on this theme is: Overweight conventional bonds and stocks versus inflation-protected bonds and commodities. Fractal Trading Watchlist After a 35 percent decline since March, copper has hit a resistance point on its short-term fractal structure, from which it could experience a countertrend move. Hence, we are adding copper to our watchlist. Of note also, the underperformance of US telecoms versus utilities has reached the point of fragility on its 260-day fractal structure that has signalled previous major turning points in 2012, 2014, and 2017 (Chart I-10). Hence, the recommended trade is long US telecoms versus utilities, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 8 percent. Chart I-10US Telecoms Versus Utilities Are At A Potential Turnaround Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions Copper’s Selloff Has Hit Short-Term Resistance Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     The value of global equities has dropped by $20tn to $80tn, the value of global bonds by $20tn to around $100tn, while the value of global real estate has increased by $20tn to an estimated $370tn. 2     Strictly speaking, housing wealth should be measured net of the mortgage debt that is owed on our homes. But as the wealth impulse is a change of a change, and mortgage debt changes very slowly, it does not matter whether we calculate the impulse from gross or net housing wealth. Chart 1CNY/USD At A Potential Turning Point Chart 2Copper's Selloff Has Hit Short-Term Resistance Chart 3US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 4CAD/SEK Is Reversing Chart 5Financials Versus Industrials Has Reversed Chart 6The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Ended Chart 7The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Has Ended Chart 8FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 9Netherlands' Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Ended Chart 10The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond At Fractal Fragility Chart 11The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 12Food And Beverage Outperformance Is Exhausted Chart 13German Telecom Outperformance Has Started To Reverse Chart 14Japanese Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 15ETH Is Approaching A Possible Capitulation Chart 16The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Has Ended Chart 17The Strong Downtrend In The 3 Year T-Bond Has Ended Chart 18A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 19Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 20Norway's Outperformance Has Ended Chart 21Cotton Versus Platinum Has Reversed Chart 22Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Is Exhausted Chart 23USD/EUR Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 24The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Has Ended Chart 25A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 26GBP/USD At A Potential Turning Point Chart 27US Utilities Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 28The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted   Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-12 Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area     Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed     Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations     Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations    

Special Report

Executive Summary   Copper prices still face substantial downside (15-20% from current levels). The global copper market is shifting from a deficit to a considerable surplus over the next 12 to 18 months. Global copper supply will likely grow by 4-4.5% year on year in both 2022H2 and 2023, surpassing global copper demand growth of 2-3% during the same period. Global copper ore output will increase thanks to a slew of new projects and expansions this year and next year. Regarding copper demand in 2022H2 and 2023, China will be the main driver due to a moderate boost in traditional infrastructure investment, an acceleration in the build-up of green sources of electricity generation and surging penetration of new energy vehicles (NEV). Global Copper Supply Balance: Shifting From A Deficit To A Surplus Bottom Line: According to our projections, the global copper market will move from a deficit to a material surplus later this year and in 2023. This will continue weighing on copper and related equity prices.     Even though copper prices have plunged over 30% from their peak, we expect them to fall further (Chart 1). Chart 1Copper Prices & Copper Mining Stocks: The Decline Is Not Over The main reason is that the global copper market will swing from a deficit to a surplus over the next 12 to 18 months (Chart 2). Global copper output growth is currently accelerating and will average 4% in 2022 and 4.5% in 2023. This will outpace the 2-3% annual growth in global copper demand during the same period. Chart 2Global Copper Supply Balance: Shifting From A Deficit To A Surplus Beware Of Rising Copper Supply In 2022-23 The global copper market balance is in the process of swinging from a 283,000-ton deficit at the end of 2021 to a 464,000-ton surplus at the end of 2023, based on our calculations. In comparison, the International Copper Study Group (ICSG) expects a smaller surplus of 350,000 tons next year. There are two key estimates for our global copper supply balance calculation. Supply We expect global copper output to grow at 4% in 2022 and a slightly faster rate of 4.5% in 2023 as many new mines/expansions are coming on stream. Table 1 lists 12 major global copper mines that will add new copper ore supply in 2022. The combined copper ore output of these projects will increase the global copper ore supply by about 4.5% this year. Table 1Major Global New Copper Ore Supply In 2022 Robust copper ore production growth in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo), Zambia, Peru and China will boost the global copper ore supply in the next 12 to 18 months. Congo has been the largest contributor to global copper ore growth, accounting for over 60% of the increase in global copper ore output during the past five years. This country has already become the third largest producer of copper ore in the world. Chart 3Congo, Zambia and Peru Will Continue Boosting Their Copper Ore Supply Its Kamoa-Kalula copper mine listed in Table 1 began producing copper concentrates in May 2021 and its production will increase exponentially into 2023 (Chart 3, top panel). Zambia is another country with substantial potential for copper ore output (Chart 3, middle panel). President Hakainde Hichilema, who was elected last year, expects to increase the country’s annual copper ore production from 800,000 tons to three million tons in terms of copper content in 10 years. This will translate into new supply of 220,000 tons per year and constitutes about 1% growth in global copper ore supply this year and next year.  Peru is the world’s second largest copper ore producer. Despite the number of strikes rising in past two years, the country's copper ore output has stayed at a near historical high level (Chart 3, bottom panel).  China, which is the world’s fourth largest producer, is also set to boost its copper ore output within the next few years. The increase in supply will be driven by the construction of Tibet's Qulong copper mine, the second phase expansion of the Duobaoshan and the Jiama copper mines, and the Chifeng Fubo project. Chart 4New Mines Are Also Coming On Stream In Chile, Australia and Canada Copper ore output in other top producers such as Chile, Australia and Canada have already declined considerably in the past several years due to lower ore quality, the pandemic, drought, and protests (Chart 4). Nevertheless, new mines coming on stream will likely prevent copper ore output from falling further in these countries. For example, the Australian government expects the country’s copper mine output to increase by 15% in the 2022-2023 financial year and by another 7% in the 2023-2024 financial year. Regarding Chile, the world’s largest copper ore producer (representing 26% of the world total), we expect copper ore output to increase over the next 12 to 18 months after declining for three consecutive years. The reason for this optimism is that the Quebrada Blanca Phase 2 (QB2) project is expected to begin production in the second half of 2022. The company estimates that QB2 copper output over the first five years will average 286,000 tons per year. This is equal to 1.3% of annual global copper output. The same company is also considering a third phase for the project, which could significantly boost capacity in the longer term. That said, investments in Chilean copper mining may struggle over the long term if the proposed mining royalties increase1 gets passed in September. Table 2The World’s Top 10 Copper Producing Companies’ Capex investment In 2022 & 2023 At a company level, Table 2 shows that the capex of the world’s top 10 copper producing companies has been planned to increase by 21% in 2022 and remain at an elevated level in 2023. Such large capex seems to support the strong copper ore output growth forecasts shown in Table 1.   Demand We expect global copper consumption to grow by 2.5% in 2022 and a slightly higher rate of 3% in 2023. Table 3 shows our growth estimates for this year and next year for China, the US, the EU, and the rest of world. This year and in 2023, red metal consumption will likely rebound in China and will experience a slowdown in the rest of the world (Chart 5). We expect copper demand growth in China to recover from last year’s contraction to post 3% growth this year and then accelerate to 4% in 2023. A detailed discussion of Chinese copper demand is presented below. Copper demand growth in both the US and the EU is set to slow as their pandemic-triggered overspending on goods ex-autos has run its course (Chart 6). Given that the US lags the EU in terms of NEV sales/production and new energy development, we expect a lower growth in the US (0-2%) versus in the EU (2-4%). The ongoing energy crisis in the EU has incentivized the bloc to expedite its transition to green sources of energy. As a result, its copper demand will rise faster than copper demand in the US. Chart 5Global Copper Consumption: A Moderate Rise Across Regions Chart 6Decelerating Copper Demand Growth In The US and The EU Using these economies’ respective shares in global copper consumption in 2021, we estimate global copper consumption growth of 2.5% for 2022 and 3% for 2023 (Table 3). We are well aware that global copper demand from green sources – electric vehicles, wind turbines, solar panels and charging poles – will continue booming. Yet, their share of global copper consumption is about 4.2% according to our estimates (Table 4). It is too small to have any substantial effect on global copper demand in next 18 months. Table 3Global Copper Consumption Growth Forecast For 2022 & 2023 Table 4Global Green Demand For Copper Bottom Line: Global copper demand growth will likely fall short of copper supply in the next 18 months. Consequently, we expect the global copper market to swing from a supply deficit to a supply surplus over the next 12 to 18 months. Chinese Copper Demand Why do we expect Chinese copper demand to grow at 3% in 2022 and 4% in 2023?  Table 5 illustrates our rough estimates of the copper consumption growth from China’s main sources of red metal consumption.  Table 5Chinese Underlying Copper Consumption: Growth Estimates For 2022 & 2023 The power sector is the largest copper user as this metal is among the best conductors of electricity. The metal is used in high-, medium-, and low-voltage power networks. Chart 7The Power Sector Will Be The Main Driver Of Chinese Copper Demand Authorities will ensure a rapid expansion of renewable energy like wind power and solar power, as well as continue construction of smart power grids as the country strives to achieve its ambitious targets for 2030 peak carbon dioxide emissions and 2060 net-zero carbon dioxide emissions. Investment in the new and old power sector grew by about 4% y/y in nominal terms in the past 12 months (Chart 7). Production of power generation equipment output has risen by 8% y/y in real terms during the same period. All together, we forecast that the copper consumption from the power sector will grow by approximately 5% year on year both this year and next year. Chart 8Mean-Reversion IN The Appliance Sector The output of air conditioner, freezer and refrigerator production are all currently in contraction (Chart 8). The global “stay-at-home” economy significantly boosted Chinese exports of air conditioners, freezers, and refrigerators in 2020 and 2021. These appliances are all durable goods, and consumers who had already purchased them are unlikely to buy again this year and next year. Thus, we expect a 3% contraction in copper use this year and a slight growth of 2% next year from this industry Capital expenditures in the transportation network will improve from current zero growth, and production of traditional automobiles may increase again (Chart 9). Meanwhile, NEV output and construction of charging poles will continue booming (Chart 10). NEV uses more copper per car than the traditional autos, and charging poles also use copper. Putting all this together, we forecast a 3% and 4% year-on-year growth of copper consumption in the transportation sector in 2022 and 2023, respectively. Assuming there will be two million more NEVs this year, copper use will increase by an additional 160,000 tons, equaling to about a 1.2% increase in Chinese copper consumption. Chart 9Copper Demand From The Transportation Sector: Supported By Rebounding Traditional Auto Sales... Chart 10...As Well As Surging NEV Sales Copper or copper base alloys are used in printed circuit boards, electronic connectors, as well as in many semiconductor products. The tech-related new infrastructure, which includes information transmission, software, and information technology services, such as 5G networks, industrial internet, and data centers, will remain the government’s focus in the coming years. Tech-related new infrastructure investment increased by 20% year on year in the January – June period (Chart 11). We expect year-on-year copper usage growth in this sector to be 15% in 2022 and 12% in 2023. Chart 11Copper Demand Will Benefit From Strong Tech Investment Chart 12Chinese Property Market Is Negative For Copper Demand   The Chinese property market is in deep trouble. Our broad measure of China’s building construction activity/building area starts contracted 15% year on year in the second quarter of this year, and completions grew only moderately at 5% during the same period (Chart 12). Assuming half of this sector’s usage is in building area starts and the other half in completions, we expect the copper consumption in this sector to contract by 10% y/y in 2022. Next year, we expect the contraction to narrow to 5% as the government implements policies to support completions. Bottom Line: Chinese copper demand will increase moderately by 3% in 2022 and 4% in 2023. Investment Implications The global copper market is moving towards a surplus. This is one of reasons behind the red metal’s 30% price plunge since March 4, 2022. Copper inventories on global exchanges are low. Yet, that is not a sufficient reason to be bullish on copper prices as we elaborate in Box 1. Box 1 What About Copper Inventories? We believe inventory data released by exchanges – LME, COMEX and Shanghai Futures Exchange - do not provide a full picture of copper inventories. First, troughs in copper inventories – often but not always – coincide with peaks in copper prices and tops in inventories with bottoms in their prices (Chart 13). Hence, low inventory levels are not a reason to be bullish on copper prices. Chart 13Level of Copper Inventories In Exchanges Is Not A Good Forward-looking Indicator For Prices Second, inventory data from commodity exchanges may overstate the supply tightness as there might have been some build-up in unreported inventories. The basis is that many end-users (companies) around the world might purchase copper for the purposes of hoarding and speculation. These inventories are not counted in the data published by commodity exchanges.   Chart 14Copper: Bearish Sentiment Is Not Extreme Yet Net speculative positions of copper in the US as a share of total open interest have already tanked to near multi-year low levels (Chart 14, top panel). However, bearish sentiment is still far from the extreme level (Chart 14, bottom panel). Putting all together, copper prices are vulnerable to the downside over the next 6 to 12 months. We expect a 15%-20% downside in copper prices from the current level. Shares prices of copper miners always move closely with red metal prices. Equity portfolios should underweight copper miners.   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1     The proposed tax reform applies to copper producers of more than 50,000 tons and combines the ad-valorem component based on the copper price with a tax based on mining operating margins (MOM). The ad-valorem component has two regimes depending on whether the production volume is above or below 200,000 tons. For the larger producers, the effective rate applied will move in a range of 1% to 4% of revenue depending on the copper price, while below 200,000 tons the rate will be between 1.0% and 1.6% of revenue. Source: "Proposed Tax Reform Weakens Cost Positions for Chilean Miners,” Fitch Ratings, July 7, 2022, www.fitchratings.com. Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations

Special Report

Executive Summary Iran Reaches Nuclear Breakout The next geopolitical crisis will stem from the Middle East. The US, Russia, and China are striving for greater influence there and Iran’s nuclear quest is reaching a critical juncture. The risk of US-Israeli attacks against Iran remains 40% over the medium term and will rise sharply if Iran attempts to construct a deliverable nuclear device. Saudi Arabia may increase oil production but only if global demand holds up, which OPEC will assess at its August 3 meeting. Global growth risks will prevail in the short term and reduce its urgency. Russia will continue to squeeze supplies of energy and food for the outside world. The restart of Nord Stream 1 and the Turkey-brokered grain export proposal are unreliable signals. Russia’s aim is victory in Ukraine and any leverage will be used. The US may be done with the Middle East but the Middle East may not be done with the US. Structurally we remain bullish on gold and European defense stocks but we are booking 17% and 18% gains on our current trades. The deterioration in global growth and likely pullback in inflation will temporarily undercut these trades. Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG GOLD (CLOSED) 2019-06-12 17.1% LONG EUROPEAN AEROSPACE & DEFENSE / EUROPEAN TECH EQUITIES (CLOSED) 2022-03-18 17.9% Bottom Line: Global demand is weakening, which will weigh on bond yields and commodities. Yet underlying oil supply constraints persist – and US-Iran conflict will exacerbate global stagflation. Feature Chart 1Equity Volatility And Oil Price Volatility US President Joe Biden visited Saudi Arabia last week in a belated attempt to make amends with OPEC, increase oil production, and reduce inflation ahead of the midterm election. Biden also visited Israel to deter Iran, which is the next geopolitical crisis that markets are underrating. Meanwhile Russian President Vladimir Putin went to Iran on his second trip outside of Russia since this year’s invasion of Ukraine. Putin sought an ally in his conflict with the West, while also negotiating with Turkish President Recep Erdogan, who sought to position himself as a regional power broker. In this report we analyze Biden’s and Putin’s trips and what they mean for the global economy and macro investors. Macroeconomics is bearish for oil in the short term but geopolitics is bullish for oil in the short-to-medium term. The result is volatility (Chart 1). OPEC May Pump More Oil But Not On Biden’s Time Frame Here are the important developments from Biden’s trip: A credible threat against Iran: The US and Israel issued a joint declaration underscoring their red line against Iranian nuclear weaponization.1 Meanwhile the Iranians claimed to have achieved “nuclear breakout,” i.e. enough highly enriched uranium to construct a nuclear device (Chart 2). A balance-of-power coalition to contain Iran: Israel and Saudi Arabia improved relations on the margin. Each took action to build on the strategic détente between Israel and various Arab states that is embodied in the 2020 Abraham Accords.2 This strategic détente has staying power because it is a self-interested attempt by the various nations to protect themselves against common rivals, particularly Iran (Chart 3). Biden also tried to set up a missile defense network with Israel and the Arabs, although it was not finalized.3 Chart 2Iran Reaches Nuclear Breakout A reaffirmed US-Saudi partnership: The US and Saudi Arabia reaffirmed their partnership despite a rocky patch over the past decade. The rocky patch arises from US energy independence, China’s growth, and US attempts to normalize ties with Iran (Chart 4). These trends caused the Saudis to doubt US support and to view China as a strategic hedge. Chart 3Iran: Surrounded And Outgunned​​​​​​ President Biden came into office aiming to redo the Iran deal and halt arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Since then he has been chastened by high energy prices, a low approval rating, and hawkish Iranian policy. On this trip he came cap in hand to the Saudis in a classic example of geopolitical constraints. If the US-Iran deal is verifiably dead, then US-Saudi ties will improve sustainably. (Though of course the Saudis will still do business with China and even start trading with China in the renminbi.) What global investors want to know is whether the Saudis and OPEC will pump more oil. The answer is maybe someday. The Saudis will increase production to save the global business cycle but not the Democrats’ election cycle. They told Biden that they will increase production only if there is sufficient global demand. Global Brent crude prices have fallen by 6% since May, when Biden booked his trip, so the kingdom is not in a great rush to pump more. Its economy is doing well this year (Chart 5). Chart 4Drivers Of Saudi Anxiety​​​​​ Chart 5Saudis Won't Pump If Demand Is Weak​​​​​​ At the same time, if global demand rebounds, the Saudis will not want global supply constraints to generate punitive prices that cap the rebound or kill the business cycle. After all, a global recession would deplete Saudi coffers, set back the regime’s economic reforms, exacerbate social problems, and potentially stir up political dissent (Chart 6). Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyThird Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Hence the Saudis will not increase production substantially until they have assessed the global economy and discussed the outlook with the other members of the OPEC cartel in August and September, when the July 2021 agreement to increase production expires. We expect global demand to weaken as Europe and China continue to struggle. Our Commodity & Energy Strategist Bob Ryan argues that further escalation in the energy war between the EU and Russia could push prices above $220 per barrel by Q4 2023, whereas an economic collapse could push Brent down to $60 per barrel. His base case Brent price forecast remains $110 per barrel on average in 2022 and $117 per barrel in 2023 (Chart 7). Chart 6Saudis Will Pump To Prevent Recession​​​​​​ Chart 7BCA's July 2022 Oil Price Forecast​​​​​​ The geopolitical view suggests upside oil risks over the short-to-medium time frame but the macroeconomic view suggests that downside risks will be priced first. Bottom Line: Saudi Arabia may increase production but not at any US president’s beck and call. The Saudis are not focused on US elections, they benefit from the current level of prices, and they do not suffer if Republicans take Congress in November. The downside risk in oil prices stems from demand disappointments in global growth (especially China) rather than any immediate shifts in Saudi production discipline. Volatility will remain high. US-Iran Talks: Dying But Not Dead Yet In fact the Middle East underscores underlying and structural oil supply constraints despite falling global demand. While Iran is a perennial geopolitical risk, the world is reaching a critical juncture over the next couple of years. Investors should not assume that Iran can quietly achieve nuclear arms like North Korea. Since August 2021 we have argued that the US and Iran would fail to put back together the 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPA). This failure would in turn lead to renewed instability across the Middle East and sporadic supply disruptions as the different nations trade military threats and potentially engage in direct warfare. This forecast is on track after Biden’s and Putin’s trip – but we cannot yet say that it is fully confirmed. Biden’s joint declaration with Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid closed any daylight that existed between the US and Israel. Given that there was some doubt about the intentions of Biden and the Democrats, it is now crystal clear that the US is determined to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons even if it requires military action. The US specifically said that it will use “all instruments of national power” to prevent that outcome. Chart 8Iran Not Forced To Capitulate Judging by the tone of the statement, the Israelis wrote the document and Biden signed it.4 Biden’s foreign policy emphasizes shoring up US alliances and partnerships, which means letting allies and partners set the line. Israel’s Begin Doctrine – which says that Israel is willing to attack unilaterally and preemptively to prevent a hostile neighbor from obtaining nuclear weapons – has been reinforced. The US is making a final effort to intimidate Iran into rejoining the deal. By clearly and unequivocally reiterating its stance on nuclear weapons, and removing doubts about its stance on Israel, there is still a chance that the Iranian calculus could change. This is possible notwithstanding Ayatollah Khamenei’s friendliness with Putin and criticisms of western deception.5 After all, why would the Iranians want to be attacked by the US and Israeli militaries? Iran will need to think very carefully about what it does next. Khamenei just turned 83 years old and is trying to secure the Islamic Republic’s power transition and survival after his death. Here are the risks: Iran’s economy, buoyed by the commodity cycle, is not so weak as to force Khamenei to capitulate. Back in 2015 oil prices had collapsed and his country was diplomatically isolated. Today the economy has somewhat weathered the storm of the US’s maximum pressure sanctions (Chart 8). Iran is in bad shape but it has not been brought to its knees. Another risk is that Khamenei believes the American public lacks the appetite for war. Americans say they are weary of Middle Eastern wars and do not feel particularly threatened by Iran. However, this would be a miscalculation. US war-weariness is nearing the end of its course. The US engages in a major military expedition roughly every decade. Americans are restless and divided – and the political elite fear populism – so a new foreign distraction is not as unlikely as the consensus holds. Moreover a nuclear Iran is not an idle threat but would trigger a regional nuclear arms race and overturn the US grand strategy of maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East (as in other regions). In short, the US government can easily mobilize the people to accept air strikes to prevent Iran from going nuclear because there is latent animosity toward Iran in both political parties (Chart 9). Chart 9Risk: Iran Overrates US War-Weariness Another risk is that Iran forges ahead believing that the US and Israel are unwilling or unable to attack and destroy its nuclear program. The western powers might opt for containment like they did with North Korea or they might attack and fail to eliminate the program. This is hard to believe but Iran clearly cannot accept US security guarantees as an alternative to a nuclear deterrent when it seeks regime survival. At the same time Russia is courting Iran, encouraging it to join forces against the American empire. Iran is planning to sell drones to Russia for use in Ukraine, while Russia is maintaining nuclear and defense cooperation with Iran. Putin’s trip highlighted a growing strategic partnership despite a low base of economic ties  (Chart 10).6 Chart 10Russo-Iranian Ties​​​​​​ Chart 11West Vulnerable To Middle East War While Russia does not have an interest in a nuclear-armed Iran, it is not afraid of Iran alone, and it would benefit enormously if the US and Israel got bogged down in a new war that destabilized the Middle East. Oil prices would rise, the US would be distracted, and Europe would be even more vulnerable (Chart 11). Chart 12China's Slowdown And Dependency On Middle East China’s interest is different. It would prefer for Iran to undermine the West by means of a subtle and long-term game of economic engagement rather than a destabilizing war in the region that would upset China’s already weak economy. However, Beijing will not join with the US against Iran, especially if Iran and Russia are aligned. Ultimately China needs to access Iranian energy reserves via overland routes so that it gains greater supply security vis-à-vis the American navy (Chart 12). Since June 2019, we have maintained 40% odds of a military conflict with Iran. The logic is outlined in Diagram 1, which we have not changed. Conflict can take various forms since the western powers prefer sabotage or cyber-attacks to outright assault. But in the end preventing nuclear weapons may require air strikes – and victory is not at all guaranteed. We are very close to moving to the next branch in Diagram 1, which would imply odds of military conflict rise from 40% to 80%. We are not making that call yet but we are getting nervous. Diagram 1Iran Nuclear Crisis: Decision Tree Moreover it is the saber rattling around this process – including an extensive Iranian campaign to deter attack – that will disrupt oil distribution and transport sooner rather than later. Bottom Line: The US and Iran could still find diplomatic accommodation to avoid the next step in our decision tree. Therefore we are keeping the odds of war at a subjective 40%. But we have reached a critical juncture. The next step in the process entails a major increase in the odds of air strikes. Putin’s Supply Squeeze Will Continue As we go to press, financial markets are reacting to President Putin’s marginal easing of Russian political pressure on food and energy supplies. First, Putin took steps toward a deal, proposed by Turkish President Erdogan, to allow Ukrainian grain exports to resume from the Black Sea. Second, Putin allowed a partial restart of the Nord Stream 1 natural gas pipeline, after a total cutoff occurred during the regular, annual maintenance period. However, these moves should be kept into perspective. Nord Stream 1 is still operating at only 40% of capacity. Russia reduced the flow by 60% after the EU agreed to impose a near-total ban on Russian oil exports by the end of the year. Russia is imposing pain on the European economy in pursuit of its strategic objectives and will continue to throttle Europe’s natural gas supply. Russia’s aims are as follows: (1) break up European consensus on Russia and prevent a natural gas embargo from being implemented in future (2) pressure Europe into negotiating a ceasefire in Ukraine that legitimizes Russia’s conquests (3) underscore Russia’s new red line against NATO military deployments in Finland and Sweden. Europe, for its part, will continue to diversify its natural gas sources as rapidly as possible to reduce Russia’s leverage. The European Commission is asking countries to decrease their natural gas consumption by 15% from August to March. This will require rationing regardless of Russia’s supply squeeze. The collapse in trust incentivizes Russia to use its leverage while it still has it and Europe to try to take that leverage away. The economic costs are frontloaded, particularly this winter. The same goes for the Turkish proposal to resume grain exports. Russia will continue to blockade Ukraine until it achieves its military objectives. The blockade will be tightened or loosened as necessary to achieve diplomatic goals. Part of the reason Russia invaded in the first place was to seize control of Ukraine’s coast and hold the country’s ports, trade, and economy hostage. Bottom Line: Russia’s relaxation of food and energy flows is not reliable. Flows will wax and wane depending on the status of strategic negotiations with the West. Europe’s economy will continue to suffer from a Russia-induced supply squeeze until Russia achieves a ceasefire in Ukraine. So will emerging markets that depend on grain imports, such as Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. Investment Takeaways The critical juncture has arrived for our Iran view. If Iran does not start returning to nuclear compliance soon, then a fateful path of conflict will be embarked upon. The Saudis will not give Biden more oil barrels just yet. But they may end up doing that if global demand holds up and the US reassures them that their regional security needs will be met. First, the path for oil over the next year will depend on the path of global demand. Our view is negative, with Europe heading toward recession, China struggling to stimulate its economy effectively, and the Fed unlikely to achieve a soft landing. Second, the path of conflict with Iran will lead to a higher frequency of oil supply disruptions across the Middle East that will start happening very quickly after the US-Iran talks are pronounced dead. In other words, oil prices will be volatile in a stagflationary environment. In addition, while inflation might roll over for various reasons, it is not likely to occur because of any special large actions by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are waiting on global cues. Of these, China is the most important. We are booking a 17% gain on our long gold trade as real rates rise and China’s economy deteriorates (Chart 13). This is in line with our Commodity & Energy Strategy, which is also stepping aside on gold for now. Longer term we remain constructive as we see a secular rise in geopolitical risk and persistent inflation problems. Chart 13Book Gains On Gold ... For Now We are booking an 18% gain on our long European defense / short European tech trade. Falling bond yields will benefit European tech (Chart 14). We remain bullish on European and global defense stocks. Chart 14Book Gains On EU Defense Vs Tech ... For Now​​​​​​ Chart 15Markets Underrate Middle East Geopolitical Risk ​​​​​ Stay long US equities relative to UAE equities. Middle Eastern geopolitical risk is underrated (Chart 15). Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022, whitehouse.gov. 2     Israel and the US will remove international peacekeepers from the formerly Egyptian Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir, which clears the way for Saudi Arabia to turn them into tourist destinations. Saudi Arabia also removed its tight airspace restrictions on Israel, enabling civilian Israeli airlines to fly through Saudi airspace on normal basis. Of course, Saudi allowance for Israeli military flights to pass through Saudi airspace would be an important question in any future military operation against Iran. 3     The US has long wanted regional missile defense integration. The Biden administration is proposing “integrated air defense cooperation” that would include Israel as well as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). A regional “air and missile defense architecture” would counter drones and missiles from rival states and non-state actors such as Iran and its militant proxies. Simultaneously the Israelis are putting forward the proposed Middle East Air Defense Alliance (MEAD) in meetings with the same GCC nations. Going forward, Iran’s nuclear ambitions will give more impetus to these attempts to cooperate on air defense. 4     This is apparent from the hard line on Iran and the relatively soft line on Russia in the document. Israel is wary of taking too hard of a line against Russia because of its security concerns in Syria where Russian forces are present. See footnote 1 above. 5     Khamenei called for long-term cooperation between Russia and Iran; he justified Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a defense against NATO encroachment; he called for the removal of the US dollar as the global reserve currency. See “Khamenei: Tehran, Moscow must stay vigilant against Western deception,” Israel Hayom, July 20, 2022, israelhayom.com. 6     Russia’s natural gas champion Gazprom signed an ostensible $40 billion memorandum of understanding with Iran’s National Oil Company to develop gas fields and pipelines. See Nadeen Ebrahim, “Iran and Russia’s friendship is more complicated than it seems,” CNN, July 20, 2022, cnn.com. However, while there are longstanding obstacles to Russo-Iranian cooperation, the West’s tough new sanctions on Russia and EU diversification will make Moscow more willing to invest in Iran. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix